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Foreword
The main purpose of the British Documents on the End of Empire Project (BDEEP)
is to publish documents from British official archives on the ending of colonial and
associated rule and on the context in which this took place. In 1945, aside from the
countries of present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Burma, Britain had over
fifty formal dependencies; by the end of 1965 the total had been almost halved and by
1985 only a handful remained. The ending of Britain’s position in these formal
dependencies was paralleled by changes in relations with states in an informal
empire. The end of empire in the period at least since 1945 involved a change also in
the empire as something that was more than the sum of its parts and as such formed
an integral part of Britain’s domestic affairs and international relations. In
publishing official British documents on the end of empire this project is, to a
degree, the successor to the two earlier series of published documents concerning
the end of British rule in India and Burma which were edited by Professors Mansergh
and Tinker respectively. The successful completion of The transfer of power and The
struggle for independence,1 both of which were based on British records, emphasised
the need for similar published collections of documents important to the history of
the final stages of Britain’s association with other dependencies in Africa, the Middle
East, the Caribbean, South-East Asia and the Pacific. These documents are crucial
research tools for scholars both from sovereign independent states which emerged
from colonial rule as well as those from Britain itself. BDEEP is also set in the much
wider context of the efforts made by successive British governments to locate
Britain’s position in an international order. Here the empire, both in its formal and
informal senses, is viewed as an instrument of the domestic, foreign and defence
policy of successive British governments. The project is therefore concerned with the
ending of colonial rule in individual territories as seen from the British side at one
level, and the broader political, economic and strategic considerations involved in
that at another.
Despite the similarities, however, BDEEP differs in significant ways from its
predecessors in terms both of presentation and content. The project is of greater
magnitude than that undertaken by Professor Mansergh for India. Four major dif-
ferences can be identified. First, the ending of colonial rule within a dependent
empire took place over a much longer period of time, extending into the final
years of the twentieth century while having its roots in the Second World War
and before. Secondly, the empire consisted of a large number of territories, vary-
ing in area, population, wealth and in many other ways, each with its own individ-
ual problems but often with their futures linked to those of neighbouring
1 Nicholas Mansergh et al, eds, Constitutional relations between Britain and India: the transfer of power
1942–47, 12 vols, (London, 1970–1983); Hugh Tinker, ed, Constitutional relations between Britain and
Burma: the struggle for independence 1944–1948, 2 vols, (London, 1983–1984).
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territories and the growing complexity surrounding the colonial empire. Thirdly,
while for India the documentary record for certain matters of high policy could be
encapsulated within a relatively straightforward ‘country’ study, in the case of the
colonial empire the documentary record is more diffuse because of the plethora of
territories and their scattered location. Finally, the documents relating to the end-
ing of colonial rule are not conveniently located within one leading department of
state but rather are to be found in several of them. As the purpose of the project
is to publish documents relating to the end of empire from the extensive range
and quantity of official British records, private collections and other categories of
non-official material are not regarded as principal documentary sources. In
BDEEP, selections from non-official material will be used only in exceptional
cases to fill gaps where they exist in the available official record. 
In recognition of these differences and also of the fact that the end of empire
involves consideration of a range of issues which operated at a much wider level
than that normally associated with the ending of colonial rule in a single country,
BDEEP is structured in two main series along with a third support series. Series A
represents the general volumes in which, for successive British governments, doc-
uments relating to the empire as a whole are be published. Series B represents
the country or territory volumes and provides territorial studies of how, from a
British government perspective, former colonies and dependencies achieved their
independence and countries which were part of an informal empire regained their
autonomy. In addition to the two main documentary series, a third series—series
C—has been published in the form of handbooks to the records of the former
colonial empire which are deposited at the Public Record Office (PRO). Series C
consists of two volumes which form an integral part of BDEEP and also serve as
PRO guides to the records. Together they enable scholars and others wishing to
follow the record of the ending of colonial rule and empire to pursue their
inquiries beyond the published record provided by the general studies in series A
and the country studies in series B. Volume one of the handbooks, a revised and
updated version of The records of the Colonial and Dominions Offices by R B
Pugh which was first published in 1964, is entitled Records of the Colonial Office,
Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations Office and Commonwealth Office
(1995). It covers over two hundred years of activity down to 1968 when the
Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office to form the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. Volume two, entitled Records of the Cabinet, Foreign
Office, Treasury and other records (1998), focuses more specifically on
twentieth-century departmental records and also includes references to the
records of inter-departmental committees, commissions of inquiry and interna-
tional organisations. The two volumes were prepared under the direction and
supervision of Dr Anne Thurston, at the time honorary research fellow at the
Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, and now execu-
tive director of the International Records Management Trust. 
In the two main series the research is organised in stages. Stage one, covering
the years 1925–1957, is now complete and consists of three general volumes and
five country volumes, collectively published in twenty-one individual parts. In
series A there are volumes on Imperial policy and colonial practice 1925-–1945 in
two parts (1996), The Labour government and the end of empire 1945–1951 in
four parts (1992), and The Conservative government and the end of empire
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1951–1957 in three parts (1994). In series B there are volumes on Ghana in two
parts (1992), Sri Lanka in two parts (1997), Malaya in three parts (1995), Egypt
and the defence of the Middle East in three parts (1998) and the Sudan in two
parts (1998). Starting in 1999, the project began publishing volumes in a second
stage which covers the period 1957–1964. Here there are five volumes, a general
volume on the Conservative government and the end of empire 1957–1964 in two
parts (2000), and country volumes on the West Indies in one part (1999), Nigeria
in two parts (2001), Kenya and Malaysia.
The criteria which have been used in selecting documents for inclusion in indi-
vidual volumes are explained in the introductions written by the specialist editors.
These introductions are more substantial and contextual than those in previous
series. Each volume also lists the PRO sources which have been searched.
However, it may be helpful to outline the more general guiding principles which
have been employed. BDEEP editors pursue several lines of inquiry. There is first
the end of empire in a broad high policy sense in which the empire is viewed in
terms of Britain’s position as a world power and of the inter-relationship between
what derives from this position and developments within the colonial dependen-
cies. Here Britain’s relations with the dependencies of the empire are set in the
wider defence, economic and foreign policy contexts of Britain’s relations with the
United States, with Europe, and with the Commonwealth and United Nations.
Secondly, there is investigation into colonial policy in its strict sense. Here the
emphasis is on those areas which were specifically - but not exclusively - the con-
cern of the leading department. In the period before the administrative amalgama-
tions of the 1960s,2 the leading department of the British government for most of
the dependencies was the Colonial Office; for a minority it was either the
Dominions Office and its successor, the Commonwealth Relations Office, or the
Foreign Office. Colonial policy included questions of economic and social develop-
ment, questions of governmental institutions and constitutional structures, and
administrative questions concerning the future of the civil and public services and
of the defence forces in a period of transition from European to indigenous con-
trol. Finally there is inquiry into the development of political and social forces
within colonies, the response to these and the transfer of governmental authority
and of legal sovereignty from Britain to its colonial dependencies as these
processes were understood and interpreted by the British government. Here it
should be emphasised that the purpose of BDEEP is not to document the history
of colony politics or nationalist movements in any particular territory. Given the
purpose of the project and the nature of much of the source material, the place of
colony politics in BDEEP is conditioned by the extent to which an awareness of
local political situations played an overt part in influencing major policy decisions
made in Britain. 
Although in varying degrees and from different perspectives, elements of these
various lines of inquiry appear in both the general and the country series. The
aim in both is to concentrate on the British record by selecting documents which
illustrate those policy issues which were deemed important by ministers and offi-
2 The Colonial Office merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office in 1966 to form the Common-
wealth Office. The Commonwealth Office merged with the Foreign Office in 1968 to form the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office.
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cials at the time. General volumes do not normally treat in any detail of matters
which will be fully documented in the country volumes but some especially signif-
icant documents do appear in both series. The process of selection involves an
inevitable degree of sifting and subtraction. Issues which in retrospect appear to
be of lesser significance or to be ephemeral have been omitted. The main example
concerns the extensive quantity of material devoted to appointments and terms of
service—salaries, gradings, allowances, pension rights and compensation—within
the colonial and related services. It is equally important to stress certain negative
aspects of the official documentary record. Officials in London were sometimes
not in a position to address potentially significant issues because the information
was not available. Much in this respect depended on the extent of the documenta-
tion sent to London by the different colonial administrations. Once the stage of
internal self-government had been reached, or where there was a dyarchy, the
flow of detailed local information to London began to diminish. 
Selection policy has been influenced by one further factor, namely access to the
records at the PRO. Unlike the India and Burma series and the current Foreign
and Commonwealth Office series of Documents on British Policy Overseas
(DBPO), BDEEP is not an official project. In practice this means that while editors
have privileged access (in the form of research facilities and requisitioning proce-
dures) to the records at the PRO, they do not have unrestricted access. For files
which at the time a volume is in preparation are either subject to extended clo-
sures beyond the statutory thirty years or retained in the originating department
under section 3(4) of the Public Records Act of 1958, editors are subject to the
same restrictions as all other researchers. Apart from cases where files or series of
files are withheld, official weeding processes now tend to remove sentences or
paragraphs from public view, rather than the whole document; such omissions are
indicated in footnotes. To date access has not impeded the research undertaken by
the project to any significant degree, and the project has been successful in secur-
ing the release of a number of hitherto withheld documents from the Historical
Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office. 
A thematic arrangement of the documents has been adopted for the general
volumes in series A. The country volumes in series B follow a chronological
arrangement; in this respect they adopt the same approach as was used in the
India and Burma series. For each volume in both series A and B a summary list of
the documents included is provided. The headings to BDEEP documents, which
have been editorially standardised, present the essential information. Together
with the sequence number, the file reference (in the form of the PRO call-up
number and any internal pagination or numeration) and the date of the document
appear on the first line.3 The second and subsequent lines record the subject of
the document, the type of document (letter, memorandum, telegram etc), the
originator (person or persons, committee, department) and the recipient (if any).
A subject entry in a heading in single quotation marks denotes the title of a
document as it appears in the original. An entry in square brackets denotes a sub-
3 The PRO call-up number precedes the comma in the references cited. In the case of documents from
FO 371, the major Foreign Office political class, the internal numeration refers to the jacket number of
the file.
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ject indicator composed by the editor. This latter device has been employed in
cases where no title is given in the original or where the original title is too
unwieldy to reproduce in its entirety. Security classifications and, in the case of
telegrams, times of despatch and receipt, have generally been omitted. In the
headings to documents and the contents lists, ministers are identified by the
name of the office-holder, not the title of the office (ie, Mr Macleod, not secretary
of state for the colonies).4 In the same contexts, officials are identified by their
initials and surname. In a general volumes, ambassadors, governors, high com-
missioners and other embassy or high commission staff are cited in the form Sir
H Foot (Cyprus). Footnotes to documents appearing below the rule are editorial;
those above the rule, or where no rule is printed, are part of the original docu-
ment. Each volume provides an initial summary list of which principal offices
were held by whom, and a separate series of biographical notes (at the end) for
major figures who appear in the documents. Other figures are identified in editor-
ial footnotes on the occasion of first appearance. Link-notes, written by the vol-
ume editor and indented in square brackets between the heading and the
beginning of a document, are often used to explain the context of a document.
Technical detail or extraneous material has been extracted from a number of doc-
uments. In such cases omission dots have been inserted in the text and the docu-
ment is identified in the heading as an extract. Occasional omission dots have also
been used to excise purely mechanical chain-of-command executive instructions
and some redundant internal referencing has been removed, though much of it
remains in place, for the benefit of researchers. No substantive material relating
to policy-making has been excised from the documents. In general the aim has
been to reproduce documents in their entirety but where available space is a
major constraint on editors, a consideration which applies particularly in the case
of general volumes, where the documentation is voluminous, this is not always
possible, and some purely factual information may be omitted. It must also be
emphasised in this context that the BDEEP volumes do not remove the necessity
for researchers to study the original records themselves. The footnote reference
‘not printed’ is used only in cases where a specified enclosure or an annex to a
document has not been included. Unless a specific cross-reference or note of
explanation is provided, however, it can be assumed that other documents referred
to in the text of the documents included have not been reproduced. Obvious typ-
ing errors in the original are in the main silently corrected, but abbreviations and
contractions stand. Each volume has a list of abbreviations together with a con-
solidated index, and country volumes include a chronology of principal events.
One radical innovation, compared with previous Foreign Office or India and
Burma series, is that BDEEP reproduces many more minutes by ministers and
officials.
Crown copyright material is used by permission of the Public Record Office
under licence from the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office. All refer-
ences and dates are given in the form recommended in PRO guidelines.
* * * *
4 This is an editorial convention, following DBPO practice. Very few memoranda issued in their name were
actually written by ministers themselves, but normally drafted by officials.
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Formally launched in 1987, BDEEP has been based since its inception at the
Institute of Commonwealth Studies. The work of the project is supervised by a
Project Committee chaired by Professor Andrew Porter, Rhodes professor of impe-
rial history in the University of London. Professor Porter succeeded Professor
Anthony Low, formerly Smuts professor of the history of the Commonwealth in
the University of Cambridge, who retired in November 1994. Professor Michael
Crowder became the first general editor while holding a visiting professorship in
the University of London and a part-time position at Amherst College,
Massachusetts. Following his untimely death in 1988, Professor Crowder was
replaced as general editor by Professor David Murray, pro vice-chancellor and pro-
fessor of government at the Open University, who played a critical role in estab-
lishing a secure financial base for the project and in negotiating contracts with
the volume editors and the publisher. His invaluable advice and expertise in deal-
ing with the early manuscripts are acknowledged with particular gratitude. Mrs
Anita Burdett was appointed as project secretary and research assistant. She was
succeeded in September 1989 by Dr Stephen Ashton who previously worked with
Professors Mansergh and Tinker during the final stages of the India and Burma
series. Dr Ashton replaced Professor Murray as project director and general editor
in 1993. 
The project benefited from an initial pump-priming grant from the British
Academy. Thanks are due to the secretary and Board of the Academy for this grant
and for the decision of the British Academy to adopt BDEEP as one of its major
projects. The Academy made a further award in 1996 which enabled the project to
employ a research assistant on a fixed term contract. The Managers of the Smuts
Memorial Fund in the University of Cambridge are also to be acknowledged. They
made possible the workshop from which the project developed and they have since
provided a further grant for work on two of the stage two volumes. The principal
funding for the project in stages one and two has been provided by the
Leverhulme Trust and the volumes are a tribute to the support provided by the
Trustees. A major debt of gratitude is owed to the Trustees. In addition to their
generous grants to cover the major costs of both stages, the Trustees agreed to a
subsequent request to extend the duration of the first grant, and also provided a
supplementary grant which enabled the project to secure Dr Ashton’s appoint-
ment. It is thanks largely to the Leverhulme Trust that BDEEP has developed into
one of the country’s most successful historical research projects.
Members of the Project Committee, who meet annually at the Institute of
Commonwealth Studies, have provided valuable advice and much needed encour-
agement. Professor Low, the first chairman of the Committee, made a singular
contribution, initiating the first exploratory meeting at Cambridge in 1985 and
presiding over subsequent developments in his customary constructive but unob-
trusive manner. Professor Porter continues in a similar vein and his leadership
and experience are much appreciated by the general editor. The director and the
staff of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies have provided administrative sup-
port and the congenial surroundings within which the general editor works. The
editors of volumes in both stages one have benefited considerably from the
researches undertaken by Dr Anne Thurston and her assistants which resulted in
the publication of the two handbooks. Although BDEEP is not an official project,
the general editor wishes to acknowledge the support and co-operation received
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from the Historical Section of the Cabinet Office and the Records Department of
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He wishes also to record his appreciation
of the spirit of friendly co-operation received from the editors of DBPO. Dr Ronald
Hyam, editor in stage one of the general volume on the post-war Labour govern-
ment and co-editor of the stage two volume on the Conservative government,
played an important role in the compilation of the house-style adopted by BDEEP
and his contribution is acknowledged with gratitude. Thanks also are due to The
Stationery Office for assuming publishing responsibility and for their expert advice
on matters of design and production. Last, but by no means least, the contribu-
tion of the chief executive and keeper of the records and the staff, both curatorial
and administrative, at the PRO must be emphasised. Without the facilities and
privileges afforded to BDEEP editors at the PRO, the project would not be viable.
S R Ashton
Institute of Commonwealth Studies
October 2000
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Abbreviations: Parts I–II
ACB African Continental Bank
ADO Assistant District Officer
AG Action Group
AMOO Assistant Medical Officers
ANTUF All-Nigeria Trade Union Federation
Ass sec Assistant secretary
AVOO Assistant Veterinary Officers
BAT British and American Tobacco
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BDEEP British Documents on the End of Empire Project
BDPP Benin Delta People’s Party
BOT Board of Trade
CAMDEV Cameroons Development Corporation
CAST College of Arts, Science and Technology
CCTA Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa
CBE Commander of the Order of the British Empire
CDC Colonial/Commonwealth Development Corporation
CDFC Commonwealth Development Finance Company
CD&W Colonial Development and Welfare (Act)
CENTO Central Treaty Organisation
CID Criminal Investigation Department
CIGS Chief of Imperial General Staff
CMS Church Missionary Society
CO Colonial Office
Col Colonial
COLA Cost of Living Allowance
Con Conservative (Party)
COR Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers
COS Chiefs of Staff
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CP Communist Party
CPP Convention People’s Party
cr created
CRO Commonwealth Relations Office
CS Chief Secretary
CSD Chief Secretary’s Department
Dept Department
DMS Director of Medical Services
DO District Officer/Dominions Office
DOO District Officers
DPNC Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons
ECA Economic Commission for Africa (UN)
ECN Electricity Corporation of Nigeria
EP Eastern provinces
EPC Economic Policy Committee (Cabinet)
ERDC Eastern Region Development Corporation
ERPDB Eastern Regional Production Development Board
Exco Executive Council
FBI Federation of British Industries
F(C)O Foreign (and Commonwealth) Office
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation (UN)
FAMA Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa (South of Sahara)
GC Gold Coast
GCE General Certificate of Education
GOC General officer commanding
Gov Governor
Gov-gen Governor-general
HE His Excellency
HMG His/Her Majesty’s government
HMOCS Her Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service
HMPSSFA Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
H of C House of Commons
H of C Debates House of Commons Debates (Hansard)
HOGM (Commonwealth) Heads of Government meeting
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IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World
Bank)
ICA International Co-operation Administration (USA)
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICS Indian Civil Service
IDC Imperial Defence College
IGP Inspector-general of police
IRD International Relations Department (CO)
IS Internal Security
ITP Ilorin Talaka Parapo
IUC Inter-University Council
JIC Joint Intelligence Committee
JSC Joint Select Committee
KBE Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire
KC King’s Counsel
KCMG Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George
KNC Kamerun National Congress
KNDP Kamerun National Democratic Party
KPP Kamerun People’s Party
Kt Knight bachelor
Lab Labour (Party)
Leg Co Legislative Council
L-G Lieutenant-Governor
MBPP Middle Belt Peoples Party
MOD Ministry of Defence
MOF Ministry of Food
MOO Medical officers
MP Member of parliament
MZL Middle Zone League
NA Native authority/Native administration
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC(S) Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (Service)
NCNC National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
NCO Non-Commissioned Officer
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NEC National Emergency Committee/National Economic Council
NEPU Northern Elements Progressive Union
NIP National Independence Party
NKDP Northern Kamerun Democratic Party
NNDP Nigerian National Democratic Party
NNFL Nigerian National Federation of Labour
NP Northern provinces
NPC Northern People’s Congress
NPF Nigeria Police Force
NYM Nigerian Youth Movement 
OAG (N) Officer administering the government (of Nigeria)
OIC Order-in-Council
OHMS On His/Her Majesty’s Service
OKP One Kamerun Party
OPEX United Nations Technical Assistance Programme
P and T Posts and Telegraphs Department
PC Privy Council
PIN Political Intelligence Notes
PRO Public Record Office/Public Relations Officer
PSC Public Service Commission
PQ Parliamentary Question
PWD Public Works Department
QC Queen’s Counsel
RAF Royal Air Force
RASC Royal Army Service Corps
RDA Rassemblement Démocratique Africain
Regs Regulations
REME Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
RN Royal Navy
RNC Royal Naval College
RWAFF Royal West African Frontier Force
S & P Secret and Personal
SEATO South-East Asia Treaty Organisation
Sec Secretary
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SG Self-government
S of S Secretary of state
T Treasury
Tel Telegram
TUC Trades Union Congress
UAC United Africa Company
UDC Urban District Council
UK United Kingdom
UMBC United Middle Belt Congress
UNIP United National Independence Party 
UN(O) United Nations (Organisation)
UNP United National Party
UPC Union des Populations du Cameroun
USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VCIGS Vice Chief of Imperial General Staff
VOO Veterinary Officers
WAASC West African Army Service Corps
WAC West Africa Conference/Council
WAD West Africa Department
WAEME West African Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
WASU West African Students Union
WFTU World Federation of Trades Unions
WIDF Womens’ International Democratic Federation
WRPDB Western Region Production Development Board
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Principal Holders of Offices 1943–1953: 
Part I
UNITED KINGDOM
1. Ministers1
(a) Wartime coalition (10 May 1940–23 May 1945) and Conservative caretaker
government (23 May–26 July 1945)
Prime minister Mr W L S Churchill (10 May 1940)
Secretary of state for the colonies Mr O F G Stanley (24 Nov 1942)
Parliamentary under-secretary Duke of Devonshire (1 Jan 1943) 
of state for the colonies
Secretary of state for Mr C R Attlee (19 Feb 1942)
dominion affairs Viscount Cranborne (24 Sept 1943)
(b) Labour governments (26 July 1945–26 Oct 1951)
Prime minister Mr C R Attlee (26 July 1945)
Secretary of state for the colonies Mr G H Hall (3 Aug 1945)
Mr A Creech Jones (4 Oct 1946)
Mr J Griffiths (28 Feb 1950)
Minister of state for the colonies Earl of Listowel (4 Jan 1948)
Mr J Dugdale (28 Feb 1950)
Parliamentary under-secretary Mr A Creech Jones (4 Aug 1945)
of state for the colonies Mr I B Thomas (4 Oct 1946)
Mr D R Rees-Williams (7 Oct 1947)
Mr T F Cook (2 Mar 1950)
Secretary of state for dominion Viscount Addison (3 Aug 1945)
affairs (from 1947, Mr P J Noel-Baker (7 Oct 1947)
Commonwealth relations) Mr P C Gordon-Walker (28 Feb 1950)
1 Details to 15 July 1953, the concluding date for Part I.
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(c) Conservative government (from 26 Oct 1951)
Prime minister Mr W S Churchill (26 Oct 1951)
Secretary of state for the colonies Mr O Lyttelton (27 Oct 1951)
Minister of state for the colonies Mr A T Lennox-Boyd (2 Nov 1951)
Mr H L D’A Hopkinson (7 May 1952)
Parliamentary under-secretary Earl of Munster (5 Nov 1951)
of state for the colonies
Secretary of state for Commonwealth Lord Ismay (28 Oct 1951)
relations Marquess of Salisbury (24 Mar 1952)
2. Civil servants
(a) Secretary to the Cabinet Sir Norman Brook (1947–1962)
(b) Colonial Office
(i) Permanent under-secretary Sir George Gater (1942–1947)
of state Sir Thomas Lloyd (1947–1956)
(ii) Deputy under-secretary Sir William Battershill (1942–1945)
of state Sir Arthur Dawe (1945–1947)
Sir Sydney Caine (1947–1948)       joint
Sir Charles Jeffries (1947–1956)}
joint
Sir Hilton Poynton (1948–1959)   }
(iii) Assistant under-secretary A J Dawe (1938–1943)
of state, responsible G H Creasy (1943–1946)
for the West Africa G F Seel (1946)
Department and, from 1947, T I K Lloyd (1946–1947)
the Africa Division A B Cohen (1947–1951)
W L Gorell Barnes (1952–1954)
(iv) Assistant secretary, O G R Williams (1938–1946)
head of the West Africa K E Robinson (1946–1947)
Department L H Gorsuch (1947–1951)
T B Williamson (1952–1958)
(c) Commonwealth Relations Office
(i) Permanent under-secretary Sir Percivale Liesching (1949–1955)
of state
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(ii) Deputy under-secretary (Sir) Saville Garner (1953–1956)
of state
(iii) Assistant under-secretary R R Sedgwick (1949-–1954)
of state
NIGERIA
1. Governors Sir A F Richards (18 Dec 1943)
Sir J Macpherson (14 Apr 1948)
2. Chief commissioners
(from 1951 lieutenant-
governors of regions)
Eastern Provinces (Sir) F Carr (1943–1948)
Cmdr (Sir) J G Pyke-Nott (1948–1952)
(Sir) C Pleass (1952–1956)
Northern Provinces (Sir) J Patterson (1943–1947)
Capt (Sir) E Thompstone (1947–1951)
Sir B Sharwood-Smith (1952–1957)
Western Provinces (Sir) G Whiteley (1939–1946)
Capt (Sir) T Hoskyns-Abrahall (1946–
1951)
Sir H Marshall (1951–1954)
3. Commissioner of the Cameroons E J Gibbons (1949–1956)
4. Chief secretary C C Woolley (1938–1941)
A W G H Grantham (1941–1944)
G F T Colby (acting, 1945)
G Beresford Stooke (1945–1947)
H M Foot (1947–1951)
vacant
A E T Benson (1951–1954)
5. Executive Council (1946–1951)
Governor
Chief secretary
Chief commissioner, Eastern Provinces
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Chief commissioner, Northern Provinces
Chief commissioner, Western Provinces
Attorney-general G L Howe (1946–1950)
Financial secretary S Phillipson (1945–1948)
A W L Savage (1948–1949)
E Himsworth (1949–1952)
Director of medical services Dr J W P Harkness (–1946)
Dr G B Walker (1946–1951)
Director of education R A McL Davidson (1944–1951)
Appointed members: Sir Adeyemo Alakija
G H Avezathe
Alhaji Usuman Nagogo, Emir of Katsina 
Sir Hubert E Walker
Maj-gen C R A Swynnerton
E A Carr
Dr F A Ibiam
G I Obaseki
(Sir) K A Abayomi
Maj-gen C B Fairbanks
4. Council of ministers 1952
Minister of works Malam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa
Minister of social services Shettima Kashim
Minister of natural resources Alhaji Muhammadu Ribadu
Minister without portfolio Alhaji Usuman Nagogo, Emir of Katsina
Minister of lands, survey and Okoi Arikpo
development 
Minister of mines and power Eni Njoku
Minister of commerce and industry A C Nwapa
Minister without portfolio Dr E M L Endeley
Minister without portfolio Sir Adesoji Aderemi, Ooni of Ife
Minister of communications Chief Arthur Prest
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Minister of transport Chief Bode Thomas
Minister of labour Chief S L Akintola
Members ex-officio:
The governor 
The chief secretary
The lieutenant-governors of the 
three regions
The attorney-general A McKisack (1951–1956)
The financial secretary E Himsworth (1949–1952)
A R W Robertson (1953–1956)
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Chronological Table of Principal Events:
Parts I–II
1943
Dec Sir Arthur Richards assumes office as gov of Nigeria
1944
Aug Foundation of NCNC
Dec Richards’s constitutional proposals forwarded to CO
1945
Mar Richards’s proposals submitted to the Legislative Council
Mar Four ‘obnoxious’ ordinances passed
June General strike
July General election in Britain; Labour victory
July Banning of West African Pilot and Daily Comet
July Alleged assassination plot against Azikiwe
Aug George Hall appointed S of S for colonies
Dec Ten-year plan of development presented to the Legislative Council
1946
Jan Visit to Nigeria by Hall
Feb Inauguration of the Zikist movement
Feb Sir Sydney Phillipson appointed to review financial and administrative
procedures for local government
Apr Ten-year plan of development commences
Apr Tudor Davies report on the cost of living completed
Oct Arthur Creech Jones appointed S of S for colonies
Dec UNO General Assembly approves trusteeship agreement for the Cameroons
Dec Harragin Commission Report on salaries completed
1947
Jan Richards constitution comes into effect
Jan Inaugural sessions of regional Houses 
Feb Bristol Hotel incident
Mar Richards’s statement to the Legislative Council on racial discrimination
Aug NCNC delegation meets Creech Jones
Sept Legislative Council approves establishment of Nigerian Cocoa Marketing
Board 
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Nov African governors conference in London
Nov Sir John Macpherson appointed gov
1948
Jan University College, Ibadan opens
Feb Accra riots in the Gold Coast
Apr Macpherson assumes office as gov
Apr Kaduna Meeting of NCNC and declaration of the Freedom Charter
May Appointment of the Foot Commission on Nigerianisation
June Inauguration of Egbe Omo Oduduwa in Nigeria
June Inauguration of Yoruba Federal Union 
June Watson Report on Accra riots published
Aug Foot report on Nigerianisation completed
Aug Decision to revise constitution announced to the Legislative Council
Aug Education Ordinance
Oct Report of select committee of Eastern House of Assembly on local
government
Nov Arrest of Anthony Enahoro and Osita Agwuna for sedition
Dec Inauguration of Ibo State Union
1949
Feb Trial of Zikist leaders
Mar Commencement of local and regional consultations on the proposed new
constitution
Apr Establishment of marketing boards for groundnuts, cotton and oil palm
produce
Apr Gibbons Report on local government
Oct Coussey Report on constitutional change in the Gold Coast published
Nov Enugu shootings
Nov Formation of the NEC 
Nov Appointment of the Fitzgerald Commission
Nov UNO Trusteeship Council visiting mission to the Cameroons
Dec Formal establishment of the NPC
1950
Jan Ibadan constitutional conference
Jan Formation of the MZL
Feb Assassination attempt on Sir Hugh Foot
Feb General election in Britain; Labour retains power
Feb James Griffiths appointed S of S for colonies
Mar Inaugural meeting of the Action Group
Mar Opening of Nigeria Office, London
Apr Zikists banned
May Eastern Region Local Government ordinance receives royal assent
June Fitzgerald Report on the Enugu shootings published
Aug NEPU established
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Dec Maddocks and Pott Report on local government in Northern Nigeria
completed
1951
Jan Opening of Nigeria Liaison Office, Washington
Feb Nkrumah appointed leader of government business in the Gold Coast
Mar Hicks-Phillipson Report on revenue allocation
Apr Formal launch of the Action Group
June Macpherson constitution approved by S of S 
June Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1951, laid before parliament
Oct General election in Britain; Conservative victory
Oct Oliver Lyttelton appointed S of S for colonies
July Commencement of elections to regional Houses of Assembly
Nov Macpherson constitution comes into effect 
Dec Completion of elections to regional Houses of Assembly
1952
Jan Council of Ministers inaugurated
Mar House of Representatives formally opened
Mar Nkrumah appointed prime minister in the Gold Coast
Apr Establishment of the Phillipson-Adebo Commission on the
Nigerianisation of the civil service
May Visit of Lyttelton to Nigeria
Oct Declaration of a state of emergency in Kenya (Mau Mau)
Nov UNO visiting mission to the Cameroons
Dec Expulsion of NCNC central ministers at the Jos Conference
Dec Establishment of the UNIP
Dec ‘Non-fraternization’ policy adopted by AG
1953
Jan ‘Sit-tight’ crisis commences in Eastern Region
Feb Formation of NIP
Feb Western Region local government law receives royal assent 
Mar Enahoro motion for self-government in 1956
Apr Macpherson and gov Arden-Clarke visit the CO for joint discussions
Apr West African Forces conference, Lagos
May Kano Riots
May Northern House of Assembly ‘Eight-point motion’
June Dissolution of Eastern House of Assembly
June Coronation day riot in Lagos
July Commencement of the London constitutional conference 
July Formation of the MBPP
Sept IBRD (World Bank) mission to Nigeria
Dec Eastern Region elections; NCNC victory
Dec Chick Report on revenue allocation completed
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1954
Jan Lagos resumed conference
Jan Declaration on the public service by Nigerian political leaders
Feb Phillipson-Adebo Report on Nigerianisation published
July Alan Lennox-Boyd appointed S of S for colonies
Aug 1954 Constitution Order-in-Council receives royal assent
Sept Report of IBRD (World Bank) on Nigeria completed
Sept Oyo riots; Alaafin leaves Oyo
Oct Lyttelton constitution comes into effect
Oct Ban on communists holding Nigerian government posts
Oct Awolowo, Azikiwe and the Sardauna appointed regional premiers 
Oct HMOCS established
Oct Southern Cameroons becomes a semi-autonomous region with its own
House of Assembly
Nov Commencement of elections to the House of Representatives
1955
Jan Lennox-Boyd visits Nigeria
Apr Approval of the interim development plan
Apr Sir Anthony Eden becomes prime minister
May General election in Britain; Conservative victory
May UPC revolt in French Cameroons
June Report of the Gorsuch Commission on salaries completed
June Sir James Robertson assumes office as gov-gen
June Western House of Assembly motion for a Mid-West Region
June Lloyd report on the Oyo riots published
June UMBC formed
Sept Eastern Region government appoints Ikpeazu Commission into bribery
and corruption
Oct Robertson and regional govs visit London to brief S of S on Nigerian
affairs
Nov Azikiwe interview with the S of S
Nov UNO visiting mission to the Cameroons
Dec Nicholson report on Ibadan District Council
Dec Western House of Assembly motion for regional self-government in 1956
1956
Jan Preparatory conference in Lagos
Jan-Feb Royal Tour of Nigeria
Mar Awolowo visit to the S of S concerning regional self-government
May Effiong Eyo submits motion in Eastern House on ACB affair
May Elections to the Western House of Assembly; AG victory
July Replacement of West Africa Command by Nigeria Command
July Inquiry into ACB affair announced in parliament
July Eastern Region ‘summit conference’ on the constitutional conference 
Aug Appointment of Sir S Foster-Sutton to lead inquiry into ACB affair
Nov Elections to Northern House of Assembly; NPC victory
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1957
Jan Foster-Sutton report into ACB affair published
Jan Harold Macmillan becomes prime minister
Feb Hudson Report on local government in Northern Nigeria published
Mar Independence for the Gold Coast as Ghana
Mar Elections to Eastern Region House of Assembly; NCNC victory
Mar Elections to Southern Cameroons House of Assembly; KNC victory
Mar S L Akintola motion for independence in 1959
Apr Eastern House of Assembly motion for regional self-government
May Commencement of London constitutional conference
Aug Self-government for the Eastern and Western Regions
Aug Abubakar Tafawa Balewa appointed prime minister
Nov Commencement of Willink Commission hearings on minorities
1958
Jan School fee riots in Eastern Nigeria
Feb ‘Ad hoc conference’ in Lagos 
Mar Merthyr Commission report on constituencies completed
Mar Death of Adegoke Adelabu; rioting in the Western Region
Apr Nigerian Defence Council established
Apr Southern Cameroons gains full regional status
May Appointment of Dr Endeley as premier of the Southern Cameroons
June Raisman Commission Report on revenue allocation
Aug Northern House of Assembly motion for regional self-government in
1959
Aug Willink Commission report on minorities published
Aug Motion in House of Representatives for self-government in April 1960
Aug Formation of Democratic Party of Nigeria and Cameroons
Sept Commencement of London constitutional conference
Oct Special List B established
Dec UNO visiting mission to Cameroons
1959
Jan Nkrumah visit to Nigeria
Jan Southern Cameroons elections; KNDP victory; John Foncha appointed
premier
Mar Regional self-government for the Northern Region
May Lennox-Boyd visit to Nigeria
July Central Bank of Nigeria formally opened 
July Commonwealth Assistance Loan to Nigeria agreed
Aug Minister of State, Lord Perth, visits Nigeria
Sept Report of the Mbanefo Commission on salaries
Oct Cameroons becomes a direct responsibility of Britain
Oct General election in Britain; Conservative victory
Oct Iain Macleod appointed S of S for colonies
Nov Plebiscite in Northern Cameroons 
Dec Dag Hamarskjold visit to Nigeria and Cameroons
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Dec Okpara becomes Eastern premier; Akintola becomes Western premier
Dec Federal elections; NPC-NCNC form a government under Tafawa Balewa
as prime minister
1960
Jan Republic of Cameroun gets independence from France
Jan House of Representatives resolution for independence in Oct 1960
Jan Macmillan visit to Nigeria
Feb French atomic tests in the Sahara
Mar Sharpeville shootings in South Africa
May London conference 
May Commonwealth HOGM in London
June Israeli loan controversy
July Lagos conference 
July Nigerian independence act passes Parliament
July Sir Adesoji Aderemi sworn in as first Nigerian governor of the Western
Region
Aug House of Assembly elections in the Western Region; AG victory
Oct Independence
Nov Departure of Robertson; Azikiwe becomes gov-gen
1961
Feb Plebiscites in Northern and Southern Cameroons
Oct End of British trusteeship in the Cameroons
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Introduction
The Foreign Office and the Foreign Office documents
‘This is the biggest colonial exercise ever’, noted Alan Lennox-Boyd, secretary of state
for the colonies, in April 1957, of the move towards Nigerian independence
(document 392). With a population of some 31 million in the early 1950s, Nigeria
was, following the independence of India and Pakistan, Britain’s largest dependency.
One in three of the inhabitants of the British empire in this period lived in Nigeria;
each of the Nigerian regions created in 1951 had a population larger than any other
British overseas possession, with the exception of Tanganyika. The political
importance of Nigeria for Britain’s standing in the world in the 1950s was
considerable; as the largest state in tropical Africa Nigeria’s potential leadership role
clearly would be central to Britain’s relations with the continent once independence
had been achieved. Yet the potential for disaster in Nigeria was also immense, given
the threats of secession that were voiced by different groups in these years and given
the ethnic tensions that later were to explode so tragically in 1966. The importance
of the Anglo-Nigerian relationship in this period and of the handling of the process of
political withdrawal that reached its culmination on 1 October 1960 can hardly be
gainsaid therefore. 
Selection of documents
The documents in this collection have been selected to illustrate this process of
British political withdrawal from Nigeria. As outlined in the general editor’s
foreword, the intention is to publish documents that illustrate those policy issues
relating to this process that were deemed important by British ministers and officials
at the time. The aim is thereby to illuminate the nature and timing of the British
decision to grant independence to Nigeria. As set by the project, the focus is on the
policy concerns of the British government; it should be stressed that these concerns
often differed from those of officials in Lagos, let alone in Enugu, Ibadan or Kaduna,
the capitals of the Nigerian regions, and certainly would have been sharply divergent
from those of the leaders of Nigeria’s political parties. That is not to imply that these
other concerns were irrelevant to this process, but it is to suggest that policy-making
in London needs to take its place in the story if that story is fully to be understood. It
must be stressed that, for reasons of space, the emphasis in this collection is
primarily political; economic, legal or military affairs have been included where they
had an impact on the politics of decolonisation, but documents on these subjects
have not been chosen for their own intrinsic importance. To do them justice would
have required several further parts. Equally, in accordance with the practice of the
project, there has been a bias in the selection against documents—such as command
papers—that were published at the time and are otherwise available; overwhelmingly
the emphasis of selection has been on unpublished documents. 
The collection begins in 1943. No single date of course, can be identified as the
definitive start of the process of decolonisation for Nigeria. Good cases could be
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made for 1939, the year of governor Bernard Bourdillon’s ‘political memorandum’;
1944, with the formation of the NCNC; or for 1945, with the ending of World War
II and the publication of governor Arthur Richards’s proposals for constitutional
reform. Certainly World War II marked a turning point in Britain’s relationship
with her Nigerian colony, as it did for most of Britain’s possessions.1 Although pro-
posals for major constitutional change had been discussed during the 1930s—most
seriously by Bourdillon—the pace of discussion and the seriousness of the changes
being proposed increased strikingly during the war years. 1943 has been chosen as
the start for this collection because it was the moment the various ideas about
post-war constitutional arrangements began to coalesce, as seen in the meetings
held in the Colonial Office during that year to discuss Nigeria (1). The appoint-
ment at the end of 1943 of Richards as governor, with a mandate to introduce con-
stitutional change, emphasises this further. It was to be his proposals for the
constitution, arising out of these CO meetings, that were to give impetus to the
post-war debate about Nigeria’s future, a debate that in effect, was to continue for
the next decade and a half. The aim of this selection of documents is therefore to
trace the evolution of British government policy towards Nigeria from the CO
meetings in 1943 through to independence in October 1960. The selection is bro-
ken into two parts, with July 1953 marking the break; this date, it should be said,
was picked purely for editorial convenience in order to arrive at two parts of
roughly equal size.
The process of political change in Nigeria was affected by the position of the
Cameroons.2 The Cameroons had been divided between Britain and France follow-
ing its capture from Germany in 1916, and then held as a mandate of the League
of Nations. Following World War II the Cameroons were administered as trust ter-
ritories of the United Nations, with a trusteeship agreement settled in December
1946. Thereafter, the CO was aware that British administration in the territory—
which was administered in two separate parts, Northern and Southern
Cameroons—would be subject to periodic inspections by the UNO and that major
policy decisions relating to it would ultimately have to be acceptable to the
Trusteeship Council (92). 
The Cameroons raised important questions for the selection of documents for this
volume, firstly as to whether the territory should be included at all in a work
primarily designed to examine British policy towards Nigeria and secondly as to
whether any such selection should end in October 1960, given that British
administration in the Cameroons continued until 1961. It was decided that the
Cameroons should indeed be included, not least because the Northern Cameroons
voted to join its neighbour in 1961, and because until 1960 both parts of the territory
were in fact administered as part of Nigeria; the Southern Cameroons was
administered as part of the Eastern Region until becoming a semi-autonomous
region in 1954 and gaining full regional status in 1958, while the Northern
Cameroons was governed as part of the Northern Region. None the less, the focus of
selection has remained firmly on policy towards Nigeria as a whole; material
included on the Cameroons has been chosen, with only minor exceptions, to
illustrate the policy concerns of the Nigerian decolonisation process more generally
rather than anything specific to the territory itself; as with other issues a further part
would have been necessary to do full justice to the Cameroons in these years. An
appendix at the end of part II has been used to cover the period between Nigerian
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independence in October 1960 and October 1961 when Britain relinquished the
administration of the Cameroons. 
As determined by the project, the documents used in this selection are chosen
from those held in the Public Record Office, Kew. In short, the documents are
derived from the government departments in London that dealt with Nigerian affairs.
The main files consulted were those of the Colonial Office; from the start of this
period documents relating to Nigeria were held in the CO 583 series, while some
relating to intelligence and political matters were filed in CO 537; from 1951 CO 554
was the series used for Nigerian material. These three series provide the backbone of
the selection in the present volume. In addition material in other CO series relating
to economics, defence, social and educational matters, as well as the Council of
Ministers, was consulted. Nigeria documents were also examined in the Dominions
Office (from 1947, Commonwealth Relations Office) files and in the Foreign Office,
Treasury and Ministry of Defence series, all of which departments had an input into
the policy-making process for Nigeria. Finally, the papers of the Cabinet (including
Cabinet committees) and the Prime Minister’s Office relating to Nigeria were also
surveyed. 
Material generated within Nigeria itself is necessarily limited in this collection,
given the considerations outlined above. To the extent that material was forwarded to
London from Nigeria, its presence can be traced in the documents contained herein.
Clearly however, much was not forwarded and the unfolding story seen from London
remains just that, the view seen from London. Fully to understand Nigerian politics
in this period, the growth of Nigerian nationalism and the role of Nigerian
individuals and organisations in the decolonisation story, requires the use of these
PRO documents alongside study of the files held in the National Archives of Nigeria. 
The main problem in dealing with the documents available for this project is the
sheer quantity of the files. Well over 1,000 files were read in the course of the
research for this volume. Of course a good deal of the documentation can safely be
ignored: material relating to personnel matters, technical detail and such like. Yet
the volume of material that still remained forced difficult choices to be made; it bears
repeating that what determined the selection was the degree to which it illustrated
the policy debates being undertaken by ministers and officials in London. However,
despite the volume of material in the PRO, there are important gaps in the record.
Not always was an issue covered in the files, whether through having been ‘destroyed
by statute’ or for other reasons. CO material on the 1948 Foot Commission on
Nigerianisation for example, has not been located and appears to have been
‘destroyed by statute’. Equally, some material relating to security and intelligence
matters or which might be sensitive for other reasons, has been ‘retained by
department’. Appeals by the project to the FCO for the release of such documents
were, it should be recorded, treated sympathetically in many cases, in particular
relating to the Kano Riots of 1953 and the African Continental Bank affair of
1956–1957.3
None the less, some areas of policy remain closed to the researcher. It is difficult to
assess precisely how extensive this is. The problem with files ‘retained by department’
is that while the file number may be listed in the series list in the Public Record
Office, the subject of the file is not and it is therefore impossible, ultimately, to tell
exactly what has been withheld. Several files apparently relating to mid-1950s
Nigeria, to the 1957 London conference and to the Southern Cameroons in the
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period 1958–61 (when a significant terrorist campaign was waged in its francophone
neighbour) are apparently so retained. Equally, material relating to intelligence and
security matters more generally appears to be missing from the available
documentation; some of this material can be traced in other files where individual
letters might be copied for cross-referencing purposes and a rough picture of the
type of material held in the retained files can be guessed at. While it is impossible
fully to assess the extent of such material, it is believed that whatever these closed
files might contain, they will not alter substantially the picture drawn by the
selection in this volume. 
The files available in the Public Record Office are coloured by two factors: firstly
the nature of the political process that generated them and secondly the policy-
making structure of the government department that considered them. The
changing context of the political process to which these files relate clearly had an
important impact on the material they contain. Over time it is noticeable that the
material reaching London from Nigeria becomes much less detailed as far as
Nigerian domestic developments are concerned; instead the business in the Colonial
Office moves towards consideration of major policy issues, such as the date of
independence, or the degree of financial aid to be negotiated with Nigeria, or
alternatively the technical minutiae of the requisite Orders-in-Council; the several
constitutional conferences held in London and Lagos during the 1950s become the
major time-consuming concern of officials. This does not mean that the amount of
paper on Nigeria circulating in London declined or that the importance of the issues
being considered in the CO diminished—on the contrary—but it does indicate that
the focus moved over time from administration to constitutional structures. Material
from the local government level—never copious in London anyway—dries up
completely. This occurred at different dates for the different regions, depending on
the speed of local government reform; it is clear for the Eastern Region from an early
date but for the North much later. This had, of course, important consequences for
the amount of intelligence available for the CO.
Similarly, as the process of granting self-government to the regions—1957 for the
East and West, 1959 for the North—gets underway it is noticeable how the amount
of material being sent from regional governors shrinks significantly, except that
which related to the changing constitutional arrangements. By 1960 even the
material arriving from the governor-general in Lagos himself is of relatively limited
import; indeed concern began to be expressed in London from as early as 1954 as to
the degree to which the Colonial Office was being kept fully informed of
developments within the colony (274). This process prompted the CO to encourage
governors to produce regular, more discursive despatches—sometimes termed
‘chatty’ despatches—reviewing political events in their region or, in the case of the
governor-general, the federation as a whole; a number have been included in this
selection (353, 539). These provide an excellent window into events in their
respective constituencies, but are no substitute, for the historian, for coverage of the
struggles for political power which were now increasingly occurring among Nigerian
politicians and within the Nigerian government. 
The progressive concession of political power to Nigerian leaders raised important
issues for the administration about the handling of sensitive or politically delicate
material. This was seen most obviously following the creation of the Council of
Ministers in 1952. It was decided to restrict the circulation of some material sent to
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Nigeria to the governor and his staff alone and not to draw attention to this; the
discovery by ministers in late 1952 that material relating to their own policy
concerns was passing directly between the governor and the Colonial Office caused a
major upset (169).4 Although this upset was resolved, in practice from 1952
something almost akin to two secretariats were operating in Lagos—one for
ministers and one for the governor—with some material being restricted in its
circulation between the two. 
Policy and policy-making
The policy-making structure of the government department in London that
processed this material also colours what is included in this volume. Within the
Colonial Office it was the West African Department, under the responsibility of an
assistant secretary, which was at the centre of the handling of Nigerian business in
this period. In 1954 this department was divided into two, West African ‘A’ and West
African ‘B’, with the former, under an assistant secretary, responsible for Nigeria.
The assistant secretaries responsible for Nigerian business reported, before 1947, to
an assistant under-secretary responsible for West Africa; in that year all the African
departments were brought under one Africa Division under an assistant under-
secretary with specific responsibility for African affairs. In 1955 this organisation was
changed again and the division split into two, with an assistant under-secretary
appointed for West African affairs and another for Central and East Africa. This
remained the situation—with St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha being
added to West African responsibilities in 1957—until independence. The way an
incoming document was handled on its way up this official hierarchy can be seen
clearly in document 301 concerning the Eastern Region crisis of 1955.
The official who played the critical role in formulating Nigerian policy throughout
this period was the assistant under-secretary responsible for African or West African
affairs. These figures—Arthur Dawe, Gerald Creasy, G F Seel, Andrew Cohen,
William Gorell Barnes and Christopher Eastwood who held this post between 1943
and 1961—assessed the incoming documentation and made the critical
recommendations. Only rarely were their recommendations ignored. Below the
assistant under-secretary, the assistant secretaries responsible for Nigeria—between
1943 and 1961 O G R Williams, Kenneth Robinson, Leslie Gorsuch, Tom Williamson
and Aaron Emanuel—were of considerable influence; their position was one where
they were able to couch policy options in ways that greatly influenced later decision-
making. Certainly these assistant secretaries were the most knowledgeable within
the Colonial Office about Nigeria—a knowledge reinforced by the several visits the
holders of this post made to Nigeria in these years—and their grasp of the processes
and personalities involved in these events is certainly impressive to the later reader.
Only rarely did the principal, who staffed what might be termed the ‘Nigerian desk’
and who was the first official to deal with material arriving from Lagos, play an
important role but towards the end of our period Maurice Smith (principal, CO,
1955–1959) was clearly taking an increasing and unusually active part. Although
there were within the CO specialist departments relating to law, economics, defence
and social welfare, which often were involved in Nigerian business, only occasionally
can they be seen—the development of the ten-year plan of 1945 would be an
example—making the running in policy-making. 
The permanent under-secretary of state was not involved in routine Nigerian
06-Nigeria-Introduction-cp  15/7/01  7:23 am  Page xxxix
xl INTRODUCTION
business but did play a more active role than might be imagined in the events of
these years. For the early part of this period, Sir Thomas Lloyd (permanent under-
secretary between 1947 and 1956) was the official involved. His interventions can be
seen most notably when constitutional conferences were approaching and briefing
papers had to be agreed. His involvement in the various problems thrown up by the
Eastern Region during the mid-1950s is certainly marked; he can also be seen as
especially active in constitutional issues such as the question of creating more
regions in 1955, the implementation of the Chick Report on financial allocation also
in 1955 and the regionalisation of the police in 1956. Interestingly, his successor, Sir
John Macpherson, fresh from his term as governor, and who brought to the post a
degree of knowledge of Nigeria that few predecessors would have had, appears to
have played a less interventionist role than Lloyd. This might reflect awareness of the
stresses and strains of the gubernatorial post and the difficulties caused by untimely
intervention from London, or more pressing concerns elsewhere in the empire. 
Ministerial involvement in Nigerian business was limited but critical in a number
of instances. Initially there were two Colonial Office ministers—the secretary of state
and the parliamentary under-secretary of state—but from 1948 a minister of state
was added to this. Oliver Lyttelton (secretary of state, 1951–1954) and Alan Lennox-
Boyd (1954–1959) were central to the Nigerian story. Both these two were ‘hands-on’
secretaries of state as far as Nigeria was concerned and played critical roles at a
number of vital moments. This can be seen not least, in Lyttelton’s breaking of the
log-jam over self-government at the London conference of 1953 and Lennox-Boyd’s
resolution of the date of independence dispute at that of 1958 (235, 464). Lyttelton
also appears to have been decisive in the decision in early 1953 to review the
‘Macpherson’ constitution (190, 191). Lennox-Boyd is notable too for his close
cultivation of relationships with Nigerian leaders and his visits to Nigeria in 1955 and
1959. 
The link from principal to secretary of state was the spine along which information
flowed and policy-making occurred in the CO, as far as Nigeria was concerned.
However, the CO was not isolated from the rest of Whitehall and policy-making
involved other departments and other influences. Outside the CO the government
department most involved in Nigerian business, at least for the latter part of this
period, was the Commonwealth Relations Office. As the transfer of power
approached, the CRO became more directly involved in Nigerian affairs. In particular
the CRO was involved over Nigeria’s future external affairs and a CRO official, Stanley
Fingland, was appointed to the Lagos secretariat from 1958 as adviser concerning
this. The relationship between the CRO and the CO was by no means a smooth one,
and from an early date the CRO began to express concern at the way the CO was
rapidly pushing on for independence before Nigeria, in the CRO’s view, was ready,
thus threatening to leave the CRO—it believed—to pick up the pieces.5 The dispute
in 1957 between the two departments over the date of independence had to be
resolved by the lord chancellor’s intervention (404). Even thereafter the question of
Nigerian membership of the Commonwealth, not least because of South Africa’s
earlier concerns over Ghana’s membership, and the issue of financial aid after
independence, both involved the CRO in the policy-making process for Nigeria.
The Foreign Office was only tangentially involved in the Nigerian story. Certainly
consideration of constitutional change in Nigeria was not restricted to Anglo-
Nigerian relations, nor was the Nigerian case not seen in a wider context. American
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and French involvement can be seen on a number of occasions in this story. The USA
as the major world power after 1945, had ambitions and concerns of her own towards
Africa, ambitions and concerns that the Colonial Office was all too aware of but by no
means always in sympathy with. At least as far as Nigeria is concerned, CO views of
USA policy were not necessarily positive ones, as seen in the concerns raised over US
provision of financial aid and US business ambitions in the region (477). Equally, the
CO, though never as worried as the French about militant Islam, monitored French
policy in other parts of West Africa while also observing developments in North
Africa, particularly, though by no means only, at the time of the Suez crisis.6
Intelligence material was clearly shared with the French authorities in West Africa.7
The Ministry of Defence was not involved in the process of granting independence
for Nigeria until a very late date. The Chiefs of Staff Committee did become involved
in the mid-1950s over the issue of control of the Nigerian forces and the issue of
secondment of officers, but it was only when the proposed Anglo-Nigerian defence
pact came to be discussed in the late 1950s that the Ministry of Defence began to play
a significant role. None the less the Ministry of Defence allowed itself to be guided by
CO views on the feasibility of the pact, illustrating both the paramountcy of the CO in
this process and the relatively limited importance of Nigeria in broader UK defence
concerns. The Treasury was occasionally called on by the Colonial Office, primarily of
course, when financial inputs were required as in the funding of Special List B in
1958 or for the negotiations concerning financial aid for Nigeria after independence
(421, 510). Although Treasury refusal to provide finance for the Southern
Cameroons was critical in influencing policy on a number of occasions towards the
territory, and financial constraints more generally affected policy to Nigeria in the
late 1950s, it would be an exaggeration to suggest that Treasury influence greatly
altered the thrust of the CO’s approach to the territory. 
For the key decisions concerning Nigeria, particularly over the date of
independence, reference to the Cabinet was involved. This was important not just to
obtain broader government approval for policy, but also to resolve differences
between departments, as between the Colonial Office and the CRO over the date of
independence, mentioned above. Reference to the Cabinet was necessary for any
major change in constitutional arrangements, as occurred with the Macpherson
proposals in 1950, and on the 1953 decision to revise the constitution; the
threatened collapse of the 1953 talks in August over the position of Lagos, again
resulted in reference to the Cabinet (105, 202, 234). As time went on Nigerian
business reached the Cabinet more often. The decision on the date of Nigerian
independence led to reference to the Cabinet three times between July and October
1958; reference was again made in May 1959 as part of a review of African policy
generally and finally in early 1960 to approve the grant of independence (507). None
the less there is no evidence of Cabinet discussion changing the broad parameters of
CO policy towards Nigeria; policy remained something formulated in the CO and
approved in Downing Street. 
Cabinet committees of course, often considered issues before they reached the
Cabinet itself. The committees dealing with Nigerian business were somewhat
transient and ad hoc in their existence however.8 The 1940s, and particularly the war
years, saw several committees covering West African issues, colonial affairs and
colonial development. This efflorescence of committees was only repeated in the
mid-to-late 1950s, when a Colonial Policy Committee was established in 1955 and an
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Africa Committee (of officials) in 1957; the Committee on Commonwealth Economic
Development (established 1957) also considered Nigerian business. Again however,
the function of these committees was less to formulate policy than to sort out the
critical issues to be considered at Cabinet and confirm policy directions already
decided on elsewhere. The only critical moment, when a committee had a decisive
role, came with the debate in the Colonial Policy Committee in 1957 over the date of
Nigerian independence. 
The prime minister was rarely involved in Nigerian affairs in this period, though
he was regularly kept informed on key issues. Clement Attlee was consulted over the
handling of the Fitzgerald Report on the Enugu shootings in 1950 while Lyttelton
kept Winston Churchill informed on the progress of the Lagos conference in early
1954 (262). Much of course, depended on the personality of the prime minister.
Churchill and Anthony Eden gave little attention to Nigerian matters in this period,
but Harold Macmillan, as a former CO minister, was much more involved, as can be
seen not least in his visit to Nigeria in 1960. He was involved in the discussions over
the date of independence in 1958, again over the Southern Cameroons in 1959, on
the issue of aid to Nigeria after independence, and above all on the negotiations
concerning the defence pact in 1960 (444, 471, 502). 
Behind all these departments and offices sat parliament. Criticism of colonial
policy in the Commons was to be avoided at all costs and it is clear, especially in the
early years covered by this volume, that the CO and its officials were acutely
concerned about the possible reaction of parliament to policy decisions. Parliament
was regularly used for the announcement of important policy decisions and the
placing of parliamentary questions by MPs interested in colonial affairs such as
Reginald Sorensen or Fenner Brockway, prompted quick action by the CO. Debates
on issues like the Fitzgerald Report on the Enugu shootings in May 1950 were a
major concern for officials. None the less the fact was that colonial affairs generally
and Nigerian affairs more particularly, were only of limited interest to public or
parliament in this period. The discussion of Richards’s constitutional proposals in
November 1945 took place in an almost empty House. While Lyttelton spoke to the
Commons following the Kano riots and on the decision to revise the constitution in
1953, Lennox-Boyd on the Eastern crisis of 1955, and Iain Macleod, secretary of state
for the colonies, 1959–1961, on the independence bill in 1960, none of these
announcements was followed by a major debate.
Outside bodies like the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the League of Coloured
Peoples attempted to lobby the Colonial Office, but their influence was severely
circumscribed. Businesses like the United Africa Company or Shell also attempted to
make their voice heard within the corridors of the Colonial Office. James Griffiths,
secretary of state for the colonies, 1950–1951, met representatives of British firms
operating in Nigeria in 1950 who wished to express their concern over Macpherson’s
constitutional proposals, but while these firms received a sympathetic hearing they
had no more influence over the final decision—which in this instance ignored their
demands—than organisations like the Fabian Colonial Bureau did (114, 143).
Business influence over constitutional policy in Nigeria was limited. 
It was impossible to isolate Nigeria from events in the rest of West Africa; through
the story of Nigerian decolonisation runs a sharp awareness of the pace of change on
the Gold Coast, and to a lesser extent, French West Africa. At a number of moments
in the Nigerian story, developments in the Gold Coast were to have a critical impact.
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The report of the Watson Commission in 1948 and the granting of ministerial
responsibility with the appointment of Nkrumah as prime minister in 1952, were the
two major instances of this; as officials in Nigeria complained, these events acted as
stimuli for more urgent demands from Nigerian leaders (44, 49, 152, 153).
Thereafter concern about Nkrumah’s regional ambitions coloured British policy-
making towards Nigeria, with repeated references in the late 1950s to the need for
Nigeria to provide a counter-weight to the more radical vision of Africa’s future
emanating from Accra (474, 475, 504). Developments in French West Africa were of
less concern but were not ignored, particularly given the close ethnic and religious
ties between much of the population of Northern Nigeria and its immediate
neighbours, and given the close relationship of the Southern Cameroons with its
neighbour to the east. The latter clearly became a major concern following the UPC
revolt in French Cameroons in 1955. 
In Nigeria, policy-making took place in the Secretariat in Lagos. This meant, in
essence, the governor (from 1954, the governor-general) and his staff, of which the
most important for this purpose was the chief secretary. Richards and Macpherson
clearly played critical roles in the evolution of the constitutions that popularly came
to bear their names; in their terms of office constitution-making was still something
determined between officials in Lagos and London. However James Robertson,
governor-general 1955–60, arrived in Nigeria once the discretion over constitutional
decisions had moved to the various conferences involving Nigerian leaders and the
secretary of state, and his role as governor was correspondingly reduced, at least as
far as the direction of major political change in Nigeria was concerned; there is no
‘Robertson’ constitution to match the ‘Richards’ and ‘Macpherson’ versions. None
the less his input into events was not negligible, as seen in his choice of prime
minister in 1957 and 1959 and in the relationship between himself and Tafawa
Balewa that ensued (410, 497). This does not compare with the renowned Arden-
Clarke/Nkrumah relationship in the Gold Coast, but Robertson’s sympathy with and
respect for, Tafawa Balewa is palpable in the files of these years. A chief secretary like
Hugh Foot (1947–1951), who clearly had views very close to those of Macpherson—
not to mention Cohen in London—could play a very influential role in policy-
making. Foot was not only active in prompting Nigerianisation but also in pushing
the ideas for constitutional change that emerged in the late 1940s.9 His speech to the
Legislative Council on constitutional change in March 1949 clearly holds a major
place in the Nigerian story (65); later chief secretaries like A E T Benson or Hugo
Marshall played a much more circumscribed role as political power moved to the
Council of Ministers. 
At the outbreak of World War II Nigeria was still administered under arrangements
that derived from the 1922 constitution.10 This, the so-called ‘Clifford’ constitution
after the governor responsible for its introduction, administered Nigeria through a
Legislative Council of 46; of the 19 unofficial members, three were elected by a
restricted electorate of adult males in Lagos and one for Calabar.11 The Legislative
Council’s remit applied only to the colony of Lagos and the protectorate of Southern
Nigeria; legislation for Northern Nigeria continued to be issued by proclamation by
the lieutenant-governor as it had been since before the unification of 1914. The two
parts of Nigeria were administered after amalgamation through separate lieutenant-
governors (from the mid-1930s termed chief commissioners) for the North and
South based at Kaduna and Enugu; in 1939 the South was split in two, separate chief
06-Nigeria-Introduction-cp  15/7/01  7:23 am  Page xliii
xliv INTRODUCTION
commissioners were appointed for the western and eastern provinces and a new
secretariat built at Ibadan. 
Underlying the separate administration of the North and South were deep
divisions that had ethnic, religious and historical origins. Obafemi Awolowo, the
leader of the AG, in 1947 referred to Nigeria as ‘a mere geographical expression’ and
these divisions were the warp across which the weft of events was woven in these
years.12 Much of the North was Muslim, the major ethnic groups were the Hausa-
Fulani and the Kanuri, and much of the area had been subjected to the rule of the
Sokoto caliphate during the nineteenth century. The so-called ‘middle belt’ of the
area by contrast, was neither Muslim nor Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri and parts of it had
fought fiercely in the nineteenth century to maintain their independence from
caliphate rule. Moreover, the centralised authority that characterised the societies of
the Sokoto caliphate and Bornu was lacking for many of the peoples of the Middle
Belt. In the South the Yoruba were the major ethnic group west of the Niger, though
as with the North, it is important not to assume a monolithic identity for the region;
parts of this area did not conform to the cultural or political hegemony of the
dominant ethnic group. These areas, which came to make up the Mid-West Region
after independence, lay to the east and south-east of the Yoruba heartland and were
the predominantly Edo and Itsekiri areas of Benin and the western Delta. To the east
of the Niger, the Igbo were demographically the major group, though once again
areas of Efik/Ibibio and Ijo speakers—to the east and south—challenged the
numerical dominance of the majority.13 Igbo political structures, characterised by
the dispersal of authority and by segmentary systems, contrasted sharply with the
more centralised authorities typical of the Yoruba and Edo. 
Nigeria was administered through 24 provinces (plus Lagos), each under a
resident, with the provinces, between 1939 and 1951, arranged together into three
groups for the east, north and west. Local administration was characterised, in
theory at least, by varying degrees of adherence to the principle of indirect rule.
Although indirect rule was a protean phenomenon which varied greatly according to
local circumstances and financial exigency, in its idealised form it involved
administration through the existing ruling authorities of a given society, structured
into a Native Authority system overseen by the guiding hand of residents, district
officers and ADOs.14 Underpinning this, at least in the Nigerian case, was the
assumption that the true representatives of the numerous ethnic groups in Nigeria
were their existing authorities, and that the real identity of Nigerians lay in their
different ethnic origins. Underlying this in turn, was the idea that the existing
authorities represented the ‘natural’ system of political administration and that the
western-educated Nigerian of the cities represented an anomalous, detribalised
African. Within this indirect rule structure, rulers were given considerable leeway
concerning the administration of their area and most exploited this; one
consequence of the NA system in many areas was a considerable reinforcement in the
power and authority of existing rulers. 
From 1951 Nigeria was a federation of three regions, with, after 1953, Lagos
removed from the West as a separate capital territory. In Enugu, Ibadan and Kaduna,
and to a lesser extent Buea, secretariats also operated under the regional chief
commissioners (from 1951, lieutenant-governors and from 1954, governors); there
were deputy governors for the East and West from 1955 and for the North from 1958.
As self-government progressed these posts became less significant in terms of
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political discretion, though for major decisions, Robertson still called the governors
to meet in Lagos in conclave. Much depended on circumstances and on personality,
and Bryan Sharwood-Smith (lieutenant-governor and governor of the Northern
Region, 1951–1957), played a much more significant political role, and for much
longer, than his counterparts elsewhere in the federation, not least because of the
pivotal position of the North in these years.
Below the level of the provinces and the regions lay the realm of local government.
Local politics is beyond the remit of this volume, except in so far as local government
reform raised issues of policy. Following the Creech Jones despatch of 25 February
1947 moves began to reform local government in Nigeria; beginning with the East in
1950 and following with the West in 1953.15 Reform of local government in the
Northern Region remained a major political issue throughout the period covered by
this volume, generating much concern not only among the existing northern rulers,
but also among the leaders of the opposition parties in the region and Nigerian
leaders from the South who both saw the power of the NA system in the north as
underpinning the dominance of the NPC and British rule in Nigeria more generally.
Local government reform—and the power and influence of NA rulers—was thus the
backdrop against which the more dramatic story of constitutions, riots and
conferences was played out. Here the residents, district officers and ADOs remained
the governor’s (and London’s) eyes and ears and their information made up the
substance of the Joint Intelligence reports that were forwarded to the CO. The key
struggles at the lower levels of politics in these years involved the control of
appointments to the chiefly thrones and councils of local government and much
more research remains to be undertaken of this story. 
* * * *
The period of managed reform, 1943–1953
Even before the outbreak of World War II, figures within the Nigerian administration
recognised the need to revise the 1922 constitutional arrangements. One problem
that had to be addressed during the 1930s was the evident need to reform the system
of indirect rule. What prompted this were the numerous allegations of abuse that
characterised its operations in many areas. This was at least partly because, in its
idealised form, it failed to reflect the complexities of Nigerian social structures. Such
a system might possibly have made sense for the highly developed states of the
Hausa-Fulani emirates of Northern Nigeria or the Yoruba chieftaincies of the West
but it most certainly did not for other areas like the more politically dispersed
societies of Eastern Nigeria, as was seen in the political unrest there in the late
1920s.16 Significant changes to administration in the East, with the so-called
‘Warrant Chiefs’ being replaced by councils of varying degrees of power and scale,
occurred during the 1930s. Elsewhere, the extent of abuse in the Native Authority
system, even in areas where the system might be argued to be more appropriate,
such as in the North, was increasingly recognised by the CO and the Nigerian
administration during the 1930s and 1940s. Indirect rule in the North, one official
was to write, made the area the home of ‘feudal graft and oppression’).17
A second problem came at the level of central administration. Congruent with
indirect rule was the idea that central administration would be a largely British
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preserve and that the western-educated Nigerians, being, it was assumed,
unrepresentative of the bulk of the population, could be ignored in the political
structures of the country. Implicit in the principle of indirect rule was the idea that if
political change was to come it would be evolutionary rather than revolutionary in
its progress and would begin from the bottom up; the western-educated Nigerian
would continue to be largely ignored at the central level. Yet well before World War II
it was clear that this assumption was in need of revision, not least because it failed to
account for the growing numbers of western-educated Nigerians produced by social
and economic change. The western-educated elite, still small in number but with a
long history of trenchant criticism of British rule behind it, was being reinforced by a
number of factors not least of which was the spread of educational opportunities
both within and without Nigeria; many Nigerians, of whom Nnamdi Azikiwe was but
the most prominent, returned during the 1930s and 1940s from study in British and
American universities.18 The pivotal role this elite would play in the future was
recognised by Bourdillon: 
It would be a great mistake to over-rate either their influence or the extent of the
interests which they represent. It would be a greater mistake still to under-rate
them. But the crowning mistake of all is to under-rate the sincerity of their
motives and to class them as mere mischief-makers. They have a great potential
for mischief. They have also a great potential capacity for good. Which way they
develop will depend to an enormous extent on the sympathy and understanding
which they receive from us.19
The various Nigerian political organisations that emerged in the inter-war years
attempted to articulate the political aspirations of these figures. Prominent among
these was the Nigerian National Democratic Party of Herbert Macaulay, formed in
the early 1920s, which won the Legislative Council elections for Lagos through most
of the inter-war years, but which despite its name, remained little more than a
Lagos-based organisation. In 1936 a further organisation, the Nigerian Youth
Movement, emerged and, helped by a sustained press campaign articulated by
Azikiwe—who since his return from the USA in the mid-1930s had been a prominent
journalist and editor—successfully challenged the NNDP to win the 1938 Lagos
Legislative Council and the Lagos town council elections; the particular significance
of the NYM was that it was the first such organisation to attempt to appeal across the
whole of Nigeria. Although it split between Samuel Akinsanya and Ernest Ikoli in the
early 1940s (with ethnic tensions seemingly coming to the fore), its Nigerian Youth
Charter of 1938 set out many of the key issues addressed by its successors and its
activities paved the way for the formation of the NCNC in August 1944 under
Macaulay as president and Azikiwe as secretary. 
These developments reinforced the thinking of figures in the administration in
the 1930s who believed that the constitution had to be revised to incorporate more
fully the western-educated Nigerian. Their re-thinking of policy was also stimu-
lated by broader changes in colonial attitudes. Lord Hailey’s African Survey, pub-
lished in 1938—and his subsequent Report on Nigeria 1940–1942—were pivotal to
these changing attitudes, though Hailey’s view of them was somewhat ambiguous;
he wished both to reinvigorate indirect rule and to encourage the integration of
the western-educated African into the wider political system.20 Also important was
the reconsideration of colonial social and economic policy that derived from the
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impact of the early 1930s depression and which culminated in the CD&W Act of
1940.21 The unrest in the West Indies that led to the establishment of the Moyne
commission of 1938–1939 reinforced this, as did—for West Africa more particu-
larly—the cocoa hold-up on the Gold Coast in 1937 that produced the Nowell
Commission.22
In the case of Nigeria, the period in office of both governor Cameron (1931–1935)
and governor Bourdillon (1935–1943) saw proposals emerge to reconsider the way
Nigeria was administered. Bourdillon in particular, was responsible for a number of
attempts to spell out such ideas particularly during the 1939–1942 period. In his
Memorandum on the future political development of Nigeria of September 1939,
which reinforced his earlier memorandum urging increased spending on social and
economic matters, he argued, like Hailey, that the critical need was to incorporate
the western-educated Nigerian into the political structures of the administration,
and went on to urge the need for increasing the pace of reform in order to give
Nigerians greater responsibility for their own affairs.23 He urged the need to increase
the number of Nigerians in the public service, to increase the responsibilities of the
existing NAs and to ensure that those Nigerians already on the Legislative Council
should be encouraged to play a more active part in the formulation and discussion of
legislation. He suggested too, that serious consideration should be given to
appointing a Nigerian to the Executive Council. 
Although this was a debate that had begun much earlier, the outbreak of war in
1939 was undoubtedly a significant moment in it. War gave Nigeria a new
importance to her imperial ruler, not least as a source of raw materials and
foodstuffs, but also in providing many thousands of troops (particularly for the fight
against the Japanese in Burma), and in its broader strategic value for the campaign
in North Africa. This importance was reflected in the creation of a resident minister
for West Africa in 1942. The war effort required government intervention in a whole
series of new activities. The significance of this, in that it showed how the
government could take on new responsibilities and functions within the colony if it
so wished, could not be gainsaid. War also led to major changes for colonies more
broadly. The emergence of the USA with its anti-colonial feelings, and the publicity
given to the ideas of self-determination expressed in article three of the ‘Atlantic
Charter’ of August 1941, all were signs that the wider world was changing; the
Atlantic Charter in particular had an important impact on Nigerian leaders like
Azikiwe.
The war years saw a ferment of discussion within the CO about the future of
Britain’s West African colonies and particularly Nigeria. Initially the CO took a
cautious position and emphasised Hailey’s rejection of the idea of unofficial
majorities in the legislative councils of the region. Yet there were powerful voices
urging significant changes concerning the place of the western-educated African in
the new structures that would be required after the war. In this a new generation of
officials, of whom Andrew Cohen (assistant secretary from 1943, assistant under-
secretary from 1947) was the most prominent, played a marked role. Pressures from
colonial administrations reinforced the views of this new generation. The Gold Coast
administration, and particularly governor Burns (who was also temporarily
responsible for Nigeria during part of 1942), led the way in this with Burns in 1941
proposing the appointment of unofficials to the Gold Coast Executive Council and
raising the issue of establishing an unofficial majority in the Legislative Council;
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Bourdillon supported these proposals and when attention turned to Nigeria, the need
for an unofficial majority in the legislative council was taken as read, at least by the
CO.24
One sign of the changing priorities of colonial policy came with the invitation to
eight West African journalists and editors—including Azikiwe—to visit Britain and
more specifically the CO, in 1943. The symbolism of the visit was significant; the CO
was recognising that the future lay with the western-educated elite. Azikiwe’s
memorandum, ‘The Atlantic Charter and British West Africa’, which demanded self-
government fifteen years after the end of the war, and which he presented to the CO
during his visit, was taken seriously as the policy of colonial reform gathered pace.25
‘This memorandum’, minuted Cohen, ‘is of interest not so much because of the
details of its contents, which are familiar, but for the aspirations which it represents.
It illustrates the strong feelings on the West Coast that HMG should show their hand
as to future policy, particularly in the sphere of constitutional development’.26
Although its conclusions were formally rejected, many of its ideas found later
expression in official policy. 
In this process of rethinking, the CO was not assuming the immediate
decolonisation of the African empire. On the contrary, the changes that officials were
proposing were designed to preserve British rule not end it. Even Bourdillon believed
that it would be at least 50 years before Nigeria was ready for such a move to be
contemplated.27 Nor was the acceptance of the ideas underlying this new emphasis of
policy automatic or general. Many in the CO itself remained sceptical as did others in
the colonial administration and particularly in the field. How to bring such figures
along with the new policy objectives emanating from London was to be a perennial
problem in these years. 
As the tide of war turned evidence of the emerging new approach could be seen in
Nigeria. In 1943 the first two Nigerians were appointed as members of the Executive
Council and the first Nigerians were appointed to senior service posts within the
administration.28 Bourdillon’s Further memorandum on the future political
development of Nigeria of October 1942 urged the integration of the Northern
provinces into the legislative council, the creation of regional councils and the
abolition of the distinction between official and unofficial members by allowing
official members to vote as they chose.29 Similarly, work began on a Nigerian
educational plan, prompted at least partly by pre-war proposals, approved by the West
African governors, for a West African University; in 1943 the Asquith and Elliott
Commissions to examine higher education in the colonies and in West Africa
respectively, were established.30 Work on a development plan for Nigeria was
inaugurated in 1944, following the decision that the 1940 CD&W Act would be
extended beyond 1951. The Nigerian administration submitted proposals in October
1944 for such a plan, and pointed out that the implementation of their proposals
would require a sharp increase in personnel and—more significantly—in numbers of
educated Nigerian staff.31
More specific ideas concerning post-war political structures in Nigeria began to be
spelt out within the CO, commencing with the memorandum on ‘Constitutional
development in West Africa’ produced in 1943 by O G R Williams, the head of the
West African Department.32 Williams’s memorandum, which was initially designed as
a briefing paper for Stanley’s visit to West Africa in late 1943, attempted to build on
Hailey’s ideas. He endorsed Hailey’s principle of the need to avoid rapid change but
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argued that it was important not to alienate the educated African and that this
required spelling out in detail precisely what the government’s ideas were. He
proposed a five-stage plan of progressive reform for the West African colonies
building from local government upwards. Only at stage four would an unofficial
majority be conceded on the legislative councils and only at stage five—which would
take ‘a good many years’—would self-government become an issue. 
Williams’s memorandum was discussed at a meeting in the CO involving Stanley
and Lord Hailey in July 1943.33 Three months later, Alexander Grantham, chief
secretary of Nigeria, gave the administration’s response.34 He broadly agreed with
Williams on the need for change but stressed that self-government was ‘very remote’
and urged the government to make it clear to Nigerians that it would be ‘many years’
before West Africa was ready for it. 
The significance of Williams’s proposals can be exaggerated, but clearly the
importance of his memorandum was that it enabled the broader debate about policy
for West Africa to coalesce around specific proposals and a broad timetable. Also
important in this process was the ill-health of Bourdillon during 1942 and 1943
which necessitated his departure in May and a consequent need to find a new
governor for Nigeria. This provided a major stimulus for the CO to think through
specific constitutional proposals for Nigeria and to articulate their future policy for
the colony. The appointment of Sir Arthur Richards as governor in November 1943,
marked this moment precisely. 
What was emerging in the CO in these years was a policy of managing colonial
reform in order to pre-empt the demand for self-government and draw the sting of a
still relatively unarticulated nationalism. It was unfortunate therefore that the
person the CO appointed as governor, while being the most experienced available,
was from the start, not entirely in sympathy with the line emanating from Church
House. On 19 November 1943, Richards met Stanley—fresh from his visit to West
Africa—to discuss reform of the Nigerian constitution (2).35 What was striking about
this meeting, although it expressed broad approval for the idea of an unofficial
majority in the Legislative Council, was Richards’ apparent reluctance to entertain
radical changes in case these upset the rulers of the North. From the start, a gulf
appeared to be opening between Richards and the CO over the extent of reform to be
proposed for Nigeria and, crucially, over the degree to which the North should
determine the pace of constitutional change.36 ‘It would be wrong to go too fast’,
stated Richards (2).
When in July 1944 Richards’s first draft of the constitution was ready it owed
much to Hailey’s and Bourdillon’s ideas, as seen in the proposals to establish three
regional councils and to bring the North under the Legislative Council’s remit for
the first time (3). Yet it also owed much to Lugard in continuing the pre-1914
boundary between North and South and in its failure to break up the North into
more than one unit. Here lay the genesis of many later problems, for implicit in
Richards’s approach was an acceptance of the North as the dominant part of Nigeria.
More generally, it represented little advance on the 1922 arrangements. Richards in
fact proposed official majorities in the Legislative Council and in the regional
councils—which in the latter case could only discuss policy and advise by
resolution—and proposed the abolition of the four directly elected members
representing Lagos and Calabar that had existed since the 1920s. Cohen was
disappointed with the scheme in that the draft did not, in his view, mark any advance
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on the status quo, particularly because it did not include an unofficial majority in the
Legislative Council (4). The educated African, he felt, would dismiss the proposals as
‘reactionary’ and he made it clear where his own sympathies lay. The tension
between what Cohen felt was necessary and what Richards was prepared to accept
meant that revision was necessary (5, 6). Indeed when Richards’s revised proposals
were forwarded to the CO in December 1944—now including unofficial majorities in
the regional councils and the Legislative Council and the continuation of direct
elections for Lagos and Calabar—they required still further revision by Cohen, before
they could be laid before the Legislative Council on 5 March as sessional paper no 4
of 1945 (7).37
Even then the secretary of state in his official response of 4 December 1945 revised
the scheme further (21).38 George Hall altered the numbers of officials and
unofficials in the Legislative Council and in the regional councils in order to reduce
their overall size and increase the unofficial majorities. In addition, Hall cut the
number of seats reserved for special interests (such as business and commerce) from
four to three and reduced the electoral qualification for adult males in Lagos and
Calabar from £100 income p.a. to £50. 
The publication of Richards’s constitutional proposals represented the keystone of
the CO’s post-war policy for Nigeria, but they were only part of a much broader
course of political, economic and educational change for the colony being promoted
in the years after 1945. Other policy initiatives considered in the early to mid-1940s
bore fruit once the war ended. The revised ten-year plan for development and welfare
was presented to the Legislative Council at the end of 1945.39 It proposed to spend
£55 million over the following ten years; £23 million of this would come from the
CD&W funds with the rest from Nigerian revenues or loans. Proposals for ‘mass
education’—what might better be described as ‘community development’—were
initiated, building on the renowned project at Udi (36). In 1946 the Elliott
Commission recommended the creation of three universities in West Africa; initially
the recommendation of the minority report that only one should be established, but
that this should be built in Nigeria at Ibadan, was taken up and the University College
of Ibadan began admitting students in 1948 (27).40 A scheme for commodity
marketing boards, designed in part to protect producers from the vagaries of sharp
price changes on the world market, led to the inauguration of the Nigerian Cocoa
Marketing Board in 1947.41 Proposals for Africanisation in the administration were
considered, though tempered by the belief held by some that this would lead to
increased corruption and inefficiency. Meanwhile the Bristol Hotel incident of early
1947 caused Richards to make a statement to the Legislative Council condemning
racial discrimination and stimulated the Nigerian government to issue a circular
against it (31, 32).42 Other political structures were not ignored. Creech Jones’s
renowned local government despatch of 1947 prompted consideration of local
government reform—soon underway for the eastern provinces—and implied a
greater role for western-educated Nigerians at the local government level (50).
For Richards the social, economic and educational measures of this new line were
a good deal more congenial than the modifications to the constitutional proposals
that the CO had obliged him to accept. The problem however was that far from being
welcomed by Nigerian leaders, Richards’s constitutional proposals in particular, and
his approach more generally, were to come under considerable criticism from the
start, as they clearly fell short of the hopes that had emerged among some Nigerians
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during the war. Part of Richards’s problem was his unwillingness to take seriously
the views of such western-educated Nigerians. This was reinforced by the wider
situation within which he was having to operate. The severe social and economic
dislocation in Nigeria following the ending of the war was not the most conducive
context within which to launch major constitutional reforms. In particular the
inflation that had characterised the war years had severely eroded the wages of public
sector employees and lay behind the general strike that broke out in June 1945
(11).43
The general strike, which lasted over five weeks before the promise of a
commission of inquiry into public sector pay levels brought about a return to work,
while overblown as a symptom of nationalist unrest was to have significant
consequences for the rest of Richards’s governorship (17, 26).44 Although not
initiated in reaction to Richards’s constitutional proposals, the strike was to have a
major impact on their reception for it poisoned the governor’s relations with
Nigerian leaders, and confirmed him in his view of Azikiwe—as seen in the banning
in June of Azikiwe’s West African Pilot and Daily Comet—as an irresponsible and
dangerous figure (18).45
Azikiwe grew in political stature during the strike. Although it was generated by
economic factors in the articulation of which Azikiwe had had little part, his quick
move to express support for the strikers and his use of his papers to publicise their
grievances finally confirmed his emergence as a genuinely national leader. His
allegations in July 1945 about a government-inspired plot to have him assassinated
reinforced this (16). Significant was the extensive publicity Azikiwe achieved in the
USA over the next twelve months concerning this alleged plot. The difficulty he
posed for the administration can be seen in Richards’s somewhat hysterical call for a
Navy frigate to be sent to Lagos when, in November, talk of a further strike
developed.46
The situation into which the Richards’s proposals emerged in March 1945 was
therefore not the most auspicious. In the event only one unofficial, Dr N Olusoga,
opposed the scheme in the Legislative Council. More importantly however, the
NCNC, established but seven months earlier, made clear from the start its view that
Richards’s proposals were not acceptable (8). It objected to the lack of consultation,
to the fact that that the electoral principle was limited to Lagos and Calabar, and that
special interests still retained representation in the Legislative Council. It
complained that the unofficial majorities in the proposals were more apparent than
real because the number of unofficials included chiefs who were government
functionaries in all but name. In addition, the NCNC focused on the four so-called
‘Obnoxious Ordinances’ of March 1945—the minerals ordinance, the public lands
acquisition ordinance, the crown lands (amendment) ordinance and the
appointment and deposition of chiefs (amendment) ordinance—which although in
reality doing little more than regularising the legal position in each instance,
appeared to be increasing the government’s powers over land and resources and over
chiefly appointments. 
The controversy concerning the constitutional proposals, like the simultaneous
uproar concerning the general strike, was important in reinforcing the NCNC’s posi-
tion at the head of critics of British rule. Although the NYM still played an active part
in these events, it was clearly the NCNC that was now the major organisation among
such critics. Its decision to launch a fund-raising tour around Nigeria in 1946—in
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order to send a delegation to London to protest against Richards’s scheme—further
emphasised its nation-wide appeal, an appeal reinforced by the death of Macaulay dur-
ing the tour and Azikiwe’s subsequent assumption of the leadership of the organisa-
tion. The meeting of the NCNC delegation with the secretary of state in London in
August 1947, and its presentation of a memorandum outlining its objections to the
constitution, confirmed the organisation’s newly achieved status (38).
Yet, significantly, not all Nigerian politicians accepted the NCNC’s claims to speak
for Nigeria. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a northern member of the Legislative Council,
rejected an invitation to join the London delegation, and in the Council in March
1947 expressed his concerns at talk of independence before the North was ready;
more ominously he referred to the North continuing its ‘interrupted conquest to the
sea’.47 Equally, the Daily Service, hostile to Azikiwe’s papers, repeated serious and
unanswered allegations about the mismanagement of funds by the London
delegation. Further evidence of the polarisation of Nigerian politics came with
clashes between Igbo and Yoruba in Lagos in 1948 and the formal establishment in
Nigeria in June of that year of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a Yoruba cultural
organisation first set up in London in 1945 and in which Obafemi Awolowo was to be
prominent; this was followed in late 1948 by the transformation of the Ibo Federal
Union into the Ibo State Union with Azikiwe as president, with its aim to organise the
Igbo people into a political unit (46, 52). In turn the rump NYM became an
increasingly Yoruba-dominated body. Politics was polarising around ethnic
identities. ‘I am very much concerned about the growth of ill-feeling between the
Yorubas and the Ibos’, noted Macpherson, ‘and I am inclined to think . . . that 
the Society [Egbe Omo Oduduwa] is mainly concerned with resistance to Zik and the
Ibos rather than with a constructive programme. . . . It has certainly been very active
in the past few months and in its resistance to the Ibos, if in little else, it can claim
considerable early success’.48 These divisions, undoubtedly reinforcing and
reinforced by the polarities reflected in Richards’s creation of regional councils, were
significant pointers to the future and meant that the NCNC’s period at the head of a
united Nigerian opposition to the administration was brief. After launching its
‘Freedom Charter’ at its Kaduna convention in April 1948, the NCNC passed into a
period of relative quiescence (45). When it re-asserted itself in 1951 it was as an
increasingly Igbo-dominated body. 
The ‘Richards’ constitution came into operation in January 1947. Within months
its author had retired. Richards went reluctantly, feeling that the work he had begun
was still unfinished but clearly the CO was determined on a change, for his attempts
to obtain an extension of his term of office were firmly rebuffed.49 His successor, Sir
John Macpherson, was appointed in November 1947 and took up office in April 1948,
accompanied by a new chief secretary, Hugh Foot, who was clearly convinced of the
desirability of further constitutional advance. 
The failure of the constitutional proposals was not entirely Richards’s fault. The
CO was being unrealistic in believing that Nigerian leaders would meekly accept
whatever package was offered to them, particularly if such a package emerged from
deliberations within the confines of Church House. Yet in retrospect, Richards had
been an unfortunate appointment. Although Creech Jones tried to sweeten the pill by
expressing his admiration for what the governor had achieved, it was clear that
Richards had too little sympathy with the policies that had emerged in the CO during
the war years to be fully at ease in such a critical post in Nigeria.50 He had little time
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for the educated African, and little vision of what was needed in the situation facing
Nigeria after 1945. His limited understanding of the problem could be seen at the
November 1947 African Governors’ conference in London, where, in taking the side
of the NA chiefs against what he saw as the dangerous theorists of the CO, he stood
firmly behind an older tradition of colonial thought. A peerage, as Lord Milverton of
Lagos and Clifton, was his compensation, but even from the Lords he continued his
criticisms of what he was to call ‘the intellectual dreamers of Whitehall’ (127). 
Macpherson’s appointment was therefore seen by the CO as an opportunity for a
fresh start after the hiatus of the Richards years and a chance to regain the ground
lost during 1945–1947. The situation facing Macpherson when he arrived in Nigeria
was in fact a critical one. Two months earlier, in February 1948, serious rioting broke
out in Accra. In themselves these riots meant little for Nigeria, but they were
followed by the appointment of the Watson Commission to examine the background
to the violence. The commission’s report, when completed later that year, made a
number of far-reaching recommendations, and in particular that the 1946 Gold
Coast constitution should be radically reshaped to give a much greater role for
Africans in the administration of the territory. With this went an emphasis on the
need to speed up moves towards eventual self-government.51 The report of the
Coussey Committee at the end of 1949 further recommended the introduction of
ministerial government with Africans responsible for government departments; by
February 1951 Kwame Nkrumah had become leader of government business in the
Gold Coast and the territory was moving towards self-government. 
These, relatively rapid, developments in the Gold Coast had their impact on
Nigeria, though the precise nature of that impact is difficult to assess without
turning to counter-factual arguments. The administration certainly feared the
knock-on effect of Gold Coast developments on Nigeria, but the expected uproar over
the Watson Report for example, failed to materialise. None the less, the pace of
change in the Gold Coast meant it was difficult if not impossible to delay change in
Nigeria. It was too easy for Nigerian leaders to point to developments in their near-
neighbour and argue for the application to Nigeria of similar measures.52 Certainly
Macpherson was concerned at what he saw as the pressures within Nigeria generated
by the changes occurring in the Gold Coast. Although it was not until 1951 that he
specifically complained to the CO of the way the pace of change in the former was
undermining his more measured approach in Nigeria, his unease about Gold Coast
developments was evident from an early date (49). 
The chief problem facing the administration as Macpherson arrived in Nigeria was
the development of a much more radical brand of nationalism and how to contain it.
The period from 1948 through to 1950 saw the emergence to prominence of militant
organisations like the Zikists, the perceived threat of Soviet infiltration, an attempt
on the life of the chief secretary and widespread rioting following the Enugu
shootings in November 1949. This unrest not only raised the possibility, admittedly
faint, that the administration would loose control of the Nigerian situation, but
threatened to undermine the whole thrust of CO strategy to Nigeria since the war. 
The Zikist movement had emerged in late 1945 through the initiative of younger
followers of Azikiwe and had been formally inaugurated early the following year. By 1948
its popular appeal, at least among younger and more radical elements, was growing.
Although not linked directly with Azikiwe, who kept an ambiguous distance, its
name reflected the movement’s admiration of his work and reinforced his appeal
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among such figures. The Zikist movement,—estimated by the administration to have
a membership of 800–900 at most—focused around an ill-defined philosophy of
‘Zikism’ and developed its own flag, symbols and songs.53 However vague its ideology
may have been, its programme was clear in its objective which was self-government.
Its activities were characterised by increasingly strident demands for militant action
against British rule that in time began to approach calls for a violent uprising. This
was talk rather than action, but it was talk that the authorities refused to ignore.
When a leading Zikist, Osita Agwuna, in a lecture given in October 1948 entitled ‘A
call for revolution’ made a public call for a revolutionary struggle against British rule
and appealed for ‘positive action’, he was arrested and, along with other Zikist leaders
and the journalist Tony Enahoro, who chaired the lecture, tried and imprisoned for
sedition (57).54 The attempt by a Zikist in February 1950 to assassinate Foot was
followed by a sharp clamp down on the movement and in April 1950 by its banning
(100). Thereafter the Zikist movement became effectively moribund. 
The actual threat posed by militant nationalism in Nigeria never became serious,
but its potential in 1948 was, as far as the administration was concerned, significant.
What gave this militant nationalism its potency was the broader international
background against which these developments were occurring and wider fears of
Soviet expansionism in these years. Concern was expressed, though no evidence ever
found, of Azikiwe’s links to the USSR.55 The main fear of Soviet penetration in
Nigeria in this period concerned finance (132). Soviet subsidies to Nigerian trade
unions, it was believed, were considerable.56 However, fears were also expressed
concerning Marxist literature entering the country and strong objections voiced
about Azikiwe’s papers and their willingness to report sympathetically the Soviet side
of arguments at the UNO. Although very few individual communists or fellow-
travellers were ever identified in Nigeria, it was believed that Nigerian students
overseas and Nigerian visitors to international conferences were being subverted and
that firm action to prevent the growth of communism in the country was needed.57
In fact the degree of Soviet influence in the late 1940s and early 1950s in Nigeria
was extremely circumscribed. There was no meaningful Soviet involvement in
Nigerian politics in these years, as the FO report on communism in Africa in June
1951 was to confirm (115). Never the less the fear was very real, as were the actions
taken by the administration to contain any potential Soviet threat. 1948 indeed saw a
wide-ranging review of security measures within Nigeria, prompted by Creech
Jones’s circular of 5 August 1948 (53).58 Not least, measures were considered to try to
control bank accounts to prevent Soviet subsidies entering the country and there was
talk of banning Nkrumah if he ever proposed visiting Nigeria.59 In 1948 the CO
created the post of police adviser to the secretary of state concerning security matters
generally and the official visited West Africa in early 1949 to review policing and the
intelligence-gathering apparatus. Furthermore, counter-measures to deal with
Soviet influence in West Africa were agreed at a meeting in Accra of representatives
of the territories in early 1951 and a broad swathe of measures to contain the
putative Soviet threat were developed. Intelligence reports were drawn up, the post
monitored, measures to influence broadcasting devised, communist literature
entering the country seized, academic employees at Ibadan University College vetted
and communists banned. 
Such concern at unrest—real or imagined—characterised policy in the 1948–50
period and was central to Macpherson’s decisions once he took up office. His
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approach was two-fold, to crush the unrest and to push on with constitutional
advance. On the one hand firm measures were taken to contain possible threats,
hence the actions he took against Agwuna and leading Zikists in late 1948 and the
subsequent banning of the organisation. On the other, the decision was taken to
pursue further constitutional reform. Soon after his arrival in Nigeria, the new
governor called a meeting in Government House to discuss the constitution, the
conclusion of which was that it should be scrapped and a new one drawn up.60 On 17
August 1948 Macpherson announced this decision to the Legislative Council. The
gloss was that the constitution had been such a success that Nigeria was ready for
further changes, several years before the nine years originally contemplated, but
little could disguise the fact that Richards’s proposals had failed in their task of
gaining the consent of Nigerian leaders. The only solution was a fresh start, as
Macpherson realised. ‘We couldn’t put a ring fence around Nigeria’, he wrote later
about his deliberations in this period, ‘we had to take the initiative and not wait to be
overtaken by events’ (153). 
Macpherson’s ‘constitution mongering’ was to be a long-drawn out affair lasting
for a period of some three years from his statement to the Legislative Council in
August 1948. The intention behind this lengthy process was to ensure that as wide an
array of views as possible within Nigeria should be expressed, thus undermining one
of the NCNC’s main criticisms of Richards. But it was designed too, to allow the
process to be channelled by the administration; Macpherson’s aim in this, no less
than Richards’s had been, was to marginalise the NCNC by judicious but controlled
reform. Macpherson set his face firmly against the NCNC demand for a constituent
assembly; his aim was to call in the ‘masses’—and not least the NA chiefs—as a
counterweight to the educated ‘classes’ of the NCNC. He outlined to the CO in
January 1949 the constitutional changes he hoped would result from this
consultative process: greater regional autonomy, a decrease in the number of official
members of the various regional houses and the Legislative Council, more scope for
unofficials to act, and steps, albeit limited, towards an embryonic ministerial system
as were occurring in the Gold Coast (61). 
In the short term at least, Macpherson’s strategy was effective. He proposed that
the process of constitutional reform would begin in the Legislative Council—in itself
a contrast with Richards’s approach four years earlier—with the setting up of a select
committee, ‘that we might consider together what changes should be made’ as he
said (65). Thereafter the intention, outlined by Foot in his speech to the Legislative
Council on 11 March 1949, was to establish village, divisional and provincial
meetings throughout Nigeria where as broad as possible an array of opinion could be
canvassed. Over the next few months such meetings were initiated, culminating in
regional conferences for the East, North, West and Lagos which made
recommendations to a Constitutional Drafting Committee, headed by Foot, which in
turn drew up proposals to put to the General Conference held in Ibadan in January
1950 (87, 90). 
The process of constitutional consultation was accompanied by other measures to
increase the role of Nigerians in the administration. One of the most notable of these
was the decision in May 1948 to establish a commission under Foot to look at the
Nigerianisation of senior posts in the government service—a necessity given the new
functions the colonial state was taking on in these years. The Foot Commission,
which included Azikiwe among its members, recommended that ‘no non-Nigerian
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should be recruited for any Government post except where no suitable and qualified
Nigerian is available’.61 In addition it recommended the establishment of public
service boards to oversee appointments, and that a number of government
scholarships over the following three years should be awarded for the training of
Nigerians for the public service. Not least of the changes represented by the Foot
commission was the new tone it evinced concerning the government’s attitudes
towards educated Nigerians; in 1948 some 208 Nigerians were employed in the
senior service, by 1951 this had reached 597 (145).
Equally in education, 1948 saw a changing emphasis towards Nigerians that
Macpherson was quick to encourage. The 1948 Education Ordinance, already in
process, set up education boards, launched increased spending on education and
gave NAs the right to levy education rates to pay for schools. This approach,
coinciding with the measures for mass education and the opening of University
College, Ibadan, earlier that year, showed the degree to which the pre-war hesitations
over the relationship between the NA system and the educated Nigerian had been
resolved; the long-term future of Nigeria lay with the latter. 
This could be seen too in the reform of local government initiated by Creech
Jones’s despatch of 1947 and which proceeded apace under Macpherson. The aim was
to attempt the democratisation of local government by progressively abandoning the
old NA system where power lay almost exclusively with a chief and his council. The
Eastern provinces—where ‘chiefly’ power had been progressively abandoned since
1929—were the first to initiate reforms, for in this region there was already
considerable debate among officials about the need for change, as reflected in the
1949 Gibbons Report.62 The appointment of a select committee of the Eastern House
of Assembly in August 1948, initiated a process which culminated in the creation of a
three-tier network of county, district and local councils in the Eastern Region Local
Government Ordinance which received royal assent in 1950 (86). This structure was
accompanied by the extension of the elective principle, the integration of the
educated Nigerian into the NA system and the reduction of the functions of the DO
vis-à-vis local government. 
Reform in the East was followed, in 1949, by moves to initiate reform of local
government in the West and the North. The West was first in this (159), with the
Western Region Local Government Ordinance receiving royal assent in February
1953, and, as in the East, establishing both a three-tier system of divisional, dis-
trict and local councils and the elective principle; it was followed shortly there-
after by legislation to systematise succession to chieftaincies. The North was
slower to proceed along this road, even though it was the critical region for local
government reform, given the strength there of the NA system, and the determi-
nation both of elements in the CO to urge its reform and of elements in the field
service to protect the position of the ruling caste in the region. The Maddocks and
Pott Report of 1950 surveyed the existing situation in the region, and was consid-
ered by a select committee of the Northern Regional Council in mid-1951.63 Then
progress slowed. The CO considered that reform of the North was urgent, as
indeed did the Lagos administration, but the fact that most of the members of the
select committee belonged to the ruling caste in the North made radical reform
unlikely, at least in the short term.64 Only in 1952 were the first steps taken when
the system of the sole NA in the North was abolished and replaced by the ‘chief-
in-council’ (147). 
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By late 1949, much of the ground lost in the Richards era had been made up.
However, Macpherson’s policy was to come under serious strain with the Enugu
shootings of 18 November 1949 (79, 80). The shootings at the Iva Valley mine near
Enugu, which resulted from a bungled attempt by the police to remove explosives
from a store during a miners’ strike, led to 21 deaths and to widespread rioting across
the Eastern provinces. This was a critical moment for the policy of managed reform
and one that threatened to undo everything Macpherson had achieved since his
arrival nineteen months earlier. 
The rioting, encouraged in many areas by local Zikists, led to a three-week state of
emergency (83). These weeks represented the one moment in the post-war Nigerian
story when violence against British rule became relatively widespread. In themselves
however the significance of these riots can be exaggerated; they were always
containable and at no point did the security forces ever look like losing control. But
much more important than the riots themselves were the political developments that
followed them. The uproar that accompanied the shootings led to a rapprochement
of the various political organisations in Nigeria—divided as they had been by ethnic
tension in 1948—around the National Emergency Committee, with Dr Akinola Maja
as president, and Mbonu Ojike as secretary, and with Azikiwe prominent among its
backers. For the next twelve months or so, until its collapse in late 1950, the NEC
threatened to provide the united opposition to the administration that had been
lacking for most of the period since the Igbo-Yoruba tensions in Lagos in 1948 (111). 
However, the combination of a security clamp-down on the rioters together with
the appointment of the Fitzgerald Commission—which reported in June 1950—to
look into the causes of the shootings, succeeded in buying the administration time.65
The breathing space thus gained, allowed the constitutional consultations to
proceed. The Ibadan General Conference met in January 1950 with fifty-three
members, of whom all but three were Nigerian, and considered the
recommendations proposed by the Constitutional Drafting Committee (90). The
conference recommended increased regional autonomy, increased legislative powers
for regional houses, a degree of ministerial responsibility and a commission to
examine financial allocations between the centre and the regions: precisely the ideas
that Macpherson had outlined to the CO at the start of this process. More radical
suggestions by NCNC representatives were marginalised at Ibadan as were demands
for the creation of several smaller regions. 
From Macpherson’s point of view the conference represented a triumph, not least
coming so soon after the Enugu shootings. However the conference was also the
moment when the issue of relations between North and South began to come into
sharp focus and an issue that was to bedevil Nigerian politics throughout these years
and after, moved firmly to centre stage. What was striking about the Ibadan
conference was the sharpening of regional tensions over several issues including
whether Lagos should be treated as part of the West or as a separate, quasi-federal
territory, over the boundary between the North and the West, where large numbers
of Muslim Yorubas in the North were separated from their compatriots in the West,
and, above all, over the demand of the Northern delegates that the North should be
given parity with the combined Eastern and Western Regions in the number of seats
in the future central legislature or House of Representatives, and thus effectively be
the dominant element in Nigeria (117). This latter demand was accompanied by the
threat from two Northern delegates that the North would go its own way if their
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demand was not accepted: secession, as so often in these years, was the threat the
North was prepared to use to get its way.66 These issues were of such divisive import
that the question of the composition of the central legislature had to be left
unresolved in the conference recommendations. 
Northern leaders looked on with unease at the changes that were being considered
at Ibadan. Underlying this lay broader fears held by many in the North concerning the
whole pace of change in Nigeria since the Northern provinces were brought under the
remit of the Legislative Council after the war. For the Northern rulers, established in
their NAs and with their authority reinforced under the indirect rule system, the pace
of proposed reform seemed to threaten their power and thereby their whole political
and social—and indeed religious—position. At root, their unease coalesced around
the increased influence of educated southerners under the reforms proposed by the
administration. For these Northerners, Nigerianisation meant ‘southernisation’, for
the western-educated Nigerian of the urban areas of the south would be best placed to
take advantage of the changes Britain was proposing; the offices being created by the
constitutional proposals would, it was feared, go to southerners with their more devel-
oped education system. In the longer term the concern was that an independent
Nigeria would be a Nigeria dominated by the South. 
This was not entirely a universal response in the North. Indeed not only were there
significant differences of emphasis between individual Northern leaders, but also
between representatives of the larger and smaller emirates, and between the Hausa-
Fulani emirates generally and Bornu. Significant too was the fact that the Middle
Belt did not share the religious, ethnic or social identities of the majority and that
organisations were beginning to emerge to stress its distinctive interests in these
changes; in 1950 the Middle Zone League was established. Perhaps most important
of these tensions however, was that which began to emerge between the radicals and
populists on the one hand and those of a more conservative bent on the other. 
During late 1948 the first significant political grouping to develop in the North,
the Jam’iyyar Mutanen Arewa, or Northern Peoples’ Congress, emerged; in
December 1949 it held its first formal convention in Kano.67 Initially intended as a
largely cultural organisation for educated Northerners, the NPC soon took on a more
overt political slant. The party split in August 1950 with the more radical elements,
who were to be joined by Aminu Kano a few months later, breaking away to form the
Northern Elements Progressive Union with its dedication to the emancipation of 
the talakawa (commoner class) of the North. Aminu Kano was thereafter to be the
leading light of these more radical elements in the region. The split of 1950 left 
the NPC temporarily moribund, until it was revived as a straight-forward political
party, but with clear links to the rulers of the NAs of the North, in October 1951. The
revived NPC, in which its vice-president, the Sardauna of Sokoto, was the dominant
influence, was thereafter to lead the way in opposing many of the more radical
suggestions emanating from southern leaders. 
For these Northern figures, parity of seats with the South in the proposed central
House of Representatives was the essential first step to protect their interests in any
new constitution. For Southerners however, such parity represented a Northern
‘veto’, and a potential block on their aspirations for self-government in the near
future. There seemed little chance, either at Ibadan or thereafter, that these two
positions could be reconciled. The deadlock meant considerable delay over the
constitutional issue during 1950 in order to find a solution. 
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When the Ibadan recommendations were considered by the Legislative Council
early in 1950 and then by the UK Cabinet in May, the question had to be left open
(106). The delays however represented a form of brinkmanship by the North—
including a threat to send a delegation to London to argue their case—which
eventually worked.68 When in September the Legislative Council debated the report
of a select committee on the constitutional proposals, the issue of the representation
of the North was resolved by agreement that it should indeed have half the seats in
the proposed House of Representatives; the representatives from the East, worried at
the implications of Northern intransigence for constitutional advance broadly and
more specifically the dangers implied in Northern threats of secession, gave in. This
was not without controversy, with the three elected Lagos members of the Council,
including Azikiwe, continuing to object to the grant of parity to the North and
urging the use of a bicameral legislature to safeguard Northern interests. 
Northern intransigence over these constitutional changes suited British interests.
Macpherson was pleased at the outcome and described it as ‘extremely satisfactory’
(117). The counter-balance to NCNC radicalism that the NPC represented was
welcomed by many in the CO and the administration. Throughout this period there
were figures, particularly in the Northern administration, who, if not directly
encouraging Northern resistance to Southern demands, certainly did little to
overcome it. There was a community of interest between the North and the
administration more broadly. This went back a long way; British officials were
undoubtedly concerned to protect Northern interests from the start of the
constitutional changes that had begun in 1943.69 Yet it would be wrong to infer from
this a deliberate policy of ‘divide and rule’. For one thing, Northern intransigence to
Southern radicalism did not need British encouragement, and for another, Northern
leaders made clear, on more than one occasion, their ability to challenge British
interests when it suited them to do so. In any case, British interests were simple: the
unity of Nigeria was central to CO aims. The greatest fear for the CO, right up to
1960, was the danger of secession and particularly, through by no means exclusively,
secession by the North. Avoiding this required, the CO believed, the building in to
the constitutional changes demanded by Southern leaders, safeguards for Northern
interests. The acceptance of Northern parity in the House of Representatives in 1950
was by no means the last of these. 
The other issue to cause problems following the Ibadan conference was that of the
powers of ministers in the proposed constitution (123, 124). The select committee of
the Legislative Council had proposed a central Council of Ministers, with ministers
having the power to formulate policy and to direct executive action in conjunction
with heads of department. Macpherson resisted the idea of ministerial responsibility
in favour of what he termed a conciliar system with ministers’ powers left
deliberately vague in the hope that in time they could flexibly be adjusted. He was
conscious of developments in the Gold Coast where considerable power was being
conceded to ministers at this time, but felt that Nigeria was not ready for such
advance. He was keen therefore that while ministers should propose policy, officials
should be responsible for executing it, in partnership with ministers. He still saw
officials—subject to the governor—as the dominant figures in this relationship, at
least for the initial phase of the constitution’s existence. For Nigerian leaders
however, this was inadequate and ministerial responsibility in the fullest sense was
essential if the constitutional changes were to have meaning.
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Late in 1950 the CO expressed concern about the ill-definition of this minister-
official relationship (123, 127). The CO view was that the vagueness meant in
practice that it would not work for long, and that the precise degree to which
ministers could direct officials had to be spelt out in advance: ‘ministers should have
no reason to believe that the Secretariat is the real power behind the throne or that
the ministers are merely figureheads’.70 Once again the CO was showing itself as
being in advance of the views of the administration, for the CO was prepared to
accept, if necessary, a much greater degree of ministerial responsibility than
Macpherson. 
The constitution was finally approved in mid-1951 and came into effect in
November.71 Popularly called the ‘Macpherson constitution’, it established a House of
Representatives of 148, of which 6 seats were reserved for special interests and 6 for
officials.72 Of the remaining 136 seats, the North was to have 68, the remaining 68
being divided equally between the two southern regions; members would be elected
by the regional Houses. The constitution also set up a Council of Ministers of six
officials together with twelve unofficials as ministers but without a prime minister.
At the heart of the constitution was the formalisation it gave to the regionalism that
the 1947 constitution had initiated. Legislative powers were given to the regional
Houses of Assembly (those in the North and West also having a second chamber in
the form of a House of Chiefs) and the regional chief commissioners became
lieutenant-governors; regional Executive Councils were also established. The
principle that underlay British policy towards Nigeria right through to 1960—of
reassurance to the North coupled with constitutional advances for the South—was
clearly apparent.
In addition the constitution regularised the position of the Cameroons as part of
Nigeria. The territory had been visited by a UNO mission in late 1949 which had
issued a generally favourable report on the UK administration; more specifically it
had approved the integration of the Northern Cameroons into the Northern Region
and the administration of the Southern Cameroons as part of the Eastern Region (92,
96). The 1951 constitution reserved thirteen seats in the Eastern Region House of
Assembly for the Southern Cameroons and seven in the House of Representatives;
one seat in the Executive Council was also allocated to the territory.
Macpherson felt pleased with the outcome. He had achieved the general principles
of the proposals that he had outlined to the CO in early 1949 and had done so despite
the Enugu shootings and the ensuing unrest. For Macpherson at least, the
constitution had regained the ground lost by Richards and had done so while
sticking to the measured approach first articulated during the war by O G R
Williams. While designed to evolve over time, the 1951 provisions were seen as an
end in themselves rather than the start of a process leading to self-government in the
foreseeable future; Macpherson spoke at this time of his view that independence was
at least thirty years in the future.73
For the success of the new constitution, much depended on the outcome of the
elections scheduled for late 1951. These were indirect elections, operating through
an electoral college system on a taxpayer suffrage. In these elections the AG won 44
out of the 80 seats in the Western Region, (though many of the NCNC opposition
defected to the AG thereafter), the NCNC 65 (soon increased to 72 by defections) in
the Eastern Region and the NPC a majority in the North. The resulting regional
Houses then chose members from their House for the House of Representatives and
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in practice a winner-takes-all approach by the majority party came into effect; only
the two seats reserved for Lagos in the House of Representatives—to be chosen from
the Western House of Assembly—and which had voted for the NCNC broke this
pattern.
The problem indeed came with the five Lagos seats in the Western House of
Assembly. These had been won by NCNC representatives, including Azikiwe.
Azikiwe’s determination was thereby to gain one of the two Lagos seats in the House
of Representatives, and to ensure this he arranged for three of the NCNC
representatives to refuse nomination in order to allow himself to have a clear run. At
the last moment however two of the three, Adeleke Adedoyin and Ibiyinka Olorun-
Nimbe, refused to honour the agreement and Azikiwe failed to be nominated.74 The
situation thus resulted that the leading figure of Nigerian nationalism since the war,
and an easterner to boot, remained the leader of the opposition in the Western House
of Assembly, circumstances that made the NCNC more determined than ever to
break the 1951 constitution. 
The constitutional crisis of 1953
In the event, the constitution that had taken nearly three years to devise was to last
for a mere 15 months or so. At root was the fact that what had seemed appropriate to
Nigeria in 1948 was no longer relevant to the situation when the constitution came
into operation in late 1951. Although Macpherson believed he had given Nigeria ‘a
constitution that is in advance of its true capacity’, circumstances had changed and
few Nigerian leaders would have shared the governor’s view (153). By May 1953
indeed, the constitution had effectively collapsed under the weight of its own
weaknesses.
There were two problems with the constitution from the start. Firstly, although
Macpherson had seen the constitution as something that could grow and develop
over time as Nigerian leaders became more experienced in operating it, its provisions
fell well short of what were, by 1951, Nigerian aspirations. This particularly
concerned the powers of the Council of Ministers which first met at the start of 1952
with four members each from the AG, the NCNC and the NPC. The question
concerned ministerial responsibility, the issue that Macpherson had left deliberately
vague in drawing up the proposals. Very quickly the aspirations of ministers to run
departments became apparent. This related in turn to the question of collective
responsibility. Ministers were expected to be collectively responsible to the House of
Representatives for policy decisions, yet did not have the power to instruct officials
concerning the execution of those decisions. Further, the lack of a prime minister—
in a Council of Ministers made up of three different parties—inevitably led to
problems. Party political considerations generated increasing suspicion between
ministers and led to deadlock. 
This was related to a second problem. In its formalisation of regionalism the
constitution gave great encouragement to ethnic tensions in Nigeria. Ethnic
tensions long pre-dated 1951, but the constitution of that year fatally exacerbated
this problem. This was because of the relationship between the central House of
Representatives and the regional Houses of Assembly, and the provision that
members of the former would be elected by members of the latter. The ‘winner-
takes-all’ principle meant that power at the centre depended on power in the region
and encouraged regional ethnic solidarity; in turn this stimulated appeals to ethnic
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minorities by rival parties in order to undermine that solidarity. Any chances of a
genuinely national party appealing broadly across Nigeria were stymied by the
constitution. 
Such centrifugal forces were in turn related to the position of the North. For the
North, despite their victory over the issue of parity of representation at the centre,
the 1951 constitution did not offer sufficient safeguards. The degree of regional
autonomy it offered was less than Northern leaders wished, given their concerns that
concessions to Southern leaders at the central level would simply facilitate southern
domination over the North in the future. The view of Northern leaders was that if
further concessions at the centre were to be made then much greater regional
autonomy was necessary. Thus the two problems with the constitution—lack of
ministerial responsibility and ethnic tension—inter-related and, as will be seen, were
to do so in a fatal way during 1952 and 1953. 
With time, these problems might have been resolved. However, the problem was
the pace of change in the Gold Coast. In early 1952 Nkrumah became prime minister
and ministerial responsibility was conceded by governor Sir Charles Arden-Clarke.75
When Macpherson heard of these proposals he flew to London for discussions in
February (152). As Macpherson realised, these changes in the Gold Coast made it
likely that Nigerian leaders would begin to push for similar concessions for
themselves, well before the period he had envisaged. He was also as conscious as
anyone of the likely impact of such concessions on Northern leaders. In a number of
forthright letters to the CO in 1952 and 1953 Macpherson expressed both surprise at
the pace of change in the Gold Coast and distress at the implications of this for what
he was trying to achieve in Nigeria. These changes were, he said, ‘catastrophic’ for
Nigeria and threatened ‘to save the Gold Coast for the Empire’ at the cost of the loss
of Nigeria (152). Nigeria needed, he felt, a good run at the new constitution but the
developments in the Gold Coast would prevent this. 
Underlying Macpherson’s concerns was his realisation that some Nigerian leaders
were determined to show the constitution to be unworkable. As far as the two main
southern parties were concerned, the 1951 constitution had strengthened their deter-
mination to push for self-government; self-government by 1956 became, during 1951,
their rallying cry. In itself this showed how far the constitution had failed in its inten-
tion of regaining the initiative and buying time for the administration. What had been
acceptable in 1948, clearly was not by 1951. ‘Nationalism, once it is in the saddle, rides
hard’, noted Macpherson (153). Indeed during 1951 there were several signs that
Nigerian leaders were attempting to regroup, following the splits and tensions of the
1948–1950 period. Behind this lay the impending elections under the new constitu-
tion, due in late 1951. In early 1951 following the demise of the NEC, Kingsley
Mbadiwe and Ojike attempted to establish a Committee of National Rebirth, to bring
unity to Nigeria’s fractured political scene and in particular to bring supporters of the
AG and the NCNC into a united front. Little came of their efforts, but in September of
that year, at its Kano Convention, it was clear that the NCNC was re-grouping. Re-
organisation of the party—prompted by the forthcoming elections—led to the estab-
lishment of committees for each region, a Central Working Committee to co-ordinate
the party, and the creation of individual membership. The NCNC remained pledged to
fighting for the unity of Nigeria and was the one party at this time genuinely attempt-
ing to operate across the whole country. It developed links with NEPU in the North
and also targeted the West, in the hope of establishing a pan-southern power base. Its
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policy, in 1951 at least, was one that stressed the unity of the country and consequently
the need for a powerful centre. It stressed too, the need for self-government and at
Kano re-affirmed this as its central policy. 
For the NCNC therefore, its failure to achieve a substantial presence in the West in
the 1951 elections was a disappointment, for not only did it undermine its hopes of
establishing a nation-wide appeal, but by showing the strength of regional loyalties it
reinforced similar tendencies within the party. Moreover Azikiwe’s failure to win a
seat in the House of Representatives caused him major difficulties. Given the
emerging divisions within the party between those who wished to operate the 1951
constitution in order to exploit whatever opportunities it provided and those who
were determined to destroy it, Azikiwe’s absence from the centre of power made it
difficult for him to maintain party unity. It also made him determined to ensure the
collapse of the constitution.
Opposition to the constitution was also articulated by the AG. In mid-1952 the AG
ministers in the Council submitted a memorandum demanding increased ministerial
responsibility similar to that which had been conceded in the Gold Coast (157, 158).
The memorandum was a well thought-through demand for ministers to be allowed
to instruct officials directly and the governor to be obliged to consult civil servants
only through the relevant minister; further, it argued that the governor’s reserved
powers should be exercised only after consultation with the Council. The
memorandum was debated in the Council of Ministers but both NPC and NCNC
ministers stalled, arguing that while they were sympathetic to the AG proposals the
time was not ripe for their implementation; the AG plan was defeated. Macpherson
for his part, agreed, early in 1953, to accept the creation of four individual ministries
but refused anything further.76
The real significance of the defeat of the AG proposals for ministerial responsibility
however, lay in the NCNC leaders’ reluctance to co-operate with the AG. The NCNC
reaction, felt Macpherson, was partly based on simple dislike of the AG leaders, but
was also a reflection of a desire to maintain the unity of Nigeria; changing the
constitution at the behest of the AG would, felt the NCNC, simply open the flood-
gates to AG demands for greater regionalisation. NCNC suspicions of the regionalist
tendencies in the AG were acute. Macpherson, however, admitted the convenience of
this reaction and his readiness to play on it. Nonetheless the AG’s defeat undoubtedly
poisoned relations with the governor in the short-term and contributed to the party’s
decision, at its Benin conference in late 1952, to adopt a policy of ‘non-fraternisation’
with Macpherson.77
Regional and ethnic tensions now took on an added importance. A number of
issues emerged which generated considerable strain between the parties. One was
the Ilorin boundary between the North and West (161). This in turn related to the
position of Lagos (163). The NCNC—not least because of Azikiwe’s experiences in the
1951 elections—wanted Lagos excised from the West, and submitted a motion
accordingly in the House of Representatives; the NPC supported this, at least partly
because of its leaders’ fears of AG regionalist tendencies and the desire therefore to
keep open the possibility of Lagos as a port for the North should the West secede. But
the AG reacted to this by demanding that the Ilorin boundary be adjusted in the
favour of the West as compensation.78 The NCNC motion failed, being ruled out of
order, but the episode showed the willingness of politicians to trade on ethnic and
regional differences for party political gain. 
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Perhaps the critical factor in this heightening of regional and ethnic tensions
during 1952 was the determination of parties to consolidate power in their ‘home’
region, given the need under the constitution to control a region in order to exercise
influence at the centre. This gave encouragement to the need to eliminate rivals and
to stress ethnic solidarity against other parties. The desire to eliminate potential rival
regional sources of power could be seen in the Western Region local government bill,
introduced in the Western House of Assembly in July 1952 which enhanced the
power of the (AG) local government minister and downplayed that of the DO who
became little more than a ‘local government inspector’. Although Williamson at the
CO was relatively sanguine about the implications of this, Macpherson expressed
concern that the AG was using the bill to assert greater autonomy for the West (159).
Similar political considerations could be seen in the politicisation of marketing
board appointments by the AG in 1952 in the West, a process that prompted
considerable concern in the CO (181).79
The consolidation of AG power in the West, together with Azikiwe’s experiences in
the Lagos elections, in turn had an impact on the NCNC. The problem throughout
this period, as both Macpherson and the CO recognised, was Azikiwe’s absence from
the centre. This absence prompted Azikiwe to push for strict party discipline in the
NCNC under his leadership, for he feared that this was threatened while he remained
isolated in the West. This fear was reinforced by the emerging divisions over the
constitution within the NCNC. In December 1952 at the Jos special convention of the
NCNC, Azikiwe enforced the expulsion of three of the four Eastern ministers in the
Council because of their refusal to accept party instructions for non co-operation
with the administration (171).80
Azikiwe followed this, in January 1953, by insisting on the resignation of the nine
NCNC ministers in the Eastern Region Executive Council (175). In doing this,
Azikiwe was not only attempting to assert his own authority in the party while he
remained outside the region but flexing his muscles vis-à-vis the Eastern lieutenant-
governor. At the last moment however, six of the nine (soon to be dubbed the ‘sit-
tight ministers’) led by Eyo Ita, the deputy national president of the NCNC, withdrew
their resignations, precipitating a major crisis in the East. The six ministers joined in
alliance with the existing UNP members in the House of Assembly to form the NIP,
and were supported by the AG in this; ethnic tensions between Igbo and Efik can be
seen as a factor in these developments. The six ministers were defeated on an NCNC
motion of no confidence in the House of Assembly in April but as the CO, to its
surprise, had come to realise, poor drafting of the relevant instruments meant that a
regional House could not be dissolved without every regional House—and the House
of Representatives too—being simultaneously so dissolved, something that could not
at this stage be contemplated (157). This left a minority government in power in the
East and prompted the NCNC to vote down every piece of government business; the
1953 budget had to be passed by use of the lieutenant-governor’s reserve powers. In
turn Macpherson talked of using emergency powers to keep the administration
functioning. Only in June, when fresh instruments could be drafted, was the impasse
resolved by the dissolution of the Eastern House. In the ensuing Eastern elections,
the NCNC, this time with Azikiwe standing unopposed for Onitsha, was elected with
a large majority. It was a victory for Azikiwe, but in a deeper sense a defeat, for he had
now accepted the logic of the regionalist tendencies in the constitution—that
political power derived from control of a region—against his earlier policy of
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emphasising the country-wide appeal of his party. Ethnic tendencies were now
colouring all of Nigerian politics. 
The ‘sit-tight’ crisis in the East coincided with an even more significant crisis at
the centre in early 1953. This was the crisis prompted by the AG ‘self-government in
1956’ motion submitted to the House of Representatives (184). Underlying this was
rivalry between the AG and the NCNC and the issue of which party would dominate
the south. AG leaders were determined to push their own credentials as nationalist
leaders and determined too, to take advantage both of Azikiwe’s difficulties in the
East and his absence from the House of Representatives. At its Benin conference in
1952 the AG had passed a motion calling for self-government by 1956 (the year the
1951 constitution was to be reviewed) and it was clear the party was determined to
break the constitution in order to gain greater powers for regions and to press for
speedier moves to self-government.81 At least partly motivated also by a desire to pre-
empt the possibility of a similar motion by the NCNC, Tony Enahoro, an AG member,
moved a motion in the House of Representatives for self-government in 1956.82 The
AG’s fear was that if the NCNC beat them to it, this would reinforce NCNC appeals to
the West, and ultimately allow it to emerge as the dominant party in the South as the
NPC was in the North; AG-NCNC rivalry over which was to be the dominant party in
the south remains a constant motif in the Nigerian story. According to the Ooni of
Ife, (the senior traditional ruler of the Yoruba), the AG ‘were determined to destroy
Azikiwe; if they failed to pursue this self-government motion with the utmost vigour
it would mean death for the Action Group’ (188). In the event the Enahoro motion
neither destroyed Azikiwe nor gained self-government by 1956 but it certainly
destroyed the Macpherson constitution. 
Moreover, the motion had the other effect of exposing the weaknesses in the
constitution concerning ministerial responsibility. The motion was considered in
advance in the Council of Ministers (184). The divisions revealed there between the
various parties meant no Council line could be agreed; given the lack of ministerial
responsibility for the Council in the House, and given the fact that the Council was
split with the four Western ministers in a minority, Macpherson insisted on
members of the Council abstaining from speaking or voting on the motion in the
House, a decision that caused deep unrest among the AG ministers and prompted the
resignation of the Ooni, followed later by the other three AG members.83 Tensions in
the Council were clearly rising and the conciliar system Macpherson had placed such
emphasis on was collapsing. 
The Enahoro motion was a defining moment in the decolonisation process in
Nigeria. Not only did it put self-government firmly on the agenda but it brought into
focus the issue of ministerial responsibility and the position of the Council of
Ministers. Perhaps most importantly however, it exacerbated Northern fears of
Southern ambitions. In the ensuing debate on Enahoro’s motion on 31 March, NPC
leaders made clear their position (187). Their anxieties were that independence in
1956 would mean Southern dominance of the North, and their opposition to
Enahoro’s motion led to its failure, following a proposed amendment put forward by
the Sardauna of Sokoto, to replace the words ‘self-government by 1956’ by ‘as soon as
practicable’.84 For Northern leaders, conscious of their region’s political, educational
and economic backwardness compared to the south, self-government in 1956 would
simply mean the replacement of British rule by domination by Southern politicians
more versed in western ways. There were religious tensions in this too. In a heated
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debate, apparently slighting references to Shehu Usuman dan Fodio, leader of the
nineteenth century jihad that had established the Sokoto caliphate (and great-
grandfather of the Sardauna) caused uproar and led to the eventual adjournment of
the House; Enahoro’s motion was lost. 
It was the wider consequence of the debate that was the real significance of this
episode. Both on arriving and leaving the House, Northern representatives were
jeered and heckled by the Lagos crowd; further abuse occurred from crowds during
their rail journey home.85 This treatment confirmed to Northern leaders the failure
of Southern politicians to recognise Northern fears and their apparent determination
to push for an independent Nigeria where the North would be a junior partner. This
sharpened Northern determination to defend their interests thereafter. The attitude
of Northern leaders after these events, was, it was noted, ‘hard, cold, and implacable’.
Remarks in the House by the Sardauna about ‘the mistake of 1914’ (when Nigeria
had been unified) hardly helped (188, 190). 
Events following Enahoro’s motion further confirmed Northern leaders in their
fears. A rapprochement between the AG and the NCNC announced in April 1953
appeared to threaten the isolation of the NPC while press attacks on Northern leaders
as the allies of British imperialism heightened this. Separatist ideas began to be
taken seriously by the Northern administration, with, somewhat to the CO’s surprise,
Sharwood-Smith, the lieutenant-governor, initiating a ‘coloured lights’ exercise to
look at the various options open to the North, including the possibility of secession
(189). Indeed on 22 May the Northern House of Assembly debated and approved
(followed by the House of Chiefs) the so-called ‘Eight-points motion’ that called for
separation from the South in all but the most limited spheres such as defence and
foreign affairs; it meant the break-up of Nigeria in all but name (207).86
Meanwhile press comment in the South continued to attack the administration,
with not-so-veiled references in the AG Daily Service, to ‘Mau Mau or no Mau Mau?’,
referring to the violent rising recently begun in Kenya, and repeated by Akintola, the
publisher of the paper, in the House, encouraging fears that were later heightened by
the Coronation day riot in Lagos in June and AG threats of launching a civil
disobedience campaign.87 When Henry Hopkinson, minister of state for colonial
affairs, visited Nigeria for the West African Armed Forces conference in April he met
Northern leaders and found them ‘deeply disturbed’ and ‘charged with emotion’ over
the Enahoro motion and determined to get a greater degree of autonomy from the
rest of Nigeria. According to Tafawa Balewa, ‘no good would come from co-operation
with the South’ (193). Western leaders meanwhile impressed on him the need for
further constitutional advance, particularly over ministerial responsibility and the
creation of an office of prime minister as in the Gold Coast.
Macpherson’s constitution had been fatally undermined by this crisis. Officials in
the CO began drafting ideas in late March—even before Enahoro’s motion was
debated—for a revised constitution giving greater powers to the regions and
Macpherson was called to the CO to discuss the situation with Lyttelton in April. The
CO was not entirely sympathetic concerning his handling of the Enahoro motion.
Officials believed that he had put too much pressure on the AG in expecting them
quietly to accept defeat over the motion and that his insistence on conciliar
responsibility to prevent ministers speaking in the debate had not helped either; a
more skilled operator would have prevented things coming to a head in the way they
did. At meetings in the CO in April the concern was with the way out of the impasse,
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and particularly with addressing the danger of possible secession by the North (190,
191). It was clear, even before the ‘Eight-points motion’, that the cleavage between
North and South was deepening and the CO fear was that Northern leaders would
refuse to attend any future meetings of the House of Representatives, leading to the
collapse of the government and the very real possibility of secession. Further,
concerns were expressed at what might replace the NPC should the CO fail to act to
stabilise the situation; ‘NEPU must be taken seriously’, warned Williamson, going on
to point out how a similarly radical movement in the Gold Coast, Nkrumah’s CPP,
had been ignored until too late.88
At the April meetings and others that ensued in early May, Lyttleton made it clear
the constitution would have to be ‘radically recast’ but that ‘dilatory tactics’ would
need to be followed to prevent any immediate changes before the situation had
settled (191, 198). Once it had, he proposed that a conference be held in London to
consider the best procedure to take to revise the constitution. He suggested that
there was a need for a much looser form of association at the centre, greater regional
autonomy and clear assurances to the North that changes would not be made over
their heads. 
Lyttelton’s proposals went to Cabinet and were approved on 13 May (202). Yet
events on the ground were removing the initiative from the CO. A planned nation-
wide tour by the AG to publicise the AG demand for self-government in 1956 led to
proposals for a rally in Kano in May. The proposed rally sparked four days of rioting
in the city. Exacerbated on the one hand by suspicions that the Kano NA—egged on
by the Sardauna who had visited the city shortly before the riots—was encouraging
the violence as revenge for the abuse received in Lagos, and on the other by the fact
that the bulk of the police contingents involved in containing the violence were
made up of Southerners, the riots became straight-forward ethnic clashes between
Hausa and Igbo and left 36 dead and 241 injured.89 The killings said much about the
underlying tensions between stranger and indigene in the North.
The Kano riots did not destroy the Macpherson constitution—they came three
days after the Cabinet on 13 May had approved Lyttleton’s decision to revise it—but
they did lead to a speedier implementation of that decision (201, 204). The riots also
led Macpherson—reinforced by appeals from Hopkinson who was still in Nigeria—to
demand an early announcement of Lyttelton’s decision, contrary to the latter’s wish
to keep the decision quiet until the dust had settled.90 On 21 May Lyttelton
announced to the House of Commons that the constitution that had taken three
years to set up, would have to be recast. 
The move to managed decolonisation 1953–1958
Lyttelton’s statement was designed to regain the initiative in a process that had been
slipping out of CO hands. Yet in the short term the Nigerian reaction to it was any-
thing but positive. Lyttleton proposed calling Nigerian leaders to London to consider
what mechanism might best be used to consider possible changes to the constitution.
Both Awolowo and Azikiwe—who had formed a pact after the defeat of the Enahoro
motion—refused to attend on this basis; they would come to London only if the pur-
pose was to hold substantive talks on substantive issues. The pace of change in Nigeria
was such that by June the CO had conceded that this was inevitable; the talks in
London would indeed be substantive and would focus on what changes were necessary
to the constitution in the light of Nigeria’s present circumstances. 
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In July delegates from the main parties in Nigeria met in London under Lyttelton’s
chairmanship to discuss the revision of the constitution (228). Even in itself, the
holding of this conference was significant: the 1947 constitution had been drawn up
by officials and that of 1951 by a tightly controlled process of consultations that had
been shaped throughout by the administration. Now the CO was willing for the first
time to pass control over constitutional change to a conference where Nigerian
leaders would hold considerable sway and where there would be only limited
guarantee of the outcome. 
What this decision represented was the recognition that the CO policy that had
characterised the late 1940s and early 1950s—of managed reform to pre-empt
nationalist demands—had been overtaken by events. Self-government had long been
admitted by the CO as the ultimate goal of policy in Nigeria, but it was now clear that
that it would occur in the not too distant future. When Macpherson called Awolowo,
Azikiwe and the Sardauna to a meeting at Government House in June to discuss
their attendance at the conference, he stressed how things had changed and stated
unequivocally that ‘the clear political objective for Nigeria . . . by Her Majesty’s
Government . . . was self-government’.91 A new CO strategy was emerging and this
strategy was making explicit its acceptance that self-government in the near future
was the goal. The precise date and nature of that self-government remained to be
decided, but that it would occur in the near rather than the distant future was now
no longer in doubt. 
This was in no way a policy of scuttle. The CO recognised in the early 1950s that it
still had room for manoeuvre in Nigeria and that ‘dilatory tactics’ could be used to
effect. The CO, initially at least, had plenty of options to play with and was
determined, following the decisions of April-May 1953, to spin out the move to
independence for as long as possible. The gaining of time remained the key to CO
policy after 1953, and remained so until the 1958 conference set a firm date for
independence. 
The long-term aim of both the CO and the administration throughout this period
remained unchanged from earlier years. ‘Our objective’, wrote Macpherson in March
1953, ‘is to keep united Nigeria in the Commonwealth of its own volition. This is
good for Britain and good for Nigeria’ (182).92 However it was now recognised that
two new emphases were necessary to achieve this end. One was to acknowledge that
since self-government had become a much more immediate objective of policy,
ministerial responsibility at the centre, and at the regional level too, would have to
be conceded. The AG and NCNC pact ensured that, whatever the CO felt, this would
be a major issue at the forthcoming talks. 
The second emphasis in CO policy after 1953 was the stress on the need for greater
regional autonomy if the unity of Nigeria was to be maintained. As Williamson wrote
to Sharwood-Smith in April 1953, in a statement that firmly reflected his own
position as a supporter of greater autonomy,
‘We firmly believe that unity is in the best interests of all regions of Nigeria, but
we recognise that the only solution for present difficulties and probably the only
hope eventually of achieving and preserving that unity, lies in some modified and
looser form of association at the Centre at this stage.’93
Not least, it was hoped, this looser association would deflate demands for
immediate self-government. 
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These two issues—of ministerial responsibility and of greater regional
autonomy—were to dominate CO thinking as it prepared for the July 1953 London
conference. While the CO was willing to concede these, self-government in 1956 was
to be resisted.94 Yet clearly both AG and NCNC delegations at the conference would
press for this, which raised a dilemma for the CO. The CO was determined not to lose
the initiative in Nigeria through being forced into negatively resisting demands for
self-government. Yet the gaining of time, no matter how little, was seen as essential
if the other element of CO strategy after 1953 was to succeed, namely the need to
reassure the North in order to maintain Nigerian unity. 
The North loomed large in the CO’s thinking in this period. However the CO
attitude to the North remained equivocal. On the one hand the CO was determined to
push for a greater pace of reform in the local government structure in the North,
given the abuses that had characterised the NA system in the region. On the other,
the CO was responsive to pressure from the administration in the North to respond
to Northern fears of Southern domination. The CO clearly shared Northern
scepticism about imminent self-government. Yet the CO was also alive to the
demands of the AG and the NCNC for faster progress and was aware that some
concession would be necessary if the conference was not to collapse in acrimony. 
The CO believed that to maintain Nigerian unity it needed to reassure the North
that its interests would be protected. Behind this lay several factors that coloured CO
views of the North. For one thing there was a recognition that the North represented
more than half the population of Nigeria and held half the seats in the House of
Representatives; this was a powerful argument in favour of the North, though the
counter argument, that the North was not monolithic and that the NA caste of chiefs
and emirs in the NPC did not represent those Northerners in the Middle Belt or for
that matter in the NEPU, was only rarely heard in the corridors of the CO. But there
were other factors at work too. On a personal level, British officials undoubtedly
found the NPC leadership more agreeable than the politicians from the South. There
is a palpable sense of personal dislike in responses to Azikiwe in the CO files of this
period coupled with an equally palpable sense of unease (coupled with respect) at
how formidable an opponent Awolowo was. References to Northern leaders—
particularly Tafawa Balewa—were characterised by much warmer feelings.95
The 1953 crisis, while pushing the CO towards a recognition that AG and NCNC
demands for constitutional progress would have to be met, was followed by a CO
determination to reassure Northern leaders concerning the future direction of
British policy. This could be seen in Macpherson’s insistence to Lyttelton in May
1953 that HMG ‘should not leave Northern leaders in doubt about their
determination to fulfil their obligations to the 17 million people of Northern Nigeria’
(201). At a Cabinet meeting that month, Lyttelton stressed that the constitutional
revision ‘provided an opportunity of according a larger measure of autonomy to the
14 million Moslem inhabitants of the Northern provinces who were more favourably
disposed to this country than the Southern Nigerians’ (202). At a subsequent Cabinet
he added that ‘we cannot let the North down. They are more than half the
population, more attached to the British and more trustful of the Colonial Service
than the others too’ (234). These attitudes, reinforced by the Kano Riots and by
Sharwood-Smith’s warnings of the dangers of further ethnic clashes in the North,
meant that the CO, for all the desire of officials to push for reform of local
government, pulled its punches in its dealings with the ancien regime in the North.
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This however, merely reinforced Northern leaders in their determination to resist
radical local government reform and rapid moves to self-government.
This was not simply a crude policy to ensure Britain’s friends inherited the mantle
of rule in independent Nigeria. That may well have been the outcome of the policy
the CO followed, but the starting point was different. The unity of Nigeria was the
key, as Macpherson had stressed in March. This was made explicit with Lyttelton’s
statement to the House of Commons in February 1954 that ‘I cannot repeat too often
that HMG firmly believe that it is in the interests of the peoples of Nigeria that the
unity of the country be preserved’.96 A united Nigeria would, it was expected, be a
major player in African politics and thereby a vehicle, it was hoped, for maintaining
British interests more broadly in an independent Africa. British policy, as it was
accepted that self-government was approaching, was determined to create a Nigeria
that would be a powerful force in Africa and this required a united Nigeria rather
than a balkanised one. In this the Kano riots and the subsequent ‘Eight-points
motion’ were pivotal, for they raised the spectre of secession, either before or after
independence. The consequence of this was that the British were therefore keen to
encourage Northern influence in Nigeria, not because this would delay
independence, but because this was seen as a necessity if the secession of the North
was to be avoided. The problem however, was that in placating the North’s fears that
self-government was imminent, the British were exacerbating Southern fears that it
was not, and thereby making division of the country more likely. In turn, this
encouraged the South to make greater demands for progress to independence,
demands that thereby fuelled Northern fears that the South was out to obtain self-
government before the North was ready.
These issues became apparent once the London conference began in July 1953.
The CO was willing to concede Nigerian leaders’ demands for greater regional
autonomy; this had been agreed within the CO before the Nigerian delegates arrived
and was seen as the essential minimum required to keep Nigeria together. It was
agreed that Nigeria would become a formal federation with all residual powers
allocated to the regions. Further, a commissioner, Sir Louis Chick, would be
appointed to examine the financial implications of this and a follow-up conference in
Lagos would consider the details. The demand for self-government in 1956, however,
was less palatable to the CO and time was taken in advance to consider a formula that
would satisfy both Northern concerns and Southern aspirations. Macpherson
stressed that the demand had to be resisted come what may. He emphasised, as the
conference started, that it must be made clear ‘that HMG will not bring any pressure
to bear on the North to accept any self-government in Nigeria . . . before the North 
wish it to’; in effect a Northern veto over Nigeria’s independence (225). Yet the
delegates from the Southern parties were determined for an explicit statement of
British intentions to withdraw, if not in 1956 then certainly as soon as possible
thereafter. The AG and NCNC pact held firm on this, even though the AG briefly
walked out of the conference in protest at the decision of the secretary of state to
excise Lagos from the Western Region as a Federal territory and over the issue of the
re-appointment to the Council of Ministers of the four (western) ministers who had
resigned in March. Bridging the North-South gap was going to be difficult, and to try
to do so, Lyttelton made a statement promising that internal self-government would
be granted to any region that demanded it in 1956, while standing firm against
setting any date for self-government for Nigeria as a whole. In agreeing for the first
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time to make a commitment for regional self-government, Lyttelton was
acknowledging that self-government more broadly was the objective of British
policy, that there was a timetable for this, and that Nigeria was well down the road to
it. 
The 1953 London conference agreed the outlines of what popularly came to be
known as the ‘Lyttelton constitution’. Lyttelton agreed to the removal of ex-officio
ministers in the regions (except in the North), full regional ministerial responsibility
with regional premiers, elections to the House of Representatives (rather than
appointment by the regional Houses of Assembly), and the calling of a further
conference in 1956 to review the constitution. In addition, the possibility of the
Southern Cameroons separating from the Eastern Region as a quasi-federal territory
with its own Assembly, should the Eastern elections in late 1953 confirm this, was
accepted. Shortly after the London conference ended, the CO also agreed to the
principle of ministerial responsibility at the centre (239).
The resumed conference in Lagos in January 1954 considered the details of these
decisions. Consideration was given to the financial, judicial and public service
implications of regionalisation. The Chick Report, which stressed the principle of
financial derivation (ie the regions that contributed the most would receive the
most), was accepted and the public service divided into four (ie three regional
services plus a federal service).97 Perhaps most significantly the issue of secession
was addressed. The AG had urged that such a right should be included in the
constitution. The NCNC, in light of its sentiments for Nigerian unity, took a stand
against this and was strongly supported by Lyttelton, a decision that confirmed the
collapse of the AG-NCNC pact.98
The new constitution came into operation in October 1954, with the creation of
regional governments under Awolowo, Azikiwe and the Sardauna as premiers and
with each of the three main parties controlling a region. The results of the elections
to the House of Representatives that followed in late 1954 were however, something
of a surprise, both to Nigerian leaders and to the CO. The NPC as expected won the
North, and the NCNC the East but what was not expected, was the NCNC victory in
the West where the party capitalised on dissatisfaction with AG tax policies and
separatist aspirations in the Benin and Delta areas; in addition local leaders of the
NCNC like Adegoke Adelabu played skilfully on intra-Yoruba rivalries to win seats in
areas like Ibadan and Oyo (276). The fact that the NCNC had won in two regions
meant that while the NPC was the largest party in the House, the NCNC was
entitled—since posts were allocated on a regional basis—to six ministerial posts, to
the NPC’s three and the AG’s none, making the NCNC the dominant party of the
government, a possibility that had apparently never occurred to the draftsmen of the
CO.
This raised all sorts of difficulties for the CO. The alienation of the AG—who still
formed the regional government in the West—was clearly dangerous, but more
worrying for the CO was the triumph of the NCNC with its radical rhetoric and its
commitment to reverse much of the regionalism of recent years. Not only would this
undo many of the measures the CO saw as vital to hold Nigeria together, but there
was the danger of the likely reaction to this by the conservatives of the NPC,
particularly if the NCNC pressed for early self-government. 
The CO feared that the NPC would react to the NCNC victory by, at the very least,
boycotting the Council of Ministers and at worst, by moving towards an AG alliance.
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The possibility of an AG-NPC axis—the two parties who had flirted with secessionist
ideas—raised great concern. A clandestine meeting of the Sardauna with Awolowo
and Akintola on November 20—monitored by Special Branch—appeared to raise
such possibilities (276). In the House of Representatives Tafawa Balewa threatened
such an alliance and to vote down all government business in response to NCNC
domination of the ministerial council. For a moment the prospects for the new
constitution, if not for the future of Nigeria, looked difficult and the constitution
designed to move Nigeria on from the crisis of 1953 had plunged her back to the days
of the ‘Eight-points motion’. H R E Browne, the acting governor of the North, met
NPC leaders and urged them to accept the election results (279). Lennox-Boyd, the
new secretary of state, similarly urged officials to reassure the NPC leadership. He
reaffirmed Lyttelton’s statement that ‘HMG would not let the North down . . . there
would . . . be no question of HMG granting self-government at the Centre so long as
the North wanted the Federal government to remain dependent’. He urged officials
to counter any secessionist tendencies ‘at this critical juncture’ (277). Only in
January 1955, two months after the elections, did Balewa inform Macpherson of the
NPC’s willingness to accept the results and co-operate in making the government
work. A coalition government of six NCNC ministers and three from the NPC (plus
one from Southern Cameroons) was set up. Yet this willingness to co-operate in
government masked a deeper alarm within the NPC at the NCNC success; Sharwood-
Smith noted the ‘increasing tendency of many [Northern] ministers . . . to indulge in
anti-Southern diatribes’.99
The 1954 elections gave major impetus to regional consolidation of party political
power. The dilemma for the two Southern parties in particular was that the more
they stressed ethnic solidarity in order to consolidate their power in a particular
region, the less able they were to appeal more broadly across the federation as a
whole, making them less able to challenge for national power. This dilemma in turn
stimulated attempts by the parties to expand into regions other than their ‘own’
through the use of promises to break up the existing regions and create smaller
regions for minorities, thereby reinforcing the ethnic characteristics of Nigerian
politics. The CO was keen to avoid regional fragmentation, even though it was its
own constitutional provisions that had generated these pressures. As a CO
Appreciation in early 1955 noted, ‘a main aim of UK policy for Nigeria in the
immediate future is therefore to prevent further fragmentation of the territory and to
preserve the unity of the Regions within the federation against possible moves to
secede’ (289). The origins of this problem went back before 1954 and had an earlier
precedent with the excision of Lagos from the West. After the NCNC electoral victory
in the West, fresh impetus was given to demands to create new regions out of
existing ones. 1953 saw the emergence of the Benin Delta People’s Party, encouraged
by the NCNC, seeking to create a Mid-West Region out of the West. This was a non-
Yoruba area, and supported the NCNC in the 1954 Federal elections. The AG tried to
get round this threat by themselves sponsoring a motion in the House of Assembly in
June 1955 to create a Mid-West, the aim being thereby to cut away NCNC-supporting
areas from the West and guarantee an AG majority in the House. Concurrently, AG
support encouraged demands for a COR (Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers) Region out of non-
Igbo areas of the NCNC-dominated East.
Related to this was the separation of the Southern Cameroons from the Eastern
Region in this period. As noted above, it had been agreed at the 1953 London
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conference that the Eastern Region elections at the end of that year would be treated
in the Southern Cameroons as a referendum on secession from the region. The
elections had been a victory for Dr Emmanuel Endeley’s KNC, which won all the
seats on a platform of separation, with the result that in late 1954 the Southern
Cameroons became a quasi-federal territory with its own Assembly and Executive
Council.100
The reverse of attempts to encourage fragmentation were moves to consolidate
power within a region. This was particularly the case in the West. Throughout the
years between its formation in 1951 and its victory in the 1956 elections in the West
the critical factor for the AG was the NCNC threat in the region, a threat whose
potency had been proved in 1954. Thus throughout this period the AG drove hard at
consolidating its control of the West and in doing so articulated a particularly acute
form of ethnic, more specifically Yoruba, nationalism. At times the AG flirted with
secession, though in practice the AG accepted federalism as the future for Nigeria. It
was a party of the economically and educationally-rising elites in Yorubaland, com-
mitted to business enterprise and capitalism, though with a strong welfarist wing, and
elements in the CO saw the party as representing the more able administrators within
Nigeria. Awolowo, the AG leader, was respected by the CO, though seen as ‘intolerant
of opposition’ and deeply suspicious both of the British and Azikiwe; the leadership of
the AG generally was described by Williamson in 1955 as ‘able and hardworking’.101 To
the CO Awolowo was a formidable opponent whose legal training made him a difficult
figure to finesse at the constitutional conferences of these years. 
The AG responded to the NCNC threat to its position in the West in two ways.
Firstly, it attempted to push for co-operation with the NPC during 1953 and again,
following the breakdown of its pact with the NCNC, in 1954. The formation of the
NCNC-NPC government in 1955 broke these moves. These were coupled with
attempts to break into the East in 1954, through the use of the COR Region issue.
Equally it attempted to push into the North, undertaking a major drive into the
Middle Belt for the 1959 Federal elections, when it won 25 seats.
AG attempts to expand outside the West were always going to be of limited success.
Its second approach was to consolidate its power within the West. In particular it
determined on asserting its control over the NA chiefs in the region, given the
influence these figures held both within local administration and over ordinary
Yorubas. This was coupled with proposals to increase party influence over the
Nigerian Police Force contingents in the region. Political Intelligence reports
stressed the AG campaign on this issue: ‘continuous pressure is being brought to
bear to gain regional control of the forces of law and order’, not least through
building up the NA forces.102 Complaints that most of the NPF forces in the region
were Igbo, not Yoruba, were followed by moves during 1955 to demand the
regionalisation of the NPF and to expand the NA police, moves that, admitted
governor John Rankine, were causing some concern (285). As the local government
reforms came into effect, the DO was progressively pushed to one side and the party
began to assert its authority over the NA court system (278). Further, the removal of
the NCNC-sympathising Alaafin of Oyo in 1954 had clear implications for other
traditional rulers in the region; so too did the Nicholson Report on the
administration of Ibadan in 1955 (271).103 This was followed by continuing press
attacks on expatriate civil servants and AG demands for political control over the
Public Service Commission in order to control appointments to the public service. 
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This attempt to remove their opponents in the West came to fruition with the
resignation of the Western NCNC leader Adegoke Adelabu as a federal minister in
1956, shortly followed by his death in a motor accident. This policy was interwoven
with a stress on the party’s nationalist credentials, as seen in the motion for self-
government in the West, moved by Awolowo in the House of Assembly in December
1955. When House of Assembly elections were held in the West in May 1956, the AG
won 48 seats to the NCNC’s 32, reversing the NCNC’s federal victory two years
earlier.104 The AG consolidation of power in the West had succeeded.
In the North too, these were years when the NPC consolidated its hold over the
region. The prime issue was ‘fragmentation’, and whether the North would remain a
monolith—under NPC control—and thereby able to dominate the central
institutions of the federation as it had done since the acceptance of Northern parity
in the House of Representatives in 1950, or whether the Middle Belt would be
separated from the region. The Middle Zone League had, with various other
organisations, merged into the United Middle Belt Congress by 1955, and the new
party received much support from both the AG and the NCNC in its demands for the
Middle Belt to be excised from the North. The two southern parties’ aim to split the
North in order to reduce its power in the House of Representatives was resisted by
the CO. This resistance required however, as Sharwood-Smith argued forcefully,
local government reform in the North, in order to devolve power to local
communities and thereby to undermine support for a Middle Belt state.105 Thus fresh
impetus was given to demands for the reform of local government in the North,
reform that the traditional rulers in the North continued to view with deep
scepticism. 
In early 1957 the Hudson Report on local government in the North appeared
(384). It recommended the creation of an intermediate level of administration
between the region and the NA at the local government level, through the
establishment of provincial administrations, a proposal that owed much to
Sharwood-Smith’s earlier ideas.106 These middle-tier administrations would include
a provincial council that would have law-making and revenue raising powers; this
would address, it was believed, the unrest of Middle Belt areas concerning their
inclusion in the North and thereby avoid secessionist demands. However, the danger
for the existing NAs was that the administrations envisaged by Hudson would take
over powers currently held by the NAs with a corresponding reduction in the
resources and offices available at that level. Although provincialisation was endorsed
at the subsequent constitutional conference, once the threat of fragmentation of the
North was removed with the decisions of the Willink Commission of 1957–1958 (see
below), the Hudson scheme was progressively watered down. The bill for provincial
councils passed by the Northern Assembly in 1959 owed little to Hudson’s original
proposals and the provincial councils it established were little more than advisory
bodies. 
It was in the Eastern Region that this process of regional consolidation after 1954
posed the greatest threat to the CO determination to maintain Nigerian unity. The
East was of critical importance to the CO, because in its view, Azikiwe remained the
most dangerous Nigerian leader. He was not to be trusted, felt the CO, and his
policies represented a sharp challenge both to British interests in Nigeria and to the
managed decolonisation process more specifically. He was ‘an exceptionally skilful
politician . . . but completely unprincipled and ruthless’, noted Williamson.107 While the
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CO welcomed the fact that the NCNC was anti-communist, it feared the radical
policies it pursued and was concerned at apparent NCNC attempts to politicise the
public service. Not least, from the CO’s point of view, the policies that Azikiwe
introduced in the East raised the stakes more generally and forced other Nigerian
leaders, especially Awolowo, to respond in turn—or see the AG hold on the West fall
to the NCNC—while generating great fears among Northern leaders, with serious
ramifications for the future unity of Nigeria. 
In early 1955 the Assembly passed a budget that, by removing expatriation pay for
several senior posts, effectively ‘Nigerianised’ the upper echelons of the Eastern
public service; only by using his reserved powers could governor Clement Pleass
reinstate the allowances. The impact on the morale of expatriate officers in the East,
already concerned at the regionalisation of the public service, was significant, with
CO fears that some sixty per cent of expatriate staff would resign by 1956, leading to,
it believed, administrative breakdown (296). The clash over allowances in 1955 was
only the start of a much deeper crisis in the Eastern Region that, despite the brief
hiatus of the Royal Tour in early 1956, consumed CO energies for much of
1955–1957. 
The significance of this crisis was that it was the last occasion upon which the CO
seriously contemplated halting the progress to Nigerian self-government. The
background lay both in the ambitions of Azikiwe, who was determined to assert 
the NCNC’s nationalist credentials, and in the breakdown in relations between the
governor and the regional government that went back to Pleass’s support for the ‘sit-
tight’ ministers in 1953, together with his use of his reserved powers to get that
year’s budget approved. Allegations of corruption against ministers during 1955
further poisoned relations, even without the new budget crisis of that year. Spending
by the government on development projects—viewed as long overdue by the NCNC
and its supporters—was seen as deliberately designed to spend reserves so
compensation for expatriate staff when they retired would not be available (298). An
NCNC-sponsored motion of no-confidence in the governor was tabled in the House
in the middle of 1955 although deferred sine die. Thereafter Azikiwe simply
continued government by ignoring Pleass’s existence. 
By May 1955 the ‘Eastern Question’ had become the major issue facing the CO in
Nigeria. Officials began warning of ‘chaos in the East’ and talk began of the possible
need to suspend the constitution in the region and to rescind the promise of regional
self-government in 1956. Williamson wrote to Pleass suggesting that it might be best
to allow the breakdown to happen sooner rather than later, so that it occurred while
Britain was still responsible for the region and could thus suspend the promise of
regional self-government and impose direct rule; ‘we should like you to think this
over very carefully’ (294, 298).
Supported by Robertson (who replaced Macpherson as governor-general in June
1955), Pleass argued against suspension (301). He stressed that Azikiwe was too
astute to allow chaos to occur before self-government and that if the CO chose to
suspend the Eastern constitution it would simply allow the premier to pose as a
martyr. Extensive debate in the CO continued and concluded that although there was
no immediate case for suspending the constitution or the promise of regional self-
government, contingency plans should be drawn up (307). In late July, Sir Thomas
Lloyd wrote to Pleass outlining that Lennox-Boyd was ‘prepared . . . to consider . . .
the possibility of withdrawing or suspending the promise of Regional self-
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government in 1956 from the East’, if Pleass and Robertson should so advise. There
were wider considerations here, he argued, for a breakdown in the East ‘would . . .
bring serious discredit on British colonial policy as a whole’ (308). In the meantime,
Robertson and the three regional governors were called to the CO in October 1955 to
discuss the crisis.
If a suspension was to occur, military preparations would be necessary. These
began. One CO official stressed the need to involve British troops ‘as a precaution and
a stiffener.’ Major-General G. H. Inglis, GOC Nigeria, reported on military planning
in September (318). His view was that military force could indeed successfully crush
any disorder but he stressed that the CO would have to consider the political fallout
from using British troops in Eastern Nigeria. His warnings had a sobering effect and
officials began to back-track. The refusal of Pleass to support suspension proved
decisive and at the October meetings in the CO alternative ways forward were
searched for. 
However, if the promise of regional self-government could not be suspended there
were few other possibilities open to the CO, as the October meetings with Robertson
and the governors established. The decision was taken to call Azikiwe to the CO for
what was called a private ‘talking to’ by Lennox-Boyd on 10 November (320). While
the CO stressed it was not trying to slight him, none the less the message was clear.
At the meeting Lennox-Boyd criticised Azikiwe’s financial and economic policies,
stated that the attacks on expatriate staff were unjustified, suggested that the Eastern
government was heading for disaster and made pointed criticism of the party
corruption and nepotism he saw in the region, before urging Azikiwe to mend his
ways (332).
This headmasterly ‘talking to’ (to an elected minister of the Crown) is an
astonishing episode but it is striking how, as a substitute for the suspension of the
constitution and the introduction of British troops, it reflected the narrowing
options left to the CO by 1955. However a way out of the impasse seemed to open as it
became clear that the NCNC might do the CO’s work for it. In early 1956 the African
Continental Bank (ACB) affair blew up in the East and in the fallout from this it
looked possible that Azikiwe would have to resign (355). 
The origins of the affair lay in the appointment by the Eastern government in late
1955 of a commission of inquiry under a barrister, Chuba Ikpeazu, to examine
allegations of corruption in public life (331). The commission soon became bogged
down in claim and counter-claim, but its significance was that it opened up the issue
of corruption in the East to wider debate. One of the figures most ferociously
attacked both before the commission and in the Assembly was E O Eyo, government
chief whip and chairman of the Eastern Region Development Corporation. Early the
following year Eyo struck back.108
In April and May 1956 Eyo made public allegations that Azikiwe had abused his
position as premier by arranging the transfer of £2 million from the Eastern Region
Marketing Board to the Eastern Finance Corporation; the Corporation then invested
a large part of this in the ACB by buying up a significant proportion of ACB shares.
However the major shareholders in the ACB were Azikiwe and his family and the
bank had been in financial difficulties and unable to meet its commitments under
the 1952 Banking Ordinance, under which it required a certain proportion of its
reserves to be liquid; in 1953 it had been refused a banking licence for this reason. 
The CO had been aware of these developments long before Eyo made them public;
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its belief was that the ACB was being geared up to finance an assault on the AG
position in the West to consolidate the NCNC electoral victory of 1954 (317). Once
again issues of regional consolidation were central to Nigerian political
developments. The allegations were serious and given Azikiwe’s refusal to respond to
Lennox-Boyd’s invitation to appoint an Eastern Region commission of inquiry, in
July 1956 the secretary of state announced to the Commons the setting up of his
own, eventually to be headed by Sir Stafford Foster-Sutton, to examine Eyo’s
claims.109 In addition he announced that the proposed constitutional conference to
examine regional self-government which was planned for 1956 would be delayed
pending the outcome; regional self-government would thus be delayed too. Azikiwe
struck back, attacking both Lennox-Boyd and the expatriate banking monopoly in
Nigeria and pointing out how the transaction met NCNC policy to bypass the power
of British banks in the region. This attack he repeated when the Foster-Sutton
Report was published in January 1957 and criticised his conduct with regard to the
ACB as falling short ‘of the expectations of honest, reasonable people’ and found him
‘guilty of misconduct as a Minister’ in failing to relinquish his financial interest in
the ACB when public monies were injected into it.110 He refused to resign as premier,
attacked the report in turn as falling short ‘of the expectations of honest, reasonable
people’ and in the subsequent election the people of the East made their sympathies
clear, returning him and the NCNC to power with a large majority. Azikiwe’s
handling of the affair had shown not just how skilled an operator he was but also just
how limited the CO’s room for manoeuvre in Nigeria now had become.
Yet this did not mean that the CO had no options left, nor that the survival of
Azikiwe meant the end of CO attempts to manage the process of political change in
Nigeria. The CO was still determined, even after the Eastern crisis, to delay the date
of independence as long as possible. This was not a blind rearguard action. Rather,
the CO view was that the longer the decolonisation process could be spun out, the
more likely it was that Nigerian unity could be preserved and equally, the more likely
the links and structures could be put in place to ensure a Nigeria sympathetic to
British interests once independence was achieved. The dilemma for the CO in this,
however, was that the best way of ensuring Nigerian sympathies for British interests
was by granting independence as quickly as possible.
The balancing act pursued by the CO in this period in order to maintain Nigerian
unity, thus also required moves to reassure the East and West that their interests
were being acknowledged and that self-government was not being delayed unduly.
During the early months of 1957 these issues took on an increased importance, not
least because of the pressures generated by the Gold Coast’s gaining of independence
on 6 March 1957. This made it clear that independence for Nigeria could not be far
away and that the momentum of constitutional change had to be maintained if, at
the very least, goodwill was to be preserved and political unrest avoided. 
When Harold Macmillan arrived in Downing Street in January 1957 he called for a
‘cost-benefit analysis’ of colonial territories in the light of the granting of self-
government.111 The resulting ‘Skeleton Plan’ for Nigeria was completed in March and
showed the influence of Sir John Macpherson, the new permanent under-secretary at
the CO (386). While recognising the growing pressures for independence, it was full
of forebodings at the rapid pace of constitutional change in the territory and the
possibilities of administrative breakdown; it blamed—as Macpherson had done five
years earlier—the Watson Commission which it was argued, had cost Britain 15–20
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years in Nigeria. None the less when the Plan considered British interests in Nigeria,
these were not seen as a barrier to independence. Britain’s economic interests in the
country were not under threat. ‘It seems to me’, noted Eastwood, ‘that the economic
effects of independence on the U.K. are likely to be pretty small’.112 More important
were Britain’s strategic interests, and in particular the use of Port Harcourt harbour
and Kano airport, and related over-flying rights, but these too did not represent a
barrier to self-government. 
Ghana’s independence in March could hardly be ignored in Nigeria. It was the
stimulus for a motion moved in the House of Representatives later that month by
Samuel Akintola, the AG leader of the opposition, for independence for Nigeria in
1957 (subsequently amended to 1959). The Akintola motion—like the Enahoro
motion four years earlier—was a surprise to the CO (388, 390). As officials realised,
Nigerian leaders were attempting to force the CO into a corner. ‘No more important
papers have come forward about Nigeria since the crisis in the spring of 1953’ noted
Williamson on reports on the motion (390). More of a shock to the CO was the fact
that the motion—in contrast to Enahoro’s—was carried unanimously in the House
with even Tafawa Balewa and the NPC representatives supporting it; the Sardauna
claimed, somewhat disingenuously, to be equally surprised at this.113
The Akintola motion meant that the forthcoming May 1957 conference—delayed
since 1956 because of the Eastern crisis—would have to address the issue of setting a
date for independence. Robertson outlined the dilemma for the British government
when he wrote of the choice ‘either to give independence too soon and risk a
complete breakdown of administration, or to hang on too long, risk ill-feeling and
perhaps disturbance, and eventually to leave bitterness behind’ (390). Articulating
the CO reaction to Akintola’s motion, Williamson argued that Nigeria still needed ‘a
generation or so’ before it would be ready for independence, but that 1960 was
probably the latest it could be put off to; ‘it is not worthwhile risking the forfeiture of
Nigeria’s goodwill . . . for the sake of hanging on for . . . a further three or four years’
(392). Lennox-Boyd was more sanguine and took the view that Britain could hold on
for a little longer, arguing that 1959 as a date had to be resisted and that delaying
tactics could succeed in putting it off (393). His view was reinforced by Sharwood-
Smith who also believed that independence could be delayed to 1961, ‘spanners to be
provided by participants’ (400). 
The question came to the Cabinet Colonial Policy Committee in May in the run-up
to the London conference (399, 402). Lennox-Boyd proposed making a statement at
the conference to the effect that, if the various Nigerian governments were to agree to
ask in 1959 for independence, the government would agree to consult with them over
this, leaving the actual date undecided. Lord Home, the secretary of state for
Commonwealth Relations, demurred on the grounds that other Commonwealth
countries objected to the precipitate grant of independence to African territories and
that 1959 was too early; he proposed a five year trial period for regional self-govern-
ment after which (ie in 1962) independence could be reviewed by a commission. The
lord chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, was asked to resolve the differences. He drew up a
declaration that stated that HMG would consider the Nigerian demand for a date for
independence after the life of the present House of Representatives came to an end in
1959, but which left the exact date of independence open. This compromise was
accepted, though reluctantly by the CRO (404). Yet events at the conference were to
push the government much further than it had envisaged. 
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The May 1957 conference began with the submission of a memorandum from the
three regional premiers, plus the leader of government business in the Southern
Cameroons, asking for independence in 1959—a blank cheque, as Lennox-Boyd
termed it, that he refused to sign. Lennox-Boyd stood behind the decision not to
agree to a date until the present House of Representatives reached its term in 1959.
‘It was received’, noted Lennox-Boyd of his reply, ‘in stony but not unfriendly silence’
(407). After conferring with Home he elaborated that the government would
sympathetically consider the request during 1960, should the House of
Representatives to be elected in late 1959 agree a resolution asking for independence,
but he refused to set a specific date. 
Although no date was conceded at the conference, CO options were being
narrowed down. This raised the issue of safeguards for the North (400). Tafawa
Balewa had contacted Sharwood-Smith to express concern about this before the
conference. As Sharwood-Smith recognised, the key was to avoid fragmentation of
the North; an undivided North was one that would be the major player in an
independent Nigeria. The government must therefore stand firm, in his view, against
demands for a Middle Belt region. The decisions of the conference avoided this by
establishing three commissions to deal with issues relating to federal-regional
relations. One (which came to be led by Sir Jeremy Raisman) was to consider revenue
allocation, another (under Lord Merthyr) the delimitation of the 320 constituencies
it had been agreed the House would have, and a third (under Sir Henry Willink) to
consider the position of minorities. 
Other significant decisions were also taken at the conference. It was agreed—as
per the undertakings made by Lyttelton in 1953—to grant regional self-government
to the East and West in 1957 and consideration was given to self-government for the
North in 1959. The Southern Cameroons would become a full region with its own
premier. Given the moves to regional self-government, there was considerable debate
over central-regional powers, particularly concerning control of the police, which it
was agreed should remain in federal control. It was agreed too, to create an upper
House or Senate at the centre, and, perhaps most significantly, to agree to establish
the office of prime minister (409). In September, Tafawa Balewa was appointed as the
leader of a national unity government involving members of all three main parties
(410). 
Tafawa Balewa was respected by the CO and clearly liked by Robertson. He was
regarded as the most able administrator in the government and his appointment as
prime minister was warmly welcomed by officials. The problem however was that his
weight within the NPC was a good deal less than the CO would have wished. In
particular the administration was aware that the key figure within the NPC remained
the Sardauna, the premier of the Northern region. The CO was concerned at the
Sardauna’s attitude to Tafawa Balewa who was described by the former as ‘my prime
minister’; he ‘will do what he is told’ he said.114 The Sardauna’s ability to influence
the government from afar was seen by some in the CO as malign. Williamson noted
that the Sardauna was ‘able’ but that his ‘intransigence’ towards the South had
dangerous implications for the future.115
Tafawa Balewa’s popularity in the CO was because he was seen as moderate and the
very opposite of a radical demagogue. Thus it was something of a shock for the CO
when the issue of the date of independence resurfaced at Balewa’s insistence during
the early months of 1958. In May 1958 he made it clear that he hoped Nigeria could
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gain its independence on 2 April 1960, a prospect the CO did not welcome, not least
because of the likely impact of this on other territories in Africa; ‘all this worries us a
good deal’, wrote Macpherson (422, 427). Ralph Grey, the deputy governor-general,
met Tafawa Balewa in June to try to persuade him to drop the date, but noted that
‘the real power to determine the pace of events has in fact passed from us to the local
people’ (430). As the proposed constitutional conference which was to consider the
reports of the three commissions, to be held in London in September 1958, drew
nearer, the issue of the date of independence became more acute. Grey attempted to
soft-pedal the issue with Nigerian leaders (430), but it was clearly going to be the
critical issue at the conference. In August 1958 a motion in the House of
Representatives moved by R A Fani-Kayode of the AG urged 2 April 1960 as the date
of independence (436). 
By end of August, Robertson wrote to the CO proposing acceptance at the
forthcoming conference of a date sometime in 1960 (442).116 Even the CRO had by
now reluctantly come round to acceptance of this. By September Burke Trend, the
deputy secretary of the Cabinet, 1956–1959, was writing to Macmillan that the
government had no choice but to accept independence in 1960, and should take steps
accordingly to ensure British interests were guaranteed (444). The date was
considered at a Cabinet meeting in early September 1958, with Lennox-Boyd, in the
face of further unease from the CRO about the CO handling of the transition to
independence, expressing his determination not to be held to a specific date in 1960;
but implicit in this was an acceptance that it would occur that year (437).
The London conference which began in September 1958 was the last of the three
major constitutional conferences that characterised the Nigerian story. Its main
purposes were to consider the reports of the commissions established in 1957 and to
resolve the date of independence. The key commissions were those of Merthyr and
Willink, both of which had implications for the proposed regional self-government
for the North in 1959. The Merthyr Commission recommended that the North
should have 174 out of 320 seats—slightly more than a majority—in the House of
Representatives and this was approved (419). Willink recommended various
safeguards for minorities including written guarantees for minority rights, but came
down against the creation of new regions (441). This was not popular with all
Nigerian leaders. The NPC welcomed Willink’s recommendations, as did the NCNC
and the CO itself. The AG however, opposed the Willink conclusions; the AG were
determined, at the very least, to break the North into two and argued strongly for
conference support for this.117 In the event the Willink recommendations were
approved, on the basis that the reform of local government in the North—
provincialisation—as proposed by Hudson would proceed; further, CO insistence
that the creation of any new regions would delay independence, persuaded the AG to
drop its demands (456). At a Cabinet meeting held during the conference on 22
October 1958, agreement was finally reached that independence could be granted for
autumn 1960 (461). Three days after the Cabinet, Lennox-Boyd addressed the
conference and announced his agreement to a date of 1 October 1960. 
Shaping independence 1958–1960
The agreement at the London conference over the date of independence meant that
the final contentious issue at stake between the British government and Nigerian
leaders had been settled. The remaining two years of British rule were taken up with
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undramatic and largely technical negotiations over the terms and conditions under
which Nigeria would gain independence. This was not of minor importance,
however. CO—and increasingly now CRO—policy in these years was clear; it was
determined to ensure that the Nigeria that gained its independence in October 1960
did so as a country firmly in the western camp. A CO memorandum in early 1959
outlined British objectives in the run-up to independence. These were: 
‘to make the best arrangements to secure U.K. interests in Nigeria after
independence, these interests being primarily to help Nigeria to maintain a
satisfactory unity under the system of Parliamentary Government that has been
adopted, to preserve U.K. economic and financial interests and to gain maximum
support for U.K. and general Western policies’.118
The years 1958–60 were therefore characterised by the efforts of the CO to achieve
these ends through formalising the economic, technical, military and diplomatic
links that were seen as central to these ‘best arrangements’. 
At the heart of this was the ‘Special List B’ scheme for expatriate officials that
came into operation in October 1958. This scheme was the culmination of a lengthy
period of consideration of the public service in Nigeria that went back to the late
1940s; to understand its significance one needs to consider both CO attitudes to the
public service in Nigeria and the genesis of the 1958 proposals. The future of the
Colonial Service in Nigeria was of overriding importance to the CO and was so for a
number of reasons. There was a strong sense of responsibility within the CO towards
British officials serving in Nigeria, many of whom had only recently begun their
careers. Further, threats to their position generally, or to their pay and conditions
specifically, appeared to raise the spectre of a mass exodus of staff with all that that
would imply for British rule, not to mention the knock-on effect on other territories
in the empire. Moreover, the CO believed that the continuation in Nigeria of large
numbers of expatriate staff up to independence and after, would both ensure
administrative stability in the immediate future and maintain British influence in
the territory thereafter. Governor Rankine stressed to the CO the importance of
avoiding an exodus:
‘it is to our advantage . . . that Nigeria should be prosperous and stable, should
become one of the pillars of the Commonwealth and not the equivalent of a third-
rate South American republic, an easy victim for communism’.119
However, the employment of expatriate staff had come under repeated attack from
Nigerian leaders, as being unduly expensive and an affront when many equally
qualified Nigerians found it difficult to gain employment in the Colonial Service.
From the Foot Commission onwards the presumption had been that expatriates
would be employed only when a qualified Nigerian was not available, though to
Nigerian leaders the progress of Nigerianisation seemed none the less slow. The
attacks on expatriate staff by Nigerian leaders during these years raised serious
concerns in the CO.120 If British interests were to be protected in Nigeria and an
exodus avoided, mechanisms to guarantee the conditions of expatriate staff—and
their independence from party political control—needed to be put in place. 
Such concerns stimulated Lyttelton to prompt Nigerian leaders to issue a
statement at the Lagos conference in January 1954 stressing their recognition of the
need to employ expatriate staff and their determination to respect public servants’
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political neutrality (260, 263). They led also to the appointment of the Gorsuch
Commission in July 1954 to review the structure of the service in Nigeria following
regionalisation, and pay and conditions more broadly, a review which led to
significant increases in salary levels and allowances. Further, proposals were brought
forward to set up a lump-sum compensation scheme, funded by Nigerian
governments, for staff who chose to retire once regional self-government had begun,
in the hope that such guarantees would avoid a precipitate departure of expatriate
staff. The scheme was strongly criticised by Nigerian leaders who objected to having,
as they saw it, to buy their freedom by paying-off expatriate staff. Perhaps the most
significant move to address this problem came in June 1954 with the creation of Her
Majesty’s Overseas Civil Service. Under this scheme staff would transfer from local
territorial control to HMOCS and be employed centrally by the secretary of state,
thereby guaranteeing the officer’s employment.121
Yet HMOCS was only a partial solution to the problems in Nigeria. Fears of an
exodus from Nigeria, particularly from the East, were reinforced by the division of
the civil service into four separate services following regionalisation in October 1954
and concerns about growing party political interference. The Eastern crisis of 1955
had a particularly damaging impact on expatriate morale, not least when the regional
Assembly voted to abolish expatriate allowances for some posts. By 1956 Lennox-
Boyd noted, ‘I am continually receiving the most disquieting evidence of the
appalling deterioration of morale in the oversea service, especially in Nigeria’ and
clearly further measures were necessary.122 From this emerged the idea in 1956 of a
‘Special List’ for expatriate staff in territories like Nigeria whereby officers would
receive guarantees of their pay and future employment. This scheme was approved at
the 1957 conference, though it remained to be considered by the various
governments of Nigeria.
Although these several measures did much to reassure expatriates and maintain
both numbers and morale at least in the short term, in the longer term, as
independence approached, expatriate staff continued to depart from Nigeria, and few
applied for Special List status. It was these concerns that led the CO to send Sir John
Martin, deputy permanent under-secretary of state, to Nigeria in early 1958 (418).
Martin estimated that up to a quarter of all expatriate staff were on the point of
leaving and warned of the danger of administrative breakdown. He proposed the
establishment of a ‘Special List B’ to which expatriate staff could transfer and have
their allowances guaranteed, with the British government guaranteeing the payment
of the lump sum compensation which staff could take if choosing early retirement,
or alternatively could ‘freeze’ if not. Lennox-Boyd echoed Martin’s concerns. ‘There
is in the Colonial field no matter of greater urgency or importance’ than the future of
the Colonial Service, he stressed, ‘the main problem is in Nigeria’ (418). The scheme
came into operation in October 1958 and did achieve what had been intended,
namely avoiding a mass exodus of expatriate staff. In June 1960, there were 1,749
expatriates, of whom some 800 were on pensionable terms, still serving in the federal
service in Nigeria, (with others employed in the regional services, particularly in the
North), and the CO estimated that some 600 of these would stay on after October
(542). 
Retaining a cadre of British officers in Nigeria up to and beyond independence was
a major aim of the CO after 1958. Financial and economic aid was another. Appeals
from the Nigerian government for economic assistance in 1957 had caused great
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difficulties, given Britain’s own economic problems in this period and officials were
aware of the dangerous long-term implications of having to refuse such requests
(413). During the early months of 1959 this issue again came under close scrutiny in
the CO. There were international dimensions to this. American officials stressed to
the British the need to settle financial terms with Nigeria well in advance of
independence; American fears were that in the event of Britain failing to make
adequate provision for Nigeria the USA would be called on to fill the gap (477).
British concerns however, were the reverse, that if the USA stepped in, valuable
influence in Nigeria would be lost to Washington. Negotiations in London in 1959,
between Lord Perth, minister of state for colonial affairs, and Chief Okotie-Eboh, the
Nigerian finance minister, took place against a background of CO unease at
allegations of corruption concerning the latter (481). A further problem came from
the Treasury’s refusal to grant more than a £10 million Commonwealth Assistance
loan to Nigeria, an offer that fell well below the £25 million Okotie-Eboh was looking
for. Both the CO and the CRO attached great importance to increasing the Treasury’s
offer, the CRO stressing the need to keep ‘Nigeria, as the biggest country in free
Africa, on the side of the West’ (483). Such was the importance of the issue that the
CO, in order to persuade the Treasury to raise its offer to £12 million, proposed a £3
million Exchequer Loan, to bring the total assistance until 1962 up to £15 million,
this sum being finally agreed at a meeting between Perth and Okotie-Eboh at the end
of July 1959 (485). 
Negotiations concerning financial aid were accompanied by consideration of a
technical assistance scheme, to provide equipment, training and the supply of
technical experts to serve in Nigeria after independence. This issue was coloured by
concerns over USA involvement (540). Proposals concerning technical assistance
were considered at meetings Lennox-Boyd held during his visit to Lagos in May 1959
and a draft proposal, worth nearly £1 million, agreed between officials of the two
countries in May 1960.123
The most controversial of the issues the British government addressed in this
period was that of defence. Consideration of Britain’s defence interests in the light of
Nigerian independence had occurred at length in the ‘Skeleton Plan’ in early 1957.
This consideration was further stimulated by Nigeria’s assumption of control over its
defence forces in April 1958, the end of a process of devolving control over the
Nigerian army going back to the West African Forces conference in 1953.124 The
Chiefs of Staff reviewed Britain’s defence interests in Africa in 1958 and concluded
that Britain required over-flying and staging rights in Nigeria, in order to reinforce
British forces elsewhere in Africa and in the Indian Ocean; this, it was believed,
would require the use of Kano airport and would necessitate the signing of some sort
of defence agreement, an issue the CO took up thereafter (423). As the September
1958 London conference approached, Duncan Sandys, the minister of defence,
proposed that such an agreement should allow Britain to retain an enclave in Nigeria
after independence; this latter idea both the CO and Robertson balked at. None the
less at a meeting between Lennox-Boyd and Sandys, it was agreed that an outline
defence agreement would be presented to Nigerian leaders for approval during the
conference—but before the date of independence should be agreed, in effect
implying that agreement on the latter was conditional on the former. The meeting
with Nigerian leaders took place on 24 October and an outline document was
initialled by Tafawa Balewa, Awolowo, Azikiwe and the Sardauna—though the exact
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details were not published (463). The outline made no mention of an enclave such as
Sandys had originally proposed but did allow Britain to lease land and facilities at
Kano, gave over-flying and staging rights, plus the use of Lagos and Port Harcourt
harbours, in the event of war; in return Britain would provide military training and
assistance, including equipment. 
Further impetus in drawing up a formal agreement came in January 1960 when
Macmillan, during his tour of Africa made famous by his ‘wind of change’ speech in
Cape Town, met Tafawa Balewa in Lagos (502). At a meeting on 12 January Tafawa
Balewa raised broader concerns about the defence of Nigeria, given French
withdrawal from Nigeria’s neighbours, concerns that Macmillan forwarded to the
Chiefs of Staff. In their subsequent report the COS identified the Cameroons as 
the most likely defence threat to Nigeria’s future. This gave the British government
the chance to subsume the original agreement within the broader needs of Nigerian
defence. Once a detailed agreement had been drawn up in March 1960, Macmillan
forwarded it to Tafawa Balewa for consideration (514). 
However, the political climate had changed in Nigeria—not least because of
French atomic tests in the Sahara—and it was now clear that a pact would be deeply
unpopular. By April the CRO was advising of the benefits of delaying the signing of
any such pact until after independence in order to avoid charges of having
pressurised the Nigerian government to sign. In any case, Nigerian ministers
rejected the idea of a lease while expressing their willingness to provide facilities for
over-flying and naval use as required; at the May 1960 conference it was agreed that
there would be no lease (523, 527). Instead there would be a pact that simply covered
mutual co-operation and assistance, plus over-flying and staging rights; it was also
agreed that the pact would be approved by the Nigerian Parliament after
independence. In return, proposals for paying the training costs of Nigerian officers
in Britain were drawn up and approved by the Treasury (533). In September the
revised proposals were agreed by the Council of Ministers and the following month
approved by the Nigerian parliament. In the event these efforts were in vain; such
was the public opposition, articulated in particular by Awolowo, that in early 1962
the pact was abrogated. 
A further area that the British government attempted to shape as Nigeria
approached independence was its future foreign policy. Central to this was Nigeria’s
membership of the Commonwealth. This however raised the question of South
Africa, which was increasingly alienated from a Commonwealth that was taking on,
in the form of Malaya and Ghana, a growing Afro-Asian block. From late 1958 the
possible South African reaction to Nigerian membership was giving cause for
concern in the CO (466). The South African problem was inverted following the
Sharpeville shootings in March 1960, which led to considerable protest in Nigeria
and which, it was feared, would have a knock-on effect concerning Nigeria’s foreign
policy position more generally. 
Behind this lay concerns that Nigeria might align herself with perceived Soviet
interests in Africa after independence. The CO and the CRO lost no opportunity in
these years to stress to Nigerian leaders how inimical to Nigeria’s interests—as they
saw it—Soviet ambitions were (480, 486). Early in 1959 a CRO memorandum on
Nigerian foreign policy after independence was presented to Tafawa Balewa—in
response to the latter’s request—stressing the dangers of Soviet expansionism in
Africa. This was followed in mid-1959 with a CRO memorandum to advise Nigerian
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staff in London about dealing with Soviet approaches. When early in 1960 Tafawa
Balewa made a request to the British government for the supply of foreign policy
intelligence after independence, this was quickly addressed; by July the CRO had
arranged for the future high commissioner in Lagos to pass on relevant intelligence
material (509).125
The hope was, noted the CRO, that Nigeria would be ‘relatively moderate in
international affairs and generally friendly to the West, in particular to the U.K.’.126
None the less, by early 1960 Robertson was warning of a growing tide of neutralism
in Nigeria (520). Tafawa Balewa caused alarm when he gave a major speech in August
of that year stressing non-alignment as the key to Nigeria’s future foreign policy. The
CRO and CO were relatively sanguine however. The CRO took the view that ‘Nigeria
will take a formal anti-colonial stand. They cannot afford not to. Sir James Robertson
[said] that he advised Sir Abubakar that he would do better in some of his public
speeches to talk about Nigeria’s imminent liberation from the Colonial “heel”’.127
The CO too believed that such statements on neutralism did not threaten British
interests and were necessary if Nigeria’s stand was to have any credibility. E C Burr, a
principal in the CO, recognised that 
‘if Nigeria is to retain influence among African states after independence it will
have to behave like an African state and not like some Western appendage. This
may from time to time result in their acting contrary to our interests but I think
we will just have to accept that’.128
More specifically, the CO welcomed signs of Tafawa Balewa’s growing suspicions of
Ghana’s ambitions. He rejected proposals for a West African Union put forward by
Nkrumah in March 1959 and remained suspicious of Nkrumah’s alleged ambitions to
break up Nigeria (474).129 The CO saw Nigeria as a useful counterweight to Ghana in
West Africa, given the latters’ radical rhetoric at the UNO. 
Influencing the public service, aid, defence and foreign policy were all clearly
important for the CO in the run-up to independence, but the critical issue concerned
the political arena. None of these schemes would mean anything if the Nigerian
government elected on the eve of independence was hostile to Britain. Precisely who
would form the government that led Nigeria to independence was therefore the
single, central concern for the CO in these years. As noted above, when the office of
prime minister had been created in 1957, Tafawa Balewa had formed a national unity
government composed of members of all three of the main parties. However two
related developments began, in time, to threaten the unity of this government. One
was the drawing away from the others by the AG, which had ambitions of its own to
form a government, albeit in coalition with other parties. This required the AG to
strengthen its influence in other regions in opposition to the NCNC and NPC. The
other, related, development was a growing rapprochement between the NPC and the
NCNC that became apparent during 1958 (433) and particularly following Azikiwe’s
meeting with the Sardauna in June. Underlying this were two further factors, the
first of which was the NPC’s concern that it would not win an outright majority in
the House of Representatives’ elections scheduled to be held at the end of 1959 which
would elect the independence government. The second was the realisation within the
NCNC of its weakening appeal outside the East and the challenge to Azikiwe’s
position as leader with the emergence of the NCNC Reform Committee in 1958
under K O Mbadiwe, federal minister of commerce and industry and former leader of
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the NCNC group in the House of Representatives. By late 1958 the Reform
Committee had become the Democratic Party of Nigeria and the Cameroons under
Mbadiwe, with an ostensible commitment to socialist-leaning policies.
Throughout these years the CO took the view that an NPC-led government for an
independent Nigeria was in the best interests of Britain. At root, the concern was that
if the NPC were excluded from government, this would prompt separatist tendencies;
the meetings Northern leaders held with representatives from Chad in 1960 (531),
although only an insurance in case of tension with the South after independence,
showed that the secessionist option had not been dropped.130 As the 1959 elections
approached, the CO expressed the greatest unease about the possibility of an NCNC
government led by Azikiwe, or even an NCNC place in a coalition. Eastwood
commented, ‘I am not sure all this augurs very well for Nigeria after independence’,
but recognised there was little the CO could do to prevent it if it occurred.131 Clearly,
given the electoral realities of Nigeria, the NCNC could only form a government in
coalition, but the fear was that in any such a coalition, Azikiwe would become foreign
minister, with all that would imply for Nigeria’s position at the UNO or more
generally. When this idea was mooted in mid-1958, Smith noted that ‘this is most
depressing’ and his concerns were reiterated by others (433, 500).
The federal elections of December 1959 to determine who would rule Nigeria in
the first few years of independence were therefore critical.132 In the event the NPC
did not gain an overall majority of seats, and, after negotiations, formed a coalition
government with the NCNC under Tafawa Balewa as prime minister; the Democratic
Party’s challenge to Azikiwe came to nothing. Balewa’s appointment was welcomed
by the CO—‘our very good friend’ was how Macleod described him shortly after—as
was the fact that Azikiwe was kept out of the Foreign Ministry; Robertson had briefed
Balewa on this repeatedly (523). None the less Azikiwe received the largely
ceremonial post of president of the Senate and it was clear that he would become
governor-general after independence (499). 
The results of the elections were as good as the CO could hope for. The creation of
the new government was followed, as had been agreed at the 1958 conference, by a
formal resolution in the new House in January 1960 asking for independence. This
the British government accepted. There followed two further conferences, one in
London in May and one in Lagos in July, to settle the technical and legal details of
independence and the process moved rapidly to its conclusion on Lagos racecourse
on 30 September–1 October in the presence of Princess Alexandria. At midnight,
following the usual ceremonies and an exuberant mock battle display—an empire
ending not with a whimper but a bang—the Union flag was lowered and Nigeria
gained its independence.133
The lowering of the Union flag on 1 October was not however, the end of the story.
There remained British administration in the Cameroons (471). As independence for
Nigeria approached, serious issues concerning the future status of the Cameroons
remained to be resolved, as the UNO Visiting Mission in late 1958 recognised. In
1958 the Southern Cameroons had gained full regional status within the federation;
the Northern Cameroons remained an integral part of the Northern region. The
North seemed willing to continue this but the situation in the Southern Cameroons
was more complex. The KNC under Endeley, who had been appointed premier of the
territory in 1958, supported continued integration with Nigeria as a separate region
after independence. John Foncha, the leader of the KNDP, however, exploited local
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distrust of Nigerians and particularly the large numbers of Igbo merchants in the
territory, and campaigned instead for union with the French Cameroons, which
gained its independence as the Republic of Cameroun in January 1960. His
campaign, it became clear, had considerable support. 
For the CO the danger was the possibility of sentiment developing for the
Southern Cameroons to go it alone as a separate state. Given its parlous economic
viability, this raised the threat of British financial obligations continuing indefinitely
into the future.134 In any case a terrorist campaign in Cameroun in this period
necessitated the continuing and costly presence of British troops along the border.
Further, as Perth pointed out, if the South opted for independence this might have a
knock-on effect on the Northern Cameroons; this possibility, he stated, would cause
problems for Northern Nigeria and ‘would really I think upset our relationship with
Nigeria as a whole and for a long time to come, and that is something which we must
at all costs avoid. The Southern Cameroons and its inhabitants are undoubtedly
expendable in relation to this’.135
Continued association with Nigeria by both Northern and Southern Cameroons
would have suited the CO best, with merger with Cameroun preferable to either
separate independence or continued British rule. The result of the Southern
elections at the start of 1959 that saw Endeley defeated by the KNDP on a platform
opposing integration with Nigeria, thus caused concern for the CO when Foncha
almost immediately started to blow cold on prospects for union with Cameroun. As
was recognised by all however, the critical decisions would have to be made by the
UNO. In March 1959 the UN decided on plebiscites in the two parts of the Cameroons
concerning their future; in the North to be held in November 1959, and in the South
before April 1960 (471). When the plebiscite in the Northern Cameroons was held in
November, much to observers’ surprise, the electorate, far from voting as expected
for integration with Northern Nigeria, voted to delay a decision; this caused alarm in
the CO. In the light of this outcome, the UNO decided to separate the Northern and
Southern Cameroons from Nigeria in October 1960 and to undertake plebiscites in
both parts before 31 March 1961. These plebiscites, held in February 1961, were
unequivocal. The North voted for integration with Northern Nigeria while the South
voted for union with Cameroun. On 1 June 1961, the Northern Cameroons joined
Northern Nigeria. Four months later, on 1 October 1961, and a full year after
withdrawal from Nigeria itself, the British withdrew from Southern Cameroons. 
Political withdrawal from Nigeria and the Cameroons was of course but part of the
story. Yet it was an important part. What is striking to the observer of this process is
the emphasis both sides put on the symbols of political rule and the relatively
restrained conflict between Britain and Nigeria that accompanied this. ‘Our general
relations with Nigeria have gone very amicably in recent years’, noted Macleod with
satisfaction once Nigeria gained its independence.136 That, at least, was the view from
London. The view from Lagos, as it would have been throughout these years, would
have been different. 
* * * *
Contrary to its image, academic research is rarely, if ever, a solitary effort and the
present piece of work is no exception. In particular I owe an immense debt of
gratitude to the BDEEP series general editor, Stephen Ashton, for his unfailing
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support and encouragement; without these, it hardly needs to be said, this volume
would never have been completed. In addition, I am grateful to Shaun Milton,
BDEEP research assistant for Kenya and Nigeria, who carried out basic background
work on issues such as defence, the Commonwealth and the economy early in the
undertaking. Thanks are also due to Richard Rathbone, editor of the Ghana volume
in the BDEEP series, for his encouragement, particularly at the start of the process
when the size of the task seemed, to me at least, overwhelming. I am also grateful to
John Smith, who served in Nigeria, and who shared with me his extensive knowledge
of this period and of the personalities involved in it. David Killingray and Tony Kirk-
Greene helped out on a number of matters of factual detail, while Peter Blair
generously shared his extensive knowledge of British politicians of the 1950s; I am
grateful to all three. Maura Pringle provided her usual excellent cartographic input.
The staff of the Public Record Office were a great help throughout; in particular
Mandy Banton, to whom I owe immense thanks. Several libraries provided assistance
above and beyond the call of duty; it may be invidious to pick out only a couple, but
the service received from the library staff of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies,
London and of Queen’s University, Belfast deserves special praise. I am grateful too,
to Queen’s University for the study leave that helped complete this volume and to
Janice Jardine, Heather Kinning, Catherine Reid and Gloria Rickard for their
secretarial assistance. Ken Barnes, James Bourn, Anthony McClellan and Charles
Swaisland answered detailed questions on their time in the Colonial Service; their
help is gratefully acknowledged. A major debt of gratitude is also owed to Roger and
Clare Goldby, Harriet and Peter Hall, Andrew and Linda Hutchinson, and Mary
Johnston, who so readily, repeatedly and uncomplainingly provided the
accommodation in London without which this volume simply could not have been
completed. I am deeply grateful to them. Finally, I wish to record my thanks for the
support and encouragement I received throughout this research from Mary and John
Lynn.
M Lynn
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to Mr Creech Jones
Despatch on prosecution of leaders of
Zikist movement for sedition
Sir J Macpherson 
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Eastern Region
18–20
Feb
E O Mercer, T B
Williamson, Sir T Lloyd
& Mr Hopkinson
Tel on resignation of Eastern Region
ministers
A E T Benson 
to Mr Lyttelton
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Council of Ministers
meeting
Circular to civil secretaries on question
of press attacks on policy & officials, +
Appendix B
L H Goble
Minutes on reaction in CO to Western
Region local government bill
27 Nov
–1 Dec
W L Gorell Barnes 
& Sir T Lloyd
Minute on threat to powers of central
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Western Region local government bill
E O Mercer
Tel on impact of Sierra Leone policy on
Nigeria
A E T Benson 
to Mr Gorell Barnes
Note of meeting with Sir S Phillipson &
Mr Adebo to discuss Colonial Service
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government in 1956, + Minute by T B
Williamson
Sir J Macpherson 
to Mr Lyttelton
Savingram on proposed amendments to
constitution
Mr Lyttelton 
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1 CO 583/261/30453, no 7 22 June 1943
[Constitutional revision]: CO note of a meeting with Sir B Bourdillon
to discuss the future development of Nigeria
[Considerable discussion concerning the future constitutional development of the West
African colonies occurred within the CO during the war years, and particularly during
1943. This debate was stimulated both by officials like Sir Bernard Bourdillon, governor
of Nigeria, and Sir Alan Burns, governor of the Gold Coast, and by figures like Lord Hailey
and Nnamdi Azikiwe, one of the members of the West African press delegation that was
invited to visit Britain that year. As far as Nigeria was concerned, at the heart of this
debate were the various memoranda produced immediately before and during the war by
Bourdillon; the most important of these being his Memorandum on the future political
development of Nigeria (Lagos, 1939) and A further memorandum on the future political
development of Nigeria (Lagos, 1942). The retirement of Bourdillon and the
consideration during 1943 of a replacement sharpened this discussion. A key document in
focusing these ideas during this period was the memorandum on ‘Constitutional
development in West Africa’ drawn up by O G R Williams in mid-1943 (CO 554/132/20, no
1; printed in BDEEP Series A, S R Ashton and S E Stockwell, ed, Imperial policy and
colonial practice, 1925–1945 part I, (London, 1996), 70), which drew on various sources
to propose a broad outline for constitutional change in West Africa in the future.
Coinciding with this, Bourdillon was called to a number of meetings at the CO to discuss
the future of Nigeria, of which the one outlined in this document was the first. Present
were the secretary of state, Oliver Stanley, and the parliamentary under-secretary of state,
the Duke of Devonshire, as well as Sir George Gater, Sir Arthur Dawe, O G R Williams, A
B Cohen and other officials. Following the meeting Bourdillon produced a further
memorandum for CO consideration (CO 583/261/30453, no 13, ‘Outline proposals for
constitutional reforms in Nigeria’, 5 Sept 1943).]
Sir Bernard Bourdillon began by outlining the present social and political
background in Nigeria and contrasted conditions in the three main divisions of the
Territory. In the Northern Provinces under the autocratic rule of the Emirs with a
predominantly Moslem population, there was a strong tradition of implicit and
unquestioning obedience which while making for ease in administration, tended to
the suppression of true popular feeling. Signs were, however, beginning to appear of
the emergence of educated opinion.
In the West well organised traditional administration was also to be found under
able and intelligent chiefs, but here the conciliar system prevailed more strongly, and
the Chiefs were bound by tradition to consult their established councils on all
matters. Here public opinion was much more vocal; the grievances of the people
were thus easier to ascertain and deal with and there was not the same danger of
their taking deep root as in the North. In the West the Chiefs were admitting
educated Africans to their Councils.
In the East political development had hardly advanced beyond the patriarchal
stage, and the family council was the largest political unit. There was practically no
tribal organisation and there thus existed a large number of very small units, a single
comparatively small community having as a Native Authority an unwieldy council on
which every family was represented. These Native Authorities were not sufficiently
developed to enable them to undertake executive duties and there was in effect direct
rule by the District Officer. An encouraging development in this area, however, was
the rise of Youth Movements, e.g. the Ibibio Progressive Union, which, while having
no official status, were generally accepted as representing the views of the advanced
section of the community, and for the most part co-operated very harmoniously with
the Native Authorities. Sir Bernard thought that the further development of Native
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Authorities in this area might depend very much on youth movements such as this.
The Government was trying to encourage the development of small executive
committees on which the more intelligent and educated Africans might serve where
the Native Authorities themselves were too large and unwieldy.
Having thus outlined the present diverse political conditions in Nigeria, Sir
Bernard turned to the consideration some of the problems attending the future
development of the Colony as a whole. It was of first importance to avoid the rise of
antagonism between the old traditional authorities and the advanced opinion of the
rising generation. At present the relations between the educated Africans and the
Native Authorities are very satisfactory. The danger of a conflict was naturally
greatest in the Northern Provinces, but he had observed within his own experience
the beginnings of development in the freedom of speech there. Certainly there was
much greater freedom of speech on the councils than seven years ago and in one case
an Emir had actually invited an educated African, a schoolteacher, to attend a
Council Meeting when the Governor was present and to give his views.
Sir Bernard then commented on the unsatisfactory character of the existing
Legislative Council. There was no unofficial representation of the Northern
Provinces and he believed that the Emirs’ lack of concern at this state of affairs up to
the present was due to a failure to appreciate that the Council in any way concerned
itself with Northern affairs. He was afraid that this lack of interest might to some
extent have been encouraged by Administrative Officers in the North.
Moreover the vast majority of the people of Nigeria, who were peasant producers,
were not adequately represented on the Council. He did not believe that the country
was ready for any form of numerical franchise, but suggested that representation
might be through the Native Authorities, who did, he was convinced, genuinely
represent the peasant. For this reason he had made a practice of consulting the
Native Authorities concerned before appointing provincial members to the
Legislative Council. Sir Bernard said that he proposed to formulate proposals for
future constitutional development which he would submit to the Secretary of State.
Turning to economic questions, Sir Bernard pointed out that Nigeria was a
predominantly agricultural country and could not hope to develop and maintain its
financial position without the growth of secondary industries, e.g. the manufacture
of produce containers. He was not, however, concerned merely with the development
of new schemes; there was considerable leeway to be made up in the financing of
existing services. Labour had in many cases long been underpaid and during the war
he had been compelled to make concessions on this account, e.g. the grant of an
increase in wages to railway workers in October 1941. He had suggested that
assistance might be afforded to Nigeria in the form of an easing of her loan
obligation.
A co-ordinated plan for the development of Nigeria was required and this should
be drawn up not by an ad hoc body but by the ordinary machinery of the Government
which was to administer it. The present Secretariat machinery in Lagos, with its
bottleneck caused by the passage of all papers to the Governor through the Chief
Secretary, was defective, and was not capable of dealing adequately with the plans
which were already being submitted by the individual departments, such as the 10
year Education Plan. The Secretary of State emphasised the importance of Nigeria
being ready with a comprehensive scheme of post-war development when the time
came.
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Turning aside briefly to the educational problem, Sir Bernard contrasted the
comparative apathy which existed in the Northern Provinces with the great demand
for secondary education in the South. He suggested that a rural type of secondary
school might be evolved to meet the need of ensuring that the majority of the boys
passing out of the schools would return to the land.
Speaking of the general feeling of the people towards the Government, Sir Bernard
said that this was very good. Of such discontent as existed 99% was due to economic
causes, e.g. differences in rates of pay between European and African appointments
and better opportunities for European trading companies. The question of social
barriers was not a live issue. The loyalty of the mass of the peasantry was
unquestionable; they had a genuine desire to help in the war efforts, and in
appreciating the extent of their financial contribution it was necessary to remember
that only a very small proportion of the people had a money economy at all. He
attributed the general spirit of contentment among the rural population to the policy
of indirect rule, under which the people were governed through machinery with
which they were thoroughly familiar and which they could understand. He
emphasised, however, that when introducing changes in methods of native
administration the criterion should not be whether the modification was in
accordance with tradition but whether it was acceptable. Thus, when Native
Authorities were introduced in the Colony, their constitution was left to the people
themselves to devise. The occasional press attacks on the policy of indirect rule were
not really directed at the system itself but at the alleged use of the Native
Administration by the Central Government as a facade.
Replying to the Secretary of State, Sir Bernard said that there was no ‘Nigerian’
feeling, but this would grow in time. At present the only occasion on which such
feeling could be said to take concrete shape was in the face of any suggestion of
fusion between Nigeria and any other West African Colony, on which subject the
people of Nigeria had strong feelings.
Sir Bernard then spoke of the tremendous field for the development of social
welfare, and in particular mass campaigns against diseases such as yaws, leprosy,
venereal disease etc. He instanced the achievements of the anti sleeping sickness
work in Zaria. Very large sums of money will be needed and Sir Bernard was anxious
that the scope of assistance available under the Colonial Development and Welfare
Act should be defined. The Secretary of State pointed out the dilemma with which
Nigeria was faced. The need for expanding the social services in Nigeria was well
recognised here, but the amount which the United Kingdom taxpayer could be asked
to contribute was naturally limited, and it would not be possible to undertake any
appreciable extension of departmental activity unless the Government confined itself
to the payment of salaries bearing some proportion to the economic position of the
people as a whole. He instanced the difference between the standard of living of
teachers and of the peasants among whom they worked. The cost of development
must be kept down. Only a limited sum would be available for the whole Empire and
this must be spread over as wide an area as possible. Sir Bernard suggested that the
financing of the development of education might be assisted by the imposition of an
education rate.
It was agreed that the various points raised by Sir Bernard should be discussed at a
further meeting to be held on 2nd July and that an agenda should be circulated in
advance.
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2 CO 554/132/20, no 16 19 Nov 1943
[Constitutional revision]: CO record of a meeting with Sir A Richards
to discuss Nigerian constitutional development
[Shortly after his appointment as governor in late 1943, Sir Arthur Richards attended two
meetings in the CO, on 19 and 22 Nov, to discuss his views on future constitutional
change for Nigeria. Present at the meeting on 19 Nov were Stanley and the Duke of
Devonshire, as well as Sir George Gater and other officials including Williams and
Cohen.]
The Secretary of State referred to the proposals put up by Sir Bernard Bourdillon for
constitutional development in Nigeria and to the memoranda by Lord Hailey1 and
others on the same subject. These had been seen by Sir Arthur Richards and Colonel
Stanley asked Sir Arthur for his views on them.
Sir Arthur Richards said that he had read the memoranda and felt that he could
join in the general approval of the proposal to establish Regional Councils. He felt
considerable doubt however whether it would be possible immediately to secure
unofficial representation from the North on the Central Council, as Lord Hailey and
Sir Bernard Bourdillon had suggested. He had not of course the advantage of
knowing the country, but prima facie his impression was that the Emirs, with their
intense loyalty to the Crown, would be suspicious of any proposal which would place
them under a Central Council or subject them to criticism by Coast lawyers. A
similar situation had arisen in Fiji, where the Chiefs had asked to withdraw from the
Council rather than be forced to sit there and listen to Indian politicians violently
criticising the actions of Government.
Sir Arthur Richards emphasised that at the present time our authority in the
North was derived from the support given to the Government by the Emirs and he
said that if we were to take any action which might give the Emirs the impression
that their position was being impugned, they might well lose their confidence in the
Governor.2 If they were to be compelled to send representatives to the Central
Council, their attitude might be one of disapproval and non-cooperation. Sir Arthur
felt that it might be possible gradually to persuade the Emirs into acceptance of a
Central Council, but he felt that it would be wrong to go too fast. He thought that it
would be necessary for him to tour the Northern Provinces and in personal
discussion with the Emirs to put to them the ideas underlying the proposal to
establish a Central Council. He might then be able to secure their confidence and to
endeavour to convince them that constitutional development on the general lines
suggested was in the best interests of the Northern Provinces. This process might
take time.
The Secretary of State said that he appreciated Sir Arthur’s point of view, but he
asked whether this would mean that no step forward could be made with regard to
the Central Council. The difficulty would then be to hold the position in relation to
the Lagos politicians. Sir Arthur Richards thought that it would not be essential for
1 W Malcolm Hailey (1st Baron cr 1936); ICS 1895–1934; director, African Research Survey, 1935–1938;
member, Permanent Mandates Commission of League of Nations, 1935–1939; head of Economic Mission
to Belgian Congo, 1940–1941; chairman, Colonial Research Committee, 1943–1948.
2 One of Richards’s very earliest meetings, following his arrival in Nigeria, was with the Sultan of Sokoto.
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the north and south to move forward at the same pace. He did not feel that it should
take long for him to work out suggestions for the Eastern and Western Provinces,
but he felt that the process must be a slower one in the north.
The Secretary of State said that it might be possible to set up a Central Council,
leaving a gap for the Northern Territories to fill later when the time was appropriate.
The Council could be given an unofficial majority and this would meet the local
politicians to some extent. He said that when he was in the Northern Territories he
was given to understand that Azikiwe’s paper was fairly widely read and he was not
sure that the position of the Emirs was quite so sound underneath as it appeared on
top.
Sir Arthur Richards said that it might well be that their position was now not so
powerful as it had been in the past and it might be well for him in talking privately to
the Emirs to put it to them that their own position required consideration and that
unless they progressed with the times, they might find their position precarious. He
thought that if the Governor travelled and talked to the Emirs privately and secured
their confidence they would accept such views from him. He had no doubt that the
Governor could, by personal persuasion, obtain their immediate approval for
proposals for constitutional reform, such approval would, if forced, probably not be
sincere. It would require time, education and persuasive methods, to convince them
of the need for progress.
The Secretary of State agreed. He was not at all in favour of the appointment of a
commission to investigate this matter and felt sure that Sir Arthur Richards was
right in thinking that the proper course was to discuss these matters with the Chiefs
and others on the spot and then to frame his ideas on what the procedure for making
progress should be. He added that he had gained the impression that there was
considerable uncertainty among officials in the North as to the Emir’s [sic] position.
Sir Arthur Richards said that Sir Theodore Adams3 had confirmed this in his talks
with him and had said that the North were full of vague fears as to the future.
The Secretary of State said that his impression was that some officials in the
North had begun to feel that the Emirs were a ban to progress, but that the Emirs
still enjoyed the full support of the peasant population.
Sir Arthur Richards said that our authority rested on the fact that the Emirs gave
the Government their support. If one or two of the older Emirs were enlightened and
progressive men, it might be possible to make an advance.
The Secretary of State said that unfortunately the older men were not enlightened
or progressive. Some of the younger ones were. He said that it was essential to avoid
giving the impression that the other regions were being held back because of the
difficulty in making progress with regard to the North. Even if the representatives of
these regions could be persuaded of the necessity for slower progress in the North,
they would not accept this as a reason for delaying their own progress. Moreover,
they might well accuse the Government of using the North in order to stall on the
question of making progress in the other regions.
Sir Arthur Richards said that, as he had said, he saw no reason why there could not
be different rates of progress for the North and the other regions.
3 Chief commissioner, Northern provinces, 1936–1943.
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The Secretary of State said that a start might be made with Regional Councils
with a Central Council for the South, leaving a gap for the North to come in later on.
Sir Arthur Richards said that he thought that the Legislative Council should not
be allowed to discuss matters concerned with the affairs of the Northern Provinces.
He had the impression that the Legislative Council did not at present deal with
Northern affairs.
Mr. Cohen said that this was the constitutional arrangement, but the Legislative
Council did in fact, sometimes discuss the matters. Indeed, it was very difficult to
avoid them, especially in connection with finance.
The Secretary of State referred to the question of granting an unofficial majority
and said that Sir Bernard Bourdillon had rather brushed aside this proposal. This was
the question about which unofficial opinion was most concerned in the Gold Coast,
as it no doubt also was in Nigeria, and it would be most difficult to concede an
unofficial majority in the Gold Coast without also doing so in Nigeria. He thought it
very unlikely that, with the official vote at its disposal, Government would be
outvoted on important questions. In any case the Governor would always be able to
certify legislation and he did not himself feel that it would be more difficult for the
Governor to do this than to enact legislation by means of an official majority in the
face of unanimous opposition on the part of the unofficial members.
Sir Arthur Richards said that he agreed and would not himself object to an
unofficial majority. He did, however, entirely disagree with Sir Bernard Bourdillon’s
view that officials should be allowed to vote as they chose. This would certainly result
in chaos.
The Secretary of State said that it was desirable that Sir Arthur Richards should
keep in close touch with Sir Alan Burns on these matters.4 It would, he thought, be
very difficult to allow the Gold Coast to go ahead in advance of the other West African
Territories.
Sir Arthur Richards said that he felt that progress with the North would depend
upon the amount of the Governor’s influence on the Chiefs. If he could convince
them that they were not being handed over to the South and assure them that their
position would be adequately safeguarded, and if the pace were not forced, he did not
see why the North should not eventually be brought in. He proposed when on tour to
talk to the senior Administrative Officers and as many of the junior officers as
possible to obtain their views. Once the Government’s policy was settled he would
make it clear to them what the aims were and he would also make it clear in matters
of policy that it was their duty to accept what had been decided and act upon it, even
though they might not themselves agree. It followed that the administrative
organisation would have to be rather more closely knit than it was at present. He was
not however, inclined to agree with Mr. Grantham that the Chief Commissioner
should disappear.
Mr. Cohen raised the question of the presentation locally of Government’s policy
with regard to constitutional advance.
Sir George Gater said that this raised the question of the treatment of Lagos, since
the Lagos politicians were likely to be the most vocal critics of any proposed reforms.
Sir Arthur Richards said that he was inclined to agree with Lord Hailey that Lagos
4 Gov of the Gold Coast 1941–47; acting gov Nigeria 1942.
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and its immediate surroundings should become a Municipality not subject to the
Western Regional Council.
The Secretary of State said that Sir Alan Burns was prepared to accept something
similar for Accra and Kumasi and that under his proposals they would direct
representatives to Legislative Council. He thought this was wise.
Sir George Gater remarked that the development of local government bodies was
not dealt with in Sir Bernard Bourdillon’s proposals. He thought this a very
important part of constitutional development and that it would require a closer
examination than had been given to it up to date.
Sir Arthur Richards suggested that there should be an announcement sketching
out Government’s objectives and stating that progress would be according to the
willingness and fitness of the people to advance and that the North would not
be forced and further that every step would require the assent of the people
concerned.
The Secretary of State said that this led him to a suggestion which he had been
turning over in his mind that a White Paper should be published for the whole of
West Africa setting out the objects, political, social and economic, which HMG had in
mind for the four Territories.
Sir Arthur Richards said that he thought that this was an excellent idea. The White
Paper could perhaps sketch out the general policy and it could be left to him to fill in
the blanks.
The Secretary of State said that he thought that the idea should be worked the
other way round. He thought that Sir Arthur Richards and Sir Alan Burns should
discuss these important matters and put up their ideas to the Secretary of State who
could then, in the light of those ideas, formulate a policy. A White Paper could then
be produced.
Sir George Gater wondered whether Sir Alan Burns would in the meantime be
able to hold the position in the Gold Coast.
The Secretary of State said that in his talks with Sir Alan it had been agreed that it
would be necessary for him to discuss these matters with Sir Arthur Richards. He did
not get the impression that the Gold Coast position was so urgent that it was likely to
get out of hand before decisions could be taken in the light of these talks. The
Secretary of State said that it was essential that the Gold Coast and Nigeria should
keep in step.
Mr. Cohen referred to the position of the African unofficial members of the
Executive Council. One of them was also a member of the Legislative Council and
could attack in that Council measures which had been agreed upon previously by a
majority in the Executive Council. It was agreed that the position was not entirely
satisfactory and this was a matter which Sir Arthur Richards would look into after his
arrival in Nigeria.
The Secretary of State then left the meeting.
The question of the substitution of election or selection of members of Councils
for nomination by the Governor was discussed and Sir Arthur Richards said that he
thought that if possible it was preferable for the method of selection or election to be
defined in the constitution, since this would show that the members of Council
concerned were really the representatives of the people and not nominees of the
Government. . . .
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3 CO 583/286/5, no 1 19 July 1944
[Richards’s proposals]: despatch from Sir A Richards to Mr Stanley
setting out proposals for reform of the Nigerian constitution.
Annexures
I have the honour to address you on the subject of the political and constitutional
future of Nigeria. I shall endeavour to set forth my views with a brevity which is no
measure of the time and trouble taken to form them.
As you are aware, I studied a number of relevant documents in London last
November and I had the advantage of many discussions with officers of your staff1
Since assuming office in Nigeria I have read all the local memoranda with which the
enquiring student is afflicted and I have to confess to a resultant impression of
unreality and sterility. My predecessor2 collected a vast number of written opinions
before formulating the proposals which you were unable to accept. During the very
extensive travelling which I have undertaken in the last six months I have kept the
subject constantly in mind and have, I hope, retained an objective outlook. The
background of the different races comprised within the area known as Nigeria and
the diversity of their customs, beliefs, habits and aspirations has been drawn by many
pens, the most notable and the latest being that of Lord Hailey.3 The picture is
complete and relieves me of a difficult preliminary task in that I may now assume as
common property the knowledge released by so competent an observer. I have also
steeped myself in the writings and the thought of Lord Lugard, who has had no
successor in knowledge of the people and in grasp of the principles and practice of
colonial administration4 He was confronted with the difficult setting of an artificial
unity which existed only on the map. His problem was to build a system which would
allow organic growth and make the unity superimposed from outside into a living
thing which might progress through varying stages of adolescence to adult
nationhood. If I may be permitted the observation, the special distinction of Lord
Lugard is that he never allowed principles to become divorced from practice and that
he never thought he had solved difficulties by evading them. He would have been the
last to launch the Ship of State on a maiden voyage of discovery through uncharted
seas in the sublime faith that the winds of chance would blow her at last into some
safe haven.
2. I have made these preliminary remarks because I feel very strongly that
political progress must be planned deliberately and that while allowance must be
made for changes and any constitutional experiment must be flexible in its
provisions, there must be some framework of design. We cannot leave all the
1 See 2. 2 ie Sir Bernard Bourdillon
3 An African Survey (London, 1938) and Native administration and political development in British
tropical Africa, 1940–1942 (London, 1944).
4 Frederick Lugard (1st Baron Lugard of Abinger cr 1928). KCMG, 1901; high commissioner and gov of
Northern Nigeria, 1900–1907; gov of Hong Kong, 1907–1912; high commissioner and gov of Northern
Nigeria, 1912–1914; gov of Southern Nigeria, 1912–1914; gov-gen of Nigeria, 1914–1919; privy
councillor, 1920; member, Permanent Mandates Commission of League of Nations, 1922–1936; died
1945.
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difficulties to Time and Fate. As I see it, there is only one test to apply to new political
and constitutional proposals—will they work, and, if so, how? The main problem in
Nigeria to-day is how to create a political system which is itself a present advance and
contains the living possibility of further orderly advance—a system within which the
diverse elements may progress at varying speed, amicably and smoothly, towards a
more closely integrated economic, social and political unity, without sacrificing the
principles and ideals inherent in their divergent ‘ways of life’. It is not possible to
retrace our steps and to break up Nigeria into three or four separate entities—like
Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda—bound only by transport, customs and postal
unions for the common convenience.
It is not possible to impose upon unwilling peoples an immediate but artificial
political unity based on false analogies of the United Kingdom.
Nor is it possible to continue in face of pressure, external and internal, the present
system of Government which is full of inconsistencies and is intrinsically unsuited
for expansion on a Nigerian basis. A governing factor in my thoughts has been the
physical size of Nigeria—one third of British India or the size of France, Belgium and
the United Kingdom—with a population double that of the Dominion of Canada.5 It
is a potential Empire in itself and I submit that planning should therefore be on an
Imperial scale, far different from the small scale planning which is adequate for a
Colony of the normal size. We have been urged to take some risks and I agree that we
should do so. To refuse to take risks is to admit political insolvency. In any case the
risk involved in bold planning by experienced colonial administrators is far less than
the risk of having plans thrust upon our inactivity by the enthusiastic amateur and
the political theorist buttressed by dangerously false analogies.
It is not the ‘Westminster model’ but the principles which lie behind it and make it
work that I have tried to apply. The ‘model’ is a facade of purely local and national
value and perishable; the principles are of universal application and imperishable.
3. I now make the following proposals, for which I ask nothing better than the
searching scrutiny and the unsentimental analysis of your advisers. I recommend a
system of Government outlined in this form, which I will expand later.
(a) Legislative Council of Nigeria
(b) Northern (c) Western (d) Eastern (e) Colony
Provinces Provinces Provinces No
(2 Houses) (1 House) (1 House) separate
House of Chiefs House of House of council
and House of Assembly Assembly
Assembly.
The present system of Native Authorities and of indirect rule would continue
precisely as at present under the guidance of the Administrative Service. Initially, all
legislation would be dealt with by the Legislative Council of Nigeria, pending
consideration by a Committee of what legislative powers, if any, could be devolved
upon the three Regional Councils. But all Bills—other than those introduced under
Certificate of Urgency—before submission to Legislative Council to be laid on the
5 In the 1952–1953 census Nigeria’s population was calculated as slightly over 31 million.
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table of the Regional Councils for general discussion if desired and for submission of
advice by Resolution if any amendments were desired.
Regional Councils to meet once annually in January. Legislative Council to meet
for Budget Session as at present in March, with possibility of other meetings during
the year when and if desired.
The Governor to preside as at present over the Legislative Council of Nigeria and
to be assisted by an Executive Council precisely as at present.
Finance Committee of Legislative Council to operate as at present with a small
quorum to admit of absence of many members who could not regularly attend.
Finance
I propose to devolve upon Regional Councils a large measure of financial
responsibility, each to have its own local Budget.
(a) At present Native Authorities exercise a growing amount of responsibility and
are financed by being allowed to retain a percentage of direct local taxation. The
power has been reserved to the Governor to increase or decrease such percentages
for good reason. In order to simplify the system still further and to encourage Native
Authorities to adopt progressive policies I have recently frozen their contribution to
central revenue at the amounts paid in by them in the year 1943–1944. The
remainder, and the whole of any increase due to increased taxation is to be retained
by the Native Authorities. I propose to allot the whole of the amount fixed for
contribution to the Central Government to the Regional Council.
(b) I propose further to supplement the funds of the Regional Councils by block
grants from Central Revenue (i.e. indirect taxation receipts such as Customs and
Excise), calculated on a pro rata basis which would not be difficult to devise, after the
Central Government had retained the amount required for Central services and
Central finance such as loan and reserve accounts. The salaries of all Government
personnel employed in the area would be shown on the Regional Budget, only those
offices and their staff who serve directly under the Central Government being borne
on the Central Estimates.
Regional Councils
(a) Northern Provinces. I have rejected, initially at any rate, the suggestion to divide
the Northern Provinces into two regions or to attach areas not predominantly
Mohammedan to the West and East. I think it is desirable to keep the Northern
Provinces heterogeneous and to avoid creation of a Mohammedan bloc—a
Pakistan—looking to Cairo rather than to Lagos for guidance. This tendency is
already visible.
The House of Chiefs, Northern Provinces
I propose that the Chief Commissioner should preside and that membership should
be settled on the lines so successfully followed at present for the Chiefs Conference.
The Regional Budget would be finally submitted to this House for approval. They
would have the right to veto or amend items but not to insert new ones. Final
approval of the Budget would be given by the Governor, who would possess an over-
riding power to amend, delete or add to it, before authorising its submission to the
Central Council as a block vote in the Central Budget, the itemized Budget forming
an appendix to the Central Budget.
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The House of Assembly, Northern Provinces
I suggest membership as follows, under the Presidency of the Senior Resident:—
Official
Senior Resident (President)
All other Residents (12) (including Secretary Northern Provinces)
Deputy Financial Secretary
Deputy Director of Education
Deputy Director of Agriculture
Deputy Director of Medical Services
Deputy Director of Public Works
Crown Counsel
Unofficial
Twelve Provincial Members to be nominated from Native Authorities
Six Members to be nominated by the Governor to secure representation of
industry and commerce and of the Sabon Gari community and any other
important aspects of life not otherwise unofficially represented
This would give an official majority of one (19–18) including the President, who
should have an original and a casting vote.
Initially all members would have to be nominated by the Governor—for a period of
three years.
Place of meeting—Kaduna. Once annually.
The present two Annual Conferences, of Residents and of Chiefs, would disappear.
Language for both Houses—Hausa.
Western Provinces
House of Assembly
President—The Chief Commissioner
Chiefs—3 Chiefs
Officials
Residents (7) Note. The Secretary Western Provinces to be raised to status of
Resident
Deputy Financial Secretary
„ Director of Education
„ Director of Agriculture
„ Director of Medical Services
„ Director of Public Works
Crown Counsel
Unofficials
Six Provincial members nominated from Native Authorities
Four nominated by the Governor from prominent citizens representing industry,
commerce or other important aspects of life not otherwise unofficially represented
The President to have an original and a casting vote.
This would give an official majority of 14 to 13, reckoning the Chiefs as unofficial.
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All nominations for three years. Initially by the Governor.
Place of Meeting—Ibadan. Once annually.
Powers and limitations as given to two Houses in Northern Provinces.
Present Annual Conferences of Residents and Chiefs to disappear.
Language—English.
Eastern Provinces (including Cameroons)
House of Assembly
President—The Chief Commissioner
Officials
Residents (6) Note. The Secretary Eastern Provinces to be raised to status of Resident
Deputy Financial Secretary
„ Director of Education
„ Director of Agriculture
„ Director of Medical Services
„ Director of Public Works
Crown Counsel
Unofficials
Seven Provincial members nominated from Native Authorities
Five nominated by the Governor from prominent citizens to represent industry,
commerce, or other important aspects of life not otherwise unofficially represented
The President to have an original and a casting vote. This would give an official
majority of 13–12.
Place of Meeting—Enugu.
Other conditions as in notes to Western Provinces.
The Colony
To continue directly under the Legislative Council of Nigeria, Lagos becoming a
Municipality with extensive powers and to comprise its present town limits divided
into urban and suburban areas. Population circa 210,000
The rural areas of the Colony to remain as at present under a Commissioner and three
District Officers with Native Authorities functioning under them as at present.
Population circa 200,000. Departmental activities also to remain as at present organized.
Finance
The Colony Budget—a small matter excluding the Municipal area—to form part of
the Central Budget. The Lagos Municipal Budget to be an appendix to the Central
Budget like the Regional Budgets, only a block grant of such subsidy as may be
considered suitable being included in the body of the Central Budget.
The Legislative Council of Nigeria6
President—His Excellency the Governor
6 Cohen noted in the margin against this passage ‘Present Membership. Governor, 24 Officials, 21
Unofficials of whom 14 Africans.’
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Chiefs
Four Emirs (nominated by Upper House Northern Provinces)
Two Chiefs from Western Provinces (nominated by the Governor)
Officials
Chief Secretary
Chief Commissioners (3)
One Senior Resident each from Northern, Western and Eastern Provinces (3)
Resident Cameroons
Attorney-General
Financial Secretary
Director of Medical Services
Director of Education
Director of Agriculture
Director of Public Works
Director of Marine
Comptroller of Customs & Excise
General Manager of the Railway
Commissioner of Police
Commissioner of Colony
Unofficials
4 members from Northern Provinces (to be nominated by House of Assembly
Northern Provinces from their own body)
3 members from Western Provinces (to be nominated by House of Assembly
Western Provinces from their own body)
4 members from Eastern Provinces (to be nominated by House of Assembly from
their own body)
1 member from Cameroons (nominated by the Governor)
2 members from Lagos (to be nominated by Municipal Council)
1 member from Colony (to be nominated by Governor)
1 member to represent Banking
1 „ „ „ Shipping
1 „ „ „ Commerce
The Council would thus be composed, under the presidency of the Governor, of 6
Chiefs, 19 Officials and 18 Unofficials.
The Governor to have a casting vote only.
The whole range of Nigerian affairs would be open for debate in this Council,
especially on the second reading of the Budget.
Budget Meeting to take place alternately in Lagos, Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu. All
other meetings to be in Lagos.
The Council would also legislate for all Nigeria, not excepting the Northern
Provinces as at present.
In nominating two Chiefs from the Western Provinces the Governor would first
ascertain through the Chief Commissioner the wishes of the major Chiefs in the
matter. It is desirable to prevent these nominations from becoming the subject of
political intrigue or public contention.
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General remarks
(a) I should propose that the New Constitution would be reviewed at the end of
nine years, but in the intervening years—at the end of the third year and the sixth
year—the possibility of substituting a form of nomination, by choice according to
African custom instead of by the Governor, for membership of the Regional Councils,
would be studied and where possible adopted. That policy to be declared.
(b) I have retained effective Government control in all Councils initially in order to
give them stability and a chance of success.
(c) I think that holding the Budget Meeting once in four years in each of the
Provincial Capitals would be of psychological value and would help to create the
sense of Nigerian unity.
(d) The judicial system as recently revised would remain unchanged.
(e) The correlation of Native Authority salaries to those prevailing in Government
Departments will facilitate the policy of increasing the trained staff and
responsibilities of Native Authorities so as to avoid the existence of parallel and
overlapping Government and Native Authority spheres of work.
(f ) The House of Chiefs in the Northern Provinces will of course be able to
originate motions if they so desire. The Houses of Assembly would naturally possess
this right.
(g) I have not overlooked the idea of a Municipality for Port Harcourt. It is not yet
ripe for that move but for this and other towns in the Eastern Provinces the objective
will remain in view for action as occasion merits. The Municipal idea in the Northern
Provinces and Western Provinces has not yet taken the public imagination and runs
counter to established ideas.
Conclusion
(a) In conclusion I should like to emphasize that my chief difficulty in considering
this difficult question has been how to bring the Northern Chiefs willingly into a
scheme devised to develop into real Nigerian unity. It would be useless to pretend
that any such unity at present exists or that clumsy attempts to achieve it would
result in anything less than accentuated opposition. The verbiage of democracy
neither impresses nor deceives the Northern Emir whose judgment of men and
motives is more acute than is commonly supposed.
The type of Emir is slowly changing and the new ones tend to be English-speaking
and educated. But we have to remember that their counsellors are not so advanced.
They represent the forces of reactionary Conservatism and have to be cajoled along
the road of progress. Progress is in the air and the pace can be accelerated, but too
great haste or too great carelessness in dealing with ingrained sentiment and belief
can only defeat its object. I have reason to believe that the Chiefs might accept the
proposals which I am submitting to you, with the elaborate safeguards of their
dignity and position.
The proposals also provide for the individualism and the craving of each to paddle
his own canoe, which distinguishes the aspiring Eastern Provinces people.
Not the least merit is the opportunity given to let Lagos, its Press and its
politicians, sink into their true Nigerian perspective.
Furthermore, I feel that the interest of the Administrative service will be
stimulated by having regional councils with all the Residents free to take an active
part in the financial dispositions of their own Provinces and in considering the
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legislation which affects them. Although Nigerian policy would be settled at a higher
level the chance of public contribution to the making of such policy would be present
in the debates of the regional council.
(b) It will be noticed that the proposals involve creation of regional deputies to the
Heads of all the principal departments. In any case this step is long overdue.
Excessive centralization of authority in Lagos has left the Chief Commissioners
without authoritative guidance at their headquarters and has so overloaded the Head
of Department himself that he cannot travel as he should and cannot give the
leisured attention to planning which the country increasingly demands. It is
lamentably true to say that most of the Emirs have never met the principal Heads of
Departments and know neither them nor their names. The difference which might
come from the courtesy of an occasional call and sympathetic discussion and
explanation of policy and practice cannot be overstressed. Under my proposals the
principal Heads of Departments, with three deputies in the Provinces and another at
Headquarters would be able to travel and to think.
A Nigerian Establishment pool, from which the regions would be fed with officers,
would be organized at Headquarters in Lagos and would present no practical
difficulty in management.
(c) The Financial Secretary (Mr. Farquhar) has just proceeded on leave, while the
Chief Commissioner Northern Provinces hopes to take leave in September. Both
would be available for consultation if you think fit.
I venture also to offer the suggestion that Lord Lugard might be given the
opportunity of comment on this Despatch.
(d) The draft in its original form was sent by me to each Chief Commissioner for
his comments. Their replies are attached as Annexures I, II, III. I have also annexed
a note on Municipal elections in Lagos. It will be seen that I have accepted the
main criticisms of the Chief Commissioner Eastern Provinces and Chief
Commissioner Western Provinces and have embodied the necessary amendments in
my proposals.
I had originally planned two Houses for the Western Provinces as in the Northern
Provinces, though I felt some misgivings about the suitability of a House of Chiefs.
The experience, and the arguments of the Chief Commissioners based thereon, have
convinced me that a one House system for the Western Provinces would be more
appropriate and more acceptable to the people.
I have also accepted the Chief Commissioner Eastern Province’s criticisms of
specific sectional representation and have modified that part of the Regional
proposals.
Two suggestions only I have been unable to accept—that of the Acting Chief
Commissioner Western Provinces for a House of Assembly totalling 43, because it
seems to me too cumbrous; and that of the Chief Commissioner Eastern Provinces
that no reference should be made to a policy of ultimate substitution of choice
according to African custom for nomination by the Governor, if it proves to be
feasible, because I regard it as essential to indicate the probable line of future
progress towards democratic control.
(e) It is worthy of note that my proposals in their final form have now the
wholehearted support of the Chief Commissioner Northern Provinces, the Chief
Commissioner Eastern Provinces, the Acting Chief Commissioner Western Provinces
and the Acting Chief Secretary.
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Annexure I to 3: Letter from—J Patterson (Northern Provinces) to Sir A Richards 14
July 1944
The idea of a bi-cameral organisation in the Northern Provinces has not previously
been developed and it has been necessary for me to give some thought to the
question whether it would achieve the objects which Your Excellency sets out in the
draft despatch and in particular surmount the difficulty which is mentioned in the
first paragraph under the heading ‘Conclusion’. Just as it seemed important to
ensure that in a single council, were it set up in the Northern Provinces, an unreal
opposition should not be created, following western examples, for that ‘opposition’
could at the present stage be anti one thing only, namely anti-Emir, so it will be
important, it would seem, to ensure that the two Houses now proposed shall not be
contending but complementary organisations. I think that can be assured by
carefully settling the details of the functions of each House and by a wise choice,
which need not thereby be fettered, of the African members of the House of
Assembly. It is the feature of the proposals on which, on first reading, I felt some
misgiving. The powers of the two Houses in finance should be a decisive factor in
maintaining a proper relationship between the two: but the House of Chiefs must not
be allowed to degenerate into merely a Committee on finance, The mixed
membership of the House of Assembly will probably promote a more vigorous
political growth there and having started with the two Houses it would be difficult
for them to coalesce at any future time without the Chiefs being regarded as on one
side and the other members from the House of Assembly, on the other.
2. There is, as Your Excellency has noted, a good deal of reactionary
Conservatism among the older men, especially those Arabic scholars whom it is
difficult to convince that modern education on western lines will not necessarily
mean the eclipse of their learning and their religion. There are many Emirs whose
way of thinking is far in advance of that of many of their counsellors; but even so I
can not imagine that those men would choose to be ‘represented’ by anyone except
their Emir. Similarly, though some young men express, while not always realising
what it means to hold, advanced opinions on social and political matters, the respect
and even affection on which I see everywhere for Emirs who show themselves to be
sympathetic towards progressive ideas leaves no doubt that these young men’s
‘representation’ too would be through their Emir. This idea is preserved in the
nomination of four Emirs as members of Legislative Council.
3. Your Excellency has mentioned certain characteristics of the Northern
Provinces in the draft: there is one other which I think it is important to bear in
mind. A very large section of the community in these provinces has not yet shown
any signs of the awakening of its political consciousness. The organisation now
proposed will cater for political thought so far as it has emerged and in the flexibility
of the organisation will lie the safeguard against any section of the community,
which at the moment may happen to be in a favoured position, being able to obtain a
dominating place in public affairs. This flexibility should also ensure that political
development will be directed by the people themselves and so be of lasting value. To
bring the large mass of the population into the constitutional scheme it will be
necessary, I feel, to foster more resolutely than has hitherto in general been possible
the formal meetings of district and village councils as part of the Native Authorities
and indirect rule which, Your Excellency mentions, will continue precisely as at
08-(Doc1-27)-cp  15/7/01  7:25 am  Page 16
[3] JULY 1944 17
present. It is in these councils, I feel, that the habit of political thought will be
inculcated that will make possible the wise choice of the African members of the
House of Assembly: it can not effectively be administered like a dose of patent
medicine through the mouth of the body politic.
4. The problem that has to be solved in the Northern Provinces and the material
that is provided for its solution can perhaps be described in the following way. No reli-
gion is more democratic than Islam, the religion of the majority of the people. It avoids
all the difficulties created by the caste system of some Indian religions. There is there-
fore a natural sense of social democracy in the Emirates and it is growing as the num-
bers of educated youths increase. One of the principal tasks of administrators is to
teach the people that political democracy is not a political system on a Whitehall or
any other pattern but a way of life, a habit of thought, of thought for others. The pro-
posals which are made in the draft for the political development of the Northern
Provinces on lines familiar to the Chiefs and people should, I feel, do this.
5. I consider that the proposals follow sufficiently closely the lines of political
development so far as it has emerged to be acceptable to those whom they affect and,
though they are an appreciable step forward from the present position, will be
realistic to them. As I have indicated in the foregoing paragraphs the growth of the
two Houses as complementary parts of the machine will need careful handling and as
a corollary to the changes now to be made the development of political thought in
the mass of the people should be quickened.
6. The following observations occur to me on matters of detail:—
(i) Page 5 of the draft under heading ‘Regional Councils’. (a) Northern Provinces.
For ‘certain pagan areas’ read ‘areas not predominantly Mohammedan’: there are
numbers of Christians in the areas in question.
(ii) Page 6 of the draft under heading ‘The House of Assembly, N.P.’ The Director
of Veterinary Services, though no longer head of a ‘Northern Provinces
Department’ will probably retain his headquarters in the Northern Provinces. The
activities of the department will affect increasingly the domestic economy of a
large number of people in these provinces and a less number in other parts of
Nigeria. He should perhaps, therefore, have a seat in this House. Your Excellency
may, however, be contemplating changes in the organisation of the department
which would make this unnecessary. I do not think he should be admitted in place
of any of the proposed official members, but I suggest a second Member for
Commerce who would be an African to balance him.
(iii) Page 10 of the draft under heading ‘General Remarks’ (e). This is an
important consideration and it is, I submit, a matter of urgency for Government to
discontinue appointing to its staff African members of the executive in technical
departments. Forestry Assistants, Veterinary Assistants and similar officials and
even more so those in lower grades should be carried on the Native Authority
estimates. Not only will this avoid the development of identical staffs along parallel
lines but it will remove one factor which might give rise to an impression that in
the new political organisation a distinction is to be made between ‘Native
Administration’ and ‘Government’. It is not always easy to convince Heads of
Departments that the Native Authorities and their organisations are the
instruments through which, on the advice of a Head of Department and under the
supervision of his Officers, departmental activities are normally carried out.
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Annexure II to 3: comments by H F M White7
While I am in complete agreement with the general scheme, I am not happy about
the proposal that in the Western Provinces there should be a House of Chiefs apart
from and superior to the House of Assembly. The proposal springs no doubt from an
analogy between the Obas of the Western Provinces and the Emirs of the North and
between the two Chiefs Conferences of the West and North. Regarding the first
comparison I would quote the following passage from a memorandum written by Sir
Gerald Whiteley8 on Lord Hailey’s Reports on Native Administration and African
Political Development:—
‘It is my opinion, shared I believe by many Western Province officers, that our
administration, applying the Northern Emirate model to the Western
Provinces, was responsible for giving the principal Obas an autocratic
position which was foreign to Yoruba custom and constitution.
Democratisation of the Native Authority is in my view in the Yoruba States
not only not inconsistent with or opposed to their own customs, but to a
certain extent is merely a return to the status quo before our advent. The
process will have to be carried a good deal further than it went before, since
the people have become and are becoming more educated and vocal, but it
will be a natural process’
2. The Western Provinces Chiefs Conference which was inaugurated as a
‘Conference of Yoruba Chiefs’ in 1937 has gradually been extended to include
representatives from the Native Authority Councils in the Benin and Warri Provinces
so that the complexion of the Conference has begun to change. It is moving from its
beginning as a Conference of individual chiefs to a Conference of representatives of
Native Authorities. But, even so, although the Conference is more representative
than it was, it would have far to go before it became fully representative of the
Western Provinces both in character and extent. I do not feel, therefore, that 
the proposed House of Chiefs would be qualified to exercise revising powers over the
House of Assembly. Moreover, if it bears on the question, I feel that the House of
Assembly would be a considerably more competent body than the House of Chiefs.
My view is, then, that a House of Chiefs should have no greater powers than the
House of Assembly.
3. Another though perhaps minor point is the proposal that the President of the
House of Assembly should be the Senior Resident. This means, in effect, that 
the President would be the most senior of the Residents in charge of Provinces at the
time. It does not seem to me very suitable that the President of an Assembly which
will deal with the affairs of the Western Provinces as a whole should be an officer
whose normal activities are confined to the boundaries of only one Province. The
obvious President, as it seems to me, is the Chief Commissioner, but it is not
practicable, I take it, that he should be President of both Houses.
4. Having regard to the above considerations—that the House of Chiefs should
not be qualified to play the part of an Upper House, that it would not be satisfactory
7 Acting chief commissioner, Western Provinces 8 Chief commissioner, Western Provinces, 1939–1946.
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to have two Houses of equal powers, and that the most suitable President of any
Assembly would be the Chief Commissioner—I prefer that the Regional Council for
the Western Provinces should consist of one House rather than two. I think that Sir
Gerald Whiteley must have had such a plan in mind when he wrote in the
memorandum from which I have already quoted:—
‘The Regional Council should ultimately become completely representative
and I agree that the best method of securing this object is to provide that it
should be composed of a mixture of Native Authority and Unofficial Members,
in addition to Official or Government Members’.
5. The House of Assembly for the Western Provinces, like the proposed
Legislative Council of Nigeria, would thus consist of Chiefs, or representatives of the
Native Authorities, in addition to Officials and Unofficials. I hesitate to make definite
recommendations as to the representation of Native Authorities in the House of
Assembly but I would tentatively suggest 21, varying from 5 for the Oyo Province
with its population of 1,340,000 to 2 for the Ijebu Province with its population of
306,000. The membership of the House of Assembly would then be:—
President – Chief Commissioner
Officials – 12
N. A. representatives – 21
Unofficials – 10
43
The total membership is the same as proposed for the Legislative Council.
6. It is not out of place to mention that just as the Legislative Council will be
largely based on the Regional Councils, so the Regional Councils in their turn must
have some foundation and their basis must be Provincial Councils. Such Councils
have already been envisaged by Sir Gerald Whiteley who has written:—
‘The Provincial Councils would be composed of a fixed number of official
members, say the Resident, Divisional Officers and Senior Departmental
Officers in the Province; and of such number of Native Authorities and
Unofficial Members chosen by Divisional Councils as would be decided by
the Resident, the guiding principle being to secure as adequate a degree of
representation as possible, from the qualitative as well as from the quanti-
tative point of view. To begin with I think it would be desirable to leave
this decision to the Resident. Later no doubt the Councils themselves
would be able to work out the basis on which representation should be
apportioned.
Similarly Provincial Councils would choose representatives from among
themselves to send to the Regional Council’.
I draw attention to the last sentence.
7. The proposal that the Regional Council should, from the outset, have its own
Budget is a bold one, but I support it. Financial responsibility will at once give the
Council a sense of reality and although some of the members will be unable to grasp
the details of finance, the majority will be able to deal with it and the others will
learn.
8. I am in agreement with all the other proposals contained in the Despatch.
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Annexure III to 3: letter from F B Carr (Eastern Provinces) to Sir A Richards (3 July
1944)
I have considered carefully the draft despatch sent to me under cover of Your
Excellency’s demi-official letter of 25th June 1944. There is one point of importance
with regard to the proposed House of Assembly in the Eastern Provinces on which I
am not clear. Is it intended that the ‘five provincial members’ should be directly
representative of the Native Authorities within the respective Provinces? I suggest
that it is essential that they should be and, doubtless as Your Excellency is aware, this
was advocated by my predecessor, Mr. G G Shute CMG.9 I use the word ‘essential’ as
it seems to me that for provincial representation one must draw from among those
who have the true interests of the people at heart and who have some inherent right
to be chosen as representatives, however small and limited that right may be at the
moment. I also suggest that the number of provincial members be increased to
seven. The Cameroons, Ogoja and Onitsha Provinces could well do with one member
each, but there is a sharp cleavage between the Ibibios and Efiks in the Calabar
Province, and the Ibos and Creek living peoples in the Owerri Province. (These
extend into the Calabar Province, e.g. the Opobos, but one representative should
suffice). I am aware of the danger of attempting to provide representation for all the
diverse elements of the Eastern Provinces, but these I consider necessary.
2. I suggest that it is unwise to designate sectional representation as, to my
mind, this can but lead to clamour from other sections for representation and
possible intra-sectional dispute. For instance, I cannot visualise the Church
Missionary Society accepting representation by a Roman Catholic or vice-versa, and I
can imagine clashes in commercial interests.
3. I am doubtful as to the intention of ‘extra numbers’ but assume that the
nominations would be of outstanding Africans such as might receive nomination to
the present Legislative Council.
4. I consider that the number of Residents should be increased to six. The
Secretary is, at present, a Senior District Officer, but with the advent of Deputy
Heads of Departments I am of opinion that he should be a Resident and a member of
the House.
5. Should the preceding paragraphs be accepted I suggest that the membership
of the House of Assembly for the Eastern Provinces should read:—
Officials
President—the Chief Commissioner
All Residents (6)
Deputy Financial Secretary E
„ Director of Education „
„ Director of Agriculture „
„ Director of Medical Services „
„ Director of Public Works „
Crown Counsel
9 Chief commissioner, Eastern Provinces, 1939–1943.
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Unofficials
Seven Provincial members nominated from among Native Authorities
Five nominated members.
(Note: The number of five nominated members might be reduced to four if it be
desired to retain the official majority at two).
6. I assume that the language for the House would be English, though it is not
stated.
7. As to the proposed Legislative Council, I would ask whether the unofficial
members to be nominated by the three Houses of Assembly are to be nominated
from their own number, and suggest that this should be made clear one way or the
other.
8. As to (a) of the ‘General Remarks’, I can see no possibility of ‘substituting a
form of nomination by choice according to African custom instead of by the
Governor for membership of the Regional Councils’ in the Eastern Provinces. I
suggest, therefore, that no declaration of policy to consider such a possibility be
made.
9. As to (f ), would not the House of Assembly in the Eastern Provinces be able to
originate motions if it so desires. I suggest that it should.
10. I should like to record my emphatic agreement, insofar as the Eastern
Provinces are concerned, with the second paragraph on page 12 of the draft despatch,
that the effect of the Regional Councils will be stimulating to the Administrative
service, and would add that I consider that it will be stimulating to all.
11. On the proposals for the Northern Provinces I do not feel competent to
comment, and I am hesitant to comment on those for the West. I have, however,
had some experience in that group of Provinces, particularly the Ondo Province,
and feel that I should record that I am apprehensive regarding the constitution of
a House of Chiefs. The Chiefs of the West, no matter what the position is of those
in the North, have not, I believe, autocratic powers being very closely linked with
their Councils. Moreover, it has been the policy, for some time now, further to
democratise the Native Authorities, and this is brought out clearly in the memo-
randum of 19th September, 1942, written by the Chief Commissioner Western
Provinces on Lord Hailey’s Reports on Native Administration and African Political
Development. If I read the situation correctly I am unable to escape the conclu-
sion that the establishment of a House of Chiefs would largely undo the work of
democratisation which I am aware was demanded by the people of the Ondo
Province, at least, and give to the Chiefs a position and power which is not theirs
inherently and which would not readily be accorded to them by many of their
subjects.
Annexure IV to 3 Note on municipal elections in Lagos
1. The actual number of people in Lagos entitled to vote can only be estimated—
it is not less than 7,000 and not more than 10,000. Of these, those who took the
trouble to register amount to only 1021. We can thus safely say that at the outside
only 15% of those entitled to vote are on the register.
2. But not all on the register did vote, as the figures below will demonstrate:—
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Wards Total registered Actual votes
voters
A 129 Unopposed
B 130 ditto
C 325 191 (5 illiterates)
D 193 133 (5       „        )
E 244 163 (1       „        )
1021
Of the registered voters of C, D and E, which total 762, votes were recorded by 487.
Lagos is of course largely illiterate—only 11 of them voted.
3. This is not a very good advertisement of democratic government via the
franchise, especially when one considers that people should naturally be more
interested in their representative on their own town council, with an African
majority, than on the remoter Legislative Council, with its official majority.
4 CO 583/286/5, no 4 9 Aug 1944
[Richards’s proposals]: memorandum by A B Cohen on Sir A
Richards’s proposals for reform of the Nigerian constitution
Sir Arthur Richards asks that his proposals should be submitted to searching
scrutiny and unsentimental analysis.1 His despatch only represents a broad outline
and no doubt he wishes to know whether the Secretary of State is prepared to agree
with the general principles of his recommendations before the details are filled in.
But before the general principles can be accepted, their implications in practice
require careful examination and for this purpose detailed scrutiny cannot be avoided
at this stage. Before anything like a final view on the proposals can be formed a
considerable degree of discussion and consultation will be required. Meanwhile the
following comments call attention to what appear to me to be the more important
points:—
(1) Main features of proposals
Sir Arthur Richards’ general constitutional scheme is based, as he says, on Lord
Hailey’s factual analysis. It is also in accordance with Lord Hailey’s general
conclusions and does not differ in its principal features from the scheme worked out
by Sir Bernard Bourdillon last year. It does, however, have the very great merit of
filling in the more serious gaps in Sir Bernard Bourdillon’s proposals. In the first
place it provides a means, likely to be acceptable to the northern Emirs, of bringing
the north straight away into the general constitutional scheme, so that the new
Legislative Council will be able to legislate for the whole of Nigeria.2 In the second
place it gives the regional councils, or Houses of Assembly as they are to be called
(with an additional House of Chiefs in the north), a concrete function to perform, the
control of regional finance. In the third place it recognises the necessity of providing
1 See 3.
2 Despite the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, the legislative council’s remit had
been restricted to the latter.
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an administrative foundation, in the staffs of Chief Commissioners, for the regional
legislative bodies which are to be established. On the other hand the scheme, while it
provides the framework for future constitutional advance on a Nigerian basis, does
not itself constitute any advance at all. In this respect it goes even less far than Sir
Bernard Bourdillon’s scheme, which was itself thought not to be sufficiently
progressive. Sir Arthur Richards says that the main problem in Nigeria to-day is how
to create a political system which is itself a present advance and contains the living
possibility of further orderly advance. Sir Arthur Richards’ scheme achieves the
second objective, but not, I think, the first.
(2) The Northern Provinces
With the support of the Chief Commissioner, Sir Arthur Richards proposes a
bicameral legislature for the north with a House of Assembly, of which the
composition is described on page 43 of the despatch, and a House of Chiefs composed
in the same way as the present Chiefs’ Conference. This Conference consists at
present of the thirteen first class Emirs and approximately thirteen representatives of
the other Emirs and Chiefs sitting in rotation. It has two secretaries, one African and
one European political officer, but no other European attends it, not even the Chief
Commissioner. Sir Arthur Richards’ House of Chiefs is to be presided over by the
Chief Commissioner.
It will be remembered that when Sir Arthur was discussing Sir Bernard
Bourdillon’s proposal for a regional council for the north he expressed the view, after
discussion with Lord Lugard, that the Emirs would not readily agree to such a
council and ought not to be pressed to accept it.4 This difficulty, as he says, gave him
more trouble than the whole of the rest of his constitutional scheme. He has visited
the north twice and it may safely be assumed, and indeed is implied on page 85 of his
despatch, that a scheme on the lines which he proposes will be acceptable to the
Emirs. One point which will require careful examination is the relation between the
House of Chiefs and the House of Assembly. Presumably the House of Chiefs will
meet immediately after the House of Assembly in January. Will the House of Chiefs
consider all other resolutions passed by the House of Assembly as well as the regional
budget?
(3) Functions of Houses of Assembly
Under Sir Bernard Bourdillon’s proposals the regional councils were to have the
functions in the legislative sphere of making recommendations on bills submitted
3 Page 11 in the text as reproduced here.
4 That the Northern Emirs were a problem for British policy was recognised by F J Pedler who commented
in a minute written on 29 Sept 1944: ‘In the Northern Provinces we have hitherto supported a
conservative regime which is rapidly becoming reactionary. Though it is the home of the native authority
policy, it is the place where that policy works worst . . . while, in our dealings with the Emirs, we go to
extreme lengths to avoid offending the susceptibilities of the Emirs and their immediate advisers, the
Emirs rarely follow the same practice in the arrangements they made (sic) for governing their own people
. . . If the true state of affairs in Northern Nigeria were really known, I believe it would be more damaging
to British Colonial prestige than any other situation in Africa. It is therefore most important that these
reforms should be worked in such a manner that a platform will be given for educated elements in the
North, who are not associated with the interests of the Emirates’ (CO 583/286/5, no14A).
5 Page 14 in the text as reproduced here.
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to them by Government, of discussing Native Authority subordinate legislation
designed for enactment throughout the region, and of putting forward private
bills; in the deliberative sphere of discussing motions brought forward by the
members; and in the financial sphere of considering and making comments on a
skeleton budget for the whole of Nigeria showing the expenditure region by
region. The regional councils were thus to have no powers either legislative or
financial. Sir Arthur Richards’ Houses of Assembly are to have approximately the
same functions in relation to legislation at first, although a committee may decide
that certain legislative powers should be devolved by the Legislative Council on
them. No mention is made of private bills. The Houses of Assembly are also to
have the same deliberative functions with regard to motions. In the sphere of
finance, however, they are to have definite powers. They are to consider and pass
the regional budgets, which will include all expenditure other than Native
Authority expenditure in the region. The revenue of each region will consist of
the whole of the Government’s share of direct taxation not retained by the Native
Authorities, together with a block grant from central revenue. After the regional
budgets have been considered by the House of Assembly, and in the case of the
north by the House of Chiefs, which, however, will only have the right of veto and
not of initiation, they will be submitted to the Governor, who will have the over-
riding power of addition, amendment or deletion. They will then be referred to
the central council and will appear in the printed estimates in the form of appen-
dices to the central budget. Apparently the Legislative Council will not consider
the regional budgets in themselves and will only exercise control over them in so
far as it has the right to vote or withhold the block grants from central revenue.
One point which is not clear is the powers which Houses of Assembly will have
with regard to revenue. Under the scheme the direct native tax will be a wholly
regional tax, divided between the regional bodies and the native administrations.
Will the Houses of Assembly have power to propose and decide upon alterations in
this or any other form of regional taxation?
One point of procedure which will require consideration is the question whether
the interval between January and March will give the Government time to consider
the regional budgets and the comments of the regional councils on legislation and
other matters before the Legislative Council sits in March. There is everything to be
said for making the interval as short as possible, so that the period during which the
Government is absorbed in legislative questions may not take up too large a part of
the year.
(4) The effects of the scheme on the structure of administration
One of the weaknesses of Sir Bernard Bourdillon’s scheme was that it made no
provision for any administrative foundation for the proposed regional legislative
bodies. When questioned about this he said that he thought the establishment of
such an administative foundation unnecessary, as there could be no certainty that
the regional councils would be a permanent feature of the constitution. But it was
not clear how the regional councils could have any reality or any chance of devel-
oping into effective political instruments unless they were fitted into not only the
constitution but also the administrative framework of the country. Sir Arthur
Richards has evidently recognised this weakness. Under his scheme deputy direc-
tors of all the more important departments, including the financial department,
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are to be established in each region. This will to some extent be a return to the old
system under the Lieutenant-Governor regime, but it is a reform which, in my
view, is absolutely necessary. Sir Arthur Richards himself describes it as a step
which is long over due. Over-centralisation has proved a fundamental weakness in
the administrative system of Nigeria. Even in much smaller Territories like
Tanganyika the need for de-centralisation has been felt. How much more necessary
is this in Nigeria, with its vast distances and its population of twenty-two millions.
The evils of over-centralisation have been greatly accentuated by the unsuitable
geographical position of Lagos. The Secretariat is out of touch with the country
and is everywhere regarded as a dead weight on progress. Heads of departments
have far too little time for travelling and become Lagos-minded. For all these rea-
sons the de-centralisation which is envisaged is, in my view, a most welcome fea-
ture of the scheme. But it is not clear from the despatch how far this
de-centralisation is to go. How great is the authority of the Chief Commissioner to
be? Is the group of deputy heads of departments to be a sort of regional executive
council for the Chief Commissioner? Or is each deputy to be under the orders of
his director at headquarters as at present? In my view, if the scheme is to have any
chance of working satisfactorily, it is essential that de-centralisation should be real
and not merely nominal. At present if a Chief Commissioner and his senior depart-
mental officers wish to put forward some proposal affecting policy there may have
to be three or four separate references to Lagos. If regional government is to work,
it is essential that this should stop. The Chief Commissioner and his departmental
officers should speak as a single unit and should communicate with the
Government through one channel, either from the Chief Commissioner to the
Chief Secretary or from the departmental officer mainly concerned, speaking on
behalf of the Chief Commissioner, to the head of his department in Lagos.
Otherwise I cannot see how regional political development can become effective.
The general tenor of Sir Arthur Richards’ despatch suggests that these are also his
views, but I think it important to find out whether this is in fact the case. If so, I
am not sure that the departmental officers at the Chief Commissioner’s headquar-
ters should be described as ‘deputies’. I would prefer to see some such title as
‘regional directors’. Some Departments, such as the Railway, Posts and Telegraphs,
Audit, etc., would have to remain centralised and these should be excluded from
the regional budgets.
(5) Analysis of the proposed composition of the regional Houses of Assembly and
and Legislative Council shows the following results:—
Houses of Assembly
North West East
Officials 19 14 13
Chiefs – 3 –
Native Authority members 12 6 7
Other Unofficial members 6 4 5
The presidents of the Houses, who would have an original as well as a casting vote, are included in
the above figures.
252737
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Legislative Council
North West East Colony Central
Officials 2 2 3 1 11*
Chiefs 4 2 – – –*
Unofficials 4 3 5 3 3*
*
*(These members would presumably be Europeans)
Thus, assuming that the three unofficial members nominated to represent banking,
shipping and commerce come from the south, the Council would consist of ten
members drawn from the north, twenty-two from the south and eleven Central
Government officials all stationed in the south. It may be argued that the complexion
of the Council is too southern, but at any rate it is a great improvement on the
present Council and it is, I think, reasonable to assume that the interests of the
northern members and of the unofficial members from the east and west
representing the Chiefs and the Native Authorities would in fact very frequently be
the same. In any case the solid official block would ensure that no purely sectional
interest was allowed to prevail.
An analysis of the membership of the Legislative Council on a different basis gives
nineteen officials, six Chiefs and eighteen unofficials (of whom two would be
nominated by the Lagos Municipal Council with an African majority, eleven by
regional Houses of Assembly with an official majority and five by the Governor
direct). It will be noticed that, assuming that the three members nominated to
represent banking, shipping and commerce were Europeans and that all the other
unofficial members were Africans, there would be twenty-two Europeans and twenty-
one Africans on the Council. The Governor, who would only have the casting vote, is
not included in the above analysis.
(6) Probable attitude of educated Africans to the scheme
What is likely to be the reception of the scheme among educated Africans? To take
the Houses of Assembly first, they are to consist entirely of officials and of unofficials
nominated direct by the Governor, mostly from Native Authorities. Native Authority
representatives cannot be regarded as wholly unofficial. In the northern council only
six out of the thirty-seven members would be wholly unofficial, in the western
council only four out of twenty-seven and in the eastern council only five out of
twenty-five. In the Legislative Council there would be an unofficial majority if the
Chiefs can be regarded as unofficials, but I very much doubt whether it would be
correct to regard them as such in Nigerian conditions. Of the eighteen unofficial
members, five would be nominated direct by the Governor, eleven by the Houses of
Assembly, which would themselves have official majorities, and only two, the Lagos
members, could be regarded as democratically elected. Moreover direct election to
the Legislative Council would be abolished. Lagos instead of having three elected
members would have two members nominated by the Lagos Municipal Council. The
Calabar elected member would apparently disappear.
It can, I think, safely be assumed that the scheme would be regarded as reactionary
by educated African opinion. I do not want to exaggerate the importance of this
1448710
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opinion, which represents only a very small section of the community in Nigeria. But
it is the only opinion which is vocal and it would no doubt influence opinion outside
Nigeria both in this country and elsewhere. In any case the reactions of the politically
conscious public in Nigeria would affect the working of the scheme and Sir Arthur
Richards himself admits the necessity of introducing a system which is in itself an
advance. Sir Arthur does not deal in his despatch with the probable reactions of
public opinion, but he evidently does not regard the probable reactions of the
educated African as likely to be sufficiently serious to prejudice the success of the
scheme. Otherwise he would certainly have mentioned these reactions. Nevertheless
I find it impossible to avoid feeling that the scheme would to some extent be
prejudiced by the fact that it does nothing to mitigate the present complete
bureaucratic control over politics in Nigeria. I think that we ought to consider the
possibility of making this control less rigid while not sacrificing the substance of
power. In effect Sir Arthur Richards’ scheme means that there would be no political
advancement for a period of nine years. In the present state of public opinion both in
this country and West Africa can such a position be sustained?
(7) The possibility of an unofficial majority
Sir Bernard Bourdillon’s scheme envisaged the possibility of unofficial majorities in
the Legislative and other Councils and the Governor was to be given reserve powers.
But Sir Bernard did not attach importance to the question of unofficial majorities
because he proposed to abolish the distinction between officials and unofficials by
allowing officials to vote according to their own opinions. When he was informed
that the Secretary of State could not accept this, he said that he was in favour of
unofficial majorities. Sir Arthur Richards said the same during the discussions before
he went out to Nigeria, but he has changed his opinion in the light of experience
locally. On page 76 of the despatch Sir Arthur says that he has retained effective
Government control in all councils initially in order to give them stability and a
chance of success. But would not this effective control by Government be assumed
without an official majority in the regional Houses of Assembly and also in the
Legislative Council (if chiefs are regarded as being official)? In the Legislative
Council itself there would be members representing the Lagos politicians, the
educated Africans in the provinces and the Native Authorities all over the country as
well as European representatives of various forms of commercial life. Is it likely that
all these would vote together on any issue and would not the interests of some of
them be closer to those of the Government than of each other? Provided that a solid
Government block were retained, could not the numbers of unofficials safely be
increased without endangering the control of Government? In the improbable event
of solid unofficial opposition, it is most unlikely that the Government would wish to
proceed with any measure unless it were absolutely vital to do so, thus justifying the
use of the Governor’s reserve powers. Similarly in the regional Houses of Assembly it
would surely be safe to have an official minority, having regard to the fact that the
majority of the unofficial members are to be representatives of the Native
Authorities, which are themselves part of the Government. It is to be noted that the
Acting Chief Commissioner of the Western Provinces recommends a House of
6 Page 14 of the text as reproduced here.
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Assembly in which there would only be thirteen officials, with twenty-one Native
Authority representatives and ten unofficials. If an unofficial majority could be
allowed, this could be achieved not by reducing the number of officials, but by
increasing the number of unofficials proper. With the figures suggested for the
Houses of Assembly there seems a danger that the more progressive elements will
not be adequately represented, while the same may be true of the Legislative Council
itself if any large proportion of the nominees of the Houses of Assembly are Native
Authorities. In the Gold Coast Sir Alan Burns proposes that the central legislature
should consist of six officials and probably fifteen unofficials, of whom, it is true, a
number would be chiefs. At any rate the grant of an unofficial majority is the central
feature of Sir Alan’s scheme. Political development is less advanced in Nigeria, but
can this essential difference be justified for the two Territories?
(8) Method of selecting unofficial members
Except in a few cases the unofficial members of the Legislative Council are to be
nominated by the Houses of Assembly and Lagos Municipal Council. The method of
selection of unofficial members of Councils is therefore only important in the case
of the Houses of Assembly. It will be remembered that Sir Bernard Bourdillon
attached great importance to providing in the constitution for the substitution of
some form of selection for nomination by the Governor. In practice he had
arranged during his governorship, wherever possible, for members to be selected by
those whom they represented. Sir Arthur Richards proposes that all the unofficial
members should in the first instance be nominated by the Governor, but it is part
of his scheme that it should be announced that after the first three years the possi-
bility will be examined of substituting a form of nomination by choice according to
African custom instead of by the Governor. What in fact does this mean? It will be
seen that the Chief Commissioner of the Eastern Provinces does not think that it
means anything in the conditions of the east. On the other hand the Acting Chief
Commissioner of the Western Provinces attaches great importance to the selection
by Provincial Councils of the provincial representatives in the regional councils.
Clearly it would be both more satisfactory in practice and more democratic if nomi-
nation by the Governor could be dispensed with. Must we assume that it is quite
impossible all over Nigeria for the representatives of Native Authorities in the
regional Houses of Assembly to be nominated by the Native Authorities in each
province? I can well imagine that this is quite impracticable in the Eastern
Provinces, but is it equally impracticable in the Northern and Western Provinces? If
such a system could be adopted in some parts of the Territory the Governor would
have to retain the power of veto; otherwise unsatisfactory or exceedingly reac-
tionary members might be appointed.
In the case of the other unofficial members the substitution of selection for
nomination by the Governor would be more difficult. On the advice of the Chief
Commissioner of the Eastern Provinces Sir Arthur Richards has abandoned specific
sectional representation. Unless you have such sectional representation it is difficult
to see how nomination by the Governor can be dispensed with.
It is interesting to note that both the Chief Commissioner of the Northern
Provinces and the Acting Chief Commissioner of the Western Provinces stress the
importance of developing deliberative bodies below the level of regional councils.
The establishment and building up of such bodies is bound, I think, to play an
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exceedingly important part in the development of the country and to affect the pace
at which political responsibility can progressively be granted to Africans.
(9) Committees of the Houses of Assembly
The Houses of Assembly are to meet only once a year, so that a continuous
association of their unofficial members with the government of the country will not
be easy. Might it not be worth considering both as an educative and as a practical
measure the creation of committees of the Houses of Assembly which would deal
with such subjects as finance, development, education, etc? This is not an attempt to
import the Ceylon constitution into Nigeria. The committees would be primarily
consultative, but they would make it possible for the unofficial members of the
Houses of Assembly to have much closer contact with the process of government at
the centre of each region than could be acquired merely by attending an annual
session of the House of Assembly itself.
(10) Finance
Once the regional budget had been passed by the House of Assembly (and in the case
of the north by the House of Chiefs), approved by the Governor and included as an
appendix in the central budget passed by the Legislative Council, how would
supplementary expenditure be dealt with? Would all proposals involving
supplementary expenditure have to be considered by the central finance committee
at Lagos? If they were, I doubt whether the financial scheme proposed would work. It
seems clear that it would be necessary for the Chief Commissioners to have power to
incur considerable supplementary expenditure on their own authority, and it might
be desirable for all such expenditure above a certain limit to be referred to a regional
finance committee meeting say once every three months. Only in the case of
expenditure above a higher limit would reference to the central finance committee
be necessary.
The relations of the Financial Secretary at Lagos with the Deputy Financial
Secretaries in the regions would be a matter of some complication. It would seem
desirable that the deputies should be given considerable latitude to frame their own
financial proposals within the general policy of Government. It would be important
to secure as great a degree of flexibility as possible in order that the division of the
country’s finances into three parts should not hold up the planning and execution of
the post-war development programme. The financial side of the scheme will
evidently require very careful working out.
(11) The position of Lagos
Sir Arthur Richards proposes that the Lagos municipality should manage its own
finances coming directly under the central legislature and that the rest of the Colony
should also come direct under the central legislature and that it should be
administered as at present by political officers and Native Authorities under the
Commissioner of the Colony. This leaves the Colony, outside the municipality,
subject to no regional political body, possibly rather an untidy arrangement. The
alternative would seem to be Lord Hailey’s suggestion that the Colony outside the
Lagos municipality should be included in the Western Provinces. This point was
mentioned to Sir Arthur Richards during his discussions here and it would be
interesting to know the reasons why he has preferred the other alternative.
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5 CO 583/286/5, no 17 30 Oct 1944
[Richards’s proposals]: CO record of a meeting to discuss Sir A
Richards’s proposals for constitutional development in Nigeria
The Secretary of State said that the principle of decentralisation on a regional basis,
contained in Sir Arthur Richards’ proposals, appeared to him sound, but that, in the
absence of fuller information as to the working of the proposed organisation,
judgment on the details of the proposals would have to be reserved until after Sir
Arthur Richards’ arrival.
It was pointed out that the proposals as they stood would arouse considerable
public criticism, since, so far from constituting an advance they were in fact
retrograde to the extent that they involved the withdrawal from Lagos and Calabar of
direct representation on the Central Legislature. The Secretary of State said that the
introduction of the scheme would be difficult politically since it might be held to
take away more than it gave, while it contained no important counter concession
such as the grant of an unofficial majority. It was important that the new
constitution should be acceptable to all parties in this country. Otherwise there
would be a danger that it might be thrown over in the event of a change of
Government in the United Kingdom. He did not himself see that, if all the unofficial
members were to be nominated by the Governor, there would be any real danger in
an unofficial majority in the Regional Councils.
Mr. Cohen explained that if the Emirs and Chiefs were included as unofficials,
there would in fact be an unofficial majority on the Central Legislature, but that he
was not sure whether in Nigeria the Emirs could be regarded entirely as unofficials.
The Secretary of State thought that political opinion in this country would accept
the proposed membership of the Central Legislative Council as constituting an
unofficial majority. Mr. Cohen pointed out that the scheme provided for a European
majority on the Legislative Council, with 19 officials and three unofficial members
for commerce, banking and shipping who would presumably be Europeans as against
6 Emirs and Chiefs and 15 other African members.
The Secretary of State said that among the matters on which further explanation
was required was the relationship between the House of Chiefs and the House of
Assembly in the Northern Provinces. It would also be as well to ask Sir Arthur
Richards to enlarge on the reasons for not creating a House of Chiefs in the Western
Provinces similar to that in the North. It was explained that there was felt to be a
danger of undoing the progressive development of the past ten years in these
Provinces if a Council consisting entirely of Chiefs was set up.
The Secretary of State thought that the withdrawal of direct representation from
Lagos and Calabar was a mistake. It must be accepted that Lagos was a cosmopolitan
centre in a special position; and he could not see that there was any serious objection
to retaining the vote in Calabar if this was strongly favoured by local sentiment.
As regards the time for the introduction of the proposals the Secretary of State
said that it would be preferable for the introduction of the Nigeria proposals to be
delayed until the New Year. Mr. Creasy said that Sir Arthur Richards had mentioned
in a letter that his intention was to introduce his proposals to the Legislative Council
next March.
Referring to the pledge given by Sir Bernard Bourdillon that the people of Nigeria
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would be given an opportunity of commenting upon any constitution proposals
which he put forward, the Secretary of State said that the submission of the
proposals to the Legislative Council could probably be held to meet this pledge, but
that he had serious doubts about such a procedure. Sir Arthur Richards’ views must
be obtained on this. The Secretary of State thought that the introduction of the new
Nigerian constitution would have to be treated in this country quite differently from
that of the Gold Coast constitution. A white Paper would have to be prepared which
would not merely explain the proposals themselves, but would set out in some detail,
the historical and political background of Nigeria and in particular its natural
division into three distinct areas.
Sir George Gater said that a point to be considered was whether the staff could be
found to man the proposed regional administrations; since it seemed likely that
decentralisation on a regional basis would involve an increase in the lower as well as
the higher ranks of the administration.
Mr. Cohen said that it was not clear how the financial arrangements proposed would
work in practice and there were a number of other matters which although points of
detail would, he thought, have to be settled before the proposals could be finally
approved. One matter which had been raised by the Commissioners of both the Northern
and the Western Provinces was the question of the political organisation below the
regional level and the need for the development of provincial councils from which the
members of the regional councils would be elected and also of district councils.
Reference was made to the ultimate aim underlying the proposals and the view
was a expressed that it would not be right to regard the proposed regional framework
merely as a temporary phase in the development of Nigeria. The Secretary of State
said that the scheme seemed to him to lead eventually to a federal system.
It was agreed that a meeting should be held with the Secretary of State as soon as
possible after Sir Arthur Richards’ arrival to enable the Governor to explain the
general picture as he saw it. The details of the proposals could then be discussed with
Sir Arthur at the departmental level and a final meeting with the Secretary of State
should be held before Sir Arthur’s departure.
6 CO 583/286/5, no 21 Nov 1944
[Richards’s proposals]: memorandum by A B Cohen on points arising
from discussions with Sir A Richards on constitutional development
in Nigeria
As a result of the discussions between the Secretary of State and Sir Arthur Richards
on the 2nd and 9th November, it was agreed that the following changes should be made
in the proposals submitted by Sir Arthur in his secret despatch of the 19th July:—1
I Legislative Council and Houses of Assembly
(1) African majority on the Legislative Council
It was agreed that the membership of the new Legislative Council should be modified
so as to provide for an African majority.
1 See 3.
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(2) Unofficial majorities in the Houses of Assembly
It was agreed that the membership of the Houses of Assembly should be modified so
as to provide for unofficial majorities.
(3) Direct election at Lagos and Calabar
Sir Arthur Richards stated that he was most anxious to abolish direct election by
means of the ballot box. He had therefore made no provision in his proposals
regarding the Legislative Council for the retention of directly elected members from
Lagos and Calabar. One of the main principles underlying his scheme was to provide
a constitutional system more suitable to Nigeria than the Westminster model; but if
direct election was retained even in one place only, it would act as a focus for
demands for its extension elsewhere. The Secretary of State on the other hand
pointed out that the withdrawal of direct election from places which had enjoyed it
for a considerable time would be likely to be much criticised in certain quarters in
this country and might lead to the scheme as a whole being unfavourably received as
being reactionary. The Secretary of State informed Sir Arthur therefore that he was
opposed to the abolition of direct election for Lagos, although he admitted that there
was a stronger case for abolishing it in Calabar. He thought that the retention of a
special arrangement for Lagos could be justified on the grounds of its cosmopolitan
character.
It was agreed that, without disclosing the connection with a scheme of
constitutional reform, Sir Arthur Richards should sound opinion in Lagos
confidentially to discover what the probable reaction would be to the substitution for
direct election to the Legislative Council of nomination by the Municipality
(presumably by the unofficial members only) coupled with an extension of powers to
the Municipality. Sir Arthur Richards, however, agreed that unless he was able, as a
result of these soundings, to convince the Secretary of State of the necessity for
abolishing direct election at Lagos, he would drop this proposal rather than prejudice
the scheme as a whole. He also agreed that there should in any case be three instead
of two members from Lagos itself in the Legislative Council.
As regards Calabar, it remains to be considered whether any special arrangement
for its representation should be made if Sir Arthur Richards decides, after further
consideration, to recommend the abolition of direct election to the Legislative
Council. Possible alternatives would be to give the Calabar Town Council the right to
nominate a member to the Eastern Provinces House of Assembly or to give the Town
Council the right to nominate a member direct to the Legislative Council.
(4) Method of appointment of representatives of Native Authorities to the Houses of
Assembly
It was agreed that it should be made clear in the Governor’s despatch that the Native
Authorities would themselves select their representatives in the Houses of Assembly,
but that, in view of the experimental nature of the arrangements, the Governor
would have to retain his right of veto at first. It should also be made clear that the
possibility of withdrawing the Governor’s right of veto would be considered after
three and, if necessary, after six years. The nomination of other unofficial members
of the Houses of Assembly and of the unofficial members of the Legislative Council,
other than those nominated by the Houses of Assembly and the House of Chiefs in
the north, would at first be direct by the Governor, but presumably this also would be
subject to review after three and again, if necessary, after six years.
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(5) Method of nomination of representatives of Houses of Assembly on Legislative
Council
The members nominated by the Houses of Assembly to the Legislative Council would
be nominated by means of a vote of the unofficial members only in each House of
Assembly and only unofficials would be eligible for nomination.
(6) Name for the House of Assembly and the Northern House of Chiefs
The name ‘Regional Councils’ should not be used, in view of the danger of confusion
with international bodies to be called Regional Councils. The three Houses of
Assembly should simply be referred to as the ‘Northern Provinces House of
Assembly’, etc. and if possible a suitable generic name should be found covering the
three Houses of Assembly and the House of Chiefs in the north.
(7) Meetings of Houses of Assembly and Northern House of Chiefs
It should be made clear in the Governor’s despatch that the Houses of Assembly and
the Northern House of Chiefs would meet at least once a year. Once a year would
probably be sufficient at first, but as the Councils developed meetings might take
place twice a year.
(8) Committees of Houses of Assembly
Committees of the Houses of Assembly should be formed to keep the members in
touch with administration and to give them practical experience of special subjects.
In particular finance committees would be required, but there might also be
committees to deal for example with development, education, etc.
II Provincial Councils
It was agreed that Sir Arthur Richards should examine the question of the
development of Provincial Councils as a link between the Houses of Assembly and
the Native Authorities and the possibility of using these in connection with the
selection of Native Authority representatives in the Houses of Assembly. If possible,
reference should be made in the scheme to the development of Provincial Councils
and it might also be desirable to make reference to the development of district and
village councils, particularly in the Northern Provinces, as suggested by the Chief
Commissioner.
III Financial Questions
It was agreed that the financial arrangements under the scheme should be generally
on the lines described in the attached note2 and that these should be fairly fully
explained in the Governor’s despatch.
IV Administrative Machinery
It was agreed that the scheme would involve some adjustment of the relations between
Chief Commissioners and the Central Government and between administrative and
departmental officers in the Provinces. Sir Arthur Richards’ general conception was
that the Chief Commissioners, in consultation with the departmental Deputy
Directors, should settle all local matters in the Regions, reference being made to
Government on all questions of policy and to departmental Directors on technical
2 Not printed, but see 7.
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questions of policy. Deputy Directors at Chief Commissioners’ headquarters would
refer to their Directors, where necessary, on technical and departmental questions,
but would be responsible to the Chief Commissioners on all local questions. It would
appear to be desirable that this should be explained in the despatch.
V Presentation and introduction of scheme
(1) Presentation of scheme
It was agreed that the scheme should be made public during the next meeting of the
Legislative Council in March, 1945. For this purpose a despatch should be prepared
by Sir Arthur Richards setting out not only the details of the scheme, but also the
background of Nigeria so as to explain why a scheme in this form was necessary. Sir
Arthur Richards said that he would prepare a first draft of the despatch and would
submit it in draft for the Secretary of State’s consideration. When the time came for
publication in March it would be published simultaneously in Nigeria by laying it on
the table of the Legislative Council and in this country in the form of a White Paper
under cover of a short note by the Secretary of State.
It was agreed that it would be desirable to make it clear in the despatch that Sir
Arthur Richards had discussed the proposals with the Secretary of State, who had
expressed himself as prepared to consider them favourably and had authorised him to
lay them before the Legislative Council, but had not committed himself finally to
their approval pending discussion of them in the Legislative Council.
After publication the scheme would be debated in the Legislative Council in
Nigeria and it would probably be desirable to arrange, after this debate had taken
place, for a debate on the proposals in the House of Commons before a final decision
was taken on them; but this would have to be considered nearer the time.
It was also agreed that before the proposals were published they should be
explained confidentially to certain persons in Nigeria. In the Northern Provinces the
Chief Commissioner would first discuss them in detail with the Emirs and the
Governor would then himself hold a special conference of the Emirs at which their
assent to the proposals would be sought. In the Western Provinces the Governor
would speak to the more important Chiefs. To cover the Eastern Provinces he would
speak confidentially to the unofficial members of the Legislative Council.
(2) Timing of introduction of scheme
It was agreed that, assuming that as a result of the debates referred to above it was
decided to give effect to the proposals, the aim should be to bring them into force
about May, 1946, so as to enable preparations to start for the introduction of the first
regional budgets in the Houses of Assembly in January, 1947, in respect of the year
1947/48.
7 CO 583/286/5, no 43 6 Dec 1944
[Constitutional revision]: despatch from Sir A Richards to Mr Stanley
setting out revised proposals for Nigerian constitutional development.
Annexures
[Following the discussions over Richards’s proposals for constitutional change between
the CO and the gov during 1944, a revised version of Richard’s plans was drawn up and
sent to Stanley on 6 Dec. This despatch, later to be further revised by the new secretary of
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state, George Hall (see 21), was laid before the Legislative Council on 5 March 1945 as
Sessional Paper no 4 of 1945 and printed as Cmd 6599, Proposals for the Revision of the
Constitution of Nigeria (London, 1945)]
I have the honour to address you on the subject of the political and constitutional
future of Nigeria. I shall endeavour to set forth my conclusions and
recommendations with a brevity which is no measure of the time and trouble taken
to form them.
As you are aware, I studied a number of relevant documents in London during
November of last year and I had the advantage of many discussions with officers of
your staff. Since assuming office in Nigeria I have read all the local memoranda on
constitutional questions. During the very extensive travelling which I have
undertaken in the past twelve months, I have kept the subject constantly in mind and
have, I hope, retained an objective outlook. The background of the different races
comprised within the area known as Nigeria and the diversity of their languages,
customs, beliefs, habits and aspirations have been drawn by many pens, among the
most notable being that of Lord Hailey, whose writings have been the foundation for
my study of the subject. I also wish to record my indebtedness to my predecessor, Sir
Bernard Bourdillon; during his period of office he gave profound thought to the
problems of constitutional development and the conclusions which he formed have
been of the greatest assistance to me in framing my proposals. I have also steeped
myself in the writings and the thought of Lord Lugard, who has had no equal in
knowledge of the people and in grasp of the principles and practice of colonial
administration. He was confronted with the difficult setting of an artificial unity
which existed only on the map. His problem was to build a system which would allow
organic growth and make the unity originally superimposed from outside into a
living thing which might progress from varying stages of adolescence to adult
nationhood. If I may be permitted the observation, Lord Lugard never allowed
principles to become divorced from practice and he held always before him the ideal
of natural growth.
2. I have made these preliminary remarks because I feel very strongly that
political progress must be planned deliberately and that, while allowance must be
made for changes and any constitutional experiment must be flexible in its
provisions, there must be some framework of design. We cannot leave all the
difficulties to Time and Fate. As I see it, the main test to apply to new political and
constitutional proposals is—will they work and, if so, how? The problem of Nigeria
today is how to create a political system which is itself a present advance and
contains the living possibility of further orderly advance—a system within which the
diverse elements may progress at varying speeds, amicably and smoothly, towards a
more closely integrated economic, social and political unity, without sacrificing the
principles and ideals inherent in their divergent ways of life. The present system of
Government in Nigeria has many inconsistencies and by its nature is unsuited for
expansion on a Nigerian basis. A governing factor in my thoughts has been the
physical size of Nigeria—one third of British India or the size of France, Belgium and
the United Kingdom put together—with a population double that of the Dominion of
Canada. Planning for such a country should, therefore, be on an Imperial scale, far
different from the small-scale planning which is adequate for a Colony of the normal
small size. We have been urged to take some risks and I agree that we should do so.
To refuse to take risks is to admit political insolvency. I have tried to avoid false
08-(Doc1-27)-cp  15/7/01  7:25 am  Page 35
36 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND POST-WAR REFORMS [7]
analogies. It is not the Westminster model but the principles which lie behind it and
make it work that I have tried to apply, and in doing so I have retained the
fundamental principle of real and practical training by progressive stages based on
Native Institutions.
3. In framing my proposals I have kept three objects before me; to promote the
unity of Nigeria; to provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements
which make up the country; and to secure greater participation by Africans in the
discussion of their own affairs. At present no unity exists, nor does the constitution
encourage its growth. The Legislative Council does not legislate for the Northern
Provinces, so that more than half the population is outside its range. Even in the
Western and Eastern Provinces, which are within its sphere, the mass of the people
are insufficiently represented. What is wanted is a constitutional framework covering
the whole of Nigeria and a Legislative Council on which all sections of the
community are given representation. But however widely representative it may be, a
Central Legislature by itself is not enough. Nigeria falls naturally into three regions,
the North, the West and the East, and the people of those regions differ widely in
race, in customs, in outlook and in their traditional systems of government. This
natural division of the country is reflected in the machinery of administration, the
three sets of provinces being grouped together each under a Chief Commissioner;
but this purely administrative arrangement, besides being incomplete in itself
through the lack of an adequate regional organization at each Chief Commissioner’s
headquarters, has no counterpart in the constitutional sphere. Apart from Chiefs’
Conferences, no bodies exist at which public affairs can be discussed on a less narrow
plane than the purely local or one less wide than the Nigerian. Nor is there any
constitutional link between the Legislative Council and the Native Authorities. What
are needed are bodies where the affairs of each group of provinces can be discussed,
bodies which on the one hand are linked by membership with the Native Authorities,
and on the other hand can send delegates to speak for each region in the Central
Legislature. And these bodies must be so constituted as to be acceptable to public
opinion in the regions where they are established. Having set up such bodies and
widened the scope of the Central Legislature, it would still remain to secure a greater
voice in their affairs for the Africans themselves. At present officials are in the
majority on the Legislative Council, but I feel that the time has come to create
unofficial majorities.
4. The recommendations which I put forward, with the support of all three Chief
Commissioners, provide both for the widening of the scope and membership of the
Legislative Council and for the establishment of regional Councils for the Northern,
Western and Eastern Provinces. The Northern regional Council would consist of two
chambers, the House of Chiefs and the House of Assembly, while in the West and
East there would be a single chamber in each case, the House of Assembly. The new
Legislative Council would legislate for the whole country including the Northern
Provinces. The whole range of Nigerian affairs would be open for debate, especially
on the second reading of the Budget. The Legislative Council would be so constituted
as to have an unofficial and an African majority and, while direct election would be
retained where it exists at present, the majority of the unofficial members would be
selected from their own bodies by the Northern House of Chiefs and by the unofficial
members of the Houses of Assembly. Thus the regional Councils would act as
electoral colleges for the Legislative Council apart from their other functions. The
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Houses of Assembly would themselves have unofficial majorities and the greater part
of the unofficial members would be nominated by the Native Authorities in each
province from their own numbers. In this way a chain of representation would be
created from the Legislative Council to the people through the regional Councils and
the Native Authorities, and it would be a type of representation which would be in
accordance with custom, would fit in naturally with existing institutions, and would
be readily intelligible to the people themselves.
5. I do not propose that there should be any change in the constitution of the
Executive Council, the functions of which are purely advisory, and which has
recently been enlarged by the addition of three unofficial members.
6. The system of native administration would continue its evolution precisely as
at present and the progressive devolution of authority and responsibility to Native
Authorities would proceed. But if the Native Authorities are to play their full part in
the constitutional framework, they must be prepared continually to adapt themselves
to modern conditions. The system of indirect rule cannot be static; it must keep pace
with the development of the country and it must find a place for the more
progressive and better educated men. Only in this way can the Native Authorities
retain the confidence of the people as education spreads and only in this way can
local administration be effectively carried on. Progress in this direction has, of
course, been taking place for some time. In the Eastern Provinces the absence of any
traditional political organization has made it possible to build up Native Authorities
on democratic lines in the form of Councils on which all the individual family units
within the larger tribal units have equal representation. These Councils include
representatives of the political associations sponsored by the educated members of
the community. In the Northern and Western Provinces also the traditional rulers
have been encouraged to admit to their Councils representatives of progressive
opinion. In the Western Provinces, in particular, only four of the Native Authorities
consist of a Chief alone, the rest being ‘Chief-in-Council’ or ‘Council’ and the
Councils include representatives of the educated element, who are often in effect
chosen by the local political associations. This progressive modernization of the
Native Authorities is an essential part of the policy which I put forward.
7. My proposals for constitutional development fit in well with the forthcoming
reform of the judicial system, under which, instead of a Supreme Court for the
Colony and a Protectorate Court for the rest of Nigeria, a single Supreme Court will
be set up covering the whole country. The details of my proposals are set out in the
paragraphs which follow.
Membership of House of Chiefs and Houses of Assembly
Northern Provinces House of Chiefs
8. I propose that the Chief Commissioner should preside and that the
membership should be on the lines so successfully followed at present for the annual
Chiefs’ Conference. First-class Chiefs would sit as of right and other Chiefs would
select a representative panel from among their own numbers, subject to the approval
of the Governor acting on the advice of the Chief Commissioner. For the present
Conference all First-class Chiefs (13) are invited. Second-class Chiefs are grouped
Provincially and one from each group is invited, which results in annual attendance
of about ten out of a total of twenty-nine Second-class Chiefs.
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Houses of Assembly
9. I propose the following membership:—
Northern Provinces
Official Members
Senior Resident (President).
All other Residents (12)—including Secretary, Northern Provinces.
Deputy Financial Secretary
Deputy Director of Education
Deputy Director of Agriculture
Deputy Director of Medical Services
Deputy Director of Public Works
Crown Counsel
= 19
Unofficial Members
Fourteen Provincial Members to be selected by Native Authorities from their
members, other than major Chiefs.
Six Members to be nominated by the Governor to secure adequate representation
of the Pagan community, smaller Native Authorities, the Sabon Gari
community, industry and commerce or any other important aspects of life not
otherwise represented among the unofficial members.
= 20
Western Provinces
PRESIDENT. The Chief Commissioner.
Official Members
Residents (7) (The Secretary, Western Provinces, being raised to status of
Resident.)
Deputy Financial Secretary
Deputy Director of Education
Deputy Director of Agriculture
Deputy Director of Medical Services
Deputy Director of Public Works
Crown Counsel
= 14
Unofficial Members
Three Chiefs. (To be nominated by the Governor after consultation with Western
Provinces Chiefs.)
Seven Provincial Members to be selected by Native Authorities from their
members, other than major Chiefs.
Five Members to be nominated by the Governor from prominent citizens
representing important aspects of life not otherwise represented among the
unofficial members.
= 15
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Eastern Provinces (including Cameroons)
PRESIDENT. The Chief Commissioner.
Official Members
Residents (6) (The Secretary, Eastern Provinces, being raised to status of
Resident.)
Deputy Financial Secretary
Deputy Director of Education
Deputy Director of Agriculture
Deputy Director of Medical Services
Deputy Director of Public Works
Crown Counsel
= 13
Unofficial Members
Nine Provincial Members selected by Native Authorities from their members.
Five Members to be nominated by the Governor from prominent citizens to
represent important aspects of life not otherwise represented among the
unofficial members.
= 14
The President of each House would have an original and a casting vote, but there
would be an unofficial majority in each. All the unofficial members would be persons
of African descent domiciled in Nigeria. Nominations of unofficial members would be
for three years.
Functions of House of Chiefs and Houses of Assembly
10. Although as stated below the regional Councils would not in the first
instance have any responsibility for the enactment of legislation, they would be
concerned with both legislation and finance in addition to their deliberative
functions. The Houses of Assembly would debate motions and resolutions whether
brought forward by the official or the unofficial members, although, in accordance
with the usual practice, the unofficial members would not be entitled to propose
money resolutions. The House of Chiefs in the Northern Provinces would equally
have the right to originate motions and resolutions other than money resolutions.
11. In the first instance, I propose that the Legislative Council of Nigeria should
remain responsible for the actual passage of all legislation pending consideration by
a committee whether legislative powers, and if so what powers, should be devolved
on the regional Councils. Meanwhile all bills, other than purely formal bills or bills
introduced under certificates of urgency, would be laid on the table of the regional
Councils, before submission to the Legislative Council, for general discussion on the
lines of a second reading debate and for the submission of advice by resolution
should any amendments be desired.
12. I propose to devolve upon the regional Councils a large measure of financial
responsibility. Each would have its own regional budget, on which would be borne
the cost of all Government services in the region, including the salaries of
Government personnel. The only exception would be the cost within the region of
services declared to be central services, such as the railway, posts and telegraphs,
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income tax and audit which would continue to be carried on the Central Estimates as
at present, together with the central organization of Government, the headquarters
and central staff of all Departments and such charges as interest on public debt,
pensions, etc. Regional revenue would consist in the first place of the share of the
direct tax at present payable to the Central Government together with any receipts
from fees, licences, etc., which might be allotted to the regional budgets, and in the
second place of annual block grants from central revenue. The Houses of Assembly
would debate the regional estimates in detail before passing them with such
amendments as they desired to suggest. In the Northern Provinces the estimates
would also be considered by the House of Chiefs, which would have the power to
delete or amend items, but not to insert new ones. After passing the regional
Councils the estimates would be submitted to the Governor, who would have the
right to amend them if he thought this necessary in the public interest. When
approved by the Governor they would appear in the central estimates as block votes,
full details being given in the form of appendices. A statement is attached giving in
greater detail my proposals for the financial procedure (Annexure I) of regional
Councils and their relations with the Legislative Council on matters of finance.
13. The arrangements which I propose for dealing with regional revenue and
expenditure would in no way detract from the responsibility of Native Authorities for
operating their own local services and financing them from their own revenues.
These revenues are mainly derived from the share of the direct tax retained by the
Native Authorities, a share which the Governor has power under the law to increase
or decrease. In order to simplify the system and to encourage Native Authorities to
adopt progressive policies, I have recently frozen their contribution to central
revenue from the direct tax at the amounts paid in by them during the year 1943–44.
The remainder, and the whole of any additional proceeds from any increase in the
direct tax, is to be retained by the Native Authorities themselves. They will thus be in
a position to play an increasing part in the development of their own areas and the
recent correlation of Native Authority and Government salaries will make it easier for
them to secure the trained staff which they need for this purpose and will also help to
prevent overlapping between Government and Native Authority spheres of work.
14. I have referred to the financial functions and responsibilities of Native
Authorities because I regard their relations with the regional Councils as equally
important as those of the regional Councils with the Central Legislature. Under my
proposals the Native Authorities and the regional Councils would share the direct tax
as a source of revenue and the presence of Native Authority representatives on the
Houses of Assembly should ensure a proper co-ordination between regional and
purely local expenditure.
Meetings of the House of Chiefs and Houses of Assembly
15. The House of Chiefs and the Houses of Assembly would meet annually in
January for their budget sessions. The place of meeting would be Kaduna for the
Northern Provinces, Ibadan for the Western Provinces, and Enugu for the Eastern
Provinces. The language would be Hausa in the North and English in the West and
East. The present annual conferences of Residents and of Chiefs in the Northern and
Western Provinces and of Residents in the Eastern Provinces would cease to take
place. At first one annual meeting of the regional Councils would probably be
sufficient, but the possibility of additional meetings would not be excluded and, in
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order that the members of the Houses of Assembly might keep in touch with
administration and obtain practical experience in special subjects, committees of the
Houses would be formed to deal with such matters as education, development, etc.,
Finance Committees of the Houses of Assembly would also be established.
Membership of the Legislative Council
16. I recommend that the Legislative Council of Nigeria should have the
following membership:—
PRESIDENT. His Excellency The Governor.
Official Members
Chief Secretary
Chief Commissioners (3)
One Senior Resident each from Northern Provinces, Western Provinces and
Eastern Provinces (3)
Attorney-General
Financial Secretary
Development Secretary
Director of Education
Director of Agriculture
Director of Medical Services
Director of Public Works
Commissioner of Labour
Director of Marine
Comptroller of Customs and Excise
General Manager of the Railway
Commissioner of Police
Commissioner of the Colony
= 20
Unofficial Members
Four Emirs (to be nominated by the House of Chiefs, Northern Provinces).
Two Chiefs from Western Provinces (to be nominated by the Governor from the
three Chiefs who are members of the House of Assembly).
Five Members from the Northern Provinces (to be nominated by the unofficial
members of the House of Assembly, from their own body).
Four Members from the Western Provinces (to be nominated by the unofficial
members of the House of Assembly from their own body).
Five Members from the Eastern Provinces (to be nominated by the unofficial
members of the House of Assembly from their own body).
One Member for Calabar (to be elected from the township area as at present).
Three Members for Lagos (to be elected from the Municipal area as at present).
One Member for the Colony (to be nominated by the Governor after consultation
with the Native Authorities).
One Member to represent Banking
„                „ Shipping To be nominated 
„                „ Industry and Commerce  by the Governor.
„                „ Mining
= 29
08-(Doc1-27)-cp  15/7/01  7:25 am  Page 41
42 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND POST-WAR REFORMS [7]
The Governor would have a casting vote only and the Council would thus have an
unofficial majority of twenty-nine to twenty, and, on the assumption that the four
members representing banking, shipping, industry and commerce, and mining
would as at present be Europeans, an African majority of twenty-five to twenty-
four. The Governor would be provided under the Constitution with the usual
reserve powers to be exercised, if necessary, in the interests of public faith, public
order and good government. Nominations of unofficial members would be for
three years.
Functions of Legislative Council
17. The Legislative Council’s functions would be the same as at present, with the
essential difference that it would legislate for the whole of Nigeria including the
Northern Provinces. The Finance Committee of the Legislative Council would
continue to operate as at present.
Meetings of the Legislative Council
18. The Legislative Council would meet for the budget session as at present in
March, with other meetings during the year as required. The Budget Session would
be held in successive years at Lagos, Kaduna, Ibadan and Enugu to demonstrate the
Nigerian character of the Council. All other meetings would take place at Lagos.
The Position of Lagos and the Colony
19. Lagos itself, comprising its present town limits divided into urban and sub-
urban areas with a population of about 210,000, would become a Municipality with
extensive powers. The rural area of the Colony, with a population of about 200,000,
would remain directly under the Legislative Council and would continue to be
administered by a Commissioner, three District Officers and Native Authorities.
Departmental activities in the Colony would remain as at present organized. The
Colony budget, a small matter if the municipal area is excluded, would form part
of the central estimates. The Lagos municipal budget would form an appendix to
the central estimates like the regional budgets, only a block grant of such subsidy
as might be considered suitable being included in the body of the central esti-
mates.
20. The Lagos municipal area would continue to elect three members to the
Legislative Council and the Calabar township area would continue to elect one. The
system of election by ballot is not, in my view, a suitable method in Nigerian
conditions for securing the proper representation of the people, nor would it be
understood by the mass of the population. I should therefore be opposed to any
extension of election by ballot at present, but at the same time I do not propose any
variation in the present electoral arrangements either at Lagos or at Calabar,
although the small number of voters in proportion to those entitled to vote does not
indicate any great attachment to this method of selecting members. A note on the
qualifications required for entry on the electoral roll at Lagos and Calabar is attached
(Annexure II).
21. I have not overlooked the possibility of introducing municipal government in
places other than Lagos, but I do not consider the time ripe for this development and
indeed in the Northern and Western Provinces the municipal system has not yet
taken the public imagination and runs counter to established ideas.
08-(Doc1-27)-cp  15/7/01  7:25 am  Page 42
[7] DEC 1944 43
Administrative Machinery
22. I regard it as essential to the success of the regional Councils that adequate
administrative machinery should be established at each regional headquarters. The
constitutional proposals involve the creation of regional Deputies to the Heads of all
the principal Departments and it is my intention that the Chief Commissioners, in
consultation with these Deputies, should settle all local matters in the regions, only
referring to Government on questions of policy and to departmental Directors on
major questions affecting their departments. Regional Deputies would refer to their
Directors where necessary on technical and departmental questions, but would be
responsible to Chief Commissioners on all local questions. The Chief Commissioner
and the regional Deputies would in fact form what would amount to a regional
executive council, responsible, under the Government, for the co-ordination of all
activities in the region and for its general welfare and development.
23. The appointment of regional Deputies is in any case long overdue. Excessive
centralization of authority in Lagos has left the Chief Commissioners without
authoritative guidance on technical questions at their headquarters and has so
overloaded the Heads of Departments that they cannot travel as they should or give
that full attention to major issues of policy which the interests of the country
increasingly demand. It is impossible to overstress the difference which would be
made to administration by the courtesy of an occasional call on officers in the field, if
Heads of Departments had time to travel, and by sympathetic discussion and
explanation of policy and practice with local Chiefs and Administrative Officers.
Under my proposals the principal Heads of Departments, with three Deputies in the
provinces and another at headquarters, would be able to travel and to think.
24. I feel moreover that the interest of the Service would be stimulated by the
establishment of regional Councils where all the Residents would be free to take an
active part in the financial dispositions of their own Provinces and in the discussion
of legislation affecting them. Although Nigerian policy would be settled at a higher
level, the chance of public contribution to the making of such policy would always be
present in the debates of the regional Councils.
25. My chief difficulty in considering how best to promote Nigerian unity and
political progress has been the patent diversity of outlook between the different parts
of Nigeria. As I have already said, it would be useless to pretend that unity exists at
present, nor would clumsy attempts to achieve it result in anything but opposition.
The individualism and the craving to paddle their own canoes, which distinguishes
the people of the Eastern Provinces, finds no counterpart in the disciplined and
conservative north, where respect and affection for their Chiefs is a very real factor.
Progress is in the air and the pace can be accelerated, but too great haste or too little
regard for ingrained sentiment and belief can only defeat its own object. In the
Northern Provinces a very large section of the community has up to now shown no
signs of the awakening of its political consciousness in the modern sense. The
constitutional system which I propose will provide an outlet for political thought so
far as it has emerged, and the representative character of the Legislative and regional
Councils will be a safeguard against the domination of public affairs by any section of
the community which may happen temporarily to be in a favoured position. This
representative character should also ensure that political development will be in
accordance with the wishes of the people themselves and so be of lasting value. But if
the mass of the population are to play an effective part in the constitutional scheme,
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it will be necessary to foster more resolutely the formal meetings of village, district
and, in some cases, Provincial Councils as part of the system of native
administration. It is in these councils that the habit of political thought will be
inculcated so as to make possible the wise choice of the provincial members of the
Houses of Assembly. The encouragement of district and village councils will be
particularly important in the Northern Provinces, where the main units of native
administration are large, so that without these intermediate links there is a danger of
the Native Authorities not being in close enough touch with the people themselves.
26. I propose that the new Constitution should remain in force for nine years
and be reviewed at the end of that period; but that in the intervening years, at the end
of the third and if necessary the sixth year, there should be a review of the system of
direct nomination by the Governor for membership of the Houses of Assembly and of
the Legislative Council, in those cases where I have proposed this form of selection in
the first instance, with a view to substituting a form of nomination by choice of the
people represented wherever this might be found to be practicable.
27. In conclusion I ask for your authority to make these proposals public by
laying a copy of this despatch on the table of the Legislative Council at the
forthcoming Budget Session and by inviting a discussion in the Council.
Annexure I to 3
It is proposed that the financial procedure of the regional Councils and their
relations with the Legislative Council on matters of finance should be as follows:—
(a) Accounting arrangements
The system of accounting would remain exactly as at present and there would
continue to be a single accounting organization for the whole of Nigeria and a single
surplus and reserve. The regions would thus have no separate accounts and no
separate surplus or reserve.
(b) Regional estimates
(i) Expenditure. The regional expenditure estimates presented to the House of
Assembly would consist of a detailed statement, in the usual form, of all items of
expenditure borne on the regional budgets. These would include all the main
services functioning in the regions, e.g., administration, medical, public works,
agriculture, education, etc., but would exclude the cost within the region of
services declared to be central services, such as the railway, posts and telegraphs,
income tax and audit as well as such central expenditure as interest on public debt,
pensions, etc.
(ii) Revenue. The revenue side of the regional budgets would show revenue
divided into two heads:—
(a) The revenue estimated to be derived from the regional Council’s share of
the direct tax (at present payable to the Central Government), plus any other
revenue from fees, licences, etc., declared to be regional.
(b) The block grant from central revenue.
(iii) Functions of Houses of Assembly with regard to estimates. The Houses of
Assembly would consider the expenditure estimates presented to them and would
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pass them with such amendments as they desired to suggest. In accordance with
the ordinary practice, the unofficial members would not have power to propose
increases on individual items or heads of the estimates, but only reductions or
deletions. In the Northern Provinces the budget, after passing the House of
Assembly, would be considered by the House of Chiefs, which would have the right
to veto or amend any of the items, but not to insert new ones. After passing the
regional Councils the estimates would be submitted to the Governor, who would
have the right to amend them if he thought this necessary in the public interest.
When approved by the Governor they would appear in the central estimates as
block votes, full details being given in the form of appendices. The regional
Councils would at first not be given power to appropriate expenditure and the
appropriation of regional expenditure would be in the hands of the Legislative
Council. If, however, as the result of the recommendations of the Committee
referred to in paragraph 11 of the despatch, it should be decided to devolve any
legislative powers on the regional Councils, it might also in due course be decided
to devolve upon the Houses of Assembly the power of legally appropriating
regional revenue.
(c) Central estimates
(i) Expenditure. All items of expenditure not included in the regional estimates
would appear in the central estimates exactly as at present, while these estimates
would include three block votes of expenditure covering the whole of the
expenditure proposed for each region. The central Council would be discouraged
from discussing the details of regional expenditure.
(ii) Revenue. The central estimates of revenue would remain exactly as at present.
(iii) Future procedure. Should the Houses of Assembly at a future date be given
the legal power of appropriating regional expenditure, as suggested under (b)(iii)
above, a further change in the form of the central estimates would become
necessary. If the Houses of Assembly appropriated their own expenditure, it would
follow that the Central Council would cease to appropriate the whole of the
regional expenditure and would appropriate only the block votes made from
central revenue to supplement regional revenue (i.e., the difference between the
total of regional revenue and the total of regional expenditure). Similarly the
central revenue estimates would then exclude regional revenue, which would be
shown on the regional estimates only.
(d) Colonial Development and Welfare expenditure
Colonial Development and Welfare expenditure would be shown in the central
estimates divided up into central expenditure and expenditure in the three regions.
The regional expenditure would also be shown, under a separate head, in the regional
estimates, with a corresponding entry on the revenue side.
(e) Supplementary expenditure
Finance Committees of the Houses of Assembly would be set up to deal with
supplementary expenditure. As wide as possible a devolution of power to the regions
with regard to supplementary expenditure should be made. The exact arrangements
would be a matter for consideration at a later stage, but as a general rule it should
not be necessary to refer supplementary expenditure to the central Finance
Committee unless an increase in the block vote for the region was involved.
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Annexure II to 3
The qualifications for persons entitled to vote in Legislative Council elections are
contained in the following Articles of the Nigeria (Legislative Council) Order in
Council, 1922:—
Elected members
‘VI. The Elected Members of the Council shall be elected as follows:—
(1) Three Members by persons duly qualified as electors as hereinafter provided,
who are resident within the municipal area of Lagos.
(2) One Member by persons duly qualified as electors as hereinafter provided, who
are resident within the municipal area of Calabar.’
Qualifications of electors
‘XX. Every male person shall be entitled to be registered as an elector, and when
registered to vote at the election of Elected Members of the Council who—
(1) is a British subject, or a native of the Protectorate of Nigeria;
(2) is of the age of twenty-one years or upwards;
(3) has been ordinarily resident for the twelve months immediately preceding the
date of registration in the municipal area for which the election is being held; and
(4) was during the calendar year immediately preceding, in possession of a gross
annual income, from all sources, of not less than one hundred pounds.’
Disqualification of electors
‘XXI. No person shall be entitled to be registered as an elector, or when registered to
vote at the election of Elected Members of Council who—
(1) has been sentenced by any competent Court in any part of His Majesty’s
dominions or in any territory under his protection, to death, penal servitude, or
imprisonment for a term exceeding six months; and has not either suffered the
punishment to which he was sentenced, or such other punishment as may by
competent authority have been substituted therefore, or received a free pardon; or
(2) is, under any law in force in Nigeria, found or declared to be of unsound mind
or adjudged to be a lunatic.’
8 CO 583/286/5, no 67 26 March 1945
[Constitutional revision]: inward telegram no 245 from Sir A
Richards to Mr Stanley reporting the reaction of the NCNC to the
constitutional proposals
[The publication of Richards’s proposals for constitutional change in Mar 1945 prompted
a storm of protest within Nigeria led by the NCNC. Partly this protest was generated by
the limited nature of what was being proposed and partly by the fact that no consultation
with Nigerian opinion had taken place during the drawing up of the provisions. Also
important in the NCNC reaction were the four so-called ‘obnoxious ordinances’—
concerning mineral rights, public land acquisition, crown lands and the appointment and
deposition of chiefs—presented during the same session of the Legislative Council; these
ordinances, arriving at a time of considerable economic difficulty for ordinary Nigerians
(see 11), were deeply unpopular and were used by the NCNC to generate widespread
opposition to Richards’ policies.]
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I have been requested to forward following message to you.
Begins. Emergency meeting of National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
Holden at Glover Memorial Hall, Lagos, Saturday 24th, 1945 resolved pray you advise
His Majesty the King defer sanction of Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1945 entitled
‘Political and Constitutional future of Nigeria’ debated in Legislative Council
Thursday 22nd March and following bills passed by budget session, Legislative
Council viz Minerals Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs, Public Lands
Acquisition, Crown Lands Ordinances pending receipt of views being respectfully
submitted through Governor of Nigeria by National Council comprising 99
organisations representing over six million Nigerians. National Council prepared to
send delegation to London to state native views. Herbert Macauley, President and
Nnamdi Azikiwe, General Secretary. Ends.
9 CO 583/286/5, no 82 17 April 1945
[Constitutional revision]: letter from Mr Creech Jones to Mr Stanley
outlining his views on the constitutional proposals
I undertook to send you my difficulties with the proposed Nigerian Constitution. I
regard the proposals as a great step forward and I hope my criticisms will not seem to
imply that I minimise their value and wisdom.
(a) Eligibility for the franchise is £100. This is far too high and gives
comparatively few Africans the right to vote. (c.f. Gold Coast)
(b) The development of democratic municipal councils is not provided for. (I have
urged for many years political advance in the townships towards municipalities. I
recognise the difficulties at Ibaden [sic]. But Calabar, Port Harcourt and such
places ought to move to proper municipal structure (¶21)1. I am a little
apprehensive about the views of ¶20. I hope they are not conclusive.
(c) The African majority on the Legislative Council is likely to be only one. I think
this errs on the side of over-caution and should be more generous. I do not
appreciate the case for retaining in the Legislative Council such a formidable army
of officials.
(d) It is proposed to give 4 seats on the Legislative Council to European interests,
almost as good as the whole representation of the Eastern Provinces. Banking is to
be as well represented as Calabar. I don’t like this syndicalistic proclivity. Why
exclude the Trade Unions, or other professions and services (e.g. Education). They
are as important as some of those named.
(e) I notice that (¶6) ‘progressive modernisation of the Native Authorities is an
essential part of the Governor’s policy’, but in the Northern Provinces it is not
clear what the constitutional relationship of the House of Chiefs would be with the
House of Assembly, or what purpose it would serve. In any case, the chiefs in
House of Chiefs would be divorced from their Councils, whereas actually the Chief
has no existence apart from his Council. In the House of Assembly, the members
go as representatives chosen by their Councils but this presumably is not the case
1 Paragraph references refer to those in 7.
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in the ‘Upper House’. Apart from this it is imperative that the Native Authority
Councils be democratised as quickly as possible. I welcome the sentiment of the
second half ¶25.
(f) I am not sure that the relation of the Executive Council to the Legislative
Council is at all satisfactory and there is no assurance that the situation will be
adjusted. It is unfortunate when a Legislative Council, however representative,
cannot start on the road of learning to participate in responsibility.
(g) It is unfortunate that it is to be specified that three members of the Assembly
for the Western Provinces must be Chiefs. This has not been specified in other
cases.
I hope the proposals will work out as the Governor would like them to—not a
stiffening of the inflexible feudal element in the provincial and central authorities,
but an elasticity which will permit of adjustment to changing conditions and needs,
effective checks of public opinion and democratic safeguards, an increasing place for
the educated and able men and women in government, and administration and an
adaptability which eliminates the feudal character of indirect rule and find
representative people (by democratic machinery) instead of hand picked chiefs and
others who conform to ‘official’ needs.
10 CO 583/286/5, no 88 28 May 1945
[Constitutional revision]: letter (reply) from Mr Stanley to Mr Creech
Jones outlining Richards’s response
I have now had an opportunity or obtaining Sir Arthur Richards’ views on the various
points raised in your letter of the 17th of April1 regarding the Nigerian Constitutional
proposals. You have, I believe, already seen him during his present stay in London,
but it occurs to me that you might like to discuss your points more fully with him. I
am sure that he for his part would welcome a talk with you on them, and if you so
wish I shall be glad to arrange a meeting.
It will, I think, be convenient if I comment on your points under the headings
which you yourself followed in your letter.
(a) Sir Arthur Richards would be quite willing to consider reducing the franchise
qualification to a level comparable with that which obtains in the Gold Coast. The
Gold Coast system is, however, on a rather different basis in that the electorate for
the Municipal Members of the Legislative Council there is the same as that for the
Town Councils and the property qualification is the ownership of real property
having an annual rateable value of not less than £6. It would, therefore, have to be
considered whether a similar system should be adopted in the case of Nigeria, or
whether it would be better to retain in Nigeria the present requirement of a stated
annual income and simply to reduce its figure.
(b) I entirely agree that Municipal Government may develop in the future, but I
think we have to recognise that it is not the only possible channel for the
development of responsible local Government, and that even in areas which have
1 See 9.
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become urbanised the Native Authorities may still have an important part to play.
The democratisation of existing institutions on the lines foreshadowed in paragraph
25 of the Governor’s despatch is, I think, likely to prove more fruitful than an
attempt to introduce ready-made democracy on a European model, and we must be
careful to avoid the importation of alien ideas and methods against the wishes of all
but a small section of the community. The Governor himself is satisfied that Nigeria
is wholly unready and unequipped for the general introduction of municipal status at
present, nor indeed does he consider that there is any widespread demand for such
development. Where there is a demand for municipal status it is for the most part
sponsored by a single political group and often, as in Port Harcourt, is accompanied
by a determination not to pay for it. In fact, they want municipal status without
rates—the worst possible training in responsibility.
(c) The Official members of the Legislative Council will not, of course, be
mustered merely for the purpose of counter-balancing the Unofficials. It is essential
that the Heads of the more important departments of Government should be present
in the Council to explain and defend the Government’s policies. However, the
Governor will be prepared to consider the exclusion of some of the Official members
and we will bear the point in mind.
(d) I think that it must be conceded that European commercial interests are in a
special position. They have played a great part in the development of West Africa in
the past, and undoubtedly have a big part to play in the future. I think that it is only
reasonable, and indeed desirable, in present circumstances, that they should have a
voice in the Council. That it will amount only to a voice is ensured by the fact that
there will be an African and not merely an unofficial majority on the Council. The
Trade Unions and the professions are not really in an analogous position, and in any
case they have the ordinary channels of representation open to them. The Governor
agrees, however, that some reduction in the European unofficial representation
might be considered.
(e) The position of the House of Chiefs in the Northern Provinces would be
roughly analogous to that of the House of Lords. I know that it is often claimed that
there is no such thing as a ‘sole Native Authority’, but, so far as the Northern
Provinces are concerned, I doubt whether this claim would bear examination. Indeed
the people of the Hausa States would be very much surprised, I think, if you
suggested to them that the powers of their Emirs were in any way limited by their
Councils. I agree that we should not do anything to consolidate this feudal tradition
but at the same time we cannot ignore that it still exists. It has always been the policy
of the Administration to encourage the Emirs to act on the advice of their Councils
in important matters and to admit to these Councils representatives of the more
progressive elements of the community. But the process of democratisation, which is
closely dependent on the spread of education, cannot safely be accelerated beyond a
certain limit, and in the meantime we must provide for things as they are and not as
we might wish them to be.
(f ) I think that for the present we must leave the Governor complete freedom in
the choice of his Unofficial Advisers in the Executive Council. Nigeria is not ready for
a ministerial system, and it would be quite impossible to find the men capable of
taking a broad enough view to see the country’s interests as a whole. You will,
however, see from paragraph 15 of the Governor’s despatch that it is proposed to
provide the Unofficial members of the House of Assembly with the opportunity of
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educating themselves in the problems of administration as members of Committees
which are to be set up to deal with individual subjects such as education,
development, etc.
(g) There are not sufficient Chiefs of ‘major’ standing in the Western Provinces to
justify the creation of a special House of Chiefs as in the North, but it would be a
great mistake on this account to omit them from the machine altogether. For this
reason provision has been made for three out of the five to sit, in rotation, in the
House of Assembly. Their own people, I am sure, would not have it otherwise. The
only reason that similar provision has not been made in the Eastern Provinces is that
there are no Chiefs there of comparable standing.
As regards the last paragraph of your letter, I have already referred, in connection
with (e), to the steps being taken to break down the autocratic tradition in the North.
I would only add here that the idea, popularised by the Southern intelligentsia, that a
Chief is necessarily a ‘Yes-Man’ does not conform to the facts. It is interesting to note
the tendency of African politicians in one breath to refer to these Chiefs as civil
servants who can scarcely count as African at all, and in the next to claim that they
are kings used to the exercise of independent authority. You will find a notable
example of this in the speeches of the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council
in the debate on the constitutional proposals.
I take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 2nd of
May, enclosing a copy of a telegram addressed to you by Mr. Azikiwe. I have already
received a long memorandum on the constitutional proposals from the ‘National
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons’ and the views they put forward will receive
due consideration before the proposals are finally approved. I must, however, admit
to some doubts as to the truly representative character of this organisation, and I
should certainly require more information about the bodies which, according to the
telegram, adopted resolutions of no confidence in the African Unofficial Members of
the Legislative Council, before I accepted their claim to represent the communities
and ‘constituencies’ concerned. I notice the telegram states that the Member for the
Ijebu Division was the only representative who opposed the adoption of the
proposals. This Member did, in the course of the debate, ask that consideration of the
proposals might be deferred for three months, but he did not actually vote against
their adoption, which was approved without a division.
11 CO 583/275/9, no 15 22 June 1945
[General strike]: inward telegram no 554 from Sir G Whiteley to Sir G
Creasy reporting the declaration of a general strike [Extract]
[The general strike by government employees that began in June 1945 was generated by
the sharp rise in the cost of living during World War II; the cost of living allowance
granted by Bourdillon in 1942 had been effectively eroded by 1945. The strike, which
demanded a 50 per cent cost of living increase, was widely supported, particularly in
Lagos, and generated considerable unease in the administration. Azikiwe’s papers were
quick to support the strikers, particularly once some trade union leaders repudiated the
strike, and Azikiwe’s popularity grew sharply during these weeks; his Daily Comet and
West African Pilot were banned by the administration on 8 July for their coverage of these
events (see 12). The strike ended in early Aug following the promise of the appointment of
a commission of inquiry into employees’ wages and the cost of living; the Tudor Davies
commission reported in 1946 and recommended an increase in the cost of living
allowance, backdated to 1945 (see 26).]
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Regret to inform you that strike has been declared today. Union leaders had
previously resigned and so far as I know no new leaders have yet been elected.
Departments chiefly affected are Railway, Marine, Public Works, Printing and Lagos
Municiple[Sic] Council, where all African Technical employees and labourers have
ceased work. Partial strike in Postal Department confined mainly to Telegraph staff.
Clerical staff in all department still at work. Emergency services are operating
satisfactorily. Present food stocks in Lagos sufficient for twenty days. No signs as yet
of civil disturbances. It is difficult at present to estimate duration of strike or
solidarity of strikers. I will keep you informed. . . .
12 CO 583/275/9, no 44 9 July 1945
[General strike]: inward telegram no 608 from Sir G Whiteley to Mr
Stanley on the politicisation of the strike
Your telegram No. 612.
Strike.
Position shows improvement and there are an increasing number of men
returning to work. There is reason to hope that existing tendency will continue and
increase, and that, once total number of returning strikers reaches a critical point,
remainder will follow en bloc. In meantime, hard core of resistance remains in
railway workshops.
2. It has become increasingly evident that the strike is now being used as a
political weapon, and political party, sponsored by Azikiwe, has been encouraging the
strike. This has been evident in his two papers ‘The Pilot’ and ‘The Comet’. In
paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 591 I alluded to this. Subsequent to the enactment
of the regulations in question the two papers published a gross misrepresentation of
a statement made by the Public Relations Officer, which was calculated to discredit
the Trade Union Leaders. As a result of this, I have suspended the publication of both
papers, which should have a salutory effect. I shall forward by the next bag all the
documents connected with the suspension for your information.
3. As a means of bringing strike to an end, it is imperative to restore confidence
in, and prestige of, union leaders who are making every effort to bring strikers back
to work, and every endeavour is being made to this end.
4. Figures of strikers are necessarily approximate, since restricted telegraph
service makes accuracy impossible. In general, however, proportion of strikers is
high in Lagos and low or even negligible outside. Following numbers on strike:—
Railway 18,500 (decreasing rapidly)
P. and T. 927
Marine 2,700
P.W.D. 5,400
Lagos Town Council 2,900.
These figures include daily labour.
5. In regard to effect on export produce, this is, fortunately, slackest time of year
and since ports are working normally, and as majority palm produce is evacuated by
water, the only important hold-up is the movement of 50,000 tons grounduts from
Northern Provinces.
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6. In regard to emergency staff, Railway requires eight Railway Civil Engineers,
eight Railway Inspectors of Works and eight track gangers. Suggest best means of
obtaining them quickly is to borrow them from a Military Railway Company. These
men are required owing to previous arrears of maintenance of permanent way due to
shortage of staff. Arrears have been greatly accentuated by strike at a period of heavy
rains and state of track now gives cause for considerable anxiety. Their services will
be required for several months, irrespective of when strike ends, and it will not be
possible to dispense with them until all permanent vacancies for such posts have
been filled.
7. P.W.D. require urgently
(a) Six Inspectors of Works (Waterworks), qualifications as in Staff Indent No.
331.
(b) Six Electrical Engineers and eight Mechanical Engineers, qualifications as in
Staff Indents Nos. 302, 309, 320, 365.
Suggest J.O. Hall,1 now on leave be consulted in regard to (b). Can these twenty men
be borrowed from public undertakings in U.K. for period of six to twelve months,
pending Crown Agents filling parmanent vacancies on indent. Suggest Northern
Ireland as promising recruiting ground and possibility of obtaining ex R.N. Warrant
and N.C.O. Engine-room Artificers.
8. These men are most urgently required. Grateful you despatch by air.
1 J O Hall, chief engineer, Nigeria.
13 CO 583/275/9 13 July 1945
[General strike]: minutes by N J B Sabine1 on the handling of
reporting on the general strike [Extract]
[One of the consequences of the general strike was the growing political stature of
Azikiwe and in consequence, his growing demonisation by the administration. His
reporting of the strike, not least in the USA, caused problems for officials, a development
exacerbated by the publicity generated by the alleged plot to assassinate him, see 16.]
Sir A. Dawe
Mr. O.G.R. Williams
We discussed this morning with Mr. Usill of the Ministry of Information and Mr.
Grenfell Williams of the B.B.C. the present position as regards the handling of news
about the Nigerian strike. . . .
We had discussed several times at the weekly Publicity Meetings the situation on
the strike in Nigeria and had given the B.B.C. some guidance in writing, which had
been supplied by the West African Department. The B.B.C.’s transmission on Sunday,
to which reference is made in this telegram, was based on a Reuter message. . . . I
think the B.B.C. News people were at fault in not referring this to us, and I have told
Mr. Grenfell Williams so.
One of the main difficulties in this case is that the Reuter correspondent in Nigeria
is Mr. Azikwe. The question was raised some time ago of pointing out to Reuters the
1 Head of Information Dept, CO.
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disadvantages of Mr. Azikwe as a correspondent, but it was decided to take no action
for the time being. It would in any case have been delicate and possibly liable to
misunderstanding to make an approach to Reuters which involved any reflection on
anyone appointed as their correspondent.
I think, however, that the time has come when it would be of advantage for the
Nigerian Government to issue an authoritative communique on the strike, including
a factual account of the present position. I think that this communique should be
prepared and issued in Nigeria. It is, however, more than possible that Mr. Azikwe
will not feel inclined to transmit the text of this as a Reuter message and I would,
therefore, propose that arrangements should be made for its simultaneous release
here at a time to be agreed with the Nigerian Government. We could then ensure
that copies were sent to the B.B.C. and the news agencies, including Reuters, who I
am sure would carry the communique in full. My idea would be that it should be
issued here under the description of a communique issued by the Nigerian
Government. I submit a draft telegram to the O.A.G. accordingly.
In order not to confuse the issue, I think that the telegrams in which Mr. Azikwe
expresses fears for his safety2 should be dealt with separately and I have minuted on a
separate sheet on this.
I also submit a draft reply to the personal telegram to me from Mr. Fletcher
(marked A).3
2 See 16.
3 Sir A. Dawe minuted (13 July): ‘I agree. The fact that Azikiwe is the Reuter’s man at Lagos explains a lot.’
14 CO 583/275/9, no 72 13 July 1945
[General strike]: despatch from Sir G Whiteley to Mr Stanley
outlining his views of the causes of the general strike
With reference to my telegram No. 608 of the 9th of July,1 I have the honour to
address you on the subject of the general strike of technical workers and labourers in
Nigeria and to set out in some detail my views on the basic causes of this dispute and
my recommendation as to the policy to be followed.
2. I am concerned in this despatch, in the first instance, to set out the views of
myself and my advisers on the underlying causes of the present unrest. I should, I
think, emphasise at the outset that the present strike is not an isolated incident and
that when it is settled and the workers have returned to duty the general situation in
Nigeria will remain basically unaltered. The strike is a manifestation of a number of
tendencies which have been apparent since the earlier years of the war, and which
have been strongly accentuated as a result of war conditions.
3. For some years before the war there had been what one might describe as a
political atmosphere in Lagos. This had been, in normal conditions, a comparatively
harmless and natural growth at a time when the majority of the population were
progressing, albeit slowly, both economically and educationally. The outbreak of war
found Nigeria, as it found all democratic countries in the world, unready for the
1 See 12.
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great changes which were inevitably necessary to deal with conditions imposed by
the war and in the first few months the tempo altered little; in fact it was not until
perhaps the later months of 1940 that any great changes became apparent. In these
months arrangements were made to recruit what by West African standards was a
very large army. At the same time substantial labour forces were required for service
works. Consequently considerable numbers of men who were formerly simple
peasants were taken out of their environment and to some extent detribalised in
large towns. The Africans recruited into the Forces began to enjoy conditions of life
of which previously they had no conception. They were clothed, cared for and fed on
a scale which was entirely unprecedented in West Africa. At the same time
considerable numbers of British and Allied soldiers were quartered in the larger
centres of Nigeria, and particularly in Lagos, and the Africans began to realise that
there were other sorts of ‘white men’ than those whom they had previously known.
In particular there were private soldiers, able bodied seamen etc. of several
nationalities who, themselves coming from comparatively lowly environments,
fraternised quite freely with the local Africans, with the consequence that the
Africans began to appreciate that there were in Europe and on the American
continent large numbers of persons in much the same position as themselves. The
African therefore began to revise his conception of Europeans as a race, and this in
turn has evoked in the larger towns a fairly widespread consciousness of colour, and
what might be termed a race inferiority complex.
4. This brief recapitulation of the conditions which obtained in the years
1940–42 may appear irrelevant in a despatch dealing with labour unrest, but I
submit it in the belief that it provides some background to the direction in which
African thought and aspirations have been moving in the last few years.
5. At the same time that this process was proceeding there was much talk of self-
government and self-determination for Colonial peoples, and while the idea of self-
government was attractive to the educated or semi-educated Africans and provided a
fertile field for the political agitators to work in, they had and have no conception of
what self-government really entails. In the more politically minded Africans of Lagos
there is a considerable body of uninformed opinion which fondly believes that, if the
Europeans were to leave Nigeria in a body, Africans could maintain the present
standard of administration with little difficulty.
6. It is also relevant to refer to the general economic conditions which have
obtained during the war period. The year 1939 was a period of moderate slump and
this slump continued without any major change until the end of 1941 when the loss
of territory in the Far East necessitated a complete re-orientation of Nigeria’s war
effort; instead of being as it was up to that time a comparatively unimportant source
of raw materials Nigeria suddenly became the most important source of oil seeds and
tin in the Colonial Empire. There was consequently a great drive for increased
production of these commodities and from the beginning of 1942 there has been a
gradual increase in prices of all primary products. This outflow of money on produce
coincided with, by Nigerian standards, a vast expenditure of funds by the Army, but
concurrently the output of the manufacturing countries of the world became
restricted and there was a considerable contraction in the imports of consumer
goods. The result, which was inevitable, is that after nearly three years of these
conditions there is marked inflation in Nigeria. This inflation has resulted in a
considerable rise in food prices at a time when owing to the fact that very substantial
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numbers of able bodied young men have been taken off the land there has been a
contraction in the production of staple foodstuffs.
7. Another factor of which account must be taken is the unfortunate failure of
Africans to understand that rights and privileges carry with them obligations, that
promotion, for instance, carries with it the obligation to perform more efficient work
and undertake greater responsibility and that an employee owes a certain duty to his
employer. Freedom of the press in Nigeria appears to be interpreted as freedom to
mislead the people and to abuse Government. This failure to appreciate responsibility
makes it almost impossible to discuss questions with Africans in the light of the
interests of the whole community and the responsibility of one individual to another
and of one section to the remainder of the community.
8. In Nigeria, as in other tropical African dependencies, wage rates have been
related more or less to the earning power of the peasant farmer and to the low
standard of living in rural areas. Thus, while the minimum wage for a labourer in
Government employment in Lagos has risen from 10d. a day before the war to 2/– a
day in 1942 it must nevertheless be admitted that this minimum wage is too low,
despite the fact that African employers of labour still pay as little as 1/3d. a day. The
wage rates for the lower grade artisans, technicians and clerks might also be judged
to be low by modern standards, and in relation to the cost of living, but on the other
hand the output of the African in this class of employment is still distressingly low.
At the present time, when in Lagos there is a shortage of food, a shortage of housing
and a shortage of imported goods, it is clear that any attempts to improve wage levels
now can have only an inflationary effect and could not have the result of improving
real living conditions.
9. It is therefore against this background that the present labour unrest must be
examined. There have been some comparatively minor labour troubles during the
course of the last few years, and the settlement of these disputes in favour of the
worker has given rise to an impression that the Government is readily swayed to give
in to the demands of labour. In fact, there is a body of opinion locally which holds
that in the war years the Government has shown weakness on many occasions. It
would be improper for me to discuss the merits or demerits of this opinion and in
this despatch I am chiefly concerned with the problem of the present. I should also
mention the agitation for a cost of living allowance for African staff in 1941, and its
culmination in the middle of 1942 in the award of allowances which were
undoubtedly generous. In passing I should of course mention that this fact in itself
materially increased inflation and has been an important factor in bringing about the
present economic difficulties.
10. It has been evident during the past six months or more that there has been a
growing demand among all sections of the salary earning community for increased
wages. This demand crystallised in May last in the receipt of what might be fairly
described as an ultimatum from the Technical Workers Union and was based on the
argument that as the cost of living had materially increased since the cost of living
award in 1942 there were grounds for increasing the cost of living allowance. In my
reply, of which you have a copy, I attempted to give a reasoned appreciation of the
economic conditions and of the effect on those conditions of increasing the cost of
living allowance. I recognised freely that the cost of living had increased and I
pledged myself to do everything that was possible to reduce the cost of living. You
will appreciate that it is only possible to attack the cost of living in a comparatively
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limited manner, but I think I can say with justice that I have taken every action in my
power to reduce the cost of foodstuffs, and there is no question that in the last six
weeks the cost of basic foodstuffs has been substantially reduced and supplies have
been increased. In the negotiations which preceded the strike I was most impressed
with the fact that the technical workers did not appear to be interested in the cost of
living—they were interested only in increased wages, i.e. cost of living allowance,
and it is my belief that had I been able at once to reduce the cost of living still more
substantially they would still have persisted in their demands for what were in effect
higher wages.
11. As you are aware, shortly before the ultimatum expired the Trade Union
leaders decided to follow the machinery prescribed in the Defence Regulations for
settling labour disputes, and I hoped that the risk of a general strike of technical
workers had been averted. Unhappily the workers disregarded the lead given to them
by their leaders and declared a strike on midnight of 21st June. This strike has
persisted since that date and I have kept you informed of all the important
subsequent developments. The strike has now been going on for three weeks and,
although there has been during the past few days a tendency to return to work, I
must record my disappointment that that tendency has not reached the proportions
that I had hoped, and there is at the time of writing this despatch no reason to
suppose that there is likely to be any general resumption of work in the immediate
future. Consequently I feel the time has come to place the whole question before you
for your consideration of my views as to the course which should be followed.
12. The maintenance of essential services has been most successful and the
arrangements made before the strike have gone very smoothly. Although there has
been a considerable measure of inconvenience both to the Government and to the
public, there has been no failure of services such as to endanger either the health or
the lives of the population in general. These services, however, cannot be maintained
indefinitely on the present basis and if we are to make preparations for a long drawn
out struggle it is essential that I should have assistance from outside in the shape of
European personnel. I have already addressed you on this subject and stated my
minimum requirements.
13. I feel, moreover, in present circumstances that there is very little more I can
do in the way of positive action to end the strike. There appear, therefore, to be three
possible lines of action. In the first place I could accede to the demands of the
workers. Secondly, there is the possibility of meeting those demands in part, and
thirdly there is the alternative of establishing skeleton services on a permanent basis
and settling down to a long struggle with the workers which could be expected to end
sooner or later by a general return to work owing to pressure of economic
conditions.
14. I confess that the problem as it exists at the present time is somewhat
baffling. I am satisfied that to accede to the demands of the workers, either in whole
or in part, will not provide a solution. I am convinced that the political atmosphere
which now exists in Lagos is such that if the demands of the workers were met either
in whole or in part this would only be a palliative and the Government would be faced
in the near future with a repetition of the existing unrest. In fact I believe that the
mood of the people of Lagos in general is such that there are few lengths short of
violence to which they would not go to secure greatly increased wages. With a
population which is largely either uneducated or semi-educated, among which an
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anti-European Press has had considerable licence, it is of no use to appeal to reason.
It is, for example, fruitless to point out that if wages are increased the increase is paid
by the taxpayer. There is an impression that the wages will be paid by ‘Government’
which apparently is regarded as some rather vague body which has unlimited
supplies of cash under its control. I would mention in passing that the African
Medical Officer of Health of the Lagos Town Council, a man of over 50 years of age
and earning a salary of £1100 a year, could not be persuaded in conversation with the
Commissioner of the Colony to see that if the demands of the workers of the Lagos
Town Council were met a substantial increase of rates would be the inevitable
consequence.
15. I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that not only the technical workers
but probably all employees of Government and the commercial firms are at the
present time unwilling to listen to reason, and to accede to their demands would not
only provide no solution to the problem in the long run but would only lay up
further embarrassment for the Nigerian Government, since I believe it to be true that
the population in general have the impression that if they pursue any objective with
sufficient determination the Government will give in. I am therefore forced to the
conclusion that the only course which can be adopted in present circumstances, and
which has any hope of providing a permanent solution to these difficulties, is to
establish the fact that the Government of Nigeria proposed to stand firm, and that
this should be done by maintaining the attitude that there can be no negotiations
until the men return to work, and by adhering to that decision. This may entail a
long drawn out strike which will I am afraid bring in its train considerable bitterness
and possibly even some measure of disturbance, and which will not, of course,
remove the discontent, but I think it would be most unwise in present circumstances
to recede from this position.
16. It is of course impossible in a despatch to give you the full picture of the
situation and all the various currents and cross currents which are involved, but I
would suggest that if you require any further information in regard to the general
background advantage should be taken of Mr. G. F. T. Colby’s imminent departure on
leave and that the matter should be discussed with him when he arrives in London
on approximately the 17th of July next. He has been intimately concerned with this
question, first in his capacity as acting Chief Secretary and latterly as the executive
officer coordinating all action and information in regard to the strike.
15 CO 583/275/10/part 1, no 35 14 July 1945
[General strike]: letter from Mr Creech Jones to Mr Stanley giving his
views of the causes of the general strike
I am disturbed by the telegrams coming to me from Nigeria on the subject of the
strike and by the news and comments recorded here. There is much concern among
Africans in London as well. I recognise the difficulties of the situation, as well as the
responsibilities of government in such circumstances. I feel, however, that there is
more to be said on the subject than is stated in your letter to me of July 3.
From your report, it would appear that the strikers have behaved irregularly, are
carrying on an ‘unofficial’ strike and have prejudiced themselves by the repudiation
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of their leaders. All this I recognise but from the information to hand, it is fair to
notice that these things arise from the strength of the men’s feelings about their
demands, the delays they have experienced in the handling of their case and the
completely negative line taken by the Government.
From the information you supply, not until the strike was about to happen was a
trade dispute declared and the prospect of conciliation and arbitration opened out. It
looks as if by that time, the patience of the men was exhausted because the
Government had already made it clear that they could concede nothing for the
reasons you set out. To the men it undoubtedly seemed obvious that the Government
wanted to postpone a decision, to play for time, and to let them stand by and watch
their standard of living steadily deteriorate. As in many other disputes, so in this
one—the psychological factors are important.
However much one may think that the final stage was bungled and that the men
should have gone, after all, to conciliation and arbitration with their case, it seems
ironic that in so many colonial disputes little happens until economic facts overtake
governments and exasperated men take action and put themselves in the wrong.
In the present case, I have only limited information to work on but something
might have been done earlier to have arrested a development of which the present
unhappy situation is the outcome. It is impossible to expect harassed men to how to
theoretical economic arguments about inflation and to persuade them that
adjustments upwards only mean further deterioration. Nor can men be persuaded
about their public duty and the responsibility of their labour when the concrete
answer of government is a disquisition on economics. Britain went through that sort
of thing in the years between the wars and by now we ought to know better. The men
concerned know that their price-levels have risen and remain shaky; their needs are
in short supply; rationing is inadequate and wage-earners are faring worse and
worse—which is not so obvious to those with other sections of the public.
The men involved are without much tradition or experience in the practice of
trade unionism. I imagine that the customary talk about ‘agitators’ and ‘irresponsible
leaders’ will be heard in those circles which understand little about the industrial
struggles of working class movements. When men are indignant I regret that they
have too little respect for the niceties of procedure and correct action and as in this
case too often they have too little experience to fall back on. Matters are made worse
by imprisoning and deporting those singled out by authority.
Of course, the Government has to govern, maintain law and order, keep vital
services running and has other grave responsibilities. Sooner or later, every section
of the public learns that. I do not condone the irregular action of the men who must
discover that their grievances are only likely to be dealt with when they return to
work and that normal constitutional arrangements in regard to disputes must be
followed if there is to be confidence, trade union progress and properly regulated
standards. But Governments on behalf of society must themselves see that
grievances don’t fester and that proper means are employed for the attainment of
justice. It is appalling how little has been done in the colonies to achieve proper wage
regulation or to apply ordinances passed for the purpose.
In this dispute, the Government, however, is the employer. I am not clear whether
it has a wage policy for those employed in public utilities and the civil service or what
is the relation of such a policy to the wage problem and African standards of living
generally. But as employers, the government is not blameless. I hope therefore, in
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spite of any waywardness on the part of the strikers, that no men will be victimized or
their pension or other rights cancelled. Some concessions must be considered when
work is resumed. I hope that the men who have been arrested for their part in the
strike (I am not thinking of men guilty of violence &c.) can be released and that they
will not be prosecuted or detained or deported. I learn, too, that several newspapers
have been suppressed. I would like to be informed about this because only the most
serious reasons can justify such action. Unofficial disputes are not unknown in this
country (several are in progress as I write), and the war has receded some way from
West Africa.
Another point disturbs me. Is the policy of the Government as set out in your let-
ter, an adequate one for the difficulties that are arising? How is the circle to be bro-
ken? When and how are the standards to be put right or even their deterioration
stopped? The problem in Nigeria is a common one in the colonies today; it has already
produced trouble and disturbances elsewhere and unless the whole question is tack-
led there will be much discontent and many disturbances ahead of us. Nigeria is a
depressed country; its living standards are deplorable; most of its people suffer from
under-nourishment and underconsumption. I feel that your letter, if its arguments
are to rest where they are, is little more than defeatism. I plead that we are not so bank-
rupt in experience and knowledge of economics that all we can say to the Nigerians:
‘watch the value of your wages decrease—we will ration and peg prices if we can, but
really there is little we can effectively do which will stop this unhappy drop in your liv-
ing standards. Remember there has been and there still is a war. And all of us have to
make sacrifices. Your country is poor and as yet we can’t find the men and materials
to improve things. We are destroying your co-operatives to help things along and we
have tried forced labour in the mines. Big Business continues of right to do very well
but for you our trustees we must let economic forces have their effects.’
16 CO 583/275/10/1, no 21 16 July 1945
[Azikiwe assassination allegations]: inward telegram no 636 from Sir
G Whiteley to Mr Stanley reporting allegations of an assassination
attempt on Dr Azilkiwe
[A major controversy in this period concerned Azikiwe’s allegation in July 1945 that he
was the target of an assassination plot; although never stated explicitly, implicit in the
allegations was that British officials were in some way behind this. The alleged plot
gained extensive publicity within Nigeria and in the USA. The allegations were
telegraphed by Azikiwe to Stanley on 12 July 1945, ‘Eye have reason to believe that my life
is in danger stop in view of fact that almost all local high officials suspect me wrongly and
unfairly to be at the bottom of the present general strike because am a journalist with
strong views . . . It is obvious eye cannot rely much on official protection stop . . .’ These
allegations were said to be based on the interception of radio signals by a radio operator
working for Azikiwe (CO 583/275/10/1, no 12). See 25.]
Your telegram No. 640.
No request for protection has been made to Police or to me by Azikiwe. My
knowledge of his telegram of 11th July was from Censorship report on which I
considered it inadvisable to take action. Now that you have given me official
information of these telegrams, Chief Secretary has asked person named to see him
this morning together with Commander of Police.
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2. His telegrams appear to be hysterical, but he is very astute and his object is
probably to obtain sympathy and support from United Kingdom in his campaign,
which ostensibly is to obtain better conditions for workers, but which is suspected to
have ulterior motive of increasing his own political power. It is thought that he has
been endeavouring to build for himself reputation as person whom Government is
afraid to challenge and that temporary prohibition of publication of his newspapers is
regarded by him as severe blow to his prestige (?which) he will spare no pains to
restore.
3. Nothing whatever is known of any plot to murder him nor has deportation
even been thought of. He is, of course, native of Nigeria.
4. Will report further after Chief Secretary’s interview.
17 CO 583/275/9 18 July 1945
[General strike]: minute by Sir C Parkinson on ending the general
strike
I understand that there is to be a meeting in the Secretary of State’s room at 4.45
p.m. tomorrow, Thursday, to discuss the strike situation in Nigeria.
We have now received the despatch promised in (55).1 I have no comments on the
first nine paragraphs which give a general picture of the background against which
the present troubles are to be viewed. I get the impression that Sir Gerald Whiteley
has some sympathy with the school of thought which holds that the government has
shown weakness in the past ie under the Bourdillon regime.
The alternatives with which the government is confronted are set out clearly in
para. 13 of the despatch. Sir G. Whiteley reaches the conclusion that the only course
is to maintain the attitude that there can be no negotiations until the men return to
work, even if this results in a long drawn out strike. In the light of his comments, in
paras. 10 and 14, on the attitude of the workers and the irrational and irresponsible
character of local public opinion, I am sure that he is right and that any weakness
now would only lead to further trouble in the future.
In a telegram received this morning Sir G. Whiteley seeks authority to issue a
notice to the strikers warning them that if they do not return to work by the 1st
August, they ‘will not be able to rely on finding their posts still open to them’ after
that date. He admits that this will amount to a bluff, inasmuch as the Government
could not hope to replace more than 10%, at the most, though the acting Governor
considers that some response is to be hoped for.
The decision is a difficult one in view of the risk involved but if the Government is
not to issue some such threat, the only alternatives would appear to be to let the
strike drag on in the hope that the pressure of economic conditions will eventually
bring the workers back. Sir G. Whiteley says that the Government cannot endure a
strike on this scale indefinitely, though he does not specify what form the breakdown
is likely to take. Para. 3 of the telegram suggests that there have already been
casualties.2
1 See 14. 2 A train between Kano and Lagos was derailed during the strike, causing casualties.
08-(Doc1-27)-cp  15/7/01  7:25 am  Page 60
[18] AUG 1945 61
The proposed notice does not say definitely that strikers who do not return by the
1st August will be regarded as having vacated their appointments, and it is
presumably the intention to take them back after that date provided that it has not
already been found possible to secure a replacement though it is not made clear on
what terms they would be readmitted. It might be as well to leave this vague at this
stage. In these circumstances I do not see that much harm would result from issuing
the notice, even if it did not produce a general return; and it might act as a stimulus
which would start the flow back. It would in any case appear desirable to make it
clear that the Govt. proposes to stand firm. Personally I am in favour of allowing the
notice to issue.
The despatch makes no reference to the suspension of the ‘Pilot’ and ‘Comet’,
which is dealt with on 30647/3 below.
I am also circulating, separately, the subfile containing representations relating to
the strike and the Azikiwe affair, which includes the letter from the National Council
of Civil Liberties.3
3 The National Council of Civil Liberties was one of the organisations contacted by Azikiwe concerning the
assassination allegations.
18 CO 583/276/1/1, no 6 21 Aug 1945
[Azikiwe press]: inward savingram no 1741 from Sir G Whiteley to Mr
Hall on Dr Azikiwe’s newspapers. Minute by Sir C Parkinson
[The ban placed on the West African Pilot and Daily Comet at the start of the general
strike was lifted in Aug. However a subsequent edition of the Daily Comet launched
further attacks on British policy in Nigeria and led to the arrest and imprisonment of
Anthony Enahoro, the paper’s editor, for libel and sedition. He was released after six
months.]
With reference to paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 739 in which I reported that the
ban on the publication of the West African Pilot and Daily Comet had been lifted, I
enclose herewith a copy of the first edition of the Daily Comet published after the
raising of the ban and would particularly invite your attention to the marked
paragraphs on page 3.1 Reference to the record of the meeting of 7th July at
Government House and to the preamble of the Order made by me on the 8th July
(copies of which were forwarded under cover of Mr. Colby’s demi-official letter to Mr.
Creasy of the 10th July) show that it was admitted that no steps whatever were taken
to communicate with the Public Relations Officer in order to ascertain the accuracy
of the statements made by the reporter and that Mr. Azikiwe stated that reporters
were instructed not to take notes at an interview so as not to waste the time of the
person interviewed.
2. The statement now published by the Daily Comet serves to illustrate the
lengths to which Mr. Azikiwe’s papers are prepared to go in fabricating and
publishing deliberate falsehoods in order to attain their own ends. The Attorney-
General advises me that the two paras, in question come within para. (a) of Regs. 3(1)
of the Nigeria Defence (Press) Regulations No. 19 of 1945, but on this occasion,
1 Not printed.
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beyond drawing the attention of the Editor to this fact, I do not consider it advisable
to take any action.
3. I am, however, seriously concerned for the future. I fear that it is no exaggera-
tion to say that Mr. Azikiwe and his friends are determined to foment disaffection and
are prepared to be entirely unscrupulous in their attempts to achieve that aim. I would
mention in passing that during the strike Mr. Azikiwe, who subscribes to Reuters News
Service, went to length of publishing and circulating to other newspapers false
reports, attributed to Reuters, of disaffection amongst West African troops overseas
caused by ban on Pilot and Comet. The newspapers controlled by Mr. Azikiwe are the
most influential in the territory and are widely read, particularly in Lagos and in the
Eastern Provinces. Present conditions provide a fertile field for the agitator, and that
field is liable to become even more fertile during and after demobilisation.
4. Unless effective steps can be taken to check Mr. Azikiwe’s activities in this
direction I fear that the consequences will be serious. Mr. Azikiwe is, I think,
sufficiently astute to avoid placing himself in the position of being successfully
prosecuted for sedition, criminal libel or defamation, and while the establishment of
an independent newspaper, conducted in accordance with the principles of sound
journalism, would in the long run have a beneficial effect, it would naturally take
some time for such a paper to acquire the reputation and circulation necessary to
make it effective, and in the meanwhile a great deal of damage could be done.
5. I have considered the question of incorporating in the Newspapers Ordinance
(Cap. 149) the provisions of the Nigeria Defence (Press) Regs. No. 19 of 1945
amended in such a way as to provide for complaint being made to and the order
being made by the Supreme Court. I appreciate that such legislation would evoke
complaints of interference with freedom of press but on the other hand no properly
conducted newspaper could suffer since no offence could be committed unless there
were a misstatement or misrepresentation of fact calculated to have subversive effect.
6. I have also considered question of withdrawing official recognition of
newspapers concerned which derive not inconsiderable revenue from Government
advertisements and notices. I should not, however, like to say that Mr. Azikiwe would
not be capable of surmounting any consequent financial difficulties, and
Government would by such action lose a considerable measure of publicity for its
own announcements. Even so it is to my mind open to question whether
Government should continue to use as a medium for official notices newspapers
which are from time to time openly subversive.
7. The question of policy raised in this saving telegram is of some importance
and one on which I have not had an opportunity of ascertaining the Governor’s
views. You will no doubt wish to consult Sir Arthur Richards on this matter when he
passes through London on his return from leave.
Minute on 18
One can sympathise with the Nigerian government in its difficulty but it is not easy
to suggest a practical solution.
Azikiwe’s conduct during the recent trouble has shown little evidence of any sense
of responsibility and he appears to have acted with complete disregard for honesty or
any kind of scruples. It cannot be denied however that his influence on such public
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opinion as exists in Nigeria is considerable and it is a question of policy whether the
Government should declare open war upon him or should make some attempt to
induce in him a more reasonable attitude. The Government may consider that such
an attempt would be quite hopeless. It is no doubt true that the best way to combat
misrepresentations is by publication of the true facts. But the Nigerian Government’s
difficulty is to ensure that such publication does in fact reach the public. As pointed
out in paragraph 4 of the saving telegram it would take some time to establish an
independent paper with the reputation and circulation necessary for the purposes of
counter-propaganda; and in my opinion it would be very difficult indeed for a
newspaper which was to any degree suspected of representing the Government’s
point of view to acquire such a reputation at all. The public is always readier to
believe evil than good.
I feel some doubt about the suggestion in paragraph 5 that the provisions of
present defence regulations for the control of the press should be incorporated
permanently in the Newspapers Ordinance, even if the provisions were amended so
as to provide for any restrictive orders to be made by the Supreme Court.2 It would be
very easy to raise a campaign of protest against such legislation and it would be
equally difficult to defend the taking of powers which, so far as I am aware, have not
found a permanent place on the statute book of any other territory. In any case I do
not think that suppression is a real answer; and in practice it could probably only
result in the consolidation of the opposition’s influence.
As regards paragraph 6, I see no reason why the Government should [sic: not]
refrain from publishing official announcements and notices in newspapers which are
openly subversive, and I do not think that it could fairly be criticised for doing so.
However I note that the Acting Governor doubts whether such action would achieve
any practical advantage and in the circumstances I feel that it might merely serve to
incite more bitter hostility.
Mr. Sabine and the Legal Adviser should see. Note for discussion with Sir Arthur
Richards.
A.C.C.P.
29.8.45
2 Sir H Duncan noted in the margin against this passage, ‘It would not do at all’.
19 CO 583/277/4, no 2 23 Oct 1945
[NCNC]: inward telegram no 1045 from Sir A Richards to Mr Hall in
reply to a request for information on the NCNC
[The NCNC had been established in Aug 1944 with Herbert Macaulay as president and
Azikiwe as general secretary. It represented a coming together of the various
organisations that had represented the political aspirations of western-educated
Nigerians during the inter-war years; the NYM however, chose to remain aloof. In early
1945 the NCNC held its first constitutional convention, and its opposition to Richards’s
constitutional proposals in Mar launched it to prominence.]
Your telegram No. 972.
National Council of Nigeria.
The National Council has never informed the Government of its formation or
supplied to the Government a copy of its constitution.
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2. I can add little to the information given in my savingram No. 644 of 29th
March on the subject of the composition of the Council, but should like to stress
again that Tribal Unions1 in Lagos, of which it is mainly composed, do not (repeat
not) represent the views of the people of the areas from which they derive. They
consist mainly of young men who migrate to Lagos to earn a living and who become
to a greater or lesser extent detribalised. The Council can be said to represent the
views of only a very small minority of the people and its political influence at present
is negligible. Its main purpose is probably to spread propaganda.
3. The declared aims of the Council are to promote:—
(i) Political freedom
(ii) Economic security
(iii) Social equality
(iv) Religious toleration.
Included in these aims are self-Government for Nigeria, all land to be vested in the
natives of Nigeria and abolition of all forms of discrimination and segregation.
4. I suggest that reply should include a statement that the National Council of
Nigeria is not (repeat not) a representative body, but consists of a few Africans
prominent in the political life of Lagos and a number of associations mainly
composed of members of various tribes who are now living in Lagos and who are not
in close touch with the views of the people in the areas from which they come. I
should have no objection to announcement of the Council aims as set out in
paragraph 3 of this telegram.
1 The NCNC when initially formed was made up entirely of organisations such as trade unions,
professional groups, literary societies and numerous tribal unions and improvement associations. These
tribal unions and improvement associations, such as the Ibo Federal Union or the Ibibio Welfare Union,
became increasingly prevalent in Lagos and other towns and cities in the inter-war years and were
composed of members of a particular ethnic group, usually western-educated, who formed an association
for mutual aid and for the benefit of their home areas.
20 CO 583/271/4, no 39 17 Nov 1945
‘Nigerian development plans’: CO note on the ten-year plan of
development and welfare
This note gives—
Firstly, a general summary of the position, and in amplification of this summary
Secondly, a brief historical description of the way in which the present Nigerian
proposals have evolved, and
Thirdly, a statement of the present extent of the Secretary of State’s commitments
to the schemes included in the Nigerian Development Plans.
I. General summary of present position
The Colonial Office is committed to the broad outlines of Nigerian development
programme. The commitment is contained in Mr. Creasy’s letter to Mr. F.E.V.
Smith1 of 6th July (Flag A). The relevant passages in that letter are the following:—
1 FEV Smith, principal assist sec (development), Nigeria, 1944–1945; development sec, 1945–1947.
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‘We are in general agreement with the main outlines of the revised plan,
which provides for a total expenditure over the ten years ending March, 1956,
of about £56 million, of which total it is proposed that sums of the order of
£16 million should be found from Nigerian revenues, £17 million from the
proceeds of public loans, and £23 million from grants and loans under the
Colonial Development and Welfare Vote. . . .
‘Subject to the comments of detail below, we agree with the general contents
of the plan as now revised and the approximate allocation of funds made to the
different services included in it. In accordance with the requirements of the
Colonial Development and Welfare Act, it will be necessary to submit sepa-
rately, for approval by the Secretary of State, applications in respect of those
schemes already approved for shorter periods which it is desired to extend for
the ten-year period covered by the new Act. When these applications are
received, they must be subject to the usual criticism and consideration. It will
also, of course, be necessary to submit separately schemes for all those services
included in the plan for which schemes are not already in existence, except in
the case of services which are to be financed without any assistance from the
Colonial Development and Welfare Vote.’
It will be seen that the general effect of these passages is to approve the broad
outline of the Nigerian development plan (see summary of this plan in Mr. F.E.V.
Smith’s letter to Mr. Creasy of 25th June—flag B), but that it was made plain that
individual schemes within the plan must be subject to approval in the usual way.
The position regarding the individual schemes is set out in detail in the third
section of this note.
It will be seen that certain schemes have been approved for varying periods up to
1950/51. The principal of these (i.e. those whose total cost exceeds £200,000) are Road,
Rural and urban water supplies, Building programme, Technical education, Development
officers, Electrical development, Tele-communications, Leprosy, Dredger for Lagos.
No Schemes have yet been approved beyond 1950/51.
We have been discussing with the Nigerian authorities first orally and then by
correspondence, a number of other large schemes, the principal of which are for
agriculture, veterinary services, forestry, medical and health services, education.
These schemes have been framed in Nigeria to cover the ten year period up to
1955/56. We have also been discussing similarly schemes prepared in Nigeria for
extensions of existing schemes, e.g. roads, up to the same date, 1955/56.
These discussions and correspondence have been on the basis that if the schemes
could be reshaped in a manner considered acceptable here, they would be approved
and in a telegram of 11th October (29 on file—Flag D) we said, ‘The basic proposals
for expansion of these services and the scale of assistance proposed over the ten year
period covered by the colonial Development and Welfare Act are approved’.
2. Course of discussions
Mr. F.E.V. Smith came to London in 1944, and discussed with the Department in
some detail the Nigerian development proposals as they stood at that time. Proposals
based upon these discussions were subsequently published in Nigeria as a Sessional
Paper. When Mr. Smith again visited England in June and July of this year, he
brought with him a sketch plan of development over ten years, showing the
estimated Nigerian contribution from revenue and loans, and the proposed amounts
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for which C.D. & W. grants would be asked for under the new Act. These last were
framed in the expectation that the total sum to be allotted to Nigeria would be about
£23 million. This statement is flagged B. Mr. Smith saw the Medical, Agricultural and
Forestry Advisers, and amended the three schemes for health, agriculture and
forestry that he had brought with him in the light of these talks. He also discussed
the broad scheme with the Department, and a record of the discussion is flagged E.
The sketch plan was also sent to the Treasury, so that they had it before them when
Nigerian loan proposals were under discussion.
Mr. Smith placed these figures on record under cover of a letter of 25th June to Mr.
Creasy (flagged B), and in his reply of 6th July Mr. Creasy indicated (flagged A) gen-
eral approval of the proposed allocation of the £23 million between all the various ser-
vices covered by the general plan, subject to the qualifications mentioned in the letter.
Subsequently, in the telegram at 29, we told the Governor that the basic proposals
for the expansion of agriculture, forestry, veterinary services, health and roads, and
the scale of assistance proposed over the ten-year period, were approved, although we
felt that modifications were required in the precise form in which the assistance
should be applied, as between these services and year by year over the period. The
telegram said further that this need not prevent the presentation to the Legislature
of the general ten-year programme, and a statement of the scale of assistance
intended towards these schemes. The statement might set out the ten-year
programme in whatever detail the Governor thought necessary, and have appended
to it details of schemes that had been finally approved.
3. Statement of present commitments
Before Mr. Smith’s last visit, a number of grants had been approved. Since his return
to Nigeria, further applications have been sent in, mostly for the ten year period
1946/7 to 1955/6. The following list shows all the large schemes so far approved.
None of them has been approved for the years beyond the year 1950/1.
£00 0
Dredger, Lagos 230,000 two years.
Leprosy control + 258,000 1944/5 to
1949/50
Roads 1,810,000 Up to 1950/1.
Rural water supplies 1,889,000 „          „
Urban water supplies 602,500 „          „
Telecommunications 230,000 1944/5 to
1948/9.
Electrical development 370,000 1944/5 to
1948/9.
Building programme 681,500 1944/5 to
1950/1.
Development officers 400,000 „      „
Technical education 401,000 1945/6 to
1950/1
Hausa newspaper 163,550 Up to 1948/9
Urban water supplies 401,000 Up to 1950/1
(Supplementary grant)
+ Application for increase to £428, 880 for the same period since received, and
awaiting Treasury agreement.
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The total sum granted to Nigeria up to the present under the schemes listed above
and miscellaneous smaller schemes, is £8,025,000. Certain other schemes have been
approved by Mr. Creech Jones, but have not yet received Treasury approval, and are
therefore not included in this total.
Nigeria have applied for further grants to enable a number of the above schemes to
be continued for the five years 1951/2 to 1955/6. These outstanding applications are
for:— roads, rural and urban water supplies, development officers, technical
education, buildings (Nigeria have asked for the cancellation of the existing grant
and its replacement by a revised grant for the full ten year period), and town
planning and village improvement. As stated above, no grant for the second five years
has yet been approved.
The following new applications were discussed by Mr. Smith when he was last in
London, and most of them were gone over in detail with the Advisers concerned:—
Agricultural (£1,597,630), veterinary Services (£200,470), Forestry (£482,805),
Health (£3,494,048), and Education (£903,600). Each of these applications is for a
grant for the full ten year period ending in 1955/6. The new draft telegram would
commit us in principle to the sums mentioned for Agricultural, Veterinary, Forestry
and Health Services, and to the framing of schemes along the lines proposed by the
Governor in paragraph 3 of 36. It would contain no commitment on Education.
21 CO 583/286/5, no 99 4 Dec 1945
[Constitutional revision]: despatch no 397 from Mr Hall to Sir A
Richards outlining his amendments to Richards’s proposals
I have the honour to refer to your despatch of the 6th of December, 1944, in which
you submitted your proposals for the political and constitutional development of
Nigeria.1
2. These proposals have been given wide publicity as the result of their
presentation to the Legislative Council of Nigeria in March as sessional paper No. 4 of
1945 and their simultaneous publication in this country as a White Paper (Cmd.
6599). They have been the subject of a special debate in the Legislative Council, the
proceedings of which I have studied, and I have noted with satisfaction that at the
conclusion as the debate a resolution was passed without a division signifying the
Council’s approval of the proposals and recommending them for adoption. More
recently, the proposals have been debated in the House of Commons on the 19th of
November, and I enclose a copy of the Hansard report.2
3. Apart from the consideration which these proposals have been given in
Parliament and in Legislative Council, there has been full opportunity for
organisations and individuals to make representations concerning them during the
months which have elapsed since their publication. The various representations
which have been received have all been carefully considered; and in certain
particulars referred to below the original proposals have, in discussion with you,
been modified to take account of the comments made. In other cases it has been
considered impracticable or undesirable to give effect to the criticisms raised and,
1 See 7. 2 Not printed.
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while I do not propose to attempt here to answer in detail all the criticisms and
alternative suggestions which have been made, I think it desirable to explain why I
have not felt able to accept the views on certain fundamental questions which have
been put forward by certain sections of Nigerian opinion. But I would first observe
that, even from this quarter, little criticism has been directed against the main
framework of the proposed new constitution; and the creation of regional Councils in
particular appears to be generally accepted. It is rather with the provisions for the
selection of members to serve on the regional and central legislative bodies, and with
the inclusion of Chiefs as members of these bodies, that dissatisfaction has been
expressed.
4. The demand that all unofficial members of both the regional and the central
legislative bodies should be elected by ballot, and that for this purpose there should
be universal adult suffrage, is common to several of the memoranda submitted from
Nigeria. I will say at once that I share the view expressed in paragraph 20 of your
despatch that this system would not be suitable, in the conditions obtaining in
Nigeria today, for occuring the proper representation of the people, and that it would
not be understood by the mass of the population. I believe that the proposed selection
of members by the Authorities in accordance with local custom and tradition,
combined with the progressive modernisation of the Native Authorities themselves
which you have declared to be an essential part of your policy, will be much more
likely to bear good fruit than an alien system transplanted from a very different
political climate. Customs, of course, change under the influence of new ideas and it
may well be that local methods of selection will in time assimilate themselves more
closely to those which are followed in this country. But such developments must
come as the spontaneous expression of the general will of the communities
concerned, and there is no evidence that the desire for general election by ballot
extends beyond certain limited sections and interests, confined for the most part to
particular areas in the southern portion of Nigeria.
5. Meanwhile the election by ballot to the Legislative Council of members to
represent the municipality of Lagos and the township of Calabar is to continue, and
you have agreed that the annual income qualification for the franchise should be
reduced from £100 to £50. I shall be interested to observe the extent to which this
concession stimulates interest in the local election.
6. You have provided in the membership of the Houses of Assembly for the
representation of special communities, minorities, and important aspects of life not
otherwise represented. I agree that those members will have to be nominated by the
Governor in the first instance but I note that you propose that at the end of the third
year after the introduction of the new constitution there should be a review of the
system of direct nomination, both in the Legislative Council and in the Houses of
Assembly, with a view to substituting a form of nomination by choice of the people
represented wherever this may be found to be practicable.
7. In certain of the memoranda submitted to me, criticism has been directed
against the fact that the proposals in your despatch provide for African majorities of
only one both in the Houses of Assembly and in the Legislative Council. So far as
the latter is concerned, this objection has already been met by your subsequent
decision to exclude from the Legislative Council four of the official members origi-
nally proposed (viz. the Director of Marine, the Comptroller of Customs and Excise,
the General Manager of the Railway and the Commissioner of Police) and one
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European unofficial member (the Member for Banking). You have also explained
with regard to the Members for Shipping, Industry and Commerce, and Mining,
that, while you consider it desirable to have in the Legislative Council unofficial
members capable of advising on the commercial and industrial needs of the terri-
tory, you see no reason why they should be appointed as representatives of specific
interests, and it has accordingly been agreed that the three members referred to
should be replaced by three members nominated, as in the case of certain of the
unofficial members of the Houses of Assembly, ‘to represent important aspects of
life not otherwise represented amongst the unofficial members’; and that men best
capable of giving the advice required, whether European or African, should be
selected for this purpose.
8. As regards the Houses of Assembly, you have explained that the number of
Provincial Members proposed is provisional and that, if necessary in order to secure
adequate representation of all communities, the number may be increased in the
light of experience. It is proposed that, the constitutional instruments should be so
drafted that it will be possible to make such increases at any time without waiting for
the general review of the new constitution proposed for the ninth year after its
introduction.
9. I am unable to accept the view which has been expressed that the Houses of
Assembly should comprise unofficial members only. It is obviously necessary at this
stage of development that official members should be present to explain and define
the Government’s policy, and in any case, as there are to be unofficial majorities,
there seem to be little substance in this objection.
10. Criticism has also been directed against the inclusion of Chiefs in the
legislative machinery and it has been represented that, because they have been
described officially as ‘an integnal part of the machinery of Government’, they
should, if included at all, take their seats as Official Members. It appears to me that
there is some confusion of thought amongst those who have made this criticism,
since the Chiefs are presented, in some cases in the same memorandum, as being on
the one hand independent rulers whose traditional and customary authority is
threatened by the new proposals; and on the other hand as civil servants who have no
right to represent their people on the Councils of Government. I can see no reason
why the Chiefs should not consider and advise on policy as well as assist in carrying it
out. In fact, of course, they already do so, since the Government would not, I am
sure, embark on any important measure without first consulting the Native
Authorities; and I consider that this function should now be given constitutional
recognition. You have assured me that there is no basis for the suggestion that the
Chiefs are unwilling to express their own views or, where they consider it desirable,
to take an independent line on Government proposals. For these reasons, and in view
of the de facto authority which the Chiefs undoubtedly possess, I am unable to agree
that they should not be admitted to the Councils of Government as representatives of
their people or that the House of Chiefs in the Northern Provinces should have
merely advisory and not legislative functions.
11. The proposals have also been criticised on the ground that they provide no
link between the legislative and the executive. As to this, you have informed me that
you do not consider that Nigeria is yet ripe for anything in the nature of a ministerial
system. I note, however, with satisfaction that it is proposed to give members of the
Houses of Assembly opportunities of obtaining practical experience of administration
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by the formation of committees to deal with particular subjects such as education,
development, etc.
12. I agree that it is necessary to provide the Governor with the usual reserve
powers at the present stage, but these will be reviewed as part of the general review of
the constitution to be held after nine years.
13. I have noted your opinion that the time is also not yet ripe for further
municipal development outside Lagos, and I would record my endorsement of the
view which you expressed during discussions in London, that municipal status
should not be granted unless the communities concerned are prepared to accept the
financial responsibilities which go with it.
14. After careful consideration of the proposals themselves, of the reception
which they have been accorded both in Nigeria and in this country, and of the
various criticisms which have been put forward, I have reached the conclusion that
the proposals as now amended not only represent the most substantial immediate
advance that can satisfactorily be made in the present state of development in
Nigeria, but also provide a framework within which the development of responsible
government can be expected to make further progress, given the goodwill and co-
operation of the great mass of the people, which the reception of the proposals in
Nigeria has led me to hope will be forthcoming. Furthermore, I believe that they give
ample scope for the exercise of the talents of all public-spirited Nigerians who wish to
serve their country and to hasten her progress along the road to self-government.
The revised constitutional instruments to give effect to them are accordingly being
prepared for presentation in due course for the approval of His Majesty the King.
15. I agree that, the new Constitution should be generally reviewed at the end of
the ninth year following its introduction. This would not, however, preclude the
earlier introduction of particular modifications from time to time, where experience
has shown these to be necessary or sufficient progress has been recorded to justify an
immediate advance.
16. You are at liberty to publish this despatch in Nigeria. I do not propose that it
should be published in this country, but a copy will be placed in the Library of the
House of Commons.
22 CO 583/294/1, no 1 4 Feb 1946
[Native administration]: despatch no 19 from Sir A Richards to Mr
Hall on the need to review financial and administrative relations
between central and local government. Minutes by J B Williams,
S Caine, O G R Williams and Sir G Creasy
I have the honour to inform you that I propose, if you see no objection and if, as a
result of the appointment of a substantive Deputy Financial Secretary, (a matter of
great urgency now under your consideration), the staff position then permits, to
relieve Mr. S. Phillipson1 of his substantive duties as Financial Secretary to enable
him to undertake, by direct consultation with the officers concerned throughout
Nigeria, a comprehensive investigation into two problems of great importance
1 Sydney Phillipson, financial secretary, 1945–1948, acting chief secretary, 1948.
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which, in my opinion, call for early attention. These problems are (a) the financial
and administrative procedure to be adopted under the new constitution and (b) the
‘rationalization’ of financial relations between the Nigerian Government and the
Native Administrations.
2. It is hardly necessary to elaborate the proposition that it is necessary to
embody in carefully considered instructions the financial and administrative
procedure to be observed under the new constitutional arrangements and that this
should be done before these arrangements come into effect. This is particularly true
of financial procedure which will be fundamentally affected by the constitutional
change. It will be no easy matter to define an orderly procedure by which the
regional estimates will be prepared and approved in time to admit of their
incorporation in the Nigerian Estimates. It will clearly be necessary to advise the
Chief Commissioners very early in the financial year preceding that to which their
Estimates will relate of the limits of revenue within which their Estimates of
Expenditure must be confined and it will equally be necessary for the Chief
Commissioners to present their Estimates to the Houses of Assembly at a date much
earlier than the date on which the Nigerian Estimates are presented to the
Legislative Council. There are also many problems of an administrative type relating
to the channels of communication, delegation of powers, etc., which will require
consideration. It is to these problems that Mr. Phillipson will address himself in
consultation with the Chief Commissioners Heads of Departments and others.
3. The subject of financial relations between the Nigerian Government and the
Native Administrations is generally recognized to be one of the most difficult and
complex of Nigeria’s problems. The matter was last handled at a high level by my
predecessor, Sir Bernard Bourdillon, whose printed memorandum entitled
‘Apportionment of Revenue and Duties as between the central Government and
Native Administrations’ constitutes an important statement on the subject. The
subject is, of course, far wider than the mere question of the method of dividing the
Direct Tax between the Nigerian Government and the Native Administrations.
Financial relations are merely a reflection of the apportionment of responsibilities,
which in turn is a reflection of the political organization of the country. Sir Bernard
Bourdillon’s memorandum indicates clearly and forcibly the essential elements of
the problem and that memorandum would be an essential document of reference for
anyone undertaking a comprehensive review. In general, however, it is a statement of
principles rather than of their application and it may well be that in the light of the
impending constitutional changes the principles will require reconsideration and it
seems certain that their application should be more closely worked out. I recognize,
as does Mr. Phillipson, how utterly unwise it would be to approach this considerable
problem without full regard to its antecedents or with any desire to impose rigid
uniformity of principles or methods clearly inapplicable to historical developments
with many and varied manifestations.
Since it is quite clear that no settlement could be achieved by the exchange of
correspondence or minutes, it seems to me advisable to detail an experienced officer
to examine the problem in the light of its historical antecedents and in consultation
with officers of the Administration and others qualified to advise with a view to
making recommendations as to the policy and procedure which should determine
the financial relations between the Nigerian Government and Native Administrations
in the future.
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4. My proposal to detail Mr. Phillipson to go into these questions was put by me
to the Chief Commissioners at a conference held in November last. The Chief
Commissioners welcomed the proposals.
5. It is my hope that Mr. Phillipson will be in a position to begin his
investigations very shortly after the forthcoming budget meetings of the Legislative
Council. It is impossible to say exactly how long will be required for the
investigations and the issue of reports. It will be necessary for Mr. Phillipson to
undertake extensive touring throughout Nigeria in order to meet officers and to
acquaint himself with the working of present arrangements. Perhaps a period of four
months might see the work completed but whether it will be possible to spare Mr.
Phillipson for this special task for as long as that is uncertain. I have, therefore,
directed that he should give priority of attention to the first problem.2
Minutes on 22
Mr. Caine
I think you will be interested to see the despatch from the Governor of Nigeria at No.
1 proposing that, on the filling of the present vacancy for a Deputy Financial
Secretary, the Financial Secretary, Mr. Phillipson, should undertake an investigation
estimated to last some four months of financial problems arising from the new
Constitution and in particular the financial relations between the Nigerian
Government and the Native Administrations.
It is perhaps, as Mr. Emanuel says, a little surprising that, even with a deputy
appointed, the Governor should be able to release Mr. Phillipson from his duties for
so long a period as four months to be spent in touring round Nigeria, but I do not
think we are called upon to comment on that. I do, however, think that we should
comment on a point of substance arising from the nature of the investigation which
it is intended that Mr. Phillipson should undertake, since this raises a point which we
have for some time felt to be very fundamental in the financial structure of Colonies,
that point being the degree of real financial tenure which is enjoyed by the organs of
local government in the Colonies, in most cases the Native Administrations.
At the present time there is undoubtedly a great deal of make-believe about the
financial proceedings of native authorities. That is to say that while many of them go
through the process of preparing budgets of revenue and expenditure, we know that
in fact every item of revenue and expenditure is apt in many cases to be carefully
scrutinised by the European officer in charge of the district and also that effective
responsibility for the revenue even of the native authorities themselves is commonly
apt to be much more in the hands of the Central Government than would appear
from the formal position. This arises from the fact that the rates of tax imposed by
the native authorities are usually either fixed by the Central Government or require
the approval of the Central Government. In consequence the onus of defending their
financial operations before the tax-paying community, in which surely lies a great
deal of the educative value of representative government, is apt not in fact to rest
with the Native Administration.
With these considerations in mind, I suggest that our reply to the Governor’s
2 See 42.
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despatch should be rather fuller than is proposed in preceding minutes and that it
should be to the following effect. The Secretary of State has learned with very great
interest of the investigation on which the Governor proposes to employ Mr.
Phillipson as soon as a Deputy Financial Secretary can take up his duties and that
he entirely agrees with the Governor about the importance of framing the financial
and administrative procedure under the new constitution on the right lines from
the start and in particular on the importance of achieving satisfactory financial rela-
tions between the Central Government and the Native Administrations. The
despatch might then say that while the Secretary of State appreciates that it is not
possible to attempt to determine satisfactory financial relations a priori and that
the formulation of these must depend largely upon the results of the investigation
on which Mr. Phillipson is to be employed, he would nevertheless be glad to learn
whether the Governor has in his mind any general principles which he thinks
should govern these matters. We might then say that the Secretary of State for his
part is impressed with the importance of making the financial responsibilities of
Native Administrations and other local authorities real and effective even though,
in the case of many authorities, they can at present only be exercised within a lim-
ited sphere. In particular, he feels that it is of great educative value if the local
authorities can be made increasingly responsible not only for the actual collection of
local revenue, but also for fixing the rates of their own local taxation, since it is only
by this means that the full onus of defending their own activities before the local com-
munity can be thrown upon the organs of representative local government.
We might conclude by saying that the Secretary of State would be glad to learn the
Governor’s views upon the considerations mentioned above, to be kept in general
touch with the progress of Mr. Phillipson’s investigations and to receive any material
that will throw further light on the problems in issue even though the stage has not
yet been reached when the Governor is in a position to put final proposals before the
Secretary of State.
J.B.W.
21.2.46
I agree with Mr. J.B. Williams that this is an enquiry of very considerable potential
importance, and that we might suggest certain general considerations to be borne in
mind on the lines of his minute. I have always felt myself the high degree of make-
believe in the financial independence of the average native authority. I suggest that
we should bring out that the essential to aim at is a position in which the native
authority has a clear responsibility for discharging certain specified functions, and,
subject to the achieving of a certain minimum standard, can exercise its own
discretion as to the amount of revenue it raises to be spent on those services.
S.C.
21.2.46
I think it is clear that Sir Arthur Richards Wishes to encourage a progressive spirit in
the Native Administrations under the proposed new constitutional regime. This is
shown by what he says in paragraph 13 of his despatch regarding the revision of the
constitution, printed as CMD. 6599.3 This paragraph runs as follows—
3 See 7.
A
B
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‘13. The arrangements which I propose for dealing with regional revenue and
expenditure would in no way detract from the responsibility of Native
Authorities for operating their own local services and financing them from
their own revenues. These revenues are mainly derived from the share of the
direct tax retained by the Native Authorities, a share which the Governor has
power under the law to increase or decrease. In order to simplify the system
and to encourage Native Authorities to adopt progressive policies, I have
recently frozen their contribution to central revenue from the direct tax at
the amounts paid in by them during the year 1943–44. The remainder, and
the whole of any additional proceeds from any increase in the direct tax, is to
be retained by the Native Authorities themselves. They will thus be in a
position to play an increasing part in the development of their own areas and
the recent correlation of Native Authority and Government salaries will make
it easier for them to secure the trained staff which they need for this purpose
and will also help to prevent over-lapping between Government and Native
Authority spheres of work’.
As will be seen, it is apparently intended that the Native Authorities should have
power to increase the rate of direct taxation but not to decrease it. So long as the
proceeds of the direct tax are to be used partly for Central Government purposes and
partly to supply the main revenues of the Native Authorities, it would appear
difficult, if not impossible, to leave Native Authorities entirely free to settle the rate
at which they should be assessed.
Clearly, the policy of de-centralisation which will be embodied in the new
constitution raises problems affecting financial relations between the Central
Government and the Native Authorities far more fundamental than those discussed
in Sir Bernard Bourdillon’s minuts enclosed in (1) on 30421/39, which is referred to
in paragraph 3 of the present despatch.
In any case it will be necessary for the functions of the Native Authorities to
conform to the general pattern of the proposed new constitution in which emphasis
is laid not on the Native Authorities but on the three Regional Councils, each
comprising an area containing many Native Authorities.
In paragraph 12 of the Governor’s despatch on the revision of the constitution,
referred to above, he definitely states that he proposes to devolve on the Regional
Councils (i.e. the three representative bodies to be created for Northern, Western and
Eastern Nigeria), a large measure of financial responsibility. Each will have its own
budget, on which will be borne the cost of all Government services (except services
which are declared to be central services) in the Region, including the salaries of
Government personnel. He goes on to say ‘Regional revenue would consist in the
first place of the share4 of the direct tax at present payable to Central Government,
together with any receipts from fees, licences, etc., which might be allotted to the
Regional budgets, and in the second place of annual block grants from Central
revenue’. The Regional Councils would debate the Regional estimates in detail before
passing them with such amendments as they desire to suggest. When submitted to
and approved by the Governor, they would appear in the Central estimates as block
votes.
4 O G R Williams added a marginal note here: ‘i.e. what is shared amongst the various Native Authorities
in the Regions’.
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In the first place it is not proposed that the Regional Councils should be given
power to appropriate expenditure and the appropriation of Regional expenditure will
be in the hands of the Legislative Council. If, however, it is decided, as a result of the
Committee which is to make recommendations on the subject, to devolve any
legislative powers on the Regional Councils, it might also in due course be decided to
devolve upon them the power of legally appropriating Regional revenue. When this
change comes about presumably the question will also be considered of empowering
the three Regional Councils to raise Regional revenue as well as to appropriate
Regional expenditure.
The exact form of the budgets of the Native Authorities forming component parts
of the three areas under the three Regional Councils will, of course, have to be
worked out and this, I assume, is one of the matters which the Governor wishes Mr.
Phillipson to deal with.
I think that it would only tend to confuse matters if we were to raise with the
Governor at the present stage the question of the Native Authorities fixing the rates
for their own local taxation. If it is thought desirable to do more than merely
welcome the proposal contained in No. 1, I should very much prefer to confine it to
that part of Mr. J.B. Williams’ minute which I have marked in the margin.
O.G.R.W.
5.3.46
Mr. O.G.R. Williams’s minute points out that there is a good deal of local background
to the question of the revenue fixing powers of the native authorities and that in
consequence of this, it is necessary to be careful what we say to the Governor if we
are not to give the impression of ignoring the previous history. I felt, however, that
to reduce our suggested comments to the Governor merely to the passage in my
minute of 21st February marked by Mr. O.G.R. Williams, i.e., that marked A, would
mean saying nothing very definite at all and while we must, as Mr. O.G.R. Williams
says, be careful not to jump in and cause confusion, I think there can be no doubt
that the general idea behind my minute of emphasising the desirability of making
the financial responsibility of the local native authorities increasingly a reality is a
point which deserves emphasising.
I have accordingly discussed with Mr. O.G.R. Williams and he has agreed to our
including in our suggested reply to the Governor the additional sentence which I have
marked B in my minute of 21st February. This puts the point in general terms, but
does not drag in the vexed question (in view of the Nigerian history) of local native
authorities fixing rates of tax. The essential reason for the particular difficulty of this
question in Nigeria is, of course, the fact that by far the greater part of the native author-
ities’ revenue is from the direct tax, the proceeds of which they share with the central
government. This, of course, makes it a matter of greater difficulty and complexity to
give the native authorities real responsibility for fixing the rates of tax than would be
the case if, as in this country, the revenue raised by the local authorities was raised
through taxes other than those by which the central government raises its revenue.
J.B.W.
6.3.46
I am still inclined to think that it is important, if we say anything at all other than an
acknowledgment or welcome of the proposed investigation, that we should say
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something on the lines of my minute of 21st February. I am not much moved by the
consideration that it has not hitherto been the practice or intention of the Nigerian
Government to give native authorities any substantial discretion in the fixing of their
own revenues. It is precisely because that has not been the policy that I feel that the
matter should be reconsidered if the proposed investigation is really to get down to
fundamentals. It seems to me most important to get over the basic idea that any
governmental authority, if it is to be truly responsible for running a particular
service, must also have the responsibility for finding the money to run it.
S.C.
13.3.46
. . . On the general question, I feel myself that Sir Arthur Richards is sufficiently a
realist to need no reminding of the points to which Mr. Caine and Mr. J.B. Williams
have drawn attention and, unless Mr. Caine feels strongly over it, I should much
prefer to confine our reply to a short despatch welcoming the proposed investigation.
G.C.
20.3.46
23 CO 554/134/13 13 Feb 1946
[Higher education]: minute by M H Varvill1 on the Elliot Report on
higher education in West Africa [Extract]
[This minute refers to the commission headed by Col Walter Elliott MP which was
appointed in 1943 to look into the future of higher education in West Africa, and which
reported in 1945. It included Creech Jones among its members. The majority report of
the commission recommended the establishment of three Universities in West Africa, to
be located in Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast and Nigeria. The minority report, which
Creech Jones signed, recommended the creation of only one University, to be located in
Nigeria; Report of the Commission on Higher Education in West Africa (Cmd 6655, 1945).
See 27 and BDEEP series A, vol 2, R Hyam, ed, The Labour government and the end of
empire 1945–1951, part IV, 361 and 362.]
. . . The position is that public opinion in both the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone has
now come down strongly in favour of the Majority Report. Nigeria, as might be
expected, has no objection to the Minority Report. In (d) of the W.A.C. conclusions
the Governor, Nigeria, speaks of pseudo-nationalism as being a poor argument to set
against the weighty facts which led to the Minority Report. Nascent nationalism is
certainly a poor argument but I do not think that it should be lightly disregarded. A
single University College, if it is decided to establish one, would perhaps be more
likely to stimulate nationalism than to provide a broader outlook. By this, I do not
mean that the products of the University would necessarily become more parochial
in outlook, more aware of Gold Coast nationality than of their common West African
origin. The numbers going to the single University College will be small and it is in
the class who do not have the good fortune to reach the College that extreme
nationalism is more likely to appear. I heard the Nigerian Leg. Co. debates in 1941
and 1942 when the Lagos Colleges had been taken over by the Military and a number
of their pupils sent to Achimota.2 The feeling at that time among members—who
1 Colonial Service, Nigeria, from 1932; seconded to CO, 1943–1947.
2 Achimota College in the Gold Coast.
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might be relied upon to take a more impartial view than the local press—was
certainly opposed to Nigeria sharing the excellent educational facilities of the Gold
Coast: and I think that, wherever a single College may be placed, we shall probably
find that this feeling grows rather than declines, however regrettable this may be. It
is not difficult for the G.C. or S.L. educated class to point to Wales or Scotland with
their Universities and to ask why they should be denied similar facilities—and,
though this is easy to answer, it is not easy to persuade African opinion to accept our
explanation, without some concession to local sentiment.
Action now rests squarely with the C.O. It will be necessary to decide on policy in
the near future. . . . 
24 CO 583/275/10/3, no 2 15 Feb 1946
[Azikiwe assassination allegations]: inward savingram no 348 from Sir
A Richards to Mr Hall forwarding Dr Azikiwe’s petition alleging an
assassination plot. Annex
Minute by J E Miller1
My saving No. 328.
I forward a copy of a petition dated the 26th of July 1945 addressed to you by Mr.
Azikiwe. According to Mr. Azikiwe the original of this petition was posted at Onitsha
on the 26th of July under a covering letter addressed to the Chief Secretary to the
Government. No such letter was received in the Chief Secretary’s office and the
present copy was forwarded under a covering letter dated the 4th of February 1946
which was received on the 12th of February.2
2. In his petition Mr. Azikiwe puts before you the ‘evidence’ which led him to
suppose that his life was in danger. This ‘evidence’ consists of ‘Wireless Messages’
which are said to have been intercepted by a wireless operator employed by the West
African Pilot. These ‘messages’ are contained in Appendix II to the petition.
3. Mr. Paul West, the wireless operator referred to, was formerly employed in the
Posts and Telegraphs Department as a wireless operator. His employment ceased
when he was sentenced to imprisonment for falsification of accounts and stealing,
and on release he was engaged by Mr. Azikiwe.
4. I have the following comments to make on these messages:—
(a) Local enquiries have failed to reveal any station WAPYEL.
(b) The messages are all said to have been received at the same time, namely 5.15
p.m. (G.M.T.) on Friday 13th July, 1945. Yet messages (2) and (4) would appear to
be in reply to ‘message’ (1) and to have been sent at different times.
(c) The English used in the ‘messages’ does not suggest that they were written or
spoken by a person having much knowledge of the English language. For example
the word ‘targeters’ is, to say the least, unusual, and the phrase ‘where all
possibility assassination can take place in hall’ is not one which would be likely to
be used by a person normally speaking the English language.
(d) None of the ‘messages’ mentions the name of the person to be assassinated.
Mr. Azikiwe’s paranoiac tendencies may, of course, have led him to identify himself
as one of the ‘two most important persons’.
1 Administrative officer, CO. 2 See 16.
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5. The fact that Mr. Azikiwe, who is well educated and intelligent, expects you to
accept these wireless messages, which are patently fictitious, as ‘incontrovertible and
conclusive evidence’ (see your telegram No. 640 of the 15th July, 1945) can lead in
my view to only one conclusion, namely that he is no longer sane. This conclusion is
supported by Mr. Azikiwe’s behaviour generally during the last eight or nine months.
6. Although the circulation of Mr. Azikiwe’s newspaper is believed to have
declined recently, he still has a considerable influence over semi-educated and
ignorant natives. That this influence should be wielded by an irresponsible lunatic is
a matter which cannot be regarded with indifference. For this reason and for the
further reason that the alleged plot on Mr. Azikiwe’s life has received considerable
publicity, I urge strongly that Mr. Azikiwe’s petition and its enclosures should be
published locally at once, and that your reply to the petition should be published in
due course. I am sure that exposure by publication can do nothing but good, and
should be grateful for telegraphic approval.
Annex to 24: Petition sent by Dr Azikiwe to Mr Hall, 26 July 1945
The humble petition of Nnamdi Azikiwe, Chairman, Zik’s Press Limited, of 72 King
George Avenue, Yaba Estate, Lagos, respectfully showeth:
1. That G. Beresford Stooke, Esquire,3 has informed me of your desire to peruse
my evidence in respect of the plot to assassinate me, as alleged in my cablegram of
July 14, 1945 to the Right Honourable Oliver Stanley. He has also requested me to
furnish him with the evidence, vide Appendix I attached. The evidence is attached
hereto as Appendix II and the two appendixes form part and parcel of this humble
petition.
2. That as will be observed, after perusing same, the plan to commit
assassination is incorporated in a wireless message which was handed to me on
Friday, July 13, 1945, at 5.45 p.m. or thereabouts, by Mr Collins Ulric Maximillian
Gardner, Managing Editor of the West African Pilot, with the information that the
wireless message was intercepted in Metre 51.5, at 5.15 p.m. or thereabouts, by Mr
Paul West, and submitted to him for transmission to me for my information and
necessary action. Mr. West is one of the Wireless Operators of the West African Pilot,
a licensed station in accordance with the Laws of Nigeria.
3. That the facts contained in the wireless message are very startling indeed, and
being a British Protected Person, by birth, I am appealing through you to His
Majesty’s Britannic Government, to protect my life and my business interests from
those who appear to be after my life and are bent on ruining my business, and to be
more reasonable and sympathetic towards me and my business.
4. That as indicated in my cablegram of Saturday, July 14, 1945, I desire to travel
to the United Kingdom in order to place my case before His Majesty the King,
through the Colonial Office, but in view of the portents in the wireless message, I am
afraid that at present I do not feel secure in my person.
5. That I submit that, if any British Protected Person, like me, cannot feel safe
and secure in his person, even under the canopy of the Union Jack, then I fail to
3 G Beresford Stooke, chief sec, Nigeria, 1945–1948; gov, Sierra Leone, 1948.
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appreciate the necessity for the sacrifices in Men, Money, Man Power, and Material
Resources which the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria had contributed, and are
contributing, to the war efforts of the British Empire and the United Nations.
6. That I beg the liberty to say, in conclusion that, in proceeding to England, I
desire to be accompanied by my Private Secretary, and I suggest that I be accepted in
bona fide and be treated as a guest and friend of Great Britain, at my expense, if need
be.
7. That I very respectfully reiterate my appeal to you for the protection of my life
and my business under the jurisdiction and protectorate of the British Government,
as a Protecting State.
And your petitioner as in duty bound will ever pray etc.
Appendix I to Annex: Mr Beresford Stooke to Dr Azikiwe, 16 July 1945
I am so sorry to hear that you are not well to-day and trust that it is not serious.
The reason why I asked you to be good enough to come and see me this morning is
that we have been told by the Secretary of State that he has received a telegram from
you stating that your life is in danger and that you have incontrovertible and
conclusive evidence of a definite plot to murder you. I at once communicated with
the Commissioner of Police, to find that he knows nothing of this at all.
If you are unable to come and see me I would ask you to be so kind as to make the
evidence you refer to available to me at the earliest possible moment in order that I
may see that suitable steps are taken in the matter.
Appendix II to Annex: Wireless messages
1. Station: WAPYEL
2. Receiver: Paul West, Wireless Operator
3. Date: Friday, July 13, 1945
4. Metre: 511⁄2
5. Time: 5.15 p.m. (GMT)
. . . xxx Reference . . . air letter . . . first item . . . assassination of the two most
important persons . . . xxx already started on steps towards . . . but proposed
assassination will take place before . . . xxx . . . targeters are detailed watch cinema
halls and dancing halls xxx arranging get round people beg ‘A’ give lecture where all
possibility assassination can take place in hall xxx reward of hundred guineas to . . .
targeter who will get at him xxx if that proves futile they will watch by night to shoot
into blue car xxx Strictly . . . and till then.
(2)
. . . xxx air letter not received yet xxx suggest all messages come by code next time
fear interception xxx Also suggest postpone assassination till . . . but advise . . . before
then xxx
(3)
. . . xxx suggest . . . demand . . . before . . . xxx shall give personal opinion on tragic
move xxx
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(4)
. . . xxx air letter unreceived yet xxx shall suggest . . . immediately given and hold on
bloody act yet unless . . . xxx
(5)
. . . xxx am still of opinion assassination takes place between now and monday xxx
just informed two of them were in a car this afternoon xxx . . . was just late who was
detailed to watch king george avenue xxx shall take your various advice then till . . .
xxx There shall . . . but . . . ready . . . cold blood xxx . . . no interception of message
xxx . . . all is safe
Minute on 24
Mr. O. G. R. Williams
On 12.7.45 (No. 12 on 30647/1A Part I), Mr. Azikiwe cabled to Col. Stanley ‘I have
reason to believe that my life is in danger . . . cannot rely much on official protection.
Could you do anything to preserve my life and my business’.
On 13.7.45 (No. 13) we asked the Governor Nigeria for background information on
this.
On 14.7.45 (No. 19) Mr. Azikiwe cabled ‘I implore you humbly for last time contact
highest authorities, enable me escorted officially to London at my expense lay before
His Majesty through Secretary of State incontrovertible and conclusive evidence
definite plot to murder me. Please advise local Government protect my life otherwise
this is last cablegram from me alive. Am still insisting my innocence and can prove it
to the hilt. Believe me am willing leave Nigeria and go into exile since it obvious
attempt being made make me scapegoat’.
On 16.7.45. (No. 21) Governor Nigeria reported no request for protection by Mr.
Azikiwe and nothing known of plot to murder him.
At (22) Governor advised that Mr. Azikiwe regretted inability to meet Chief
Secretary on plea of illness and Mr. Azikiwe was requested to place evidence of
murder plot in hands of Chief Secretary at earliest possible moment.
On 17.7.45 (No. 30) the Governor advised no reply from Mr. Azikiwe.
On 18.7.45 at (39f) still no reply from Mr. Azikiwe and reminder sent to him by
Governor.
On 23.8.45 at (95a) the Governor advised that Mr. Azikiwe left Lagos about the
middle of July and went to Onitsha where he has remained ever since. The Governor
added that according to a news item dated London 17th July and published in West
African Pilot on 20.8.45. the story of a plot to murder Azikiwe was repeated and a
local editorial note added ‘Zik has since forwarded his evidence to the Government’.
However, the Governor adds that no announcement or statement from Mr. Azikiwe
has yet been received.
On 22.8.45 at (96) Dr. Harold Moody4 forwarded a copy of a telegram from Mr.
Azikiwe reading ‘Thanks your seventeenth. Could not have presented myself
personally on sixteenth vital date originally scheduled for my assassination. When
4 Dr Harold Moody, a Jamaican doctor resident in London; founder (1931) and president of the League of
Coloured Peoples.
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invited state case was away hiding in jungle. Gardner Editor Pilot informed Chief
Secretary I was out of town but was not believed apparently. Have just seen copies
invitation by Chief Secretary and have written him enclosing my evidence and have
asked him forward same plus appendices unabbreviated to Colonial Secretary. Am
reasonably safe now but still vigilant.’
Nothing further is recorded on the files until arrival of Governor’s savingram of
15.2.46 at (2) on 30647/1A/46 which covers Mr. Azikiwe’s ‘incontrovertible and
conclusive evidence’, which on examination of the papers would appear to be not a
strictly accurate statement. With regard to this evidence the following points
arise:—
(a) Wireless station Wapyel. Governor Nigeria states that he has been unable to
trace this station. I have been in touch with Mr. Megson who has also failed to
trace any such station. The prefix ‘W’ in the callsign is one of a series allotted to
American stations; and if the first two letters ‘WA’ are regarded to mean West
Africa, the prefix ‘P’ of the remaining callsign Pyel would then be one of a group
allotted to Brazil. However, Mr. Megson is unable to trace either the callsign
Wapyel or WA—Pyel, and states that if there were such a station it must be a pirate
station.
(b) The peculiar style of English used throughout.
(c) The fact that the wireless operator obtained the most important parts of the
message but failed to receive the less important sections.
(d) The use of the word ‘unreceived’ in message 4 at Appendix 2. This is purely
‘telegraphese’, not, repeat not, used in official circles.
(e) The fact that all these messages were received at the same time. (5.15 p.m. on
13.7.45)—which, incidentally is twenty-four hours later than Mr. Azikiwe’s first
cablegram to Col. Stanley that he had reason to believe his life was in danger.
(f ) None of the messages mention the names of the ‘two most important persons
to be assassinated’.
With regard to No. 3 on this file—a further savingram from the Governor Nigeria
on 19.2.46—the Governor encloses a copy of a document received by the Daily
Service—a rival organ of the Zik Press. The original was typed on Crown Agents
paper and enclosed in an O.H.M.S. envelope pasted over with plain paper.
The documents purport to contain copies of communications exchanged between
the Chief Secretary and the three Chief Commissioners. The messages are fictitious,
the Governor advises, but he forwarded them because passages in the first five
messages correspond with passages in the messages said to have been intercepted by
the West African Pilot wireless operator and quoted in Appendix 2 of No. 2. These
messages fill the gaps left in the original messages.
Comments submitted are:—
(1) Apart from the fact that the Governor states that these messages are fictitious,
that these messages were transmitted en clair in wartime is, of course, absurd.
(2) That this anonymous document should appear out of the blue five days after
Mr. Azikiwe’s forwarding of the evidence of the Chief Secretary is amazingly
convenient.
(3) The even more peculiar English used by the Chief Secretary and the Chief
Commissioners in the text of the messages.
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(4) Again that all the messages should have been transmitted by one radio station
at the same time when it is now most obvious that messages 2 and 3 are in answer
to 1; and 4 is in answer to messages 2 and 3; whilst 5 is in answer to 1.
It is noticed that the Governor has not intimated what answer he would desire to
be sent to Mr. Azikiwe, but he requests telegraphic approval to publish all Mr.
Azikiwe’s ‘evidence’. As the discovery of the assassination plot caused such a furore
throughout Nigeria, this approval to publish should be forwarded immediately?
? Approve attached draft telegram.
J.E.M.
26.2.46
25 CO 583/271/4/4, no 7 23 Feb 1946
[Nigerian development plans]: despatch no 29 from Sir A Richards to
Mr Hall on the Legislative Council approval of the ten-year plan of
development and welfare [Extract]
. . . 8. In accepting the Report of the Select Committee and the amended Plan1 the
Legislative Council passed the following resolution:—
‘Be it resolved:
That this Council adopts the Report of the Select Committee appointed to
consider the Ten-Year Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria set out in
Sessional Paper No. 24 of 1945 and approves the Plan as amended by the
Select Committee and recommends its acceptance as the general
development policy of the Government of Nigeria for the next ten years,
subject to periodic review of details in the light of experience and the
inclusion of such additional schemes as may prove to be necessary as the
result of unforseen circumstances.’2
In supporting the motion all of the Unofficial Members, in their speeches, referred to
the desirability of this Plan being accepted and retained as the general development
policy of the Government of Nigeria; an attitude with which I am in full support.
9. Many Members also emphasized the necessity for a maximum of continuity,
not only of policy but of personnel associated with the actual work. While it may not
be possible, on account of the exigencies of the service, to ensure that the same
officers will continue to deal with this development plan during the whole of the ten
year period, I must endorse the view that a maximum of continuity of policy and
staff, in order to ensure that the Plan is properly effected, is a most desirable thing
and should be given careful consideration.
10. It was evident throughout the debate, in which practically every Unofficial
Member took part, that this Plan of Development and Welfare, together with the
legislation connected with it, is regarded as being a thoroughly constructive piece of
work and a clear indication of the desire both of His Majesty’s Government, through
1 See 20.
2 Resolution passed on 7 Feb 1946. The ten-year plan was revised in 1951 and a new plan approved in 1955.
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the generous allocation to Nigeria under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act,
and of this Government to ensure that this country should be developed as rapidly as
possible. Council was also very impressed with the statements which were made that
the Development Plan would be used as a means of training Africans to accept
further responsibility and to replace European officers in the course of time in a
large portion of the services of the Dependency.
11. In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the majority of the
component parts of the Plan have already been considered by your Advisers, I trust
that you will not find any difficulty in giving your full approval of the Plan and to the
desire of the Legislative Council expressed in the resolution set out above. . . .
26 CO 583/276/2/2, no 50 26 Apr 1946
[Cost of living]: outward telegram no 518 from Mr Hall to Sir A
Richards on the Davies Report on the cost of living in Nigeria
Your telegram No. 553. Copy of Tudor Davies report is being sent to you by earliest
practicable air mail.1
Following is brief summary of its specific recommendations.
(a) That cost of living allowances existing in July, 1945, shall be increased by 50
per cent. with effect from the various dates on which work was resumed after
strike of 1945, until such time as the cost of living allowances can be absorbed in
the reconstituted wages structure which will be put together by a team of
statistical officers and a nutritionist working in collaboration with local
committees as recommended elsewhere in the report.
(b) That above award of 50 per cent. shall apply not only to cost of living
allowances paid to African employees earning £220 per annum or less, but also to
separation or local allowances paid since October, 1944, to African employees
whose salaries are over £220 per annum, except those receiving local allowances
because they hold ‘superior posts’.
(c) That although the future cost of living allowances payable under (a) will be
payable together with future wages in the normal way, the retrospective cost of
living allowances which are also payable under (a) shall be paid to African civil
servants by being credited to them either in Post Office Savings accounts or in
bank accounts, or in other ways, and shall be released to them in 12 equal sums
over 12 months after payment begins.
(d) That this award shall remain in force until the new wages structure is set up
by the team mentioned in (a) above, which should be effected within two years of
the date of report.
(e) That family allowances shall not (repeat not) be granted to Nigerian workers
on the same principle as separation allowances already granted to Europeans, but
that the principle of separation allowances which already exists for certain African
civil servants who are required by the nature of their duties to live away from their
families and thus pay for two homes shall be extended.
1 See 11. Inquiry into the Cost of Living and the Control of the Cost of Living in the Colony and
Protectorate of Nigeria. Part I, Report by W Tudor Davies, April 15, 1946. Part II, Despatch from the
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Nigeria, July 9, 1946 (Col. No. 204), 1946.
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(f ) That the same rates of cost of living allowances shall not (repeat not) be made
payable to all workers throughout Nigeria.
(g) That Government’s decision that while the period spent on strike should not
count for pension it should count for purpose of continuity of service for pension
was correct.
(h) That there shall be no payment from the Government to workers for the
period of the strike, ex gratia or otherwise, it being the function of the Unions, not
of the employer, to provide strike pay.
(i) That the claim made by the Federal Union of Native Administration Staffs for
equal wages and cost of living allowances with the Government employees was not
substantiated.
27 CO 554/134/13, no 26 6 July 1946
[Higher education]: despatch no 184 from Mr Hall to Sir A Richards
on the Elliot Commission’s Report on higher education in West Africa
[Extract]
In my despatch (1) No. 334 of 1st October, 1945, I had the honour to inform you of
my preliminary opinion on the Reports of the Commission on Higher Education in
West Africa. I have since given further consideration to the Reports and full
consideration to the views which you have expressed to me in despatches and at the
first meeting of the West African Council. I have also studied the considerable
volume of advice and opinion which has been submitted to me from many sources,
both official and unofficial. I have reached the following conclusions concerning
action which should now be taken.
2. Development of higher education facilities must form part of a balanced
advance along the whole educational front, and I am gratified by the prominence that
is being given to education in the development programmes which have already 
been submitted. In particular I wish to emphasize the importance which I attach to
the expansion of secondary school facilities at the greatest speed consistent with the
achievement and maintenance of high standards. The Elliot Report stressed 
the importance of this aspect of education both in regard to teaching and
curriculum, if the new higher education institutions proposed are to receive a
sufficient intake of students of suitable standard for university studies and if suitable
personnel is to become available for the great constructive tasks which young
persons will be required to perform in the services, economic activities and works
necessary in the developing life of their country. The broadening of secondary school
curricula with some regard to practical training and science is a feature of much
importance to the needs of African development.
3. I accept the advice of the Commission (pages 81–4 and 160) that there is
urgent need to improve the training facilities for both secondary and primary school
teachers, and commend to your special attention the recommendation that such
training should be through special professional courses, clearly separated from
attempts to make good the deficiencies of the general education of the students.
4. I have given careful attention to the representations made to me as to the
considerations which should guide me in reaching my conclusions on the central
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problem of university development. I have been urged to give due weight to local
political considerations as well as to those which are primarily educational and
practical, and it has been suggested to me that a beginning in the founding of
university colleges should now be made in two, if not three of the territories
concerned or that arrangements should be made by certain of the existing colleges
so, that the foundations of a federal university for West Africa may now be laid. I
appreciate the contribution to African progress and educational advance made by
Fourah Bay College1 and Achimota College, and I cannot lightly disregard the hopes
entertained as to the future of these foundations and the popular feeling for them
engendered because of their long service. At the same time I am impressed by the
arguments used in the Report of the Asquith Commission regarding university
progress and am convinced that at this present stage it is most desirable that a
unitary university college for West Africa should be established.2 The arguments
advanced by the minority commissioners in the Elliot Report seem to me to conform
most nearly to the advice of the Asquith Commission and their case seems to me to
be soundly conceived.3 But I feel that my decision while respecting the
considerations advanced by these commissioners must be such as to secure a wide
measure of consent from the people of all the territories and to enjoy the co-
operation and goodwill of local feeling in the tasks ahead.
5. I am fully alive to the ultimate educational needs of a population of 27 million,
but at this juncture, I must recognise that the facilities that can for some time to
come be effectively used, can be adequately met by the provision of one university
institution, and that insufficient students of the requisite standard for entrance to
university studies are available or staff of sufficiently high degree of academical
qualifications can be secured for more than one really good institution, i.e. a
university college sufficiently comprehensive in its range of subjects in faculties of
arts, science and medicine and adequately equipped for research. . . .
11. For the development of university education in West Africa I propose that
there should be established for West Africa a University College sited at Ibadan and
that in the near future executive machinery should be set up to prepare and carry out
the necessary plans. It is my intention to take the necessary steps for the creation of a
Provisional Council of the University College of West Africa, which would be an
autonomous body, legally competent to hold and spend funds, to make contracts of
employment with staff, and to have such other powers as it will need for its task. Its
membership would consist, in the first instance (since it would later need to include
further academic members), of:—
The Chairman (nominated by the Crown).
The Principal-designate of the University College.
The Principal of Fourah Bay College.
„          „         „ Achimota         „
„          „         „ either the Higher College or the 
Medical School, Yaba.
1 In Sierra Leone.
2 This commission, under Mr Justice Cyril Asquith, was appointed in 1943 to consider the principles which
should guide the promotion of higher education and the development of universities in the colonies;
Report of the Commission on Higher Education in the Colonies, Cmd 6647 (1945). 3 See 23.
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One person nominated by the Governor of Gambia.
„        „              „          „    „          „         „ Sierra Leone.
„        „              „          „    „          „         „ Gold Coast.
„        „              „          „    „          „         „ Nigeria.
One person elected by the African unofficial members of the Legislative Council
and adopted by the full Legislative Council of Sierra Leone.
„        „                       „                   „                    „         Gold Coast.
„        „                       „                   „                    „         Nigeria.
Four representatives of the Inter-University Council for Higher Education in the
Colonies (the membership would be reconsidered after the initial stage of bringing
the University College into being).
The Council would have a full-time Secretary. In order to keep the Council in close
touch with schools throughout West Africa, it is desirable that the four Directors of
Education should attend its meetings; but to avoid overweighting the official
element on the Council, I propose that they should not sit as members of the
Council, but should attend as advisers.
12. When a suitable candidate can be found, I propose to appoint a Principal-
designate of the University College of West Africa, on the nomination of the Inter-
University Council. Until the University College is able to strengthen the Council by
adequate representation of the College staff, the Principal-designate would be
ultimately responsible not to the Council but to me. He would however be required
to act in accordance with the Provisional Council’s decisions, over which I would
reserve to myself during this interim period a power of review. It is my desire that at
an early date these interim arrangements may be terminated, and that the College
may become fully autonomous. I am proposing to make a scheme under the Colonial
Development and Welfare Act for payments not exceeding £10,000 per annum for a
period of three years to cover the salaries of the Principal-designate of the University
College and of the Secretary, office expenditure, travelling expenses of members of
the Provisional Council and similar expenditure.
13. The Provisional Council, acting through the Principal-designate as its
executive officer, would be requested to take appropriate steps (including the
preparation of detailed financial estimates for submission to me for consideration by
the Colonial University Grants Advisory Committee) towards achieving among other
things, the following:—
(a) The selection and definition of the university site at Ibadan. Preliminary plans
for the lay-out of the permanent buildings should be prepared and temporary
accommodation at Ibadan should be acquired from the military authorities or
other sources.
(b) An expert mission from the United Kingdom universities should visit West
Africa to advise on plans for a permanent West African medical school at Ibadan,
on the feasibility of the interim use of temporary accommodation (e.g. the military
hospital if available), on the phasing of the transfer of the medical school from
Yaba to Ibadan, and on the question whether the school should include provision
from the start for dentistry training.
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(c) Preliminary arrangements should be made with the Nigerian Government
for transferring the responsibility for the direction of the higher training work
now undertaken in the Schools of Agriculture and of Forestry at Ibadan, and
(as recommended on page 111, paragraph 52 of the Elliot Report) of Animal
Health at Vom, as far as possible, to the Principal-designate and Provisional
Council. Schools for training at university level in these three subjects should
be created or adapted from the present schools, designed to serve the whole of
British West Africa, and developed to become integral parts of the University
College.
(d) The staff for Ibadan should be steadily recruited and be sufficient in number
and qualifications to provide teaching of full university standard, in both arts and
science as the faculties are created. Adequate provision should be made in the
temporary accommodation for laboratories, etc. for teaching and for research
facilities for the staff. Students from all four territories should be admitted at post-
intermediate level. It is essential from the start that a suitable entrance standard
should be laid down.
(e) An Institute of Education, both for research and for professional training, on
a West African basis, should be developed as an essential part of the University
College at Ibadan. The scope of such Institute is set out on page 84 of the
Report.
(f ) A library of university standard should be built up at Ibadan.
(g) A scheme of scholarships on an inter-territorial basis should be established,
including the co-ordination of existing scholarship resources.
(h) A Guild of Graduates should be formed, with branches in each territory, as
recommended on page 162 of the Elliot Report. I appreciate that this can
effectively be done only by the spontaneous action of the graduates concerned and
that the College can do no more in this matter than issue an invitation. The Guild
would later be represented on the Provisional Council.
(i) The research activities of the Institute of Arts, Industries and Social Science
should be moved to Ibadan while the future of its other activities will be the
subject of an enquiry as was decided at the meeting of the West African Council in
January last.
14. I accept, and wish to see implemented at once, the recommendation of the
Elliot Commission (pages 118–21) with regard to technical education, and I hope
that technical and commercial institutes will be developed on the lines suggested in
the report. I understand that in the case of Nigeria urgent consideration has already
been given to technical education development and that steps are being taken already
to transform the Higher College at Yaba into a Technical Institute, the change-over
from academic to technical work to take place gradually and the Institute continuing
the work started by Yaba Higher College until suitable arrangements have been made
for the creation of the Territorial College and of the University College of West
Africa. . . .4
4 The University College at Ibadan opened for its first students in Jan 1948. In the event Sir Arthur Burns
announced in March 1947 that work would begin on a University College for the Gold Coast.
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28 CO 583/277/4, no 5 18 July 1946
[NCNC]: letter from Sir G Creasy to Sir G Gater on the activities of
the NCNC
When I was in Lagos I was shown a copy of Richards’ Secret despatch of the 12th of
July regarding the activities of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
and the situation that may develop therefrom, and I discussed with Richards and
Colby,1 both separately and together, the possible steps that could be taken to meet
it.
As you know, a mission from the National Council has recently toured the
Northern Provinces to enlist support, both moral and financial, for the proposed
delegation to England. The mission is now in the Eastern Provinces, which is of
course the storm centre, and I understand that it will probably be back in Lagos
towards the end of August after taking the Western Provinces on its way. The glowing
accounts of the mission’s progress that appear daily in the ZIK press are no doubt
exaggerated, and I was told that the very considerable sums which are named in
them as having been collected for the delegation’s expenses are to a large extent
promises rather than hard cash. But there is no doubt, I understand, that the
delegation will come to London, especially as a few wealthy African merchants are
said to be behind ZIK at present, no doubt entirely for their own ends.
It would be absurd for me to attempt to produce a first-hand appreciation of the
position, but I am convinced in my own mind that it is potentially very serious,
especially in the Eastern Provinces, and that there has been a definite deterioration
since I was out earlier in the year. I enclose copies of the West African Pilot and the
Comet for the last three days, every word in which I think I can claim to have read.2
You will see from the accounts of the mission’s meetings the extensive use that is
made of the demobilised soldiers who are, at any rate in the Eastern Provinces, only
too easy a field for ZIK propaganda: they have ‘fought and bled’ for Britain, a gross
exaggeration, as the fighting man came largely from the North, and the E.P. man did
not for the most part get beyond the Middle East; they were promised jobs (an
absolute untruth) and this promise is not being kept; and so on. You will note also
the constant use made of military metaphors: ‘we must fight for Nigeria’, ‘we must
strike for freedom’, and so on. Articles on these lines appear now in the Nigerian
press day after day. Richards is determined to take the offensive whenever possible
and he has ordered that the editors, etc., should be prosecuted whenever there is any
reasonable chance of conviction, while the Government’s Nigerian Review has also
been told to take an aggressive line in combating ZIK’s propaganda. But ZIK is clever
enough to keep within the law as it now is, and I am afraid he has ample opportunity
to stir up and inflame racial bitterness without running any risk of conviction. The
most casual observer cannot fail to see how these papers are read and studied
everywhere in Lagos, and I feel that the Governor is fully justified in all that he has
written about the cumulative effect of their anti-European and anti-Government
contents.
It is comparatively easy to describe the position, and Richards has already done
that at some length in his despatch of the 12th of July. It is extremely difficult,
1 G F T Colby, administrative secretary, Nigeria, 1945–1948. 2 Not printed.
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however, to decide how it can be remedied. The spread of real education and the
development of a steady and responsible public opinion are both long-term
measures, and one of the most depressing features at present is the lack of moral
courage on the part of those Africans, and there are many of them, who are
essentially men of goodwill and who realise the harm that ZIK and his friends are
doing, but who fail to raise their voices against him.
It will help in the immediate future if it is possible to ensure closer administration,
especially in the Eastern Provinces, and this will be helped by the reinforcements to
the Administrative Service that are now beginning to come out in some numbers:
the spread of the Leopard murders in the Eastern Provinces is one result of under-
administration.3 It would be most valuable, however, if steps could be taken to
ensure that the balance of the 100 cadets for whom Richards originally asked come
out as soon as possible. If the projected Kemsley newspaper can be started soon, that
too would be of some help: but I gather there is no early prospect of this. There
remains the proposal which Richards has now made to the Secretary of State that an
ordinance should be enacted on the lines of the Cyprus law. He realises the
embarrassment that this may cause to the Government at home, but he is absolutely
satisfied in his own mind that nothing else will do and that unless strong action is
taken now trouble is bound to come, whether six months ahead, in a year’s time, or
later.
Richards also discussed with Colby and myself the question of the preparations
that might be made now for the reception of the National Council’s delegation in
England. He has no doubt that ZIK and his fellow delegates will receive the reception
they deserve at the Colonial Office, but he is concerned about the encouragement
that may be given to them by elements at home who know nothing of the West
African background and yet are only too ready to talk and write about self-
government for Africa, as if its introduction was a matter of a few months or years,
instead of decades. Richards will be thinking further about this and will, I was told,
send a despatch to the Secretary of State with his suggestions. Amongst those made
at our talk was one that papers such as the Times, the Economist, or the Manchester
Guardian should be asked to publish articles giving an entirely objective and
dispassionate account of the position out here as a corrective to the kind of picture
that will be drawn by ZIK and so readily accepted by ignorant theorists.
Another suggestion which, I believe, Richards has already made is that a small
party of Members of Parliament should visit Nigeria and study the position there for
themselves. This would, I think, be excellent, if it could be arranged, and I know that
such a mission would be most warmly welcomed by Richards and his senior advisers.
I come now to the security aspect. The G.O.C. was in Lagos ten days ago and I
know that he was considerably disturbed by what he was told by Richards and very
doubtful, I understand, as to his ability, with his present resources, to deal with any
situation that may arise. But the position is now worse in that the G.O.C. has
recently received a direct order from the War Office to reduce his present cadre of
3,900 British officers and N.C.Os. to 1,500 and to put the first cut of 1,000 in force by
the 30th of September. He proposes to do this as much as possible at the expense of
3 This is a reference to some 100 or so murders in Calabar province, 1945–1947, in which the bodies were
mutilated as if they had been killed by leopards, and which were ascribed by the police at the time to the
Idiong society.
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the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone, but it cannot but have a very serious effect on the
military resources available to maintain law and order in Nigeria, and Irwin4 has told
me that he will certainly put this to the War Office. Richards will also represent to
the Secretary of State the additional risks that we must incur if this drastic reduction
takes place, and he has promised to send me a copy of his telegram, so that I can keep
Irwin fully informed.
I do not know how far we, that is, the Colonial Office, are committed on this, and I
certainly have not been told anything about it from the Office, nor has anything been
said to Burns or Richards. But I would urge most strongly that steps should be taken
to hold the position until you have received and considered Richards’ telegram and
the War Office have had Irwin’s appreciation. Irwin himself is due to leave Accra by
air on the 7th of August for a two or three weeks’ visit to the U.K. and I hope that you
will be able to have a full discussion with him on the position.
You may, perhaps, think that in this letter I have gone somewhat outside my
province, but I thought it right to let you know the impressions I brought back with
me from Lagos.
4 Lt-gen N M C Irwin, West Africa Command, 1946–1948
29 CO 583/277/4, no 7 9 Aug 1946
[NCNC]: despatch from Sir A Richards to Mr Hall on the plans of the
NCNC to send a delegation to the UK. Enclosure [Extract]
I have the honour to refer to my Secret Despatch of the 12th of July, 1946, in which I
addressed you at some length in regard to the Nigerian Press and suggested that you
should consider certain measures for dealing with a situation which was causing me
considerable anxiety; in the same despatch I had occasion to allude to the activities of
the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, and I propose now to address
you more fully on this subject.
2. In paragraph 12 of my Despatch under reference I gave a brief account of the
present activities of this body and made particular reference to the fact that a
delegation of the Council is likely to visit the United Kingdom during the course of
the next few months, and I feel that it is most advisable that I should ask you to
consider in advance your attitude towards the members of the delegation when they
arrive in the United Kingdom.
3. In considering this matter, I make the basic assumption that, whether you will
be willing to accord them an interview or not, you will not be able to accede to their
demands for revision of the New Constitution of Nigeria, the Minerals Ordinance, the
Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance and the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs
Ordinance.1 As you are aware, these measures have received the detailed examination
of myself and my advisers and have been introduced with your full approval. I find it
difficult to submit advice at this stage whether or not you should consent to see the
delegation, but I am assuming that it will be politic to do so.
1 These ordinances, together with the Crown Lands Ordinance, were the so-called ‘Obnoxious Ordinances’
of 1945. See 8.
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4. You are aware, of course, that organizations and other groups exist in the
United Kingdom who would be only too glad to accord them a measure of support
and there is little doubt that the avowed objects of the delegation will receive
sympathy and support in some sections of the British Press. It seems possible,
however, that unless steps are taken to make the facts known, the delegation may
enlist the support of a not inconsiderable body of well-meaning but ill-informed
opinion, which is at present quite unaware of conditions as they really exist in
Nigeria. Such developments might cause embarrassment to His Majesty’s
Government as there are perhaps certain elements in the House of Commons who
would not be averse to seizing an opportunity to criticize Government’s colonial
policy.
5. However that may be, there can be no doubt that any considerable measure of
support for the delegation in the United Kingdom would considerably enhance the
prestige of the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons in this country, a
development which I am most anxious to avoid.
6. I feel therefore that it is no more than prudent to consider now the measures
which can be taken and to be ready with a working plan when the delegation arrives.
I would suggest that as a first step the ground might be prepared by the Public
Relations Officer at the Colonial Office and that he might give to the more reputable
organs of the British Press some factual information about the Mission, a sketch of
the individual members, and their history and, as a background some information
with regard to the present stage of development in Nigeria and some facts in
connection with the Ordinances which the delegation oppose and their reasons for so
doing. With this object in view, I have had prepared a Memorandum on the National
Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons and brief biographical notes on the principal
figures in this organization.2 It is important that the Press and the public should be
left in no doubt as to what these people stand for, which is, of course, disruption of
British rule in Nigeria, the achievement of their own selfish ends and the sacrifice of
the vast majority of the population on the altar of their political and financial
advancement. It is, I think, advisable that this question should be energetically and
immediately tackled if a grossly misleading impression is not to be left upon the
British public to the discredit of British colonial policy, and I feel that it would be of
advantage if you felt able to make a direct approach to the Editors of ‘The Times’ and
the ‘Economist’, in order to enlist their assistance in dealing with what may well
become a most embarrassing situation.
7. As there is little doubt that the delegation will be received by certain groups in
the United Kingdom who are likely not only to be sympathetic to its views but to be
uncritical of its aspirations it would, I think, be most salutary if it were possible to
arrange for the delegation to meet bodies who would adopt a critical and questioning
attitude. The myth of the National Council could be readily exploded by a few
relevant questions, and with this object and, I must confess, in ignorance of what you
regard as permissible in the circumstances, I suggest that it might be useful if a
representative body of Members of Parliament could meet them in the presence of
the Press, and if you could ensure that such Members were in possession of all the
facts about the National Council. In these circumstances I feel convinced that there
2 Biographical notes not printed.
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would be nothing to fear from any wrong impressions being created in the House of
Commons, and consequently the Colonial Office would be saved from considerable
embarrassment.
Enclosure to 29: National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons
. . . [A] few months after its formation the Council claimed to have a roster of
Members which included the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria and the West
African Union of Seamen, the National Democratic Party and the Union of Young
Democrats, four literary societies, eleven professional associations, eleven social
clubs and 69 Tribal Unions. At first sight this list appears impressive, but on exam-
ination by anyone with local knowledge it becomes far less so. To take first the
Trade Union Congress of Nigeria. It is true that the majority of Trade Unions in
Nigeria are affiliated to the T.U.C. but like all other Trade Union activities in
Nigeria, the T.U.C. is entirely centered on Lagos, from which all its Executives are
drawn, and the Executive is undemocratic and unrepresentative of the masses of
the workers. If the Executive, which is drawn from a small semi-political clique,
sees fit to give its support to any particular party in Lagos it will do so without
consulting the member Unions and the men themselves will know nothing of it
and will care less. The West African Union of Seamen has a membership of about
250.
To turn next to the two political parties. It will be appreciated that only in Lagos
where Municipal and Legislative Council elections are held, do political parties, in
the generally accepted sense, exist. The two parties mentioned are Lagos parties
formed to fight Lagos elections and both of them were fostered by the promoters of
the National Council.
For the purposes of this Memoranda the four literary societies, the eleven
professional associations and the eleven social clubs may be considered together, for
they all have this in common, they are purely local Lagos phenomena and can claim
to be representative of nothing in particular.
However, to one unacquainted with local conditions the most solid backing of
the National Council would appear to be the 69 Tribal Unions. It must be remem-
bered that it is only since the advent of Government that the Nigerian has dared
to leave his home and venture abroad. Prior to that it was only the very adventur-
ous who ever willingly left the narrow confines of the place where he was born.
Not unnaturally this has led to a strong sense of parochial patriotism which is
symbolized by the way in which, when three or four men from some remote vil-
lage come together in a strange town, they immediately band together to form a
Union and give to the Union a high-sounding name such as the Ndoni Progressive
Union.
Lagos is essentially a cosmopolitan town in the sense that it draws to it people
from every corner of Nigeria, either in the course of their employment or in search of
work. It is not surprising therefore to find in Lagos scores of these Progressive
Unions, often consisting of only half a dozen members. Some of the members may be
older men who have been away from their home town for years, but the majority will
be younger men who have but recently arrived. The objects of these Unions are firstly
social, secondly to look after their fellow-townsmen who happen to be in Lagos, and
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finally to promote the interests of the neighbourhood from which they come. It
would be as wrong to suppose that these Unions are the voice of the areas from which
they originated as it would be to suppose that the members of the Caledonian Club in
Bnenos Aires expressed the unanimous opinion of Scotland. Incidentally only one of
these Unions consisted of men from the Northern Provinces. This was the Tiv
Progressive Union, a tribe which has little in common with the Hausa who forms the
vast bulk of the population in the North.
At that time therefore it might have been true to say that the National Council
expressed the views of a section of the population of Lagos, but it was patently untrue
to claim, as the National Council did claim, that they represented 6,000,000
Nigerians. Even in Lagos it would be wrong to suppose that the National Council had
all its own way. When Dr. Nimbe stood for Legislative Council in 1945 on the
National Council ticket, he was opposed by another candidate who received one third
of the total votes cast.
On its inception the avowed aims of the National Council were to oppose four Bills
then about to come before Legislative Council. These Bills and the Council’s
comments on them are of interest. They were:—
(1) The Public Lands Acquisition (Amendment) Ordinance 1945.
(2) The Minerals Ordinance, 1945.
(3) The Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1945.
(4) The Royal West African Frontier Force (Nigeria Regiment) (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1945.
The National Council alleged that the first of these Bills sought to transform public
lands acquired by the British Government in Nigeria into Crown Lands; that the
Minerals Ordinance contained a clause vesting in the British Crown, mineral rights
in Nigeria; that the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance gave to
the Governor the power to appoint and depose the people’s natural rulers, and that
the R.W.A.F.F. Ordinance sought to apply to Nigerian soldiers serving overseas
regulations enacted under an Act of Parliament. Some of these allegations will be
dealt with in greater detail later but it is worthy of note here that in each case the
underlying suggestion was that the native was being deprived of his rights in the
interests of the British.
It is impossible to think that men of the intelligence of Macaulay and Azikiwe
really believed this, but it suited admirably the line of propaganda which they wished
to put over to their gullible public.
The National Council, while not dropping its interest in these Bills, (except the
R.W.A.F.F. Ordinance), next turned its attention to the new Constitutional proposals
which had been published as a White Paper and which received the unanimous
approval of the Legislative Council.
Their main contentions were that, in the Regional Houses, Government Officials
should not be allowed to sit or vote but should only attend in the capacity of advisers,
that Native Authority representatives should be regarded as ‘Official Members’, and
that only members elected by popular ballot should be regarded as Unofficial
Members and that they should be in the majority.
Their proposals for the Legislative Council envisaged 40 elected Unofficial
Members and the proposed allocation of Members of it is of considerable interest.
This was as follows:—
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Lagos Municipal Area 5 members
Lagos (Rural Area) 2 members
Western Provinces 11 members
Eastern Provinces 11 members
Northern Provinces 11 members.
The 400,000 people in Lagos Colony would therefore return 7 Members, the 10
million in the Eastern and Western Provinces would return 22 Members, and the 11
million in the North, 11 Members. It is obvious how such a Constitution would play
into the hands of the Lagos politicians, especially when it is remembered that such
support as they have outside Lagos is almost entirely centred round the politically
minded, semi-educated classes in the Eastern and Western Provinces.
During the next year the attitude or influence of the National Council did not
materially change, but all the time the papers of the Zik Press whose policy is of
course controlled by the National Council, was hammering away at its racial and
anti-British propaganda, dispensing lies and half-truths to mislead a public which is
barely literate and which is prepared to believe anything which it sees in print.
Early in its history the National Council planned to do a propaganda tour of the
country. This was postponed owing to the strike of 1945, and for other reasons, and
did not begin till the end of April, 1946, when Herbert Macaulay, Olorun-Nimbe and
another agitator, Imoudu,3 left Lagos for the North; they were joined by Azikiwe at
Kaduna. They had planned a very extensive tour of the Northern, Eastern and
Western Provinces, but when they had been away some ten days and had reached
Kano, Herbert Macaulay slipped and sustained injuries. He was taken to the N.A.
Hospital where an X-Ray revealed a broken thigh. Such an accident to a man of over
80 was of course very serious, but all facilities were available in the Hospital. In spite
of this, Nimbe, who was the medical adviser to the delegation, refused to put him in
Hospital but, because he thought it politically more expedient, brought him back to
Lagos with the limb unset—a journey of 21⁄2 days by train, which at the best of times
can only be regarded as arduous. It is impossible to say whether Macaulay would have
recovered had he been left at Kano; in the event he died 36 hours after arriving at
Lagos, and his funeral was the occasion of much popular demonstration and much
advertisement for the National Council.
After the funeral the delegation, now joined by Macaulay’s ne’er-do-well son, Oged
Macaulay, resumed their tour and in the past three months have visited most of the
larger towns in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Their avowed intention is to
collect funds and the mandate of the people to send a delegation to England to
protest against what they call the four ‘obnoxious’ Ordinances and the Richards
Constitution. Their published target is £10,000, but why they should require so
3 Herbert Samuel Heelas Macaulay, trained as a civil engineer; founder of the Nigerian National
Democratic Party in the early 1920s, and of the Lagos Daily News; elected president of the NCNC in 1944.
Dr Abubakar Ibiyinka Olorun-Nimbe, medical practitioner; member of the NCNC; elected to Lagos Town
Council 1944 and to the Legislative Council 1945; elected mayor of Lagos 1950. Michael Ominus Imoudu,
prominent in the formation of the Railway Workers’ Union in 1932; elected vice-president of the African
Civil Servants Technical Workers Union in 1941; detained under Defence Regulations 1943–45; member
of NCNC; elected president of the Nigerian National Federation of Labour in 1949; president of the
Nigerian Labour Congress in 1950; president of the All-Nigeria Trade Union Federation 1953; president of
the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, 1959.
09-(Doc28-60)-cp  15/7/01  7:26 am  Page 94
[29] AUG 1946 95
considerable a sum to send a delegation to England—unless they believe that
English politics are as corrupt as their own—has not been explained. Though their
main plank has been the Ordinances and the Constitution they have missed no
opportunity to ferment discontent, particularly among the demobilized soldiers of
the Eastern Provinces, whom they encourage to believe that they are neglected by an
ungrateful Government. Nor have they hesitated to spread rumours which they
believe will be damaging to Government, as, for example, that Government has a
large scheme for the settlement of ‘Whites’ on land seized from the native.
It is of importance to the delegation that when they visit England they should
appear to have the backing of as much of the country as possible and with this end
in view they have, wherever they have been, collected signatures in support of the
delegation. There can be no doubt that they will collect an imposing list, but it is
equally certain that the list will be as shallow as their original pretensions to repre-
sent 6,000,000 Nigerians. It must be remembered that they have confined them-
selves almost exclusively to the larger towns, in which there are always a number of
literate, detribalized natives to whom their propaganda particularly appeals. The fact
that certain of these men have signed their memorial is of course in no way an indi-
cation that the delegation has the support of even the majority of the town which
the signatories purport to represent. To take the example of Zaria. Here, as else-
where, they held a mass meeting which was attended by some 600 people, most of
them Southerners. The chief sub-Editor of the ‘Gaskiya ta fi Kwabo’, the
Government-sponsored Hausa newspaper, Mallam Makama, a native of Kano but a
well-known man in Zaria, was sent to report the meeting. He was immediately
invited to take a place with the delegation at the front of the meeting. After the
usual speeches, an announcement was made that a Hausa was wanted to represent
Zaria and append his name to the delegations’ petition—as has been said very few
Hausas and none of local importance were present. Mallam Makama was invited to
sign for Zaria but he indignantly refused, saying that he was no one in Zaria and
pointing out that in any case he, a Kano man, could not possibly claim to represent
Zaria. Finally a Mallam who works for one of the European firms in Zaria signed for
the town.
Needless to say, the Press has given the delegation the fullest publicity, and has
made the usual extravagant claims. Again to take the example of Zaria, the press
account states that about 15,000 men and women attended a mammoth meeting at
which the Hausa community was fully represented and that without a dissentient
voice the meeting authorized the delegation to represent them abroad. At Aba, which
has a population of some 15,000, it was claimed that 85,000 people attended a
meeting. At Calabar they claim 80,000; the total population not only of Calabar but of
Calabar Division as well, scarcely passes this figure.
It would, however, be stupid and dangerous to pretend that the delegation has not
won a considerable body of support for themselves; not among the peasants who
form 95% of the total population, but among the educated, semi-educated and de-
tribalized and unemployed populations of the larger towns. This class has been most
influenced by the propaganda which has been so consistently handed out to them;
propaganda deliberately designed to turn gratitude into envy, respect into hatred,
trust into suspicion; to attribute to every act of Government the only motive which
the propagandists understand—selfishness and lust for power. There is every reason
to suppose that this propaganda is not entirely self-inspired, that the leaders of the
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movement are in close touch with Communist elements in various parts of the world
from whom they receive inspiration and advice.
It may be worth considering how far the delegation’s allegations are justified in
fact. To take first the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance. The National Council have
attacked this Ordinance, or rather the amending Ordinance, on two grounds: first
that it vests lands acquired for public purposes in the British Crown, and secondly
that the ulterior motive behind the Ordinance is Government’s intention to settle
Europeans on the land.
It is, of course, essential that Government should have the power to acquire, if
necessary compulsorily, land required for public purposes. Such a power has been
given to the Government by various Ordinances, and the present Public Lands
Acquisition Ordinance was passed in 1917. It defines the expression ‘public
purposes,’ provides for payment of compensation on acquisition and for settlement of
disputes with regard to compensation by the Courts. The ‘Crown Lands Ordinance,’
passed in 1918, defines Crown Lands, inter alia, as ‘lands which have been or may
hereafter be acquired by His Majesty for any public purpose or otherwise howsoever.’
It follows therefore that, since 1918, lands acquired under the Public Lands
Acquisition Ordinance have become Crown Lands, though the Public Lands
Acquisition Ordinance was silent on this point. Some doubt had also arisen as to the
position which would arise if land acquired for public purposes ceased to be wanted
for that purpose. Under the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance Government gets
absolute title to land acquired under the Ordinance (other than land acquired for a
term of years), all previous titles being extinguished. It is not possible therefore to
hand back such lands to the previous owners. Moreover in many instances
Government would have expended from public funds considerable sums on
improvement, and it would not be equitable to the general public who had paid for
improvements, to hand back these improvements to the previous owners who had
already received compensation in full for their interest in the land prior to
acquisition. The amending Ordinance of 1945, dealt with these points, and
specifically provided that lands acquired under the Ordinance became Crown Lands,
and that they remained Crown Lands notwithstanding that the purpose for which
they had been acquired had ceased to exist. Up to June, 1945, the total area acquired
by Government in the Colony, the area of which is 1,381 square miles, was 9 square
miles, and in the Southern Provinces, the area of which is 89,515, 22 square miles.
The Ordinance does not apply to the Northern Provinces. It is probable that more
lands will have to be acquired in connection with the Development Programme, but
the total area will still remain infinitesimal.
In the second place the Ordinance was amended to enable land to be acquired
for/or in connection with, rural development or settlement. The object of this
amendment was to create the machinery for re-settlement schemes for Nigerians,
including ex-soldiers. It has never been the policy of this Government to encourage
in any way European settlement. Outside the Colony a non-native cannot acquire
freehold in land. With the approval of the Governor and the consent of the owners he
can acquire a lease, but it is only in very exceptional circumstances that the
Governor would approve a lease for agricultural purposes. There has been no change
in Government policy, nor does the amendment of the Public Lands Acquisition
Ordinance foreshadow any change in policy.
To turn next to the Minerals Ordinance. Here the line of attack is the same,
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namely that the Crown—the propagandist call it the British Crown where in practice
the Crown in this sense means of course the Government of Nigeria—is taking to
itself all rights in minerals which properly belong to the natives. As a matter of fact
the Minerals Ordinance of 1945 made no change whatever in this respect. Section 3
of the Minerals Ordinance which was passed in 1916, and which is now replaced by
the Minerals Ordinance, 1945, already vested in the Crown the entire property in and
control of all minerals in, on or under any land in Nigeria. It is now a widely accepted
view that mineral wealth should be vested in the State rather than in the person or
persons who happen to own the surface rights. Adequate provision is made in the
Ordinance for compensation for disturbance of surface rights but the minerals
themselves remain the property of the State. The main alteration introduced by the
1945 Ordinance was that mining operators can now be required to restore the soil
after mining operations have been completed, a measure which is plainly to the
advantage of the surface owner.
The other Ordinance which has been violently attacked is the Appointment and
Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance. Again the Ordinance is not a new one. The parent
Ordinance is the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance, 1930. This
Ordinance gave the Governor the power to approve the appointment of a Head Chief
in the Protectorate or any Chief in the Colony who had been duly appointed in
accordance with Native Law and Custom, and made the Governor the sole judge of
whether such an appointment had been made in accordance with custom. It also
gave the Governor the power to depose a Head Chief or Chief as the case might be if
after enquiry he was satisfied that such deposition was required by Native Law and
Custom or was necessary in the interests of peace, order and good government. The
amending Ordinance of 1945 restricted the Governor’s powers to a Chief who is a
Native Authority or a member of a Native Authority but extended his powers to cover
Chiefs, instead of only Head Chiefs, in the Protectorate. It further required the
Governor to make due enquiry and consultation with the persons concerned in the
selection before deciding a chieftaincy dispute or before deposing a Chief.
Chiefs and Head Chiefs form an important part, perhaps the most important part,
of the machinery of native administration. In many parts of Nigeria chieftaincy is not
hereditary and on a vacancy occurring there may be a large number of possible
candidates. Before the advent of Government disputes were rapidly, though perhaps
not permanently, settled, victory going to the strong, but in these more enlightened
days when force majeure can no longer be used, disputes are apt to drag on
interminably to the disruption of the administration and the disturbance of the
neighbourhood. It is necessary to have machinery to settle such disputes, and
individual enquiry followed by the Governor’s decision has proved the most
satisfactory. Similarly, in the old days a Chief who had outraged his subjects by mal-
administration was given the choice of suicide, flight, or sudden death; he usually
chose the former. These sanctions no longer exist and it is necessary to replace them
with the sanction of the law.
These then are the laws which are being stigmatized as a wicked infringement of
the natives’ inalienable rights in the interests of the alien British Government.
To turn now to the new Constitution. As has been said, the National Council’s
main criticisms have been that representatives of Native Authorities should not be
regarded as Unofficial Members and that the only Unofficial Members should be
members elected by ballot who should have a majority in the Legislative Council.
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The argument advanced on the first point is that native administrations form an
integral part of the machinery of Government. This is true but it by no means follows
that Native Authorities or their members are the mere mouthpieces of the
administration. Anyone who has had any experience of dealing with Native
Authorities knows well that they have very definite views of their own and are neither
afraid to express them or to stick to them. Here again, the National Council is
inconsistent; when it suits it it is fond of referring to the Chiefs as ‘our natural
rulers’, and yet when it is suggested that certain of these natural rulers should
represent their people on the Legislature, the Council denies their right to speak on
behalf of their people. The real objection of the National Council to the
representation of Native Authorities on the unofficial side of the House is that they
know them to be a body of sober African opinion, with some experience of practical
administration, who are far nearer than the politicians will ever be to the thoughts of
the mass of the people and who therefore may be dangerous rivals to the politicians’
own political aims.
But what of the alternative? The suggestion is seriously made that all Unofficial
Members should be elected by ballot. This in a country where barely 5% of the
population can read or write, where for generations the peasant has been far too
concerned with the problem of existence to concern himself with anything but the
most petty local affairs, where in large areas the natives, men and women, go
unclothed, where cannibalism is still practised, where secret societies based on ju-ju
can still indulge in mass murder, where the very leaders of organized labour invoke
ju-ju to impart discipline; where the vast populations of the Moslem Emirates are
only just emerging from the eastern feudalism of the Middle Ages. To attempt
popular election in such circumstances would not be to introduce democracy but a
sham disastrous alike to the true interests of the people and to the future of the
country.
30 CO 554/152/1, no 4 Jan 1947
‘The effect of Africanisation on the integrity of the Public Service’:
memorandum by the Nigerian government
1. The West African Governments are firmly committed to a policy of
Africanization of the Service. There can be no question of any change in this policy,
but it is pertinent to consider the effects of this policy on the integrity of the public
service.
2. In considering this there are two aspects—financial integrity and loyalty to
Government. The problem of financial integrity is a difficult and delicate one. It must
be remembered that the African’s background and outlook on public morality is very
different from that which exists in present day Britain. Before the advent of
Government he was accustomed to an administration and a judicial system which
were based very largely on ‘graft’, and to the average African there was nothing
unusual in having to pay for any services he might receive from a public servant or in
the idea that those who judged his case should receive a ‘gift’ for their trouble.
3. Although there are signs of an awakening of public opinion on this question of
corruption, there can be no doubt that the average African believes that his fellow-
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African, if put into a position of authority, will make the best of that position to
further his own financial interests. Accusations, whether direct or implied, both
against individual Africans and against some particular class of official, are of almost
daily occurrence. On more than one occasion the local papers in Nigeria have drawn
attention to the widespread corruption which, they allege, presently exists. Such
accusations generally or specifically are extremely difficult to prove, but the fact that
they are made by Africans against Africans is not without significance, particularly in
view of the fact that, in spite of the present racial antagonism which has been
engendered in Nigeria, accusations against Europeans on this score are extremely
rare. It is pertinent to note that a prominent African has very recently been convicted
of offering a bribe to an African Puisne Judge. Attempts to bribe European Judges are
almost unknown. This attitude of mind towards his fellow-African is of importance, if
only because it naturally follows that temptation is more likely to be put in the way of
the African official than of the European.
4. There is evidence, though it cannot be taken as conclusive, that corruption
has increased during the war years as a result of the diminution of European
supervision. Examples include the degree of corruption in the Produce Inspection
Department which was revealed by a recent Commission of Enquiry; another
Enquiry which showed that a number of African officers were trafficking in forged
Motor Transport Warrants on a large scale; evidence of corruption in many
Government hospitals where it is alleged that the African patient generally can
receive no attention without payment; and recent indications that in the P.W.D.
there is growing discontent among the daily paid workers with regard to their
African ‘bosses’, whom they accuse of corrupt practices. A strike was recently staged
at the Ijora Sawmill, based on the demand for the removal of certain members of the
African supervisory staff on the grounds that their demands were becoming
unbearable; a further instance is alleged corruption on the part of ticket collectors,
booking clerks, etc., on the Nigerian Railway which is said to be costing the Railway
Administration £300,000 per annum.
5. To turn to the political aspect. It is a fundamental principle that the Civil
Servant must subordinate his own political views to those of the Government which
he serves. As a result of growing political consciousness in Nigeria there has of recent
years been a notable falling off in the African Civil Servant’s realisation of his
responsibility in this respect, and instances multiply of African Civil Servants
supporting subversive movements. It has also recently been found necessary in the
interests of security to remove all Africans from the Secret Branch of the Nigerian
Secretariat, and it becomes increasingly difficult to find Africans who can be trusted
with regard to confidential matters.
6. It appears therefore that the inevitable result of the policy to which we are
committed will be a falling off in the general integrity of the public service and it is
worth while considering whether this should be accepted as inevitable and if so to
what extent.
7. There is no ready solution to the general problem of corruption, and it is only
public opinion which can deal with it in the long run. There is a deplorable lack of
responsible public opinion in Nigeria and there are few Africans who have the moral
courage to stand up and condemn the corrupt practices of their fellows. While it is
quite evident in the present stage of development of Nigeria that progressive
Africanization of the Service must result in a general lowering of standards, it is
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nevertheless a fact that should that progressive lowering of standards become
excessive there would inevitably have to be some slowing down in the rate of
Africanization, and consideration might have to be given to replacing Africans in
positions of trust by Europeans. There has been in recent years a constant and
increasing clamour in the Press for an acceleration in the programme of
Africanization. At the present time the rate of Africanization is controlled, almost
exclusively, by the number of Africans with the necessary academic qualifications,
little attention being paid to the character of the candidate. Present policy is directed
to increase the number of potential candidates by the grant of Government
scholarships, the establishment of Territorial Colleges and the opening of University
Colleges. While this policy will widen the field of choice and accelerate the rate of
Africanization, unless we are assured that the moral standards of the African will
improve with his academic advancement—and unfortunately at the present time
there is all too little evidence of this—the result will be only to lower the standards of
the public service. In the future it will be necessary to insist not only on academic
qualifications but on moral integrity and it becomes increasingly important to
explain to the African public that academic achievement is not the only, or even the
most important, qualification for the public service.
8. Consideration may therefore have to be given in due course to some public
announcement which will explain somewhat bluntly the reasons why Africanization
cannot proceed at a greater rate. It may be stated here that the writings of
irresponsible sentimentalists in the United Kingdom have tended to give the African
an inflated and wrong impression of his capacity and integrity, and it may well be
that it would be in the interests of the African himself to make such an
announcement.
31 CO 537/1917 22 Mar 1947
[Bristol Hotel incident]: minute by Sir T Lloyd reporting an interview
with I G Cummings
[This minute concerns the visit to Nigeria by J L Keith, director of colonial scholars, and
I G Cummings of the CO Welfare Department in Feb 1947. Accommodation for the two was
reserved by the Nigerian government at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos. Following complaints by
the hotel manager on their arrival that he should have been informed in advance that
Cummings, who had a Sierra Leonian father and Yorkshire mother, ‘was an African’ and
his statement that ‘if he had known about Mr Cummings’ race he would not have booked
him’, Keith and Cummings left the hotel without staying the night. The incident brought
into sharp focus the issue of racial discrimination in hotels, clubs and bars in Nigeria and
led to the formation of the United Front Committee of prominent members of the NYM
and the NCNC, including Azikiwe. On 20 March 1947 Richards, who had initially been
unmoved by the incident, made a statement to the Legislative Council that the
government would not countenance discrimination based on race or colour; this was
followed by the issuing of a circular outlining government policy (see 32).]
I had a talk of over an hour with Mr. Cummings yesterday. The first part of this was
taken up with a most interesting account of his impressions of all four West African
territories, particularly on the point of race relations. In that respect the Gold Coast
is, of course, by far the best. Partly because that territory has a much higher
proportion of educated Africans, partly because the Administration has shown
goodwill by promoting Africans to quite senior appointments, but mainly through
09-(Doc28-60)-cp  15/7/01  7:26 am  Page 100
[31] MAR 1947 101
the personal influence and efforts of Sir Alan Burns and a few others who think with
him, race relations in the Gold Coast are incomparably better than in any other
territory Mr. Cummings knows.
In Sierra Leone matters have much improved in this respect since Mr. Cummings
was last there in 1945. But present policy over higher education and over the
Municipality are still strongly resented by many even of the better disposed Africans.
In the Gambia Mr. Cummings thought that race relationships were reasonably good.
Mr. Cummings presents a quite different picture in Nigeria. He agrees that
relationships are most embittered in and near Lagos but feels that a similar feeling is
gradually pervading the whole country. He agrees that this is in part due to the
influence of the Zik press but regards the attitude which a very large number of
European officers take up towards Africans as contributing at least as much to
present troubles. Several of the examples which he gave of that attitude are touched
upon in the attached Reuters report (No. 13)1 of Sir A. Richards’ speech at the
opening of the Nigerian Legislature. Sir A. Richards did not however, mention the
European Club at Ikeja which so Mr. Cummings told me, will not admit Africans of
whatever position even as visitors for a single meal. For example, Mr. Macarthy,
when visiting Nigeria as a member of the West African Court of Appeal, is
accommodated at Ikeja but not admitted to the Club and has to bring his own cook
with him. Mr. Cummings mentioned this, together with the past exclusion of all
Africans from the European Hospital at Lagos, as making for the embitterment of the
more educated coloured people.
We spent the last half hour of our talk in discussing the Bristol Hotel incident. While
Mr. Cummings naturally feels strongly over this, I am satisfied from my talk with him
that he has no wish to be vindictive and would prefer not to cause embarrassment to
the Secretary of State or the Nigerian Government. But he did represent strongly to
me his view that the Greek proprietor of the hotel deserved to be expelled from Nigeria
and that, if the Nigerian Government really wished to make it plain to the people of
the country that they would not tolerate race discrimination, they ought to use pow-
ers which (as Mr. Cummings represents) they do possess to deport the proprietor with-
out taking any preliminary legal proceedings against him. I said this would be a strong
measure and told Mr. Cummings of the substance of the Governor’s view in the
telegram at No. 9. I also told him of the advice given to the Governor, and (as I under-
stand it) upheld here, that as Mr. Cummings did not seek a remedy at law while in
Nigeria, it would be difficult, in the absence of some conviction against the proprietor,
to take punitive action. Mr. Cummings represents that the Nigerian Government
could at least proceed against the proprietor for breach of contract in having at the
instance of that Government reserved accommodation for Mr. Keith and Mr.
Cummings on which reservation he later went back. This point should now be exam-
ined though I doubt whether there can be anything in it.
As the Governor has (see the third page of No. 13) now stated publicly that the
future arrangements for the licensing of hotels and bars in Nigeria are to be based on
the principle of no discrimination on account of race, I think that this unfortunate
incident must be regarded as having served its purpose and that, subject to such
further consideration as can be given to it in the light of the point raised in the
preceding paragraph, no further action should be required in Nigeria.
1 Not printed.
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One point about which Mr. Cummings naturally feels badly is that not a single word
of apology was ever spoken to him by the Governor, the Chief Secretary or the
Administrative Secretary, all of whom were closely involved in this unhappy business.
This point must be brought out in the reply which eventually goes to Sir A. Richards’
letter at No. 12; I should like the Department to consider and to advise whether, as the
Nigerian Government failed in what seems to me to be its elementary duty in this mat-
ter, Mr. Cummings should not have some letter of regret on this incident from the
Secretary of State. I, of course, made my own views plain in the talk yesterday.
32 CO 554/152/1, no 22 April 1947
[Bristol Hotel incident]: letter from G Beresford Stooke to A B Cohen
on the outcome of the Bristol Hotel incident.
Many thanks for your letter of the 6th March, 1947. May I congratulate you on your
promotion to be Superintending Assistant Secretary—at least I assume that this is a
promotion, and may I say, too, how pleased we were to find ourselves once again
under your protecting wing.
We have been having rather a busy and exciting time lately. You will have heard all
about the Bristol Hotel and the Colour bar. In many ways I think it is a very good
thing that this happened. It has enabled us to clear the air very considerably, and I
enclose for your information the notes of a meeting held between the Governor and a
body known as the United Front Committee.1 I think I can truthfully say that, with a
few exceptions which I shall mention later, Africans on the whole are pleased and
satisfied with the outcome. The Governor in his opening speech at Legislative
Council took the further opportunity of making the attitude of the Government
towards colour discrimination unmistakeably clear. The exceptions to which I refer
are the politicians headed by Azikiwe who raised the question as a political issue and
are disappointed that by the Governor’s prompt action they have been deprived of
what could have been a very formidable weapon.
Legislative Council has, I am thankful to say, gone extremely well in spite of the
fact that Azikiwe and his two colleagues decided at the last moment to abstain from
attending the Council. All the Unofficial Members present welcomed the new
Constitution and most, if not all, of them appreciated the very real advance which
has been made. They are taking their work as Members very seriously, so much so
that proceedings in the Select Committee on the Estimates are taking rather longer
than we thought they would.
The Provincial Members from the Northern Provinces were very outspoken about
Azikiwe and the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons. They said quite
plainly that they were capable of making their own representations and did not
require the people from the South to do it for them. Their complete refusal to
identify themselves in any way with the National Council for Nigeria and the
Cameroons has, I am told, been a great disappointment to Azikiwe. The latter has, of
course, made a great blunder in boycotting the Council, and has only succeeded in
putting himself in an impossible position with regard to his proposed visit to
1 Meeting held on 8 March 1947; notes not printed. The delegation included Azikiwe, Sir Adeyemo Alakija,
Ernest Ikoli, H O Davies, Adeleke Adedoyin, Dr Olorun-Nimbe, J K Randle and Dr K A Abayomi.
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London. Personally, I am very much inclined to doubt whether he will now continue
with his plan to head a delegation to England, since the only possible outcome must
be the further deflation of the National Council.
While one can never tell from day to day what these people are going to do next,
they do not appear at the moment to have any very effective whip with which to beat
the Government. The one which I am very much afraid they will have placed in their
hands very soon concerns the question of palm oil prices, but as you have probably
already seen all that we have said on that subject there is no point in repeating it. The
only other question which is really worrying us at the moment is the shortage of
trained Administrative staff with the result that in some parts of the country, at any
rate, the Administration is rapidly losing touch with the people. Unfortunately, too,
we have a number of Residents who should never have been promoted, and will I
hope be retired under the new Harragin terms.3 The position will right itself to a
certain extent when the new Cadets have settled down, but it is the present situation
which causes us some disquiet.
I might add that the air is still comparatively thick with threats of strikes—but
that is a state of affairs to which we are now quite accustomed.
2 A secretariat circular on ‘Racial discrimination’, issued to members of the Nigerian Service over
Beresford Stooke’s signature on 21 March, read:
‘As a result of the recent incident at the Bristol Hotel, Lagos, His Excellency has given very careful
consideration to various aspects of inter-racial contact in Nigeria with a view to eliminating all possible
grounds for suspicion that it is the policy of Government in any way to countenance, let alone to
encourage, colour discrimination in any shape or form.
2. For this purpose His Excellency met a deputation of the Island Club ‘United Front Committee’ and
discussed with the members a number of questions which appear to have created among Africans the
impression that Government condoned and was prepared to perpetuate such discrimination. In the
course of the meeting His Excellency made a clear pronouncement of Government policy in this respect
and, lest there should be any misapprehension in this matter, His Excellency has directed that a copy of
the notes of the meeting and of this circular shall be sent to every European Government Officer.
3. It is apparent that there exists among Africans a considerable misunderstanding and that
distinctions based on economic, social and cultural factors which apply between African and African are
attributed to colour discrimination when made by Europeans. It will probably take time to dispel this
mistaken idea and it can only be dispelled by continuous and conscious action by every European Officer.
4. I am therefore directed to invite attention to this reiteration of Government policy and to say that
His Excellency, relies on every European Officer to co-operate in its fulfilment’ (CO 554/152/1).
3 The report of Sir Walter Harragin, chief justice of the Gold Coast, on the structure and remuneration of
the civil service in the West African colonies, was completed in December 1946, Report of the Commission
on the Civil Services of British West Africa 1945–1946, col. no. 209 (1947). It recommended, inter alia,
wage increases for civil servants and the introduction of expatriation pay for expatriate staff, as well as a
higher entry point for African technical staff; these recommendations were accepted by Creech Jones.
33 CO 583/296/6 2 & 3 June 1947
[Regional councils]: minutes by A Emanuel and K E Robinson on the
regional councils established under the 1947 constitution
[The new constitution came into effect in January 1947. Under its provisions houses of
assembly were set up for the Eastern, Western and Northern provinces, together with a
house of chiefs for the Northern provinces. Concern was expressed within the CO both on
how members were chosen and on the calibre of deliberations that ensued.]
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On this file are the minutes of the meetings of the Northern House of Assembly on
the 20th and 21st January and of the Northern House of Chiefs on 10th and 11th
February.
2. The meetings were not much more than inauguration ceremonies. At the first
meeting of the Northern House of Assembly messages were read from the Governor
and the O.A.G. and the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Provinces. Standing
rules and orders were passed and an address made by the President of the House
(Captain E.W. Thompstone, Senior Resident, Kano Province, who has since been
promoted Chief Commissioner). At the second meeting the most important item was
the selection of the Representatives of the House for the Legislative Council; 14
nominations were received out of which 5 were selected.
3. There was apparently some debate in which most of the unofficial members
took part but this was presumably of little interest since what was said was not
recorded.
4. Proceedings at the House of Chiefs were more or less in the same style but the
minutes of the first meeting do record a reply to the message from the Governor by
the Sultan of Sokoto.1 The Sultan while welcoming the constitutional advance
underlined the importance attaching to advice on the matters of religion.
5. Mr. Robinson, Mr. Cohen and possibly higher authority may like to see these
proceedings since they do after all mark the effective beginning of a new period of
constitutional advance. They will also wish to see the similar proceedings of the
Western and Eastern Houses of Assembly on /2 and /3, on which I have minuted
separately.
6. It is not of course possible to draw any conclusion from these first meetings,
concerning the ability of the unofficial members of each House to represent
effectively the views of the populations of their areas. For a guide to this we must
await future meetings.
A.E.
2.6.47
I do not think the proceedings of the three Nigerian Regional Councils particularly
impressive: though this was only the first meeting they have a formality which sug-
gests to me I am afraid that there is little intention of making their proceedings a
reality. Perhaps that is unduly cynical but I cannot help comparing these proceed-
ings with those of the Northern Rhodesian African Representative Council, which
you sent me recently: after all there is certainly no reason why at any rate the two
Southern Councils in Nigeria should not be as good as the Northern Rhodesian
one. It is of course too early to arrive at any definite conclusion on this point but I
am sure that the line of policy is to insist on the maximum possible use being made
of these Councils and for the Secretary of State to take every possible opportunity
of satisfying himself that all important measures have been fully considered by
them.
2. I cannot help wondering whether the somewhat anodyne character of the
proceedings may not reflect the rather mysterious process by which the members
have been selected. I was not, as you were, concerned with the proceedings leading
1 Sir Abubakar, KBE, Sultan of Sokoto, installed 1938.
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up to the new Nigerian constitution but it has always seemed to me rather ominous
that the constitution should provide that the unofficial membership of the Regional
Councils should be composed in a manner of which we know nothing e.g. the
Western House of Assembly is to consist inter alia of ‘not less than 15 nor more than
19 unofficial members who shall be:— . . .
(1) . . .
(2) Such number of members not being less than 7 nor more than 11 (who shall be
called provincial members) selected as hereinafter provided as the Governor may
from time to time direct in writing.’
Similarly in the case of the provincial members of other regional councils in Nigeria.
So far as I am aware we have never seen the Governor’s directions in writing on this
point and it appears to me to be one of major importance. It is perhaps worth
remembering that in the Gold Coast, the ‘electoral colleges’ are themselves
constituted independently of the Governor. The Joint Provincial Council (from
which the Provincial members of the Legislative Council are elected) is itself
constituted by the Gold Coast Legislative Council Order in Council and in fact
consists of all paramount chiefs (or their duly accredited representatives) plus one
member of the native authority for every area which does not include a State or part
of a State, such member having been chosen by such native authority as there [sic]
representative.
3. It may well be that in the very different conditions of Nigeria it is unavoidable
that these Regional Councils should have a somewhat artificial character: but I think
we ought to know how in fact the provincial members of the Houses of Assembly are
chosen. I think that we might well ask the Governor to provide us with this
information.2
K.E.R.
3.6.47
2 See 40 and 41.
34 CO 583/292/2, no 19 5 June 1947
[NCNC delegation]: despatch no 20 from Sir A Richards to Mr Creech
Jones on the NCNC delegation to the CO
[During 1946 the NCNC undertook a tour of Nigeria to mobilise opposition to the new
constitution and to raise funds for sending a delegation to London. The tour was a
considerable success both in terms of the funds raised and the support gained,
particularly when Herbert Macaulay, the doyen of Nigerian politics and the president of
the NCNC, died during it. See 29. His funeral attracted massive crowds. The NCNC
delegation visited London during 1947 and met Creech Jones on 13 Aug. See 38. However
not all Nigerians accepted the delegation’s claims to represent the whole of Nigeria and
divisions began to appear among Nigerian leaders, most notably articulated by Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa, a Northern member of the Legislative Council. This was soon to express
itself in press allegations concerning the funds raised during the NCNC tour.]
I have the honour to refer to your Secret telegram No. 686 of the 10th May on the
subject of the proposed visit to the United Kingdom of a delegation of the National
Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, and to inform you that it has now been
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officially announced that the persons who will comprise the delegation are Dr.
Azikiwe, Dr. Olorun-Nimbe and Mr. Adedoyin1 representing the Colony; Mrs.
Ransome-Kuti2 representing the Western Provinces; the Hon. Nyong Essien3
representing the Eastern Provinces; Mallam Bukar Dipcherima4 representing the
Northern Provinces and Mr. P.M. Kale,5 representing the Cameroons. Photographs of
these persons are attached. Biographical notes on Azikiwe and Olorun-Nimbe were
sent to you with my Secret Despatch of the 4th of August, 1946,6 and I now enclose
similar notes on the other members of the delegation (Enclosure A).7
2. Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe has already left Lagos, having sailed in S.S. ‘Almanzora’
on the 12th of May, with the intention of first visiting the United States and
returning to the United Kingdom in time to meet the other members of the
delegation when they arrive. These have provisionally booked passages in
S.S. ‘Elizabethville’ which is due to leave Lagos on the 22nd of June.
3. The history of the N.C.N.C., its place in Nigerian politics and the purpose of
the proposed delegation were fully explained in the Note which formed an enclosure
to my Secret Despatch of the 4th of August, 1946. The purpose of this despatch is to
supplement that information with such additional material as may assist you in
dealing with any matters the delegation may raise.
4. When I wrote my previous despatch the N.C.N.C. delegates had not completed
their tour and were about to enter the Western Provinces. There is no doubt that
when they did so they found their reception disappointing. The principal Chiefs and
their Councillors, together with other responsible men, either declined to receive
them at all, or did so very coolly, and their attitude is perhaps summed up in a letter
(Enclosure B) addressed by the Oni of Ife to the Senior Resident, Oyo Province.
Several less important Chiefs who met them have since expressed annoyance that
what amounted to no more than the traditional Yoruba hospitality, that would have
been extended to any guest, should have been misrepresented in the reports issued
by the delegation to the Press, as active support of the delegation’s objects. True to
their tactics, the delegates suited their approach to their audience. They adopted a
reasonable and restrained attitude: they were not against the Government; the last
thing they wanted was to see the Europeans leave Nigeria. Nevertheless, the attitude
of the people generally was indifference and the only support they obtained was from
teachers and some, though not all, of the younger generation of literates.
5. Recent events have somewhat weakened the influence of the N.C.N.C. The
three leaders of the movement, Azikiwe, Olorun-Nimbe and Adedoyin, made a grave
1 Adeleke Adedoyin, magistrate and commissioner of Supreme Court; elected to Lagos Town Council and
to Legislative Council, 1947; secretary of NCNC; elected to Western House of Assembly and to House of
Representatives, 1951; joined the AG, speaker of Western House of Assembly, 1957.
2 Mrs Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti, principal of CMS Girls School, Abeokuta; founder of the Egba
Women’s Union.
3 Nyong Essien, clerk in the Nigerian civil service; leading member of the Ibibio Union; member of the
Legislative Council and Eastern House of Assembly.
4 Zana Bukar Dipcharima, teacher; member of the NCNC; joined the NPC in 1954; elected to House of
Representatives, 1954; minister of state without portfolio, 1957; later minister of commerce and industry.
5 Paul Monyonge Kale, headmaster of Salvation Army School, Lagos; president of Cameroons Youth
League.
6 See 29. 4 Aug should read 9 Aug.
7 Enclosures not printed.
09-(Doc28-60)-cp  15/7/01  7:26 am  Page 106
[34] JUNE 1947 107
political blunder in failing to take their seats in Legislative Council and undoubtedly
forfeited the confidence of a considerable number of people by their action. They
committed a further blunder by falling out with the United Front Committee when
that body achieved what was regarded as a great political success in connection with
the ‘Bristol Hotel incident’. The United Front Committee when originally formed
consisted predominantly of Lagosians of moderate views and they did not take kindly
to a suggestion put forward by Azikiwe that the Committee, of which Azikiwe was
himself a member, should become merged in the N.C.N.C. An attack launched upon
them by Zik’s Press for ‘failing to co-operate’ completed the estrangement and
resulted in an opposition group arising with the aim of breaking Azikiwe and the
N.C.N.C. whose irresponsibility, they consider, can only spell ruin for the country. So
far the United Front Committee has made no public pronouncement of its intentions
but there is good reason to believe that a series of articles which have recently
appeared in the ‘Daily Service’ and the ‘Nigerian Daily Times’ openly attacking the
N.C.N.C. were inspired by this body. I enclose cuttings of these articles (Enclosure C)
because there are indications that they reflect the growing distrust not only of the
more moderate elements of Lagos but certain less irresponsible elements in other
parts of Nigeria who were formerly disposed to support the N.C.N.C.
6. In the Northern Provinces, the N.C.N.C. and its doctrines have been flatly
rejected, and the movement has achieved nothing beyond provoking extreme
indignation at what is regarded as its impudent claim to be in a position to speak for
the people of the North. The concern the Northern people feel in this matter is
illustrated by a letter (Enclosure D) written by the Mallam the Hon. Abubakar
Balewa8 (Second Member for the Northern Provinces) to the Resident, Bauchi
Province, and in the attached extracts (Enclosure E) from speeches made at the last
meeting of Legislative Council by the Second and Fourth Members for the Northern
Provinces. In presenting these unequivocal views the Members in question were
undoubtedly speaking with the authentic voice of the North, and it will therefore be
readily appreciated that extreme difficulty was experienced in finding any one at all in
the Northern Provinces who was willing to join the delegation. This is further
evidenced by the fact that after their unsuccessful efforts to entice Mallam Abubakar
Balewa into the fold, the N.C.N.C. was reduced to accepting an obscure young man
who has no standing in his own locality and who has never been heard of out of it.
7. Enthusiasm for the N.C.N.C. has undoubtedly waned with the subsidence of
the excitement occasioned by their tour of Nigeria but it would be folly to assume
from this, and from the critical attitude now being adopted by certain sections of the
public, that the N.C.N.C. is a spent force. As long as Azikiwe lends it his support it
will continue to command the backing of a large proportion of the literate and semi-
literate elements, especially in the Eastern Provinces.
8. It is difficult to say what line the delegation will take when it arrives in the
United Kingdom. When questioned their reply has invariably been that they have
8 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa rejected the delegation’s invitation to join it, ‘with aims of which I do not agree.
This invitation cannot be regarded as attempt to promote unity’, enclosure D. In March 1947 he had
spoken in the Legislative Council to repudiate the NCNC’s leadership and, in the context of demands for
early self-government, had referred with foreboding to the historic conflict between the north and the
south of what was now Nigeria; once the British left, he said, the north would continue its interrupted
march to the sea.
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their plans and will reveal them when the time is appropriate. The only public
announcement they have so far made is a ‘Statement of National Policy’ which
Azikiwe published on the eve of his departure. It will be observed that this statement,
(Enclosure F) contains nothing new beyond advocating a policy of non-co-operation,
a policy which Azikiwe may well endeavour to carry into effect when he returns to
Nigeria. The delegation’s ostensible purpose is still to secure an alteration to the new
Constitution and the repeal of the four ‘obnoxious’ ordinances, but it seems that
their hope of being able to move you on any of these subjects has waned and it is
probables that they will concentrate their energies upon contacting individuals and
groups who they consider are likely to show sympathy to their cause. What their
exact aims are is far from clear and it is doubtful whether the delegates have any
clear idea themselves, beyond a desire to embarrass the Government.
9. You are aware that the N.C.N.C.’s views on the Constitution are shaped by
nobody but themselves but it is probable that this knowledge is not shared by many
of the people and groups with which the delegates will seek to establish contact. In
the hope that they may be of assistance in dispelling any erroneous impressions the
delegates may create, I enclose further extracts (Enclosure G) from the speeches on
the subject of the Constitution made by the African Unofficial Members of Legislative
Council. I suggest that these alone furnish sufficient proof, if any be required, that
the Constitution is not only acceptable to, but welcomed by, responsible Africans in
all parts of Nigeria.
10. I dealt with the so-called ‘obnoxious’ Ordinances in my Secret despatch of
the 4th of August, 1946, but I desire to take the opportunity of correcting one small
error. It was stated in the enclosure to that despatch that the fourth ‘obnoxious’
Ordinance is the Royal West African Frontier Force (Nigeria Regt) (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1945, and the N.C.N.C. in fact stated when they commenced their
campaign that this was the fourth Ordinance to which they took exception. They very
soon dropped it, however, and substituted the Crown Lands (Amendment)
Ordinance, 1945. This Ordinance merely enlarged the definition of Crown lands to
include land acquired under the provisions of the Public Lands Acquisition
Ordinance and was a corollary to section 3 of the Public Lands Acquisition
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1945.
11. With regard to the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance, during
a recent tour of the Western Provinces, the Ibadan Divisional Council presented me
with an address of welcome containing the following pertinent passage which more
than speaks for itself:—
‘One other matter that is worrying our minds is the alarming frequency with
which chieftaincy disputes are being taken to the Magistrates’ and High
Courts, where, as it appears to us, native laws and customs are neither
understood nor respected.
When over a year ago Your Excellency’s Government foresaw the evil and
introduced an Ordinance presumably to save the situation and to preserve our
time-honoured chieftaincy customs and usages criticisms came in torrents
against Your Excellency and Your Government from those who knew little or
nothing at all of our difficulties and the intricate customs upon which
selection of chiefs rests, especially in the Yoruba land. We who are intimately
connected and know our own customs in practice and not in theory, now
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appreciate your vision and praise your wisdom in so far as that section of it
which makes it impossible for chieftaincy disputes to go before British Law
Courts is concerned. Our wish is that that Ordinance be made to cover all
minor chieftaincies’.
12. It has been a characteristic of the N.C.N.C. to level abuse against
Government Officers and particularly against the Administrative Service which is not
surprising in view of the duty of Administrative Officers to give to the people
entrusted to their care political advice which is seldom palatable to the N.C.N.C. It
was particularly gratifying to me in the course of my tour to receive spontaneous
assurances of the peoples’ confidence in their Administrative Officers. In an address
presented to me by the Ede District Council it was stated:—
‘The Ibadan District in general and the Northern Districts in particular is
always lucky in the type of Administrative Officers we have in our midst. We
must therefore take this opportunity to pay tribute to their good work among
us. They give us useful advices and guidance whenever we need them. In the
hands of such men the destiny of the country is safe and sure’
Similar assurances were given me wherever I went, coupled invariably with the
request that the number of Administrative Officers should be materially increased.
13. It is possible that the delegation will wish to raise the question of Lagos Town
Planning proposals. Their arguments, if they do, are likely to be those that were
advanced in the memorial which was forwarded with my confidential despatch No. 69
of the 31st of March, and I trust that that despatch and its enclosures will provide you
with sufficient information to enable you to answer any representations on this
subject that they may make.
14. The delegation expects to be away from Nigeria for a period of from three
months to one year. That they have set such wide limits to the duration of their
expedition is possibly due to the fact that they have mooted the possibility of visiting
America, France and Russia. One of the objects of these visits, if they take place, will
be to endeavour to establish business connections with West Africa but it is not
improbable that a more important purpose will be to endeavour to obtain support for
bringing their case before the United Nations Organisation. It is doubtful, however,
whether the delegation’s financial resources will permit them to embark on such
extensive travels, though possibly Azikiwe himself may take the opportunity of going
to Russia if he can get there. He is believed to be anxious to visit that country.
35 CO 583/292/2, no 21 10 June 1947
[NCNC delegation]: letter from G Beresford Stooke to A B Cohen
describing the views of the Nigerian government on Dr Azikiwe’s
personality, his methods, his delegation and his financial support
The following comments on Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in particular, and the National
Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons in general, may be of some interest to you in
view of the proposed visit to England by a delegation of this body.
The first point to be made about Azikiwe is that he is an Ibo. An outstanding
characteristic of the Ibos is that their tribal authority is unusually weak. A Yoruba
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commented to me the other day that the Ibo youth will speak to his local Chief, or
indeed to his own father, in a manner which would not be tolerated for one moment
amongst the Yoruba. The individualism and independence of the Ibo is very marked.
You will find when you meet him that Azikiwe himself is well spoken and, on the
surface at any rate, very reasonable. He usually succeeds in impressing people with
his sincerity of purpose and in persuading those who do not know him very well that
he is sadly misunderstood. He will say that he is anxious to co-operate with the
Government; that he is not at all anti-British, nor indeed, anti-European, but that he
has been driven into his present position by an unsympathetic and hostile
Government. That is where he can be so very dangerous. He is quite unscrupulous,
and is always ready to say whatever he thinks will appeal to the audience of the
moment. He has no regard whatever for the truth, and will make any statement or
give any promise which will advance his cause with no more intention of keeping his
promises than the late Mr. Hitler had. In fact, his methods in many ways remind one
of Hitler, and have possibly been copied from him. However, the point is that he is
able to impress people—particularly people who do not know very much about
Nigeria.
In many ways he is clever. He has of course put us in a weak position by organising
this delegation to England without giving us any intimation at all of what his real
aims and objects are. We have no idea what he is going to ask for or what arguments
he is going to put forward, and consequently it is very difficult for us to brief you
satisfactorily. We can only guess the line that he is going to take and brief you on
that.
It seems likely that he will object to the new Constitution on the grounds that it is
not democratic, since Native Authorities are part of the Government of Nigeria, and
that whatever we may say, their representatives will feel themselves bound to support
Government. In this, of course, he hardly does justice to his own friend Nyong
Essien. He may ask for universal franchise, but I think he will certainly demand an
unofficial majority of Elected Members whatever the basis of franchise may be. On
this point the remarks, at the last meeting of Legislative Council, of Chief Bowari
Brown, himself from the Eastern Provinces, are of interest.1
It is important to note that Azikiwe has not succeeded in gaining the support of a
single responsible and intelligent African. You will see from the biographical
sketches of the other delegates that they can hardly be called a very impressive
collection. The people of Lagos are getting so tired of Azikiwe that the United Front
Committee led by Sir Adeyemo Alakija is now gaining considerable support.2 It is also
notable that the Lagos Chiefs, some of whom strongly supported Azikiwe a little time
ago, have now withdrawn their support from the N.C.N.C.
1 Chief Bowari Brown, the second member for the Eastern Provinces, referring to the issue of a
‘substantial unofficial majority’ in the Legislative Council, expressed his hope that the administration
would ‘give us a constitution equally as good as that of the Gold Coast, if not better’, but urged patience on
his colleagues. ‘It is for us to be patient . . . and we shall eventually achieve our aim. It is not necessary I
believe that there should be any employment of offensive or destructive weapons of any kind in
endeavouring to achieve this aim. We certainly can do it peacefully, loyally and agreeably . . . I believe we
shall not be denied self-government when it is time for us to get it—Rome was not built in a day . . . Let us
therefore wait patiently, loyally and unitedly . . .’ (CO 583/292/2, no 19, enclosure G, extracts from
speeches of unofficial members of Legislative Council on new constitution).
2 See 32.
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It has been reported that the N.C.N.C. proposes to institute legal proceedings in
England against the Nigerian Government for ‘constituting an illegal Council’ as
they hold, apparently, that the presence of the Lagos Members in the Council is
essential to its legal constitution. In this contention they appear to have been
supported by some lawyers in London. We do not know the name of the firm but
their telegraphic address is ‘Rexworthys’. It seems that the only people who are likely
to profit from this manoeuvre will be the lawyers themselves.
You may be interested to have a note of the finances of the N.C.N.C. If their
accounts are anything like correct they have received over £13,000 in donations from
the public. It is said that of this £13,000, some £5,000 is ‘unaccounted for’. Of the
money actually collected over £3,000 have already been spent. £1,120 appears under
the vague heading of ‘Allowances’. Postage has absorbed already the high figure of
£254, and no less than £1,088 has been spent on transport. They expect that the costs
of the delegation will be about £8,500 of which passages account for £1,400, board
and lodging for the delegates £2,700, transport £1,000, Secretariat expenses £1,000,
legal expenses £1,000, and propaganda £1,000 with £350 for outfits for the delegates.
After Azikiwe left Lagos a meeting of the Executive Committee approved the payment
to Dr. Nimbe of £1,000 down, plus monthly payments to cover the salaries of the staff
at his Nursing Home during his absence in England. The account of the meeting
states that Mr. Adedoyin presented a ‘similar claim’ which was also approved. These
payments can be met either by reducing the expenses of the delegation at home, or
by raising more funds, and it was decided to send the Assistant Secretary of the
Council on a tour of Nigeria to raise more funds. He has, however, not yet left Lagos.
It is interesting to note that Azikiwe does not apply his democratic principles in
the affairs of the National Council for Nigeria in that the selection of delegates to
represent different parts of the country has been made, not by the subscribers, but
arbitrarily by Azikiwe and his friends here in Lagos. In this he has had a little
difficulty. His first selection, made as recently as last April, was as follows:—
Nnamdi Azikiwe
Dr. Olorun-Nimbe
Adeleke Adedoyin
Nyong Essien
Dr. Udo Udoma
Dipcherima of Bornu
Mallam Abubakar Balewa of Bauchi
(2nd Northern Member of the 
Legislative Council)
and in addition:
Chief Oluwa
Chief Onikoyi, and
Chief Oniru
of Lagos, on the understanding that these last three paid all their own expenses.
Mallam Abubakar Balewa replied to the invitation in the following terms: ‘I will not
join a delegation with the aims of which I do not agree’. Dr. Udo Udoma decided to
join the United Front Committee instead.
Early in May the list of the chosen was:—
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Azikiwe
Olorun-Nimbe
Adedoyin
Chief Shodipo of Abeokuta
Dipcherima of Bornu
Kale, from the Cameroons, and
Chief Amobi of Ogidi.3
By this time the Lagos Chiefs had ceased to take any further interest in the N.C.N.C.
It is not clear whether or not Chief Shodipo of Abeokuta refused to go, or whether on
reconsideration Azikiwe thought that Mrs. Ransom Kuti would be a better person.
Chief Amobi of Ogidi was also dropped, and so we come to the final selection which
has already been given to you.
Dipcherima recently visited Lagos and appears to have been so disappointed with
the company in which he found himself that he returned to the North. He will not,
we gather, join the deputation to London.
A report just received from Patterson says that the educated and progressive men
in the Northern Provinces are so perturbed at the claim of Azikiwe and his friends to
have authority to speak for the Northern Provinces that the proposal has been made
that a delegation from the North should be sent to the U.K. for the sole purpose of
denying this claim.
The people whom Azikiwe chiefly represents are the ‘have-nots’—those members
of the educated and semi-educated classes who are dissatisfied because their
education has not given them the lucrative returns which they hoped for. If Azikiwe
were to disappear from the stage tomorrow, his place would at once be taken by
another. The movement is, in fact, a symptom of the stage of development through
which Nigeria is now passing. A sound cure can be provided only by progressive
economic and political development. The foundations for this development have
been laid in the new Constitution and the Development Plan, but success will depend
largely upon keeping economic and political development in step with each other.
Azikiwe wants to push political development ahead of economic development. That
would be fatal to both.
3 See 34.
36 CO 583/292/3 12 Aug 1947
[NCNC delegation]: minute by K E Robinson on the NCNC
memorandum for the meeting with Mr Creech Jones on 13 August
Secretary of State
The memorandum from the Delegation of the National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons, which you are seeing tomorrow morning was only received in the
Department this morning and in the time available it is obviously impossible to
examine it in any detail.
2. The Delegation divide their representations into the following groups:—
(a) Objections to the Richards’ Constitution.
(b) Objections to the ‘obnoxious’ ordinances.
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(c) Objections to certain laws or sections of laws which deny basic human rights.
(d) Complaints about alleged acts of maladministration.
(e) A protest against the Government of Nigeria and the Cameroons as if they are
an exclusive Colonial possession of Great Britain. This is based on the alleged
treaty obligations arising out of the protectorate status of most of Nigeria.
(f ) Demands for immediate steps towards self-government for Nigeria and the
Cameroons.
3. As regards (a)–(e) separate notes are attached.1
4. As regards (f ), which is the nub of the whole memorandum, the Delegation
ask that immediate steps be taken towards self-government for Nigeria and the
Cameroons and that this should be done in three stages, namely,
(1) a period of ‘at least 10 years’ when an Anglo–Nigerian condominium will
govern the country.
(2) a further period of 5 years during which the Anglo–Nigerian condominium
will be replaced by a Nigerian interim government.
(3) at the end of these two periods a treaty should be concluded between Nigeria
and presumably the United Kingdom under which Nigeria would become an
independent self-governing Domination and an autonomous unit of the British
Commonwealth. The proposed Condominium is not at all clearly explained but it
is apparently intended that a central parliament should be established composed of
equal numbers of members from each of the eight protectorates in [to] which it is
proposed Nigeria should be divided and that the majority party in this parliament
should provide the Cabinet composed of 15 Ministers together with the Prime
Minister and three Secretaries of State (who seem reminiscent of the officers of
state in the Donoughmore Constitution in Ceylon). Nothing is said about the
Secretaries of State, however, in the Draft Constitution.
5. Each of the Protectorates would have its own Governor and Lieutenant
Governor and its own legislative council. Both the Central Legislature and the
Protectorate Legislatures would be elected by universal adult suffrage.
6. Quite apart from the details of these proposals, which are very confused, it is
clearly premature to consider any such constitutional change in Nigeria at the
present time. If you were going to be available in the United Kingdom in the
immediate future you might wish merely to listen to anything the Delegation may
have to say on this and other aspects of their proposals and then to appoint a time at
which you would give them your reply. This, however, will not be practicable in view
of your departure for the West Indies next week. Though, therefore, it will clearly be
necessary for some of the new points of detail which they have now raised, especially
under (c) and (d) to be referred to the Government of Nigeria and considered at more
leisure, it is recommended that on the main issue of the immediate grant of self-
government or a new constitution you should make it clear to the Delegation
straight away that you cannot consider this at the present stage and that it is up to
them to go back to Nigeria and make every effort to work the new Constitution and
demonstrate their capacity for further advance. If you were merely to undertake to
1 Not printed.
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consider their views on this major issue it would not be possible for them to be given
any final reply until after your return from the West Indies and there would be
serious danger that in the meantime they would put it about that their proposals in
this matter were being seriously considered by H.M.G. This would be most
embarrassing to the Nigerian Government and would provide a useful excuse for the
Delegation to remain in the United Kingdom.
7. One general point which might also be made in this connection is that many
of the points raised in their memorandum are matters which should be taken up, if
they wish to do so, in the Nigerian Legislature and thrashed out there.
37 CO 859/136/5, no 4 20 Aug 1947
[Mass education]: despatch no 203 from Sir A Richards to Mr Creech
Jones on the Nigerian government’s programme for mass education
I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 127 on the subject of Mass Education
and to say that the Report on Mass Education in African Society (Col. 186) has been
widely read in both official and unofficial circles in this country. Much has been
written on the subject and a variety of opinions has been expressed. I will therefore in
this despatch confine myself to informing you what has so far been achieved and the
programme which I intend to follow in the future.
2. The progress so far achieved has consisted of controlled experiments
conducted in selected areas. At the present time and with our limitations in regard to
resources I do not consider that the subject is suitable for a formal long-term plan
and consider that it should be treated more empirically. My advisers are all agreed
that the first essential for success is the active co-operation of the people. Efforts
have therefore been concentrated on those areas where the people have shown the
necessary energy and initiative to make a start under the guidance and with the
assistance of Administrative and Education Officers.
3. A report on these experiments was forwarded to your Education Adviser in
December 1946 in response to your telegram 1645 of the 22nd of November, 1946. 
In addition an account of the territory’s Mass Education work has been published in
‘Overseas Education.’ These publications have, I believe, evoked recognition that
Nigeria is one of the areas in which a promising start has been made. My address to
the Legislative Council in March 1945 and in March 1946 set out this Government’s
policy in regard to Mass Education. An expansion of the Welfare and Public Relations
Departments is gradually taking place and they will assist with the social education
side of this problem, while the Education Department will concern itself primarily
with fundamental Adult Education.
4. In regard to the future the Education Department will continue to
concentrate its efforts on fundamental Adult Education which covers:—
(a) instruction in reading and writing and the vernacular;
(b) English for those who desire it;
(c) elementary arithmetic for farmers;
(d) organized discussions on matters of interest;
(e) instruction in matters which lend themselves to treatment by class room
method, such as cooking and sewing for women;
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(f) production of simple reading material in the vernacular and in English
suitable for adults.
5. I consider that a literacy campaign on these lines is essential. It is something
in which all can play a part, either as teacher or pupil. Its success in a village can be a
measure of the success [?extent] to which that village is likely to be prepared to
discipline itself and undertake its own social education. Not counting Udi Division
mass literacy campaigns are now progressing in nine homogeneous areas under the
supervision of African Adult Education organizers, nine of whom are ex-soldiers.
Each area has a population of about 80,000 and it has been selected after careful
consideration. In deciding on the areas the factors advocated by the Advisory
Committee were all considered, though in each case there was one factor which
outweighed the others. It may be of interest to you to know the areas which have
been selected and the reasons for their selection. They are as follows:—
Area Principal Factor
Zuru Contains large number of ex-soldiers.
Misau A very progressive Emir whose people
are readily adopting improved
agricultural methods.
Abuja A development area.
Southern Tiv A development area.
Kankiya District An area containing a large
demonstration farm.
Ado-Ekiti District The most educationally minded area
in the Western Provinces.
Ilaro An area in which an intensive campaign
of children’s education has recently
started.
Ngwa area (Aba District) A progressively minded people.
Eket Division An area which spontaneously started
a number of literacy classes.
6. The work at Udi consists of nothing less than the reconstruction by voluntary
work of the social and economic life of those villages that have accepted the scheme.
The scheme has grown naturally out of the ordinary administrative work of the
District Officer in the field, and although it is grafted on to, it is not a function of, the
Native Administration. Nevertheless it was found that the work of Administrative
Officers in the field since the introduction of Native Administration in the Eastern
Provinces has prepared the ground for Mass Education in the fullest sense. By 1944
the people in Udi Division were demanding services within their villages which the
Native Administrations, on account of their limited resources, could only supply at
central points. The people became so enthusiastic that they expended thousands of
man days of free labour on the construction of new roads, the erection of
communally owned maternity units, subdispensaries, reading rooms, village halls,
co-operative consumers’ shops, etc. All the profits made by the shops have been
expended on the erection of further buildings. In addition several sub-clans in the
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Udi Division have been surveyed for leprosy, and a village for the segregation of
infectious lepers has been erected by voluntary labour. This work of communal
development was started before the Colonial 186 on Mass Education in African
Society was received. On receipt of that paper experiments began with Mass Literacy,
and it was found that the injection of a Mass Literacy campaign into the work of
communal development gave the communities concerned greater self-confidence in
their own ability to raise their standard of living. Thus, although Mass Literacy was
not essential to the work of communal development and social education, and
although some villages have made and are still making considerable progress
without Mass Literacy, nevertheless it was found that where Mass Literacy was
introduced it helped to accelerate the rate of progress.
7. It is proposed that certain of the areas listed in paragraph 5 be selected for a
Mass Education Campaign. In the first place it is probable that one village which
has proved itself outstanding in the Literacy Campaign will be selected as a focus
for the Mass Education Plan. If staff is available a Development Officer or an
Assistant District Officer will be posted to this village to plan a mass education pro-
gramme and supervise the continuance of the literacy campaign in the area. No for-
mal plan will be laid down but it will be allowed to develop and emerge as the
people desire, the object being that the plan should be related not so much to what
we may consider to be good for the people, but more to the troubles and problems
which are uppermost in their minds. The Development Officer will have available
for discussion the specialists in the Province, i.e. Agricultural, Forestry and Medical
officers and will come under the directing control of the District Officer. It is hoped
that actual physical improvements by self-help will eventually result, and as the
idea spreads to neighbouring villages they will start to copy in mutual rivalry the
physical improvements in the pilot village. The Development Officer will be at hand
to watch carefully for such movement so that he will be available for advice and
guidance.
8. The sum of £10,000 has been included in this year’s estimates in order to
provide for the necessary staff and teaching material. Adult Education Centres will be
set up in selected areas and in order that they shall be closely linked with the
development of the community, Native Authorities will be invited to take an interest
in such Centres and where possible contribute towards their upkeep.
9. I wish finally to refer to certain points made by the Advisory Committee in
their Commentary on Colonial No. 186. In regard to paragraph 8 of the Commentary
it is untrue to say as far as Nigeria is concerned that Adult Literacy is a field largely
neglected. In fact the emphasis has been on Adult Literacy and progress has so far
outstripped the work of the Public Relations and Welfare Departments which are
both in early stages of development. In regard to paragraph 12 I can see no reason
why there should be any conflict between the Mass Education and the Public
Relations Authorities. As I have said above, I consider that the Education Department
should be primarily concerned with fundamental education and the other
Departments should concern themselves with the various aspects of social education.
10. I am in general agreement with paragraph 8 of your despatch. A clearing
house for the exchange of information will be most helpful in providing concrete
advice by experts who know their ground, provided it does not merely concern itself
with the collation of a mass of statistics.
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38 CO 583/292/3, no 58 21 Aug 1947
[NCNC delegation]: CO record of a meeting held on 13 August 1947
with the NCNC delegation
The Secretary of State welcomed the delegation and thanked them for sending him
the memorandum. He said he was glad of the opportunity to hear the views of the
Delegation and invited them to speak on any points in the memorandum which the
Delegation desired particularly to bring to his attention.
Dr. Azikiwe thanked the Secretary of State and the Colonial Office for giving the
Delegation this opportunity for an exchange of views. He said that there was no need
for conflict; what was wanted was an adjustment of the present situation. The
Delegation had great confidence in the people and the Government of this country
and the Colonial Office. It was because they had this confidence that they left Nigeria
on their mission. The main problem at present was constitutional. It was desirable
that the people of Nigeria should have more representation in the conduct of their
own affairs. Other developments were also necessary in the social and economic
sphere but these were not possible without the people of the country having political
power. The Delegation had nothing against the officials of the colonial
administration, though they to some extent tended to ignore the literate and
educated elements in the country and to regard them as extremists if they put
forward political views. The policy of discrediting the educated elements was not,
however, a good one. They had a right to express themselves and felt that they should
be the spokesmen of their people more than anyone else.
Turning to the laws to which objection was raised in the memorandum, Dr.
Azikiwe said that the Delegation did not object in principle to the purpose of laws
permitting, for example, land to be acquired for public purposes. This was right and
proper. The Delegation objected, however, to those sections which gave arbitrary
powers to the Governor.
Dr. Azikiwe referred also to various grievances which should be removed, for
example, the employment of European women to the detriment of Nigerian ex-
service men; the breaking up of lawful processions as in the Idu Bridge incident
where there had been no provocation by the demonstrators; incidents elsewhere
involving arrests of people in procession; and the existence of deportation laws which
went against basic human rights. He referred also to a trade dispute at Ikoyi and to
the detention of a chief in the Ibibio division for six months without his having been
told of the nature of his offence. He objected to the use of taxpayers’ money to
finance newspapers which were used to attack taxpayers. He also objected to the
discouragement of Africans in the Civil Service. In this connection, however, Dr.
Azikiwe expressed appreciation of the policy announced by the Governor of avoiding
racial discrimination in hospitals and schools, etc. There was no mention of the issue
of racial discrimination in the memorandum and Dr. Azikiwe instanced this as
showing that the Delegation had no intention of acting irresponsibly by making
accusations where these were not justified.
Dr. Azikiwe then referred to the relations between Great Britain and the
Protectorate as laid down in the many treaties. Under these treaties the native rulers
agreed to the abolition of sacrifices and of the slave trade and undertook to
encourage missionaries. On the other side, it was agreed that native law and customs
09-(Doc28-60)-cp  15/7/01  7:26 am  Page 117
118 CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND POST-WAR REFORMS [38]
should be respected. In his view the treaties were not designed to give Great Britain
exclusive internal jursidiction.
In these representations Dr. Azikiwe stated that the Delegation had a large
measure of support throughout Nigeria. He did not claim that every Nigerian
supported them, but generally speaking they were supported by all sections. There
was full evidence of this, details of which could be provided in their tour of Nigeria in
which they had raised the very large sum of £13,000, quite a notable achievement in
view of the poverty of the country. This had been done despite the fact that in some
cases officials had sought to besmirch their personal characters, and Dr. Azikiwe
objected that even the Governor had seen fit to ask for enquiries to be made into
their personal lives. Even embezzlement had been alleged by officials. Dr. Azikiwe
emphasised, however, that the Delegation’s action was purely constitutional and they
were anxious to help evolve in Nigeria a constitution based upon a study of modern
practices in, for example, Australia, Ceylon, New Zealand, the United States and
Great Britain. He appreciated that the constitution which the Delegation had
recommended was not necessarily perfect, but it was a genuine endeavour to
harmonise modern democratic practice with the traditional African way of life, which
was communal.
One of the aims of the proposed constitution was to enable a truly independent
judiciary to be set up. Today the judiciary was not independent and the general
impression he had was that persons not liked by the administration suffered in the
courts. He suggested that there was scope for a commission of enquiry into the
judiciary and also into the working of indirect rule.
Dr. Azikiwe drew attention to the fact that all parts of Nigeria, including the north,
were represented on the Delegation. Moreover, many Emirs in the north had
intimated to him in confidence that as servants of the Government they could not
come into the open. Some Chiefs in the south similarly supporting the aims of the
Delegation were also afraid to come into the open.
Lastly Dr. Azikiwe asserted that the powers given to the Governor over the Chiefs
made the present constitution a mockery of democracy. He realised that there was a
new approach to these problems in London but it would take a long time unless
energetic steps were taken to bring about the changes which were desirable.
Mallam Dipcharima said that the position in the north needed particular scrutiny.
The Emirs and most of their staffs were generally illiterate and there was no
democracy of any kind. Administrative officers were content to leave things to the
Emirs instead of ensuring that there was democracy. He emphasised the great
poverty of the north and the limited provision of education and social services, and
said that it was not right that the north should pay more in taxes than the south but
yet receive out of the total revenue less than one-third. He also said that officials in
their speeches had aimed at disuniting Nigeria and had given encouragement to one
representative of the north who in Legislative Council had made a speech aimed at
disuniting Nigeria. It was essential to improve the condition of life of peasants in the
north and he felt that the N.C.N.C. provided the only way.
Mallam Dipcharima referred also to the United Nations Charter concerning which
a pamphlet had been issued in April. He felt that the Nigerian people should have
been consulted; as it was very few people in Nigeria knew anything about it. He also
referred to the low prices received for crops owing to the distance from the sea,
which was one of the reasons for the poverty in the north. He considered also that
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the administration in the north was getting further away from the masses and very
little was being done to remove the marked difference between the north and the
south.
Mr. Kale said that all people in the Cameroons were agreed that Great Britain
should maintain its mandate or trusteeship. He thought it was wrong, however, that
whereas under the old constitution the Cameroons were represented there was now
no member of the Legislative Council representing the Cameroons. He also referred
to the petition made in August 1946 by the Bakweri people against the alienation of
Buea lands to which no reply had been received. The alienation of lands originally
carried out by the Germans was not in accordance with tradition and the plantation
system had led to great poverty for the people. He referred also to the Cameroons
Development Corporation and said that it was looked upon as a commercial
enterprise. This type of development and the absence of educational facilities,
making it necessary for children from the Cameroons to go to Nigeria for secondary
education, was placing a great strain on the people of Nigeria.
Mr. Adedoyin referred to the question of the independence of the judiciary and said
that he spoke with the experience of a magistrate and knew that magistrates could
not give decisions without being influenced by administrative officers. He also said
that the native rulers were not pleased with the new constitution. In the western
provinces there had been a conference of Obas who had at first objected but were
induced in the end by Government coercion to accept. He also referred to the Ijebu
Remo Treaty which established the district as a Protectorate. Despite this the
territory was administered as if it were a Colony and the Government had broken the
condition under which £100 per annum was payable to the Akarigbo.1
Mr. Adedoyin said that the Nigerian Youth Movement was not in agreement on all
matters with the N.C.N.C. but they were in agreement with the N.C.N.C.’s criticisms
of the constitution. He emphasised that under the constitution the nominated
unofficial members would do what they were told by the Governor. In consequence
the people had no say in the management of their affairs. He and Dr. Nimbe and Dr.
Azikiwe had been elected as the people wished to show that they were really
representative of them. They had been asked by those who elected them not to take
their seats but to come to London on their mission.
He argued that the new constitution should have provided more representation by
election. He pointed out that Lagos and Calabar had had elected members for many
years and it could not be argued that there was no scope for elected members else-
where. Literacy was not a necessary qualification for an electoral system and Nigeria
was no worse off as regards literacy than India, where there was an electoral system.
One good feature of the Richards constitution was, however, the regionalisation it
afforded; this was generally applauded in Nigeria. Apart from this, however, the posi-
tion of the Chiefs had been substantially weakened through the Constitution, the
Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance and the Native Authority Ordinance, and he, as the son
of the Akarigbo of Ijabu Remo, was personally interested to see that they were accorded
their proper place in accordance with the Treaty.
Mrs. Ransome-Kuti said that the Delegation objected strongly to the appointment
of sole native authorities which permitted the people to be oppressed. Many of these
1 The Akarigbo was the ruler of Ijebu Remo.
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Chiefs exercised autocratic powers. They were nonentities before their appointments
and should have been mere figureheads. Now the people themselves had no say in the
appointment of their Chiefs. Mrs. Ransome-Kuti added that the native authorities
were not even able to use the funds raised by local taxes without the sanction of the
Resident and instanced the fact that the people of Abeokuta had requested
permission to use their reserves to start local industry but permission had not been
given. As a result men were unemployed and more work had to be done by women.
There was great poverty but this was due not to lack of materials but to the fact that
the people had no voice in fixing the price of their produce, which was fixed by the
combines and large firms. Mrs. Ransome-Kuti added that while there was no
objection to income tax when properly assessed the authorities made arbitrary
assessments based upon peoples’ way of living.
Dr. Nimbe referred to the land question in Lagos and said that the recent measures
introduced, including the Public Lands Acquisition Ordinance and the Town
Planning Ordinance, were contrary to the Docemo Treaties of 1861. When the Town
Planning Ordinance was introduced the Governor refused to allow the Lagos
members, of whom he was one, to speak in the Legislative Council and consequently
he had had to publish what he intended to say. Under the town planning scheme land
was put on a leasehold basis. This was the equivalent of turning people into slaves
and tenants and the fact that this was so could be seen from the experience of Port
Harcourt, where people had to pay rent. A petition had been made to the Secretary of
State but the petitioners had been informed that the Secretary of State was not
prepared to intervene. They had asked to see copies of the Secretary of State’s reply
but so far they had not done so.
Dr. Nimbe said that in Africa there was no land without an owner. Since this was
so it was difficult to understand how Government could introduce a Bill which
provided that no compensation should be paid for unoccupied land acquired for
public purposes. Dr. Nimbe also referred to the status of Nigeria as a Protectorate
and said that it was laid down in the Treaty of 1862 that no ordinances would be
passed which were not consistent with the Treaty.
Dr. Nimbe also objected to the Director of Medical Services having absolute
discretion over private hospitals, and there were also other points he had to make on
the medical services but he would appreciate the opportunity of discussing these
with the Secretary of State’s Medical Adviser.
Chief Nyong Essien said that the Chiefs Ordinance virtually made his people worse
than slaves. He cited the deposition of the Obong of Calabar in 1926, and the arrest
and detention without trial this year of Chief Ntuen Ibok, who was not even told why
he was arrested. He said that Chief Ntuen Ibok had been honoured by the grant of a
certificate of service. There should be confidence in such a man and such treatment
as he was given placed a great strain on the loyalty of the people, which should be
encouraged.
Chief Nyong Essien also said that in Opobo an increase of 1/- in taxation had been
made for the specific purpose of providing for education, and on this basis it had been
agreed by the people. After the money, amounting to £700, had been collected it was
taken by Government into general revenue and no encouragement was given to
education, in fact the district officers had prevented firms selling building materials
for schools.
He also spoke of the importance of religion and said that Idiong was merely the
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legalised form of religion that was common throughout Africa. Yet priests in one
area had been arrested, the shrines desecrated and the relics burnt on the suspicion
that the religion was connected with the leopard murders. There was no proof of this
and if Idiong led to leopard murders in one area then it should have led to murders in
other areas. Idiong in fact had nothing to do with human bloodshed. The
Government’s action to attempt to destroy Idiong would destroy the people, who
could not exist without religion.
He also asked that the local people should have control over the proceeds of the
palm oil mill which had been set up, since at present the proceeds were simply going
to general, revenue and did not benefit the local community.
Dr. Nimbe and Mr. Kale then instanced cases in which administrative officers
acted arbitrarily, Dr. Nimbe reading a confidential letter of 1906 concerning an
administrative officer in the Northern Provinces, and Mr. Kale citing the case of a
Chief who he said had been imprisoned in July for failing to pay his respects to the
Chief Commissioner. The Secretary of State invited Mr. Kale to send particulars of
the case.
The Secretary of State said that the Delegation in their memorandum and in their
speeches had covered a wide field and raised many questions, some of a major kind
and some of a more particular local interest. It was impossible for him to deal with
them all at the meeting, but he would arrange for them to be examined and would
give the Delegation a considered reply in due course. It would, however, be necessary
to refer some points to the Governor of Nigeria.
He appreciated the desire of the Delegation to state the problems as they saw them
and to bring them home to those in London as matters of vital importance to them.
He was, however, conscious of the inaccuracy of a number of statements made by the
Delegation, no doubt not intentional but due to their not always having the full
information in their possession. This impressed him with the vital importance of
doing everything possible to ensure that the people of Nigeria had available to them
all the essential facts.
The Secretary of State said that whatever had happened in the past—and no doubt
mistakes had been made—it was of no avail to dwell on them now. We were
responsible for the present and we had to adjust ourselves to a moving world. He
would like to impress upon the Delegation that the Colonial Office earnestly desired
the best interests of the colonial peoples. Neither he nor the officials of the Colonial
Office, were anything but disinterested; there was no question of any personal
advantage. He was anxious, too, that our administrations overseas should reflect the
same spirit and he believed that the services overseas were manned by men who were
only anxious to be of service to the peoples with whom they worked. No doubt
individual lapses were inevitable, and where possible action would always be taken to
correct this. Nevertheless, in general the aim of all concerned in the administrations
was to devote all efforts to enabling Nigeria to become a nation.
He asked the Delegation not to imagine that he or the administrations objected to
political criticism. It was fully realised that a healthy people must think and criticise.
He did, however, ask that criticism should be constructive. There was certainly no
desire on the part of Government to try and clamp down on criticism or on political
movements. On the contrary it was a sign of healthy life and what we wanted was
leaders of political movements to join with us in trying to find a solution to the very
real problems which existed.
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Nigeria was a vast complex state with a developing basic unity. The new
constitution helped to provide a framework for that unity while allowing for the
differences in regional conditions and the great variety of people. Nigeria was the
largest colonial territory in the British Commonwealth and the Delegation had a
great responsibility in trying to build up new political forces, and a great obligation
to the people of the country. The Secretary of State said that he was fully conscious of
deficiencies in the education, medical services and social services generally in
Nigeria and was most anxious to do all that could be done to develop the resources of
Nigeria so that a higher standard could be provided for all. This, however, could only
be done by hard work on everyone’s part. There were serious limitations of staff and
other resources which inevitably slowed down progress. The Delegation should not
believe that it was simply our aim to keep people in the British Empire against their
will. It was our desire to press on so that people in the Colonial Empire could attain
self government as soon as possible and also secure a good standard of living which
alone made for happiness and stability. This was desirable even in the British people’s
own self interest.
As regards the Nigerian constitution, the Secretary of State emphasised that it was
not to be regarded as something static and fixed for all time. There was no desire to
hold the people back and this was shown, for example, in other territories such as
Ceylon. The approach was the same in regard to Nigeria. The present Constitution
could certainly be modified and amended in the light of experience but he made it
clear that it was essential to give it a period of trial before it could be seen how it
needed amendment. There could be no question of setting it aside and replacing it by
something quite different which would not be suitable to Nigerian conditions. He
wanted to leave them in no doubt about that and he urged them to work through it.
As regards the criticisms that had been made of the working of indirect rule, he
reminded the Delegation that it was necessary to build upon the past. The present
system had grown up from the past but the Colonial Office were giving their urgent
attention to examining the whole problem, not only in Nigeria but elsewhere, of how
best to facilitate development and growth and to achieve the machinery of a modern
democracy and effective local government.
The Secretary of State referred also to accusations that excessive powers were
given to the Governor and asked the Delegation to believe that there was no question
of these powers being used arbitrarily. It was not to be expected that they would be
used except where it was necessary for the benefit of the people, for example in seeing
that the Chiefs discharged their responsibilities to their peoples.
On the question of African representation in working out development plans the
Secretary of State referred to the fact that there was representation on the provincial
Committees and informed the Delegation that he understood that possibly four
Africans would serve on the Central Development Board.
As regards the allegations made against the judiciary, this was a serious charge and
if the Delegation made such charges they should be prepared to substantiate them.
He was of course prepared to consider any facts that might be put forward and he
would certainly not tolerate abuses in the administration of justice in Nigeria.
As regards the accusation that the native rulers were instruments of Government,
the Secretary of State asked the Delegation to believe that there was no desire to
exercise undue influence over them. What was desired was their free and
independent expression of opinion as representatives of the people.
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As regards the Cameroons, he explained that the object of the Cameroons
Development Corporation was to ensure development of the area under proper
public control and that any profits arising from that development should not be used
for private purposes but for the benefit of the people of the area as a whole.
As regards land in Lagos, he was surprised that arguments should be put forward
in favour of freehold tenure, which was contrary to African conceptions. He would
have expected the Delegation to be opposed to freehold.
In conclusion, the Secretary of State invited them to co-operate in trying to make
the new constitution a success. He said that on the other points raised he would give
a reply to the Delegation in due course after consulting with the Governor. He
stressed that in the long run the degree of progress made must depend upon the
efforts of the Nigerian people and he instanced the progress that had been achieved
in the United Kingdom through voluntary effort. The Secretary of State said that the
reply to the memorandum would take some time. They might of course have other
business here, which was their affair, but he felt that there was no need, as far as the
Colonial Office was concerned, for the Delegation to remain in this country pending
the receipt of the reply.
39 CO 852/903/2 22 Sept 1947
[Marketing boards]: minute by J M Kisch1 on the establishment of the
Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board [Extract]
[The Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board, which replaced the West African Produce Control
Board established during the war, began operating in June 1947; the legislation setting it
up was approved by the Legislative Council in Sept 1947. Marketing Boards for
groundnuts, cotton and palm produce began operating in Apr 1949.]
The Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board Ordinance at 74 has already been the subject of
correspondence and discussion with Mr. F.E.V. Smith who is to be the Chairman. It
is modelled on the Gold Coast Cocoa Marketing Board Ordinance at 48 from which
however it differs in the matter of the constitution and method of appointment of
members of the Board and in the establishment of an Advisory Committee (Sections
30–35).
Summarising these differences, the Gold Coast Board consists of 12 members, 4
including the Chairman being appointed by the Governor, 4 being nominated by the
Governor on recommendation from African Councils, 2 being directly nominated by
those Councils and 1 each being nominated by the manufacturers and the Gold Coast
Chamber of Commerce. The Nigerian Board on the other hand consists of not less
than 5 or more than 7 members of whom not less than 2 shall be Nigerians and all of
whom will be appointed by the Governor who also appoints the Chairman. It will be
an ‘official’ Board with a minority of Africans. In order to base the Board more
broadly on the producers in whose interests it is to act, an Advisory Committee is to
be established of not less than 9 members of whom not less than 5 shall be Nigerians,
the 9 members to meet under a Chairman appointed by the Governor and are to
include representatives of producers and commercial interests. All members are
1 J M Kisch, formerly Board of Inland Revenue, CO principal from 1939.
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appointed directly by the Governor. Section 20 directs the Board to seek the advice of
the Advisory Committee on all matters in connection with the purchase and grading
of Nigerian Cocoa and the development of the industry and in the use of its funds. If
the Board fails to accept the advice offered it by the Committee, the Chairman shall
report the matter to the Governor in Council giving the reason for such refusal.
It will be interesting to see how this arrangement works out. If there are frequent
differences between the African Committee and the Board, an awkward position will
result and the Governor in Council will continually become involved. We shall have
to hope for the best. Perhaps eventually it will be possible to allow African Councils
to nominate members for the Advisory Committee instead of all appointments being
made by the Governor. . . .
40 CO 583/292/4, no 82 3 Oct 1947
[NCNC delegation]: despatch no 25 from Sir A Richards to Mr Creech
Jones giving his views of the matters raised by the NCNC delegation
[Extract]
I have the honour to refer to your Secret Despatch No. 23 of the 21st of August on
the subject of the memorandum submitted to you by the Delegation of the National
Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, and to offer my observations on the matters
raised by the Delegation in that memorandum and at the interview which you
accorded them.
2. I concur in the answer you propose to give on the Constitutional issues and
shall confine my observations to the allegation that the present Constitution is
undemocratic. It has, of course, never been claimed that the Constitution is fully
democratic in the sense that it provides a means whereby the sovereign will of the
people may be carried into effect by their freely-elected representatives and it is
obvious that no Colonial Constitution can ever be completely democratic in that
sense until the stage is reached where it is possible to transfer full and complete
powers of self-government. The Constitution purports to be no more than a step
towards democracy but I consider that it may fairly be claimed for it that it
represents the longest step towards that goal that the people of this country are at
present capable of taking and that it provides the best means of ensuring that all
sections of the people, in their differing stages of development, are represented by
those best qualified to speak on their behalf. I can well understand that this view is
not shared by those who are unable to appreciate that ‘the people’ means any but
those who think the same way as themselves or that democracy is not synonymous
with the ballot-box.
3. In examining the extent to which the Constitution is democratic in the sense
that the members of the House of Chiefs and the Unofficial Members of the Houses of
Assembly and the Legislative Council are truly representative of those on whose
behalf they purport to speak, it is necessary to distinguish between the Chiefs, the
members nominated by the Governor to represent special interests and those who
have been selected by popular choice.
4. The criticism levelled against the Chiefs, that is to say, the Northern Emirs
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and the three Chiefs from the Western Provinces, is that they are appointed by the
Governor and are, therefore, virtually Government servants, that they are not free to
speak their minds for fear of being relieved of their offices, that in any case they are
an undemocratic anachronism and that for all these reasons they cannot be regarded
as the true representatives of the people on whose behalf they purport to speak.
These arguments are, of course, based on a complete disregard of the facts. The
Governor does not appoint Chiefs, his powers in this connection being confined,
under the Appointment and Deposition of Chiefs Ordinance, 1930 (No. 14 of 1930),
to approving appointments made in accordance with native law and custom and to
determining in cases of dispute, whether an appointment has, in fact, been made in
accordance with native law and custom. It is true that under the same Ordinance the
Governor may, if those concerned take no steps to appoint a Chief, appoint one
himself but there is no record of it ever having been necessary for these powers to be
exercised. That the Chiefs are not free to speak their minds is controverted by the
sometimes startling frankness with which they express themselves and if proof were
wanted that they are not anachronisms it is to be found in the respect and confidence
reposed in them by the simple farmers who constitute the vast majority of their
followers. With the awakening of political consciousness there is undoubtedly the
danger of a cleavage between the Chiefs and the more progressive elements, but as I
made clear in my Despatch of the 6th of December, 1944,1 when setting out my
proposals for constitutional reform, it is an essential part of the policy underlying the
Constitution that the Native Authorities should be modernized by admitting to their
councils representatives of progressive opinion.
5. The procedure for selecting the Provincial members of the Houses of
Assembly necessarily varied according to local conditions and was in accordance with
Directions, of which I enclose copies, which I issued in respect of the three Houses.2
In those Provinces where the areas subject to the Native Authorities are extensive
and the Native Authorities consequently few, it was sufficient for each of them to
send representatives direct to the Provincial Meeting; in those Provinces where
Native Authorities are small and numerous it was necessary to start at a lower level
and to select at Divisional Meetings representatives to attend the Provincial
Meetings. No procedure was prescribed whereby the Native Authorities and
Divisional and Provincial Meetings should select their representatives, each of these
units being left to transact their business in accordance with such procedure as, in
the light of their custom, they considered appropriate. The extent to which this
method can be deemed to be democratic depends, of course, on the extent to which
the Native Authority councils or advisory councils, as the case may be, are
democratic. So far as the Eastern Provinces are concerned, it is difficult to envisage a
more democratic system for the Native Authorities are for the most part councils
consisting of family or clan representatives who retain their position for only as long
as they can command the support of those they represent. The same is true in
considerable areas in both the Northern and Western Provinces but where the
institutions are less democratic in character it is, as I explained above, a cardinal
point of policy to force the pace as far as is compatible with safety to ensure that
adequate representation is secured for the more progressive elements in the
community.
1 See 7. 2 Not printed.
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6. It would be idle to contend that the selection of those members nominated by
the Governor to represent interests otherwise unrepresented is truly democratic, but
when no machinery exists whereby those interests may secure adequate representa-
tion for themselves it is, I conceive, more in the interests of democracy that they should
be represented by nomination than that they should not be represented at all.
7. Mr. Kale, in pleading that the Cameroons should be separately represented in
the Legislative Council has apparently overlooked the fact that, under the terms of
the Trusteeship Agreement, the Cameroons are administered as an integral part of
Nigeria, that is to say, as far as the Cameroons Province is concerned, as an integral
part of the Eastern Provinces. There is no more justification for according the
Cameroons Province special representation in the Legislative Council than there is
in respect of any other Province in Nigeria; moreover, such representation could not
be in respect of the Cameroons Province alone but would also have to embrace that
part of the Cameroons which is administered as part of the Northern Provinces, a
course which in practice would be rendered impossible on account of the
geographical, ethnological and administrative considerations which are involved. . . .
. . . 50. One of the principal complaints of the Delegation is that the legislation of
Nigeria places excessive powers in the hands of the Governor, and that this is
undemocratic. It is true that the Governor or the Governor in Council is given
powers to regulate many matters which in more advanced countries are controlled
by boards or bodies of commissioners wholly or partly composed of private citizens
but it has not in the past been possible to adopt this procedure extensively in Nigeria
because there have been insufficient persons with the necessary qualifications to
appoint to such boards. Only now is it becoming possible to make a wider use of this
method of associating the people with public affairs and I think it is worthy of note,
as indicating the development that is taking place in this direction, that of the
twenty-one statutory boards and committees which have been set up to deal with
public and quasi-public matters, twelve have been established in the last five years. As
a further step in this direction I am at present considering proposals in connection
with a new Education Ordinance and a new Agriculture Ordinance whereby the
responsibility for operating these Ordinances will in a very large measure devolve
upon Boards on which there will be unofficial majorities.
41 CO 583/297/1, no 5 2 Dec 1947
[Regional councils]: letter from H F Marshall to K E Robinson on the
selection of unofficial members for the regional houses of assembly.
Enclosure
I am sorry there has been such a long delay in replying to your demi-official letter to
the Governor of the 12th of June, about the selection of Unofficial Members for
Regional Houses. Copies of the directions issued by Lord Milverton regarding the
procedure to be followed have, I see, already been sent to you under cover of our
official Secret despatch No. 25 of the 3rd of October,1 and these may have given you
all the information you want.
1 See 40.
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2. On the whole the selection of representatives passed off very smoothly indeed,
and you may like to see the enclosed notes on the subject which I have received from
the Regional Secretariats. There were, as you will observe, a number of teething
troubles, but speaking generally, both the quality of the representatives and the
degree of popular support which they enjoyed were fully up to expectations.
Enclosure to 41
The most outstanding event of 1946 was the coming into force of the new
constitution and the preparations for the first meeting of the House of Assembly
which was held just after the close of the year. At the direction of His Excellency
Divisional and Provincial meetings were formed in order that the electoral chain
could be forged by which the Provincial members could be elected to the House of
Assembly. The Native Authorities of each Division selected from among their
members such number of persons as the Chief Commissioner approved to constitute
a Divisional meeting. The numbers of each Divisional meeting varied in accordance
with the wishes of the Native Authorities from 12 in some cases to as many as 60 in
others. Of their number the Divisional meetings again each selected from two to six
persons, subject to the approval of the Chief Commissioner, as members of the
Provincial meetings. And from these bodies in turn selections were made to attend
the House of Assembly. The importance of literacy for the member of the House of
Assembly, where the proceedings are in English, was strongly stressed but in other
respects, with the one qualification that candidates must be members of a Native
Authority, selection was left entirely to the Native Authorities themselves. In the
existing fluid state of the Native Authorities of the Eastern Provinces some
apprehension was felt as to whether or not the selections would be made without
rancour but from the beginning no troubles were experienced. It must however be
recorded that a hitch occurred in the Owerri Division through failure to realise the
full implications of selection to the Divisional Meeting. In this Division selection was
arranged by inviting the Federal Councils of the Division to choose representatives
for the Divisional Meeting. Now the Federal Councils (Native Authorities) are
composed of representatives of other Native Authorities subordinate to them and
their membership is changed every six months. The invitation, therefore, made
eligible for selection only those who were actual members of the Federal Councils at
that time and debarred members of the compopent and subordinate Native
Authorities. The choice was thus undoubtedly restricted and did not include many of
those with the greater ability. The mistake was pointed out to the Federal Councils
but they declined to reconsider their original selections and there were no means by
which they could be compelled to do so. Discontent has since been overt and,
regrettably, some loss of interest in the constitution has been occasioned but matters
will be straightened out at the end of the first three-year period of election; it may
even prove a useful lesson and tend to encourage greater stability which is so much
to be desired. At Divisional and Provincial Meetings, though opportunity was taken
to discuss matters of general interest at Divisional and Provincial levels respectively,
during the actual election of members for the Provincial Meeting or House of
Assembly the meetings were left to their own devices. There were no disputes and the
most surprising unanimity was shown; judging from the general quality of the
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representatives who emerged successfully as members of the House of Assembly it
can be said that considerable perspicacity was shown. The first meeting of the House
proved highly successful: the members were dignified and made useful and
interesting contributions, and the meeting augured well for the future.
42 CO 583/294/1, no 18 [Jan 1948]
‘Summary of administrative and financial procedure under the new
constitution’: CO memorandum on the Phillipson Report
[Sydney Phillipson, financial secretary of Nigeria, 1945–1948, was commissioned in 1946
to review the implications of the Richards constitution for administrative and financial
relations between central and local government, see 23. His report, Administrative and
Financial Procedure under the New Constitution: Financial Relations between the
Government of Nigeria and the Native Administration (Lagos, 1947) which influenced
spending through to the 1950s, recommended the principle of derivation, that is that
regions should receive funding proportionate to their contribution to central government
revenue.]
I. Administrative procedure
The purposes of the new Constitution can be summarised as
Regionalization
Devolution
Representation of Native Administration.
The Administrative implications of the first two of these are clearly set out in
paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Statement, and the Phillipson Report itself adds little to this
account. In brief they are
1. the maximum devolution of executive functions from Heads of regionalized
Departments to regional representatives.
2. that regional representatives should be responsible to Heads of Departments
for strictly technical matters, but to the Chief Commissioner for the execution of
approved policy within the Region, and for all local matters.
3. that the effect of this devolution should increase the authority of the Chief
Commissioner through the association of a group of advisers who will constitute a
kind of regional executive council.
The Phillipson Report points out that these administrative developments to some
extent preceded the constitutional changes and are already far advanced.
II. Financial procedure
The constitutional despatch embodying the original Richards proposals stressed the
importance of the financial responsibility of the Regional Councils. The Report pro-
vides operative instructions designed to implement the Constitution in this respect.
1. Limitations of regional responsibility
Regional Councils will not possess any power of appropriating revenue for regional
expenditure; all revenue available for regional purposes will be voted to the Regions
by the Nigerian Legislative Council. Further devolution of financial responsibility is
regarded as outside the terms of reference of the Report.
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2. Classification of services and works as Nigerian or regional.
(a) Regionalized Heads of Expenditure
Accountancy
Agriculture
Co-operation
Education
Forestry
Medical
Police
Provincial Administration
Public Works
Veterinary.
(b) All other services and works will be classified as Nigerian, and provision will
also be made in the Estimates of Nigerian Expenditure for the following aspects of
the regionalized departments
Nigerian H.Q. staff
Research
Institutions serving whole of Nigeria – e.g. Veterinary
Training School
Expenditure on Colony of Lagos
(c) Regional Councils will be at liberty to debate matters connected with non-
regionalized departments.
(d) C.D. and W. expenditure will be shown in the Nigerian Estimates divided into
Nigerian expenditure and expenditure in the three Regions. Regional expenditure
will also be shown under a separate Head in the Regional estimates with a
corresponding entry on the revenue side. This procedure is intended to ensure a
combination of Central Control of Development finance with Regional interest in
Development projects (the Regional Councils will of course have no power to
increase expenditure or to modify approved schemes).
3. Revenues to be declared regional
This falls under two heads
(a) Revenue to be derived from Regional Councils’ share of Direct Tax plus other
revenues to be declared regional – e.g.
Licences
Mining rents
Court fees
Earnings of Government Departments and
Rent of Government property.
(b) Block grant from central revenue.
4. Basis of allocation to regions of available revenues not declared regional
Owing to the conflict between the principle of derivation (and consequently of
financial responsibility) and that of even progress between Regions, this problem
presents some difficulty. The aim is declared to be ‘to bring about a state of affairs in
which the contribution made by each Region to the non-declared revenues of Nigeria
is proportioned to the required scale of expenditure on regional purposes so that the
latter may correspond to the former’, (this is far from being the case at present).
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When that objective is reached ‘any further available resources to be allocated
according to the measure of the incidence per head of each regional population of
the total true taxation . . . . Alternatively the available resources might be allocated
with the express purpose of bringing on backward regions or parts of regions’. To
achieve these aims the following recommendations are made:—
(a) Procedure for 1948–9
Allocation to be at least equal to present (i.e. 1947–8) Government expenditure on
regional purposes plus a sum to cover unavoidable expansion plus a figure for Public
Works moderately adjusted to give the Northern Provinces a share less
disproportionate to its (greater) contribution to revenue.
(b) Procedure after 1948–9
(i) A Revenue Allocation Board to be set up, to meet annually and to submit
recommendations regarding revenue allocation for the coming year with a view to
achieving the objectives defined above within 5 years.
(ii) Sums to be notified to Regional Secretariats not later than 31 July each year
within which the Estimates of Regional expenditure are to be formulated.
5. Preparation of regional estimates
(a) In order to review this provisional estimate in July it is necessary to provide for
revision by Regional Councils in December and the Nigerian Legislative Council to
set up:—
1 General and 3 Regional Committees on the Estimates
1 General and 3 Regional Committees on Finance
for subsequent revision. It is intended that Regional Councils shall brief their
representatives on Leg. Co. with a list of priorities in case of an increase or decrease
on the Estimates.
(b) Budget meetings of the Regional Councils are to be held not later than 20th
December, giving the Regions 4 months to collect expenditure estimates.
6. Preparation of estimates of Nigerian (i.e. ‘central’) expenditure and of estimates
of Nigeria (i.e. including regional estimates)
The responsibilities of the Nigerian Secretariat will include:—
(a) Compilation of Estimate of Revenue for Nigeria (as hitherto)
(b) Informing Chief Commissioners of the revenue allocation of the Regions. (4
above)
(c) Technical co-ordination of whole process of Estimates preparation.
(d) Preparation of Estimates of Nigerian (i.e. ‘Central’) expenditure.
(e) Composition of Estimates of Nigeria, which will henceforward include the
following modifications
(i) They will be divided into 3 parts
I. Nigerian
II. Regional (consisting only of three one line Heads with the block vote in each
case).
III. Development and Welfare (divided into Nigerian and Regional).
(ii) Detailed Estimates of Regional expenditure and the statement of revenues will
appear as appendices.
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43 CO 583/292/5, no 8 10 Jan 1948
[NCNC delegation]: letter from S Phillipson to A Adedoyin1 outlining
the official response to the matters raised by the NCNC delegation
The Secretary of State has directed that the enclosed memorandum should be
transmitted to you as his reply to the various detailed points contained in the
memorandum which a Delegation of the National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons presented to him on August 11th, 1947.2
2. The memorandum does not deal with the question of constitutional change
which was dealt with at the Delegation’s interview with the Secretary of State. The
Secretary of State desires to state that he is always anxiously concerned about the
growth of political life in the colonial territories and fostering a deepening sense and
realisation of responsibility. He is therefore much preoccupied with furthering self-
government and evolving free democratic institution for the better representation
and government of the people. He wishes to record, however, that he does not accept
the criticism that the present constitution and system of administration is static,
unprogressive or undemocratic, having regard to present conditions in Nigeria. That
constitution marks a substantial step forward in the degree to which the people of
Nigeria can participate in the legislative machinery of the country. It is in no sense
regarded by the Secretary of State as incapable of modification but in the Secretary of
State’s view, any modifications which are made should be such as are found
necessary in the light of experience in the actual working of the constitution. It is in
the Secretary of State’s view essential as he stated at the interview with the
Delegation that the present constitutional arrangements should be given a proper
trial before it can be seen how they may need amendments: there can be no question,
in his view, of setting the present constitution aside and replacing it by something
which might prove to be unsuitable to Nigerian conditions.
3. One of the criticisms made by the Delegation concerns the role of the
Nominated Unofficial Members whom the Delegation considers to be dependent on
the will of the Governor and hence unable to fulfil their function of independent
representation of the peoples of their areas. The Secretary of State considers that
such a view clearly misrepresents the true position of the Members of the House of
Chiefs and the Unofficial Members of the Houses of Assembly and of the Legislative
Council. It is desirable to make it clear that the Governor does not appoint Chiefs, his
powers in this connection being confined, under the Appointment and Deposition of
Chiefs Ordinance 1930 (No. 14 of 1930) to approving appointments made in
accordance with native law and custom and of determining in cases of dispute
whether an appointment has in fact been made in accordance with native law and
custom. It is true that under the same Ordinance the Governor may, if those
concerned take no steps to appoint a Chief, appoint one himself, but there is no
record that it has ever been necessary for these powers to be exercised.
4. So far as the ability of the Chiefs to speak their minds is concerned the reports
of the proceedings of the Legislative Council alone are sufficient to show that they
have no hesitation in doing so and that no attempt is made by Government to restrict
in any way their freedom of speech. Indeed in every way possible the Government
1 General secretary, NCNC. 2 Not printed. See 36.
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seems to encourage free discussion and independence of mind among the
representatives of the people. A further disproof of the Delegation’s assertions in this
matter is found in the presence on the Delegation of one Nominated Unofficial
Member.
5. The Secretary of State wishes to point out, moreover, that under the
constitution the majority of the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council are
elected to that position by the Unofficial Members of the Houses of Assembly. The
Provincial Members of the three Houses of Assembly are selected, in accordance with
arrangements published in the Government Gazette on the 10th September, 1946, by
Provincial Meetings, and where appropriate the members of these Provincial
Meetings are selected by Divisional Meetings. These Provincial and Divisional
Meetings are representative of the Native Authorities of the areas. The Secretary of
State believes that indirect election of this kind is the best method under present
conditions of securing the adequate representation of the great majority of the
population of Nigeria and he understands that public men in Nigeria have expressed
satisfaction at the manner in which the arrangements are working.
6. In conclusion the Secretary of State desires to stress that he fully appreciates
that in a country such as Nigeria, which is, like many other parts of the world,
undergoing a process of increasing development and change, there is a keen desire
on the part of an ever larger number of its citizens to take part in the discussion and
management of the affairs of the country. The Secretary of State, like the Nigeria
Government itself, welcomes this tendency wholeheartedly, since progress in the
improvement of the general conditions of life of the people must be greatly assisted
by it. The Secretary of State and His Majesty’s Government fully support the Nigerian
Government in its present policy of seeking all possible ways and means of
encouraging and facilitating the participation of the people in public affairs. It is
recognized that, in co-operating in the tasks of development, improvement and
general betterment, the representatives of the people will find it necessary to criticise
the Government where they think that improvements can be made. Such criticism if
made constructively and on the basis of study and understanding of the facts, is
entirely welcome. Nigeria can, however, ill afford criticism for criticism’s own sake
or activities designed to obstruct and embarrass the Government, which can only
have the effect of diverting the energies of Government and people away from the
many constructive tasks which confront them. The Secretary of State hopes
therefore that a policy of constructive co-operation with the Government in the
many ways open to them will commend itself to the Delegation.
44 CO 583/292/5, no 23 24 Mar 1948
[Accra riots]: letter from G Beresford Stooke to Sir T Lloyd
concerning the possible reaction in Nigeria to the Accra riots
Thank you so much for your letter of the 2nd of March about the Sub-Committee of
the Select Committee on the Estimates. I shall certainly impress upon our witnesses
the desirability of being perfectly frank and open with the Sub-Committee. There is,
of course, nothing to hide and the more people in the U.K. know of the facts of the
situation in the Colonies, the better it will be for us all.
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We are still engaged with Legislative Council. The Select Committee on the
Estimates has taken much longer than usual. There has been much discussion and a
greatly increased demand for information but, even so, the Unofficial Members have
not so far changed a single item.
Azikiwe has been sweetly reasonable throughout. This attitude is, however,
reserved for the Legislative Council alone, and while he has been cooing like a dove
in the Council Chamber his newspapers have, if anything, intensified their
dangerous anti-European propaganda. It is, unfortunately, the newspapers which the
public read, not Hansard.
I am not at present apprehensive about reactions in Nigeria to events in the Gold
Coast, but we are fully prepared for any demonstration which may suddenly take
place, and shall continue to keep ‘on our toes’.1 As you probably know, ever since the
General Strike of 1945 we have had fairly elaborate plans drawn up to deal with
general strikes and riots etc., and these plans are continually being revised and
overhauled. Intelligence reports indicate a possibility that some attempt may be
made to stir up trouble in Lagos over the Easter week-end, but, as I have said, we
have our plans laid and between three and four hundred police will be standing by
with motor transport and full anti-riot equipment. A force of that size, fully mobile
and fully trained to deal with mobs, should be able to break up and disperse any
unlawful assembly before it becomes dangerous. This, of course, is not a new
organization. We had our amber warning three years ago, and have thus had plenty
of time in which to organize security services.
You will be interested to learn that yesterday Azikiwe moved in Council “that this
Honourable Assembly is entitled to know all the facts relating to the deputation of
the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroóns to the Colonial Office, and calls
for all papers relating thereto’. This was strongly opposed from all sides of the
Council on the grounds that the N.C.N.C. does not represent the people of Nigeria
and had no authority to approach the Secretary of State. On the division, the voting
was 38–4 against, the only persons who voted in favour being the N.C.N.C. delegates
themselves – i.e. Azikiwe, Adedoyin, Nimbe, and Nyong Essien. This is a pretty clear
demonstration of what responsible Africans think of Azikiwe and the N.C.N.C. It is a
great pity that this irresponsible minority should control the popular press.
I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you in London next month when I shall be
able to give you the latest news of Nigeria in greater detail.
1 Serious riots broke out in Accra on 28 Feb 1948. BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I,
21.
45 CO 583/292/5, no 28 28 April 1948
[NCNC Kaduna convention]: memorandum by J O Field1 on the NCNC
Convention in Kaduna and the Freedom Charter
The announcement that the N.C.N.C. proposed to hold a Convention, followed by a
National Assembly, was made by Azikiwe shortly after his return from the United
1 Secretariat, Lagos.
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Kingdom. It was hailed as a masterly example of Azikiwe’s statesmanship by all his
supporters, but as a matter of fact it was not Azikiwe’s idea at all.
After the Pan-Nigeria Delegation had had their (to them) unsatisfactory interview
with the Secretary of State,2 George Padmore3 sent them a letter in which, after
urging them not to lose heart, he gave them the following advice:—
‘The first thing you should do on your return to Nigeria is to convene a
popular rally at which you should give a full report about your mission to
Britain. Similar meetings should be held in different parts of the country. . . .
‘Following these mass meetings, the Executive Committee of the N.C.N.C.
should convene a National Convention, to which should be invited not only
delegates from the organizations affiliated to the N.C.N.C. but also from those
bodies still outside the fold. The purpose of the Convention should be to ratify
your draft constitution submitted to Creech Jones as the provisional
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Nigeria and the Cameroons. . . .
‘Having moved from the defensive to the offensive the N.C.N.C. will be able
to pose to the entire country a positive alternative programme to the Richards
Constitution on the one hand and the British Government’s bureaucratic 10-
year plan on the other. . . . In opening this new chapter, you must seize the
initiative and you can only do this by forgetting the Richards Constitution
and putting before the nation a Constitution which expresses the needs and
aspirations of the people, and call upon them to make this their Charter of
Freedom’.
This extract is quoted at length for it will be seen that Zik adhered very closely to this
advice.
The Annual Convention met at Kaduna on the 5th–6th April. Forty-eight delegates
attended representing thirty-seven of the one hundred and eighty odd bodies claimed
by Zik to be affiliated to the N.C.N.C. Of these thirty-seven, twenty were bodies in the
Eastern Provinces, seven were Northern Provinces branches of Southern Provinces
(predominantly Ibo) organizations, four were Western Provinces bodies, one was a
Northern Provinces body (the Tiv Progressive Union) and the remainder were
miscellaneous organizations such as Zik’s Athletic Club, the Kaduna Plot Owners’
Union, and the Nigeria Legion. The Accra branch of the N.C.N.C. also sent a delegate.
Of the forty-eight delegates, twenty-six were Ibos, ten Yoruba, three Ibibio, one Ijaw,
one Uhrobo, one Bini, one native of the Cameroons and one Tiv. The tribes of the
other four are unknown. It is noteworthy that the Northern Elements Progressive
Union was not represented, nor apparently were any of the prominent Northern
Zikists (such as Mallam Abdullah, President of the Zikist Movement)4 present at the
Convention, though they later attended the Assembly.
The most noteworthy absentees, however, were Adedoyin (General Secretary,
N.C.N.C.) and Dr. Nimbe (Treasurer). The excuse they gave to their friends in Lagos
2 See 38.
3 George Padmore (Malcolm Nurse), Trinidadian political activist and writer, member of the Communist
party of the USA; later personal adviser to Kwame Nkrumah.
4 Habib Raji Abdallah, founder member of the Northern Elements Progressive Association, 1946; Zikist
activist; president of the Zikist Movement, 1947; tried and imprisoned for sedition, 1948–1949; sentenced
to two years gaol.
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was that they had attended so many delegations and political gatherings of late that
their practices were beginning to suffer, though it is well known that their real
reason was that they are no longer on speaking terms with Zik. Dipcherima was also
absent, though he sent a message to say that he still sympathised with the N.C.N.C.
but had once given up his job for the cause and was not prepared to do it again unless
they made it worth his while. P.M. Kale did not attend and gave no reason for his
absence. In fact, the only members of the Pan-Nigeria Delegation who were present
were Zik, Mrs. Ransome-Kuti (who came for one day) and Nyong Essien. For the rest,
the delegates were nonentities.
The proceedings opened with a Presidential Address by Zik. After surveying in
broad detail the aims and objects of the N.C.N.C. and the extent to which they have
been achieved, he launched an attack on his enemies, who he classified as
‘Negativists’ and ‘Nihilists’ but for whose machinations even greater successes would
have been achieved. The ‘Negativists’ are those who believe that the people of Nigeria
are not yet ripe for self-government, i.e. the moderate politicians. The Nihilists are
those who believe that ‘nothing good can be done in this country unless it is done by
them, therefore their task is to stultify the national will by obstructionist tactics’. (It
is not clear to whom this refers, but it may be the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and the
Nigerian Youth Movement, both of which have set themselves up in opposition to the
N.C.N.C.) The ‘Positivists’, on the other hand, are all good men and true who support
the N.C.N.C. Turning to the Delegation to the U.K., he described the Secretary of
State’s reply as an insult to the intelligence of the people of Nigeria and continued
‘Mr. Arthur Creech Jones has told us bluntly that so far as the British Government is
concerned, we are at liberty to do our worst’. He then went on to explain that the
assistance of U.N.O. would be essential in the struggle for independence, adding:—
‘I wish to make it clear that so far as I am concerned we must not expect
national emancipation by relying on Great Britain to honour treaty
obligations in the light of her own conscience. As a Colonial Power, he would
be a simpleton who believes that Great Britain would grant us our
independence without a struggle’.
Then followed an attack on the new Constitution, which his experience in Legislative
Council had convinced him was but a device whereby the Government could ‘divide
and rule’ and foster the evil of what he called Pakistanism. ‘After attending the
Budget Session of legislative Council’, he said, ‘I have come to the conclusion that it
is embarrassing to co-operate in the working of the Richards Constitution’, and he
expressed the hope that the Convention would decide whether it was worth while
continuing to co-operate. Then he turned to his own draft constitution which
followed roughly his previous outline but with the significant difference that no
longer was provision made for a transitional period or for the appointment of a
Governor by the Colonial Office: instead power was to be vested directly in a
President elected at an annual convention of the N.C.N.C. who would be assisted by
cabinet ministers chosen by himself. All this, however, led up to the real point of his
speech—a clear declaration of the intention to sever the British connection and to
obtain independence, if need be by violence. This part of the speech is worth
recording:—
‘One distinguishing element between the N.C.N.C. and other organizations is
our readiness to graduate from the “talking stage” to that of “positive action”.
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In years gone by I believed staunchly in Great Britain and in her ability to
set us free without fuss. Even when I was in the United Kingdom with the
N.C.N.C. delegation I had to debate within myself whether Great Britain will
make self-government possible within the fifteen years I have been advocating
since 1943. . . .
In reading through one of Barere’s speeches during the French Revolution
I ran across the following: “The tree of liberty grows only when watered by the
blood of tyrants”. In view of what has happened in the history of many
countries, it saddens my heart to think of obtaining the independence of our
country in this inhuman way.
In truth, my faith in Great Britain has waned and I am compelled to admit
openly my belief that freedom for Nigeria and the Cameroons can no longer
be expected to descend to us easily without tremendous sacrifice. . . . If we
mean to liberate our country we must reckon with these realities and cease
from living in a fool’s paradise.
I have doubted the wisdom of these thoughts in the past, I have waited for
one positive act on the part of those who govern to prove me wrong; and now
I am free for I am no longer wishful in my thinking. . . .’
and he ended up with an exhortation to ‘our youths, our wage-earners, our world war
veterans, our patriots and our peasantry’ to stand firm in the approaching struggle
and see it through.
This is probably the most hypocritical speech Zik has ever made, for he sought to
convince his public that he was driven against his will to claim complete
independence and to obtain it, if necessary, by violence as a result of his
disillusioning experiences on the Delegation and in Legislative Council. But he had
these thoughts in his mind long ago. As early as 1943 he prepared a draft ‘blueprint’
which he set up in type but never published, in which he advocated an independent
State outside the Commonwealth but in alliance with Britain, while he had already
revealed that his mind was playing with the possibility of extreme measures in the
‘Statement of National Policy’ which he issued just before the Delegation left the
shores of Nigeria.
The next item on the agenda was the presentation of the Secretary’s report, but as
the General Secretary had failed to attend to present it himself, some heated
discussion ensued as to how the report was to be brought properly before the
meeting. In the end Zik revealed that it hadn’t been written by the General Secretary
anyway, so Oged Macaulay signed it and read it out. It consisted of a resumé of the
activities of the N.C.N.C. since its foundation in 1944 and contained nothing of note.
The Convention then got down to the real business of considering the various
resolutions and motions that were brought before it. Most of these were of little
importance and dealt with such minor and parochial matters as demands for
increased educational facilities in Ogoja Province; support for Mrs. Ransome-Kuti in
her crusade against the taxation of women in Abeokuta; the restoration of the Oba
Falolu’s stipend; and support for the claim of the people of Enugu Ngwo to a share of
the profits of the Colliery.
More important resolutions were to the effect that ‘whereas the N.C.N.C. is likely
to be the party to take over the administration of the country in the event of Nigeria’s
freedom, any person elected president of the National Council by any National
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Convention be allowed the discretion of electing his own cabinet ministers’. After an
object on to the use of the word ‘cabinet’, because it savoured of foreign influence,
had been hotly debated and over-ruled, the motion was carried nem. con. This was
followed by a motion that ‘this National Convention of the N.C.N.C. assume the
right, claim the right, and exercise the right . . . to continue defending Nigerian
people’s right by criticising Government and any legislation that might be passed in
any Legislative Council meetings that shall be deemed incongenial to Nigerian
peoples’ freedom. . . .’ Following this came a resolution that ‘the tenure of office of
both the President and the cabinet ministers shall be extended to five years’. The
motion was carried subject to an amendment that the period should be reduced to
three years.
These resolutions are of interest because they form the basis of the ‘shadow
government’, approval for the setting up of which it was one of Zik’s principal objects
to secure.
Then came a resolution condemning the manner in which the Nigerian repre-
sentatives at the forthcoming African Conference had been selected and demand-
ing that the three Lagos elected members and Nyong Essien should be included
among the representatives.5 One hot-head from the Cameroons suggested that
the people should be called upon to refuse to pay tax unless these members were
included. It was decided that this amendment had better be discussed in ‘select
committee’, but the reporter of the ‘Daily Times’ had the temerity to report that
it would be discussed in a ‘secret committee’, which indeed amounted to the
same thing, with the result that he brought down the wrath of all the delegates
upon his head and got himself excluded from further meetings for his pains. The
real cause for the indignation however, seems not to have been the alleged mis-
reporting, but because this little suggestion for ‘positive action’ leaked out. As
Zik more than once remarked in the course of the proceedings, it is unwise to
reveal one’s plans to the enemy! The resolution as originally proposed was finally
passed and it was agreed, in addition, to send a telegram of protest to the
Secretary of State.
In the middle of the proceedings one of the delegates, whose mind was apparently
still brooding on the first items on the agenda, suddenly jumped up with a proposal
that a priority telegram should be sent to Adedoyin and Nimbe requesting them to
report forthwith to the Convention by air, the cost, he obligingly added, to be borne
by the Council. This proposal gave rise to considerable discussion in the course of
which some rather uncomplimentary remarks were passed about the absentees, but
in the end the motion was agreed to and the telegram was duly despatched. Nimbe
ignored it. Adedoyin, however, sent a polite reply regretting that he was unable to
comply because it was impossible to get an air passage. As a matter of fact, he never
applied for one. It seems, however, that nobody thought it likely that Nimbe would
comply with their request, for at the same time it was decided that if he did not
produce the accounts for auditing within twenty-eight days, legal action would be
5 This refers to the conference in Lancaster House, London, in Sept–Oct 1948 for representatives of each of
the African territories. The Nigerian delegation was elected by the unofficial members of the legislative
council; Azikiwe failed to be elected.
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taken against him. It is difficult to believe that the N.C.N.C. executive would be so
rash as to carry out this threat, for an examination of the accounts is unlikely to
reflect any credit on any of them.
The rest of the Convention’s time was taken up approving in principle the various
matters to be brought before the National Assembly. Then they considered the report
of the Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of Magnus Williams (see Political
Summary No. 23) and decided that he should be expelled from the movement, and
this having been done the Convention adjourned until next year. That evening they
held a demonstration. A fair crowd followed them, most of them Ibos and the rest
Hausa youngsters who were there to see the fun. Significantly, and to the chagrin of
Zik, the not inconsiderable Yoruba population of Kaduna for the most part boycotted
the demonstration. Led by a bodyguard of ten ex-servicemen and followed by a
couple of brass bands with Zik perched somewhat nervously on a horse, the
procession made its way through the town; but as a propaganda stunt it appears to
have been a failure: most people – Hausas, Yorubas and Binis – thought it a
presumptuous display and complained of the noise kicked up by Zik and his
followers.
The National Assembly
After a day’s rest, the delegates, considerably augmented, gathered again for the
National Assembly. In accordance with George Padmore’s advice, invitations had
been issued to some three hundred organizations and individuals, many of them not
connected with the N.C.N.C. Since the Assembly seems to have been open to anyone
who cared to go in it is somewhat difficult to say exactly how many actually attended
or to classify those who were present according to tribes, but an examination of the
list of official delegates shows that there were fifty-two Ibos, thirteen Yorubas, Zik’s
five Northern lieutenants (Mallams Abdullah, Bida, Attah, Zungur, and Zukogi), four
Ibibios, three Oras, two natives of the Cameroons, two Yagbas (Northern Provinces
Yoruba), an Ijaw, an Uhrobo, a Bini, and a Tiv. Among the delegates were two women
—a Miss Ogunrinka who represented the Youth Congress, Lagos, and a Mrs. Ekpo,
an Ibibio who has recently begun to organize a Women’s Party at Aba. All the
delegates present were Zikists, with the single exception of Mr. J.V. Clinton, editor of
the Calabar Eastern Mail, who went as an observer. Of the other non-N.C.N.C.
organizations and individuals who were invited, most ignored the invitation and the
rest declined it.
The business of the first day was confined to speech-making, Zik starting the ball
rolling with a Presidential Address. After remarking that the N.C.N.C. had been
founded ‘in order to hasten our march towards political freedom, economic security,
social equality and religious toleration’ he explained that the Assembly had been
summoned so that the conduct of the N.C.N.C. could be placed ‘in the crucible of
public opinion’. In the past, he said, it had been difficult to determine what was the
opinion of the country as a whole, but the convening of the National Assembly
provided an opportunity for the question to be placed beyond doubt. He therefore
proposed to lay his new constitution before them in the hope that, after examining it
and amending it if necessary, they would adopt it as the nation’s Charter of Freedom.
The speech was brief and to the point and except, for one reference to the ‘atrocious
crime committed . . . by those who are determined to introduce ‘Pakistanism’ into
‘this country’, was moderate in tone.
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This Address was followed by nine ‘Goodwill Speeches’ delivered by persons who
purported to represent the nine ‘protectorates’ into which Zik’s constitution divides
the country, and a similar speech by Blankson on behalf of the Press. All the speeches
consisted of strings of the usual Zikist catch phrases and none of them were in any
way remarkable, except that of Jaja Wachuku,6 who, no doubt to sustain his
reputation as ‘the silver-tongued orator of Iboland’, let himself go without restraint
in his threats and prognostications of violence and bloodshed.
The Assembly then got down to the business of considering the various motions
that had been tabled. Like those before the Convention, many were merely the airing
of local grievances and it was perhaps typical of the Assembly that for the most part
they were unanimously adopted without discussion, though nobody present except
the proposers could possibly have known anything about the merits of the case.
Considerable indignation, however, was shown during the discussion of a motion
condemning the way the representatives to attend the African Conference had been
selected, it being contended that only the Elected Members and Nyong Essien were
qualified to speak on behalf of the people of Nigeria. The discussion ended in the
action already taken by the Convention being ratified.
A motion that women should be exempted from taxation was carried but only after
it had been amended by excluding women liable under the Income Tax Ordinance.
The effect of this would be that European women would continue to pay tax while
their African sisters would be exempt.
An interesting discussion centred round whether Zik should continue to sit in
Legislative Council. The indications are that he hoped the Assembly would ‘instruct’
him to stay away in future, but the Assembly decided by a majority that he should
continue to sit, because if he did not, they would have no watchdog to safeguard their
interests in the Council.
The Assembly then turned to considering the future organization of the N.C.N.C.
It is not easy to say what exactly was decided because it is difficult to determine when
they were referring to the N.C.N.C. and when to their new Constitution, for it was
their declared object to integrate the two, and thus prepare the way for the Federal
State of Nigeria. The proposals, as they emerged, appear to be that in future the
N.C.N.C. should be organized on the following basis:—
(a) A Federal Parliament (i.e. the Convention) which elects the Federal President
and nine Regional Presidents. The Federal President to hold office for three years
and to have power to select his own ‘Cabinet Ministers’.
(b) Nine Regional Assemblies, presided over by the Regional Presidents who have
power to appoint their own ‘Regional Committees’. The Regional Assemblies
appoint Provincial Presidents.
(c) Provincial Assemblies, presided over by the Provincial Presidents who have
power to appoint their own Provincial Committees. The Provincial Assemblies
elect Branch Presidents, who select their own Branch Committees, and, it appears,
preside over the local branches of the N.C.N.C.
It is not clear how the members of the various Assemblies are to obtain their seats
though presumably it is to be by some unspecified system of universal adult suffrage.
6 Jaja Anucha Wachuku, elected to the Eastern House of Assembly, 1951 and to the House of
Representatives, 1952; speaker of House of Representatives 1960.
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This proposed re-organization was adopted, and the President was forthwith voted
power to proceed with the formation of his ‘cabinet’.
The next item of importance was the N.C.N.C.’s Education Plan. Very little
information is available about this because it has never been made public, but its
main provision is the raising of funds to found a University of Nigeria, to be run
under the auspices of the N.C.N.C. for the purpose of training technicians and others,
to take over all the senior Government posts and to staff the industries that are to be
set up under the N.C.N.C.’s Industrial Scheme. Mr. Clinton, who rarely spoke,
intervened to suggest that the N.C.N.C. could more profitably employ themselves by
assisting the mass education campaign, but this unpalatable suggestion was ignored
as was a suggestion that the N.C.N.C. should devote its attention to founding
secondary schools before starting on a University. The University appealed to the
majority and the plan was accordingly adopted.
Then came the Industrial Plan. There was a great deal of talk about Government’s
failure to establish local industries and much airy debate about what industries
ought to be established. In the end it was decided to adopt the plan in principle and
to leave the detailed planning to a committee, and the only concrete decision arrived
at was that whatever else the plan might contain, it must make provision for the
manufacture of gin.
The Assembly realized that the founding of a University and the establishment of
industries would require money, so the next point considered was Finance. The
Secretary announced that an appeal would shortly be made to the public to subscribe
to a Twenty Million Shilling Fund. Mr. Jaja Wachuku thought this amount inadequate
and increased it to Forty Million Shillings. Nobody explained how £2,000,000 was to
be extracted from pockets which, according to the N.C.N.C., were long ago emptied
and have since been kept empty, by the imperialist exploiters, but a gentleman from
Aba wondered whether the public would take kindly to a further appeal when the
N.C.N.C. was unable to account for what they had already got. The President explained
that the action already taken by the Convention against Dr. Nimbe ought to restore
public confidence and the launching of the fund was approved. It would perhaps be
uncharitable to speculate whether there is any connection between these proposals
and Zik’s efforts to raise capital for his new Continental Bank.
At this stage an enthusiast arose to propose that
‘In view of the fact that the N.C.N.C. has planned a series of positive action, be
it resolved that this Assembly decides to instruct the N.C.N.C. Cabinet to
appeal to India, Russia or America for alliance in case of belligerent attack’.
Zik rapidly intervened to explain that an open Assembly was not the place to discuss
such things and the motion was promptly withdrawn. A number of minor motions
were then debated and the Assembly adjourned for the day.
On the next day, the greater part of the morning session was taken up discussing
the iniquities of the Daily Times reporter, who had further blotted his copy book by
referring to the Convention and Assembly as an ‘all Ibo affair’. The discussion ended
with a decision to boycott the Daily Times for one month, but in the course of it the
question arose of leakages of N.C.N.C. secrets. Nobody mentioned any names but S.A.
George, the paid under-secretary, who everyone knows would cheerfully sell
anything to anybody for a very small price, was so upset at the thought that his
integrity might be open to doubt that he burst into tears.
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The rest of the day was devoted to considering the proposed constitution.
According to the ‘Pilot’
‘It was really dramatic to watch experts of both constitutional law and
political science split hairs over a word or phrase for its technical, legal
international and other implications Greek to the laymen’.
The result of the hair-splitting was to abandon the proposal to set up nine
‘protectorates’ on a geographical basis, and, instead, to carve the country up into a
number of linguistic groups, each of which would form an autonomous state within
the Commonwealth of Nigeria. They also abandoned the original proposal of a single
chamber legislature and instead made provision for a House of Nationalities and a
House of Representatives which together would form the Assembly of the
Commonwealth. The revised Constitution has not yet been published, but as it
apparently dispenses with the period of condominium which Zik originally proposed,
it ought to differ radically from the suggested constitution which the Delegation
presented to the Secretary of State, and it is not at all clear how it is to fit in with the
previously adopted organization of the N.C.N.C. It is doubtful whether the delegates
themselves know. When the revision had been completed, Nyong Essien suggested
that before it was finally approved, the delegates should take it home with them to
consult their ‘constituents’, but this suggestion was cried down as being quite
unnecessary—an interesting side light on the N.C.N.C., seeing [as] one of their
principal complaints about the Richards Constitution is that it was forced upon the
country without the people at large being given an opportunity to say whether or not
they liked it, and a typical example of the N.C.N.C.’s arrogant conviction that nobody
but themselves are qualified to speak for the people of Nigeria. So Nyong Essien was
overruled and the revised constitution was adopted as the ‘Freedom Charter of
Nigeria and the Cameroons’ and the Cabinet of the N.C.N.C. was given a mandate to
implement it.
The last item on the agenda for this day was the consideration of the report of a
Committee which the N.C.N.C. set up to examine the question of conditional sales.
Zik hoped to make considerable capital out of this but his teeth were drawn by
Government having set up its own committee on which the chief complainants are
well represented, with the result that this item fell very flat.
The proceedings on the last day opened with the ill-starred Daily Times reporter
being again put on the carpet—this time for allegedly reporting that a resolution had
been passed calling upon the people not to pay tax. As has already been observed,
such a possibility had in fact been mentioned in the course of the discussions in the
Convention, but no formal motion had been moved to this effect. After the
possibilities of taking legal action against the reporter had been discussed and
rejected, they finally decided to expel him again, which they did after passing another
resolution that the Daily Times be boycotted.
From then on the proceedings became a kind of ‘private members day’, everyone
trying to jump to his feet to propose some motion or another, most of which were
adopted without discussion. Nyong Essien got himself into hot water by asking for
£25 to cover his travelling expenses. Even the N.C.N.C. thought this was going a bit
too far, for everyone knew that he had got free transport to Kaduna to attend
Legislative Council, and that he had a warrant in his pocket to take him home again.
The final act was the expulsion of Nimbe and Adedoyin from the N.C.N.C. on
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account of their generally reprehensible conduct and in particular on account of
their contempt of the Convention’s summons to come to Kaduna and explain
themselves. Nobody seems to have worried about the fact that the Assembly, not
being the N.C.N.C., had presumably no power to expel anybody from that
organization, nor were they troubled by the fact that membership of the N.C.N.C. is
confined to organizations and that they had just defeated a motion that it should be
thrown open to individuals. Perhaps it was as well they forgot it because had they
remembered it they would have been put in the awkward position of having to expel
the Democratic Party, which would have automatically resulted in expelling their
worthy President as well!
There was no more business to transact, and after Zik had dismissed the delegates
with a final address in which he expressed the hope ‘that the sweat of our brows
during this National Assembly will serve to water the trees of liberty which we have
sown’, the Assembly came to an end.
* * *
It is still too early to judge the full political results of Zik’s latest manoeuvre, but as a
political bombshell it has proved a rather pitiful misfire. His object in calling the
Assembly was to strengthen his hand with a ‘mandate’ which would have the colour
of having been given him by representatives of all shades of advanced political
opinion and it is known that the fact that nobody of note showed any disposition to
accept his invitation has caused him considerable mortification, which is in no way
lessened by the manifest defection of Adedoyin and Nimbe. This was but an added
rebuff to the many he has received of late. He held the Assembly in Kaduna in
furtherance of his campaign to win over the North, and in that region he seems to
have won a point or two, for he has undoubtedly quickened the interest of numbers
of Northern young men, but against this he has lost heavily in the Yoruba country
where his activities have only served to harden the opposition against him. It is
difficult to say what the effect has been in the East, but as he has always drawn his
main support from that area, his position there probably remains unchanged.
An interesting factor is Zik’s apparent throwing of discretion to the winds and
openly preaching a doctrine of violence. In the past, he has been circumspect enough
to pay at least lip service to the necessity of proceeding in a constitutional manner.
The change is probably due to the succession of blows which his pride has lately
suffered—the failure of his delegation; the unexpected hostility which he experienced
at Legislative Council, especially the slap in the face he received from the Unofficial
members over the selection of representatives for the African Conference; the fact
that Dr. Danquah7 stole his thunder with the Gold Coast disturbance and finally the
realization that for the first time in his life, he is faced by a considerable body of
opposition among the politically-minded younger generation, which opposition is
largely directed against him personally, and the most likely explanation of this new
departure is that all these rebuffs have worked upon his unstable mind and forced
him to indulge in this display of reckless oratory in order to re-instate himself in his
own esteem. The principal factors militating against any deliberate resort to violence
7 J B Danquah, founder member of United Gold Coast Convention, 1947; detained by colonial govt
following Accra riots, Feb 1948.
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are the trepidation with which he views any prospect of danger to his own skin and
his well known lack of enthusiasm for landing himself in gaol. The principal cause
for apprehension is that he will be carried away by the flood which he himself is in
danger of setting loose.
Although, therefore, the possibilities of civil commotions certainly cannot be
ignored, it is to be doubted whether these play any immediate part in Zik’s plans of
‘positive action’. His present intention seems to be to spend the next few years
building up his organization, his aim being to secure his ends by creating a parallel
administration which will slowly paralyze the Government by usurping its authority.
It is for this purpose that he has set up his ‘shadow government’—a political device
not unknown elsewhere—and when he talks of the possibilities of bloodshed and
violence he most likely has in mind what may possibly happen when, as it inevitably
must, his rival organization comes into conflict with established authority.
A disturbing factor is the indication that Zik is becoming increasingly subject to
outside influences. It has been shown that the idea of a National Assembly came from
George Padmore, and anyone who has made a close study of Zik’s writings and
speeches cannot fail to observe in his recent utterances a note which is certainly not
the authentic Zik. In the past he has been prepared to accept the support of
Communist and other such organizations only in so far as they were likely to further
his own decided ends. It would be to misjudge the situation to believe that Zik is, or
ever has been, a communist, or that he is ever likely to be willing to further
communism for its own sake, but the recent Convention and Assembly reveal
disquieting indications that his moves are no longer inspired entirely from within
and that he is now allowing himself to be pushed to some extent from without. And
in that his prompters are clever, for they know that his egotism will blind him to the
fact that he is being used as a pawn in the game of stirring up embarrassing
situations wherever they can.
46 CO 583/287/4 21 May 1948
[Egbe Omo Oduduwa]: minute by F J Webber on the formation of the
Egbe Omo Oduduwa
[The Yoruba cultural organisation, Egbe Omo Oduduwa (Society of the descendants of
Oduduwa), was first formed in London in late 1945, and formally inaugurated in Nigeria
at Ife in June 1948, with Obafemi Awolowo as general secretary, and Sir A Alakija as
president. Initially a cultural body, it came to be seen as increasingly separatist and as
articulating the political aspirations of Yoruba leaders against the NCNC.]
Mr. Gorsuch
I expect you have seen this interesting news item from the ‘Times’.1 It is obviously
impossible to make a true assessment of its implications at this stage, but we ought
to watch this kind of thing very carefully.
On narrow grounds the launching of this moderate movement may be beneficial
to the extent that it discredits the N.C.N.C., and brings home the important fact that
Zik is not the logical and recognised successor to the British Crown. But on broader
1 Not printed.
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grounds this news gives me cause for concern. In the first place I do not like the
element of separatism which cuts across what I conceive to be our traditional policy
of the unification of Nigeria: if this movement achieves any amount of success there
may well be others, e.g. the Northern Provinces which I suspect are all too
susceptible to this kind of development. In the second place this business of self-help
when not inspired by Government is not a thing we should condone. Quite obviously
they are taking a leaf out of the N.C.N.C. book who talk about their own development
plans etc.
This attempt at independent executive action is bound to confuse public opinion
in Nigeria, and impede the Government. It will be a stumbling block to our attempts
to canalise public opinion in the accepted constitutional channels, and to provide
government of the Nigerians for the benefit of Nigeria as a whole.
I do not propose that at this stage we should attempt to give any guidance but I
feel that it would be useful if Mr. Cohen wrote to Sir John Macpherson as in draft
attached.
47 CO 583/287/5, no 12A 30 May 1948
[Political development]: note by H M Foot on the Kaduna meeting of
the Legislative Council
The Legislative Council met on the morning of the 23rd of March at Kaduna. This
was the first time that the Council had met outside Lagos under the arrangement
whereby the annual budget session of the Council is to take place in the Regional
headquarters in rotation. Next year it will meet in Ibadan, in 1950 in Enugu and in
1951 in Lagos. There was at first some petty criticism mainly from the unofficial
Lagos members and in the Lagos Press about the expense and inconvenience of
meeting in Kaduna but special care had been taken to ensure that satisfactory
transport and accommodation arrangements for unofficial members were made and
although the Southern members suffered some discomfort from the dry winds of the
North I think that before the meeting was over everyone was prepared to agree that
the experiment had proved a success. The move to Kaduna at least brought home to
those unofficial (and official) members who live in Lagos the necessity to keep in
proper perspective the overwhelming claims of the great bulk of the people of Nigeria
in relation to those of the comparatively tiny but vociferous minority in Lagos. The
mere fact that the meeting took place four hundred miles from Lagos made it less
likely that the tail would have much success in its persistent and energetic efforts to
wag the dog.
The magnificent new building which is to be the home of the House of Chiefs and
Northern House of Assembly is still under construction and was not therefore avail-
able for this meeting of the Legislative Council as had at one time been hoped. The
Council therefore met in the Kaduna Trade Centre, which was perhaps rather bare
(and hot in the afternoons) and provided for only about fifty members of the public in
the visitors’ gallery, but as a make-shift we could scarcely have hoped for a better
debating hall. The seating arrangement was the same as that previously devised at
Lagos, the Chief Commissioners and one Resident from each Region sitting with the
unofficial members who were in four groups. Immediately on the President’s left was
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the Northern block of nine Emirs and Mallams magnificent in their headdresses and
flowing gowns: next to them on the left were the six Eastern members, most of them
in European dress: opposite to the President sat the Westerners led by the Oni of Ife
and Oba of Benin in their caps and robes with the four other Western members behind
them: next, on the far right from the President were the Lagos and nominated mem-
bers—a somewhat ill-assorted group headed by the Father of the House, the Rev.
Ogunbiyi, sitting in front of Dr. Azikiwe (who startled the Council by an almost
Churchillian weakness for varying head-gear, ranging from a headband with an Ibo
feather to a Moslem tarboush). The other Lagos elected members, Dr. Nimbe and Mr.
Adedoyin, were scarcely less colourful in comparison with their European neighbours,
the nominated commercial members. Between this group and the chair (on the
President’s immediate right) sat the Attorney-General, Chief Secretary, Financial
Secretary and the Heads of the principal Departments.
The proceedings of the Council were throughout orderly and, with only one or two
lapses from Dr. Nimbe who insists on maintaining his reputation for being offensive
to everyone, were good-humoured—though some doubts, anxieties and animosities,
to which I shall presently refer, were moving below the surface.
Each day started, after prayers, with answers to questions, over three hundred of
which (mainly asked by Dr. Azikiwe) had been put down just before or during the
meeting. These questions were often well thought-out and searching and although
the attempt to obtain all the information required threw a heavy strain on the
officials concerned at a time when pressure of other work was exceptional, it is
certainly satisfactory that members are now prepared to make full use of this means
of obtaining official information and statements of policy. It is also to be welcomed
that the practice of asking supplementary questions in the Council, which keeps the
officials on their toes and enlivens the proceedings, is on the increase.
The first day of the meeting was mainly taken up with the President’s address (of
which copies were sent to the Colonial Office at the time) and the first reading of a
number of comparatively minor Bills. It was not until the second day that the first
skirmish took place over ‘The European Officers’ Pensions (Amendment) Bill’. On a
vote the second reading of the Bill was, however, passed by thirty-three votes to eight
(the eight being from Lagos and the East). Proposals for an annual grant-in-aid of
£100,000 for five years to the new University College and for a contribution of
£250,000 to the University College endowment fund were unanimously carried (after
Mr. Adedoyin had attempted to attract attention to himself by proposing
unsuccessfully that the contribution to the endowment fund should be doubled).
On the third day, having unanimously welcomed the Secretary of State’s invitation
to attend a Conference of African delegations later this year in London, the Council
debated a motion put down by Dr. Azikiwe condemning ‘any attempt to create ill-will
among the various communities of this country’. The motion was supported from all
parts of the Council and Dr. Azikiwe accepted with fairly good grace an amendment
proposed by an Eastern member to substitute the word ‘in’ for ‘of’. The Zik papers are
of course the main instigators of ill-will against the white communities in Nigeria
and the other unofficial members enjoyed putting him in the position of having to
support the neat change proposed. Later in the morning a more important debate
began on a motion put down by Eastern members seeking permission to introduce a
Bill to enable the Courts to make maintenance orders for illegitimate children. The
debate was important since it brought the East and the North into direct conflict.
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The Northern members, backed by Moslem public opinion, were opposed to the Bill
on religious grounds since under strict Moslem law the punishment for adultery is
death and to provide by law for the maintenance of illegitimate children might in
their opinion tend to condone a crime which they regard as unpardonable. After an
interesting debate in which it became clear that the permission of the Council to
introduce the proposed legislation would not be obtained the motion was withdrawn.
Another interesting division of opinion occurred on a Motion proposed by a Western
member for leave to introduce a Bill to exclude all matters relating to the selection,
appointment and deposition of Chiefs from the jurisdiction of the Courts. This
Motion was carried by a majority of seventeen to ten (the official members
abstaining). All the Northern members voted for the motion together with four from
the West, one from the East and one from the Colony, the opponents being five from
the East, three from Lagos and two from the West (including, rather surprisingly, the
Oba of Benin). The day finished with the debate on Dr. Azikiwe’s motion for payment
of salaries of £600 a year to unofficial members which was later defeated by 35 votes
to 5 (the official view being that while there might be a case for payment of increased
allowances to members the time had not yet come for payment of salaries).
For the next week following the Financial Secretary’s statement on the budget made
on the 6th of March what is usually called the budget debate proceeded. In fact most
of the speeches made little or no reference to the budget. The widest latitude has in
the past been allowed during the debate on the second reading of the Appropriation
Bill for members to speak on almost any question they wish. Unofficial members feel
moreover that they are under some obligation to speak in the debate and in fact all of
them spoke on this occasion. It is of course valuable for members to have an oppor-
tunity from time to time to discuss all aspects of Government policy but to listen over
a period of a week to nearly thirty set speeches on end on the widest variety of uncon-
nected subjects is a wearisome business (Dr. Azikiwe created a new record by speak-
ing for about three and a half hours). The existing system is open to objection on other
grounds. It is the practice for official members to wait until all the unofficial members
have spoken before they intervene and then to reply to any points raised which con-
cern their Departments or spheres of activity. This arrangement leaves the initiative
to the unofficial members and tends to put the officials on the defensive. Too often
after listening to days of criticism and complaint the official members are content with
short statements in almost an apologetic manner on a series of unconnected points.
The general impression is exactly the one which we are striving to avoid and if the
Government is to take a bold initiative, outlining future policy, putting forward new
proposals and seeking to win the enthusiastic support of the Council and the imagi-
nation of the public some better system must be devised. A great deal of the detailed
discussion of minor points should be left to the Select Committee, separate debates
should be arranged on prinicpal questions of departmental policy and there is much
to be said for restricting the budget debate to discussion of major financial matters,
leaving questions of general policy to a debate on the Governor’s opening address.
On the 13th of March the Council went into Select Committee on the Estimates,
which is composed of the Financial Secretary and all unofficial members of the
Council. It emerged ten days later very much the worse for wear. For that ten days it
sat from early in the morning often till late at night questioning Heads of
Departments, raising matters of major policy and also examining the most trifling
points—covering in fact the whole range of Government activities. Dr. Azikiwe in
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particular, who was probably the only member who had taken real care to study in
advance departmental reports and estimates, raised all sorts of questions often only
remotely related to particular items in the estimates. His long cross-examination of
Departmental Heads at first made many of the other members extremely restive. The
Financial Secretary reports, however, that his lead resulted in the other members
taking a much closer interest in a wide variety of subjects than has previously been
the case and there is no doubt that the Select Committee has given to all members a
most useful understanding of Government’s achievements, problems and difficulties.
The fact that the estimates and substantial increases in taxation were in the end
approved without any important amendment is sufficient tribute to the tact and
patience shown by the Financial Secretary and the confidence which he has won
amongst all the members of the Council.
Throughout the sittings of the Select Committee there were two main issues in
which all members were particularly interested and on which there was a wide
measure of agreement. The members were first of all specially concerned about black
market prices and conditional sales (the disorders which had just taken place in the
Gold Coast1 were no doubt very much in their minds). They were also most anxious
that in all departments of Government there should be an acceleration of the
training and recruitment of Nigerians for higher posts. The appointment shortly
afterwards of Commissions of Enquiry on those two matters, on each of which there
is a Nigerian majority, has since shown them that the Government has given full
weight to their representations on these two important questions.
The Council resumed on the 24th of March and having passed the Appropriation
Bill proceeded to dispose of outstanding official and unofficial motions. Dr. Azikiwe
was granted formal permission to introduce a number of Bills but could obtain little
support for a motion calling for papers about the visit of the N.C.N.C. delegation to
the Colonial Office. He failed to explain what papers he wished to be published and
the motion was lost by 38 votes to 4.
Meanwhile a Select Committee had been sitting on the selection of the delegation
to represent Nigeria at the London Conference to be held in September next and on
the 24th of March the recommendations of the Select Committee were unanimously
adopted by the Council. A separate report on this Select Committee has been made
and it is sufficient here to record that the decision of the unofficial members taken by
secret ballot was the source of bitter disappointment to Dr. Azikiwe who received
only three votes as against seventeen for the Member for Calabar who was the elected
member selected to join the delegation.
Although they were not debated it should also be recorded that the Third Lagos
Member (Mr. Adedoyin) put forward at the last moment the following two important
constitutional motions:—
‘That this Honourable House recommends that the Executive Council of
Nigeria should include Members elected from the African Unofficial Members
of the Legislative Council and that such Members assisted by Technical
Experts should be responsible to the said Legislative Council for Government
Policy in matters affecting Land, Agriculture, Education, Transport, Health
and Social Services with a view to affording Nigerians opportunity of
1 This refers to the Accra riots of Feb-March 1948.
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participating in the management of their own affairs and thereby according
them a measure of Political Responsibility in fulfilment of the oft declared
British Colonial Policy of training the Colonies for Self-Government.’
‘That this Honourable House approves of the unity of Nigeria by federation
of the various regions which should become autonomous in due course, and
that the whole country be developed towards self-government on this federal
basis.’
Mr. Adedoyin agreed to postpone debate on both these motions until a subsequent
meeting of the Council. They will no doubt be discussed at the next meeting which it
is hoped to hold in August.
The main business of this meeting of the Council was of course to deal with the
1948/49 budget. This was done with thoroughness and with very little disagreement.
The Bills taken to the Council were mainly uncontroversial and were passed without
opposition. As for the legislative work accomplished the result can consequently be
regarded as fully satisfactory. It was moreover a useful achievement to have secured
the unanimous support of the Council for the statement of educational policy drawn
up by the Director of Education and for the grants to the new University College.
In other ways the meeting can also be counted a success. The new constitution is
still in its early stages and there is, I think, little doubt that many of the Northern
members, and some from the West too, entered the Kaduna meeting with misgivings
and anxieties.
The Northerners felt that there was some danger of being outvoted by the
Southerners and being thus saddled with legislation contrary to Northern principles
and susceptibilities. The Obas of the West were still a little uneasy at sitting with com-
moners. There were general doubts about what might result from the elected Lagos
members taking their seats for the first time. My own impression was that by the time
the meeting ended there was on all sides a realisation that effective work had been
done and that the experiment of bringing representatives of all sections of the popu-
lation into one legislative assembly had been well justified by results. Such animosi-
ties as had come to the surface during the debates—in particular the attacks on Dr.
Azikiwe by the Second Northern member—were expressed in the best parliamentary
manner. All members appeared to realise that the long hours of discussion—includ-
ing particularly the gruelling work in Select Committee—had been well worthwhile.
Even the elected Lagos members, in spite of the rebuff which they received in the
selection of the London delegation, enjoyed the opportunities for unrestricted oratory,
of which they took full advantage. Dr. Azikiwe in particular was at great pains to study
his subjects and to adopt throughout a reasonable approach which did not fail to make
some impression on the other members. I think that it can be said that the second
meeting of the new Legislative Council has done much to consolidate the marked suc-
cess which has already been achieved by the new Regional Houses.
There was another result of major importance which emerged from the meeting.
It became clear as the debates proceeded that, while the experiment of bringing
representatives of all the Regions together in the Legislative Council can and will
lead to a growing appreciation of the needs of Nigeria as a whole, there is, on the
other hand, a determination on the part of each Regional bloc to ensure that the
internal interests of the Region it represents shall not be overriden by a majority
opinion from outside. A strong tendency became apparent for each Region to express
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its wish to develop in its own way, and to allow the other Regions to pursue their own
internal policies, unimpeded by outside interference. The Northern Emirs and
Mallams want to be quite sure that the Moslem traditions of the North will not be
disturbed, the Eastern members hope to see in their Region all sorts of reforms based
on new ideas, the Western leaders wish to progress within the framework of the
aristocratic system to which they are accustomed. The undoubted success which has
been achieved by the united central legislature is accompanied by a new sense of
Regional self-respect and a determination on the part of each Region not to allow
unity at the centre to break down the strong and increasing determination of each
Region to order its own internal affairs as it wishes. The trend of the debates in fact
indicated that the thinking leaders of Nigeria are moving rapidly to the conception of
a federal state. As the authority of the single bureaucratic government gives way to a
more democratic system it becomes increasingly clear that a country of the size of
Nigeria with its widely differing races must in future draw its strength not from
power originating from the centre but from separate racial divisions, rooted in their
own diverse traditions and developing in different ways, being at the same time
prepared to send their representatives to meet together with mutual respect for the
direction of those affairs which must be decided for the whole.
48 CO 583/287/4, no 4 3 June 1948
[Egbe Omo Oduduwa]: letter from H M Foot to L H Gorsuch on the
formation of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. Enclosure
Thank you for your letter No. 30453/3/48 of the 28th of May sending me a cutting from
the ‘Times’ about the launching of ‘a great Yoruba national movement’. You may now
have seen our political summary for March–April on page 13 of which mention was
made of the progress of the Egbe Omo Odudowa which is the organisation to which
the ‘Times’ report refers (I attach an extract from the summary).
It is true that the Egbe Omo Oduduwa has been rather more active lately and has
been raising funds for scholarships. (Its leaders have up to now been at pains to
explain that it is a non-political organisation). It has also, as the ‘Times’ says,
arranged a rally at Ile-Ife to take place early this month. The correspondent who sent
the report published in the ‘Times’ is however obviously a keen supporter of the Egbe
and has allowed his party enthusiasm to run away with him. I do not myself think
that we can look to the existing Yoruba leaders to start ‘a great national movement’
and I should feel rather more enthusiastic about their activities if there was more
evidence that they have new and constructive ideas rather than merely a policy of
opposition to Ibos and retention of their own influential positions.1
We shall send you a separate note about the Egbe in a week or two.
1 Foot’s concerns were echoed by Macpherson, ‘While I warmly welcome increased social and political
activity in the Western Provinces, I am very much concerned about the growth of ill-feeling between the
Yorubas and the Ibos and I am inclined to think . . . that the Society is mainly concerned with resistance to
Zik and the Ibos rather than with a constructive programme. It is, however, too early to say whether the
Society will, in fact, make any useful contribution to progress among the Yorubas. It has certainly been
very active in the past few months and in its resistance to the Ibos, if in little else, it can claim considerable
success’ (Macpherson to Creech Jones, 19 June 1948, CO 583/287/4, no 5)
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Enclosure to 48
Other political moves
The Egbe Omo Oduduwa has continued to make slow, but undoubtedly steady
progress. Numerous branches have been inaugurated throughout the Western
Provinces, several among Yoruba communities in the North and one even at
Abakaliki in the East. Although they continue to declare that their purpose is to unite
all Yorubas and that their movement is not aimed against any other tribal group, the
fact remains that their object is to combat the ‘Ibo menace’ and to break Azikiwe.
They realise that the cause will be lost if Zik succeeds in his attempt to win over the
North and so apprehensive were they of the possible effect of his activities in LegCo
and at his Convention and Assembly, that they sent off Bode Thomas2 and
H.O.Davies3 hot foot to the North to try to counteract his propaganda there. They did
nothing very spectacular, though they are reported to have found warm support at
the few public meetings they held. These, however, were attended for the most part
by Yorubas and cannot be taken as any indication of the extent to which they were
able to influence true Northerners, but it is reported that much of their time was
taken up quietly visiting Northern men of influence, and that they were received with
a considerable amount of sympathy. There is little prospect of the Egbe doing
anything notable in the immediate future. They realise that they have no outstanding
leader. and that, except for the ‘Ibo menace’, which they are not prepared to use
openly, they have no plank in their platform which the N.C.N.C. have not already got
in theirs. Their present policy, therefore, is to consolidate their organisation, to find
a leader and start grooming him and to lie low until the Lagos Town Council and
LegCo elections in 1950. They hope then to be able to come forward as a party with a
programme based on whatever issues are the subject of public controversy at that
time and make an all-out drive to capture all the vacant seats. It is idle to speculate
on their chances of successfully carrying out their programme for, on past showing,
the prospects of any Lagos political party adopting a programme and sticking to it for
any length of time are exceedingly remote.
2 Chief Bode Thomas, founding member and deputy leader of the AG; Federal minister of transport,
1952–1953.
3 Hezekiah Oladipo Davies, teacher and barrister, founder and later chairman of NYM; president and
secretary-general of WASU, legal adviser to Egbe Omo Oduduwa; QC 1958.
49 CO 583/287/5, no 2 28 June 1948
[Watson Commission]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to A B Cohen on
the likely impact on Nigeria of the Watson Commission’s Report
[The Commission of Inquiry under Aiken Watson was appointed following the Gold Coast
riots of Feb–March 1948. Its report was published in June, Report of the Commission of
Enquiry into Disturbances in the Gold Coast, 1948, col. No. 231 (see BDEEP series B, vol
1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I, 33, 34, 35, 36) and generated concern in the
administration over the likely response in Nigeria. In the event the publication of the
report did not cause the anticipated unrest elsewhere in West Africa.]
Many thanks for your secret and personal letter of the 12th of June with which you
sent me a copy of the Gold Coast Commission’s report. I am extremely glad to have to
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this so quickly. Gerald Creasy received his copy just as he was leaving the Gold Coast
to visit us; he finished reading it while he was here and passed on to me the main
findings and recommendations.
There will certainly be lively reactions in Nigeria to the report, and as you say, it is
the proposals for constitutional advance that will arouse particular interest. My first
thought is that it will be assumed here, as well as in the Gold Coast, that any
constitutional advance that follows upon the proposals of the commission has been
achieved as a direct result of disorder; this assumption will do great harm in leading
colonial peoples to believe that advance is more certainly and more speedily achieved
by violence than by constitutional means. Apart from the encouragement given to
political extremists throughout West Africa the proposals in the report will cause
serious misgivings amonst those in Nigeria (particularly in the North and West) who
wish to see advance along different lines.
The timing of the report is very unfortunate for us in Nigeria. So far the new team
has been given a very fair run by the extremist politicians and Zik told me the other
day that, as far as the N.C.N.C. was concerned, this was the result of a considered
decision, taken at the time of his Kaduna Convention, not to embarrass the new
regime; hence their quiescence since my arrival. He added that he was being pressed
by some of his more hot-headed supporters to take up the fight and admitted that his
position was difficult. I expressed understanding of his dilemma! I think that there is
some truth in what he said (although I discount the complimentary utterances that
went with it) but principally I think he is puzzled and uncertain about his next
course of action. The publication of the Gold Coast report may clarify his doubts and
uncertainties.
On my month’s tour of the country I moved too fast to get more than a superficial
knowledge of how things were going, but even so I found much to be pleased about
in the growing understanding and appreciation of the true purpose of the new
Constitution. In some places the Native Authorities (up to Divisional level) said that
they would not bother me with a lot of demands and problems, not merely because
my visit was short and made for the purpose of getting to know folks, but because
they already had their proper channel for the ventilation of these matters in the
House of Assembly. And I met Provincial members of the Houses of Assembly (in the
East and West) who had been having meetings with Provincial Committees at which
matters of Regional or Provincial interest were discussed. Given time, and with
flexibility on our part, the thing will work.
The press were gentle with me in regard to my ‘defence’ (really explanation) of the
Constitution in speeches I had to make on tour, and at a Press Conference which I
held immediately after my return I had to make it quite clear that I was putting no
new interpretation on the Constitution; nothing that I had said was other than
uppermost in the mind of its framer. I let it be understood that I wanted the
Constitution to be given a fair and full trial, and that I had no intention of suggesting
any major changes ahead of our timetable for review and modification. That was
before I knew how high wide and handsome the Gold Coast Commission would be.
The recommendation of the Commission that will be most eagerly taken up is, of
course, that relating to the Executive Council or Board of Ministers responsible to
the Assembly. As you know, I am not satisfied with my Executive Council as now
constituted; it is largely official and ‘rubber stamp’, and deals principally with death
sentences and with draft legislation at a late stage in its preparation. Apart from the
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lack of unofficials the Chief Commissioners can seldom attend and I can get little or
no advice from the Provinces. If Nigeria were a territory of normal size with a fairly
homogeneous population I should probably already have been considering the
conversion of Executive Council into a body for the formulation of policy. But the
distances make it very difficult to contemplate frequent meetings (once or twice a
week) of a truly representative body, though Zik would probably urge—following the
Gold Coast Commission’s proposal—that the members should be salaried full-time
Ministers. (This would lend force to the objections to Emirs and Chiefs playing a full
part on representative bodies). And even if we could get over the geographical hurdle
the important consideration remains that we are trying to build up in the Regions so
that, without destroying the unity of the whole, they can develop according to their
own traditions and social patterns. We are in fact moving towards a federal system,
by a gradual devolution from the centre.
To encourage this process of building up confidence in the Regions Hoskyns-
Abrahall is beginning, with my full approval, to have informal committees—not
statutory committees—in which the unofficial members of the Western House of
Assembly are associated with Heads of Departments, or Regional Deputies, in
considering various groups of activities. In the Eastern Provinces Carr is on very
excellent terms with his unofficial members and freely discusses with them matters
of policy which are not ripe for anything but confidential discussion. The members
take great satisfaction in this and there has been no case of any breach of confidence.
Thompstone too has informal meetings from time to time with members of the
Northern House of Assembly and House of Chiefs to discuss general questions of
policy. Here in Lagos I have just started a new arrangement whereby I can, without
reducing the build-up in the regions, have friendly talks with the members of
Finance Committee. To ensure that the work is not all carried out by the Lagos
nucleus Savage brings in the up-country members on a roster, and we have now
arranged that after the Committee has disposed of its formal business the members
should meet with me in Government House for general discussion of matters
affecting the country. We had our first of these meetings last week and I think the
members appreciated the arrangement. These tender little shoots are likely to be
shrivelled by the hot wind of clamour for spectacular constitutional advance.
It is not only the Executive Council proposals of the Commission that are
unsuitable for Nigeria. The Commission proposes that the Regional Councils in the
Gold Coast should be local government bodies, equivalent to County Councils,
whereas in Nigeria our Regional Houses are part of our legislative organization,
providing the basis for a federal system. This essential difference is not likely,
however, to affect the attitude of the N.C.N.C. which will no doubt use the Gold Coast
proposals as an additional argument for a system of ministerial responsibility at the
centre.
I have referred earlier in this letter to the N.C.N.C’s attitude towards the Emirs and
Chiefs. The Commission made no immediate recommendation regarding the future
position of the Gold Coast Chiefs but they gave a lot of space to the criticisms made
by Africans with a modern political outlook, and they did not contemplate the
retention of the Gold Coast Chiefs otherwise than ‘in a form which is a pale reflection
of the past’. This will upset our traditional elements and encourage the extremists;
and the result will not be conducive to sound progress.
At a first reading I do not think that, apart from the Constitutional proposals,
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there is much in the report that will cause strong reaction in Nigeria. (We are
engaged in action on Nigerianisation of the Senior Service1 and on conditional sales.
Our P.R.O. is good. And we have agreed to a swollen shoot rehabilitation subsidy
which, though under criticism, is equal to the upper limit proposed by the
Commission for the Gold Coast).
The real question is what action we should take as a result of the report. I shall not
attempt in this letter to deal fully with that. The Chief Commissioners are coming to
Lagos about the 9th of July and we shall consider the matter very carefully.
Meantime I reject of course, any idea of adding new members to Executive Council in
a hurry. We may have to alter our time-table for revision of the Constitution but
even if that were decided I should be averse from making any statement of our
intention in advance of publication of the Gold Coast report. Our next Legislative
Council meeting will begin about the 17th of August and the question of appointing
embryo ministers will in any case come up at that meeting (on a motion by Adedoyin
—see my recent letter to you about a proposal to add Phillipson to Executive
Council). We might avoid being put completely on the defensive by making a
statement at the opening of the meeting. The N.C.N.C. will not have had much time
to digest the report.
In any case I shall let you have my further thoughts after discussion with the Chief
Commissioners, and you will no doubt keep me posted about the action proposed in
the Gold Coast, following your discussions with Gerald Creasy, to whom I am
sending a copy of this letter.
1 The commission led by H M Foot, the chief secretary, was appointed in May 1948 to examine the
recruitment and training of Nigerians for senior posts in the civil service. It reported in August 1948 and
recommended that no non-Nigerian should be recruited for any government post except where no
qualified Nigerian was available; that public service boards should be established to select staff, and that
385 scholarships should be established for training candidates over the subsequent three years, Report of
the Commission appointed to make Recommendations about the Recruitment and Training of Nigerians
for Senior Posts in the Government Service of Nigeria (Lagos, 1948).
50 CO 583/299/1, no 1A 29 June 1948
[Local government reform]: inward savingram no 990 from Sir J
Macpherson to A B Cohen on local government reform in the Eastern
Provinces
[Creech Jones’s renowned despatch of 25 Feb 1947 on local government reform in the
African territories (see BDEEP Series A, vol 1, R Hyam, ed, The Labour government and
the end of empire 1945–1951, Part I, 44) was followed by a further despatch of 13 Jan
1948 (see BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I, 20), urging an increase in
the elective element at this level. In Nigeria it was the Eastern provinces that led the way
in this process, with moves by the administration to initiate local government reform
through the appointment of a select committee of the Eastern House of Assembly. The
select committee reported on proposals for local government reform in Aug 1948. The
importance of these local government reforms and the fact that the Eastern House drew
them up, was stressed by Foot, ‘We certainly appreciate how tremendously important it is
that we should win and keep the initiative and I believe that in very many important
directions we now have it’ (CO 583/299/1, no 9, Foot to Cohen, 9 Sept 1948).]
Since you heard from Gibbons about the proposals for local Government reform in
the Eastern Provinces he has written his report and I have fully discussed the whole
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question with Carr in Enugu. We think that some important modification of the
proposals first put forward from the Eastern Provinces is necessary. In particular I
am satisfied that it is essential that the new system when it is introduced should not
replace subordinate Native Authorities but incorporate them. Carr and Gibbons now
agree that the existing Native Authorities should not be scrapped as was first
proposed but should be retained as authorities subordinate to the proposed new
County Councils. The importance of having a small unit similar to Parish Councils in
England needs no emphasis from me and it would, I am sure, be a great mistake to
abandon the Authorities of this kind which we already have. Subject to that main
modification I have already reached the conclusion that it is necessary to introduce
local government reform in the Eastern Provinces on the general lines which
Gibbons explained to you.
2. You should also know that the other Chief Commissioners are disturbed by
these proposals and feel that to introduce a new system in the East will prejudice the
gradual process (which they are trying to accelerate) of making the Northern and
Western Native Authorities more democratic. I am to discuss the whole question
again with Chief Commissioners next month but while I have given full weight to the
views of the North and the West I feel quite sure that progress in the East on the lines
which the East wishes should not be held up.
3. The Eastern House of Assembly is to meet towards the end of July, and I shall
be most grateful if you will let me know soon if you agree that the Chief
Commissioner should then make a public statement foreshadowing the reforms
proposed. When ample time has been allowed for the Eastern House and the public
to express their views legislation will be drafted and will of course be forwarded to the
Colonial Office allowing ample time for detailed consideration before it is published
here.
51 CO 583/286/5, no 102 13 July 1948
[Constitutional review]: inward telegram no 889 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones outlining his plans to review the
constitution
[Macpherson arrived in Nigeria in April 1948. He faced a situation that, because of the
ramifications of the Accra riots in the Gold Coast in Feb and Mar, was causing concern
amongst officials (see 49). Shortly after his arrival the new governor began consultations
within the administration about the need to review the constitution; this document
concerns the outcome of these consultations. On 17 Aug 1948 Macpherson announced to
the Legislative Council that the process of drawing up a new constitution would begin.
See 65.]
I have now been able to hold a full discussion with the Chief Commissioners to
review the progress made under the new Constitution and to consider what future
course should be followed in the constitutional advance. We have taken into special
account the repercussions likely to be caused in Nigeria by the publication of the
report of the Gold Coast Commission at the end of this month.1
1 Report of the Watson Commission, see 49.
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2. After only a few months in the country, I myself am not yet able to speak
with full confidence on these matters, but during an extensive tour I have had
good opportunity of hearing both official and unofficial opinion in many areas and
from many different sources, and the proposals which I now wish to put forward
are wholeheartedly supported by the three Chief Commissioners and my other
advisers.
3. There are two outstanding factors which have impressed me.
Firstly, the new Constitution in spite of early criticism and misunderstanding, has
got away to a first rate start and has in fact been more widely appreciated and
accepted than even those who created it could have hoped. Secondly, there has been
remarkable move of opinion in all regions in favour of a policy of regional autonomy
within a Federal State. The regions above all else (?gp omitted) to develop and
advance in their own ways and they have been quick to realise that Regional Houses
(although their functions are as yet purely advisory) provide the best medium for
effective participation in the management of their own affairs, and at the same time
the best safeguard for their regional interests and traditions. It must be added that
although move towards regional autonomy mainly arises from a healthy urge
towards a greater measure of self-Government, it has also been reinforced by a
marked (? increase in) tribal ill-feeling.
4. These developments would I believe have enabled me in any event to make
proposals to you for constitutional changes to be introduced within the next few
years, but I should have preferred to delay doing so for some little time to come. The
forthcoming publication of Gold Coast Report and repercussions which will result
here have, however, made it necessary for us to review the whole question of the
course and pace to be followed in Nigeria as a matter of urgency.
5. It must be emphasised that constitutional recommendations in the Gold Coast
Report would be quite unsuitable for the very different circumstances of Nigeria. The
first main difference is that Regional Councils proposed for the Gold Coast are Local
Government Agencies, whereas in Nigeria the Regional Houses are legislative bodies.
The second factor is that in Nigeria the association of representatives of the people
with making of the policy and executive government must, I consider, be built up in
regions before we can expect to create truly representative executive body at the
centre. Such differences will be very well recognised by all responsible political
opinion here, but we can be sure that those local extremists whose main aim is a
quick transference of power to themselves will overlook them and shout for the same
reforms here as those recommended for Gold Coast. That being so, I regard it as of
the utmost importance for the Government to keep the initiative and take whatever
action is possible to prevent an agitation which might do greatest harm to sound
constitutional progress of the country.
6. With these factors in mind I put forward this proposal for conservation[sic]. In
my address to the Legislative Council when it assembles on 17th August I propose to
make a statement on the following lines:—
(a) I have now had time to see something of the constitutions system in force in
the Country and to appreciate rapid and sound progress which has already been
made.
(b) I have come to the conclusion that we should review the timetable already
proposed (that new Constitution should remain in force for 9 years, limit[ed]
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changes only being made at the end of 3 and 6 years-see paragraph 26 of Lord
Milverton’s despatch of 6th December, 1944)2 and consider generally what
changes should be made and whether they should be made earlier than at first
suggested.
(c) I accordingly propose that if it is the wish of the Council and Country that
earlier changes should be made, they should be introduced not at the end of 9
years but in the second 3 year period (we are halfway through the first at present).
(d) Before any change is made it is of the utmost importance to allow time for
expression of public opinion and if Council agrees I propose, after a period has
been allowed for preliminary public discussion, to set up a Select Committee
composed of all unofficial members (and one or two officials) following budget
session next year to review the whole position and make recommendations. Ends.
I do not expect such a course would kill extremists but it would, I believe, convince
more responsible opinion in all parts of the Country that the Government is anxious
to encourage constitutional advance in the way the people wish as fast as can
reasonably be expected. At the same time, it would be plain to the more moderate
political leaders who can speak for the bulk of the people and who would regard a
hasty shifting of power at the centre in the present circumstances as a disaster, that
no (? precipitated) [sic] change is intended.
7. I have set out these important proposals in this brief form so that you may be
aware of them while you have the Gold Coast Report under consideration. It will be
most helpful if you can inform me as soon as possible whether you agree with
general line which I propose to take. Ends.
2 See 7.
52 CO 583/287/4, no 8 26 July 1948
[Yoruba-Igbo relations]: inward telegram no 952 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones reporting the deterioration in ethnic
relations in Lagos
[A concern for the administration in mid-1948 was the increased tension between Yoruba
and Igbo inhabitants of Lagos, following the emergence of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa. This
tension was exacerbated by a press war between Azikiwe’s West African Pilot and the
Daily Service. The Yoruba Federal Union was established by supporters of the NCNC in
June 1948 in Lagos, in response to the formation of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and was
followed in Dec by the formal launch at Aba of the Ibo State Union, with Azikiwe as
president. Macpherson held secret meetings with both Azikiwe and Sir A Alakija to try to
calm feelings in Lagos. This tension was one of the factors that underpinned the
emergence of the AG.]
I think you should know that during the past few weeks there has been a serious
determination in the inter-tribal relations between the Yorubas and the Ibos,
especially in Lagos. There has been a press battle between the Zik papers and the
Yoruba ‘Daily Service’, with a great deal of personal abuse and washing of dirty linen,
and feelings are running so high that danger of a physical clash cannot entirely be
discounted.
2. This exacerbation of an (?underlying) hostility dates from the time when the
Ibos reacted sharply to the formation of Egbe Omo Oduduwa by attempting to
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inspire the creation in opposition thereto of a Yoruba Federal Union.1 See note by
Field transmitted with my confidential savingram No. 947 of 19th June. Situation
was not helped by the action of Onyeama, fifth Legislative Council member for the
Eastern Region, who, after being baited (?by omitted) Yoruba acquaintances in the
Island Club, signed a statement to the effect that ‘The Ibo domination of Nigeria is
merely a matter of time’. Facsimile of this was published in the ‘Daily Service’.
3. There is little to choose between the parties in this unpleasantness, but on the
whole the Daily Service has been more aggressive. It has been carrying on a vicious
campaign with the declared object of driving Azikiwe out of Lagos and out of politics.
Zik press has replied by personal attacks by Zik himself on Nimbe and Adedoyin, his
erstwhile lieutenants, and on other Yoruba leaders. Zik on his part is, I think,
seriously worried by the harm these attacks are undoubtedly doing to his position,
and his papers have demanded that the Government should put a stop to
‘unprovoked aggression’. His Yoruba enemies are confident that if the Government
remains neutral they can achieve their purpose.
4. At a press Club dinner in my honour on 14th July I took the opportunity to
refer to these polemics. I said that I had no wish or intention to interfere with the
freedom of the press or to discourage frank discussions about matters of public
interest, but I gave serious warning of the danger that the present controversy might
lead to deterioration of relations between Nigerian races, and I made it abundantly
clear that the Government was unalterably opposed to any action that might have
this effect and which would retard progress towards self-government.
5. Full publicity was given to my remarks, but each side has, of course,
claimed that they were addressed to the other, and although responsible opinion is
becoming alarmed there has been no improvement in the press war indeed it has
worsened. I have just received report, which I accept with reservation, but cannot
ignore, that the Yorubas propose to provoke disorder at lecture to be delivered in
Lagos on 24th July by Jaja Wachukwu, one of Zik’s more hot-headed supporters
who has attacked Yorubas in previous speeches. Yoruba leaders to whom I spoke
on 23rd July deny that anything of the sort is contemplated, but the possibility of a
clash which may spread on this or some subsequent occasion cannot be dis-
counted.
6. All possible precautions will be taken to check any breach of the peace and I
shall report further if trouble occurs.
1 See 46 and 48.
53 CO 537/2787, no 4 3 Sept 1948
[Intelligence apparatus]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to Mr Creech
Jones on reviewing the security and intelligence apparatus in Nigeria
Thank you very much for your letter of the 20th of August about security forces and
information services. We are preparing a full reply to the circular despatch of the 5th
of August to which you refer but in the meantime I write to say that the questions
which you raise have been the subject of the most careful review here in recent
months. In my despatch No. 37 of the 15th of July and in the full Note attached to
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that despatch we explained the new intelligence organisation which is being created
here. We have not only expanded and improved the Special Branch of the Police but
have created a system whereby in each Region there will be both an Administrative
officer and a Police officer giving their whole time to intelligence work and
corresponding direct with the Central Intelligence Committee here in Lagos at
which representatives of the Administration, Police and the Military meet every
week, and more often when necessary, to collate and review the intelligence reports
coming in. We have an excellent Administrative officer in the Secretariat giving his
whole time to this work. This new system to which I attach the greatest importance
has only recently been started and we still have to overcome certain difficulties
arising from shortage of staff but when I saw the Chief Comissioners a week or two
ago I told them that I considered it to be a matter of first importance to ensure that
the new system gets into its full stride as quickly as possible and every one concerned
is co-operating fully to achieve this.
We have at the same time been reviewing our Police strength while discussions
have been proceeding about the strength of the military forces to be maintained in
West Africa in the future. In Lagos itself, where trouble is most likely to originate,
the Police are in good strength and very much on their toes in readiness to deal with
any disorder which may occur. The numbers of Nigeria Police in the town centres
elsewhere are, however, small and as you know in large areas of the country,
particularly in the North, we rely principally on the Native Administration Police. We
are considering a substantial addition to the numbers of the Nigeria Police in order
to provide striking forces in different parts of the country available to deal
immediately with any trouble which may arise.
It has been of the greatest assistance to us in the past week to have a full
discussion with Rees-Williams on these matters.1 He has illustrated to us by recent
experience in other territories how vitally important these questions of security
forces and intelligence services are and we shall certainly make quite sure that we
follow up the steps already taken to ensure that our organisation is kept at the
highest possible state of efficiency.
We warmly welcome the proposal to appoint a Police Adviser in the Colonial Office
and look forward to co-operating with him in the ways which you propose.
1 D R Rees-Williams, parliamentary under-secretary of state.
54 CO 583/287/4, no 20 4 Oct 1948
[Inter-tribal tension]: inward telegram no 1375 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones on the easing of Yoruba–Igbo tension
in Lagos
My telegram No. 1186, Inter tribal tension and Your telegram No. 1106, Executive
Council.
Although tension in Lagos has eased somewhat during September, the press still
continues policy of mutual abuse of leaders and, as attacks on Azikiwe are regarded
by the Ibos as attacks on the Ibo tribe while attacks on leaders of Egbe Omo Oduduwa
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are similarly regarded by the Yorubas, tribal feeling still, runs high and danger of a
clash in Lagos is, by no means past.1
2. In the meanwhile, these antagonisms have spread to parts of the Provinces
and danger of repercussions in the Provinces (? leading omitted) to a clash in Lagos
is now greater than before.
3. A complicating factor is the changed attitude of the N.C.N.C. which has now
openly declared its intention of attacking the Government which it claims to believe
is secretly supporting the Egbe Omo Oduduwa in pursuance of a prearranged policy
of ‘Pakistanism’.
4. As reported in my savingram No. 1280, Zik’s press has been and still continues
to run vigourous campaign for removal of Alakija2 from Exco3 and has hinted that
Egbe Omo Oduaduwa receives its secret instructions from Government through
Alakija who himself gets them in Exco.
5. In these circumstances, announcement of Alakija’s reappointment to Exco at
present moment would almost certainly be taken by many as proof that Zik’s
interpretation of Government policy is correct and might encourage further
animosity leading to possible tribal clash in Lagos with serious consequence in
Provinces. I have, therefore, decided to postpone announcement and am holding
consultation with my advisers including Chief Commissioners on 4th October. I will
address you further in the light of conclusions then reached.
1 See 52.
2 Sir Adeyemo Alakija, KBE 1945; called to the Bar 1913; member of Legislative Council, 1933–1941;
member of the Executive Council, 1943; founder of the Daily Times; president of Egbe Omo Oduduwa,
1948.
3 ie the Executive Council.
55 CO 583/287/4, no 25 10 Oct 1948
[Inter-tribal tension]: inward savingram no 52340 (sic) from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones on his attempts at a rapprochement
within the Nigerian press
My telegram No. 1375, Inter-tribal tension. I am sorry that this further report has
been delayed. After very full discussion with my advisers, including Chief
Commissioners, I decided to try personal intervention and events have been moving
rather fast.
2. The danger is, of course, inter-tribal strife but in my telegram under reference
I did not make sufficiently clear the perfection of the dilemma presented by the
question of Executive Council membership. I referred to the obvious reactions of the
National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons to the reappointment of Alakija, but
on the other hand, as you will realise a decision not to renew his appointment would
be likely to impair confidence in the North and West. I had in mind a further
statement by Government, part warning and part appeal to all men of good will, but
any appeal coincident with action regarded as inimical to one side or the other would
have been abortive.
3. At the meeting with my advisers in Lagos on 1st October, including District
Commander and Commissioner of Police, we discussed the whole situation in the
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light of developments that had occurred during my two weeks absence from Lagos
on tour ending on 30th September (see paras. 12–17 of Nigerian Political Summary
No. 26). Everyone was in favour of my proposal to make a personal approach to both
sides. I decided to call Chief Commissioners to Lagos for discussion on 4th October
and in the meantime to invite Alakija and Azikiwe to meet me separately in the hope
that I might be able to gauge their attitude towards a possible peace move. I saw
Azikiwe that evening and Alakija on 2nd October.
4. Azikiwe was very reasonable. I explained afresh Government’s attitude to the
dispute and the reasons why we had not so far intervened more vigorously. I made it
quite clear that I was not at all disturbed by the fact that Government was being
criticised but that I was seriously disturbed by reports from parts of the Provinces
which indicated that the Lagos quarrels which were not understood up country were
nevertheless likely to lead to inter-tribal strife with a consequent terrible set-back to
the country. I said that I was considering a more direct approach and asked whether
in his opinion anything could be done to prevent strife and whether there was any
chance of Government effecting a rapprochment.
5. Azikiwe thanked me for speaking so frankly to him and assured me that he and
the responsible elements close to him had full confidence in the ‘new regime’. He
also had hot-heads in his party, however, and they wanted action. He agreed that
nothing but harm could result from the present quarrels and made no attempt to
suggest that the faults were all on one side. He thought that a further Government
statement would be useful; it might point out that Government had been very
tolerant but that licence was becoming licentiousness and that hereafter stern action
would be taken against either side if it continued its incitement. He did not despair of
good results from an attempt at a rapprochment.
6. I put the same arguments to Alakija but additionally I explained frankly to him
the difficulty presented by his reappointment to Executive Council while tempers on
both sides are so hot. (He had been sounded by Savage1 at my request during my
absence on tour and agreed to his name going forward.) He was less willing to face
realities than Azikiwe (and unlike Azikiwe he has disclosed what transpired at my
private meeting with him) but he too thought that a statement might help, and
equally he did not entirely reject the possibility of a peace move.
7. On 4th October I discussed the situation very fully with the Chief
Commissioners and my other advisers. All agreed that the danger of a flare-up in the
Provinces had increased and felt that the time had come for a further declaration of
Government’s position, if only to give confidence to the honest decent citizens who
still form the great majority of the population. The terms of a Government statement
—copy attached—were agreed. No satisfactory solution was seen to the dilemma
presented by the problem of Executive Council membership. With concurrence of all
advisers I decided to try to see Alakija and Azikiwe together. I also decided to
postpone a final decision about Executive Council pending consultation with the
Unofficial members of the Regional Houses. (It may be wise to add someone
temporarily from the Eastern Provinces and Carr agreed that the unofficials there
would almost certainly not wish to see Azikiwe appointed). Alakija is not much
admired even in Yorubaland but he has become an issue and it is unlikely that the
Western Provinces would wish any other Yoruba to be substituted for him. If general
1 A W L Savage, financial secretary, 1948–1949.
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situation can be improved Executive Council membership might become a little
easier.
8. I saw Alakija and Azikiwe together on 6th October, Savage, Acting Chief
Secretary, being present. The discussion was encouraging. After covering same
ground as in separate talks (without reference to Executive Council) I produced
copies of the proposed Government statement. Both expressed satisfaction with its
terms. It was agreed that it should be published forthwith and it appeared in the
Press on 8th October. They also agreed that it was worth while having an informal
meeting with both sides representative of the Press—i.e. Zik Press and Daily
Service—to see whether we could by agreement decide to change the tone of the press
controversy so as to leave out of it anything likely to exacerbate inter-tribal relations.
9. This meeting took place on 9th October and there were present:—
(a) Alakija, Maja (Chairman of Board of Directors of Daily Service) Rotimi
Williams2 and Bode Thomas (Members of Board);
(b) Azikiwe, Blankson (Zik Press) Ojike3 (late Editor of the Pilot) and Coker
(present Editor of the Pilot).
I enclose a copy of my opening statement.4 The meeting lasted for two hours and
although there were some vigorous exchanges there appeared to be at one stage a
real hope that both sides would agree to cut out anything likely to create or intensify
inter-tribal animosity. Unfortunately Ojike who is a real rabble-rouser was at times
abusive and offensive. I believe that he wanted to wreck the proceedings and Azikiwe
who was I believe seriously unhappy about this could not completely quell him. The
discussion was primarily directed to the conduct of the press. We did not get as far as
a mutual self-denying ordinance but both sides favoured action as follows in any
future cases where press stories appear making allegations against Ibos or Yorubas.
The matter should be investigated and thereafter the parties should be called
together and the facts disclosed. If the story is proved to be without foundation the
offending paper will publish a correction. I was prepared to agree to this without
prejudice to immediate prosecution if this seemed to be warranted.
10. It was left that nothing should be published about the meeting but that both
sides should have consultations and report back on 15th October whether they were
in favour of resuming discussion, probably with wider representation.
11. It had occurred to me that reference in Government statement to possibility
of introducing measures to control press might be embarrassing to you and that I
should have consulted you before publication. I will say only:—
(i) time was pressing;
(ii) both sides agreed with the statement;
(iii) the statement refers to ‘seeking’ powers which means reference to Regional
Houses and Legislative Council (if necessary at emergency meetings). To
introduce press control otherwise would mean first declaring a state of emergency,
and we hope that conditions will never justify this.
2 Rotimi Alade Williams, barrister and leading member of the AG, attorney-general and minister of justice
in the Western Regional government.
3 M M Ojike, Eastern Region minister of finance, 1954. 4 Not printed.
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12. Azikiwe is a very difficult person to assess. He wants power and I believe that
he tried hard at March meeting of Legislative Council to work towards achieving this
by constitutional route. He was then eliminated from delegation to London
Conference as a result of most unwise ganging-up against him by traditional
elements amongst unofficial members. Even after that he stayed his hand but at the
urging of his wild men he might be tempted to throw caution to the winds and try to
come to power through chaos. I believe that there is good in him and that the good
part at least would genuinely like to cooperate with Government. He is knowledgable
and useful as a member of Finance Committee. As regards the Yorubas, the Egbe
Omo Oduduwa was, I believe, formed to wake the Yorubas from their lethargy; to
create an enlightened ethnic group which could play its part in the new Constitution
and resist being swamped by the more vigorous Ibos. This was very reasonable but
unfortunately the creation of this body gave rise to controversy, in part because it
challenged the position of the N.C.N.C., and in part because there are some
irresponsible young hot-heads amongst the Yorubas in Lagos who thought that by
vicious attacks in the ‘Daily Service’ they could drive Azikiwe out of Lagos and back
to Iboland. If it came to a show-down my assessment is that the opponents of Azikiwe
and the N.C.N.C. would ‘go to bush’ and Government would be left in direct conflict
with the N.C.N.C. who could create all sorts of trouble throughout the country.
Whatever one may think of Azikiwe he is a force to be reckoned with and I am
determined not to drive him into violent opposition. Whether we can harness him to
good use remains to be seen.
13. Although I am not able to report real success I have at least brought the
parties together for discussion and I have made Government’s attitude quite clear.
Even if the attempt fails we shall be in a stronger position when the lines are drawn
for battle and we have to take such stern action as may be necessary.
56 CO 583/299/1, no 20 22 Oct 1948
[Local government reform]: CO record of the second meeting of the
Colonial Local Government Advisory Panel [Extract]
As requested by the Government of Nigeria, the Panel met to allow Sir Bernard Carr,1
and Brigadier Gibbons2 to consult it regarding proposals for the reorganisation of
local government in the Eastern Region contained in ‘The Report on Local
Government Reform’ and ‘Report of a Select Committee of the Eastern Region House
of Assembly set up to review the existing system of Local Government in the Eastern
Provinces’, (Circulated under cover of C.L.G.A.P. (48) 3).3
Sir Bernard Carr sketched the history of local administration in the Eastern
Provinces. At first a policy of direct rule through ‘Warrant Chiefs’ was applied, but
the Aba riot in 1929 discredited them. This was followed by an attempt to apply the
principles of indirect rule on the Northern Provinces model, using, in the absence of
1 Colonial Service, Nigeria, from 1919; chief commissioner, 1943.
2 E J Gibbons, Colonial Service, Nigeria, from 1929; senior resident, 1947; author of Administrative
Reorganisation of the Colony Districts of Nigeria (Sessional Paper No 9, 1939).
3 See 50.
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the institution of Chieftanship, mass collections of family heads gathered in unwieldy
councils. In 1933 separate native treasuries were introduced and the councils
assumed some degree of financial responsibility. The progressive literate Africans,
however, continued to be excluded from the native authorities and formed
‘Improvement Unions’, often in opposition to them.
The proposed reorganisation of local government aimed to bring progressive
Africans into the local authorities. To gain this end County Councils covering a pop-
ulation of the order of half a million, controlling an annual revenue of approximately
£20,000, and consisting mainly of elected members would be set up. The existing
Native Authority Councils, with some modification, would continue as authorities at
a lower level, subordinate to the elected county councils. The lower councils would
have no powers of their own, but County Councils would delegate work to them.
The Panel was uncertain as to the wisdom
(i) of placing too much power in the hands of the County Councils and leaving the
subsidiary councils, which were closer to the people, without any powers, apart
from those delegated by the County Councils;
(ii) of imposing so many duties on the Local Authorities and of such a kind that
the Authorities could hardly discharge the otherwise than as agents of the Central
Government.
English local government experience showed that County Councils were reluctant to
delegate their powers to subordinate Councils. On the other hand it was pointed out
that the wide powers at the disposal of County Councils would allow progressive
Africans to stimulate and energise the local activities of the subsidiary Councils. The
Panel felt that, although this may be necessary as a temporary measure, the ultimate
structure should not be one in which the lower level authorities enjoyed only those
powers which Country [sic] Councils were willing to delegate to them. Eventually
the subsidiary councils should be granted a measure of independent authority in
purely local matters and this aim should he kept constantly in mind. Otherwise the
great majority of the people would not learn to govern themselves through local
government, and power would be concentrated in the hands of the educated classes.
The Panel heartily endorsed the principle that in general urban and rural areas
should be brought together in common local government [sic] had been made in
separating rural from urban areas. In this way community of interests between town
and country has been destroyed.
Regarding the proposed Local Government Board, the question was asked whether
it would degenerate into a government department, or whether it would remain a
really active and independent force representing local government and capable of
standing up to the Central Government on behalf of the local authorities. It was
explained that the aim was to place the regional direction of local government affairs
in the hands of African literates by means of an unofficial African majority on the
Board. The Board would control the unified local government service when
established, co-ordinate bye-laws and rules made by various authorities and advise
the Chief Commissioner, especially in relation to local government finance.
The Panel agreed in general that a unified local Government service was essential
under present conditions, but some members felt that as a long term principle the
idea was bad. The idea should be to make local government units employers of their
own staffs, controlling and paying them.
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There was some uncertainty as to whether a revenue of the order of £20,000 was
sufficient to finance the activities of County Councils and it was suggested that the
figure should be something nearer to £50,000 as a minimum.
The question was raised that if the membership of County Councils was restricted
to 20 as proposed, it would be difficult to find enough members for the many
Committees which would have to be set up, without overworking them.
The Panel was generally in favour of separating judicial from administrative
functions and placing courts matters in the hands of the central government, rather
than handing them over to local authorities.
The Governor of Nigeria had asked if one or two members of the Panel could visit
the Colony to advise on the proposed reorganisation of local government in the
Eastern Provinces and the new Municipal Authorities Bill. It was decided that until it
was known more specifically on what points advice was needed, it would be
impossible to decide which members, if any, should go.
57 CO 537/3557, no 6 Nov 1948
[Arrest of Zikist leaders]: despatch no 54 from Sir J Macpherson to Mr
Creech Jones on the prosecution of leaders of the Zikist movement for
sedition
[The Zikist movement that emerged in late 1945 and early 1946 put forward a radical
critique of British rule in Nigeria, coupled with calls for militant action to gain
independence. As its name suggests, its ideology was inspired by the ideas of Azikiwe,
although he himself kept an ambivalent distance. Among its early leaders were Kola
Balogun, M C K Ajuluchuku, Abiodun Abiola and Nduka Eze. In late 1948 it announced a
positive action campaign against British rule, at the centre of which was the lecture by
Osita Agwuna, ‘A Call for Revolution’ given in Lagos on 27 October. Three days later
Agwuna and Anthony Enahoro, who had chaired the lecture, were arrested for sedition;
this was followed by further arrests of Zikist leaders, including Raji Abdallah, Ralph
Aniedobe and Fred Anyiam, in early Nov. They were tried in three separate trials during
late 1948 and early 1949; one was acquitted while the remaining eight were found guilty
of sedition and sentenced to fines and terms of imprisonment of up to two and a half
years. See 66. The Zikist movement was banned by the government in Apr 1950.]
I have the honour to inform you that an honest difference of opinion has arisen
between the Acting Attorney General (Mr. A. Ridehalgh) and myself on a matter of
such importance that I feel it necessary to seek a ruling on it from you.
Briefly it arises from the considered opinion of Mr. Ridehalgh ‘that the question of
prosecuting in a case of sedition is one for decision by the Attorney General’ and ‘a
matter within the exclusive province of the Attorney General’ whereas I consider that
where high political interests are involved the Governor, as being ultimately
responsible for the maintenance of law and order, may intervene.
2. You will have learned from my secret Saving Telegram No. 1784 of the 10th
November that it recently became necessary to institute proceedings against O.L.
Agwuna,1 Deputy Secretary General of the Zikist Movement, in connection with a
speech he made in Lagos on the 27th October. The substance of this speech was
reported to me on the following morning and I promptly agreed that a charge of
1 Osita Agwuna, assistant editor of the Daily Comet and deputy president of the Zikist movement.
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sedition should be laid. Later I learned that Tony Enahoro,2 who had taken the chair
at the meeting at which Agwuna had spoken, and two other persons who had taken
part in the proceedings had also been charged. I was rather doubtful about the
wisdom of instituting these further prosecutions in respect of a single speech but I
was not aware of all the circumstances, and I thought it inappropriate that I should
intervene.
3. It is necessary here to digress from the narrative and to give you my
assessment of the present political situation. The Zikist Movement, of which the
persons charged were all members, is composed of the more hotheaded followers of
the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons and is a body which on many
occasions has preached ‘positive action’. How far the Zikist Movement takes its
orders from the ‘Cabinet’ of the N.C.N.C. or from Dr. Azikiwe himself is largely a
matter of conjecture. It is, however, known that certain members of the N.C.N.C.
‘Cabinet’ are much more inclined to violence than others, and there is some evidence
to suggest that Dr. Azikiwe himself is not at present anxious to resort to violence. It
has been reported, though the report may be inaccurate, that Dr. Azikiwe was aware
of Agwuna’s intention to deliver his speech but was strongly opposed to it and
advised against it. Since I assumed office it has been a cardinal point of my policy not
to drive Dr. Azikiwe into violent opposition, or to give him martyrdom. If Dr. Azikiwe
decides that he can come to power only through violence and an attempt to create
chaos I wish the decision to be clearly his. In that unfortunate event I should not
hesitate to use the full rigour of the law against him, but as I have said I am most
anxious that the decision to resort to violence, if it should be made, should come
from Dr. Azikiwe himself and should not be induced by any precipitate or avoidable
action of Government.
4. To revert now to the narrative. On the morning of the 4th November the
Acting Attorney General informed the Chief Secretary that he had issued instructions
for a search warrant to be obtained to search the premises of the ‘West African Pilot’
in connection with an article which had appeared on 27th October which purported
to come from the Zikist Movement and was in fact a summary of parts of the lecture
delivered by Agwuna later that day. The Chief Secretary immediately informed me of
this development and at my request the Acting Attorney General agreed to postpone
action until after I had had an opportunity to discuss the position with him and the
Chief Secretary.
5. It will, I think, be fairest if I put the Acting Attorney General’s views with
regard to a possible charge against the ‘West African Pilot’ and its staff in his own
words:—
‘On 27th October I saw a copy of the West African Pilot, but, having interested
myself in the objectional leading article on the new Court of Appeal I did not
read further. The following day, after drafting a letter to the Editor about the
leading article, I glanced through the rest of the paper and saw the article
“Appeal to the People”. I immediately formed the opinion that it was
seditious, and I sought the opinion of Mr. Manyo-Plange, Senior C.C., which
2 Anthony Eronsele Enahoro, journalist and editor; founding member of the AG; elected to Western House
of Assembly and to House of Representatives in 1951; Western Region minister of home affairs, 1954;
Western Region minister for mid-western affairs, 1957; AG spokesman on foreign affairs, 1959;
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agreed with mine. At that time I had seen Mr. Finlay, Commissioner of Police,
and had read a copy of the seditious speech which is now the subject of a
criminal prosecution at my instance. I did not, however, connect the two at
that stage.
‘Having launched the proceedings in respect of the seditious speech. I
turned my attention yesterday morning (4th November) to the seditious
article (I had already come to the conclusion that proceedings should be
taken in respect of it against Zik’s Press Ltd., the printers and publishers, and
one Coker, the Editor of the paper) and it was apparent that there was a
connection between the “Appeal to the People” and the “Call for Revolution”.
I at once had an analysis made which shows that the former is a paraphrase of
parts of the latter. I attach a copy of the analysis. I then decided that the
proper procedure was to obtain a warrant to search the premises of Zik’s
Press Ltd., at 34 Commercial Avenue, Yaba, for seditious publications, and
gave instructions to that end, reporting the action I proposed to Mr. Savage
(Acting Chief Secretary). Later, I stayed action, at his request, until after the
meeting at Government House, and I have since stayed police action until
further instructions are given by me.
‘My view of the whole matter being that there probably exists a treasonable
or seditious conspiracy involving more persons than the four now charged, it
is essential to search the premises at Yaba for evidance of that conspiracy, and
also for further incriminating evidence in relation to the proposed
prosecution in respect of the article. Incidentally, the occasion of the search
would provide the opportunity to secure evidence as to who was the Editor of
the Pilot on the 27th October. I should like to point out that a conspiracy to
levy war against His Majesty is an offence punishable with death.’
6. At the discussion to which I have referred in my paragraph 4 above, which
took place on the afternoon of the 4th November, I put before the Acting Attorney
General my views with regard to the political situation and expressed the opinion
that the search of the premises of the ‘West African Pilot’ at the present juncture
might have most serious political consequences, and that it might well be the
occasion which would finally decide Dr. Azikiwe to take his stand with those of his
followers who were advocating violence. I need hardly point out that a campaign of
violence led by Dr. Azikiwe would be likely to be far more serious than a similar
campaign from which Dr. Azikiwe disassociated himself. In these circumstances I
informed the Acting Attorney General that I had decided that the action which he
proposed to take was undesirable but in order that it should be clear that I took full
responsibility I asked him to submit his arguments on paper, when I would record
my decision, (The Acting Attorney General later withdraw his instructions for the
issue of a search warrant against the ‘West African Pilot’).
7. In accordance with the decision taken at the discussion the Acting Attorney
General submitted his views. He contended that the assessment of a political
situation was not a sufficient argument against the course of action he proposed to
take as he considers it essential that
(i) the criminal law should be administered impartially;
(ii) the criminal law should be administered in its full rigour so as to demonstrate
that it is no weak thing
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(iii) the premises should be searched (under the authority of a search warrant) for
incriminating evidence.
He then went on to examine the constitutional position of the Attorney General in
relation to criminal prosecutions and again I think it will be fairest if I quote from his
subsequent minute:—
‘At this point, I refer to the constitutional position of the Attorney General.
There can be no question that the institution and conduct of prosecutions in
such criminal cases as come especially within his purview, is within his
exclusive province: he is an officer of the executive, but in this sphere he acts
in a judicial capacity and should act without interference from the executive.
This principle was departed from in the famous case of the communist,
Campbell, in 1924 when, after consideration in the Cabinet, the Attorney
General (Sir Patrick Hastings, K.C., M.P.) gave instructions for the
withdrawal of the prosecution, with the uproar and result we all know. It was,
however, re-affirmed by Sir John (now Lord) Simon in the debate on the J. H.
Thomas affair, and, I am glad to say, by the present Prime Minister and Mr.
Chuter Ede as recently as last week in connection with the inquiry into the
Board of Trades bribery allegations: see The Times 28th October, page 4,
column 1 and 30th October, page 4, column 3. Dealing with the bearing of
the inquiry on any criminal proceedings, Mr. Attlee said: “It may be that as a
result of the inquiries now being conducted by the police under the direction
of the Director of Public Prosecutions criminal proceedings are contemplated
or may be fact be instituted. This is a matter within the exclusive province of
the Attorney-General.”
Mr. Chuter Ede, in reply to a question said: “I have no intention of being
involved in a repetition of the Campbell case. It is not for me or for the
Government to give any directions to the law officers of the Crown on the way
in which they handle this case.” Some authority is to be found for
intervention by the executive in Berriedale Keith’s Constitutional Law (7th
Edn.) page 169, where he says:—
“It is clear that where high political interests are involved, the
Cabinet may intervene, as responsible for the welfare of the realm
though the action in the case in question (the Campbell case) was ill-
advised, as may be seen from the resignation of the Ministry rather
than face an investigation by a Select Committee.”
This opinion is apparently based on the Campbell case, and I think that the
better opinion is that the question of prosecuting in a case of sedition is one
for decision by the Attorney-General. That, at all events, is my opinion, and,
being one of principle, I am not prepared to depart from it.’
8. It clearly would not be right for me to question the legal advice given to me by
my Acting Attorney General but you will, I think, agree that this matter raises a con-
stitutional issue of the gravest importance. (Mr. Ridehalgh has asked that the enclosed
note referring to certain provisions of the criminal code should be brought to your
notice but in fact he had not drawn my attention to Section 65 (1) of the Criminal Code
although its provisions do not alter the views expressed in this despatch).
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I, as His Majesty’s representative, am personally responsible for the order and good
government of this territory and it appears to me in the highest degree undesirable
that any officer serving under me should be in a position to take action which, in my
opinion, may jeopardise the security of this territory. I fully appreciate how desirable
it is that the law should take its course without fear or favour, but I submit that
charges of sedition are essentially a political offence and that they must be viewed
against the political background, and therefore that they should be instituted only
with my consent.
You will be aware of the practice which existed in Palestine, India and other
overseas territories where local conditions were or are not dissimilar to those
obtaining in Nigeria. I know what the practice was in Palestine but not what the
constitutional position is.
9. I would add that this difference of opinion has in no way affected the friendly
relations between the law officers and the executive and that Mr. Ridehalgh has
agreed until such time as your decision is received to submit for my directions all
cases in which he considers that action should be taken in connection with sedition.
10. I should be grateful for an early reply.
58 CO 859/136/5, no 15 29 Nov 1948
[Mass education]: inward savingram no 1903 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Creech Jones on the progress of adult education schemes in
Nigeria
Your Savingram No. 1246 of 24th July, 1948.
Mass Education Movement.
The policy of this Government in regard to mass education was set out in
paragraphs 4, 5 and 7 of Sir Arthur Richards’ (now Lord Milverton’s) despatch No.
203 of the 20th of August, 1947,1 and the following observations thereon relate to the
particular aspect of the problem raised in the supplementary question by Mr.
Hughes.2
2. As a result of the experience acquired in recent years it has been decided that
assistance from the Adult Education vote can most usefully be given, firstly, by
fostering in rural areas the creation of centres where instructors experienced in
teaching adults are employed, and, secondly, by the production and distribution of
low priced literature.
3. In carrying out the policy laid down in the despatch under reference, it has
not been the normal practice to pay instructors of adult classes. The organisations
and agencies conducting such classes have, however, found that the most successful
results are obtained through instructors who give regular service and that a small
honorarium often achieves this end. In certain areas, therefore, the Education
Department gives a small measure of financial assistance to those organisations and
agencies that are served by competent instructors.
1 See 37. 2 H D Hughes, Labour MP for Wolverhampton West, 1945–1950.
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4. In recent years a number of literacy campaigns have been attempted with
voluntary instructors, and in almost every case these have proved to be short-lived.
In some cases the volunteer instructers have desisted from their efforts, while in
others the attendance at the classes have become increasingly irregular, very often
because of dissatisfaction with the quality of the instruction given.
5. Broadly speaking, there are four types of adult instruction which have
achieved a certain permanency and success. These are, firstly, adult classes, in both
urban and rural areas, where fees are paid; secondly, classes of religious instruction
(including literacy) where teachers are remunerated; thirdly, adult classes organised
by certain Native Authorities in the Northern Provinces where instructors receive an
honorarium of some five shillings a month: and, fourthly, village housecraft (and
literacy) classes organised by societies whose local instructresses receive a small
remuneration.
6. There are many variations in the detailed organisation of these experiments.
These derive from the sociological requirements of the different Regions, but,
broadly speaking, the Adult Education movement is proceeding along the following
lines:—
(a) In most villages of the Northern Region there are no literates. To start adult
education, therefore, Native Authorities have found it necessary to send out
suitable men after they have received a short course of training. These men are
housed and cared for by the villages concerned and receive a small remuneration
of approximately five chillings a month, Block grants are made to Native
Authorities for adult education campaigns organised on these lines since the
instructors, with practice and experience, have achieved a fair degree of
competence.
(b) In the Eastern and Western Regions, villages are encouraged to organise their
own Adult Education Centres through Village Committees employing fairly
competent instructors. Funds are collected by the Committee from various
sources e.g. village contributions, public’ subscriptions, the proceeds of concerts,
pupils’ fees (a penny or two pence per month), and in certain areas the Education
Department gives financial assistance when satisfied that a reasonable standard of
instruction has been achieved. The assistance, which is paid to the Committee’s
Chairman, is based on the enrolment and is approximately 5/- a month for 30
pupils. Village Committees normally use part of their funds to pay small honoraria
to the instructore and so retain their regular service.
There is only one circumstance in which instructors are remunerated direct from
the Education Vote. In a certain area where the women could not be approached
except through female instructors, arrangements have been made whereby the latter
each visit three or four villages weekly to hold afternoon classes in needlework and
literacy. The villages give these instructresses some financial assistance, and, in view
of the travelling and time involved, this is supplemented from the Education Vote on
the same scale as for the Centres.
7. In conclusion, it must be remarked that the emphasis in this country has been
placed initially on ‘Mass Literacy’ (in which the employment of competent
instructors is regarded as essential to success) since it is considered that once
literacy has been secured in any area there is a greater likelihood that mass—or
social—education will eventually be achieved.
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59 CO 537/3557, no 12 26 Dec 1948
[Arrests of Zikist leaders]: inward savingram no 2050 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones on possible reactions to the arrests of
the Zikist leaders for sedition
My Top Secret Saving No. 1918. PROSECUTIONS FOR SEDITION.
There has been considerable talk in certain sections of the Zikist Movement of the
action they propose to take in the event of any of the persons now charged with
sedition being sentenced to terms of imprisonment. I enclose a copy of the
instructions sent by the Headquarters of the Movement in Lagos to the branch at
Enugu (and presumably to other branches throughout the country) which indicates
the measures they have in mind.1 Action on these lines was endorsed at a recent
emergency meeting of the N.C.N.C. ‘cabinet’ to which delegates from the provinces
were called.
2. The prosecutions have not roused any widespread public feeling and the talk
of violence is at present confined to a handful of reckless young Zikists who have a
negligible personal following and is echoed only by similarly irresponsible young
men in the provinces. Nevertheless they are creating a potentially dangerous
situation which, if it got out of hand could seriously embarrass this Government.
One of the greater dangers lies in the proposed campaign against the payment of tax
for, in large areas of the country, the people are still far more willing to give credence
to a doubtful rumour that tax need no longer be paid than they are to a categorical
official statement that it must be. Such a campaign, however, could not become fully
effective until the next tax paying season starts in about the middle of next year and a
more proximate danger is that they will attempt to foment strikes among the
workers.
3. There is within the Zikist Movement a body of opinion which is opposed to
these plans but the cardinal factor is the attitude which Dr. Azikiwe will adopt. He
has been subjected to considerable pressure by the extremists in the N.C.N.C.
‘Cabinet’ but he has so far not committed himself and the impression he has given is
that he is apprehensive of the lengths to which they are anxious to drag him but
reluctant to lose their support by openly opposing them. He is clearly worried over
the issue, as will be seen from the enclosed note of a conversation which he had a few
days ago with the Acting Chief Secretary (Mr. A.W.L. Savage) when he stated, with
apparent sincerity, that he was trying to bring himself to choose between throwing in
his lot with the extremists and openly opposing them.
4. If Azikiwe inclines to the right, the present loose talk may lead to small and
isolated incidents, especially in Lagos and in parts of the Eastern Provinces, but it
unlikely to lead to any widespread disorder, and the same is probably true if he
continues to take the middle course. Should he swing to the left the possibility of
serious industrial unrest, a successful anti-tax campaign and disorders resulting
from a general flouting of authority will be very materially increased. At the moment
the indications are that Azikiwe would prefer to incline to the right.
5. As you will be aware from my Secret despatch No. 59 of the 8th of December,
legislation conferring emergency powers on the executive has been drafted and is
1 Enclosures not printed.
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available to be brought into force immediately the situation warrants it, while other
precautions of an administrative nature have been taken. I should, however, add that,
while hitherto and especially during the period when the recent inter tribal tension
was at its height the police have behaved admirably, in recent weeks the
Commissioner of Police has felt some uneasiness over the effects of Zikist
propaganda on Ibo policemen stationed in Lagos. The nature of the propaganda was
explained in paragraph 33 of Nigeria Political Summary No. 27. It is reassuring that
when a few days ago it was necessary to send police from Lagos to Shagamu in
connection with the present agitation in that area they all, Ibos and others alike,
went about their duties with their accustomed cheerfulness and efficiency and
showed no signs of there having been any lowering of their morale. Nevertheless,
this insidious propaganda may be expected to continue. The Commissioner of Police
is, of course, taking all possible steps to counteract it.
60 CO 537/4727, no 1 Dec 1948
[Arrests of Zikist leaders]: Nigeria political summary [Extract]
Political situation
1. On the surface December has been a quiet month. There have been no more
seditious speeches and no attempts to hold unauthorised meetings, while the
sedition trials opened and continued in an atmosphere of public indifference and
Christmas Eve, which had been fixed as the Zikist D-Day (see Possum No. 27,
paragraph 7) passed off without incident, though this may have been due to the
adjournment of the trials. Behind the scenes, however, the more extreme political
groups have been active in making plans for future operations and trying to stem the
tide of defections from their ranks by members who draw the line at violence. In the
N.C.N.C. Cabinet in particular the rift between extremists and moderates has grown
more and more marked and it is significant that the rift is also a tribal one, for it was
the Yoruba members who were the first to take alarm. At the meeting during which
the state of emergency was declared (see Possum No. 27), the Cabinet resolved on a
policy of civil disobedience and non-co-operation with Government, but it was little
more than a rump Cabinet that took the decision. Apart from Asikiwe himself there
are now only a few men of any real standing left-amongst whom are Professor Eyo
Ita1 and Arthur Prest,2 the Barrister—and both of these pleaded prior engagements:
Prest adding in his telegram of apology that he hoped that any decisions reached
would be constitutional. It is fairly clear that their other engagements were dictated
by caution and that they have no intention of getting themselves involved in
violence. E.D.A. Ojaleye, the Treasurer and the last of the moderates, resigned a few
days after the meeting.
2. The Zikist Movement has been particularly active, though scarcely united.
Early in the month they set up two sub-committees, one for intelligence (one of the
1 Eyo Ita, vice-president of the NCNC, 1948; member of Eastern House of Assembly, 1951; minister for
natural resources and leader of government business, 1951; expelled from NCNC, 1953; founder of the
NIP, 1953.
2 Arthur Prest, policeman and barrister; member of NCNC, then joined AG; member of Western House of
Assembly, 1951; member of House of Representatives, 1952; minister of communications, 1952–1954.
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tasks allotted to it being to obtain secret information from the Nigerian Secretariat!)
and the other the E.A. Committee whose functions were deemed to be of so secret a
nature that it had been decided not to reveal them to members: it was, however, to
form ‘the spearhead of the attack when the movement puts its plan of positive action
into effect.’ On the 5th December an emergency conference was held in camera; it
opened with a vigorous slanging match between members of the Central Executive:
Abdullah, Eze, Aniedobe and Duke Dafe being particularly prominent in demanding
apologies and counter apologies from each other for irregularities in procedure and
the use of unparliamentary language. The Secretary’s minutes then continue
somewhat optimistically:—
‘CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE. Meanwhile there was a cordial atmosphere
characteristic of Zikists practicalizing the “Spiritual Balance,” a canon of the Zikist
Philosophy, and the session began in earnest.’
The main decisions taken were to open a Defence Fund for Agwuna and the others on
trial for sedition, to utilize labour movements for their political ends and to suspend
action (on the plan outlined in the Zikist National Message?) until after the N.C.N.C.
tour, the opening date for which has still to be fixed. Since then the Central
Executive has sent out supplementary instructions to Provincial Branches: these do
not appear to be uniform, the Northern Provinces being asked to provide martyrs on
the Agwuna model and the Eastern to concentrate on the collection of rifles and
ammunition which they are to obtain from the police and the military and which are
to supplement the central armoury of sixteen rifles which are hidden in the house of
‘a respected King who is also a Zikist.’
3. The attitude of Azikiwe to this planning remains obscure, although the
indications are that it is proving a source of considerable embarrassment to him.
After his discussions with the Acting Chief Secretary (see postscript to Possum No.
27) he left Lagos to attend the Pan–Ibo Conference at which, he indicated, he
expected a good deal of pressure to be exerted upon him by the more moderate Ibo
elements to bring him to dissociate himself from the extremists, who, they consider,
are dragging the Ibo name in the mud. He said that after the Conference he intended
to take a rest and think things over quietly. He is expected back in Lagos at the end of
January and he may declare himself one way or the other in the near future, but he
has always been very careful not to commit himself in the past and has maintained
his sometimes precarious seat on the fence with much adroitness: it would be more
in keeping with his character to continue to do so to the last possible moment.
4. The most interesting feature of the Pan–Ibo Conference was the foundation of
the Ibo State Union with Azikiwe as the first State President. One of its stated aims is
to support the N.C.N.C. ‘Freedom Charter’, but otherwise its organisation bears a
somewhat embarrassing resemblance to that of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa—a fact
which members of the latter have pointed out with relish. The list of office holders
ranges from the entirely responsible Dr. Ibiam3 through moderates like H.H. Kaine
to vociferous Zikists such as Ojike and Wachukwu. A source usually considered
reliable told the Governor in a private conversation that the meeting was organized
by young men with University degrees but little wisdom. It is virtually certain that
people like Dr. Ibiam were not consulted before publication of their names and
3 Dr Francis Ibiam, medical practitioner; member of Legislative council, 1947; member of the Executive
Council, 1949; gov of Eastern Nigeria, 1960–1966; president World Council of Churches, 1961.
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source pointed out omission of names of influential moderates such as Egbuna and
Mbanefo. It is understood that responsible Ibos have lectured the organizers and
made it clear that if the Ibo State Union is to mean anything and is to have the
support of prominent Ibos there must be a complete reorganization, in which the
responsible elements must fully participate. The interest taken in the Pan–Ibo
Conference was surprisingly small—the attendance never exceeded 1,000 in spite of
the figure of 10,000 given in Zik’s Press—and it is significant that a convention of
Jehovah’s Witnesses held simultaneously with, and adjacent to, the Conference
attracted a larger ‘gate.’
5. An unsavoury development in the East has been the foundation of the
‘National Church of Nigeria and the Cameroons.’ at Aba, the service being a
blasphemous travesty of that of the Church of England. At the first service, held on
the 12th of December, nationalist hymns such as ‘Alien Rule must go’ were sung, the
lesson was from a book called ‘Renascent Africa’ by a Zikist named Simbi Wellington,
the sermon was on ‘The God of Africa’ and the service concluded with the Zikist
National Anthem. Present information suggests that the local attitude is one of
disgust and that this sort of think [sic], like Mbonu Ojike’s anti-Catholic diatribes, is
doing the Zikist Movement and the N.C.N.C. more harm than good.
The opposite camp too has not been idle. The N.Y.M. have pushed ahead with their
preparations for the Representative Assembly and for the tour of Rita Hinden4 and
the Rev. Sorensen5 who are now in this country. Zik’s Press have lost no opportunity
of ridiculing the whole affair at first taking the line that the two visitors are no more
than imperialistic stooges sent to ensure that Nigeria is kept in slavery for a few years
more. Here, however, they found themselves in a somewhat delicate position since
the N.C.N.C. Delegation to London in 1947 made considerable use of the services of
both—Sorensen for example was called in as peacemaker during a row between Dr.
Azikiwe and Mrs. Kuti—and the opposition Press has naturally not been slow to
point this out. The visit is proving an expensive one for the N.Y.M. who are bearing
the whole cost and have already paid out nearly £400 on the air passages alone. They
have the funds to meet this but it is estimated that a further £400 will be needed to
cover the entire trip, and this they are having great difficulty in collecting. The
leaders have worked out a series of preliminary recommendations for constitutional
changes which will be considered at the Assembly, but they have been careful to
insist that these recommendations are intended as a guide only and that every
opportunity will be given to those attending to put forward their own proposals.
7. Egbe Omo Oduduwa having started with a fanfare of trumpets has lost most of
its first momentum. Their meetings are sparsely attended and missionary tours to
whip up enthusiasm have fallen flat. During a recent tour of Ondo Province the
missioners were told bluntly that the best thing they could do would be to affiliate
Egbe to N.C.N.C. The younger generation, at any rate, of the Yorubas tend to look
upon it with suspicion and in particular to question the motives of the leaders, whom
they regard as more interested in preserving their old privileges than in promoting
the welfare of the Yoruba race. . . .
4 Rita Hinden, Fabian socialist and anti-colonial campaigner; secretary, Fabian Colonial Bureau,
1940–1950.
5 Reginald Sorensen, Labour MP for Leyton West, 1929–1931 and 1935–1950; for Leyton, 1950–1964; cr
Baron Sorensen 1964; government whip in the House of Lords, 1964–1968.
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61 CO 537/4625, no 1 29 Jan 1949
[Constitutional review]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to A B Cohen
outlining proposals for constitutional reform. Enclosure
We have just completed a series of discussions here with Chief Commissioners on a
number of questions of policy, and first amongst these questions was the all-
important problem of constitutional reform.
It is hardly necessary to say that the discussion on the form which constitutional
changes might take and the procedure to be followed in formulating
recommendations for such changes was purely tentative and preliminary. As you
know we have been at pains to allow the maximum time for public discussion and we
want to arouse public interest in all parts of the country in the issues at stake. There
is therefore no question at all of a Government plan being framed and pressed upon
the country. Indeed the constitutional advance can obviously only succeed if it
carries the greatest common agreement after the fullest public discussion.
On the other hand there is a good deal of uncertainty, and some doubts and
misgivings, in the Service about the way things will go and we all thought that it
would be wise to clear our own minds as to the possibilities before we embark on the
confused currents and dangerous waters of constitutional review. The document
which I enclose is the result of the first discussion which we have had with Chief
Commissioners with this object in mind and I think that we have reached a very
satisfactory measure of agreement on the main line of advance which we would all
like to see. The document is to go no further than the Chief Commissioners
themselves but they are going to have informal talks with all their Administrative
staff, and their chief technical officers too, on the lines set out in the document. We
believe that by bringing our own people fully into discussion we shall enable them to
give some unofficial guidance to the public debate at all levels which we are anxious
to encourage. At the same time these discussions will, we hope, go a long way to allay
the misgivings of those officials in stations remote from head quarters who are
sometimes inclined to think that we are making quick changes as a result of pressure
from the talkative politicians of Lagos. We want to convince them that we are quite
genuine in our conviction that success already achieved under the present
constitution does in fact fully justify further substantial advance.
Although the document is, as I say, purely tentative and the suggestions which it
contains will no doubt be varied and modified in all sorts of ways as the stages of
discussion give us more experience of public opinion during the coming year, I shall
naturally be glad if you feel that you wish to comment at this stage on the main line
of advance which we have in mind.
Enclosure to No 61: Constitutional advance
The fundamental principle on which the present constitution is based is unity at the
Centre through strength in the Regions. That principle has not only won wide
support but has enabled the present constitutional experiment to succeed more fully
and more quickly than could have been hoped when it was inaugurated two years
ago.
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For many reasons it is desirable that a constitutional advance should now be made,
but the advance is not made as a result of political pressure: it is made because the
solid achievements of the past two years render a further advance fully justified. That
being so the basis of the further advance must be the same as that on which success
has already been achieved—strength in the Regions.
The main purpose of the new advance should therefore be to give to the Regions a
greater measure of autonomy under a federal system. (It is suggested that townships,
other than Lagos which presents a special problem, should be represented in
Regional Houses rather than have direct representation in the Legislative Council).
The object should be mainly achieved by giving to Regional Houses legislative and
financial powers in place of their present purely advisory functions. Experience over
the past two years has made that major development both sound and necessary.
It is suggested that the time has also come to take one further step of great
importance. In the existing constitution legislative and financial powers have been
given to the Legislative Council acting with the advice of the Regional Houses. There
is however no provision in the constitution for giving any share to members of the
Regional Houses or Legislative Council in the responsibility for formation of policy.
(It is true that there have been for some time past Nigerian members of the Central
Executive Council but they were appointed individually to the Council and were not
selected by or responsible to the Legislature). It is now suggested that in each Region
there should be established a Chief Commissioner’s Council composed partly of
officials but with a majority of non-officials selected from their own number by the
unofficial members of the Regional Houses. These Councils would have the task of
formulating policy and directing executive action within the Regions. It will at once
be realised that this would be a change of fundamental consequence and indeed
could be regarded as the most important step yet taken in enabling Nigerians to take
a leading part in the management of their own affairs. The sense of responsibility
shown by members of the Regional Houses in the past justifies the confident hope
that the success already achieved by the Regional Houses would be followed by the
equal success of the new Chief Commissioners Councils.
At the centre it is suggested that a Governor’s Council should be formed composed
of officials, (including the Chief Commissioners), and non-officials selected from
their own number by the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. It is for
consideration whether the officials and unofficials on the Governor’s Council should
be in equal numbers or whether, as in the Chief Commissioners’ Councils, the
unofficials should be in a majority. The duties of the Governor’s Council would be to
meet from time to time (probably three or four times a year) to deal with questions of
major policy affecting the whole of Nigeria. Another suggestion which has been made
is that a Privy Council should be formed to take over some of the non-political duties
now performed by the Executive Council (such as advising H.E. regarding the
exercise of his prerogative in relation to death sentences and on questions affecting
discipline in the Government Service).
It is suggested that we should go one step further. Already committees of the
Regional Houses have been established to maintain contact with Government
Departments. It is now suggested that in the Eastern and Western Regions (and pos-
sibly in the Northern Region too—though it is recognised that in the North there are
special difficulties in this respect) an embryo Ministerial system might be introduced
whereby certain unofficial members of the Chief Commissioners’ Council would speak
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for a Department or group of Departments in the Chief Commissioners’ Council and
should be responsible for conducting legislative business affecting that Department or
group of Departments in the Regional Houses. It would be made quite clear that in the
first stage every decision on major policy including departmental policy would be taken
not by the Minister but by the Chief Commissioners’ Council. The Ministers would
give their whole time to their official duties and would receive salaries.
It is not proposed that the unofficial members of the Governor’s Council should be
given any executive functions but it is for consideration whether they should each be
made responsible for conducting legislative business affecting a Department or
group of Departments in the Legislative Council (in which event they might be called
Member of the Governor’s Council for Education, Health, Communications, etc.).
Certain other proposals have been made regarding the legislature. It is suggested
that in both the Regional Houses and the Legislature the number of official members
should be decreased and the number of unofficial members increased and that a
Speaker of the Legislative Council should be appointed instead of retaining the
Governor as President.
The suggestions so far summarised do not touch on such important issues as the
system of election or selection for the Regional Houses, the relationship of Native
Administrations and local government bodies to the Legislature or the position of
the Chiefs (as to the system of election or selection it is recognised that it will almost
certainly be desirable to evolve some wider or different basis of representation for the
future). In these matters it is likely that different solutions will be desirable in the
different Regions and it is essential that each Region should be given the fullest
opportunity to express its wishes as to the course to be followed.
There remains one other important matter to be decided. If the principal [sic] of
Regional autonomy is accepted it is clearly necessary to make sure that the present
Regional boundaries are the best. As to the Colony, it is suggested that at least the
rural areas might be added to the Western Provinces. It will also probably be
necessary to give constitutional recognition to the special status of the Cameroons as
a Trusteeship territory. It is not proposed to make any change in respect of the parts
of the Cameroons now administered as part of the Northern Provinces but it is
suggested that the main area of the Cameroons (in the Eastern Provinces) should
have direct representation both in the Eastern House of Assembly and the Legislative
Council.
Those in outline are the proposals for the new system of Regional autonomy which
have so far been considered. The proposals are based on three principles, firstly, that
the advance made in the Regional Houses under the present constitution justifies the
grant of further powers to those Houses, secondly that we should give to unofficial
members of the Regional Houses an important part in the constructive work of
framing policy and thirdly that the unity of Nigeria will not be jeopardised but in fact
will be ensured by building on Regional strength.
Procedure to be followed in formulating recommendations for constitutional
changes
1. It is clearly desirable that the fullest discussion about constitutional changes
should be encouraged at all levels.
2. All discussion at this stage should be preliminary and attempts to formulate
final recommendations at once should be discouraged.
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3. It is considered undesirable to form special committees at Divisional and
Provincial levels to deal with constitutional matters: informal discussions with the
widest possible representation are thought preferable.
4. It is the present intention at the March meeting of Legislative Council to
introduce a Government motion for the establishment of a select or special
committee to make recommendations for constitutional changes. This committee
would be composed of all unofficial members with the Chief Secretary, the Chief
Commissioners, the Attorney-General, the Financial Secretary and the
Commissioner of the Colony as official members. It is for consideration whether the
committee should have the power to co-opt a fixed number of unofficials from
outside the Council.
5. Preliminary debates would take place on constitutional issues in the Regional
Houses in July.
6. Thereafter the Legislative Council committee would hear public evidence in
Lagos and main centres in the Regions.
7. A further debate would take place in the Regional Houses towards the end of
the year.
8. The Legislative Council committee would then meet to formulate its final
recommendations.
9. Government officials should refrain from making any public statement on
constitutional issues but should be prepared to take part freely in informal
discussions.
62 CO 537/4631, no 1 28 Feb 1949
[Political situation]: inward savingram no 435 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Creech Jones warning of the possibilities of unrest in Nigeria.
Minute by F J Webber
It is necessary to report on certain disquieting developments in the political
situation.
2. The hearing of the charges of sedition instituted towards the end of last year
against a number of members and supporters of the so called Zikist Movement
(which is probably the most extreme organisation of those affiliated to the N.C.N.C.)
has proceeded and sentences have been imposed ranging from two years six months
imprisonment to fines of £25. (See previous savingrams Nos. 1784 and 2050). It was
at one time thought that the conviction of these extremists might be accompanied by
disorder but while this has not been the case and while the legal action taken has
certainly had some effect in maintaining public confidence in the Government
amongst more moderate elements, the trials with the violent speeches made by some
of the accused in Court have fomented increased anti-Government feeling amongst
extreme nationalists. The attitude of the Zik Press, though it has recently avoided the
sort of blatantly seditious material which led to the sedition trials, has not improved
and the campaign of malicious lies and vicious attacks both on the Government and
on rival political organisations (particularly the Nigerian Youth Movement) has
continued unabated. Scarcely a day passes without the appearance in the Zik press of
leading articles accompanied by cartoons suggesting that Nigeria is the miserable
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victim of imperialist oppression and that a stream of ‘white settlers’ is arriving in the
country (for which there is of course, as they well know, no foundation whatever in
fact). The Press agitation is not so much an attack on specific acts or omissions of
Government as an attempt to stir up feeling against the continued existence of
‘Colonial status’ by appealing to anti-European prejudice. Moreover, the Youth
Movement whose leaders are much more reasonable and moderate have felt that they
too must increase attacks on the Government in order to compete for popular
support.
3. The poisonous propaganda of the Press must have its effect and evidence from
several sources indicates that in particular the Zikist Movement both in parts of the
Eastern Provinces and in Lagos is becoming more bitter and more inclined to
advocate violence and civil disobedience.
4. It is difficult to estimate the strength of the Zikist Movement in relation to the
N.C.N.C. Undoubtedly Azikiwe lost a great deal of ground, particularly with the
Yorubas, during the tribal and personal controversies which took place in the Press
last year, and responsible opinion in the Provinces (including the Eastern Provinces)
is becoming increasingly critical of the Lagos politicians. But there is still strong
support for Azikiwe and for the N.C.N.C. amongst the younger educated people
particularly of the clerk type not only in Lagos and the Eastern Provinces but also to
some extent in the Western Provinces and even amongst some of the educated
Northerners. The Zikist Movement which was formed only a year or two ago
apparently without Azikiwe’s direct participation (the parallel with certain Jewish
organisations in Palestine is interesting) has not a very large membership but it
includes the most militant extremists. If a general situation of insecurity and unrest
were created by an outbreak of strikes the more responsible elements might be
terrorized and the extremists might make serious trouble.
5. Against this background of increasing bitterness and pressure for more
‘positive action’ Azikiwe himself has found himself in a most difficult position. He
apparently does not feel that the present time is one for violent opposition to the
Government and he has been doing all he can to dissuade his followers from
committing themselves to such a course. As a result there is a growing restlessness
amongst the hotheads of the Zikist Movement. He has been pressed to give up his
seat in the Legislative Council and his newspaper interests and devote his whole time
and effort to extreme political activities. Zikist Movement documents have been
obtained by the Police which talk of organising disorder, obtaining rifles by theft and
even of assassinations whether Azikiwe approves or not. He is still standing against
this increasing pressure and has persuaded his ‘cabinet’ to wait at least until the
Legislative Council meeting has taken place at Ibadan next month. An N.C.N.C.
Convention, to be followed by a countrywide N.C.N.C. tour has been arranged for
April and it seems that he will have to reach a decision by then whether he is to
follow the lead of his most extreme partisans (against his own better judgment) or
whether he is prepared to resist them and so create a major split in his own party.
6. There has been another disturbing development no less serious in its possible
long term results. I have previously felt that the Nigeria Trade Union Movement gave
many signs of developing on sound lines. Some of the leaders of the movement have
gained valuable experience in Great Britain and many of them have shown common
sense and responsibility and not a little courage in their handling of trade disputes.
The movement cut across tribal affiliations and devoted itself more to the interests of
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the workers than to nationalist politics. For some years past the T.U.C. had been
affiliated to the N.C.N.C. but at a meeting in December last it was decided by a
majority of 32 to 8 to sever that connection. The intention was, I understand, to start
a new Labour Party with Trade Union support. This action has most unfortunately
resulted in a few of the Trade Union leaders, particularly the Ibos amongst them and
those who are fervent N.C.N.C. supporters, withdrawing from the T.U.C. and starting
a campaign of abuse against the remaining majority of the Trade Union leaders. The
main instigator of this defection is the paid secretary of the U.A.C. Union, called Eze,1
who is, I gather, interested in Zikist politics and communism to the exclusion of
almost everything else (see paragraphs 4 and 23 of Political Summary No. 27). He is a
member of the N.C.N.C. cabinet and of the Zikist Movement Executive Committee.
He is unbalanced and violent and quite unreasonable and is now engaged both in
trying to set up a rival organisation to the T.U.C. and in preparing the ground for an
attempt to call a strike of all U.A.C. employees as soon as possible. The new threat of
industrial conflict is no doubt part of the Zikist Movement’s plan to work up as much
unrest as possible following the meeting of. Legislative Council next month. While
the immediate threat is disturbing I am even more concerned at the prospect of the
weakening of the whole Trade Union Movement which this split, carried out solely
for reasons of political expediency, will probably cause.
7. Another factor in the existing situation, though largely unconnected perhaps
with those to which I have already referred, is the position in some parts of the
Western Provinces about which I have recently submitted reports to you (my Secret
Savingram No. 268 of the 7th February and my Secret Savingram No. 161 of the 24th
January). There has been a number of minor disorders, first in Abeokuta and later in
the Ijebu Province followed by more recent troubles in Owo2 Province and agitation
against the Oni of Ife in the Oyo Province. This unrest probably had its origin in local
circumstances different in each case but the possibility of instigation from Lagos
cannot be altogether discounted and the N.C.N.C. has been quick to support any
dissatisfaction directed against the Native Authorities. It is particularly unfortunate
that these potentially dangerous developments should be taking place in the Western
Provinces at a time when the increased activities of the extremist elements in Lagos
and the Eastern Provinces are causing concern.
8. It should also be recorded that although the Press controversy in Lagos
between Azikiwe and his enemies has been somewhat less virulent during the past
few months the bitterness between the leaders of tribal groups has continued and
discussions about constitutional advance may once again give rise to a flare-up of ill-
feeling between leading Yorubas, Ibos and Hausas.
9. All these disturbing factors indicate that a situation may soon arise when the
danger of disorder will be considerably increased, possibly accompanied by strikes,
extremist violence and agitation against Native Authorities as well as the
Government.
10. The purpose of this report is to give advance indication of those possibilities.
I do not propose in this report to discuss in detail the measures to be taken in an
1 ie Nduka Eze, trade union leader and political activist; secretary of the Amalgamated Union of UAC
African Workers, 1946; general secretary of the NNFL, 1949, general secretary of the Nigerian Labour
Congress, 1950; leading member of the Zikist movement.
2 ie Ondo Province
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endeavour to prevent such a deterioration of the position, except to say that I am
convinced that the dangerous tendencies to which I have referred cannot be checked
by repressive action alone. It has been my constant aim to try to win and keep the
initiative by showing a readiness to make substantial advances in co-operation with
all who are willing to put forward or discuss progressive and constructive proposals,
and the increased dangers to which I have referred make it all the more necessary at
the forthcoming meeting of the Legislative Council and thereafter to show our
anxiety to press forward with projects already initiated for economic development,
local government reform and constitutional advance.
Minute on 62
This important report contains most disquieting news. Government strategy is the
traditional policy of winning the support and confidence of the ‘moderates’ and to try
and prove that the extremists (who will denounce any forward move by the
Government, whatever its merits) are sabotaging the political and economic future
of Nigeria. But Government is sadly lacking in weapons to counteract a vicious press.
I believe the press is the major factor: it must be in any semi-educated community.
And I believe that if the situation deteriorates badly the press should be entirely
muzzled. Any newspaper thrives on criticism however unjust and bitter it may be;
but malicious distortion is quite another thing.
Para. 7 should be submitted to the Abeokuta and Ijebu pp. Note the references to
Owo and Oyo.
? The S/S should thank the Governor for this report which he has read with some
disquiet and while endorsing the aim at the end of 1[0] promise his full support to
any stricter measures of control the Governor may deem it advisable to take in the
interests of public security.
F.J.W. 
5.3.49
63 CO 537/4625, no 5 4 Mar 1949
[Constitutional review]: letter (reply) from A B Cohen to Sir J
Macpherson on the proposals for constitutional reform
With reference to your secret and personal letter of the 29th January1 about the
Nigerian constitution and my interim reply of the 10th February, I am now sending
you herewith a copy of the notes I have written on the subject.2 I do so with some
trepidation, having only been in the country for five weeks, but the notes may be of
some use to you as showing some of the points in which we are likely to be
interested. Please treat the notes strictly for what they are worth and do not feel
under any obligation to comment on them at this stage at any rate.
Since I wrote the notes I have received Foot’s secret and personal letter of the 21st
February, for which I am very grateful.
1 See 61. 2 Not printed.
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I have shown both your letter and Foot’s and their enclosures and my notes to the
Secretary of State. Apart from what follows, he does not wish to make any comments
at this stage either on the procedure for re-examining the constitution or on the
substance of the tentative ideas set out in the memorandum enclosed with your
letter of the 29th January. He was quite willing for my notes to be sent to you, but
these are to be regarded as simply representing my views.
The only points which the Secretary of State wishes to make at this stage are as
follows. He hopes that as little public currency as possible will be given to the term
‘constituent assembly’. It is of course impossible to prevent the N.C.N.C. or others
using this term if they wish to do so, and I imagine it is bound to appear frequently in
the newspapers. The Secretary of State feels, however, and I am sure that you share
this view, that it is important that the great bulk of the country with its moderate
ideas should not get the impression that anything like a constituent assembly is to be
established. Incidentally, when I was in Lagos Rotimi Williams and possibly one or
two others talked to me about a constituent assembly and I always took the line that
you could only have a constituent assembly if a country had reached the stage when
it was in a position to settle its own future constitution without reference to some
outside power or government. Rotimi Williams and the others I talked to seemed to
accept this point. The Secretary of State of course realises that the committee which
he agreed to in principle in his telegram No. 823 of the 20th July last year is in no
sense a constituent assembly or anything like it. The point he wanted to make was
that, in so far as it is possible to counter any suggestions from any quarter that the
committee is to be a constituent assembly, this should be done.
The other point which the Secretary of State made was that in his understanding
all that the committee was to embark on was a review of the various points in the exist-
ing constitution with a view to its improvement and development and not a complete
re-writing of the constitution. He realises of course that it is always difficult to pre-
vent people who want to do so from ranging over the whole field of constitutional
reform, but he hopes that in the committee it will turn out to be possible to concen-
trate on practical methods of improving the working of the existing constitution and
developing it. He is of course entirely happy about the discussion of all the points men-
tioned in the memorandum enclosed with your letter of the 29th January.3
3 See 61.
64 CO 537/4731, no 11 16 Mar 1949
[Communism in West Africa]: memorandum by R E S Yeldham1
summarising Soviet activity in Nigeria [Extract]
. . . In Nigeria during the latter half of 1948 the Russian case at U.N.O. was fully
reported in the Press, particularly by the Zik Press group of newspapers. Editorial com-
ment followed two main lines: first, that the Russian demand for enquiry into the affairs
of the Colonial powers is justified, and that resistance is inspired by the fact that Great
Britain has so much to hide; and, second, that the Nigerian Government and the
Colonial Office are using the Russian bogey as a justification for opposing nationalist
agitation. The theoretical aspect of communism receives little attention.
1 Principal, CO West African Dept.
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Reference is made in the Nigerian report to Mduka Eze,2 the Secretary of the U.A.C.
Union, and a member of both the N.C.N.C. Cabinet and of the Zikist Movement
Executive Committee. The fact that he is an ardent Communist has already been
referred to in the West African Political Intelligence Summary No. 5 for March.
In Nigeria it is reported that there has been an increase in the import of
Communist and pro-Russian pamphlets and books which command a ready sale
among the young, educated classes. Steps are being taken, however, to counteract
the influence of these publications as far as possible by increasing the import of anti-
Communist literature from both British and United States’ sources, and distributing
them through the medium of reading rooms and similar institutions.
There is still no evidence of an organised Communist Party in Nigeria though it is
known that two attemps have been made in the Provinces amongst some
enthusiastic youths of the student type without any backing. Their efforts have come
to nothing. There is no evidence that the inception of these two Communist groups
was inspired from abroad. On the other hand some societies and individuals are
known to be in contact with either Russia or the satellite countries. In July, 1948, the
World Federation of Democratic Youth extended an invitation to Koma Balogun3 of
the Nigerian Youth Congress to attend the international Conference of Working
Youth at Warsaw. He did not go. Mrs. Kuti, who has appeared once again in the
political limelight, and is now the President of the Women’s Union in Abeokuta,
recently received a message of greeting from the women of Moscow. From a cutting
which appeared in the ‘Daily Worker’ early in March this year it appears too that she
has been corresponding with that paper, but on this occasion it is believed that it was
purely in sympathy with the death of a U.K. editor of the ‘Daily Worker.’
Although the Communist Party apparently does not accept Africans as full mem-
bers the Nigerian report continues: ‘we believe that Communists in Great Britain con-
tinue to make contact with Nigerian students arriving for courses in the U.K.’ In
summing up, this report concludes that ‘although Communism appears to make lit-
tle progress in Nigeria there is a disquieting increase in supplies of Communist liter-
ature, and extremist politicians are very ready to accept without question Russian
propaganda when it is directed against British and American actions and policy’. . . .
2 ie Nduka Eze.
3 ie Kola Balogun, journalist and barrister, member of the NCNC; member of the Western House of
Assembly, 1953; member of House of Representatives, 1954; minister of research and information,
1956–1958; expelled from NCNC, 1958; high commissioner to Ghana, 1959.
65 CO 537/4635, no 6 24 Mar 1949
[Constitutional review]: despatch no 11 from Sir J Macpherson to Mr
Creech Jones on the progress of the constitutional review. Enclosures:
speech by H M Foot and report of the Select Committee of the
Legislative Council
Minute by L H Gorsuch
I have the honour to report on the preparations for the review of the constitution of
Nigeria following the announcement which I made with your approval in August last
year.
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2. The announcement which I made in the course of a speech to the Legislative
Council on the 17th of August, 1948, was as follows:—
‘As Honourable Members are aware it was originally proposed that the new
constitution should remain in force for nine years and should be reviewed at
the end of that period, though limited changes might be made at the end of
the third and sixth years. Nine years, as Lord Milverton said, is not a long time
in the history of a country, and we are now little more than half way through
the first period of three years. The progress already made however, has been,
in my considered view, so rapid and so sound that I suggest that we might be
justified in reviewing our timetable, and that we might consider together
what changes should be made, and whether they should be made earlier than
originally intended. I accordingly propose that if it is the wish of this Council
and of the country that earlier changes should be made they should be
introduced not at the end of nine years but in the second three-year period
which will start at the beginning of 1950. Before any change is made it is of
the utmost importance to allow adequate time for the expression of public
opinion, and if the Council agrees I propose, after a period has been allowed
for preliminary public discussion, to set up a Select Committee of this
Council, following the Budget Session next year, to review the whole position
and to make recommendations.’
3. Since I made that announcement, which was well received in the Press and
elsewhere, there has been an increasing amount of public discussion about
constitutional questions and in particular about the methods to be adopted for the
review of the constitution. The N.C.N.C. has published what it calls a Freedom
Charter setting out proposals for an entirely new constitution under which a
measure of autonomy would be granted to the linguistic or tribal groups within a
federal constitution somewhat on the model of the United States of America. The
Nigeria Youth Movement has not published its proposals but has had a series of
discussions including a conference held in Lagos in January at which suggestions
were put forward for a federal system based on the existing Regions, with certain
important modifications in regional boundaries, and with ministerial responsibility
at the centre. In most parts of the country outside Lagos these proposals have made
little impression and general public opinion has not yet been formulated on most of
the questions at issue. The prevailing feeling in the Provinces is, I think, anxiety lest
important constitutional changes should be made without sufficient time being
allowed to enable the public to understand what is proposed, together with distrust
in many quarters of the intentions of members of the Lagos political groups which
are suspected of merely seeking to secure a quick transfer of power to themselves.
4. Public discussion has, however, been mainly concentrated at this early stage
on the methods to be adopted for the constitutional review and spokesmen of both
the N.C.N.C. and the N.Y.M. have urged that a ‘constituent assembly’ should be set
up. Little or no attempt has however been made to indicate what is meant by a
‘constituent assembly’ and still less thinking has been devoted to the question of how
such a body might be composed. Nearly all politicians and journalists are however
agreed that the original suggestion that a Select Committee of Legislative Council
should be formed to undertake the constitutional review is objectionable on the
grounds that the Legislative Council as now constituted is not truly representative,
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and during the past month or two there has been a number of indications that
moderate as well as extreme opinion favoured an attempt being made to evolve some
system of sounding public opinion on a wider basis.
5. Though it is no doubt impossible to satisfy all opinion in this difficult
matter—some of the extremists resent any proposal for consultation with anyone but
themselves—I came to the conclusion that it would be unwise, in the face of a good
deal of adverse public opinion, to proceed with the original suggestion that the
constitutional review should be undertaken by a Select Committee of the Legislative
Council. To do so would have certainly invited from the start the strongest
opposition from the political parties who would have been able to gain fairly wide
public support in a popular campaign directed against the Select Committee and the
Legislative Council itself.
6. I therefore decided that the best course would be to appoint a Select
Committee of the Legislative Council not to review the constitution but to advise
how the constitution should be reviewed. This proposal, which was welcomed in all
sections of the Press, was accordingly put to the Council on the 12th of March and a
Select Committee was accordingly set up to advise on the steps to be taken in the
constitutional review. I attach a copy of the speech made by the Chief Secretary in
moving the resolution.
7. The Select Committee has now made its report, of which I enclose a copy, and
the report has been unanimously accepted by the Council. I regard the fact that the
report of the Select Committee was unanimous as most important and very much to
the credit of the Committee (which included all unofficial members of the Council)
and not least to the Chief Secretary who was Chairman. I also regard the proposals
made by the Committee as sound and acceptable. It was important that the bodies to
be set up should be based on the existing Legislative Council and Regional Houses
but it was also most important, in my view, that other representative opinion should
be brought in. It was also necessary, in order to allay fears that provincial and
regional opinion would be disregarded, to ensure that discussion should be
facilitated at all levels and not only at the centre. It was, I think, desirable
(particularly in view of the composition of the committee set up to review the
constitution in the Gold Coast)1 for a general conference to be formed which would
be predominantly Nigerian. It was also, I consider, essential to provide for
consultation between officials and non-officials at some stage before final
recommendations are prepared. All these objects have been included in the proposals
of the Select Committee.
8. I have little doubt that the report of the Select Committee will be attacked in
the more extreme sections of the Press (in spite of the fact that Dr. Azikiwe who
controls most of those sections of the Press was a member of the Select Committee)
but I believe that it will be generally recognised as an honest attempt to arrive at a
satisfactory procedure for ascertaining public opinion and that the proposed
discussions at Provincial and Regional levels before discussion in the General
Conference will be widely welcomed.
9. It is now necessary for me to announce with the least possible delay whether I
accept the recommendations of the Select Committee and I shall be most grateful if
1 The Coussey Committee in the Gold Coast consisted entirely of Africans.
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you will be good enough to inform me by telegram as soon as possible if you agree
that I may do so.
Enclosure 1 to 65: Speech by H M Foot in the Legislative Council, 11 March 1949
Let me first of all emphasize the limitations of this discussion today and the
limitations of the resolution which I am moving and the limitations of the functions
of the Select Committee which we propose to set up.
We are not here today to try to find the answers to the constitutional questions
which confront us—it would be obviously out of order to do so. Nor is the proposed
Select Committee to concern itself with the answers to those questions. It is
proposed that it should be set up with one simple purpose—to make
recommendations to Your Excellency on the steps to be taken in the constitutional
review. We are concerned for the moment, and so will the proposed Select
Committee be concerned, not with the question of what constitutional changes
should be recommended but merely with the question of how those
recommendations should be prepared.
What in effect I am suggesting is merely this—that we should sit down together in
Select Committee while we are here at Ibadan in order to advise Your Excellency on
ways and means by which the constitutional review should proceed. I hope and
believe that all Honourable Members will agree that it is wise and necessary to do so
and that they will also agree that the test of those ways and means should be that set
out in the motion—the test whether all sections of the population are given full
opportunity to express their views on all the great issues involved.
We are in fact concerned today not with objects but with methods and I do not
think that it is necessary to go into lengthy argument to justify the proposal to
establish a Select Committee for the limited purpose which I have described.
Before the Council decides whether our proposal should be accepted I should
however like to make brief reference to three matters which are very much in my
mind and I believe in the minds of most of us at this time.
First let me say this. The task of working out constitutional reform for Nigeria is as
complicated and difficult as any which has ever confronted any country. We have in
Nigeria so many different peoples with different history and tradition and religion
and outlook. We have the problems arising from the great distances which separate
one area from another. We have the widely varying systems of local administration.
We have so many different standards of education and ways of life. Let no one
imagine that the problem of deciding on the best course of constitutional advance for
a country such as this can be easily solved. It certainly cannot be solved by snap
decisions and rhetorical resolutions and attractive catch phrases. We can only reach
a sound solution by hard and honest thinking.
Let me try to emphasize what I mean by stating some of the principal questions
which we have to answer. I shall certainly not try to answer these questions now—it
would clearly be out of order to do so—and I do not pretend that the main questions
which come to my mind are the only ones which we have to answer. I should
however like to mention some of those questions to illustrate the point which I am
making—that our task is to find answers to a whole series of complex questions each
one of which demands the most careful examination.
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What are the main questions which at once come to our minds? Let me endeavour
to state a few of them.
Do we wish to see a fully centralised system with all legislative and executive
power concentrated at the centre or do we wish to develop a federal system under
which each different region of the country would exercise a measure of internal
autonomy?
If we favour a federal system should we retain the existing regions or should we
accept the existing regions with some modification of existing regional boundaries or
should we form regions on some new basis such as the many linguistic groups which
exist in Nigeria?
Should the regional legislatures be granted legislative and financial powers instead
of being purely advisory as at present?
What changes should be made in the composition of the regional Legislative
Houses and of the Legislative Council? Should the number of officials in each be
reduced and the number of unofficials increased? Should the system of nominated
members be retained?
Should there be a Council in each region to consider the policy to be followed in
that region and to direct all executive action within the region and if so what should
the composition and powers of those regional Councils be? Moreover, should the
unofficial members of the regional Legislative Houses have the right to select from
their own number members to sit on the regional Councils? If so, should each of the
unofficial members who sit on the regional Councils be granted responsibilities in
respect of the activities of a Department or group of Departments?
What should be the method of election to regional Houses? Should the existing
system of selection through the Native Authorities be retained? Or should some new
system of selection or election be worked out specifically for the regional Houses? If
so, should election be by the direct system (each member being selected or elected by
a single constituency) or by the indirect system of electoral colleges, and what should
be the electoral qualification? Should each region be permitted to adopt a different
electoral system?
What functions and powers should be reserved to the Central Legislative Council
and Executive Council in order to achieve the overriding object of maintaining and
strengthening the unity of Nigeria?
What should be the system of election to the Legislative Council? Should its
unofficial members continue to be chosen by regional Houses or should some
method of direct election to the Legislative Council be considered?
Should any towns be given the right of direct representation in Legislative Council
(as Lagos and Calabar are now represented) or should they be represented in regional
Houses?
What should be the powers and functions of the Central Executive Council?
Should unofficial members of the Legislative Council have the right to select from
their own number members to sit on the Central Council? If so, should each of the
unofficial members who sit on the Central Council be granted responsibilities in
respect of the activities of a Department or group of Departments?
What should be the future of the Colony in relation to any new legislative system?
Should the Colony and the Western Provinces be treated as one unit for legislative
and administrative purposes or should the rural part be added to the Western region?
Or should the Colony be formed into a separate region?
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Is some special constitutional arrangement necessary in regard to the Cameroons
in view of the fact that it is a Trusteeship Territory?
Should all the changes decided upon be introduced at one time or should some be
introduced progressively?
Should the system to be introduced in all these matters necessarily be the same in
each region or should each region be given freedom to decide on certain
modifications to suit its own peculiar circumstances and needs?
Your Excellency and the Council will note that I have made no attempt at all to
answer any of those vital questions. It would be quite wrong to do so at this stage but
the Council will, I believe, agree with me that it is useful for each one of us to think
what the main questions are, not to hide them away but to bring them out into the
fresh air of public discussion.
There have already been some views expressed about the kind of body which
should make recommendations to Your Excellency on constitutional reform. We
shall of course have to consider that matter as one of our chief tasks if the Select
Committee which I have proposed is set up. But I should like to mention one
reservation. We must certainly try to form the best body or bodies for this purpose
which can be devised but it would be wrong in my view to imagine that everything
will depend on the composition of whatever body is established. We must not put
our faith in one body alone to the exclusion of other opinion. The solution to be
found will and should depend not solely on some specially formed body but on the
views and opinions of the people, expressed in many different ways. There is some
inclination to believe that all that is necessary is to send a committee like Moses
into the mountain and that all the people need to do is to watch and pray—pray
that the committee will in due course return from the clouds with the perfect con-
stitution to last for ever written on tablets of stone. No one can hand over his
responsibility in this matter to others. Every Nigerian has a stake in his own coun-
try and it is for him by means of village meetings and Divisional meetings and
Provincial meetings throughout the country and through the organisations of
which he is a member to make his views known. Your Excellency has insisted that
there should be the fullest opportunity for public consultation at every level. The
Regional Houses in separate resolutions have already made it clear that they are of
the same opinion. It is not only for the Government and Government officials and
members of the Legislative Council and the Regional Houses and the Native
Authorities and leaders of public opinion who have a responsibility in this matter.
Every one in Nigeria has a responsibility. It is for us, on our part, to see that the
people are consulted and it is for the people to see that their views are made
known.
Finally may I say one word about our approach to the work of the proposed Select
Committee. We well know that owing to the composition and history of the country
we have many animosities and diverse interests in Nigeria. As Your Excellency has
said, we have unfortunately had a good deal of evidence during the past year of how
much harm those animosities can do. In the past there have no doubt been faults on
all sides. On the part of the Government there have certainly been faults. On the
other side, on the part of the public, there has, I believe, been one fault more than
any other. There has, I believe, been a failure of Nigerians to co-operate with other
Nigerians whether it be politically or commercially. As Your Excellency has
emphasized to us a great nation cannot be built on the basis of individuals envious of
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others each seeking selfish and sectional interests. It must be based on free and
constructive association to achieve common aims.
When Your Excellency made the announcement about constitutional advance last
August that was the first step in a new era. We are to take the second step now. I
claim, like Your Excellency, to be an optimist. I wonder if it is unduly optimistic to
hope, as I do, that all of us concerned will enter on this new era with a new spirit? On
the side of the Government we have had ample evidence of Your Excellency’s
readiness, indeed determination, to take the people into Your Excellency’s
confidence and give them great new opportunities and responsibilities. On the part of
the people I hope that there can also be a new spirit of readiness to work one with
another and to forget past antagonisms in the great task of building a sound
constitution which can win and retain the widest possible public support.
Enclosure 2 to 65: Report of Select Committee (Chairman, H M Foot), 22 March
1949
I have the honour to submit the following unanimous report of the Select
Committee appointed by Your Excellency on the 11th of March in accordance with
the following resolution passed by the Legislative Council:—
‘Be it resolved that a Select Committee of this House be set up to make
recommendations to His Excellency the Governor regarding the steps to be
taken for a review of the present constitution of Nigeria, with special
reference to the methods to be adopted for ascertaining the views of all
sections of the population on the issues involved.’
The Select Committee was composed of all the Honourable Unofficial Members of the
Council together with their Honours the Chief Commissioners, the Honourable
Attorney-General, the Honourable Financial Secretary, the Honourable the Acting
Commissioner of the Colony and myself.
The Select Committee first of all agreed that in carrying out the constitutional
review the widest public discussions should be encouraged and facilitated and ample
time allowed at every stage of these discussions. With this in view the Select
Committee recommends that the discussions should be concentrated at three
levels—at the Provincial level, then at the Regional level and then at the Centre—
and I set out below the functions and composition of the bodies which we
accordingly recommend should be established.
Provincial conferences
Function. To give preliminary consideration to the question of constitutional
advance after studying the views of village meetings and divisional meetings and of
representative organisations in the Province: and to send a representative or
representatives to a Regional Conference to state the views of the Province and to
take part in discussions at the Regional level.
Composition. The object is to make the Provincial Conference as representative as
possible of all sections of opinion in the Province. It is recognised that the methods
of achieving that object must vary in different parts of the country. It will therefore
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be the duty of each Resident in co-operation with the member or members of the
Regional Houses from that Province to consult all Native Authorities and other
representative bodies in the Province and then to call a Provincial Conference as
representative as possible, with due regard to the claims of minority groups.
Regional conference
Function. To give further consideration to the question of constitutional advance
after studying the views of the Provincial Conferences. Each Regional Conference
will send three representatives to be members of a small drafting committee and
later send representatives in greater numbers to a General Conference.
Composition. Members of the Regional Houses together with an additional
representative or representatives of each of the Provincial Conferences, the numbers
of the additional representatives to be decided by the members of the Regional
Houses.
Arrangements in regard to the Colony and Lagos
For purposes of preliminary consideration two conferences shall be called—the first
representing the Colony and the second Lagos. The composition of the Colony
conference shall be settled by the Commissioner of the Colony in co-operation with
the Hon. Member for the Colony and after consultation with the Native Authorities
and representative organisations in the Colony. The composition of the Lagos
conference shall be settled by the Commissioner of the Colony in co-operation with
the three elected Members for Lagos after consultation with the Town Council and
representative organisations in Lagos. The two conferences will then meet in a joint
Colony and Lagos conference for further discussion and will send representatives to
the drafting committee and the General Conference.
Drafting committee
Function. To prepare a statement setting out draft recommendations for
constitutional changes based on the views of the Regional and Colony and Lagos
Conferences and to submit the statement for consideration to a General Conference.
Composition. Three representatives of each Regional Conference, one representative
of the Colony Conference and one representative of the Lagos Conference, sitting
with the Chief Secretary, Attorney-General and Financial Secretary, and such other
official advisers as may be called in for consultation.
General conference
Function. To study the statement prepared by the Drafting Committee, to suggest
any changes or amendments which it considers necessary and to submit its
recommendations regarding constitutional advance for debate in the Regional
Houses and the Legislative Council and then for submission to His Excellency the
Governor and the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Composition. All unofficial members of the Legislative Council together with
additional representatives of the Regional Conferences and the Colony and Lagos
Conference, providing that the additional representatives shall be drawn from the
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Regions and the Colony and Lagos in the same proportions as those fixed in regard to
the unofficial members of the Legislative Council. On this basis it is recommended
that the full composition of the General Conference should be as follows:—
Members
Northern Provinces 18
Western Provinces 12
Eastern Provinces 12
(including two members from
Calabar)
Lagos 6
Colony 2
Other existing nominated
unofficial members of
Legislative Council 3
Total 53
His Excellency the Governor shall be invited to appoint an independent Chairman
(who shall have no vote). The Committee suggests that he should be a Law Officer
and hopes that the Honourable the Attorney-General may be selected for this task.
The General Conference shall meet at a convenient centre to be later agreed upon
by the Legislative Council, but shall not meet in the towns in which the Regional
headquarters are situated or in Lagos.
Minute on 65
It will be recalled from (4) that at the Budget meeting this month the Legislative
Council was to be invited to set up a Select Committee of the Council to make
recommendations ‘regarding the steps to be taken for a review of the present
Constitution of Nigeria, with special reference to the methods to be adopted for
ascertaining the views of all sections of the population on the issues involved’.
The despatch at (6) opposite reports that the Select Committee was set up, that it
produced a unanimous report and that the report has been unanimously accepted by
the Council.
The review of the Constitution which is proposed falls into four stages:—
(i) At provincial level. It is recognised that the composition of the Provincial
Conferences may vary in different parts of the country. They will be set up after
consultation between the Resident of each Province, in co-operation with the
Member or Members of the Regional Houses from that Province, with the Native
Authorities or other representative bodies. This will ensure consideration down to
village and divisional level.
(ii) At regional level. (a) The Regional Conferences will consist of Members of the
Regional Houses together with additional representatives from each of the Provincial
Conferences as may be decided by the Members of the Regional Houses. (b)Special
arrangements for the Colony and Lagos. For preliminary consideration there will be
two Conferences—one for the Colony and one for Lagos. The composition of the
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Colony Conference will be settled by the Commissioner of the Colony, in co-
operation with the Member for the Colony, after consultation with the Native
Authorities and representative organisations. The composition of the Lagos
Conference will be settled by the Commissioner, in co-operation with the three
elected Members for Lagos, after consultation with the Town Council and
representative Lagos organisations. These two Conferences will later meet as a Joint
Conference.
(iii) Drafting Committee. The object of this Committee is to prepare draft
recommendations for constitutional changes based on the views emerging from the
bodies at (i), (ii) (a) and (ii) (b) above, and to submit these recommendations to the
General conference at (iv) below. The Drafting Committee will be representative: of
each Regional Conference and of the Colony and Lagos Conferences, but it will also
contain the Chief Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Financial Secretary and such
other official advisers as may be called in for consultation.
(iv) General Conference. This Conference will study the statement prepared by
the Drafting Committee, will suggest any changes or amendments which it thinks
necessary and will submit its recommendations for debate in the Regional Houses
and the Legislative Council. The final stage will be submission to the Governor and
the Secretary of State. The General Conference will consist of all unofficial Members
of the Legislative Council together with additional representatives of the Regional,
Colony and Lagos Conferences. Representation of the latter three bodies will be in
the same proportions as those fixed for unofficial membership of the Legislative
Council. The Conference will number 53 in all. It will have an independent Chairman
without a vote, and the Select Committee has expressed the hope that the Attorney-
General may be the Chairman. It is provided that the Conference shall not meet in
the towns in which the Regional Headquarters are situated or in Lagos.
Consideration of constitutional change is, therefore, bound to be a lengthy
progress; but it will be none the worse for that, and the proposals seem to be
eminently sound, as they are designed to give the widest possible representation, not
only geographically, but to varying bodies of opinion, while, at the same time,
preserving the right to participate fully at all stages both of the Regional Houses and
of the Legislative Council. The insertion of the Drafting Committee at the third of
the four stages seems to me well timed. The weight of official opinion and advice will
be able to make itself felt at this stage without the imputation that the official
element has steered the proceedings from the outset. The General Conference will
also have the results of consultation at the previous stages put before it clearly and
expertly. The provision that the General Conference shall go into retreat for its
consultations is eminently sound. Finally, the questions posed by Mr. Foot in his
speech, of which the text is attached to (6), present the Conferences at all levels
squarely with the problems to which they will have to find the answer.
The Governor asks to be informed by telegram as early as possible whether the
Secretary of State agrees to his announcing acceptance of the recommendations of
the Select Committee. I can see nothing in these proposals to criticise. It may be
assumed that the Conferences at provincial and regional levels will have the benefit
of the advice of the financial and legal experts of Government if they choose to call it
in. The General Conference will be predominantly Nigerian, and in this respect will
resemble the Coussey Committee. The differences between procedure in the Gold
Coast and Nigeria is that the Gold Coast has started with a Central Committee which
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will go down into the constituent regions of the Gold Coast during the course of its
deliberations, whereas in Nigeria, owing to the much greater distances and
differences in composition of the territory, a system of local consultation building up
to eventual deliberation at the centre has been evolved.
The question at /P.Q.1 attached, which is for answer on Wednesday next, bears on
this subject.2 In drafting the answer I have assumed that the Secretary of State would
wish to have rather more time for study of (6) herein before making any public
statement.
L.H.G.
28.3.49
2 Not Printed.
66 CO 537/4727, no 2 Mar 1949
[Political situation]: Nigeria political summary on developments since
the sedition trials [Extract]
1. Political
The sedition trials have come and gone, leaving six of the nine men who stood their
trial serving prison sentences of varying lengths.1 Agwuna, who was tried on two
charges, fared worst, receiving one year on the first charge and two and a half years
on the second; Abdullah2 was given two years—the maximum for a first offence;
Oged Macauley, Anyiam and Smartt Ebbi a year each and Tony Enahoro six months.
Of the remaining three, Aniedobe and Duke Dafe were fined £25 each and J.J.
Odufuwa, successfully pleading an alibi, was acquitted, although shortly afterwards,
in his capacity of editor of the ‘African Echo’, he was fined £200 for a criminal libel on
the acting Commissioner of Lands. Only three of the imprisoned ‘martys’ [sic] really
matter; Abdallah is an effective orator with an attractive speaking voice and not
lacking in courage and determination. The N.C.N.C. have always billed him as the
man who speaks for the North and invariably refer to him as a Hausa, but in fact he is
an Igbirrah and entered the Posts and Telegraphs under the name of Abdallahi
Okene. (At one time he was married to the daughter of the Atta of Igbirrah but has
since divorced her). He was a member of the radio monitoring service up to January
1948 when he was dismissed under G.O. 40(B) for making a violent anti-Government
public speech. During his recent trial he took the opportunity to deliver a 90 minute
harangue in which he repeated and underlined all the seditious opinions uttered in
the speech for which he was being tried and, while no doubt this helped him to earn
the maximum sentence, it has certainly increased his reputation and he has won a
good deal of respect and admiration in nationalist circles for the way in which he has
maintained his principles. Agwuna is a very much rougher diamond, but he too held
firm—he refused throughout to make any defence, on the grounds that the Court
had no jurisdiction over him—and has gained correspondingly in reputation with
the extremists. At one time he held a very junior post in Posts and Telegraphs and
later with the Air Ministry in Kano but he did not come to the fore until a few
1 See 57. 2 ie Raji Abdallah.
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months ago when he became General Secretary of the Zikist Movement. He can
hardly be described as fully literate but he has drive and directness of purpose and
may well win more popular support when he emerges from prison. Tony Enahoro, in
spite of his past record, is out of place in this galley; all our information suggests that
he had no wish to be a martyr and did his best to avoid conviction, having had
enough of prison after his last two sentences. The indications are that he is at heart a
moderate and dislikes his fellow-prisoners, who are not his equals in ability and
education, but his trouble is that he allows his impulses to run away with him and to
land him in situations for which he has no relish. The other three are poor stuff,
being looked down upon even by their own party. Oged Macauley [sic: Macaulay], the
degenerate son of an attractive and able though unscrupulous father,3 was drunk
when he received sentence: Freddie Anyiam, who runs a pay-as-you-wear clothing
service, is known as a cheerful rogue who specialises in doing other peoples dirty
work. He was a member of the N.C.N.C. hierarchy for a brief period but was caught
out in a ‘fiddle’ with the funds at the beginning of last year. Smartt Ebbi was an Army
clerk during the 1939–45 War; though he is fond of referring to the way in which he
fought for the Empire, he was at no time in contact with the enemy. After the war, he
got a job with a firm of building contractors but was soon in the dock charged with
extorting money from his fellow employees, and was sentenced to nine months
imprisonment, since the completion of which he has earned a living as Assistant
Editor of the ‘African Echo’. The three last-named all pleaded ‘not guilty’ and did
their best to avoid conviction—a course of action which has provoked adverse
comment among the nationalists.
2. There is not much doubt now that Azikiwe disapproved of the action of the
seditionists, if only on the ground that it was premature. Perhaps the most important
feature of the trials has been the use made of them by his own extreme left wing to
attempt to force him to burn his boats and declare for violence. The ‘African Echo’,
which now speaks for the extremists, has recently published articles openly
criticising him for his inactivity, casting doubt on his personal courage and strongly
hinting that if he is not prepared to make an issue of the imprisonment of the six
‘heroes’ and fight it out until their release is obtained then it is time for him to
relinquish his leadership in favour of a more dynamic personality. But Azikiwe is a
shrewd and experienced politician, adept at gauging the reaction of the public which,
as a whole, does not appear to have been interested enough in the trials to justify his
making a major issue of them. In the North and West they have created scarcely a
ripple: in Lagos and in literate circles of the East they have been a topic of
conversation but do not appear to have inspired any deep feelings. There have been
indications in the Press that the extreme nationalists themselves are disappointed at
the public indifference, but they have no intention of letting the issue die. On the
contrary we have reliable information that they plan to demand the immediate
release of all the imprisoned men, and to make the rejection of their demand the
excuse for an attempt to start a campaign of civil disobedience and possibly of
‘positive action’.
3. The Zikist Movement has been very busy preparing the blue-print for this
campaign and there has been much va-et-vient and interchange of letters between
3 ie Herbert Macaulay.
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Lagos and Enugu. Their chances of success depend on two factors—the attitude of
Azikiwe and the support of the workers—and both of these must be regarded as
doubtful at present. If the workers were solidly behind them the Zikists could
probably dispense with Azikiwe altogether, since he is almost the only member of the
N.C.N.C. Cabinet whose attitude is in question. Some, like Prest and Eyo Ita, have
seen the red light and either resigned or retired out of harm’s way, while the rest,
including Imoudu and Emejulu are apparently working closely with Nduka Eze, now
President General of the Zikist Movement in place of the imprisoned Abdullah.
4. It is still difficult to assess how much of the Zikists’ plans is based on reality
and how much is hot air. They are talking—and writing—of plots to assassinate the
Governor and other leading Government officials and there were sybilline references
to April 1st and the shocks to come on that day, which was probably chosen because
of the publicity it received in the Gold Coast as the deadline for freedom. But the
ground has been cut from under the Zikists’ feet by Kwame Nkrumah’s explanation
that actual violence on April 1st is not contemplated and the day passed with no
incident. The potential threat, however, must not be underestimated: the Zikists
have possibly a stock of hand grenades, probably a certain number of firearms, and
certainly a considerable amount of .303 ammunition at their disposal. But, unless
and until they can command the support of the mass of the workers, they will not be
in a position to mount an offensive of more than local significance.
5. It is perhaps upon the result of the competition for control of the workers,
even more than on the constitutional issue, that the immediate future of Nigeria will
turn. The latest developments are discussed in Paragraphs 10–13 but it should be
noted here that the Nigerian Youth Movement have given somewhat tepid support to
the T.U.C. and allotted them a certain amount of space in the ‘Daily Service’ for
propaganda, not so much because of any inherent faith in that body as on the
principle that any organisation opposed to the N.C.N.C. deserves encouragement.
The career of N.Y.M.–Egbe has been a chequered one during 1949. The
Representative Assembly (See Possum 28, paragraph 6) was a marked success—
which seems to have surprised not only their enemies but the organisers themselves.
The Rev. Sorensen and Miss Rita Hinden behaved circumspectly, always emphasising
that Nigeria’s problems must be dealt with by Nigerians and that they themselves
held only a watching brief, the attendances were good and a lot of solid
commonsense was talked. But almost immediately afterwards the N.Y.M. wearying of
well-doing, decided that the only royal road to popularity—and votes at the 1950
Elections—was to join in the vilification of Government. This they did through the
medium of the ‘Daily Service’ with a gusto not a whit lessened by their almost open
admission that they did not believe in what they were saying and writing: indeed
throughout February they might have said with the poet that they had seen and
approved the better course but followed the worse.
6. Their attack followed two main lines—the iniquity of Government in
alienating their God-given land and discrimination in the Civil Service. Both were
well-chosen—particularly the former, for the African is of course instinctively
sensitive on the subject of land tenure and only too ready to assign the worst possible
motives to any attempt to acquire land for public purposes even in the smallest
parcels and for the most praiseworthy objects. A Mass Meeting held under N.Y.M.
auspices on the 18th of February to protest against certain sections of the Land
Acquisition Ordinance was very well attended. The leaders of N.Y.M. had intended to
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stage a ‘spontaneous’ march on Government House, but news of this leaked out and
on the advice of the Commissioner of Police Sir Adeyemo Alakija successfully
appealed to the more responsible feelings of the gathering and a deputation to
Government House was substituted. This was received by His Excellency a few days
later and discussions are continuing. In this connection it is worthy of note that the
sections of the law in dispute had been the subject of correspondence between
Government and N.Y.M. for some months past and it is highly probable that N.Y.M.
only decided to force the issue for reasons of political expediency. The series of
articles by Magnus Williams on ‘Spiritual Depression in the Civil Service’ has had
some effect in acerbating discontent in the ranks of the Junior Service, although the
facts were twisted and distorted almost beyond recognition. The anti-Government
campaign, however, has not been followed up with any vigour and of recent days the
tone of the ‘Service’ has been distinctly more friendly.
7. There has been a split in the ranks of N.Y.M. which began with the re-election
of Dr. Maja as President in January: this post H.O. Davies had hoped to capture
through the votes of his supporters who feel that Maja is now too old and that
younger blood is needed. Davies is known to have felt considerable jealousy over
Maja’s re-appointment and in February he ran counter to the whole trend of N.Y.M.
policy by accepting £1,000 from the faction opposed to the Oni of Ife to stir up
trouble in Ifeland. Davies is now, quite naturally, looked upon as a traitor by some
members of N.Y.M., particularly those who are also members of Egbe Omo Oduduwa
which has always supported the cause of the Obas, and indeed, derives much of its
strength from their adherence. In private conversation Davies has declared his
intention of breaking the Egbe and on March 7th in the office of the Daily Service, a
clash took place, during which blows were exchanged between himself and Bode
Thomas over the wording of an article on the visit of the N.Y.M. and Egbe delegates
to Ife . . . . Davies waited in the office until Thomas had left and then had the article
re-set to his own liking, but to no purpose, as later in the evening M.A. Ogun, a
supporter of Thomas came in, found out what had occurred and re-wrote the article
to conform with Thomas’s ideas, which no doubt came as an unpleasant shock to
Davies next morning.
8. The label N.Y.M.–Egbe has until now been used in these summaries to denote
the two organisations which were so closely merged that they could safely be treated
as one, but this tag has now outlived its usefulness, not only because of the split
referred to above, but because the leaders of Egbe Omo Oduduwa have had second
thoughts. Although such an object was carefully excluded from the prospectus,
E.O.O. set out in the first place to play national politics but they have burned their
fingers and are now inclined to confine themselves to declared principles—that is to
run the E.O.O. on a tribal and cultural basis. They have by no means lost their fears
of Ibo infiltration and Egbe will no doubt continue to have a strong anti-Ibo bias, but
the new policy has mitigated the distrust of the leaders’ motives previously felt by the
rank and file and a fresh stirring of interest has been noticeable in the past few weeks.
9. During the past three months, a series of efforts has been made to patch up a
truce between the two main parties—N.C.N.C. and N.Y.M.—in order to present a
united front on the constitutional issue. Such a reconciliation could at best be
temporary, for motives and interests are too sharply opposed and personal hatreds
probably run too deep for any lasting settlement to be achieved, but it is obvious that
if the parties could speak from a common platform during the next year the trend of
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events might be considerably altered, and there has been no lack of go-betweens and
would-be mediators, most of whose efforts have been stillborn. There has, however,
been one serious approach, made on the initiative of Dr. Maja and Obafemi Awolowo,
the Secretary General of E.O.O., which reached the stage of pourparlers with
Azikiwe, and at one stage looked as if it might come to something. The majority of
the leaders on both sides, however, were totally opposed to any reconciliation—Eze
in particular being alarmed at the curtailment of his personal influence which might
result from it—and negotiations fell through. Judging from the severity of the
attacks on Azikiwe now appearing in the ‘Service’ the chances of a further move
towards reconciliation in the near future are remote. . . .
67 CO 583/299/2, no 7 12 Apr 1949
[Local government reform]: letter from H M Foot to A B Cohen on
the need for local government reform in the North and West
I am sorry to have been some time in replying to your confidential letter of the 4th of
March about the proposal to appoint a local government expert to Nigeria. We have,
as you know, been in Ibadan for the past few weeks and we thought that it would be
useful to take the opportunity which the Legislative Council meeting provided to
discuss the matter with the Chief Commissioners.
The Governor accordingly had a full discussion in Ibadan with the Chief
Commissioners and I think that the importance of pressing ahead with reform of
local government in the North and the West as well as in the East is now more clearly
recognised by all concerned. Apart from the discussions with the Chief
Commissioners there was a debate in the Legislative Council on local government
advance and a Private Member’s Resolution was passed unanimously urging the
necessity for urgent action to ‘democratize’ the existing Native Authorities in the
North and West.
The Chief Commissioner of the Western Provinces announced in his speech that it
is proposed to set up a special committee to consider how advance should proceed in
the Western Provinces and the Chief Commissioner of the North made a speech
indicating the changes which he hopes to see in the North. Indeed I think it can be
said that the recognition of the need to press ahead with overhauling the Native
Authority system was one of the principal points which emerged from this meeting
of the Legislative Council.
Whilst we certainly agree with you on the necessity for advance in the North and
the West we are doubtful, on thinking the matter over yet again, whether the best
means of achieving our object will be to import an expert with solely U.K. experience.
In drawing up the new legislation for the Lagos Municipality and for the Eastern
reforms we certainly need U.K. advice (and we are getting it from the Local
Government Panel) but we feel that at this stage at least the problem in the North
and the West must be dealt with by different means. After talking to the Chief
Commissioners we propose that the next step should be to select an experienced
administrative officer in each Region who should be detached from other work in
order to give his whole time to questions of local government advance. He would
spend most of his time travelling and would be able to provide some of the co-
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ordination and prodding and new thinking which are necessary. Pyke-Nott has
already appointed an officer for such duty in the Eastern Provinces and we hope soon
to be able to make similar appointments in the West and North. We believe that that
step is the best one to take at the moment and that we should hold over the proposal
to bring in a U.K. expert for the time being. Perhaps the best course will be to give
these regional local government officers experience, by secondments in the United
Kingdom, of U.K. methods rather than bring some one out from England who could
have no knowledge of the peculiarities of the Emirates of the North or the special
system of Native Authorities in the West.
We certainly do not dispute the points which you bring out in your letter but after
a good deal of thought we are inclined to feel that for the present we should press
ahead in the way that I have mentioned rather than bring in an outside expert. The
Governor has asked me to put this view to you and to say that we should very much
welcome any further comment or advice which you can give us.
68 CO 537/4631, no 3 27 Apr 1949
[Political situation]: inward savingram no 893 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Creech Jones taking stock of the current political situation
The lull in political activity following the Ibadan meeting of Legislative Council and
preceding the lengthy process of constitutional review which is now to take place
provides a useful opportunity to take stock of the present situation and to record
developments which have taken place since I sent my saving telegram No. 435 dated
the 28th of February about the political situation.1
2. The Ibadan meeting of the Council went well. Savage was able to carry the
Finance Committee with him in approving the budget with little or no important
amendment, full support was given to legislation proposed including the extremely
important marketing legislation; and the unanimous decision reached regarding the
method to be adopted for review of the constitution was a most useful achievement.
There was strong criticism of the Posts and Telegraphs Department for failure to pro-
vide efficient and extended services (due to desperate staff difficulties) but general
appreciation of progress under the Development Plan was expressed for the first time.
Throughout the proceedings there was evidence from representatives of all parts of
the country of irritation and anger directed against Azikiwe particularly arising from
the attacks of his newspapers on Native Authorities and traditional rulers.
3. The N.C.N.C. convention took place in Lagos early this month. The delegates
were men of little standing and the meeting was chiefly of interest for the
disagreement which went on behind the scenes between Azikiwe and the most
extreme of his own followers. He made appeals for discipline and has tried to
persuade his supporters to postpone plans for ‘positive action’ until next year by
which time better preparations can be made and the attack can be directed at
whatever constitutional changes are then proposed. This more cautious policy has
earned him a good deal of criticism (not much of which is however publicly voiced)
and the Zikist Movement is now probably more inclined to disregard N.C.N.C.
leadership and follow an extreme line of its own. Azikiwe himself is worried by this
1 See 62.
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restlessness amongst his followers and no doubt as a sop to them has instructed his
papers to increase attacks on the Government. The proposed N.C.N.C. tour of the
Provinces for which Azikiwe has shown little enthusiasm has however been
postponed until later in the summer.
4. Meanwhile there has been no very serious recrudescence of the tribal ill-
feeling which threatened to have serious consequences last year although the Lagos
papers still compete with one another in abusing political adversaries—and both
sides are complaining that the Government does not intervene to stop their
opponents.
5. Azikiwe himself was a member of the Legislative Council Select Committee
which unanimously recommended the methods to be adopted for the review of the
constitution but that has not prevented his Press from criticizing the methods
approved and now being put into effect. The unconvincing line of the attack is that it
is no use consulting the mass of the people on such matters and that in any event the
N.C.N.C. ‘Freedom Charter’ is the last word which need be said in the matter.
6. Generally the political situation has somewhat improved since my report was
made in February and the method decided upon for review of the constitution has
taken the political initiative out of the hands of the N.C.N.C. and its extremists.
7. There is however another aspect of the situation which I regard as potentially
dangerous. When I made my last report in February I referred to the split in the
Trade Union Movement and to the activities of a group of Trade Union leaders who
are supporters of the N.C.N.C. or members of the Zikist Movement: they have now
formed what they call the Nigerian National Federation of Labour. In particular I
mentioned Eze, the paid secretary of the U.A.C. Union, and his attempts to call a
strike of all U.A.C. employees. These efforts have been intensified and I think that it is
probable that, seeing the circumstances unpropitious for a purely political agitation
N.C.N.C. supporters propose to attempt to stir up labour trouble, starting with the
U.A.C. and possibly then turning their attention to the Railway and other large
employers of labour.
8. In the U.A.C. dispute (if such it can be called when the reasons for the
proposed strike are more political than industrial) the Labour Department has
endeavoured to persuade both parties to resort to the proper procedure of
conciliation. These efforts have been made more difficult by the fact that the U.A.C.
Management has refused to deal with Eze (the Management regards itself as justified
in this by Eze’s unreasonable and violent attitude and by his abusive attacks on the
U.A.C. in the Press) but, though I sympathize with their views on Eze, I think that
they are on unsound ground in refusing to deal with whatever leaders the workers
choose particularly once a dispute is declared. Negotiations are however still
proceeding through the medium of the Labour Department. Eze has declared that a
general U.A.C. strike will take place on the 6th of May2 and it seems clear that the
Management is prepared for the strike and determined not to give way. It is still
uncertain whether Eze and his associates are strong enough to achieve a full U.A.C.
strike but the present indications are that the strike will take place next month and
that in many areas, particularly in Sapele and Burutu, where the largest numbers of
U.A.C. employees are congregated, the Union leaders will be supported. There are
2 ‘It did not’ was minuted in the margin at this point.
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disturbing reports that the extremists intend to attempt to organise sabotage of
U.A.C. buildings and equipment. Meanwhile the Labour Department is doing
everything possible to proceed with the negotiations without much help from either
side.
9. A further disturbing feature of the situation is that in many areas, particularly
in the towns, prices and rents have continued to rise and that fact tends to play into
the hands of those who wish to start labour troubles.
10. In general it can, I think, be said that our plans for advance in the political
field and in the economic field have created a feeling that the Government is
genuinely anxious to press forward with a progressive and constructive policy in full
co-operation with the people. A comparatively small number of extremists, now more
isolated from general public support, is determined to use violent and subversive
methods to prevent orderly progress. They have apparently decided to attempt a first
trial of strength in the labour sphere. They may not succeed by strike action in
obtaining any benefits for the workers but that is not their primary intention—their
main aim is to create confusion and bitterness against the large firms and against the
Government.
11. Any measures which can be taken by the Government to forestall or curtail
the intended U.A.C. strike and strikes of Government workers will of course be taken
but, for the reasons to which I have referred, I am not optimistic that the leaders of
the U.A.C. Union will be prepared to listen to reason. I shall of course keep you fully
informed of developments.
69 CO 537/4727, no 3 May 1949
[Political situation]: Nigeria political summary on tensions in the
Zikist movement and the increasing influence of the NYM [Extract]
Political
1. The Budget Session of Legislative Council took place in an atmosphere of
general goodwill and co-operation. The members now know each other much better
than they did and many of the unofficial members, having attended together the
African Conference in London last year, are now on terms of personal friendship
which cuts across regional and tribal affiliations. There is ample evidence of
increasingly bitter hostility amongst nearly all members against Azikiwe and
impatience with the other Lagos members but apart from that the unofficial
members get on well together and often decide amongst themselves on a joint line of
action to be taken in the Council. The work of the Council over the past two years has
certainly helped to build up a spirit of mutual respect between the representatives of
the three Regions. There has also been a marked improvement in the confidence
which unofficial members show in debate and most of them are now more ready to
press their own views without being worried by procedural pitfalls or in any way
deterred by the possibility of official disapproval. The numbers of the Council (forty
four in all) are perhaps too small for good debate but there is a welcome increase in
straight speaking. The Northern members though still concerned to make quite sure
that their Region is not dominated by the Eastern and Western Provinces, so much
more advanced from the point of view of Western education, are less inclined to
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adopt an isolationist attitude and this year there were only faint echoes of Mallam
Tafawa Balewa’s famous ‘March to the Sea’ speech.1
2. The dislike for Azikiwe was illustrated by the opposition from all sides to his
Newspaper Bill. The main object of the Bill was the abolition of the bond which must
be deposited before a new paper is launched and Dr. Azikiwe no doubt had his own
interests primarily in view but personal animosity and distrust were apparent in the
speech of member after member and it is doubtful whether the Bill would have been
approved even if it had been completely unobjectionable in itself. The Emirs of the
North and the Obas of the West are particularly embittered by the attacks on their
traditional position made through the medium of Zik’s Press. They naturally identify
Azikiwe completely with the policy of his papers but Azikiwe himself says in private
that he is only one of a Board of Directors, the other members of which are more
violently inclined than himself, and that he frequently has to defer to them. In spite
of this deep cleavage, Dr. Azikiwe subscribed to the unanimous and important
decision reached regarding the method to be adopted for the review of the
constitution. The political significance of this move by Azikiwe cannot be overlooked
and subsequent events have not detracted from its importance.
3. The N.C.N.C. Convention which followed at the beginning of April in Lagos
was an anti-climax. The bands and ballyhoo of last year’s Kaduna Convention were
absent: the attendance was sparse—only about 150 delegates turned up, of little
standing for the most part—and nothing of great importance was said or done,
except for Zik’s appeal to his followers for moderation and discipline, in the course of
which he said:—
‘At the present stage of the development of Nigeria and the Cameroons our
national life is interwoven too much with the vagaries of human nature. Not
all of our sons and daughters have the stomach for battle, and not all of them
have the spunk to resist injustice. We must make allowances for the bold and
for the timid, hoping that time will vindicate the correct perspective. When,
therefore, the militant elements among us feel that the time of positive action
has arrived they must ponder deeply that for such action to succeed, there
must be first, a mobilisation of forces, second, a disciplined army, third, a well
protected general staff, fourth, a line of communication and lastly a cause
worth fighting and dying for’.
This did not go down at all well with the extremists and on the 6th of April the
‘African Echo’, which may usually be taken as speaking for the Zikist Movement;
published a violently denunciatory leader including such comments as
‘This is a disappointing and distracting declaration coming as it did from
quarters most unexpected, as was evidenced by the lifting of eye-brows and
the ghastly staring at one another of those national conscious citizens who
congregated either to participate or to watch the proceedings of the historic
event.’
and
1 24 March 1947. See introduction, p. lii.
10-(Doc61-99)-cp  15/7/01  7:27 am  Page 200
[69] MAY 1949 201
‘For our part, we wonder where Zik will get any army to mobilise when the
time comes. Certainly, not those disappointed and disillusioned disciples of
Zikism would again freely offer their services’.
Two days later Azikiwe in open convention accused Eze of being responsible for the
article: the latter indignantly denied this and Odufuwa, the editor of the ‘Echo’ was
sent for. Asked for his source of information, he made the embarrassing revelation
that Agwuna and Oged Macaulay were the guilty parties. Naturally, this part of the
proceedings was not reported in the press. For the rest, various branches of the Zikist
Movement tabled resolutions counselling violence: the following extract from one by
the Onitsha Branch being typical of the whole:—
‘vii. Gymnastic Exercises
All Branch Committees shall learn:
1. Forest escapades and studies.
2. Fasting in the Campings.
3. Swimming.
4. Military Tacties.
viii Arrests of Members
On the pronouncement of sentences:—
(a) The Magistrate or Judge shall be dealt with
(b) The Incendiary explosive shall be laid if possible under the seat of the
Judge or Magistrate and around the courts’.
This and the rest of its kind were turned down by the ‘Cabinet’ but Nduka Eze
dissented from their decisions, not surprisingly considering that during the N.C.N.C
Convention he was holding secret meetings of the Zikist Movement at which he
persuaded members to swear an oath of personal allegiance to himself in support of
any line of action he might decide to take.
4. Though no open breach has yet taken place all the indications are that there is
a growing rift between Zik on the one hand and the extremists led by Eze on the
other and that neither of the protagonists is particularly anxious to close the gap. Eze
is an ignorant and narrow would-be demagogue but he is probably the most
dangerous extremist in Nigeria today and he would not be sorry to step into Azikiwe’s
shoes. Azikiwe, on the other hand, is growing increasingly doubtful of the value of
the support of the extremists of his movement. There are even indications that he is
seeking a rapprochement with the N.Y.M.—of recent weeks a number of cartoons
have appeared in his papers depicting the N.C.N.C. and the N.Y.M. standing side by
side to fight the common enemy of ‘Imperialism’ and though these cartoons have
only enraged the extremists while failing to win the N.Y.M., whose leaders are still
bitterly opposed to Zik, they may be regarded as a first step by Zik to educate public
opinion to the idea of a centre party. That no open rift between Zik and the
extremists has appeared is probably due to the doubt in Eze’s mind as to whether he
can afford to dispense with Azikiwe whose prestige, particularly in the Eastern
Provinces, is important and to the fact that, should the Nigerian National Federation
of Labour, also led by Eze, succeed in winning the support of the Trades Union
movement, Azikiwe could with difficulty do without its support. In these
circumstances Zik is having to tread a particularly delicate and tortuous course.
5. Azikiwe’s attitude may be influenced by the fact that the Nigerian Youth
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Movement is experiencing something of a revival and its influence at any rate in
Lagos and the Western Provinces is increasing: even in the North, where previously
it existed virtually in name only, it is gaining some new adherents, chiefly, of course,
among the Yorubas resident there, for its membership is still essentially Yoruba. The
executive, greatly daring, are even planning a propaganda campaign in the East. This
is not to say that its influence in the country is yet on a par with that of the
N.C.N.C.—it is not; but there can be little doubt that during the past year it has
developed from a shadowy debating society into a comparatively virile body, capable
of formulating its views and maintaining them against the formidable opposition of
the N.C.N.C., at whose expense most of its gains have been effected.
6. The increased extent of N.Y.M. influence in Lagos may be gauged by the
progress of the Lagos Conference at present discussing the revision of the
Constitution. It is difficult to find a genuinely representative body for so
cosmopolitan and heterogeneous a town as Lagos but it may be taken that the
delegates invited form as representative a body as can reasonably be expected. The
crux of the debate has been whether regionalisation should be based, as the N.Y.M.
contends, on three powerful Regions or whether more numerous Regions should be
created as the N.C.N.C. advocates, based on ‘linguistic groups’. On this issue a vote
was taken on the 13th of May, the principle of three Regions winning by 34 votes to
14. Up to this point N.Y.M. and N.C.N.C. delegates had been sitting together in
apparent amity—Azikiwe and H.O. Davies sat next to each other—but the same
evening a hasty N.C.N.C. ‘Cabinet’ meeting was held at which it was decided to stage
a ‘walk-out’ at the next meeting of the conference. On the 20th of May, Sa’ad Zungur
and L.N. Namme duly walked out. Azikiwe, wisely and typically, did not attend on
that day, but he took part in the deliberations at the next meeting, held on the 27th
of May, and is under fire from the extremists for having done so. (This well illustrates
Zik’s present dilemma of having to appear to hunt with the wolves while wishing to
run with the lambs). Similar ‘walk-outs’ by N.C.N.C. representatives may occur at
conferences in the Provinces, when it becomes apparent that the N.C.N.C. Freedom
Charter is not going to win the day. . . .
70 CO 583/294/2, no 2 30 May 1949
[Revenue allocation]: inward savingram no 1175 from H M Foot to 
Mr Creech Jones on the need to review the allocation of revenue
between the centre and the regions. Enclosure: memorandum by
A.W.L. Savage on the allocation of revenue to the regions
Financial and Administrative Procedure under the New Constitution: Method of
Allocating non-declared Revenues to Regions.
The Statement of Administrative and Financial Procedure under the new
Constitution which was approved as a result of the report by Mr. (now Sir Sydney)
Phillipson, copies of which were sent to you with my Despatch No.272 of the 2nd of
December, 1947, provided in para. 9 for the declaration of certain revenues as
‘regional’ and, in para. 10, for the allocation to each Region from the revenues of
Nigeria other than those ‘declared regional’ of amounts strictly proportionate to the
contribution which such Region makes to those other revenues.1 This allocation of
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revenue has proved to be one of the most contentious matters connected with the
present Constitution and one which has thus far defied attempts at a satisfactory
solution. In the past two years, grave practical objections to the method of allocation
proposed by Sir Sydney Phillipson have become apparent and the method (which Sir
Sydney explained in para. 25 of his Report results from an attempt to reconcile two
conflicting principles) is not beyond objection in principle. It is certain that the
framing of some more suitable financial arrangements will be one of the most
difficult features of the revision of the Constitution which has recently been begun.
2. A copy of a Memorandum recently prepared in this office which sets out the
history of the allocations of revenue to the Regions and explains the problems is sent
with this Savingram. This Memorandum was drafted for the information of the
Finance Committee but, in the event, was not circulated. The Committee agreed that
an investigation was necessary and £1,500 was provided under Head 40,
Miscellaneous Subhead 74, Statistical Survey for Revenue Allocations in current
Estimates. The Resolution foreshadowed in para. 18 of the Memorandum was not,
therefore, necessary.
3. In these circumstances, Sir John Macpherson directed shortly before his
departure on leave that the matter should be discussed with the appropriate
members of your Office by the present Financial Secretary (Mr. Savage) when he
arrives in the United Kingdom. Mr. Savage expects to reach London towards the end
of the third week in June and the purpose of this Savingram is to ask that he be given
an early opportunity of discussing with Mr. Cohen and others the possibility of
obtaining the services of an expert on federal finance, probably and preferably, from
the Dominion of Canada (where problems not dissimilar from our own have been
successfully solved), who could come to Nigeria for a few months this Summer and
advise on the local problems.
Enclosure to 70
One of the declared objects of the Constitution which was introduced as a result of
the Despatch of the 6th of December, 1944, from the Governor of Nigeria (Sir Arthur
Richards, as he then was) to the Secretary of State was the devolution upon the
Regional Councils of a large measure of financial responsibility. Paragraph 12 of the
Despatch (Sessional Paper No. 4 of 1945) stated:—
‘I propose to devolve upon the regional Councils a large measure of financial
responsibility. Each would have its own regional budget, on which would be
borne the cost of all Government services in the region, including the salaries
of Government personnel. The only exception would be the cost within the
region of services declared to be central services, such as the railway, posts
and telegraphs, income tax and audit, which would continue to be carried on
the Central Estimates as at present, together with the central organization of
Government, the headquarters and central staff of all Departments and such
charges as interest on public debt, pensions, etc. Regional revenue would
consist in the first place of the share of the direct tax at present payable to the
1 See 42.
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Central Government together with any receipts from fees, licences, etc. which
might be allotted to the regional budgets, and in the second place of annual
block grants from central revenue’.
After the proposals in the Despatch had received the approval of the Secretary of
State, it was necessary to work out in greater detail the financial and administrative
procedure required to give effect to the broad principles of the new Constitution.
This task was entrusted to Mr. S. Phillipson, CMG (as he then was) and at the end of
1946 he submitted the very valuable Report upon which was based the Statement of
Administrative and Financial Procedure which now governs these matters.2
2. The author of the Report found no great difficulty in establishing principles to
govern the declaration of ‘fees, licences, etc. which might be allotted to the regional
budgets’ but, in respect of the ‘annual block grants from central revenue’ he wrote
(para. 24 of the Report):—
‘By far the most difficult aspect of the problem of financial procedure under
the new constitution is the question of the basis on which available revenues
are to be allocated to the Regions for expenditure on regional purposes. In
approaching this question one is confronted at the outset by two cogent but
unfortunately conflicting principles which may, for convenience be called:—
(a) Principle of derivation
(b) Principle of even progress.’
The Report went on to consider these two principles and the possibility of
reconciling them. The proposals finally recommended, which in due course received
the Governor’s approval, are thus stated in para. 10 of the Statement of
Administrative and Financial Procedure:—
‘(i) The interests of Nigeria as a whole must always determine the allocation
of revenues and other public funds for Nigerian and Regional Expenditure.
(ii) Subject to the fundamental principle stated in sub-paragraph (i) above
and also to the condition that more should not be allocated than can
reasonably be expended, it will be an objective of policy to achieve, as early as
may be and in any event within a period of five years, a condition of things in
which it will be possible to allocate to each region for expenditure on regional
services and works:—
(a) the full amount of the Government share of the tax collected under the
Direct Tax Ordinance, 1940 (as subsequently amended) and all other
revenues declared regional.
(b) a grant from the other revenues of Nigeria not included in (a) above or
from the other public funds of Nigeria in strict proportion to the
contribution which the region makes to those other revenues’.
3. Whatever the merits in principle of allocating non-declared revenues ‘in strict
proportion to the contribution which the region makes to those . . . revenues’ (and,
as will be shown later in this Memorandum, the system has grave defects in
2 See 42.
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principle), difficulties were immediately met with in practice. Appendix C of Mr.
Phillipson’s Report was devoted to the basis of allocation of revenues and he applied
the formulae which he devised to a ‘break-down’ of the Estimates for 1946–47, that
is to say, to an analysis of the Estimates for that year, prepared by the authorities
severally responsible for the preparation of those Estimates, showing, in respect of
revenue, the shares drawn from each region (so far as this was possible) and, in
respect of expenditure, its division between Nigerian and regional services and works.
It was immediately found that no reliable statistical information was available upon
which to determine the proportions in which the Regions at that time contributed to
Nigerian revenues not declared regional and Mr. Phillipson was careful to state that
his calculation of the relative proportions was based ‘on the best information at
present available’.
4. The Estimates for 1947–48 were similarly ‘broken down’ and used as a basis
for calculating the provisional allocation of revenues to the Regions for the financial
year 1948–49 (the first year for which ‘Regional Estimates’ were to be prepared, the
first year in which the financial provisions of the new Constitution were
implemented). On this occasion, the work was done in much greater detail and the
most intricate calculations were used in determining the basis upon which each of
the major Sub-heads of Revenue should properly be deemed to be derived from the
respective Regions. The absence of reliable statistics and the fact that the trade of the
country is not organized upon the same geographical basis as the new constitutional
arrangements were great handicaps and although the results achieved were felt to be
the best possible in the circumstances, the Government was far from satisfied that
the method it was compelled to adopt were satisfactory having regard to the great
political and financial issues involved. The task would have been one of great
complexity and administrative difficulty in a country where advanced statistics were
readily available but in Nigeria, where there is not even any reliable estimate of total
population or of distribution of that population the job could only be done by the use
of broad assumptions and approximations. It should be recorded, however, that the
percentages determined by this means were not substantially different from those
arrived at by Mr. Phillipson by the use of different methods.
5. The provisional allocations of revenue for 1948–49, which were made in July
1947, had to be adjusted (as had been foreseen in the Report) because the cost of the
then existing services and works in the Eastern Region was more than that Region
would have received under the approved principles of allocation and it had been
accepted that the introduction of the new Constitution could not be made an
occasion for a sudden and drastic curtailment of expenditure on Regional services
and works in a particular Region when that expenditure had been incurred or
planned according to pressing needs. It is unfortunate that the Memorandum on
these provisional allocations described the allocations determined by the approved
means as ‘ideal allocations’ and went on to speak of adjustments of these ‘ideal
allocations’. The term was intended to signify the allocations made according to
approved procedure: but these were not in themselves ‘ideal’ in any absolute sense—
they were admittedly the result of an attempt to reconcile the two conflicting
principles referred to in para. 2 above. Experience has shown that the approved
method of allocating is far from ‘ideal’, indeed, it seems likely to offend against the
very obvious principle declared by Lord Lugard in connection with the amalgamation
of Northern and Southern Nigeria (at a time when, in the words of the Amalgamation
10-(Doc61-99)-cp  15/7/01  7:27 am  Page 205
206 ZIKISTS AND ENUGU SHOOTINGS [70]
Report, the material prosperity of the South had increased ‘with astonishing rapidity’
whereas the North ‘largely dependent on the annual grant of the imperial
Government was barely able to balance its budget with the most parsimonious
economy’) that the revenue of the country should be so disposed ‘as to benefit the
country as a whole without creating jealousy and friction’.
6. According to the procedure approved in the ‘Statement of Administrative and
Financial Procedure under the New Constitution’, the provisional allocations of
revenue made in July 1947 should have been completely revised in November or
December of that year by a recalculation not only of the amount of revenue available
for allocation, but also of the proportions in which, according to contributions to the
newly-calculated non-declared revenues, the three Regions should share that
amount. In theory, the whole process should be repeated in (say) July 1949, when the
correct figures of actual revenue for 1948–49 are known. But, in July 1949, the
provisional allocations of revenue for 1950–51 must be made: and they, again, would
have to be twice recalculated, first in the following November and again in the
following July. It has been proved in practice that these recalculations are beyond the
administrative capacity of the country in its present state of development and with
the present lack of reliable statistical information.
7. The lack of accurate statistics was thought to be the chief imperfection in the
approved system and it was for this reason that the Standing Committee on Finance
of the Legislative Council was invited to approve in August 1948, financial provision
so that Nigeria might obtain the services, for a short period, of a well-qualified
statistical expert or an expert on federal systems of finance from overseas who could,
with Mr. Phillipson, carry out a statistical survey and then make recommendations
for the future determination of revenue allocations. But subsequent events showed
that our statistical inadequacies were not the chief imperfection in the approved
system.
8. When the provisional allocations of revenue for the financial year 1949–50
were to be made in July, 1948, it appeared probable, on such indications of revenue
and expenditure as there were at that time, that the draft estimates of Nigeria for
1949–50 would show a deficit of between £1,500,000 and £2,000,000 to be met by
additional taxation. The formulae devised by Mr. Phillipson are not appropriate
where the foreseeable revenue of the country falls short of the inevitable expenditure
of Nigeria and of the Regions. In these circumstances, it was considered essential to
limit the regional allocations to the minimum required to provide for the
maintenance of public services then current and to provide for the earned
increments of serving officers. It was agreed to adopt provisionally a total allocation
of £5,500,000 and it was recognized that this would make it necessary for one or
more Regions to ignore the approved margin of five per cent between revenue and
expenditure.
9. At the end of November, 1948, when it became necessary to revise the
allocations and to notify the Regions of the revision in time for the impending
Budget meetings of the Regional Councils, there was an estimated shortfall of
revenue in 1949–50 of over £1,500,000. It was not then possible to say precisely what
methods could be employed to raise this additional revenue or to see clearly what the
total sum raised was likely to be. Without knowing how the total revenue is to be
raised, it is not possible to determine the proportions in which the Regions
respectively can be estimated to contribute to the non-declared revenues and,
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consequently, to calculate what their share should be in accordance with the
methods of allocation now approved. It is, as was admitted in para. 30 of the
Phillipson Report, an inherent difficulty in the approved system that the allocation of
revenue must be made ‘long before the Nigerian Government is in a position to
estimate the probable revenues for the relative year or to state with any definiteness
the changes in taxation, if any, which are to be made’. The author of the Report
thought it reasonable to envisage a revision stage at which ‘By early in December the
Nigerian Government will normally be in a position to give a revised figure based on
a considered estimate and on any fiscal proposals which may have taken shape in the
meanwhile’. In fact, in December 1948, largely because very heavy unforeseen
expenditure had just become inevitable, the Nigerian Government was not in that
position. In these circumstances, there was no alternative but to revise the
provisional allocations, not in accordance with the approved methods, but by
maintaining the provisional figure of £5,500,000 adopted in July ‘subject only to
modifications arising from approved policy and to such future increases as may later
be considered essential in relation to needs proved after review by His Excellency’.
10. Between the date of the provisional allocations and the date of revision, the
decision had been taken that educational grants-in-aid should be borne on Regional
Estimates. As had been stated in paragraph 17 of the Memorandum on Approved
Estimates for 1948–49, expenditure on such grants is essentially regional and it was
only because the amounts actually payable in 1948–49 depended on the results of an
inquiry into long-term policy then in prospect that it was decided to treat the
1948–49 expenditure as Nigerian. Nevertheless, the decision was not lightly taken.
The pattern of educational development is such that these grants, which are (save for
‘special purposes’ grants) payable automatically under the new Educational Code,
aggravate the position that the cost of maintaining existing services and works in one
Region is more than that Region would receive under the approved methods of
revenue allocation. It was the declared intention of the Government to redress this
position as speedily as possible and the regionalization of educational-grants-in-aid
would further frustrate that intention. But the arguments in favour of
regionalization were so compelling that the decision was taken.
11. The review given above of the working of revenue allocations so far shows
that there are serious practical defects in the approved method of allocating revenue
to the Regions: but further examination has shown that, as was only to be expected in
a system designed to resolve the conflict between two principles, there are objections
in principle as well and those objections have proved graver than was anticipated.
One objection can be clearly seen if one pictures a country divided into two regions,
one of which has been fully developed in the past and so enabled to make a great
contribution to the non-declared revenues of the country as a whole, and the other
which may be rich in natural resources but has had no development of any kind. The
latter makes little or no contribution to the non-declared revenues of the country as
a whole; its ‘ideal’ allocation of revenue under the present system is, therefore,
practically nil and consequently it is without the funds which it requires to develop
its resources and so increase its contribution to the country’s revenues. In other
words, the system has an inherent tendency to preserve inequality of development.
12. Apart from the extreme example given in the preceding paragraph, it is not
difficult to imagine circumstances in which the system would prove quite unsuited
to conditions in Nigeria. If there were to be a sudden decline in the price of cocoa,
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resulting in a ‘slump’ in that commodity such as have been not unknown in the past,
the contribution made by the Western Region to the non-declared revenues of the
country would dwindle so far as to make its ‘ideal’ allocation of revenue quite
insufficient to cover the cost of existing services and works. But it would be at the
time of such a ‘slump’ that there would be the greatest need for the maintenance of
existing services and for their extension in order to provide the people with an
alternative source of livelihood. Paragraph 25 of the Phillipson Report recognized
that the principle of derivation was in essence ‘To him that hath shall be given’ but
sought to minimize that objection on the ground that the contribution made by a
Region to the revenues of Nigeria may be determined to a material extent by the
readiness of its people to accept a high rate of direct taxation. But this argument is
not valid in circumstances which render it impossible for the people to pay a high
rate of direct taxation because their main source of livelihood has dwindled almost to
vanishing point. As is stated in the same paragraph of the Report, a more just
criticism of the principle is that its full adoption might permanently condemn
backward regions to remain backward.
13. For the purposes of allocations so far made to the Regions, the extent of a
Region’s contribution to the non-declared revenues of Nigeria has been in large part
related to the value of the products exported from that Region. The first problem
here is to determine what ‘value’ should be used. In practice it has been the ‘port
price’, which is the yardstick for measuring export duties; but the main export crops
of the country are now marketed under control and the ‘port price’ may be very
much less than the price which the Marketing Board ultimately receives after
allowing for freight and other charges incurred by the Board. This difference now
accrues to the Board for the creation of a stabilization fund and for use in schemes
for the benefit of the people who produce the crop. It is questionable whether in
measuring the contribution made (say) by the Western Region to the non-declared
revenues of Nigeria, the ‘port price’ of cocoa is a true standard by which to measure.
Furthermore, the system takes no account of any benefits derived by Nigeria from a
Region other than those which can be computed mathematically as part of the non-
declared revenues of the country.
14. The difficulties which the present system has presented and the
dissatisfaction in the Regions with its working over the bare two years since it was
introduced threaten to be a grave danger to the political and economic development
of the country. Paragraph 10 of the Phillipson Report refers to the fact that before the
amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, Southern Nigeria and the Colony
of Lagos had to assist Northern Nigeria financially. In paragraph 5 of the Governor-
General’s Report on the Amalgamation (African West No. 1070 of 1919) the late Lord
Lugard wrote:—
‘Thus the anomaly was presented of a country with an aggregate revenue
practically equal to its needs, but divided into two by an arbitrary line of
latitude. One portion was dependent on a grant paid by the British
taxpayer. . . .’
We are tending to develop a similar anomaly now: but the relative financial
contributions of North and South to the common revenue are now reversed. The
anomaly has recently been painfully illustrated by the need for improvements in the
administrative organization of the Cameroons Province, part of a Trust Territory
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under United Nations trusteeship. It is clear that the United Nations will not be
impressed if we claim to be unable to put into force our plans for the development of
the Trust Territory because, although the country as a whole could afford them, the
system under which we allocate revenue to the Regions results in the Region
principally affected being unable to afford them.
15. The most probable form of constitutional development in Nigeria is towards
a federation of several semi-autonomous Regions but the present arrangements,
under which the ‘revenues declared regional’ are so very much less than is required
to cover expenditure declared regional and under which the difference must be made
up from allocations of non-declared revenues, are not only unsuited to the
development of such a federation but are likely to render its achievement impossible.
Sir Sydney Phillipson has stated in his Report (para. 25):—
‘It should be an objective of Nigerian and Regional fiscal action to bring about
a state of things in which the contribution made by each region to the non-
declared revenues of Nigeria is proportioned to the required scale of
expenditure on regional purposes in that region so that the latter may
correspond to the former’.
It is obvious that under the present system some years must elapse before this
objective could be achieved (if it could ever be achieved under the present system)
and during those vital years a Region which required financial assistance from the
revenues of Nigeria disproportionate to its contribution would be regarded by 
the other Regions as a financial impediment to their progress. It is improbable that the
other Regions would look on it as a desirable partner in a Federation if its potential
value to such a Federation were obscured by its temporary inability to ‘pay its way’.
16. It is clear that we have here a constitutional and financial problem of the
utmost difficulty which can perhaps be solved only by a radical alteration in our
revenue system. If, as the Constitutional Despatch foreshadowed, the Regions are
ultimately to have power to appropriate revenue for regional purposes, the field of
taxation in which they are permitted to operate must be very different from that
bounded by the present principles governing ‘revenues declared regional’. No case is
known elsewhere where a federation has been formed by the separation of a unified
territory into several components which then join together again in a federation so
that they may present a common political and economic front to the world.
Federations have occurred where independent states, realizing the benefits of
presenting a common political and economic front to the world, have joined together
for this purpose and have voluntarily surrendered some of their state’s rights to the
federal organization as the price to be paid for those benefits. Nevertheless, it is sure
that Nigeria could learn much from studying the financial systems which have been
evolved in such countries as the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of
Australia, the Union of South Africa and the United States of America to serve groups
of states joining in a central organization. It is therefore proposed to collect material
on the subject from these countries and to obtain the services of an expert in federal
finance who will, with the Financial Secretary, examine the problem and make
recommendations.
17. It was stated in Annexure I to the Constitutional Despatch that the Regions
would have no separate surplus or reserve, but the recommendation in the Phillipson
Report (para. 29) that the difference between actual expenditure and the revenue
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which might properly have been allocated to the Region on the basis of actual
revenue returns should be carried forward for or against the Region was later
accepted by the Governor. It follows, however, from what has been stated earlier in
this Memorandum that even when the actual revenue returns for the year 1948–49
have been received, there will not be the statistical data on which the revenue
allocations already made could be adjusted in strict accordance with the principle
that the ‘block grants’ should be in strict proportion to the Regions’ contributions to
non-declared revenues. It is therefore proposed that pending such further
recommendations as may result from the investigation to be undertaken by the
Financial Secretary with expert assistance, the unexpended portions of the Regional
Revenue Allocations for the year 1948–49 will be paid to the Regions for the
establishment of Regional General Revenue Balances. The allocations for the year
1948–49 included an element in respect of expenditure under Colonial Development
and Welfare Schemes which is reimbursable by the Imperial Government. It is not
intended that under-expenditure of this element should be credited to the Regional
General Revenue Balances, since this would, in effect, be to charge to Nigerian
revenues expenditure expressly declared to be reimbursable by the Imperial
Government. On the other hand, it is not proposed that the Regions should forfeit
any allocation made to them for expenditure under the Development and Welfare
Head which they have, in the event, been unable to spend during the financial year.
18. If the Standing Committee on Finance agrees with the recommendation that
the subject of regional revenue allocations should be investigated by the Financial
Secretary with the assistance of an expert in federal finance, a Resolution to this end
will be submitted to the Legislative Council at the forthcoming Budget Meeting.
71 CO 537/4625, no 29 1 June 1949
[Constitutional review]: inward telegram no 1193 from H M Foot to
Mr Creech Jones on the progress of consultations for the new
constitution
Reference my Savingram No. 1054 of the 17th of May. Constitutional Review.
Preliminary discussions in the Provinces continue satisfactorily. We do not expect
village, Divisional and Provincial meetings to deal with all the complicated and
difficult constitutional points at issue, but they will in particular be able to give an
indication, before representatives of the Provincial Conferences go forward to take
part in the discussions in the Regional Conferences, of how each Province wishes to
be represented in the Regional Houses of Assembly and how the Provincial
representatives from each Province to sit in the Regional Houses should be selected.
The discussions now proceeding all over the country have had a valuable effect in
educating public opinion. Many people who previously took little interest in
constitutional matters are making an effort to understand the present system and to
think what changes might be made.
2. In Lagos Azikiwe was taken to task by his own ‘Cabinet’ for agreeing to
participate in the Lagos Conference and he had to concede that the two N.C.N.C.
representatives should walk out at the next meeting. Azikiwe was absent from that
meeting (pleading illness) and the two N.C.N.C. representatives duly walked out,
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having protested about the composition of the conference and against the decision of
the conference to vote on resolutions (the supporters of the N.C.N.C. had been
heavily outvoted at the previous meeting). There was a good deal of public interest as
to what would happen at the next meeting of the Lagos Conference which was held
last week. To our surprise Azikiwe himself attended and took part in the discussions,
and representatives of all the other organizations affiliated to the N.C.N.C. were also
present. The only absentees were the two N.C.N.C. delegates who had walked out at
the previous meeting. Some wrangling about the system of voting continued and one
other delegate walked out in protest but all the other representatives continued the
discussions which, as before, were reasoned and constructive. The conference will
continue to sit once a week, probably for another month or more. It is perhaps,
unfortunate that three representatives have withdrawn and extremist pressure may
lead to other withdrawals later but it was important that a full party boycott of the
conference should, if possible, be avoided and it is satisfactory that Azikiwe himself
and other organisations affiliated to the N.C.N.C. have continued to take part.
3. These events give rise to speculation about Azkiwe’s future intentions. He
appears to be following a very moderate line in spite of the increasing restlessness
and opposition to his leadership amongst some of his own followers and he is
devoting more of his time to his business and sporting activities. At present it looks
as if the Zikist Movement intend to break with him and follow an extreme line of its
own.
72 CO 859/131/2, no 9 8 June 1949
[Mass education]: despatch no 78 from H M Foot to Mr Creech Jones
on the relationship between the constitutional review and schemes for
community development
I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 389 of the 10th of November, 1948,
on the subject of mass education and to express regret that a reply has not previously
been made.
2. The fact that no earlier reply was sent does not mean that the principles which
the despatch emphasize are questioned. On the contrary the call to new thinking and
a new approach to the whole problem of the objects and methods of our
administration is most warmly welcomed. Nor has there been any delay in discussing
all the issues involved. Mr. Cohen, during his visit to Nigeria last year, was able to
hear what has been and is being done by the Government and the Native Authorities
and other agencies in the directions which the despatch advocated and to take part in
preliminary discussions on the future policy to be followed. The whole matter was
then considered at a conference of Chief Commissioners under the chairmanship of
the Governor in January last, and following that conference the Chief Commissioner
of the Eastern Provinces (Commander Pyke-Nott), who had attended the Cambridge
Summer School, prepared at the request of the Governor a personal letter to all
Residents in the Eastern Provinces, to which was attached a digest of the Summer
School papers, explaining and commenting on the ideas which emerged from the
Cambridge and London Conferences (the letter was sent to other Chief
Commissioners as a guide to the action to be taken in their Regions). Other action
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has already been taken, including an increase from £100,000 to £250,000 a year in
the Vote for village reconstruction and development, these funds to be expended by
Residents and District Officers in stimulating local development and enterprise
without reference to higher authority. Moreover the Nigeria Local Development
Board has been divided into Regional Development Boards which have a total capital
amounting to £1,250,000 available for loans to Nigerian enterprises. Regional
Production Development Boards have also been established and the first allocations
(totalling £4,300,000) have now been made to them by the Produce Marketing
Boards to finance schemes for the development of the producing industries and for
the economic benefit and prosperity of the producers. The Regional Development
Boards and the Production Development Boards (on both of which there are
majorities of Nigerians) operate on a Regional basis and they were not set up with the
specific purpose of encouraging community development, but you will appreciate
how important it is from the point of view of community development that these
Boards should exist with such substantial funds at their disposal and with powers to
make loans and approve expenditure on industrial enterprises and agricultural
development schemes. Provincial Development Committees and others engaged on
working out plans for community development will be able to turn for assistance to
these Boards and the fact that the Boards have statutory powers to make loans and
approve expenditure will obviate the delay which would necessarily occur if
application had to be made in the usual way and through normal channels for
assistance from Government funds. In regard to staff too a first step has been taken
in the recent appointment of Mr. Chadwick, who has done such outstanding work at
Udi, as Community Development Officer for the whole of the Eastern Provinces.
3. Although wide discussion of the issues raised in your despatch has been
encouraged and although the initial steps to put into effect some of the
recommendations of the conferences held in England have been taken, it would be
wrong to give the impression that, with so large a Service and so vast a territory, it is
possible for new ideas to be quickly or equally assimilated or for immediate results
on a widespread scale to be achieved. The questions at issue effect almost every major
problem of administration which faces us today and, in particular, are bound up with
the reform of local government to which all Administrative Officers have been and
are giving so much attention. The future of community development clearly depends
to a very large extent on the success which we can achieve in creating a framework of
local government which can give the people of each village and each rural and urban
area not only full responsibility in running their own local affairs but also the
financial and administrative means to make the improvements which they need.
An almost equally important matter which must have its effect on community
development is the policy of financial and administrative decentralization which we
are putting into effect. The first and most important stage in carrying out that policy
must be to distribute central revenue to the Regions and the problem of how that can
fairly be done is one of the most difficult of the many problems which arise from the
policy of greater Regional autonomy. It is obvious, however, that until the problem of
allocation of central revenue to the Regions has been solved it will be impossible to
effect further financial devolution to Provinces and Divisions or to reach conclusions
on the question of what Government financial assistance can be given in the future
to local government bodies. With regard to administrative decentralisation good
progress has already been made in the regionalisation of the principal departments.
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More can be done and will be done in this direction so that those engaged on work in
the Divisions and Provinces who need approval from higher Departmental authority
will be able to obtain decisions at Regional headquarters rather than await directions
from Departmental Directors in Lagos.
The results of the main constitutional review on which we are now engaged must
also have a decisive effect on community development. If, for instance, a
Constitution were evolved which concentrated power at the centre the Government
of a country so large as this would unavoidably be out of touch with the needs of the
great bulk of the rural population, but if, as we confidently hope, power is shifted still
further to the Regional legislatures and Regional Councils made up predominantly of
men who come from the rural areas we can expect that the needs of community
development will be much better appreciated.
I mention these major issues to illustrate how closely the policy of community
development is bound up with nearly all the principal problems which we are now
tackling and to emphasize the essential point that community development can
never be treated as a separate and self-contained subject. The proposals discussed in
your despatch do not in fact represent a new policy but rather a call to give in all our
work a new emphasis to the needs of the smallest communities and to build with
them on the sound foundations of self-help and communal initiative.
4. There is one other question on which I should comment because on its
solution so largely depends the pace and extent of progress in community
development—it is the old question of how Administrative staff and Departmental
staff in the Provinces can be partly relieved of the great and increasing burden of
office work. During the war when recruitment to the Colonial Service came almost
to a stop the position grew much worse and since the war there has been such an
increase in the complexity and volume of Government work, and so marked a
quickening in the pace of events, that the position has still further deteriorated.
There has been a most welcome acceleration of Administrative recruitment since the
war but we are still well below even the pre-war Administrative establishment, and
now that the influx of new recruits from the Forces which followed the war has
ended I gather that recruitment to the Administrative Service is likely to be once
more reduced. The new appointments and the extensive reorganization which would
be necessary to give the fullest effect to the policy of community development is,
therefore, I am afraid, out of the question at the present time. Nothing would be
gained, for instance, by withdrawing a District Officer from a large Division, leaving
that Division without an Administrative Officer in order that be should take up a post
as Community Development Officer at the Provincial headquarters. I myself feel that
the aim which we should eventually achieve is for Administrative Officers to become
members of a Provincial team working and touring from Provincial headquarters,
each becoming a specialist in some branch of the Provincial work—such as local
government or community development or land tenure reform—but that cannot be
achieved in most areas until a more effective and efficient system of local
government has been built up and the building up of that system is largely
dependent at this stage on the efforts of Administrative Officers stationed in the
Divisions. We are giving renewed and special attention to this problem of
organisation and, on the Governor’s direction, I am during his absence on leave
making a series of visits to Provincial headquarters to discuss with all the Residents
and all Administrative Officers in the Province together with the principal
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Departmental Officers stationed in the Province what solution to this most difficult
problem can be found. Some valuable suggestions have already emerged from the
meetings of this kind which I have held in recent weeks and these suggestions are
now under consideration with Chief Commissioners and Needs of Departments
concerned. There can, however, be no easy or quick solution to the problem and for a
long time to come shortage of experienced staff is bound to be the principal factor
limiting advance in carrying out the policy of community development.
5. I have replied to your despatch in very general terms at this stage indicating
only some of the principal problems and difficulties which have to be faced here in
carrying out the policy which was discussed so fully in England last year. The fact
that it is necessary to refer to those problems and difficulties does not mean that we
do not fully support that policy. We do: and I feel sure that I can speak for all
members of the Nigerian Service in saying that we believe that it is our duty, while
pressing on with constitutional and economic advance, to put first the interests of
the great mass of the people who are villagers and farmers. We must ensure that
those interests prevail by doing everything we can to arouse the rural population and
village communities to a new realization of what they can achieve by communal
effort and enterprise.
Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Chief Secretary, West African Council
and to the Governors of the other West African Colonies.
73 CO 583/299/2, no 8 28 June 1949
[Local government reform]: despatch no 27 from H M Foot to Mr
Creech Jones on the progress of local government reform
I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 17 of the 13th of January, 1948,
dealing with local government and in particular to the request in the seventh
paragraph of that despatch that the question of the machinery for the review of
policy on African local government should be further examined.1 Lord Milverton, in
his despatch No. 243 of the 30th of September, 1947, explained the reasons, which
still hold good, why it was not intended to re-create the post of Secretary for Native
Affairs in the central Nigerian Secretariat (the post created in 1920 was abolished in
1930) but in your despatch under reference you directed that further consideration
should be given to the question how work connected with local government should
be organized in the Regions and how it should be co-ordinated at central
headquarters.
2. In discussion of this question in previous correspondence two closely con-
nected matters which are usually included under the heading of ‘Native Affairs’
have also been considered—those of land tenure and Native Court Reform and,
before coming to the main question which you have asked to be further examined,
it may be useful to record very briefly what has been done in those matters since
Lord Milverton’s despatch of the 30th of September, 1947 was written. The Lands
Department has been separated from the Survey Department and completely reor-
1 See BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I, 20.
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ganised under the direction of a senior Administrative Officer with Regional
Assistant Commissioners stationed at the headquarters of the Western and Eastern
Regions, while in the Northern Provinces there is a separate section of the Regional
Secretariat, under a Senior Assistant Secretary. In regard to Native Courts your
Legal Adviser visited Nigeria last year and after consultation with him an Ordinance
(The Native Courts Ordinance, 1948) was enacted at the meeting of the Legislative
Council held in August, 1948. That Ordinance has effect until the 1st day of
October 1951, and it was intended that before then a full review of the existing
Native Court system should be made. Although it may not be possible to complete
the review and work out final proposals for changes before that date we have
already been considering the best method of effecting the review and we hope that
it will be undertaken by Judge Brooke who is specially well qualified to undertake
this work by reason of his long experience in Nigeria first as an Administrative
Officer and, since 1940, as a Puisne Judge. The question of the appointment of
Native Court Advisers in the three Regions has also been discussed and we well
recognise how strong a case exists for appointments of this kind, but we think that
it may be best to await the review of the Native Court system before such appoint-
ments are made, since it would be difficult to determine the duties of such advisory
or supervisory officers until the future powers and functions of Native Courts have
been decided.
3. On the general question of the organisation for dealing with local government
matters both in the Regions and in the central Nigerian Secretariat, it has been made
quite clear in past correspondence first that all Administrative Officers in the
Regions, whether in the Provinces or in Regional Secretariats, constantly devote 
the greatest amount of their time and effort to local government affairs, and also 
that the Governor must mainly depend for advice on such matters not on any officer
stationed in the central Secretariat but on the Chief Commissioners. It is for those
reasons that any attempt to concentrate responsibility for dealing with or advising on
‘Native Affairs’ in a particular section of the Regional Secretariats or the Central
Secretariat would be inappropriate in Nigeria. Indeed the conception that ‘Native
Affairs’ is a separate subject and only one of the preoccupations of the Government is
out of place in Nigeria, and would be rightly opposed by Administrative Officers here
as strongly as it would be by the Nigerian public. What is required, as already
suggested in previous despatches, is the strengthening of the Political Branch of the
Central Secretariat and some reorganisation in regard to local government in the
Regional Secretariats.
4. In the Central Secretariat the Political Branch has already been strengthened
by the addition of two Senior Assistant Secretaries, one of whom deals with all
Intelligence matters in close consultation with the newly appointed Intelligence
Officers in the three Regions and with the Police and Army, and the other with a
number of administrative matters, so that the Principal Assistant Secretary can be
freed from some of the weight of detailed work which has in the past taken up so
much of his time. We also intend to create a new post in this Branch for a Senior
Assistant Secretary (External Affairs) who will be responsible for dealing with such
questions as liaison with non-British West African territories, communications with
the Trusteeship Council regarding the Cameroons, and international conventions.
Moreover it is, I am sure, most important to select an officer to take charge of the
Political Branch who can expect to remain in that post for a number of years. When
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these things have been done I feel confident that the Branch will be well able to
perform the duties required of it.
5. Measures taken in the three Regional Secretariats will probably not follow
exactly the same pattern. We have for some time past been considering how
Regional Secretariats can be strengthened to give further effect to the policy of
decentralisation from Lagos and in preparation for the increasing Regional auton-
omy sin the political sphere which we confidently expect to arise from the present
constitutional review. The initial steps in regionalisation of the principal
Departments, the creation of Regional Loan Development Boards and Regional
Production Development Boards and the proposal, on which we are now working,
for recasting the Development Plan on a Regional basis, make it necessary to
strengthen the Regional Secretariats as soon as possible. In doing so we have to
bear in mind the likelihood, if not certainty, that as a result of the constitutional
review Regional Houses will be given wider powers, unofficial representation in
those Houses will be increased, and Chief Commissioners’ Executive Councils will
be established on which there will be unofficial representation. All these factors
make it urgently necessary to strengthen the Chief Commissioners’ headquarters
staff which will in future have to carry greatly increased responsibilities both in
administrative work and in the Regional Legislatures. As I have said, some variation
in organisation will probably be desirable in the different circumstances of the
three Regions, but proposals which we have recently been considering with Chief
Commissioners provide for the creation of permanent posts in each Region of a
Civil Secretary, Financial Secretary and Development Secretary, and also a Legal
Secretary. These Secretaries would not only be the Chief Commissioners’ principal
advisers and executive officers, but would also be the leading official spokesmen in
the Regional Houses and the Chief Commissioners’ Councils. It is proposed that the
posts should not be filled, as has usually been the case in the past, by the temporary
secondment of Administrative Officers from the Provinces, but by permanent
appointment, the best men for the posts being selected on merit and not on senior-
ity and the field of choice not being limited to officers serving in the Region in
question (the posts might in some cases be filled by transfer from one Region to
another or even exceptionally by appointment from outside Nigeria). It might be
mentioned in passing that one of the principal reasons for the proposed appoint-
ment of Regional Development Secretaries is that they would normally be
appointed Chairmen of the Regional Loan Development Boards and Regional
Production Development Boards. It is further proposed that there should be addi-
tional headquarters officers in each Region dealing with Local Government,
Community Development and Intelligence. Regional Intelligence Officers have
already been appointed in all the Regions and a Regional Local Government and a
Regional Community Development Officer have been appointed in the Eastern
Provinces. It is not intended that these three posts in each Region should be
Secretariat posts in the usual sense. The activities of the officers concerned will
cover a whole Region and they should not be tied to a headquarters office. On the
contrary they should be free to spend the greater part of their time travelling
throughout their Region and talking with Administrative Officers in the field.
Discussions with Chief Commissioners on these proposals are not yet complete, but
I refer to them now in order to indicate the kind of Regional organisation which we
have in mind. Chief Commissioners are themselves constantly touring and dis-
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cussing local government affairs with Residents and District Officers. Frequent con-
ferences attended by Residents and District Officers take place to consider such
matters. The principal Regional Secretariat Officers are themselves by their training
and experience fully familiar with local government problems. The new Regional
Local Government Officers will, under the direction of the Chief Commissioners,
keep under constant review changes and reforms which are going forward in local
government bodies in the Region, they will be able to give Administrative Officers
in one Province information about changes being made in others, by direct discus-
sion they will explain to all Administrative Officers in the field the over-all policy of
the Government in regard to local government in the Region and they will, of
course, keep Chief Commissioners fully informed of developments in different parts
of the Region. These Regional Local Government Officers would also visit other
Regions and keep in touch with changes there taking place in the field of local gov-
ernment in order to be able to pass on the experience so gained to Administrative
Officers in their own Regions. I hope that they will also be able to gain wider expe-
rience from time to time by visiting other territories and by studying local govern-
ment in the United Kingdom when they are on leave. It will also be useful if they
can keep close personal contact with the Principal Assistant Secretary in charge of
the Political Branch of the Central Secretariat (often by personal visits and demi-
official letters rather than by official correspondence) in much the same way as the
Regional Intelligence Officers already communicate with the Central Secretariat
Officer who deals with Intelligence matters in Lagos.
6. There is one other aspect of the organisation for dealing with local
government affairs in the Regions which should be mentioned. Shortage of
Administrative staff makes it difficult to expect any rapid progress but there will, I
believe, be an increasing tendency in the future for Administrative Officers to be
concentrated in a Provincial team rather than to remain scattered in Divisional
Stations. In the more backward areas this change must be a slow one but as and
when it becomes possible with local government advance to attach more
Administrative Officers to Provincial Headquarters it will also be possible for some of
them, freed from the multitudinous duties of a Divisional Officer, to specialise in
local government affairs. To take one example, an Administrative Officer in the
Calabar Province was recently released from other duties in order to deal with local
government matters throughout the Province and the work which he has done has
well justified the experiment.
7. These then are the principal measures taken or to be taken to improve the
organisation for reviewing and implementing local government policy:—
(a) The strengthening of the Political Branch of the Central Secretariat by the
appointment, under the Principal Assistant Secretary in charge of the Branch, of
three Senior Assistant Secretaries to relieve him of work connected with
Intelligence, Administration and External Affairs.
(b) The strengthening of Regional Secretariats by the permanent appointment of
a team of Secretaries and also by the appointment of Regional Local Government
Officers.
(c) The appointment of Provincial Local Government Officers as staff shortages
and the prior claims of the Divisions allow.
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74 CO 537/4727, no 4 July 1949
[Political situation]: Nigeria political summary on continuing
tensions in the Zikist movement [Extract]
Political situation
(a) Lagos politics
Azikiwe has found himself increasingly bombarded and chivvied by the Zikist
Movement and the rank and file of the N.C.N.C. with accusations of inactivity and
demands for more dynamic leadership, and an indication of the pressure to which he
is being constantly subjected is given in a letter containing the latest political news
which Tony Enahoro sent to his fellow seditionists who are still in prison:—
‘OGBUEFI (Azikiwe) was to have left this morning (30/5/49) to open branches
of the Continental at Aba, Onitsha and possibly Kano, but he told me
yesterday that he could not travel today in view of ‘certain developments’.
What are these ‘developments’ Gentlemen? OGBUEFI has a crisis on his
hands. The crisis began at the Convention when Zikist Movement threatened
to walk out if the proposed N.C.N.C. tour did not come off by April end. A
delegate from the Provinces said that he was mandated to ask O what part he
played in the sedition crisis and why he was not in prison. O said he was
prepared to lay down his all for the country, but not if the army was
irresponsible and undisciplined. Tonight, EZE and ZUNGUR are to try and
force him to reshuffle the ‘Cabinet’ and fix the date for the commencement of
the tour. Otherwise the Cabinet will resign en bloc, or he must resign. Some
branches of the Zikist Movement have asked O to step down at once or to
proceed with positive action. Delegates of the N.C.N.C. have walked out of the
Lagos Conference in protest against the subtle attempt to steam-roll them
into accepting Government-sponsored, N.Y.M.—supported views. In spite of
this, however, O remains a member of the Conference and still attends its
meetings. He has been severely criticised for this and tonight the Cabinet will
ask him where he stands. Either he quits the Conference or he quits the
Presidency of the N.C.N.C.’
2. Zik finally set out on his travels on the 6th of June. There is no reason to
suppose that he fled for the sole purpose of escaping from his critics for he had been
talking for some time of visiting the Provinces to open branches of his Continental
Bank at Onitsha, Jos and Aba and to attend the first Assembly of the Ibo State Union
at the latter place.1 Nevertheless, he was no doubt relieved to escape from them for a
while and from the embarrassing position he had been put into by the N.C.N.C. walk-
out from the Lagos Conference on the revision of the Constitution (Possum No. 30
para 6). The tour was primarily for the purposes of business and Zik confined himself
to that for most of the time but at the Assembly of the Ibo State Union he let himself
go in no uncertain terms, delivering a most provocative speech deliberately
calculated to arouse feelings of Ibo nationalism. ‘The God of Africa,’ he said, ‘has
1 The Ibo State Union had been inaugurated in December 1948 in Aba out of the existing Ibo Federal
Union.
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specially created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of the
ages’. Never had they been conquered in war or been the victims of a Carthagenian
treaty. ‘Instead, there is record to show that the martial prowess of the Ibo nation, at
all stages of human history, had enabled them not only to conquer others but also to
adapt themselves to the role of preserver of all that is best and noble in African
culture and tradition’. Having filled his audience up with this entirely unfounded
claim to historical greatness, he proceeded to demonstrate that living in a country
blessed beyond all others for its potential wealth they had an equal claim to
economic greatness; and yet, in spite of all, by the studied design of Government and
in breach of the treaties that govern Anglo-Ibo relations, the Ibo nation was
humiliated and kept backward and he illustrated this subtle policy of discrimination
and persecution with a wealth of detail ranging from an alleged ‘unholy crusade’
against the Ibos in the London press to the lack of fire brigades in the remoter
villages. But now the time had come, he said, for the world to know that ‘the Ibo
giant is waking from its stupor and is asserting its inalienable rights in the scheme of
things in this great country of Nigeria and the Cameroons’, and in dismissing the
delegates he exhorted them to ‘make it clear to our folks in the villages and towns of
Ibo-land that as a nation with a glorious tradition and historic past, the Ibo nation
demands from the protecting power freedom from persecution, freedom from
ostracization, freedom from victimization and freedom from discrimination.’
3. The immediate result of this peroration was a decision by the Assembly to
charge His Majesty’s Government before the Permanent Court of International
Justice at the Hague with a wilful disregard of the ‘Anglo-Ibo treaties’ (which, inci-
dentally do not exist) and Jaja Wachuku and other legal luminaries are now busy
drawing up the indictment. Elsewhere, the speech was received with a certain
amount of dismay, especially by sober and responsible Ibo opinion which feared
that it would once again raise the ‘Ibo domination’ scare and lead to a fresh out-
break of anti-Ibo feeling, but on the whole, it caused much less reaction than might
have been expected, probably because the Yoruba leaders too, had the wisdom to
ignore it in their press and, behind the scenes, to damp down any indignation it
may have caused. Possibly Zik, with whom more moderate Ibo opinion has remon-
strated, realised he was tactless: in any event, he has not since reverted to the
theme.
4. It is clear that, with the exception of this one lapse, Zik’s whole strategy of late
has been to play for time. His purpose is not at present clear but it may be for one, or
several, of the following reasons:
Zik often says that he is tired of politics and is looking for a suitable opportunity to
get out of them and devote himself to his business. It is unlikely that he really wants
to give up politics, but he may want a breathing space to pull his business together.
He may be genuinely apprehensive of the courses the Zikists and other extremists
are urging him to follow and is, for the moment, passively resisting them. At the
same time, Government is largely setting the pace in Constitutional and economic
developments. As a result of these factors, events have moved beyond his control and,
Micawber-like, he is waiting to see what might turn up and enable him to recover the
iniative.
It may be that he realises he has had his hey-day in Lagos and the West and is most
unlikely ever to obtain an unchallenged position in the North and is consequently
preparing to consolidate his position in the East where, as leader of the Ibos (or a
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large section of them) he would be an authoritative and established political force.
His Aba speech may have been the first move in this direction.
Finally, it may simply be that he is unwilling to compromise himself by adopting
any particular course until he sees what the revised Constitution might have to offer
him.
At the moment, one guess is as good as another.
5. If there is any doubt about where Zik is going there is none about the
direction in which the Zikist Movement is heading. It is from this body that the most
stident [sic] demands for more dynamic leadership come. Not getting it, they are
drifting more and more to the extreme left wing and there is every indication that
they will drift so far as to separate themselves completely from the comparatively
moderate school of thought at present represented by the N.C.N.C. A manifesto
which they have recently prepared shows that they are becoming increasingly subject
to Communist influence. It is clear from this document that those who prepared it
have not only read a considerable amount of Communist propaganda but must also
have made some study of Communist organization and methods and it is in fact
known that they have recently received considerable stocks of communist literature.
An occasional voice has been raised to suggest that the Movement should openly
declare itself to be a Communist party but the suggestion has not so far been
seriously pursued. It is very doubtful whether any of the members with the possible
exception of one or two individuals, consider themselves to be Communists, and it
would not be of any very great significance if they chose to label themselves as such
for there is nobody in the Movement capable of organizing a proper Communist
party or with sufficient intelligence fully to understand and pursue that party’s aims.
The danger is that the Movement seems well on the way to turning itself into an
instrument ready to the hand of Communists elsewhere.
6. The N.C.N.C., with Zik away, did nothing very much but discuss arrange-
ments for a march on Government House to protest against the manner in which
the Lagos Constitution revision conference was being conducted and to express dis-
approval at the imprisonment of the seditionists. The arrangements, however, never
got beyond the talking stage, it being felt by many that there should be no demon-
stration until Zik came back so that the opportunity could be taken of forcing his
hand by making him lead it. The matter was discussed at a stormy public meeting
early in July. None of the ‘Cabinet’ members of any prominence attended with the
result that the critics had the field to themselves and made good use of the opportu-
nity to voice their dissatisfaction with the ‘Cabinet’s’ inactivity. To pacify them, Zik
promised a cabinet reshuffle—which has not yet taken place—but he followed it
with an announcement that it had been decided to move the N.C.N.C. headquarters
to the Provinces. It has not yet been definitely stated whether the new headquarters
will be at Aba or at Jos but it seems to be generally accepted that it will be at the lat-
ter place, especially as, to assuage Eastern pride, Zik has promised Aba a sort of local
cabinet to run the party’s affairs in that part of the country. The move to the
provinces is undoubtedly an attempt to escape from the disruptive influences at pre-
sent at work in Lagos and the choice probably fell on Jos rather than Aba because
Zik still commands a sizeable and firm body of support in the East while the Plateau,
with its minesfield labour and a population restive over the use of their land for
mining purposes, seems at the moment to offer the most fruitful field for missionary
endeavour.
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7. The N.Y.M. has not been very active of late, either, most of their time having
been taken up with domestic affairs arising from the rivalry between Bode Thomas
and H.O. Davies who was suspected, possibly rightly, of having been flirting with Zik.
For the moment, the matter has died down for Davies has declared that pressure of
business is too great to permit him to take any further part in Constitutional revision
discussions and Bode Thomas accordingly had the satisfaction of being selected a
member of final drafting committee. The party’s main fire was being reserved for an
attack on Government over the prosecution of Rotimi Williams for embezzling his
clients’ funds. The acquittal of Williams, however, damped their powder so they made
the best of a bad job by changing the occasion into one of rejoicing that their General
Secretary had faced his ordeal unflinchingly and come out of it with his integrity
unscathed and his reputation enhanced—despite the severe strictures passed by the
trial judge on his professional conduct. The Party has now decided that if it is to
make any progress it must be more critical of the Government and a series of attacks
on Administrative Officers which have recently appeared in the pages of the ‘Service’
suggests that they are beginning to put this policy into operation. . . .
75 CO 852/982/5, no 16 18 July 1949
[Oil exploration]: letter from C J Pleass to L H Gorsuch on the
granting of an oil exploration licence to Shell Overseas Exploration
Company
We are sending by this mail a despatch enclosing a copy of an Oil Exploration
Licence which has been granted over part of the Southern Provinces and the
Cameroons to the Shell Overseas Exploration Company and the D’Arcy Exploration
Company jointly. For reasons which are explained in the despatch and which I need
not go into here the licence had to be executed in a hurry and there was not time to
send The Secretary of State a preliminary draft. It is largely based on a previous one
granted to the same Companies but it contains one or two important differences.
Clause 15 of the licence differs from the corresponding clause in the licence already
approved by the Secretary of State. The difference occurs in paragraph (a) of that
clause which used to require that in such circumstances two of the Directors and the
Resident Manager shall be British subjects while the new clause 15(a) requires that
the Chairman, the Managing Director (if any) and the majority of the Directors be
British subjects; this is in accordance with the section of the Ordinance. The other
difference is a new clause in which reference is made to the grant of an Oil
Prospecting Licence (which has already been applied for) and of an Oil Mining Lease.
That brings me to the point of this letter.
The clause in question (Clause 22), reads as follows:—
‘On or before the expiration of this Licence or any renewal thereof the
Licencee observing and performing the terms and conditions herein
contained shall have a right (subject to the provision prescribed in any
written law or regulations then in force for granting Oil Prospecting
Licences) to an Oil Prospecting Licence or Licences in respect of so much of
the said lands as the Licensee may select; provided that the grant of any such
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Oil Prospecting Licence shall not entitle the Licensee to the grant of a lease
for mineral oils save in accordance with such terms and conditions whether
in respect of the composition of the body or company to which such lease
may be granted or otherwise whatsoever, as the Governor may determine at
the time of the grant of such prospecting licence.’
We inserted this provision so as to make it quite clear at the outset that, in the event
of oil being discovered in workable quantities, the Governor might insist on having a
say in the composition of any company which might be formed to exploit it and that
any Mining Lease would be granted on our terms and not those of the Shell D’Arcy
interests. At a meeting attended by the local representatives, copies of the record of
which are enclosed, His Excellency expanded this point and made it clear that no
Mining Lease would be granted except on such terms as would ensure a share in the
profits accruing to this Government. The Shell people accepted this but on the
instructions of their London office, said that they must know the terms on which a
Mining Lease will be granted at the time the Prospecting Licence is issued. Hence the
last two lines of the clause I have quoted.
In consultation with the Shell Company a draft Prospecting Licence is being
prepared which will include provision for the sinking of a deep borehole, but we
cannot, of course, complete it for submission to the Secretary of State until the
terms of the Mining Lease are decided, and it is here that we should be glad of your
help. The Shell Company are anxious for technical reasons connected with weather
conditions to start preparing for their boring operations as soon as possible, and we
are just as anxious for our own reasons that if there is any oil it shall be discovered
with the minimum of delay.
Here I must digress for a moment in order to give you a picture of the general
situation.
The area for which the Shell D’Arcy parties want the Prospecting Licence, and
more particularly the place they have selected for their borehole, are situated in an
extremely densely populated part of Ibo country, the inhabitants of which are
fanatically attached to their land and are intensely hostile to anything which savours
to their naturally suspicious minds of an attempt to tamper with it. In addition they
can count on the support of politicians of the Zikist persuasion in general and
Azikiwe in particular, who is always ready to take up the cudgels in his newspapers
on behalf of any cause, regardless of its merits, out of which he thinks political
capital can be made. The Exploration Parties have already met with considerable
opposition, including sabotage of equipment and, on one or two occasions, physical
violence, but it is certain that the future holds in store even fiercer opposition
probably incited by politicians and backed by sections of the Press.
It is, however, of the greatest importance that Nigeria’s mineral resources be
speedily developed and that new sources of revenue be discovered, particularly in the
Eastern Region, the economy of which as you know is at present based almost
exclusively, and quite inadequately, on the oil palm. For these reasons we feel that
exploration and prospecting for oil should not be held up, and we are especially
anxious that Shell D’Arcy should be enabled to sink their deep bore with the
minimum of delay.
To achieve these objects we are convinced that a major effort must be made to
demonstrate to the people of Nigeria in general and particularly of the Eastern
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Region and of the parts of the Owerri Province concerned that the discovery and
exploitation of oil would conduce immeasurably to national and local interests, and
we are anxious that as a first step in an attempt to achieve this purpose a public
statement should be made at the earliest possible moment. Such a public statement
would have to make abundantly clear our determination jealously to safeguard
national and local interests: it should also if possible give an indication of how we
propose to ensure this and make it clear that decisions on these points must be made
before a Prospecting Licence is issued.
As to how it is proposed to ensure that Nigeria is to be assured of a proper share in
the benefits to be derived from oil production we are inclined to favour some form of
profit-sharing, but apart from this we have no preconceived ideas and we should
naturally welcome advice from the Colonial Office on the subject.
I am coming on leave by air on July 27th and His Excellency has minuted as
follows:—
‘the Development Secretary who is fully familiar with the local position, will
be in London early next month, and that we hope that early discussions may
be undertaken with him.’
76 CO 583/299/2, no 12 12 Sept 1949
[Local government reform]: inward savingram no 2108 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones on the progress of reform in the
Eastern provinces
Your Secret Savingram No. 1 of the 11th of January. Local Government in the
Eastern Provinces.
2. The Eastern Provinces’ proposals have been widely discussed at all levels, with
attention directed to those sections of the population particularly interested, and
unofficial Members of the Eastern House of Assembly visited all provincial
headquarters to obtain the views of the public, and the administrative staff.1 As the
result of all these discussions, a Memorandum on Policy regarding Local
Government was prepared in the Eastern Regional Secretariat and adopted by the
Eastern House of Assembly on the 16th of July. Ten copies of the Memorandum,
together with six copies of a memorandum for official use also prepared by the
Eastern Regional Secretariat, are now enclosed.2
3. The programme to which we hope to adhere provides for the Local
Government Bill being laid before the Eastern House in December or February, and
before the Legislative Council in March. The policy Memorandum as finally adopted
by the Eastern House differs in several respects from the first draft which we saw
only at the end of June, when it was not possible to examine it in detail before it came
before the Eastern House in July. We made several major alterations, which were
duly adopted, and although the final text of the Memorandum still requires detailed
examination here (more particularly as regards rating—paragraph 8 below), I think
1 See 50. 2 Not printed.
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it should be furnished to you at this stage for your information and for examination
by the Local Government Advisory Panel, although it cannot be taken as a formally
accepted statement of policy by this Government. The drafting of legislation has
already been taken in hand at Enugu, and to save as much time as possible I intend to
send the first draft to you with Messrs. Briggs (counsel responsible for drafting) and
Beaumont (Eastern Provinces administrative officer responsible for all liaison work
in local discussion and compilation of views). These two officers will probably leave
for London early in October and I suggest that the Panel consider the two
Memoranda as early as possible, in order to discuss their main features, as well as
major points in the legislation with Briggs and Beaumont on their arrival.
Meanwhile, of course, further examination of the proposals will proceed here.
4. The proposals, as contained in the Memoranda, will be found to differ
substantially from those contained in the Report of the Eastern House Select
Committee, already considered by the Panel in October 1948. The main variations
are the abandonment of the idea of a Local Government Board and of a unified Local
Government service, the absence of the administrative officer as a nominated
member or chairman of councils, and a new conception of each class of local body
having direct dealings with the Regional Authority, without any form of
subordination to any local body of another class.
5. It will be seen from the Memorandum compiled for official use that public
discussions in the Eastern Provinces revealed considerable local opposition to the
idea of a Local Government Board, and your Advisory Panel had already expressed
doubts as regards the likely development of such a Board. Some members of the
Panel were also opposed to the idea of a unified Local Government service, and the
view is now taken here that it will make for the more realistic development of local
government if each local body employs and controls its own staff. The only measure
of outside control contemplated by the present proposals is that the appointment and
dismissal of a Council officer in receipt of emoluments of £400 per annum and
upwards shall be subject to the approval of the Regional Authority.
6. The new conception of the various local bodies each having mutually exclusive
functions is also in general accord with the advice of your Panel, which advocated
that each council have a measure of independent authority in purely local matters, in
order to spread more widely the realisation that self-government in local affairs is in
force. For the same general reason it has been decided to keep the local District
Officer outside the Councils as a guide and friendly adviser, rather than to introduce
an element of seeming derogation from their independence by appointing him to
chairmanship.
7. Further consideration is being given here to the question of councils’
functions in respect of education, having regard to Government’s general education
policy (paragraphs 42(5) and 45 (31) of the Policy Memorandum); of the land
acquisition powers to be permitted to councils (paragraphs 94–97); and of the
exaction of communal services by local councils (paragraph 29). It has been agreed,
with regard to the proposals in paragraphs 42 (22) and 45 (33) (that Councils can
establish a rural constabulary) that extension of the police arrangements should
normally be by way of recruitment to the Nigeria Police. The whole question of the
relationship of the Nigeria Police to other Police forces such as Native
Administration Police is under examination but in the meanwhile it is intended that
Councils may be authorised to set aside funds to finance the policing of their areas.
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8. In particular, the important question of rating, covered in paragraphs 65–86
of the policy Memorandum, has been reconsidered here, and certain modifications
agreed upon. I shall shortly send a further supplementary memorandum bringing
this part of the proposals up to date.
9. There is, however, one major point to which you will no doubt wish to give
immediate consideration. Certain special powers, set out in paragraph 100 of the
Policy Memorandum, are proposed for reservation to the Regional Authority to
ensure efficient local administration and to safeguard Government dues. The exact
identity and composition of the Regional Authority (at present, of course, the Chief
Commissioner) can not be known until review of the constitution has been
completed, but the recommendations of the Eastern Regional Conference have
already been received on this point, and are to the effect that in the Eastern Region
policy shall be initiated and executive decisions taken by a Regional Council
consisting of the Chief Commissioner with four or five official members and nine or
ten unofficial members. Should Councils of this kind eventually be established the
possibility could arise of the non-official majority of the Regional executive declining
to take, in respect of a local body, the action which might seem necessary in the
interests of good administration. I am therefore disposed to consider the reservation
of certain powers to the Governor, to provide an ultimate safeguard for use in the last
resort.
10. I shall, of course, address you further on points arising out of these
Memoranda, but I would appreciate an early expression of your own views and of
those of the Panel, and an indication of whether the Panel could meet again on some
date about the 10th October for discussion with Briggs and Beaumont.
11. I should have preferred to postpone addressing you on this subject until all
outstanding points had been fully considered here and a draft Bill had been prepared
but it has become a matter of special urgency to push ahead with the reforms which
have now been under public discussion for more than a year. In spite of irresponsible
attacks from extremists the unofficial members of the Eastern House of Assembly
have given their keen support to the reforms proposed and have themselves toured
through the Eastern Provinces to explain the proposals and to combat destructive
criticism. It is not too much to say that sound progress in the Eastern Provinces will,
to a large extent, depend on whether the proposed reforms, with the main purposes
of which I, like the Chief Commissioner, am in whole-hearted agreement, can be put
into effect without undue delay. The Eastern Provinces officers concerned are
working enthusiastically to put the proposals into shape (we are fortunate to have
officers like Briggs and Beaumont engaged on this task) and I should regard it as
little short of a political disaster if delay in consideration of the Bill in Lagos or
London were to make it impossible to secure its enactment in 1950. If that were to
happen the forces of reason and constructive reform which have scored a number of
notable victories in the volatile East during the past year against considerable odds
(not least in the constitutional review) would suffer a severe set-back and the forces
of confusion and disorder would gain corresponding encouragement.
12. It is because of the urgency of the matter that I have suggested that Briggs
and Beaumont should visit London next month and I trust that you will forgive any
faults in the necessarily hurried presentation of our preliminary proposals and assist
us to put the reforms into effect with an absolute minimum of delay.
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77 CO 537/4625, no 51 2 Oct 1949
[Constitutional review]: inward savingram no 2307 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones on the progress of the constitutional
review
Your savingram No.86 of the 26th of July. Constitutional Review.
I had intended to make another report on the progress of the constitutional review
before the Regional Conferences met but the Eastern Regional Conference took place
in July whereas the Northern and Western Regional Conferences did not meet until
early in September, and I thought it best to wait until I was in a position to report on
the results of all the Regional Conferences.
2. I now forward for your information the following documents:—1
(a) The recommendations of the Regional Conferences (including the Lagos and
Colony Conference) (Enclosures I, II, III, IV),
(b) A digest of Regional Conference proposals (Enclosure V),
(c) The minutes of the Eastern Regional Conference and a synopsis of the Eastern
Regional Review (Enclosure VI),
(d) A report on the Eastern Regional Conference (Enclosure VII),
(e) A report on the Lagos and Colony Conference (Enclosure VIII),
(f ) Provincial Conference resolutions from the Northern Provinces (Enclosure
IX),
(g) A Report on the Northern Regional Conference (Enclosure X),
(h) A Report on the Western Regional Conference (Enclosure XI),
3. As you know the next stage is for the Drafting Committee to prepare a
statement of recommendations based on the views of the Regional Conferences. The
Drafting Committee is composed of three representatives of each Regional
Conferences, one representative of the Colony Conference and one representative of
the Lagos Conference sitting with the Chief Secretary, the Attorney General and the
Financial Secretary. The Drafting Committee hopes to meet on the 10th of October
and to complete its work in November.
4. The General Conference will, we hope, meet in January next. It is to be
composed of 53 members, all unofficials, and is to sit under the Chairmanship of Sir
Gerard Howe.
5. I do not suggest that it is necessary for the voluminous papers which I attach
to be closely studied in the Colonial Office since it is for the Drafting Committee to
prepare a single document (an unenviable task!) based on the Regional proposals for
consideration by the General Conference, but I wish to invite your attention to
certain points of special interest which have so far emerged from the review.
6. In the first place I am convinced that in spite of considerable diversities of
view which are apparent in the recommendations which have been drawn up in the
Provincial and Regional Conferences the system of review unanimously approved by
the Legislative Council in March last has been fully justified. It would be impossible
to overestimate the value in terms of political education of the discussions which
1 Enclosures not printed.
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have taken place and a rapid glance through the Provincial recommendations from
the North (Enclosure IX) gives ample indication, for instance, of the thoughtful
examination of constitutional problems which has taken place in all parts of the
country.
7. The second main result which has been achieved is the general support for a
federal system of Government based on three Regions (there seems moreover to be
wide agreement that Lagos and the Colony should in future be grouped with the
Western Provinces). This is a result of first importance in view of the reactionary
N.C.N.C. campaign, which was bound to make a strong appeal in many areas, for the
establishment of a much larger number of states based on ‘linguistic groups’.
8. The third major subject on which general agreement has been reached is that
there should be a larger measure of Regional autonomy, with Regional legislatures
exercising legislative and financial powers and Regional Executive Councils.
9. As to the Regional Conferences themselves I consider that the Eastern
Conference showed the keenest appreciation of the questions at issue and the skill
and responsibility shown by the unofficial members of the Eastern House in
persuading a number of extremists to subscribe with them to constructive proposals
were most remarkable.
The Lagos Conferences suffered from an early attempt on the part of a few
N.C.N.C. supporters to wreck the proceedings by walking out but the Conference
completed its work and since the main complaint of the N.C.N.C. was that voting
took place on resolutions (a procedure which was subsequently adopted by all other
Conferences) the N.C.N.C. has certainly not gained any prestige from its disruptive
tactics.
The Northern Conference has shown a much more restrained and conservative
approach than the conferences elsewhere and, as was to be expected, has laid great
emphasis on the need to allot to the North representation and finance proportionate
to its majority population. The Northern Conference is moreover firmly opposed to
any Ministerial system at the centre. These strong views will make it particularly
difficult to reach any agreed compromise on many major questions but it was not to
be expected that the North would subscribe to other views, and it is satisfactory that
the North, like other Regions, will welcome increased Regional autonomy.
The most surprising outcome of the Regional Conferences is the
recommendations of the Western Conference which are the most extreme and also
the most ill-considered. Unlike other Regions there was not a great deal of public
interest in the West in the Regional review and a few people of extreme views and
little experience were able to push through recommendations which certainly do not
represent the opinions of the predominantly conservative Yorubas. But although the
Western recommendations are not representative they will make the work of the
Drafting Committee much more difficult (the Western members of the Committee,
unlike nearly all the other members of the Committee, are mostly of poor calibre).
10. The programme to which we hope to be able to adhere is for the General
Conference to meet in January, and for its conclusions to be debated in the Regional
Houses in February, a full debate then taking place in the Legislative Council in
March. It may be desirable when that debate takes place to make a statement of the
official view on some of the main questions at issue and in the meantime I shall keep
you fully informed of developments in the Drafting Committee and the General
Conference.
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78 CO 583/299/2, no 27 25 Oct 1949
[Local government reform]: outward savingram no 113 from Mr
Creech Jones to H M Foot approving the proposals for reform in the
Eastern provinces
My secret telegram No. 1458.
Eastern Provinces Local Government
I have read with considerable interest the draft Local Government Ordinance and the
Memorandum for official use prepared by the Eastern Provinces’ Secretariat as an
introduction to local government in the Eastern Provinces. I have been impressed by
the great care which has been taken to devise legislation which will provide for the
efficient and widespread functioning of local government organisations in the
Eastern Provinces and I should like to take this opportunity of congratulating all
those who have been concerned in the preparation of those documents. I have been
particularly grateful for the opportunity afforded by the presence of Mr. Briggs and
Mr. Beaumont in London for the discussion of the many problems raised by your
proposals both with the Local Government Panel and my advisers.
2. In considering your proposals I have been very conscious of the peculiar diffi-
culties which it is necessary to meet in the Eastern Provinces and I accept without hes-
itation the view that it is desirable that any system introduced should be as flexible as
possible. There are, however, certain other considerations which I have had very much
in mind and to which I would wish to direct your attention. I consider it important
that any local government organisations which may be created should possess an
assured status together with rights and privileges of which they may not be divested
without good and apparent cause. As you will see from my detailed observations in the
following paragraphs I would like to suggest that certain provisions in the draft
Ordinance might be altered in order to ensure that local government organisations
possess a greater measure of assured status than is provided for. I have also had in
mind the fact that work in local government is likely to provide the initial training
ground for many of the future political leaders of Nigeria. It therefore seems to me to
be important that such organisations should provide the greatest possible scope for
the training of such people and that as far as practicable such organisations should be
autonomous, taking decisions in the knowledge that such decisions will not be set
aside by higher authority except by constitutional and public procedures that are man-
ifestly just. I also attach importance to measures which effectively demonstrate that
power is not concentrated either within the Region at a central point or within Nigeria
in the Central Government. It would, in my view, be an unfortunate development if
the only worthwhile political life centered round the seat of power in a Region or in
Lagos and I am therefore anxious that there should be as many opportunities as pos-
sible for public spirited citizens no matter where they live to devote their time and
labour to the service of the community in the sure and certain knowledge that their
services will be accepted and properly used and that they may expect to enjoy the exer-
cise of power, albeit limited in an acceptable and fair manner, in the sphere which they
have chosen for their public services. I am quite sure that you will agree with these
general principles, to which the Bill is designed to give effect.
3. I now turn to certain detailed observations which I would wish to make on your
proposals and in this connection I enclose copies of the minutes of the Local
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Government Panel, with whose conclusions and recommendations I am in agreement.1
4. The constitution and functions of the Regional Authority have formed the
subject of detailed discussion with Mr. Briggs and Mr. Beaumont who will already
have reported to you the views expressed in the Colonial Office, I consider that it
would be desirable, that the definition of Regional Authority, which I understand you
now propose shall be included in a separate section, should include the Chief
Commissioner because it seems proper that at this stage he should be closely
associated with and responsible for the development of local government within the
Region. Turning to the question of the functions and powers of the Regional
Authority, I am not entirely convinced that it is reasonable to vest in the Authority
the powers provided in Sections 6, 9 and 11 of the draft ordinance without at the
same time providing for forms of public consultation in advance of the exercise of
such powers. I appreciate that it may not be possible or desirable to specify forms for
every kind of enquiry which it may be necessary to hold, but I trust that it may be
possible to devise satisfactory forms for the major types of enquiry which can be
foreseen. In making this suggestion I am moved by my desire to ensure that as far as
practicable Councils shall not be removed or changed without public process.
5. The grant of a more assured status to a Council would seem to imply at the
same time the imposition of mandatory functions. I consider that in principle it
would be desirable that no Council should be constituted which could not perform a
minimum number of functions, with provision that the Regional Authority may
excuse a Council, where this is necessary, from performing some of these minimal
functions. I appreciate that it may not be easy to translate this suggestion into
practice at this stage. Nevertheless, I shall be grateful if you will give it your
consideration, as the prestige of Councils must depend on the work which they
perform and it might be a mistake too create Councils of a similar type which did not
perform similar functions. In any case, I am sure you will agree that it is desirable
and necessary to provide that certain functions should be mandatory.
6. I should note that in discussion with Mr. Briggs and Mr. Beaumont it has been
agreed that the provisions of Section 15 should be amended to avoid any difficulties
which might arise by reason of membership of Co-operative Societies by the Councils.
Your officers are also considering what additional provisions for disqualification are
necessary, such as membership of the Police Force and Armed Services, membership
of prescribed organisations and certain other categories of persons.
7. After discussing the provisions of section 45 (b) I understand that your officers
accept the view that it would be desirable to omit this provision which would appear
to give members of any dissident organisation the right ostentatiously to boycott
local government activity. Your officers also agreed that section 56 (d) should be
omitted on the suggestion of the Local Government Panel.
8. I should like to invite your attention to the suggestion made by the Local
Government Panel that Councils should be empowered to perform any necessary
work required for the abatement of nuisances and subsequently to charge the
offender with the cost of such work. I should also like to mention the further point
made by the Panel that Section 100 (10) did not appear to provide a Council with the
power of compelling the carrying out of maintenance work on buildings.
1 Not printed.
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9. I have given careful consideration to the recommendation of the Local
Government Panel that the submission of estimates by a Council should only occur
when required by the Regional Authority. The memorandum entitled ‘An
Introduction to local government in the Eastern Provinces of Nigeria’ refers in
paragraph 31 to the need for caution by the Regional Authority in handling the
estimates of local government councils, but has explained in paragraph 30 why the
submission of estimates by Councils is considered necessary at this stage. I do not
expect that you will feel able to accept the Panel’s proposal in full, but I suggest that
provision might be made for Councils to be excused from the requirement of
submitting estimates as and when they become competent to control their own
finances, so that they may have an incentive so to order their affairs as to justify a
claim that the submission of estimates is not necessary. I also consider that the
procedure set out in Section 135 of the Ordinance could with advantage be modified
in order to provide that Councils may incur supplementary expenditure without the
approval of the Regional Authority on any Head of the estimate within a limit of 10
per cent of that Head. I would further suggest that a Council should be permitted to
incur supplementary expenditure within a limit of, say, 5 per cent of the total
approved budget without the need to obtain the approval of the Regional Authority.
In making this suggestion I have in mind the possibility that a Council may need to
rebuild an essential building destroyed by fire and that it would be of little value to
delay such rebuilding by the need to refer such expenditure for approval to the
Regional Authority. It would also seem necessary to provide that any estimates which
have not been disapproved at the beginning of the financial year shall be deemed to
have been approved. It was pointed out to Messrs. Briggs and Beaumont in
connection with Section 126 that it might be desirable to include receipts from the
sale of land and grants from the Marketing Boards within the definition of Revenue.
10. On the question of rating I share the view expressed by the Panel that very
few exemptions should be made and that it would be desirable to assist public
institutions such as hospitals by making a grant from Revenue rather than by
exempting them by rating.
11. I have given careful consideration to the provisions of Section 226 in the
light of the correspondence ending in Mr. Foot’s letter No. 52257/669 of the 8th
October. I am not satisfied that the provisions of Section 226 constitute the best
method of providing for the exercise of such powers, particularly as it is to be
expected that Chief Commissioners will be required under the new Constitution
themselves to exercise certain reserve powers, in relation to the Regional Authorities
and Councils, perhaps by the power to defer action in case of disagreement with
them on matters affecting good government etc. pending submission to the Central
Government. I would therefore suggest that it would be preferable to provide in the
Bill that the Chief Commissioner shall report to the Governor any act or omission to
act or decision of the Regional Authority which in his opinion is contrary to the
interests of public order, public faith or good government and that thereupon the
Governor shall have power to call upon the Regional Authority to repair such act etc.
I am sure that this is in fact the procedure which would be used and I think it
important that this should be fully apparent in the Bill when the Legislative Council
is called upon to pass it. I also think it is desirable that there should be no doubt
about the position of the Chief Commissioner in such matters, in order that it may
be apparent that any subsequent setting aside by the Governor of any act of the
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Regional Authority can only take place on the recommendation of the Chief
Commissioner. I hope that you will be prepared to accept the suggestions in this
paragraph.
12. Subject to the above comments I agree that the Bill should be proceeded
with.
13. I know that it is vary well appreciated to what a large extent the success of
the new system of local government in the Eastern Provinces will depend on the
availability of adequately trained local government staff. The provision of facilities for
training in the Eastern Provinces themselves is, I am aware, receiving the active
attention of the Chief Commissioner and yourself. Arrangements are proposed
meanwhile for sending a number of persons to this country to receive training in the
practice of local government. Separate correspondence is taking place with regard to
these arrangements. I only mention the matter here again to emphasise the very
great importance which I attach to the question of training and to the establishment
of suitable training facilities locally.
79 CO 537/4628, no 6 15 Nov 1949
[Enugu shootings]: inward telegram no 1746 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Creech Jones reporting a strike at Enugu Colliery
[One of the most serious outbreaks of disorder in Nigeria in the post-war period followed
the shooting of miners by police at Enugu on 18 Nov 1949. 20 died and 31 were injured
(of whom 1 subsequently died); further deaths occurred in the disorders across the
Eastern provinces that ensued. The background to the shootings lay in a long history of
poor labour relations at the colliery during 1949. Following the start of the strike in
November, a police detachment under senior superintendent F S Philip attempted to
remove explosives from the Iva Valley mine to prevent them falling into the strikers’
hands. It was during this operation that the police opened fire. The shootings were
followed by widespread rioting in Eastern Nigeria and the establishment of a National
Emergency Committee in Lagos under Dr Akinola Maja and which included Azikiwe,
Awolowo and others among its members. The commission of enquiry announced by
Macpherson on 20 Nov was headed by Sir William Fitzgerald KC, former chief justice of
Palestine and attorney-general of Northern Rhodesia. The other members were Mr Justice
S O Quashie-Idun of the Supreme Court of the Gold Coast, Mr Justice A A Ademola of the
Supreme Court of Nigeria and R W Williams, MP for Wigan and legal adviser to the
National Union of Mineworkers. The commission’s report was published in June 1950.
See 99.]
Colliery strike
A go-slow strike started amongst coal hewers at Enugu Colliery last week which
threatens to have serious effect on railway operations.
2. The causes of the go-slow strike which started unexpectedly without warning
were at first obscure, but it appears that Ojiyi,1 leader of the union, has for months
been assuring workers, particularly hewers, that large sums of back pay would be
obtained for them. There is and has been no justification whatsoever for holding out
such promises and feeling against Ojiyi and the union has been growing. The men
still believe that back pay will be secured but many of them have now lost all
confidence.
1 Okwudili Ojiyi, secretary of the Colliery Workers’ Union.
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Ojiyi’s recent behaviour has been so irresponsible and double-faced that it is
useless to continue to negotiate with him as the men’s representative. Failing all
efforts to get the men to resume full work (the Nigerian members of newly formed
Colliery Board have been most helpful) 150 hewers have been dismissed.
Recruitment of new labour to take the place of these dismissed is already proceed-
ing.
3. Strike came at a most awkward time as far as our coal supplies are concerned
as heavy groundnut railings last month had reduced reserves to a minimum.
Curtailment of passenger and goods traffic must be effected at once. If output from
Enugu does not improve groundnut railings will, I fear, soon have to be reduced. We
are endeavouring to obtain coal to meet immediate emergency from the Gold Coast.
We have already ordered 4,000 tons from South Africa but this will not arrive until
next month. An additional order for 20,000 tons has now been placed with South
Africa. It is impossible to guess how long the stoppage at Enugu will last but we are
assuming that almost complete stoppage may continue for a week or two. I am
greatly disappointed that this interruption in railway traffic which may well be
serious should have been caused just when the railway had achieved greatly
improved transportation of groundnuts. The intrigues of Colliers’ Union and very
poor output which have been worrying us for long past were however bound to lead
to a showdown sooner or later and I am hopeful, that when present trouble is over,
both general labour situation and standard of output at the colliery will show a
marked improvement. I shall report further developments.
80 CO 537/4628, no 12 19 Nov 1949
[Enugu shootings]: inward telegram no 1782 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Creech Jones reporting on the police shootings at Enugu
Colliery
I very much regret to report that police in Enugu had to open fire yesterday
afternoon (18th November) killing 4 and wounding 16. Police suffered only minor
injuries.
2. Police were engaged in moving explosives to safe store when they were
attacked by a large crowd which made concerted attempt to disarm police and rush
explosive store. Situation remains dangerous and disorder may spread.
3. I shall send fuller report when details are available and shall keep you
promptly informed of developments.
81 CO 577/4628, nos 18 and 25 21–22 Nov 1949
[Enugu shootings]: minutes by Mr Creech Jones on the events at
Enugu
This is a tragic and serious business and most unfortunate in West Africa just now
and terribly disturbing to the Governor and Colonial Secretary. I assume that Sir
John has immediately announced an Enquiry. In this, can we help? What are the
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causes of the dispute. There have been telegrams. Was any wage claim put in and any
arbitration suggested?
A.C.J.
21.11.49
What is the nature of the Commission which the Governor proposes to appoint? Is
this a matter in which H.M.G. should intervene? It is a pretty bad affair—the loss of
18 lives and 31 wounded? Did the police lose their heads? We ought to get more
information than the Governor gives. What is the story of the Dispute? I recall
telegrams about the matter. It would be well for me to have the facts: was the Labour
Commissioner attempting to arbitrate? Had the miners genuine grievances? How did
this thing fester? We can’t escape by pleading ‘wild agitators’.
A.C.J.
22.11.49
82 CO 537/4628, no 44 26 Nov 1949
[Enugu shootings]: inward telegram no 1816 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Creech Jones on the declaration of a state of emergency
My telegram No. 1813.
Disturbances in Eastern Provinces.
Chief Commissioner at Enugu reported that following rioting and looting which
has occurred in Aba and Port Harcourt it is considered probable that similar
disorders may break out in other centres in Eastern Provinces. He reports that
extremist malcontents are moving about from place to place inciting people to riot
and local newspapers are aiding them by publishing inflammatory material.
2. Chief Commissioner accordingly recommended that Emergency Regulations
should be introduced. I have signed Proclamation of state of emergency and made
Regulations for detention of persons, curfew and deporting of persons.1 I have also
introduced Regulations for press censorship applicable to Eastern Provinces only.
1 The state of emergency lasted until 8 Dec 1949.
83 CO 537/4628, no 51 28 Nov 1949
[Enugu shootings]: inward telegram no 1826 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Creech Jones on the spread of disorder in the Eastern provinces
Disorders in Eastern Provinces.
There were further disorders in Onitsha and Calabar yesterday (26th November).
Rioting and some looting believed in the morning at Onitsha. Tear gas used and
police also opened fire, three wounded one seriously. At Calabar to which police
reinforcements were flown order was restored without resorting to tear gas or
shooting. A curfew was imposed in Calabar in the evening. No other disorders
yesterday. Arrests have been made in several Eastern Provinces towns in the past few
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days and 5 sentences ranging from 2 years to 6 months were yesterday imposed by
court in Aba.
2. At Port Harcourt all was quiet. One of the persons wounded on 25th
November died making total killed at Port Harcourt 2.
3. In Lagos a large public meeting was planned by trade union leaders which
might well have led to violence. When I saw a number of Lagos leaders in the
morning to explain the reason for taking emergency powers I advised them to use
their influence to prevent this meeting for which no licence under the Police
Ordinance had been applied for. The Commissioner of the Colony later saw trade
union leaders and in result the meeting was cancelled. It is encouraging that leaders
decided to adopt this course at a critical time.
4. The situation in Enugu is most disturbing although there has been no
disorder there since 18th November. The miners having been persuaded to go back
on their agreement to resume full work at midnight on 23rd November are being
encouraged by malcontents, including leaders sent from Lagos, to continue go-slow
strike and to put in fresh demands. I am concerned about safety in the mine which is
still under control of miners without European overmen who are responsible for
safety. The mine should be closed but this could only be achieved when maximum
force of police is available and at present considerable proportion of available police
forces in Eastern Provinces is distributed amongst other Eastern towns to prevent
further rioting and looting. It may be that appointment of Commission will help to
end deadlock but as Ogiyi’s [sic: Ojiyi] influence has now been revived and miners are
being backed in extreme demands by outside politicians, I can see little prospect of
early settlement and there is serious danger of further clashes between miners and
police if attempt to close the mine is made. If the mine is not closed there may be an
accident in the mine for which the Government will be blamed.
5. I am hopeful that rioting and looting in Eastern Provinces which has followed
Enugu disorders will not be much prolonged. There has been little reaction so far in
Western Provinces or in the Northern Provinces. There was and is danger of public
meetings in Lagos leading to violence but cancellation of yesterday’s meeting was
important and encouraging. I am now chiefly concerned about extremely awkward
and dangerous position at Enugu. Government authorities in Enugu yesterday saw
the Lagos leaders who have gone there and explained the whole position in cordial
meeting but Chief Commissioner does not believe that they sincerely wish to end the
trouble, and re-emergence of Ogiyi [sic: Ojiyi] is disquieting.
84 CO 537/4631, no 11 [Nov 1949]
[Enugu shootings]: note by N H Smith1 on the deterioration of affairs
in the Eastern provinces. Minutes by Mr Creech Jones, A B Cohen, L
H Gorsuch and Sir C Jeffries
It may help towards obtaining a clear picture of the situation at Enugu and in
Eastern Nigeria if I reiterate certain information which I gave, partly orally and
1 Norman Smith, CO Economic Liaison Officer for West Africa, 1948–1950.
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partly in my report, on my return from Nigeria in April of this year. There was, even
then, an atmosphere of tension—and a feeling of apprehension among the European
inhabitants that the growing aggressiveness of the Africans in that area would sooner
or later break out, on some pretext or other, into actual violence.
At the time of my visit to Enugu (February 1949) European members of the
Railways Administration, the Coal Mines, the Public Works Department and the
Police were gravely concerned about the growing aggressiveness of the Africans and
the licence allowed them by higher authority to pursue a policy of vilification of the
British and to indulge in strikes and go slow methods which, in the opinion of many,
were quite unjustified. It was felt that unless appropriate action was taken the
situation would continue to deteriorate. Other Europeans—missionaries and people
engaged in commercial pursuits—were concerned with the lack of public security in
the Enugu area. Successful raids were being made on the mines and property stolen;
the occupants of a Mission were locked in a room while the place was looted and
other buildings set on fire. There were many cases of insubordination in the Railways
and Public Works Departments while abusive words written on coaches, private cars
and premises were commonplace. Strikes and go-slow methods were either in
progress or threatened. Members of private mining organisations had difficulty in
carrying out prospecting operations because of interference by the native population.
One responsible member of the European community went so far as to say that there
was no longer any security of life or property in the Enugu area. I quote these
instances as indicative of the state of affairs in Enugu during the early part of this
year.
On my return to Lagos from Enugu I mentioned these matters to the Governor
and others. I expressed the concern felt by members of the European community but
it was the opinion of the Governor and others in Lagos that I was exaggerating the
situation and the Governor went so far as to show me a letter from the Chief
Commissioner who had just completed a tour of the Eastern Region where he was
apparently well received as one of the passages in his letter ran ‘if this is African
democracy, give me more of it’. I could only inform the Governor that I had formed
rather a different impression.
Telegram No. 1806 of 24th November, 1949 from Nigeria states ‘communication
with Enugu in emergency must nearly all be by telegram’. In paragraph 6 of my
report above referred to I drew attention to the distressing state of communications
in Nigeria and made particular reference to Emugu where a new £40,000 apparatus
to connect Enugu and Lagos had been lying, unused, since 1947. With the excep-
tion of Ibadan, there is no telephonic communication between any Regional
Headquarters and Lagos, and telegraphic communication is most inefficient. It was
found simpler to send inland telegrams by West African Airways—when function-
ing.
In Sokoto province, Gusau is a trouble-centre. Sokoto is provincial Headquarters;
but it is difficult and often impossible to establish communication between the two
places owing to the inadequacy of the telegraph system. As for moving re-
inforcements from Sokoto to Gusau, it would be fortunate if they got through in the
wet season as the road is incapable of bearing heavy traffic at that time of year.
Among other likely trouble-centres are Jos, and Buea in the Cameroons. There is an
increasing amount of political agitation in Jos, fostered mainly by Ebos; and there is
unrest among the African employees of the Cameroons Development Corporation
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stirred up, I am informed, largely by Ebo traders. (I am commenting separately on
the Cameroons Development Corporation papers).
Minutes on 84
I am surprised to read Mr. Norman Smith’s report of 30th November 1949 (copy
attached) on the deterioration of affairs at Enugu in February of this year. It is a
complaint about lack of respect for authority, of disorder and insecurity which is
bound to come to light in the Enquiry and which cannot escape public attention. If
things are deteriorating over the Eastern provinces what is being done to correct it?
Are newspapers and agitators urging subversive action and treachery, lawlessness
and violence going scott free? We cannot let a situation like this drift—particularly
in regard to the press.
A.C.J.
12.12.49
As neither Mr. Gorsuch nor I had the opportunity of commenting on Mr. Smith’s
note about the situation at Enugu before it went to Ministers, I wonder if I may
venture to comment on it now.
The suggestion in the note as I read it is that ‘higher authority’ in Nigeria ought
for some time to have adopted a firmer attitude towards Africans. That is not a point
on which I feel that we can comment in detail at the present time while the
Commission of Enquiry is sitting. But it is worth noting from what he says that Mr.
Smith’s view was not shared either by the Governor or the Chief Commissioner
(Commander Pyke-Nott). They are, of course, the people responsible for political and
other relations with Africans in the area and this is the first time that I have heard it
suggested that the Nigerian Government either at the centre or in the Eastern
Region has been pursuing a wrong policy in this respect.
The facts that the Ibos are aggressive, that there has been much violent and often
unjustified criticism of Government and Government officers in the press and
elsewhere and that there is hooliganism among Africans of certain types are, of
course, well known both to the Nigerian Government and ourselves.2 There are two
methods of dealing with this situation. One is the policy pursued by the present
Governor of Nigeria and his senior officers, with the full support of the Colonial
Office. It involves establishing friendly relations with Africans and calling responsible
Africans into consultation; in a word, trying to improve relations between Africans
and Europeans to the maximum possible extent. Of course it involves firmness on
the part of Government where this is necessary and, as I have said, I have not heard it
suggested before that the Nigerian Government has been lacking in firmness.
Obviously this policy cannot succeed except gradually and no-one can expect that in
a place like the Eastern Region hooliganism and other violent forms of opposition to
Government will not be found. But Sir J. Macpherson’s policy does, as far as I know,
hold out the best hope at the present time of securing an improvement in the
relations between Government and the people.
2 Jeffries added in the margin, ‘No less true of the British!’
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The alternative policy is one of clamping down, meeting aggressiveness with
aggressiveness and imposing censorship on the press in normal times (this is what
Lord Milverton wanted to do when he was Governor, but the Secretary of State would
not agree). It is this kind of policy which I understand from Mr. Smith’s note that
those he has been talking to in the Eastern Provinces have been advocating. It does
not surprise me that a number of the more junior officers at Enugu have been
talking in this way. We know, of course, that in his policy of conciliation Sir J.
Macpherson has his critics, even in the Government service. It is, of course, a fairly
common phenomenon for subordinate European staff in West Africa to criticise the
Government for not being firm enough. Personally I believe such criticisms to be
unjustified and it is a significant fact that after the initial Enugu incident there have
only been two fatal casualties in the riots, although these were widespread and
serious. One cannot express an opinion in advance of the Commission’s findings, but
this does suggest a degree of control over the situation by the Government which in
the circumstances is, I think, rather remarkable.
I do not think that I need comment on the other part of the note except to say that
the moving of reinforcements from Sokoto to Gusau is hardly likely to be necessary,
since the reinforcements, if they had to be moved, would come from the other
direction (i.e. Kaduna and Zaria). There is, of course, a railway as far as Gusau.
Mr. Gorsuch and I were not aware that this note had been written until it reached
us with the Secretary of State’s comments. It was not submitted through the West
African Department, nor were either Mr. Gorsuch or I sent a copy of it at the time it
was written. I have discussed with Sir H. Poynton the question of procedure involved.
My own view is that it ought to be laid down that where liaison officers make notes
on matters primarily the concern of the geographical departments involved, they
should either submit them through the department or, if this is not possible, send a
copy to the head of the department simultaneously.3
A.B.C.
15.12.49
Mr. Cohen
I have spoken with you about the Secretary of State’s minute below.
The answer to the questions asked is that the Governor has kept us fully informed
of the dangerous elements in the political situation in Nigeria as a whole, and of the
policy he is adopting in respect of them. In February of this year he stated—‘I am
convinced that the dangerous tendencies to which I have referred cannot be checked
by repressive action alone’, and that it was his ‘constant aim to try to win and keep
the initiative by showing a readiness to make substantial advances in co-operation
with all who are willing to put forward or discuss progressive and constructive
proposals’. This view was fully accepted at the time.
Nevertheless the Government of Nigeria took proceedings for sedition against a
number of people at the end of 1948, and sentences ranging from 21⁄2 years’
imprisonment to fines of £25 were imposed.
As regards the press, in a draft reply to a letter on the subject addressed to the
Secretary of State by Lord Vansittart, I set out a few days ago the constructive side of
3 Jeffries added in the margin, ‘I entirely agree.’
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the policy which is being pursued; i.e. the establishment of close personal relations
between P.R.Os. and editors in the territories so as to enable the former to influence
the papers towards a more responsible standard, and the training of young African
journalists in this country so that they may absorb traditions as well as technique.
L.H.G.
15.12.49
I agree with Mr. Cohen. It is absolutely essential (and this goes for Sarawak4 too) that
we should not allow these unfortunate incidents to deflect us from our policy.
C.J.J.
16.12.49
4 Sarawak was brought under direct colonial rule at the end of the Second World War, British planners
arguing that this would lead to progressive social and economic development. ‘White Raja’ rule under the
Brooke family was ended. The assumption of direct rule provoked a bitter reaction among the minority
Malay population. Anthony Brooke, nephew of the last Raja (Charles Vyner Brooke) was banned from
Sarawak by the governor, Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, and became the focus for Malay opposition. Arden-
Clarke transferred to the Gold Coast in Aug 1949. His successor, Duncan Stewart, was assassinated in
Sarawak in Dec 1949. The editor is grateful to Professor A J Stockwell for this background.
85 CO 537/4625, no 62 3 Dec 1949
[Constitutional review]: letter from H M Foot to A B Cohen on the
report of the Constitutional Drafting Committee. Enclosure [Extract]
[The Constitutional Drafting Committee was set up to examine the recommendations
made by various regional conferences as part of the review of the 1947 constitution that
Macpherson had inaugurated. The committee, which had an unofficial majority, was
chaired by Foot and included Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Bode
Thomas, Rev I O Ransome-Kuti, C D Onyeama and E N Ogbuna among its members. Its
report was drafted for discussion at the General Conference on the constitution held in
Ibadan in January 1950.]
The Governor has asked me to send you the enclosed five copies of the Report of the
Constitutional Drafting Committee. We are sending out copies of the Report to
members of the General Conference at once and we hope that they will meet our
request to keep it confidential until the General Conference meets in Ibadan on the
9th of January. We have to send the Report to all fifty-three members and leakage
before the Conference meets is more than possible, but we must clearly give them a
chance to study it before the Conference takes place.
Before the recent disorders started the Governor had in mind sending me to
London some time this month for a few days in order to tell you how the work of the
Drafting Committee went, and also to explain the principal difficulties which we see
ahead—the chief of which is the possibility of a serious split between the North and
the South. I am afraid, however, that as things are at the moment I cannot get away,
though possibly I might be able to make a short visit to London some time next
month.
We had a tremendous job to get the Drafting Committee to agree on a single
statement of recommendations for consideration by the General Conference and I
am afraid that there are still a number of major differences between the North and
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the South which remain unsettled, but we feel that the report of the Drafting
Committee is at least a step in the direction of attaining some compromise.
. . .
B.—General structure of the constitution
5. All Regional Conferences recommended that our constitutional advance
should be based on a federal system and we have given to the issues arising from this
recommendation the greatest amount of our time and thought. We are all agreed
that unity will not be achieved by attempting to concentrate all power at the centre
but rather by further decentralisation of authority to the Regions, coupled with
sound systems of local government.
6. It is not our function to examine questions of local government but we
should, in passing, record our view that the problems of local government are
certainly no less important and no less urgent than those of Regional or National
government. We recognise the vital contribution which existing local government
bodies make and we believe that their development and reform must be matters for
each Region to decide for itself as matters of importance and urgency. Indeed, we
think that one of the principal advantages of the increased Regional autonomy which
is now proposed will be that the Regions will be encouraged and enabled to decide for
themselves how the need for improved local government is to be met.
7. It is also unnecessary for us to state the case for increased Regional autonomy
since the principle has been so whole-heartedly welcomed by the Regional
Conferences. Already under the present constitution, in accordance with which the
legislative functions of Regional Legislatures are purely advisory, the need for greater
Regional autonomy has become increasingly apparent, and the striking fact is that in
the realms of legislation, finance and initiation of policy members of Regional
Houses have, in practice, shown themselves anxious and able to assume and exercise
responsibilities beyond the limits of the functions with which the present
constitution invests them. We have no doubt at all that the process already given
constitutional sanction, and fully justified by experience, of devolution of authority
from the centre to the Regions should be carried much further so that a federal
system of government can be developed.
8. While recognising this fundamental need we have been impressed by the
difficulty of evolving a federal system by devolution of authority from the centre.
Indeed the problem which confronts us is unique. The federal governments of the
United States of America, Canada and Australia, for instance, have been built on the
basis of separate states surrendering to a federal government some of their powers
for the benefit of all. The reverse process on which we are engaged—that of the
creation of a federal government by devolution—is a political experiment for which,
as far as we know, there is no precedent which can guide us and we are very
conscious of the dangers inherent in such an experiment.
9. We are all most anxious that in our determination to grant real autonomy to
the Regions we should do nothing to endanger the unity of Nigeria or to render the
government of Nigeria as a whole weak or ineffective. It is for that reason that the pro-
posals which we have made, while giving to Regional Legislatures and Regional
Executives a far greater measure of responsibility and field of authority than has been
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allotted to the Regions in the past, provide adequate safeguards to preserve central
authority in questions where the overall interest of the country must be predominant.
We propose that the Regional Executives and Regional Legislatures should, within the
boundaries of the Regions, have power to decide policy and carry out that policy by
legislation and executive action over a wide range of vital subjects. That is an advance
of the highest importance in the policy of granting greater Regional autonomy. At the
same time we propose that the Central Legislature should have power to review
Regional legislation and to refer it back or even to reject it if the Central Legislature
considers that the Regional legislation offends against the general interests of Nigeria
as a whole. In the sphere of policy covering these Regional subjects we consider that
the right aim should be for the Regional Executives to carry out the administration of
the country within their own Regions but the authority of the Regional Executives
must be subject to any general direction on policy given by the Central Executive on
the ground that an overall interest of Nigeria is involved.
10. It will be seen that we have not attempted to define too closely the functions
of Regional Legislatures and Executives in relation to the functions of the Central
Legislature and Executive since close definition of the respective powers of the
Centre and the Regions would, we believe, lead to differences and disputes, and in the
process of decentralisation in which we are engaged there is much which must
inevitably be left to adjustment in the light of practical experience. The Central
Legislature and Executive must retain both residual and overall powers, but since the
Central Legislature and Executive will themselves be made up of representatives of
the Regional Legislatures and since the policy of greater Regional autonomy is so
widely accepted we do not fear that there will be any desire at the Centre
unnecessarily to interfere with purely Regional legislation or administration.
C. Regional divisions
11. All the Regional Conferences recommended that the three-Region system
should be retained. At the same time it is recognised that in certain areas,
particularly, for example, in that part of the Cameroons Trusteeship Territory which
lies in the Eastern Provinces, there has been a feeling amongst the people concerned
that in the past they have had inadequate representation in the Regional and
National Legislatures. We believe that the proposals for a large increase in the
number of elected members in the Regional Legislatures and the Central Legislature
should help to dispel anxiety on this score by providing better representation for all
areas and, as far as the part of the Cameroons under United Kingdom Trusteeship
which lies in the Eastern Provinces is concerned, specific provision has been made in
our recommendations to ensure that area is adequately represented both in the
Eastern Legislature and Executive and in the Central Legislature and Executive.
12. There are two important questions affecting Regional grouping to which we
have given special attention.
The first is the position of Lagos and the Colony, and we support the
recommendation of the Western Provinces Regional Conference and the Lagos and
Colony Conference that both Lagos and the Colony should in future be grouped with
the Western Provinces for legislative and administrative purposes. We feel that the
retention of the present system under which Lagos and the Colony are directly
represented in the Central Legislature could not be justified in a new system based
10-(Doc61-99)-cp  15/7/01  7:27 am  Page 240
[86] DEC 1949 241
on increased Regional autonomy and we believe that the arrangement recommended
whereby representatives of the Western Provinces, Lagos and the Colony will sit
together in a single Regional Legislature will best conform with the main
constitutional structure now proposed.
We have also considered the question of whether there should be any variation of
the existing boundaries of the Regions. There appears to us to be no case at all for any
variation except possibly in limited areas in the Benin Province and the Kabba and
Ilorin Provinces, and we do not feel that as a Drafting Committee we can express any
opinion on the arguments for or against a change in those limited areas. The
Northern representatives are opposed to any variation of the boundary between the
Northern Region and the Western Region on the ground that variation of Regional
boundaries should be a matter for administrative decision by Government rather
than for the Drafting Committee and General Conference, whereas the Western
Representatives consider that this is a question rightly dealt with by the Drafting
Committee and that some variation of the boundaries between the Western Region
and the Northern and Eastern Regions is justified. Most of us think that there should
be an impartial investigation to be undertaken as soon as possible. We are also of the
strong opinion that once the investigation has been completed decisions should be
taken which must be accepted as final, as we consider that it would be entirely
contrary to the interests of the inhabitants of the areas concerned if uncertainty
about boundaries were to be perpetuated. . . .
86 CO 583/299/2, no 36 6 Dec 1949
[Local government reform]: inward savingram no 2886 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones on the progress of local government
reform in the Eastern provinces
Your secret Savingram No. 113 of the 25th of October. Eastern Provinces Local
Government.1
2. I am very greatly obliged for the attention which has been given to the draft
Local Government Bill by your advisers and by the Advisory Panel, and it has been
recast in several respects as the result of the comments made in your Savingram and
in the enclosures thereto. As you remark, the Bill had been designed to give full
effect to local government as a training ground for participation in national politics,
and the changes now made have been by way of laying greater emphasis on this
intention.
3. As regards major alterations, the term Regional Authority has been re-defined
so as to cover both the Chief Commissioner in an individual capacity (as in the
present constitutional arrangement), and the Chief Commissioner in association
with such body of persons as may be determined by the Governor, (so as to provide
for the possible emergence of a Regional Executive Council). The powers of this
Authority have been recast to the extent that the Instrument constituting a council
shall be amended only after the wishes of the inhabitants and the views of the council
1 See 78.
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have been consulted, and statutory enquiries are to be held prior to any alteration of
boundaries or dissolution of a council for failure to hold meetings or to conform to
statutory obligations. The enquiries contemplated by the original clause 11 will be
held by direction of the Regional Authority, and additional clauses have been added
to prescribe procedure.
4. The question of imposition of mandatory functions, proposed in paragraph 5
of your Savingram has been reconsidered, and certain public health functions have
now been made mandatory, whilst provision has been made for the Regional
Authority declaring all or some of the functions allocated under Instrument to be
mandatory in the case of County and Local Councils.
5. The important question of intervention by the Governor has also been
reconsidered, and the relevant clause in the revised Bill redrafted so as to conform
with the suggestion in paragraph 11 of your Savingram. I agree that it is most
important that the position of the Chief Commissioner should be made plain and his
prestige safeguarded.
6. Certain amendments have been made in clauses 15, 45(b) and 100 in the light
of your comments, and clause 56(d) has been omitted.
7. The financial provisions of the Bill have also been reviewed, more particu-
larly with regard to the submission of estimates. I appreciate the necessity of
encouraging Councils to order their affairs in such a way as not to require prior
official sanction, but, as you know, the present local government experiment con-
templates elected bodies operating each over a very much wider territory and with
very much greater financial resources and responsibilities than the Eastern
Provinces have hitherto seen. It may well be that one or two such bodies will at
once prove themselves fully competent to manage their affairs in all respects, but
to make statutory provisions for excusing certain Councils from submitting esti-
mates while retaining that control in respect of others would, I feel, open the way
to much discriminatory argument and the maintenance of constant pressure on
Government in individual cases. I would prefer, therefore, to retain the present
insistence on submission of estimates, and consider relaxation, as a general statu-
tory measure, after we have gained some practical knowledge of the working of
these experimental bodies.
8. At the same time I agree that there could be modification of the original draft
provisions to allow of incurring supplementary expenditure without approval under
any particular Head of the Estimates up to a limit of ten per cent of the original
allotment under that Head, and up to five per cent of the total approved expenditure
for emergent purposes. The Bill has been redrafted accordingly.
9. The rating provisions now confine exemption from rating only to buildings
provided for public worship, cemeteries and burial grounds.
10. The Bill is now about to be published and will be introduced in the Eastern
House of Assembly in February. Thanks to the careful sounding and education of
public opinion when its general principles were being considered and to the care
taken to meet progressive views to the greatest extent compatible with sound
administration, I have every belief that it will prove acceptable and workable, and
provide valuable experience to the Eastern Regional politicians of the future. I
trust also that its introduction and enactment may in some measure assuage the
bitterness and bewilderment engendered by the unhappy events of the last few
weeks.
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11. It has not been overlooked, however, that the successful working of this
projected Ordinance will very largely depend on the training of an adequate local
government staff, and arrangements are now being made to send a number of
officers and officials to the United Kingdom for instruction. I would take this
opportunity of acknowledging the very valuable assistance which you are extending
in this respect.
87 CO 537/4625, no 69 20 Dec 1949
[Constitutional review]: letter from A B Cohen to Sir J Macpherson
on the Constitutional Drafting Committee’s report
I have already written to Foot to thank him for his secret and personal letter of the
3rd December enclosing five copies of the Report of the Constitutional Drafting
Committee.1 We have since been considering what the best time would be for the
discussion between the Colonial Office and the official side of the Nigerian
Government which will no doubt have to take place before the Legislative Council
meeting in March. I was very glad to hear from Foot’s letter that you had been
proposing to send him home for this discussion and that it might be possible for him
to come in January. Our view now is that it would be best for him to come after the
General Conference, i.e. when you know what has been recommended and have been
able to form some view on the major points at issue. Any time towards the end of
January or early in February would be suitable, if the General Conference has in fact
ended by then. We appreciate that this might be a difficult time for Foot to get away,
since the report of the Enugu Commission of Enquiry will presumably then have
been made or be about to be made and Foot will no doubt be wanted in Lagos for
urgent consideration of its recommendations. We feel that we must leave the timing
to you in relation to local needs, but I thought that I had better let you know what we
felt to be the most suitable arrangement for discussion here. I have consulted the
Secretary of State and he agrees with what is said above.
We realise, of course, that until the General Conference has made its
recommendations it would be premature for us to express any official views on the
proposals. Nevertheless we have felt that we owed it to you to let you know now
whether we had any comments on the report of the Drafting Committee. We have all
been considering it very carefully and the comments which we wish to make at this
stage are contained in the attached memorandum.2 A number of the comments are
on points of detail but we have dealt with five more important points, the respective
legislative powers of the centre and the regions, the relations between the central
and regional Executives, the method of appointing Ministers, the composition of the
Nigerian Legislature and the system of election.
I want to make it clear straight away that the comments in this memorandum, are
not sent to you with a view to influencing the discussions in the General Conference,
which we appreciate is designed for the purpose of formulating an agreed unofficial
view if possible. They are sent to you to give you and your official advisers some idea
of the more important points which we think that the Secretary of state will want to
1 See 85. 2 Not printed.
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raise in any discussions in London after the General Conference. It may be useful to
you to have a chance of considering these points before Foot or whoever you send
comes to London.
We appreciate that the General Conference may well produce recommendations
which are different from those in the Drafting Committee’s Report in a number of
important respects. We realise the wide differences which still persist between the
North and the South on certain important points and we have admired the skill with
which the Drafting Committee has been brought somewhere near agreement on
these points.
You will see that in the main our comments relate to federal relations between the
centre and the regions. This is obviously a most difficult subject and requires a great
deal of study of comparative federal constitutions. It would be quite wrong for us at
this stage to attempt any final or even considered views. We have therefore cast our
memorandum in the form of a series of questions. What we want to do is to raise a
number of points for subsequent discussion here. Perhaps those who have been in
the heat of the fray in these discussions in Nigeria may tend to feel that we have been
a little theoretical and general. That is to a large extent inevitable and it is, I suppose,
our function to try to bring to bear such general experience as we have of
constitution-making on the particular problems of Nigeria.
I hope that you will not feel that we are being inconsistent in relation to the
composition of the Legislative Council itself. You will remember that in the notes
which I sent you with my secret and personal letter of the 4th March3 I said in
relation to the Legislative Council that I doubted whether it would be either
politically safe or satisfactory in practice to cut out the Houses of Assembly as
electoral colleges. In the enclosed memorandum we raise the question whether the
elected membership of the Legislative Council should be entirely drawn from the
regional Houses. We do not of course in any sense suggest that the regional Houses
should be left out; indeed that would be quite impossible. But we have been
wondering whether you can really get away with a Council entirely drawn from the
regions without any more directly elected membership at all. I am not, of course,
suggesting the extension of the direct franchise à la Lagos. We have been wondering,
however, whether there ought to be some membership drawn from the provincial or
divisional level direct to the Legislative Council in addition to the substantial
number of members who must obviously be drawn from the regional Councils.
May I finish up this letter by saying what a really valuable document we think the
Drafting Committee’s Report is? With such a wide conflict of views between the
North and the South it is really remarkable to have got such a large measure of
agreement. We realise that it is going to be a very difficult job bringing the North and
the South completely together; we feel that a most excellent start has been made.
We do not, of course, want you to comment in detail on the memorandum but
merely to take it as an indication of some of the points we shall wish to raise with
Foot or whoever else you send to London.
I have shown this letter to the Secretary of State, who was entirely agreeable that
we should let you have the views contained in the enclosed memorandum. He does
not himself want to be committed in detail to any comments on the Drafting
Committee’s Report at this stage.
3 See 63.
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88 CO 537/4625, no 80 9 Jan 1950
[Constitutional review]: CO note on two meetings held to discuss the
reform of the Nigerian constitution1
The meeting was called in order to discuss with Mr. Foot the present state of the
consultations in Nigeria about the reform of the present Nigerian constitution.
The following points were made in discussion:—
I. Procedure
(a) It was expected that the Nigerian Government would have to make some
statement of their views on the proposals for the new constitution at the meeting
of the Legislative Council in March. Mr. Foot had already discussed with Mr.
Cohen the form which this statement might take and it was thought that it would
be sufficient for it to mention only the points on which the official view agreed
with the views accepted by the Legislative Council. It was expected that Mr. Foot
would be able to avoid controversial points, particularly as he would bear in mind
what had been said to him in London. The statement would simply give the views
of the Nigerian Government and would not purport in any way to convey any
decision on proposals put forward. It might be necessary to clear the wording of
any statement with the Secretary of State, but this was a matter which could be
left for subsequent decision.
(b) The time schedule for consultations in Nigeria might appear to be rigid but it
must be borne in mind that the discussions about the future constitution of the
Territory had now been going on for a period of about eighteen months.
(c) It should also be borne in mind that the General Conference was not bound in
any way by the conclusions reached by the Drafting Committee and that there was
a strong possibility in Mr. Foot’s view that the General Conference might be
unable to agree on these conclusions. Mr. Foot emphasised the difficulty of
reaching agreement on the proportion of seats in the central Legislature to be
allocated to each region, the possibility that the Northern Region might be
unwilling to accept central Ministers and the possibility that those members of the
General Conference who supported the National Emergency Committee might
take the opportunity to walk out of the Conferences at an appropriate moment.
(d) It would admittedly be difficult for H.M.G. to modify substantially the
proposals which would eventually come from the Legislative Council. Mr. Foot did
not, however, expect that any of these proposals would be objectionable to H.M.G.
in the light of the discussions he had had in London. He considered that the
changes which the Colonial Office appeared to contemplate were not likely to
cause difficulty in Nigeria. It was pointed out that a certain measure of opposition,
particularly in the House of Lords, was likely on the grounds that H.M.G. were
concentrating on constitution-making to the detriment of economic development.
(e) It was expected that when the General Conference had reported the Regional
Houses would debate its recommendations in February and the Legislative
Council would debate its recommendations in March. The Governor would then
1 These meetings were chaired by Creech Jones and involved Foot and senior CO officials.
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transmit the agreed views of the Legislative Council to the Secretary of State early
in April and both Mr. Foot and Sir G. Howe2 would be on leave in the U.K. at that
time and ready to assist in discussions. Mr. Foot mentioned the possibility that if
the Northern members disagreed with the recommendations of the General
Conference they might ask to be allowed to send a deputation to the Secretary of
State.
II. Object of London discussions
(f) Although it was not possible at this stage to indicate what recommendations
the General Conference were likely to make, it was necessary for the Nigerian
Government to be aware of the main lines of thought of the Secretary of State in
order that they should avoid as far as possible any fundamental divergence of view
between the recommendations likely to emerge in Nigeria and the known views of
the Secretary of State. There was no doubt that all concerned were agreed on the
need to advance on the road towards a federal system in Nigeria.
III. Major constitutional problems
(g) The proposed structure of the Nigerian constitution outlined in the Report of
the Drafting Committee implied an overlapping of the powers of regional
Legislatures and the central Legislature which was remarkable, if not unique. The
Nigerian Government considered that it was necessary at this interim stage of
constitutional development not to be too rigid but to feel their way towards a
system which might be defined with more exactitude after five or ten years, when
experience had been gained of the manner in which the Nigerians themselves
wished to order their affairs. Mr. Foot claimed that experience under the present
constitution had shown that Regional Houses were in fact exercising what
amounted to legislative power. This process had perhaps not gone very far. The S
of S suggested that there might be same danger in this at a time when experience
throughout the world showed the need for larger administrative units.
(h) Although it might be thought that regionalisation under the proposed new
constitution was going too far, Mr. Foot pointed out that there were very strong
safeguards proposed in the Report of the Drafting Committee. The Secretary of
State stressed the importance of inculcating a sense of unity and of preserving a
strong central power.
(i) Mr. Foot explained that the transition from a unitary bureaucracy to a working
democracy necessarily meant regional autonomy because that was the only way in
which the regions would agree to co-operate. Nevertheless there must be a proper
reconciliation of power at the centre and in the regions and it was important in 
the Secretary of State’s view that the centre should never wish to take back any
powers granted to the regions. The overlapping of powers might well cause
confusion and there was a need to keep power at the centre in order to ensure that
regional Governments performed their functions effectively. It was entirely
appreciated that a measure of regional devolution was inevitable and the
successful working of the new constitution must in any event rely on the good
sense of those working it.
2 Sir G Howe, attorney-general of Nigeria, 1946–1950.
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(j) The new constitution would of course include the ordinary provision making it
impossible for a private member to move any Bill creating a charge on public
revenue without the consent of Government.
(k) Mr. Foot stressed the importance of the expert enquiry into the division of
revenue which would probably be undertaken by Sir S. Phillipson together with
outside experts in consultation with a committee representing the three regions.
(l) Although much would depend upon the numbers of representatives of each
region in the central Legislature, it seemed important that the rejection by the
central Legislature of regional legislation should depend on a simple majority and
not on a two-thirds majority.
(m) Although there were arguments against Ministers in the central Legislature,
it seemed clear that without them the central Legislature would become a second-
rate show.
(n) Mr. Foot explained the arguments in favour of the election of Ministers by the
regional blocks in the central Legislature. Each block would elect four members to
serve on the Council of State. He considered that a system of election would
relieve the Governor of the extremely difficult and thankless task of selecting
Ministers in the Legislature, adding that it would be clear that any useless Minister
was a Minister because of the Legislature and not by choice of the Governor.
Against these arguments it was pointed out that it would be a great mistake to
have useless Ministers, particularly at a time when the ministerial system was on
trial. It would be difficult for Ministers to be responsible to the Governor whilst
tied to a regional block which had elected them. If Ministers were selected by the
Governor, it was more likely that they would have a sense of unity and work as a
team in the Council of State.
(o) Mr. Foot explained that he did not expect the Council of State to meet more
frequently than four or five times a year and that Ministers would only be
empowered to carry out the decisions of the Council of State. It was pointed out
that if the Council of State were to develop into an effective instrument of
government, it would undoubtedly need to meet more frequently and that
Ministers would of necessity wish to supervise the day-to-day administration of the
departments for which they were responsible. As, however, the General
Conference might well reach conclusions different from those of the Drafting
Committee on the question of Ministers, it would be preferable not to carry the
discussions further at this stage but to await the outcome of the General
Conference.
(p) The Secretary of State expressed his concern that any electoral system should
be genuinely representative. Mr. Foot said that when the proposals for a new
constitution came from Nigeria they would be accompanied by the proposals of the
three electoral commissions which it was proposed to set up to recommend the
electoral system which should be followed in each region.
(q) The system of electing members of the central Legislature by the members of
the Regional Houses was open to criticism on the grounds that the more extreme
political elements might thereby be completely excluded from the central
Legislature. Mr. Foot pointed out that this criticism had not been made in Nigeria
in the course of the constitutional discussions and that the Nigerian Government
agreed that there should be in the central Legislature two members from each
Province in the Territory. It was pointed out that this system of election had been a
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feature of other federal constitutions but that elsewhere in the world as far as was
known no central federal Legislature had ever been completely composed of
elected representatives of subordinate houses. Much depended upon how
representative the members of the Regional Houses would be under the proposals
to be made by the electoral commissions.
(r) No recomendation had yet been made in Nigeria for nominated members of
the central Legislature. There was no objection to the nomination of members
with wide experience who would be of value in a Legislature. It was possible that
the present nominated members of the Legislative Council might be able to
persuade the General Conference to recommend that there should be a small
number of nominated members in the new constitution. It was not however,
necessary to give further consideration to this point unless either the General
Conference made such a recommendation or the business firms concerned made
an approach on the matter. They had made such an approach concerning the Gold
Coast, but of course in the Gold Coast they had had no opportunity of participating
in any of the constitutional discussions.
89 CO 537/5807, no 12 31 Jan 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from A B Cohen to Sir J Macpherson
reporting on a meeting with Dr Azikiwe
Gorsuch is writing to Foot about the reports we have had about Zik’s activities in the
United States. This letter is to record very briefly the main points in an hour’s talk I
had with him last Friday. I had heard that he wanted to see me so I rang him up and
invited him to come along, which he did.
Most of the talk was about the constitution. He had had reports from his people
about the proceedings at Ibadan. The main points which he raised were:—
(1) The attitude of the North. He was inclined to be bitter about this and said that a
separation from the North might well be necessary. At one stage he even went so far
as to say that he would be in favour of not giving the North facilities for the transit of
their exports, etc. without making them pay through the nose. If their attitude was as
intransigent as the reports suggested the South could be equally firm. I said that the
view of the Colonial Office, and as far as I knew of H.M.G., was that it would be an
unmitigated disaster if Nigeria broke into two parts. It seemed to us quite essential to
prevent this and I knew that everything possible had been done by the Nigerian
Government, both in the Drafting Committee and otherwise, to bring Northern and
other representatives together and to avoid a split. Zik then said that personally he
agreed with the view that I had expressed that it would be a disaster if Nigeria broke
into two parts. But for tactical reasons the South would have to take a tough line
with the North.
(2) Zik expressed great disappointment at the decision of the General Conference
that the central Legislature should consist primarily of regional delegates. He said
that the intention of the N.C.N.C. had been to try to work the new constitution which
emerged from the present discussions, even if they regarded parts of it as
unsatisfactory. They had hoped that they would be in a position to put up candidates
so as to secure representation on the various bodies. In view of the reported decision
10-(Doc61-99)-cp  15/7/01  7:27 am  Page 248
[89] JAN 1950 249
of the General Conference he was doubtful whether it would be easy for them to do
this. I expressed fairly strong disagreement and said that as I understood the position
much depended on the results of the Regional Committees on the electoral system in
each region. I gathered that both the East and the West at any rate were aiming at a
system of election at the divisional level and I could not myself see any reason why a
particular party should not put up candidates through this machinery. If they got a
sufficient number of members in regional Houses, they would no doubt also get
members on the Legislature. Zik admitted the force of this and we did not pursue the
matter. (I did not mention the decision of the General Conference about Lagos, since
I was not sure exactly what had happened. But if, as I understand, Lagos is to have
the right to send members direct to the Legislative Council, this further weakens
Zik’s argument).
During this part of our talk Zik suggested that the Nigerian Government were glad
to have isolated the N.C.N.C. in the constitutional discussions. I emphatically denied
this and said that I was quite sure that this was not the attitude of the Nigerian
Government at all. They had been anxious throughout that the discussions on the
constitution should be fully representative and it was their aim that the new
constitution should be equally representative.
At the end of our talk Zik referred to the trouble over his admission to the Gold
Coast. He said that he had no criminal record either in the Gold Coast or in Nigeria;
that the action of the Gold Coast Government suggested that he was regarded as an
undesirable person; and that it would have been perfectly possible for the Gold Coast
Government to let him carry out his original arrangements for transit, at the same
time asking him not to make any political speeches. He referred to the Human
Rights Convention and said that he was being pressed to declare his attitude on his
return to Nigeria and that this incident might affect his actions. He said that he
thought that the Gold Coast Government ought to apologise to him.
In replying to all this I could not of course refer to the Secretary of State’s attitude
in the matter as expressed in the telegram which he sent to the Gold Coast. I said
that I was quite sure that the Gold Coast Government was aware that he had no
criminal record and had not been deported. The fact that they had felt obliged to
oppose his entry into the Gold Coast was not because they regarded him as an
undesirable person, but because they were gravely anxious about the political
situation in the Gold Coast and feared that a speech from a prominent political leader
from outside the Gold Coast at that particular stage might add to the already rising
tension. With regard to his point about the Human Rights Convention I said that
every Government had the duty to take measures for the maintenance of public order
and that the action to be taken in this respect must be decided upon according to the
judgment of the Government concerned. As he knew, the Secretary of State was very
sorry that this incident had occurred. I felt that had the Gold Coast Government had
more notice it would have been possible to arrive by telegram at some arrangement
quite satisfactory to all concerned. The difficulty had been due to the very short time
available before Zik’s proposed departure for the Gold Coast. I referred to the fact
that the Gold Coast Government had been prepared to allow him to pass through
Accra; he said that he had not felt able to agree to a night flight in a one-engined
plane. I put him right about the number of engines of Doves and he then said that as
a member of the Legislative Council he had felt doubtful about putting the Nigerian
Government to this expense. I finished up by saying that I was sure he realised that
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this particular incident, which had arisen suddenly, did not in any sense imply any
alteration in the attitude of H.M.G. or the Nigerian Government towards him. He
said that he perfectly realised this.
I did not of course refer to his suggestion about an apology from the Gold Coast
Government. He thanked me for what I had said; but I was not sure that he was
entirely satisfied by it.
He did not say much to me about his visit to the United States. He mentioned his
talk with some State Department officials which is referred to in Gorsuch’s letter to
Foot. He said that he had made it very clear to them that there was a great deal of
suspicion in Nigeria about outside investment. He got the impression that they were
not entirely clear how the Fourth Point worked (this does not surprise me at all). He
himself had, I gathered, not formed the impression that Nigeria was likely to be able
to take much advantage of it.
90 CO 537/5786, no 7 2 Feb 1950
[Constitutional review]: inward savingram no 34 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Creech Jones on the results of the General
Constitutional Conference at Ibadan
[The process of constitutional consultation initiated by Macpherson in 1948 reached a
conclusion at the general conference held in Ibadan in Jan 1950 to consider the report of
the constitutional drafting committee. The conference had 53 members, of whom all but
three were Nigerian, and included the unofficial members of the Legislative Council as
well as delegates elected by the regional constitutional conferences. The Ibadan
conference was characterised by considerable differences over the issue of the size of
regional representation in the proposed House of Representatives; the Northern delegates
insisted on parity of representation with the Eastern and Western Regions combined, that
there should be no change in the boundary between the North and West and that 
finance should be allocated on a per capita basis. Although the conference largely
accepted the recommendations of the drafting committee, these issues were not fully
resolved. The conference issued a report, Report of the General Conference on the Review
of the Constitution, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1950 (Lagos, 1950), though four minority reports on
issues such as adult suffrage, franchise rights of southerners living in the North, the
position of Lagos and the number of regions were also issued.]
My telegram 123 of 27th January.
2. The General Constitutional Conference completed its session at Ibadan on
January 28th, and the outlook is now more promising than when I made my previous
report. The Northern delegates had been on the point of leaving the Conference after
the session of January 25th, but were induced to appear on the 26th, and agreed to
remain to complete the work of the Conference provided it were clearly specified in
the record that they had abstained from voting on the crucial issue of Regional
representation in the Central Legislature and that should their claim for 50% of seats
in the House of Representatives not be conceded they must be considered to
disassociate themselves from the other proceedings of the Conference.
3. The Conference then continued consideration of other items, in the
discussion of which the Northern delegates participated to the full. At the close of 
the Conference it was a Northern delegate, the Sardauna of Sokoto, who proposed the
vote of thanks to the Chairman, and in his speech he stressed the point that 
the deadlock reached with regard to the Central Legislature was not impossible of
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solution. He went on to hope that the results of the Conference would lead Nigeria to
achieve national unity, and he made it plain that he was speaking on behalf of all
Northern delegates.
4. Copies of the recommendations made by the Conference will be sent to you as
soon as possible, but I might mention here the main points on which the Conference’s
recommendations vary from the suggestions of the Drafting Committee. These are:—
(a) the Municipality of Lagos should not form a part of any Region, although the
Colony districts should be incorporated in the Western Provinces:
(b) commercial interests should be given three nominated representatives in the
Central Legislature:
(c) if expert inquiry finds that any Region has been inequitably treated in the past
in respect of financial allocation from the Centre, that Region should be given a
block grant from Central funds by way of compensation.
5. The decision in respect of Lagos was carried mainly by the votes of the
Northern and Eastern delegates, who also voted down a suggestion that Lagos should
have representation in the Central Executive. There is likely to be much opposition
to these decisions in Lagos, the Colony districts and the Western Provinces, and a
minority report has been prepared on the subject by certain delegates, although it
has not yet been received. The decision to give representation to commercial
interests was well received at the Conference and was, in discussion, a much less
controversial issue than the subject of Lagos. The recommendation for a block grant
in respect of finance, should any past inequity be proved, was intended by the Eastern
and Western Regions as a concession to the North.
6. The question of the Reserve Powers of the Governor was raised and the
Conference has made a definite recommendation that these powers should for the
present be left untouched.
7. The Conference’s recommendations are now being circulated for
consideration by Regional Houses, which meet at varying dates during the next two
weeks. The recommendations should prove generally acceptable in the Eastern
Region, but in the Western House much attention will no doubt be concentrated on
the subject of Lagos. It is not possible to anticipate the course of discussion in the
Northern Houses, but there is no reason to suppose that at this stage they will adopt
an attitude markedly different from that adopted by the Northern representatives at
the Conference and I do not think that any attempt to find a new basis for
compromise regarding Regional representation in the Central Legislature can be
attempted before the Regional Houses meet.
8. In general I think that it can be said that the constitutional review
culminating in the General Conference has put forward proposals for constitutional
reform which are basically sound. The review had indicated the full agreement which
exists on the need for greater Regional autonomy and for association of
representative Nigerians with the executive. It was most unfortunate, particularly
from the point of view of the effect on the public, that the General Conference failed
to find a solution of the problem of Regional representation in the Central
Legislature and although I trust that some way out of the impasse on this issue can
be found, the publicity given to the disagreement on this matter and on the question
of the status of Lagos has tended to overshadow the very satisfactory agreement
reached on so many other vital matters.
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9. I should add that Sir Gerard Howe did most admirable work as Chairman of
the Conference: indeed had it not been for his tact and skill the Conference might
well have broken down altogether.
91 CO 537/5804, no 1 4–8 Feb 1950
[Local government reform]: minutes by R J Vile1 and L H Gorsuch on
a savingram from Sir J Macpherson concerning colonial officers
I do not think we can be entirely satisfied with the report at 1. We have been trying
for some time to obtain from Nigeria some indication of what the basic causes of the
unrest in the Western Provinces have been and in 1. we have no answer to this
question. From what I can gather, there has been a considerable amount of
dissatisfaction among the Administrative Officers in the Western Provinces who
appear mostly to have felt that the Nigerian Government were attempting to rush
them in the reform of local government in the Western Provinces. I believe that it
was necessary for the Governor to address a meeting of all residents in the Western
Provinces in order to convince them that their grounds for dissatisfaction were not
valid ones. As I understand it and I speak here with a considerable amount of reserve,
residents have not only disliked the pressure put on them to undertake reforms but
they also resented what seemed to them the extremely weak handling by the Central
Government of libellous attacks on individual officers including the Chief
Commissioner. The result of this situation seems to have been that it is impossible
for the Nigerian Secretariat to press the Chief Commissioner any further in the
direction of the reform of local government.
In these circumstances the basic argument on 1. seems to be that the difficulties
in Ijebu-Remo have been solved and that this solution gives reason to hope that the
difficult problems of the Western Provinces in local government can be resolved in a
spirit of co-operation and good will. I am sure that we must accept the advice of the
men on the spot that this is possible and that policy must be formed accordingly. In
these circumstances I doubt very much whether there is any point in referring again
to our desire to know what the basic causes of unrest are. I would therefore propose
that we reply to 1. by thanking the Governor for his full account of the situation by
expressing pleasure at the way in which the Yoruba leaders took the initiative in the
solution of this difficult problem, and by reiterating the belief that constitutional
progress in the region and at the centre must depend on an efficient representative
and local system of local government, adding that the Secretary of State would wish
to have as soon as convenient a general account of the situation, together with the
considered view of the Governor on the policy which should be followed as soon as
the Governor is able to do so.
R.J.V.
4.2.50
I took the opportunity of discussing with Mr. Abell recently the position in the
Western Provinces generally (he was, as you know, Resident of Oyo). He said that in
dealing with the unrest in the Western Provinces the administration were not faced
1 R J Vile, principal CO, 1947; assistant secretary, 1963.
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merely with reactionary Obas on the one hand and the progressive younger
generation on the other which wished to have a greater share in the direction of
affairs. There was another ingredient; i.e. that while quite a number of people might
wish the basis of local government to be broadened, only a very few wished to get rid
of the Oba altogether. Apart from his position as Native Authority, the Oba had a
traditional and almost spiritual place in Yoruba society, and it would be quite wrong
to suppose that any significant part of the people wanted to see this destroyed. The
administration had, therefore, to go very delicately and to decide very carefully in
each case whether or not they would support the Oba and if so how far; it might well
be that the Oba should be persuaded to broaden the basis of his local government, as
the Oni of Ife had already done, and even to give up some of the practices in which he
indulged, as the Alake of Abeokuta had failed to do; but it was not for the
administration to incur the odium of having turned the Oba out altogether except for
some very good reason.
There is undoubtedly a feeling amongst the Western Province officers that Lagos
does not fully understand their difficulties and is inclined to press them to go too
fast. I think, therefore, that it would be preferable in view of the tone of the
Governor’s report at 1. to confine our answer to A of Mr. Vile’s minute and not to
include B.1
L.H.G.
8.2.50
1 A and B referred to the lengthy sentence with which Vile concluded the seconded paragraph of his
minute. A referred to the sentence as far as ‘solution of this difficult problem’. B referred to the remainder
of the sentence.
92 CO 583/314/2, no 5 7 Feb 1950
[Cameroons Visiting Mission]: letter from Sir A Burns to A N
Galsworthy on the report of the UNO Visiting Mission to the
Cameroons
[In late 1946 the UNO general assembly met to consider the transfer of the former League
of Nations mandates in Cameroons, Togoland and Tanganyika as trusteeship territories to
Britain and (in the former two cases) France. The trusteeship agreement with Britain for
the Cameroons was approved by the general assembly on 14 Dec 1946. Thereafter the
Trusteeship Council continued to monitor British administration in the territory and the
first of what were to be several UNO Visiting Missions visited the Cameroons in Nov 1949.
The key issue to be considered on this occasion, at least as far as the British government
was concerned, was whether the Cameroons should continue to be administered as part
of Nigeria; hitherto the Southern Cameroons had been administered as part of the
Eastern provinces with, under the Richards constitution, seats in the Eastern Assembly
and, from 1948, the appointment of a commissioner for the Cameroons, responsible to
Enugu; the Northern Cameroons were similarly administered as part of the Northern
provinces. See 96. Sir Alan Burns, previously governor of the Gold Coast, 1941–1947, and
acting governor of Nigeria, 1942, was the permanent UK representative on the UNO
Trusteeship Council, 1947–1956.]
I read hurriedly through the report of the Visiting Mission on the Cameroons last
night. Incidentally, my lack of faith was unjustified and the report was delivered to
me a day earlier than promised and I now have little doubt that we will get the
remaining reports by Thursday.
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My first impression is that the report is a very good one and quite satisfactory from
our point of view. It shows an entirely different approach from that on Tanganyika
last year and I think this is partly due to the different personnel of the Secretariat as
well as of the Mission, and partly to our violent reactions to the Tanganyika report.
I invite your attention to the very generous references to the freedom of speech
allowed in the Cameroons at pages 6 and 57 of the report and also to the general
blessing of the Development Corporation at page 7 and the realisation at page 10 of
the impertinence of the criticisms of the Fon of Bikom’s matrimonial extravagances.
They point out, at page 52, that the division of the Cameroons between the French
and the British adversely affects the interests of the inhabitants and the ‘nationality’
of the Cameroons. What they of course overlook is the fact that any boundaries in
Africa e.g., as between Cameroons and Nigeria, would have exactly the same effect.
The main criticism of the administration is naturally enough, in view of what has
happened before, ‘the administrative union’ between the Cameroons and Nigeria.
The Mission realises the difficulties but is stimulated to attack the union by the
demands of the people in the south. It is, however, to those who do not realise the
comparative size and population of the two territories, a tempting idea that Southern
Cameroons should be set up as a completely separate organisation similar to the
various groups of provinces in Nigeria and without attaching the Cameroons in any
way to the Eastern Provinces. On the whole I think we have come very well even out
of this difficult problem.
The other serious criticism is the tax paid to the Nigerian Government by the
Cameroons Development Corporation, but on this again I think they have been very
reasonable.
No doubt the Nigerian Government will have a lot to say in its comments on the
report but I feel personally that the Mission has gone out of its way to be as friendly
and as helpful to us as possible and I hope that the tone of our reply will be similarly
forthcoming.
You will observe that the Mexican Minority Report has disappeared without any
detrimental compromise in the report itself. I have had many talks with Khalidy,
Greig and Wieschoff and I think they have responded to my suggestions in as
satisfactory a way as we could have hoped. I now await with some anxiety their report
on the Ewe problem and the other territories.
93 CO 537/5786, no 9 Feb 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from H M Foot to A B Cohen on the
next stage of the constitutional review. Minute by R J Vile
We have sent you copies of the resolutions of the General Constitutional Conference
and in a day or two we shall forward a descriptive note about the Conference written
by A.A. Williams who was joint-secretary of the Conference. Following a meeting of
Chief Commissioners a few days ago the Governor has now asked me to tell you how
we think the next stages in the constitutional review may go.
As far as local reactions to the General Conference were concerned popular
interest has centred in the controversies about Regional representation in the central
legislature and about the future constitutional status of the Colony including Lagos
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township. It is a pity that these two issues are getting most of the limelight and are
detracting interest from the main constitutional structure proposed which is much
what we hoped would emerge. Indeed, the General Conference has improved in
several respects on the Drafting Committee’s recommendations. It was most helpful
to get a well-backed recommendation for commercial representation in the central
legislature. It was also a good thing that the Conference came down in favour of
giving Western Obas places on the Western Executive Council and in the central
legislature. It would clearly be unsound to have Northern Chiefs in the Northern
Executive Council and in the central legislature and to deny such opportunities to
Western Obas, but we had been unable to convince the Western representatives of
this in the Drafting Committee. Another useful change was to leave over for later
decision the actual method of election to Regional Houses rather than to appoint
Commissions on this matter and to require the Commissions to make hurried
recommendations (as the Drafting Committee had proposed). It was also an
improvement to provide that rejection of Regional legislature should be achieved by
a straight majority in the central legislature instead of a two-thirds majority. On the
whole we feel that in spite of the great anxieties still ahead we have emerged so far
from the constitutional review with a set of recommendations more in line with what
we wanted than even the most optimistic would have dared to hope a year ago.
The next stage is for the Regional Houses to consider the General Conference’s
proposals and all we can hope for from that stage is that eventual compromises on
the remaining issues in dispute are not made less possible by hardening of Regional
differences. We propose that select committees of the Regional Houses should be set
up to consider the General Conference’s recommendations and that these select
committees should be mainly, if not wholly, composed of unofficial members
probably under an official chairman. The advantage of this arrangement (if it is
adopted in the Regional Houses) will be that it will enable Regional Officials to avoid
making official declarations at this stage and that it will also allow most if not all the
discussion in Regional Houses to be conducted calmly in private (Select Committee
proceedings are, of course, not public) rather than in open debate in which Regional
representatives would no doubt feel it necessary to commit themselves even more
strongly than they did in the General Conference to an uncompromising stand on
the questions still in dispute.
The last stage in which Nigerian representatives will be directly involved will be in
Legislative Council when we meet in Enugu in March and there again we intend to
propose that a Select Committee should be set up. We have in mind that the
composition of this Select Committee should be much the same as that of the Select
Committee set up in March last at Ibadan to make recommendations on how the
constitutional review should be carried out—that is, that it should be composed of
all the unofficial members together with the Chief Commissioners, the Attorney-
General, the Financial Secretary and myself. We propose that this Select Committee
should meet from time to time throughout the Legislative Council session, which
will no doubt last for a month or more, and that we should all make a sustained effort
to find acceptable compromises on the two main questions still in dispute—Regional
representation in the central legislature and the constitutional status of Lagos and
the Colony. (In addition there is, of course, the problem of Finance which is always
with us, and it is crucial; as you know special arrangements are proposed for tackling
this, though it will colour and affect all the discussions). We cannot, of course, see
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clearly what sort of compromise might be acceptable and there will have to be a lot of
give and take but if we could emerge from the Select Committee with workable
proposals commanding substantial support from all three Regional groups for
solving those two vital outstanding questions we should have carried the whole
review much nearer a satisfactory conclusion. What the chances of achieving this are
we can’t tell—they don’t look very bright at present—but we shall go at it as hard as
we can in the hope that in the end the desire for compromise will prevail and some
sensible plan for overcoming the disagreements can be worked out.
As I say we can’t in advance guess what line of compromise is most likely to
succeed but the Governor has asked me to put two suggestions to you to see what
you think of them.
As to Regional representation, Southern alarm is partly but not wholly due to the
possibility that the North, if it did get half the seats in the central legislature, might
use its power to reject Eastern or Western Regional legislation. If it were not for this
fear the objection to giving the Northerners what they ask for should be much less.
(If we had been building a unitary structure the North would presumably have
automatically got representation on the basis of population by electoral divisions). It
has therefore occurred to us that the right to refer back or reject Regional legislation
might be taken altogether out of the hands of the central legislature and vested in
the central executive (in which, with Northern agreement, there is to be equal
representation between North, East and West). We think that there is something to
be said for this in theory as well as in practice as the power of veto is normally an
executive and not a legislative function. If this suggestion were adopted we think that
the Southern opposition to the North having half the seats in the central legislature
might diminish since there would clearly be less force in the objection to giving the
North half the seats in a body which is considering ‘Nigerian’ matters. The Northern
representatives might well accept the proposal to shift the veto to the central
executive and if they were in a compromising frame of mind (no sign of it yet) they
might just possibly agree to go a bit below their parity demand—possibly on the
basis of something like 40 : 22 : 22 instead of 30 : 22 : 22 as proposed by the Drafting
Committee and 45 : 33 : 33 as finally voted by the Southerners in the General
Conference. We don’t ask you (unless you wish to!) to comment on the
representation figures which must remain for the time being a matter for local
horse-trading but we should be most interested to know if you see any objection in
principle to the right to refer back and reject Regional legislation being vested in the
central executive rather than the central legislature.
On the other question—the question of the status of Lagos and the Colony—we
certainly think that the General Conference proposals are unacceptable as they
stand, however much there may be to be said in theory for a capital isolated from the
Regions. Apart from anything else if the Conference recommendations were accepted
it would be impossible for a member elected to the legislature from Lagos ever to
reach the central executive.
As we judge feelings in the Colony just now the Yorubas, apart from a few self
seeking individuals like Adedoyin, Nimbe and HO Davies, who are mainly concerned
with their own political prospects, are overwhelmingly in favour of the Colony
(including Lagos) being joined with the Western Provinces (there is a very strong
feeling against splitting Lagos from the Colony Districts). And this is also the feeling
of the people of the Western Provinces. In part this is due to Yoruba solidarity (hence
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the argument about Lagos being a Yoruba town whose fate should be decided by its
own people) but the opposition of more responsible Yorubas to direct and separate
Lagos representation is also coloured by anxiety not to let the Lagos representatives
(whom they fear might include people such as Zik, H.O. Davies and even,
conceivably, Imoudu) have things all their own way.
The sort of compromise we have in mind is that the special position of Lagos and
the Colony should be recognised by continuing to treat them as one administrative
unit, by guaranteeing to them a minimum number of seats in the central legislature
(on the analogy of the guarantee proposed for the Cameroons) and by making a
special allocation from central funds to cover the costs arising from the fact that
Lagos is the capital of Nigeria; but at the same time including Lagos and the Colony
in the Western Provinces. Such an arrangement would go some way to meeting the
demand for special status which comes mainly from the East and from non-Yorubas
in Lagos, and would also meet the Yoruba desire for amalgamation, and also,
incidentally, would have the effect of satisfying Lagos politicians that their chances of
return to the central legislature (thus leaving the door to the Council of Ministers
open) are not adversely affected by the merger. We should be most grateful if you
would let us know if something along these lines seems to you a sound compromise.
I am sorry to put such vague and, to some extent, hypothetical questions to you
but at least this letter will show you how our minds are working. We are going to
have a very difficult time at Enugu and it may well be that we cannot then do
anything to close the gap of disagreement on the two main issues now in dispute.
Any further guidance which you can give us on those two issues before we go to
Enugu at the end of the month will be very welcome.
The Governor has asked me to tell you that in spite of the difficulties and dangers
ahead we are more than ever glad that we undertook this review. We feel certain that
if we had not started when we did, so that consultations were carried out in an
atmosphere of reasonable calm, we should now, because of what is happening in the
Gold Coast and elsewhere (not to mention the Enugu incident) have been
improvising something in haste and under pressure and in a very different
atmosphere. The political education has been most valuable and the irresponsible
and voluble politicians are finding themselves up against real problems (not just a
struggle between an Imperialist bureaucracy and the people) which cannot be solved
by clap-trap and cheap slogans.
Minute on 93
Forty copies of the enclosure to 8 have been sent to Press Section and they will
distribute them as required and as appropriate to the press. Other copies have gone
to the supervisors of Colonial Service Courses and separate copies have gone to Sir T.
Lloyd, Mr. Cohen and Mr. Gorsuch.
The main problem arising out of the General Conference is the refusal of the
northern representatives to agree to anything less than half the representation in the
Central Legislature. This has already been reported at 3 and the Governor now says at
5 that he does not think any attempt to find a new basis for compromise regarding
regional representation in the Central Legislature can be attempted before the
Regional Houses meet. He further considers that there is no reason to suppose that
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the Northern Houses will adopt an attitude markedly different from that adopted by
the northern representatives at the Conference. I am sure that we must accept the
Governor’s advice on this matter. I am equally sure that the Nigerian authorities will
take every possible opportunity to bring about a compromise between the North and
the rest of the country. I should have thought that it was only necessary for northern
representatives to mention a division of the territory for them to realise how unreal
such a view is. I suspect that the northern attitude has been adopted more for the
purpose of horse trading than as a sober contribution to political thought. It is
possible indeed that the frank statement of the extreme northern position will at the
outset have impressed eastern and western representatives with the very great need
to keep Nigeria together and the importance of making sacrifices to this end. In this
connection the proposal that any region inequitably treated in the past should be
given a block grant by central funds by way of compensation, was intended as a
concession to the northern point of view by the eastern and western representatives.
In short, there is I think good reason to believe that the present deadlock has perhaps
more hopeful implications than might at first sight have been expected. On the other
hand, there is still a danger that the deadlock may continue and that in the last resort
an appeal will be made to the Secretary of State to resolve the issue. It is perhaps
premature at this stage to comment on this possibility but it would seem
unfortunate if events developed to that extent. The successful working of the more
democratic constitution proposed should preferably depend on the people working it
and not on the influence of an extraneous person.
There are some differences between the recommendations of the General
Conference and the statement prepared by the Drafting Committee. For example,
the General Conference have recommended that Lagos should remain as an inde-
pendent municipality. On this point I do not think there is any need for us to com-
ment at this stage because there seems to be no compelling reason why we should
not accept any recommendation which finally emerges from the Legislative
Council no matter which way the decision finally goes. As far as nomenclature is
concerned, the General Conference wish to call the Central Executive Council, the
Council of Ministers instead of the Council of State. This point is not, I think, a
material one.
The membership of Regional Legislatures has undergone some change in the
General Conference figures. The most important change is that the official members
should have no vote. This seems to me a most peculiar proposal, and I would suggest
that we should ask the Governor if he can let us have some explanation of the reasons
for it. The argument would seem to be that as officials are in the minority it does not
matter if they have a vote or not. This seems to assume that the unofficial should
have complete power, but there are bound to be cases in which unofficial opinion is
divided and in which the official vote might have a considerable effect. I do not,
however, think that we can reach any conclusion without more information on this
point. The number of official members has been reduced from 17 to 4 in the north
and is the same in the west and the east at 3 and 5 respectively. The number of
unofficial members has gone up from 50 to 66 in the northern region, from 60 to 80
in the Western House of Assembly and gone from 60 to 80 in the Eastern House of
Assembly. In the east it is proposed to have at least two members for each division
instead of one and similarly in the west. In the north a provision that there should be
at least 2 members for each province has also been included. I do not think these
10-(Doc61-99)-cp  15/7/01  7:27 am  Page 258
[93] FEB 1950 259
changes need worry us. They seem to be intelligent in that they do make
representation more exact.
The functions of Regional Legislature are substantially those proposed by the
Drafting Committee, except that the word ‘major’ now appears in the expression ‘any
major overall Nigerian interest’. Apart from the bad English of this phrase, the
addition of the word ‘major’ seems designed to strengthen the Regional Legislatures
as against the Central Legislature. I do not think we need worry over much about
‘major’ except to note the way in which the General Conference has sought further to
increase the strength and authority of the Regional Legislatures.
As far as relations between Houses are concerned, it is worthy of note that the
Western House of Chiefs is to have equal and concurrent powers, including those of
financial appropriation, and in the north the provision that the decision of the
Lieutenant-Governor in Council should prevail has been deleted. I do not think we
need worry about either of these changes.
The provisions for the operation of legislation are the same as those prepared by
the Drafting Committee. Our views on this have already been made clear to the
Governor and I do not think there is any more to be said at the moment on that
point.
On the composition of regional executives, the figures have been altered in the
northern region only from 7 to 9 elected members. I do not think this is a point
which need concern us. As far as functions are concerned, no change has been 
made except to add local courts to the list of suggested portfolios. The objection of
the provision about the arrangements for the distribution of portfolios remains. The
provision about the termination of appointments has been altered to make it
necessary in regions where there are two Houses for the Houses to meet together to
pass a vote of no confidence. This seems a sensible amendment to which I do not
think we need raise any objection.
The number of representatives in the Central Legislature has been raised from 74
to 113 unofficial members and the 6 ex-officio members have been named. Three
nominated members have also been suggested. There are detailed provisions to
ensure that in the north one member should be selected from each province and in
the east and west one member from each division with at least two members from
the Trust Territory. These additions again seem to be sensible ones on which we need
raise no comment.
The composition of the Central Executive remains as before and the functions
have not been altered. There is a useful additional provision that no person except a
Lieutenant-Governor should be at the same time a member both of the Regional
Executive Council and the Council of Ministers. The objectionable provision for the
distribution of portfolios remains.
In the finance section there is an additional proposal that the recommendations of
the expert commission, accepted by the Committee, should take effect at the same
time as the introduction of the new Constitution, and that any region unfairly
treated during past years should be allowed a block grant to make up for part of what
it has lost. These additional provisions do not seem to call for any comment.
A considerable amount of thought appears to have been given to the qualifications
of candidates, system of election and the distribution of seats. In the north the
province is to be taken as the basis of representation and in the east and west the
division. The voters must be over 21 and resident for at least one year in or a native of
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the province or division in which he wishes to vote. In the north, however, only men
may vote and in the first five years voters1 can only be male Northern Nigerians of 25
years or over or have been resident in the region for three years. This particular
provision has called forth the minority report signed by Dr. Ibiam and others which
is attached to the major recommendations. The way in which these northern
qualifications have been put is unfortunate but I do not think in fact they will have
the bad effect which the minority report claims. The only difference between the
north and the other regions is in fact that you have to reside for three years in the
north before you get a vote, but you need only reside for one year in the east and
west. Furthermore this provision only lasts for five years in the north. This difference
of 2 years in the residential qualification does not really seem to matter enough for
us to comment on it.
The recommendation about the Trust Territory is a pious expression of hope and
does not say any more than we are committed to observe under the terms of the
Trusteeship Agreement. The provision about common language is equally pious. The
provision about the Governor’s reserve powers is, however, a valuable expression of
support which it is encouraging to see.
The last recommendation is that the Constitution should be reviewed as seems
necessary from time to time within a period of five years. The implication is that at
the end of the five years there will be an entirely new constitution. This seems to be
crystal gazing with a vengeance. I am sure that as far as the drafting of the
Constitution is concerned we cannot include a provision for review in accordance
with this recommendation. On the other hand, it would not be politic to raise any
public doubts about this provision because it is quite likely that such a review will
take place and it is far better to leave this expression of opinion as it is at the
moment and consider in the future what need be done in the light of the circum-
stances at the time. I think there is every reason to say that at the end of five years
it will be the intention to review the working of the Constitution, that it would be
proper for the Legislature at any time to raise the question of review but that until
experience has been gained of the working of this new Constitution, it would seem
to be preferable not to make any specific commitment for review during the five
year period.
The minority reports are a curious collection. The first one is simply a plea for
the N.C.N.C. freedom charter and need not concern us. The second one is also part of the
N.C.N.C. freedom charter. I am sure everyone agrees that universal adult suffrage
must be the eventual goal in Nigeria but I see no point in pressing for it at the
moment when we know it would not work. It is surely preferable to leave it to the
electoral commissions to work out the kind of electoral system in each region which
in their view would work best. I have already commented on the third minority
report which is concerned with the qualifications for voters in the north.
The last minority report concerns the status of Lagos. It is most interesting to see
the very strong support both in Lagos and in the western region for doing away with
direct representation in the Central Legislature. As I have said earlier in this minute,
I do not think there is any need for us to comment on this point as it is clearly a
1 Gorsuch added in the margin here ‘candidates’.
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matter which ought to be settled locally. There will no doubt be much more
discussion on this point in Nigeria and I would prefer to leave it to the local people to
make their own decisions as best they can.
I have minuted at some length because it does seem important to see in some
detail what alterations the General Conference have made to the statement of the
Drafting Committee which we have already considered in considerable detail. I have
also been anxious to consider what we should say to the Governor on these
recommendations. My feeling is that generally speaking it will suffice for us to write
to the Governor (I would suggest a semi-official letter for Mr. Cohen’s signature)
saying that we have been generally impressed by the sound sense shown by the
General Conference, that we have no desire at this stage to add anything to the views
already expressed, but that we would like to have some explanation of the reasons
which prompted the General Conference to take away from officials in the regional
legislatures the right to vote. I think we should conclude by saying that we entirely
share the Governor’s high opinion of the way in which Sir G. Howe chaired the
Conference. It is, I think, particularly gratifying that so large and in some respects
amorphous body was able in so short a time to produce so workable a document.
That this was so is, of course, in a considerable measure due to the very hard work
put in by Mr. Foot and his colleagues in the Drafting Committee. Finally, I think we
should say that we entirely appreciate the reasons why the Governor prefers to wait
until the Regional Houses have met before making any attempt to find a new basis
for compromise regarding regional representation, repeating our willingness to do
anything to help if that is necessary.
R.J.V.
10.2.50
94 CO 537/5801 14 Feb 1950
[Zikist movement]: minute by L H Gorsuch on further arrests of
Zikist leaders
[On 8 Feb 1950 the authorities launched a series of raids on Zikist members across
Nigeria. Among those arrested was Mokwugo Okoye, general secretary since the
incarceration of the movement’s leaders in 1949; during this period M15 had monitored
correspondence between Okoye and Harry Pollitt, general secretary of the British
Communist Party (CO 537/5801, minute by R E S Yeldham, 7 Dec 1949). The arrests were
followed by an assassination attempt by a Zikist member on Foot on 18 Feb, see 97. In
Mar Okoye was convicted of sedition and imprisoned, see 98. Shortly after, on 12 Apr, the
government took the decision to ban the Zikist movement, see 100.]
Enclosures 4 to 6 show that the Nigerian Government is taking action under the
sedition law against members of the Zikist movement.
This movement, with which Dr. Azikiwe is not associated, is the extreme left-wing
party in Nigeria. Its constitution is given in encl. 1, but it has been evident for some
time that its practice tends towards violence and subversion of ordered government.
Mr. Foot told me when home recently that success by the Gold Coast Government
in breaking ‘Positive Action’ there would greatly strengthen the hands of the
Nigerian Government. It may be that this action is attributable partly to the course of
events subsequently in the Gold Coast.
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95 CO 537/5786, no 10 23 Feb 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter (reply) from A B Cohen to H M Foot on
the next stage of the constitutional review
Many thanks for your letter of —February1 about the constitution. I am most
grateful for this full statement of the position as it now is. We have not, in present
circumstances, been able to show your letter to Ministers and what follows therefore
represents views at the official level only. I think that it is our views at the official
level that you wanted for the purpose of your discussions during the Legislative
Council. There will of course have to be full discussions with the Secretary of State at
a later stage, presumably when you are here in April.
2. We think that the results of the General Conference are on the whole very
satisfactory and that Howe is to be warmly congratulated. Apart from the points you
mention it is particularly satisfactory that the North has endorsed the
recommendations of the Drafting Committee about Ministers and has accepted
regional Ministers for the North itself. Without this there would have been a
tendency, I believe, for the North to fall behind under the new constitution. Although
the insistence of the Northern delegates on half the seats in the central Legislature
has created a difficult situation, we should have been very surprised, as no doubt you
also would have been, if they had not pressed for this and we are not too despondent
about reaching some compromise. We entirely agree with the view expressed in the
last paragraph of your letter that the whole constitutional review has been of the
utmost value.
3. As regards the two points with which your letter particularly deals, I can say
straight away that, subject to what follows, we agree generally with the compromise
suggestions which you tentatively put forward.
4. Taking the question of the central Legislature and regional legislation first, we
would see no objection in principle to taking the power to refer back or reject
regional legislation out of the hands of the central Legislature and vesting it in the
central Executive, if a compromise over the composition of the central Legislature
could be arrived at in this way. The proposal which you now make is indeed an
extension of what we ourselves suggested in the memorandum enclosed with my
letter to the Governor of the 20th December and subsequently, in a different form, in
the talks with you. The suggestion which emerged from these, recorded in paragraph
3 on page 2 of the note which you took back with you, was, as you will remember,
that, in the event of the Council of State deciding that a Bill passed by a regional
legislature was in conflict with an overall Nigerian interest, a joint committee would
be set up, consisting of members of the regional legislature on the one hand and of
the central Legislature and Council of State on the other. In the event of agreement
being reached in this committee the amended Bill would be referred back to the
regional legislature and would not come to the central Legislature at all. It would
only come to the central Legislature in the event of a disagreement in the joint
committee, in which case it might be rejected there by a simple majority.
5. You now propose to cut out the central Legislature altogether and in effect
what you are doing is establishing a procedure under which the Governor-in-Council
1 See 93.
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(i.e. the Council of Ministers) would have the right to consider every Bill passed by a
regional legislature and to decide whether it conflicted with an overall Nigerian
interest or not. The constitutional principle would presumably be that the Governor-
in-Council would be deciding whether the Bill in the form passed by the regional
legislature should be presented to the Lieutenant Governor for the Royal assent. If
the Governor-in-Council (the Council of Ministers) came to the conclusion that
there was something objectionable in the Bill from the overall Nigerian point of view,
the procedure under your proposal would, we assume, be that a joint committee
representative of the regional legislature and the Council of Ministers would be set
up. The Ministers without Portfolio and the Ministers for regional subjects might
well be drawn upon, with the Attorney General, for this purpose. If this joint
committee reached agreement, the amended Bill would go back to the regional
legislature for approval in its new form. If the joint committee failed to reach
agreement, the Council of Ministers would have to decide whether the Bill should be
presented to the Lieutenant Governor for assent. Incidentally, it is necessary to bear
in mind that at some stage, either before or after reference to the Council of
Ministers, there would have to be an opportunity for the Lieutenant Governor to
consider whether there is any objection to giving assent to the Bill, quite apart from
any overall Nigerian interest.
6. I agree that from some points of view the procedure you now propose is more
logical than that previously proposed. In particular it leads on more smoothly to the
ultimate objective, which we have agreed must be aimed at in future amendments of
the constitution, after the one now taking place, under which the central and
regional legislatures would each have their own exclusive spheres of operation (there
might also be a concurrent sphere) and the central Legislature would not be
concerned directly with legislation within the exclusive regional sphere. I suppose
that it is possible that you may have difficulty in securing sufficiently wide
agreement to cut the central Legislature altogether out of regional legislation; but if
you could do so, the procedure would certainly be simpler.
7. What you are suggesting in effect is that the East and the West should be
persuaded to agree to the North having the same representation on the Legislature
as the East and the West put together, or something near it, in return for the North
agreeing that the central Legislature should not be concerned with regional
legislation. As I have said, we see no objection to the compromise proposal you
suggest. But from the point of view of a bargain surely the North would be a rather
substantial gainer in the compromise, since I should imagine that they themselves
would not be sorry to see the central Legislature cut out in this way, and we gather
that you do not think they would object to your procedure on the ground that they
would be in a minority in the Council of Ministers, where there would in any case be
six officials. We are inclined therefore to think that something else ought also to be
added to the bargain to make it more palatable to Eastern and Western opinion. We
suggest that the North should also, if possible be persuaded to agree to drop their
insistance that a candidate for election to the Northern Regional House should be a
‘Northern Nigerian’ (IXD of the Report). We are not at all clear what the term
‘Northern Nigerian’ actually means. Taken literally it might well include southerners
born in the North; from the Eastern minority report, however, we assume that it is
intended to exclude them and to apply only to persons of Northern Nigerian descent.
While we are fully aware of the historical and other reasons which have led the North
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to insist on this provision, we think that it is objectionable in principle and hard to
defend; and we are doubtful whether it is in the long term interests even of the North
to insist on it. It would be an excellent thing, we feel, if, as part of the compromise
about representation on the central Legislature, the North could be induced to drop
this and perhaps also—although this is less important—reduce the period of
residence required to one year, as for the other regions, instead of three. We do not of
course suggest that you should try to induce the North to drop the limitation of
voters and candidates in the North to males.
8. As regards the numbers in the central Legislature I agree that these for the time
being must, as you say, remain a matter for local horse trading. I should, however, like
to say that I believe that there are very good grounds for having enough seats in the
central Legislature to enable every division in the East and West to be represented by
one member on the central Legislature, as is proposed by the General Conference in
VA (a) (iv). One of the criticisms which I have heard made of the system of a double
electoral college (at the divisional or provincial level and the regional level) is that
under it there would be no guarantee that all areas of the country would in fact be rep-
resented on the central Legislature. Zik has said this to me on more than one occa-
sion and no doubt it is a criticism which would be made freely by the N.C.N.C. when
pressing for direct election to the central Legislature, cutting out the Regional Houses.
If it is laid down in the constitution that every division in the East and West is to have
at least one member, then, although you would not completely satisfy those who want
direct election, you would at any rate have a strong argument against them. Incidentally,
if each division in the West and East is to have at least one member on the Central
Legislature, ought not each province in the North to have at least two rather than one?
This would, I imagine, be easily possible if the numbers available are 40 or 45, even
allowing for the representation of the House of Chiefs. In any case I feel that the rather
larger numbers suggested by the General Conference would have a considerable advan-
tage in that they would allow each division in the East and West to have at least one
member on the Central Legislature.
9. Turning now to the question of Lagos, we agree generally with what you pro-
pose. We feel strongly that if Lagos is to be treated as part of the Western Region for
purposes of the constitution, special arrangements must be made on the general lines
which you propose to ensure that it has adequate representation both on the regional
and central Legislatures. This seems to us necessary for three reasons—because Lagos
is the capital, on historical grounds (because there are at present three Lagos mem-
bers) and on political grounds (because otherwise there will always be strong criticism
from the Lagos politicians). We assume that, if Lagos were to be treated as part of the
Western Region, as the Drafting Committee proposed, the Municipality area would be
regarded as equivalent to a division. Under this arrangement Lagos would get at least
two members on the regional legislature and at least one member on the central
Legislature. We doubt whether this is enough and we are inclined to think that, in set-
tling the minimum number of seats, as you propose on page 7 of your letter, you would
have to provide for at least two seats on the central Legislature for the Lagos
Municipality—and possibly three—with a correspondingly increased minimum for the
regional legislature. Another important point seems to us to be that the Lagos
Municipality should have separate representation from the Colony divisions both on
the regional and central Legislatures. That is, I understand, what is intended. If this
were not done, I take it that the Yorubas would be getting matters altogether too much
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their own way. There is one final point about Lagos which may not directly affect the
constitution. You say that it should continue to be treated as one administrative unit
with the Colony. We see no objection to that; but, if it is to be in the Western Region,
does this mean that the Commissioner for the Colony (or whoever was in charge of
this administrative region) would have to report to Government through the
Lieutenant Governor at Ibadan? This would seem to us a pretty clumsy arrangement
and we hope that it could be avoided.
10. We have considered, as no doubt you also have, whether it would be desirable
to hold suggested compromises on the two major questions discussed above in
reserve for the Secretary of State to bring forward if agreement cannot be reached by
the members of the Legislative Council. There is evidently some risk that if the
compromises you suggest are put forward in the proposed Select Committee of the
Legislative Council and not accepted, it may be difficult to find further compromises
which would serve as a basis for securing an agreement. On the other hand it seems
to us so desirable to secure agreement in Nigeria itself on all the main points before
the proposals come to the Secretary of State that we believe that the balance of
advantage lies very definitely in favour of the procedure which you suggest, namely
to try to secure compromises on the two points of difference while the Legislative
Council is meeting. In other words we agree with the procedure which you suggest.
11. The fact that there will be six official members on the proposed Select
Committee might be regarded as raising a difficulty since, in the discussions which
you will have, it may be slightly difficult for you to take the necessary initiative to
secure compromises without committing the Nigerian Government to a particular
point of view. Obviously in these major constitutional questions the Nigerian
Government can hardly have a separate point of view from H.M. Government, and it
might hence be felt that the suggested procedure would at any rate indirectly
implicate H.M. Government prematurely. We have come to the conclusion that this
difficulty need not be a real one, provided that in the Select Committee the objective
is finally to crystallise the unofficial view, the purpose of having official members
thus being to help the Africans to reach agreement on the points where there is still a
difference of view. We imagine that this is in fact what you intend. I am sure that you
will agree that Government—and by that I mean H.M. Government and the Nigerian
Government—must be left quite free to consider whatever comes out of the
Legislative Council.
12. There are one or two other points in the Report of the General Conference on
which I should like to comment. I do not intend to go over the whole ground, in
particular where comments have been made in the memorandum enclosed with my
letter of the 20th December and in our discussions here.2 So do not regard these
comments as exclusive.
13. My first comment relates to the position of the Trust Territory. The
conclusions of the General Conference seem to us satisfactory in this respect. The
Southern Cameroons will have at least two members for each division on the Eastern
Regional House and at least one member for each division on the central Legislature.
Incidentally VA (a) (v) in the report seems to us to have no effect, having regard to VA
(a) (iv). If each division of the Southern Cameroons is to have at least one member on
the central Legislature, the whole of the area will have a good deal more than two,
2 See 87.
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We should in fact regard two as inadequate out of a total representation of 33 for the
Eastern Region. It is also satisfactory that under IX A (i) each section of the Trust
Territory in the Northern Region is to have at least one seat on the Northern House
of Assembly. Would it be possible to provide in any way a minimum representation
on the central Legislature to cover these areas? It is satisfactory also that the
Southern Cameroons is to have one representative on the central Executive;
obviously the same arrangement is not possible for the Northern Cameroons.
14. You will no doubt now have seen the report of the Visiting Mission on the
British Cameroons. It seems to us generally to be a satisfactory and objective
document and one is encouraged to consider how far we can go to meet the points
made in it about the position of the Cameroons in relation to Nigeria. No doubt the
point which follows will be discussed with Gibbons. I imagine that the Nigerian
Government will wish to stand firm in arguing that the Southern Cameroons ought
not to be separated from the Eastern Region, because if it were it would cease to be
financially viable. But I wonder whether it might not be wise to agree in connection
with the new constitution that there should be a special council for the Southern
Cameroons, which would be responsible for advising inter alia on the expenditure of
monies made available for general development in the area by the Cameroons
Development Corporation. This is something very like what the Visiting Mission has
itself recommended and it seems to us that it might go a long way to meet the
aspirations of those who are pressing for separate status for the Trust Territory
within Nigeria. I am not suggesting that such a council should be given any
functions in relation to the constitution (e.g. as an electoral college). What I am
suggesting is that the intention to set up such a council, if this were agreed to,
should be announced at the appropriate stage in the constitutional discussions.
Whether the council should be provided for in the constitution or not would be a
matter for consideration. The idea is a tentative one and would require further
consideration here if you thought that there was anything in it.
15. As regards III B of the recommendations, we are not at all clear why the
General Conference has recommended that officials on the Regional Houses should
have no right to vote. This seems to us to be wrong in principle. As we understand it
the officials on the Regional Houses would, in the East and West and also, in the
main, in the North be the official members of the regional Executive Councils. It
seems to us an essential part of the scheme that they should be treated in all respects
as being on all fours with the regional Ministers. In other words they, like the
Ministers with portfolio, would have certain departments under their charge and as
members of the regional Executive they should in our view have the vote in the
Regional Houses just as Ministers will have it. This may not be a point of major
practical importance; it does seem to be a point of principle on which a modification
of the General Conference’s recommendation would be desirable.
16. I need not say anything here about the arrangements for the appointment of
regional and central Ministers or the distribution of portfolios. These were discussed
fully when you were here and you know our views, which are in any case recorded in
the papers which you took back with you.
17. As regards V A (b) it is very satisfactory, as you say, that the General
Conference has agreed to recommend a small number of members to be appointed by
the Governor for their general qualifications. We shall have to consider at a later
stage whether three is enough and take into account what is proposed for the Gold
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Coast, where the Coussey Committee recommended two members to represent
commerce and mining and the Governor has recently agreed to the Secretary of
State’s suggestion of six, not all of whom would be drawn from the commercial and
mining community. I think that we shall want to suggest that these members are not
appointed to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented, because it is
our policy to avoid the representation of interests in this way. We shall want the
members simply to be appointed for their general competence. This, however, is a
point of drafting.
18. As regards section IX of the recommendations I agree with you that they
represent an improvement over the proposals of the Drafting Committee. I was glad
to see the recommendation in F of this section that the primary election in each
region would be direct. It will be interesting to see how the details of this
arrangement will be worked out in each region and I am sure that this is a point on
which the Secretary of State will be interested when the time comes, as the method
adopted is bound to have such an important effect both on the working and the
acceptability of the new constitution.
19. As regards section XIII about the review of the constitution, the General
Conference seem to have gone a bit astray. Do they really mean to recommend that
the constitution should be subject to review within the first five-year period? We
should have hoped that there would be no review at any rate for five years.
20. There are two other points which I merely mention now in preparation for
the discussions which we shall be having when you come on leave. We shall want to
discuss then the question of the working of the Council of Ministers under the new
constitution (paragraph (o) on page 5 of the record of your meeting with the
Secretary of State on the 9th January)3 and the question of the administrative
reorganisation which the further devolution will make necessary (pages 4 and 5 of
the note of the discussions with you at the official level from the 3rd–5th January).
21. May I finish up by apologising for this exceedingly long letter?
1 See 88.
96 CO 583/314/2, no 25A 9 Mar 1950
[Cameroons Visiting Mission]: observations of the Administering
Authority on the report to the Trusteeship Council on the Cameroons
under British administration by the Visiting Mission to Trust
Territories in West Africa made by the Representative of the UK on
the Trusteeship Council [Extract]
. . . (b) Integration of the Trust Territory with Nigeria1
The Administering Authority welcomes the Mission’s balanced statement of this
problem, to which it has little to add. The Mission’s Report shows clearly that close
integration is inevitable in the Trust Territory administered as part of the Northern
Provinces. Regarding the Cameroons and Bamenda Provinces of the Southern
Cameroons, the views of the Administering Authority are expressed in paragraphs
22–25 of the observations on document T/PET.4/16 which read as follows:—
1 See 92.
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‘The claim made in the Memorandum is for the constitution of the
Cameroons and Bamenda Provinces as a separate Region of Nigeria, instead of
forming as at present two Provinces of the Eastern Region and the operative
sentence would appear to be:
‘If all the Cameroons as one man are opposed to the present
Administrative system which derogates us into an appendage to a
Region in the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, it is because of the
absence of direct representation to the Legislative Council of Nigeria,
through this faulty system’.
It is impossible to offer final comments on this argument until the results of
the review of the constitution now taking place in Nigeria, with Trust
Territory representatives participating, are known and have been considered.
It may, however, be said that the early stages of the discussions have revealed
a strong body of opinion in favour of guaranteeing Cameroons representation
in the Central Legislature, on the assumption that the new pattern of the
Nigerian Constitution will be that of a federal state with a central and three
regional legislatures. Should this view prevail the only practically cogent
reason for the desire on the part of the petitioners for separate regional status
would have been met.
23. A grave drawback to creating a separate region composed of the
Cameroons and Bamenda Provinces, even if this were practicable, would be
that it would introduce a sharp distinction between the methods of political
development to be followed by the Southern and Northern parts of the Trust
Territory respectively, for a glance at the map and the slightest knowledge of
their social structure clearly indicate that the portions of Trust Territory in
the Northern Provinces cannot be administered except as integral parts of
three of those Provinces. In fact, provided that their political identity and
power of self-expression can be safeguarded by other means, it is difficult to
see what advantages the inhabitants of the Southern Cameroons would derive
from becoming a separate region. The disadvantages are obvious. If they were
to have technical services in any way comparable in quality to those now
provided for them by the regional organisation they would contract a
crippling burden in the overhead costs of administration. They would lose the
invaluable opportunities of political education offered by representation in
the legislature of the Eastern Region: they have not themselves yet produced
the men to form a separate legislature of real competence or value and the
result of their retreating into isolation would inevitably mean that they would
lag further and further behind in political development. At the same time
there are overwhelming geographical and economic reasons, and some ethnic
reasons, for their remaining in close association with the rest of the Eastern
Region.
24. It remains to examine what steps have been taken to preserve the
political identity of the Southern Cameroons and to provide its people with
means of expression to the Administering Authority. Each of the two
Provinces, is, of course, a political entity clearly distinguishable from the
neighbouring Provinces of the Protectorate of Nigeria. They have both been
placed under the administrative control of the Commissioner of the
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Cameroons, (an office created in April 1949), who is thus able to direct their
joint development. It is the practice for questions of policy to be discussed
between the Commissioner and representatives of the Native Authorities and
other popular representatives of the two Provinces sitting together. Whatever
the forthcoming constitutional developments may be, therefore, an
organisation for the expression of the will of the whole area is growing up.
25. In the exercise of his functions in administrative charge of the
Cameroons and Bamenda provinces the Commissioner of the Cameroons is, of
course, responsible to the Chief Commissioner of the Eastern Provinces. The
Commissioner has, however, also been made responsible for dealing with ques-
tions arising from the application of the Trusteeship Agreement to the whole
of the Cameroons under British Trusteeship and for ensuring the representa-
tion of the Nigerian Government at meetings of the Trusteeship Council of the
United Nations. To enable him to discharge these responsibilities communi-
cations affecting the application of the Trusteeship Agreement are referred to
him direct by the central government and he is authorised to communicate
direct in this respect with the Chief Secretary to the Government as well as
with the Chief Commissioners, concerned and, where necessary, with Heads of
Departments. There is thus an assurance that matters concerning the
Trusteeship obligations of the Administering Authority will not be overshad-
owed by the Administrative requirements of the two Regions in which the
Trust Territory lies, and in all matters of moment, the most direct channel is
provided for information and representations from the Trust Territory to the
Governor of Nigeria and thus to the Administering Authority’.
Regarding the review of the constitution, the stage of public discussion outside the
Legislature has now been completed. It is not the case that the Trust Territory was
not specifically represented at the general conference which marked the final step in
the procedure of consultation. The Southern Cameroons was specifically represented
in that conference by Dr. E. M. L. Endeley, the President of the Cameroons National
Federation. As an indication of the views of the educated classes of the Southern
Cameroons the text of Dr. Endeley’s speech in the general debate has been made
available to the Trusteeship Council in connection with the reply to No. 6. of the
written questions transmitted by members of the Council on the 1948 Report on the
Cameroons under British Administration. While stressing the special status and
claims of the Trust Territory Dr. Endeley expressed the degree of satisfaction with
which the Cameroons people regarded the various guarantees for their
representation proposed during the discussions, and eventually supported the
recommendations of the Conference without adding to the number of Minority
Reports submitted by certain other interests. These recommendations will shortly be
published, together with a record of the proceedings of the Conference, and will be
made available to the Trusteeship Council in the usual way. Meanwhile it may be of
interest to summarize those of the recommendations which concern the Trust
Territory. They include the following proposed safeguards for its effective
representation:—
(a) Regional Legislature In the Eastern Region, besides normal unofficial
representation, consisting of at least two members per Division, one of the five
official members should come from the Southern Cameroons. In the Northern
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Region at least one representative in the House of Assembly should come from
each section of the Trust Territory in the Bornu and Adamawa Provinces.
(b) Regional Executive Councils In the Eastern Regional Executive Council, of
nine unofficial members at least one should come from Trust Territory.
(c) Central Legislature Of thirty-three unofficial members from the Eastern
Region, at least one should come from each Division in the Cameroons as well as
in the rest of the Region.
(d) Central Executive Council Of four unofficial members from the Eastern
Region, one should be from Trust Territory.
97 CO 583/302/13, no 11 18 Mar 1950
[Attack on H M Foot]: inward savingram no 87 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Griffiths concerning the assassination attempt on H M Foot
My telegram No. 280. Attack on Mr. H.M. Foot.
The attack was made at 8.20 a.m. on the 18th of February. As Foot was entering the
Secretariat a man, later identified as one Heelas Ugokwe (an Ibo of Abagana, Onitsha
Province, aged about 24), attempted to stab him with a jack-knife, but the blow was
badly aimed and the knife merely pierced Foot’s coat and slightly scratched his skin.
Ugokwe then escaped leaving his hat and the knife behind him. He was, however,
recognised and was arrested the following day.
2. When a boy, Ugokwe was sent to the reformatory school at Enugu for stealing.
He joined the army during the war as a signaller, served in Burma and rose to the
rank of Corporal Signal Instructor. He was, however, a trouble-maker and in
December, 1948, after having been reduced in rank for accepting bribes, he was
discharged. He then became a daily-paid employee in the Post and Telegraphs
Department and was in that occupation at the time of the assault.
3. When arrested, Ugokwe freely stated that he intended to kill Foot. He said that
he was filled with hatred for Europeans after the Enugu incident—there were several
newspaper cuttings relating to that incident on his person when he was arrested—that
he had originally intended to assassinate the Governor but that after waiting for nine
days and failing to find an opportunity he had decided to assassinate the Chief
Secretary instead, especially since he considered the latter to have been instrumental
in turning down the N.N.F.L.’s demand for increased wage rates and other recent wage
claims. He repeated the substance of this during the preparatory examination before
the Magistrate. He was committed for trial on a charge of attempted murder on the
27th of February and was tried at the Lagos Assizes on the 13th of March before Mr.
Justice Rhodes, who found him guilty and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.1
4. It seems probable that recent events have put Ugokwe into a morbid state of
mind, but although he appears to be unbalanced, there is nothing to suggest that he
is mentally deranged.
5. As you are aware, the assassination of high Government officials has been the
subject of the discussion in the inner circles of the Zikist Movement for some
months and there is some reason to believe that this attack may have been an
attempt to put these plans into operation. Ugokwe himself is reported to have said
1 Reduced on appeal to 12 years.
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(and there is a certain amount of evidence to support his statement) that
arrangements were made at the Zikist Movement Convention held in Kaduna in
December, 1949, to recruit twelve persons to act as assassins in various parts of the
country. These had been selected and had received instructions from H.M. Okoye. He
(Ugokwe) had been selected for Lagos. This aspect is being further investigated.
6. While Ugokwe’s act is probably applauded by a small circle of irresponsible
extremists, it is viewed with disgust and concern by all responsible leaders whose
forthright denunciation of this act and of the Zikist Movement’s general tendency
towards violence, undoubtedly reflects the feeling of the vast majority of the people
of this country.
98 CO 537/5801, no 7 25 Mar 1950
[Zikist movement]: inward savingram no 94 from Sir J Macpherson to
Mr Griffiths on the arrests of Zikist members
My telegram 172. ZIKIST MOVEMENT. H. M. Okoye, Secretary General of the Zikist
Movement was arraigned before Mr. Justice Rhodes at the Lagos Assizes on the 7th
March on three charges of being in possession of seditious documents. He refused to
plead and after the Crown’s case had been proved he was convicted and sentenced to
a total of 33 months imprisonment.
2. In the Northern Provinces, fifteen persons’ houses were searched and seditious
documents were found in eleven of them. These eleven persons have been prosecuted
for being in possession of seditious documents. Nine persons have so far been con-
victed, of whom eight were sentenced to imprisonment for six months and one was
fined £25. Four of these have lodged appeals. The other two trials have not yet been
concluded. In the Eastern provinces, seven houses were searched and two persons in
Onitsha and one in Enugu were arrested and charged for like offences. The trials of
two have not yet been completed; the third was acquitted, though I am advised that in
this case the Magistrate probably misdirected himself on a point of law.
3. I attach copies of the principal documents1 which were found during the
searches and for the possession of one or more of which each of the accused was
prosecuted. The document entitled ‘The National Programme’ was found in the
house of Nzimiro, the Secretary of the Onitsha Branch of the Movement. This
document was in code, the key to which was also found. It purported to be a code for
the use of the ‘National Command’ comprising the Zikist Movement, the N.N.F.L.
and the U.A.C. Amalgamated Workers Union, the three bodies with which Nduka Eze
is intimately connected, but it is considered unlikely that the U.A.C. Amalgamated
Union as such was aware that it was implicated in these seditious activities.
4. These arrests and trials have excited little public interest, the feeling of most
people being that the Zikists have got only themselves to blame for their present trou-
bles. There are, however, those, especially among the Ibos, who consider that their
actions were justified, though their methods were inept. Azikiwe is reported to have
expressed considerable annoyance with the Movement and to have said that he was not
prepared to waste the funds of the N.C.N.C. in defence of unplanned action. Within the
Movement there has been considerable criticism of Okoye who is blamed for causing
1 Not printed.
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the trouble by composing and distributing the seditious papers without reference to
the other members of the Central Executive. Among the ordinary rank and file there
has been a tendency, especially in the Northern Provinces, to withdraw unobtrusively
from the Movement, while in Lagos and Kano, certain members, including Smart Ebbi,
have been accused (quite wrongly) of selling to the Police the information on which
the searches were based, and ‘purged’ from the Movement despite their protests of
innocence. At the moment, as might be expected, the Movement is somewhat disor-
ganised and there is an apparent tendency on the part of those left at the head of affairs
to conduct themselves with a greater regard for constitutional methods than has been
their practice in recent months, but there is no reason to suppose that these prosecu-
tions will result in the Movement’s disintegration.
99 CO 537/5795, no 3 25–27 Mar 1950
[Fitzgerald Commission report]: minutes by R J Vile and L H Gorsuch
on the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Commission
[The Fitzgerald Report, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disorders in the
Eastern Provinces of Nigeria, 1949, col. no. 256, (1950) was completed in Mar and
published in June 1950]
The Report of the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry into the disorders in the Eastern
Provinces of Nigeria in November 1949 is attached behind this file as an enclosure to
2. The copy for the Governor of Nigeria was despatched by special bag on the 23rd
March and thirty printers proof copies will be despatched on the 25th March for use
in Nigeria. Copies of the printers proofs have also been sent to Sir T. Lloyd, Mr.
Gorsuch and Mr. Grossmith and a copy will be given to Mr. Cohen on his return from
Lisbon.
For convenience I have prepared a summary of the conclusions and
recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry and a short version of the Report. I
have not prepared the short version because I consider that the report is too long to
read, but for convenience at a later stage when it may be necessary for those
concerned to refresh their memory quickly.
This Report is an authoritative document and the views it contains cannot in my
view be set aside in any particular. It is possible legitimately to criticise certain points
of detail but these do not affect in any way the main conclusions reached by the
Report. We must recognise that these conclusions constitute a very severe criticism
not only of the acts of individual officers but also of the general policy followed by the
Nigerian Government and the Secretary of State. There are passages in the Report
which will be of the utmost value to the Communists, to those members of the
Trusteeship Council bitterly opposed to the U.K. and to the fellow travellers who
delight in criticising British colonial policy. This Report constitutes a challenge to
our policy and I would suggest that that challenge can only be met if we take bold
and imaginative measures in the light of the recommendations contained in the
Report. It would I am sure be fatal to allow our enemies to seize the initiative both in
Nigeria and elsewhere.
Turning to the detailed recommendations made, they can be divided into those
which the Governor should deal with on his own initiative and those in which a
consultation with the Secretary of State is necessary. I would suggest that it is not
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necessary for the Secretary of State to take any part in the decisions about the errors
of judgment committed by the Chief Commissioner and the officers who advise him
and the Senior Superintendent of Police who gave the order to fire at Iva Valley. On
the other questions raised by the Report, we must first consider the general political
recommendation made by the Commission. It is indeed difficult to see what more the
Governor of Nigeria could have done to impress upon the people of Nigeria the
goodwill and enthusiasm he felt and the constructive policy to which he is
committed. I am sure that there is no deficiency in our previous thinking about the
need for Constitutional Reform and the rapid improvement of Local Government
Organisation. The association of Africans with all forms of government enterprise in
Nigeria has proceeded as quickly as the supply of competent Africans would allow.
Nevertheless I think it behoves us to re-examine very carefully indeed the whole
question in order to see what more we can do and to announce even more loudly the
constructive policy to which we are committed.
The recommendations made about labour policy do not constitute a completely
workable policy in themselves. We have, however, had the opportunity recently to
consider with the Africa Sub-Committee of the Colonial Labour Advisory Committee
the recommendations made in the Commission of Inquiry into the railway dispute
earlier in 1949 and from that consideration there has emerged a large number of
constructive suggestions. I would suggest that the time is ripe for us to take the
suggestions made by that Sub-Committee and the suggestions made by this
Commission in order to see what new departure in policy could be inaugurated.
The recommendations about the industrial relations at the Enugu colliery seem to
be sound and I would suggest that even if there are some doubts about their
practicability it would be far better to adopt these suggestions without delay.
Although the report of this Commission is to the Governor, there is no reason why
we should not give him the benefit of our views on it at the earliest possible moment.
I am sure indeed that he would welcome such an expression of our views. After
discussion with Mr. Gorsuch I have prepared a draft letter for Sir T. Lloyd’s signature
to Sir John Macpherson which I now submit for consideration. After this letter has
been issued it would then I think be appropriate to consult the labour advisers and
Mr. Grossmith urgently in order to see what more detailed views we were able to put
forward.
R.J.V.
25.3.50
Sir T Lloyd
The Fitzgerald Commission Report has been sent to the Governor, and is being
printed here. I have also sent an advance copy to each of the three other Governors. I
send the file forward direct to you because I think you would not wish Sir John
Macpherson to be left to consider this extremely difficult report without some word
from here, not only of our first reaction to it but also of sympathy.
The position with which the Governor will be faced on publication of the Report is
briefly as follows.
The shock of events at Enugu brought the N.Y.M. (the leading Yoruba Party) and
the N.C.N.C. (the predominantly Ibo Party of which Doctor Azikiwe is the head)
together and led to the formation of the National Emergency Committee. Although
this is an uneasy alliance it is still holding together, and the contents of the
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Commission’s Report may help to cement it. The tactics likely to be pursued by this
body are indicated in para 17 of the Nigerian Political Summary flagged in
47272/3A/50 below. There can be little doubt that the adverse comment in the Report
on the handling of the situation will set the extreme political elements barking at the
heels of the officers whose conduct is criticised. The comments of the Commission
on wider aspects may also be used by them as a pretext for prejudicing the
discussions on further constitutional advance, which are now in a delicate stage, and
for urging that something much more radical in the shape of Constitutional Reform
is necessary.
In the labour field the position is likely also to be difficult. Another body which
emerged from the Enugu incident is the National Labour Committee (see para 7 of
the Nigeria Political Summary). The names of the leaders indicate that this body is
likely to be anything but moderate in its views or inclined to be co-operative with the
Government in any action it may take on the Commission’s recommendations in
regard to re-organisation of the Trade Union Movement and improvements in the
field of industrial conciliation.
Nigerian political combinations are notoriously fickle; but it is clear that the
Nigerian Government will have its work cut out to avoid a serious setback to its pol-
icy from the publication of this report. Its object must, I think, be to obtain the sup-
port of moderate and responsible opinion, but this can only be achieved by clear-cut
action aimed at keeping the initiative. For this purpose it seems certain that the report
when published must be accompanied by some definite and convincing statement of
the Government’s intention in regard to the recommendations made, and my feeling
is that it would be of great help to the Nigerian Government if the document published
with the report consisted not only of a despatch from the Governor setting out his
comments on the report and his intentions with regard to its recommendations, but
also a despatch to him from the Secretary of State accepting and endorsing the lines
which he proposes to follow. To put the report out without something of this nature
accompanying it would be to play into the hands of those who aim at using it to bedevil
the political and industrial atmosphere in Nigeria.
As regards the officers, from the Chief Commissioner downwards, whose actions
have been adversely criticised by the Commission, I feel that we should refrain from
comment at the moment and leave it to the Governor to say the first word. As regards
the wider field of labour organisation, industrial relations and trade unionism, which
the Commission’s Report covers, we should I suggest let the Governor know at once
that we are anxious to let him have the benefit of the best possible advice which we
can give him, and are for that purpose studying the report very carefully and will, if
we think it would be of help, write to him again on this subject before we receive his
comments. Perhaps I could have a short discussion with you on the lines which
consideration of this part of the report in the office should take.
Enugu has for some time been a weak spot in Nigeria, and you may remember the
letter which we sent on the subject at 18 on 30647/1C/48 below. It is a pity that the
Colliery Board was not formed sooner; it might have helped to bring about not only
the improvements in labour organisation but the change in the mentality of the
management which seems to be essential if the colliery is to settle down properly.
I have enclosed an alternative draft in Sir J. Macpherson.
L.H.G.
27.3.50
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100 CO 537/5807, no 24 29 Mar–6 Apr 1950
[Banning of Zikists]: inward telegram no 426 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Griffiths on his intention to ban the Zikist movement. 
Minutes by Sir T Lloyd and Mr Griffiths
Following searches undertaken by police in houses of a number of leading members
of the Zikist movement, prosecutions for sedition have taken place and convictions
obtained. This has weakened the organisation, but there is evidence that it is still
endeavouring to organise acts of violence.
2. I have considered the position in the Executive Council, and with the
unanimous advice of the Council I have decided to declare the movement an
unlawful society under section 62 of the Criminal Code. The announcement of this
decision will be made early next month and the following Government statement will
issue at the same time: Begins:—
‘Conclusive evidence has been obtained from many parts of the country that
the Zikist movement is an organisation which aims to stir up enmity and
malice and to pursue seditious aims by lawlessness and violence.
2. The movement has a membership of only a few hundreds and its teachings
and methods are condemned by the overwhelming majority of the people of
Nigeria who wish to maintain law and order and to pursue economic and
political progress without resort to violence.
3. Although the movement is small and unrepresentative its purposes and
methods are dangerous to the good government of Nigeria and it is essential
to make it quite clear that such purposes and methods will not be tolerated.
The Governor in the Executive Council has therefore declared the movement
an unlawful society under section 62 of the Criminal Code’. Ends.1
Minutes on 100
Secretary of State
No doubt you have already seen the Nigerian telegram at No. 24 among those
circulated to you. The decision which the Governor there reports is, of course, within
his legal powers and the matter at issue is one on which the policy always is to leave
decisions to Governors unless there are quite unusual reasons for the contrary. Sir
John Macpherson is acting with the unanimous advice of his Executive Council
which includes Africans, and although his decision will no doubt provoke some
Parliamentary Questions we must, I submit, trust his judgment.
The Governor does not require, and has not sought, you approval and no action is
necessary.
T.K.L.
3.4.50
1 The Zikists were banned on 13 April 1950.
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I note the trend towards banning publications and organisations. Where there is
evidence of incitement to disorder and violence this is clearly right. But otherwise
my view (and my experience at home) is that banning defeats its own ends. I would
like to discuss this general problem soon please.
J.G.
6.4.50
101 CO 537/5786, no 22 3 Apr 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from H M Foot to A B Cohen on the
Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the
Constitutional Review Enclosure
Minute by A B Cohen
The Governor has asked me to send you these copies of the Report of the Select
Committee of the Legislative Council on the Constitutional Review.
The main bone of contention was, as we expected, the question of representation
in the Central Legislature. Up to the last moment we had hoped that the non-
Northerners might be prepared to make the generous gesture of accepting the
Northern claim to parity. In the event several of the Western and Eastern Members
indicated that they were willing to see Northern representation considerably
increased and the Oni of Ife suggested that the figures might be fifty from the North
with thirty from the East and thirty from the West (Including Lagos). The
Northerners, however, were quite unprepared to shift their ground and as the
discussions went on opinion between North and South hardened. You will see that in
the end the whole question of the Central Legislature was postponed for further
consideration with special references to the possibility of establishing two Houses at
the centre.1
It is a big disappointment to us that we were unable to get substantial agreement
on the main outstanding question but we feel sure that you will agree that it was
much better to postpone consideration of the issue of the Central Legislature rather
than force the matter to a vote in which the North and the South would have been in
direct opposition.
In the past when we have thought of the possibility of a bicameral system we have
been inclined to rule the proposal out on the grounds that such a system would be
cumbersome and expensive but we shall now think the whole matter over again.
The other recommendations made by the General Conference seem to us
satisfactory as far as they go. The Lagos Members are against including Lagos in the
West and will, I believe, submit a minority report to that effect. I also believe that Zik
is busily engaged in preparing a monster minority report setting out his own views
on the whole question of constitutional reform.
1 The deadlock over northern representation in the central legislature led to plans in early 1950 to send a
northern delegation to London under the title ‘Northern Nigerian Petition of Rights’ to lobby the secretary
of state for equal representation, see inward telegram no 646 from Marshall to Cohen in CO 537/5786, no
26, 10 May 1950. 
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I am sending the report of the Committee at once so that you shall know without
delay how things have gone here. I hope to leave Lagos for London within the week
and I shall of course get in touch with you as soon as I arrive (although I shall try to
spend Easter week-end with my family in Cornwall). There is now no tremendous
hurry and I assume that we can have a full talk about the new situation in a week or
two’s time.
Enclosure to 101: Report of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council of
Nigeria on the Constitutional Review
1. The Select Committee of the Legislative Council composed of all Unofficial
Members of the Council, the Chief Secretary, the three Chief Commissioners, the
Acting Attorney-General, the Financial Secretary and the Commissioner of the
Colony was appointed to consider the recommendations of the General
Constitutional Conference held at Ibadan and the comments of the Regional Houses
thereon.
2. The Committee wishes to emphasize that it has no power to amend the
recommendations of the Ibadan General Conference: its functions are merely to
comment upon them.
3. The Committee has duly considered the recommendations of the Ibadan
General Conference together with the comments of the Regional Houses and, subject
to the important reservations and proposals which are set out in this report, endorses
the recommendations of the General Conference. In particular the Committee
warmly welcomes the proposals
(a) for greatly increased Regional autonomy within a united Nigeria;
(b) for giving Nigerians a full share in the shaping of Government policy and
direction of executive Government action in a Central Council of Ministers and
Regional Executive Councils; and
(c) for the creation of larger and more representative Regional Legislatures with
increased powers.
4. The Committee deliberately did not deal in minor detail with the recom-
mendations of the General Conference but rather directed its attention to ques-
tions of major importance on which divergence of view existed, in the hope that
it would be able to give advice which would assist in resolving the differences.
The three principal questions to which it directed its attention were the position
of Lagos in the new constitution, the exercise of the function of referring back
and rejection of Regional legislation and the composition of the Central
Legislature.
5. With regard to the position of Lagos two views have been put forward in
earlier discussions. The first was that Lagos as the capital should be separate from
any Region, with direct representation in the Central Legislature. The second
suggestion was that Lagos should be included in the Western Region. The
Committee came to the conclusion that in the kind of federal constitution envisaged
the balance of advantage was in favour of including Lagos in the Western Region but
it was also considered that the special status of the capital should be recognised by
the following means:—
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(a) all central services, including particularly the port and railway, should remain
a central responsibility under the direction of the Central Government;
(b) all expenses arising from the special needs of Lagos as the capital should be
met by a direct allocation of funds from the Central Government;
(c) the estimates of the Town Council should be submitted to the Governor in
Council for approval through the Lieutenant-Governor in Council of the Western
Region (bye-laws and regulations of the Town Council being however approved by
the Lieutenant-Governor in Council);
(d) at least two members representing Lagos in the Western House of Assembly
should be selected by that House to sit in the Central Legislature.
6. With regard to reference back to Regional Houses or rejection of Regional
legislation the Committee considers that it would be preferable to vest the power to
do so in the Council of Ministers rather than the House of Representatives as
previously proposed, on the ground that the exercise of such a function would be
more properly exercised by the Executive than the Legislature.
7. The Committee has thoroughly examined the different views put forward with
regard to the composition of the Central Legislature. The Northern representatives
adhere to their previous view that, on grounds of the relative populations of the
Regions, the Northern Regional Houses should have representation in the House of
Representatives equal with that of the other two Regions together. Most of the other
members however held the view that, while the Northern representation might be
considerably greater than that of either of the other Regions, the Northern claim to
full parity could not be justified in a federal system of the kind recommended by the
General Conference, in which only one Legislative Chamber at the centre was
proposed. These members urged that representation on a population basis in the
House of Representatives could only be justified if a bicameral system were
introduced and if the stipulation included in the recommendations of the General
Conference that only Northern Nigerians should be entitled to be candidates for
election to the Northern House of Assembly were abandoned. With regard to the last
point the Northern representatives indicated their readiness to agree to this
stipulation being abandoned provided that their claims to parity in the Central
Legislature were accepted.
In the discussion of the difficult problem of Regional representation in the Central
Legislature it was thought that a solution might be found by following the example
provided in other federal constitutions and having two Legislative Houses at the
centre—the composition of the House of Representatives being based on population
and the composition of an upper House being based on equality between the three
Regions. This was a proposal which had not been previously considered in the Regions
and it was therefore decided to recommend that the Regional representatives should
be given an opportunity of discussing it in the Regional Houses before a final
recommendation on the composition of the Central Legislature is made by the
Legislative Council to the Governor and Secretary of State.
During the discussion on the question of the composition of the Central
Legislature one other matter was raised which the Committee wishes to record.
The Committee considered that if there is to be a second Legislative Chamber at
the centre it would be advisable to reduce the size of the House of Representatives
below that recommended by the General Conference (it was recommended by
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the General Conference that there should be 122 members of the House of
Representatives).
8. The Committee also makes the following recommendations:—
(1) At least one member representing Calabar in the Eastern Regional House
should be selected by that House to sit in the Central Legislature.
(2) Official Members of the Regional Houses should have the right to vote.
(3) In the event of disagreement between the House of Chiefs and the House of
Assembly in either the Northern or the Western Region the question on which the
Houses disagree should be referred to a joint meeting composed of equal numbers
of both Houses, where a majority vote should prevail.
Minute on 101
Sir T. Lloyd
During Mr. Foot’s visit to London last week I discussed with him the action to be
taken on the Nigerian constitution. As you will see from the enclosure to (22), the
suggestion that there should be a bicameral Legislature at the centre, which is a new
one, is to be put to the Regional Houses and later to the Legislative Council and we
shall not know the conclusion on this until September. Mr. Foot, however, feels
strongly that it would greatly assist the Nigerian Government to secure a satisfactory
solution of the question of the representation of the Regions in the Legislative
Council if the Secretary of State were shortly able to send the Governor a despatch
for publication in which he would indicate that, subject to the successful resolution
of this one outstanding issue and to the further examination of certain points of
detail, H.M.G. would be prepared to accept the proposals of the Ibadan Conference as
recommended by the Select Committee.
I believe that Mr. Foot is quite right in saying this and I think also that it would
very likely be of considerable assistance to the Governor in the difficult situation
likely to be created by the Fitzgerald Report if shortly after that the Secretary of
State’s acceptance of the constitutional proposals could also be published. This
would in effect show that we mean business about constitutional advance and that
there is to be no stalling on this issue.
If the Secretary of State is publicly to announce his acceptance of the proposals
submitted, he will no doubt wish to consult his colleagues before doing so, as Mr.
Creech Jones did before publishing his despatch of last October on the Gold Coast
constitution. I therefore, submit for consideration the draft of a Cabinet Paper for
this purpose. This sets out the main points in the new proposals and the main
difficulties which have arisen in the Nigerian consultations. It also gives the reasons
for making an early statement.
After the Secretary of State has had an opportunity of reading the proposals at (8)
and (22) and the draft memorandum, he may wish to discuss the matter with the
department. Mr. Foot would very much like to take part in such discussions even
though that would involve his coming up from Cornwall. If he has to come up in
connection with the Fitzgerald Report perhaps the two discussions could be
combined.
I have told Mr. Foot that if the above procedure is agreed to we will prepare a draft
despatch for the Secretary of State to send to the Governor and will discuss this with
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him towards the end of the month. We will at the same time discuss with him a
number of points of detail which are not of sufficient importance to put into the
despatch itself but will require to be settled between us and the Nigerian
Government. I have agreed with Mr. Foot what generally ought to be put into the
draft of the despatch and also the points of detail which will require discussion.
I attach opposite a very brief note dealing with some of these points.
We have not yet received the minority report on Lagos and that by Dr. Azikiwe
personally which are referred to in (22). I do not think that that need delay us. I am
sure that the decision on Lagos must be to accept the Select Committee’s proposals,
while Dr. Azikiwe’s minority report, which covers roughly the same ground as the
first minority report attached to the General Conference’s report (enclosure to (8)),
is, I think, more of a political gesture than anything else. At any rate the points in it
are unacceptable. I did however telegraph separately to the Governor telling him of
my discussion with Mr Foot and asking for the Minority reports. I am also informing
the Ministry of Information about the proposals. 
A.B.C.
18.4.50
102 CO 537/5801, no 8 Apr 1950
[Zikist movement]: CO memorandum on the Zikist movement.
Minute by R J Vile on the desirability of strong measures to deal with
the Zikists
The Zikist Movement was founded in February, 1946, to act as an extreme movement
within the organisation of the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons. It is
now reported to consist of some 800–900 members but there are indications that
many of these members are far from enthusiastic and that the central funds of the
Movement do not amount in all to more than £20. The President-General of the
Movement is Nduka Eze a young semi-illiterate Labour Leader who is also Secretary-
General of the U.A.C. workers’ union and a leading figure in the Nigerian National
Federation of Labour and a prominent member of the Cabinet of the National
Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons. The Secretary-General, another young man,
was recently sentenced to 33 months imprisonment for the possession of seditious
documents and other members of the Movement have also recently been imprisoned.
Although the Movement was founded ostensibly to propagate the philosophy of Dr.
Azikiwe this latter has never been a member of the Movement and there is no place
assigned to him in its constitution. Indeed the Movement has not been able to adopt
a proposed new constitution and it is not quite clear under what constitution it at
present works. Reports have, however, been received which indicate that discipline
within the Movement is far from perfect and that it is from time to time rent by
personal squabbles. Dr. Azikiwe has in the past clearly been suspicious of the
Movement and when it attacked him for some remarks he made recently in the
United States which indicated that he was willing to reach a working agreement with
the United Kingdom he replied by saying that had been misinterpreted and by
praising the Movement for the work that it had been doing. This is the first and only
time that he has identified himself in any way with the Movement.
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The philosophy of the Movement is largely nationalistic with a strong admixture of
Communist Party terminology, the adoption of Marxist philosophy and a complete
opposition to Colonial Government in any of its forms. The Movement is frankly
revolutionary and considers that the present order of society must be destroyed in
order effectively to build the new order. Although some attempt is made to pretend
that such a revolution can be achieved by peaceful means, particularly by non-
cooperation, there is no doubt that it is the intention of the leaders of the Movement
to encourage violent revolution whenever possible. It is known that members of the
Movement have accumulated stores of arms and ammunition and that plans have
been made to encourage any acts of sabotage and assassination.
The Nigerian authorities have been able to keep a very close watch on the activities
of the Movement. They appear to have at all times complete information about devel-
opments therein, and this has enabled them recently to secure the imprisonment of
leading members of the Movement. The next step to be taken is to proscribe the
Movement as an unlawful society under the provisions of the Criminal Code.
Minute on 102
I attach opposite a copy of a Note prepared for the Secretary of State and Minister of
State at their request on the Zikist movement in Nigeria.
Although I have read the Memorial lecture1 enclosed with 7 I would not suggest
that anybody else should read it in its entirety. It is enough to read Appendix 2 and
the programme of work 1950–51 and the National programme to see the line that is
being taken. There is of course nothing new in this. Its people are determined to
encourage any violent activities and I am sure that the answer to their activities does
not lie merely in repressive measures however necessary and swift these may be. I am
equally sure that it is only by the rapid development of a positive policy that we can
so secure the support of the mass of the people that the attempts of this extreme
movement will be regarded as unnecessary. I think we must face the fact frankly that
extremist movements of this sort can count upon the apathetic support of the mass
of the population. They do represent a feeling which is apt to lurk in the minds of
many Nigerians because they appeal to that base element in human nature which is
ready to respond to cries of envy, hatred and malice. Unless we can convince the
mass of the people of our goodwill and secure their constant and intimate
cooperation in the business of government both locally, regionally and nationally
then the Zikist movement will have the opportunity to develop into the spearhead of
the struggle for independence and we may well be faced with a situation similar to
the one in Ireland and Palestine.
The attitude of Dr. Azikiwe reported in paragraph 4 is particularly significant. I
think it sufficient to say that he would be ready to profit by any violent act of the
Zikist movement and if for this reason if not for any other it is equally important
tactically to outwit the movement at every stage. Nevertheless the mere winning of
tactical skirmishes will not secure any worthwile result.
The conclusions which I then draw from this is that the forward policy we are
pursuing in West Africa must whenever possible be accompanied by strong measures
1 This refers to the ‘Abdallah-Agwuna memorial lecture’, 1950 (not printed)
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against extremist movements of this nature. In the past year it has been difficult for
the Nigerian Government to take the initiative in this way but I think we can hope
that now that the constitutional proposals have been largely thrashed out the
opportunity has come for a much more determined policy in respect of the Zikist
movement. If this is so then we ought to be able to look forward to a period which
will be far less troubled than recent history.
R.J.V.
6.4.50
103 CO 537/5795 14 Apr 1950
[Enugu shootings]: minute by A B Cohen on the CO reaction to the
Fitzgerald Report
[The Fitzgerald Report was published in June 1950 and debated in the House of
Commons on 12 July. The report criticised industrial relations at the colliery over several
years and blamed several figures for their role in the tragedy. It criticised the
management for sacking hewers at the start of the dispute and failing to use offers of
conciliation that were made during it; it reproved Okwudili Ojiyi, the secretary of the
Colliery Workers’ Union, for encouraging workers to believe pay arrears had been
withheld from them. The chief commissioner, Sir J Pyke-Nott, his advisers and the police
were criticised for treating the problem as a political rather than industrial dispute; the
report was critical of the chief commissioner’s decision to order the removal of 
the explosives ‘at all costs’, rather than having them guarded and negotiating with the
miners. Senior superintendent of police F S Philip was criticised for an error of
judgement in giving the order to fire when the police detachment was not under attack;
the report rejected the suggestion that the miners were armed. The report went on to
make various recommendations for the overhaul of trade unions in Nigeria and the
establishment of industrial conciliation machinery. Following the publication of the
report the government gave exgratia payments to the families of the dead miners, while
Philip was retired on medical grounds; Azikiwe’s attempt to move a motion in the
Legislative Council to have Philip tried for causing the deaths was defeated.]
Sir T. Lloyd
During most of the last week Mr. Gorsuch, Mr. Foot and I have been engaged in
discussing the terms of the documents to be published with the Report of the
Fitzgerald Commission.1 We have discussed the labour aspect of this with Mr.
Grossmith2 and Mr. Parry3 and the police aspect with Mr. Johnson.4 We also had a
two hours’ discussion with the Secretary of State and Mr. Cook5 on the 13th April,
but neither the Secretary of State nor Mr. Cook have yet seen the drafts which we
have been preparing.
First of all as to the form of the documents. You will remember that at the
discussion with the Secretary of State just before Easter the provisional conclusion
was reached that the best form would be a joint memorandum agreed by the
Secretary of State and the Governor and this suggestion was put to Sir J.
Macpherson. Mr. Foot definitely prefers a despatch from the Governor accompanied
by a reply from the Secretary of State. He thinks—and in the light of discussion we
agree with him—that it would be perfectly possible to avoid in these documents
1 See 79 and 99. 2 C A Grossmith, ass sec, CO, head of Social Service Dept (B).
3 E Parry, assistant labour adviser, CO. 4 W C Johnson, police adviser to sec of state for the colonies.
5 T F Cook, parliamentary under-secretary of state for the colonies.
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giving the impression that the initiative for the action to implement the
Commission’s recommendations is coming from the Secretary of State rather than
the Governor and the drafts have been prepared on this basis. It is moreover
necessary for the Governor to give his comments on certain of the views expressed by
the Commission regarding the action leading up to the shooting. For this reason in
particular Mr. Gorsuch and I now fully agree with Mr. Foot on this form of
documents.
I propose to comment below on the various points in the drafts:—
(1) The action to be taken on the recommendations. The Nigerian Government
fully accept in principle the recommendations for future action and we and they are
in complete agreement that in the implementation of the recommendations
regarding conciliation and negotiating procedure the trade unions and employers
must take a full part. Mr. Foot has, however, called attention to certain difficulties
about the proposal to appoint a commission of workers and employers under an
independent chairman for the purpose of implementing the proposals, with which
trade union and employers’ representatives from this country would be associated as
advisers. In the first place he thinks that the appointment of another commission
even of this kind would give an impression of delay rather than of action.
Recommendations not entirely dissimilar from those of the Fitzgerald Commission
had already been made by the Brook Commission6 on the railway at the end of last
year; these have been referred by the Nigerian Government to the trade unions but so
far the latter have not commented. Secondly it would be most difficult to secure
representation of the trade unions owing to the rivalry between the Nigerian T.U.C.
and the Nigerian Federation of Labour (the Zikist trade union organisation). Both
organisations would contest the right of the other to be represented and it is quite
possible that the procedure would break down at the start. Thirdly it would be
extremely difficult to find a suitable African employer or employers to sit on such a
commission, since the employers of industrial labour on a large scale are either
Government organisations or the big firms. There would thus be the difficulty which
the Secretary of State had wished to avoid of having the workers’ side entirely African
and the employers’ entirely European. Fourthly, as you will remember, the Secretary
of State has emphasised the importance which he attaches to taking early action at
Enugu without awaiting the results of the Commission’s work. Mr. Foot has pointed
out the very great difficulty of quick action at Enugu owing to the fact that there is
no union to deal with there at present. There is only Ojiyi, who has been condemned
in the strongest terms by the Fitzgerald Commission.
In these circumstances the following alternative procedure has emerged from
discussion with Mr. Foot which is, I think, generally acceptable to the Secretary of
State, although he has of course formed no final conclusions. It is suggested that the
Governor in his despatch should state his general acceptance of the Fitzgerald
Commission’s recommendations and his desire to see them implemented quickly
and should add that he looks to the trade unions and employers to take a full part in
their implementation. He should also invite the Secretary of State’s advice and
assistance as to their implementation. The Secretary of State in his reply should
6 The Brook commission of 1949 examined the labour situation on Nigerian Railways following the rail
strike of that year.
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indicate that he is arranging to send out to Nigeria for the purpose of assisting in the
implementation of the proposals two trade unionists (one from the T.U.C. and one
working miner) and one official, probably of the National Coal Board. The functions
of this mission would be:—
(i) to assist in implementing the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Commission
on negotiating and conciliation machinery;
(ii) to assist in implementing certain recommendations made by the Brook
Commission regarding the amendment of the trade union law;
(iii) to help the trade unions in respect of their own organisation—this obviously
requires very careful wording.
The despatch from the Secretary of State should make it fully clear that the onus of
implementing remained on employees and employers. The mission from this
country would merely assist them. It is proposed that Mr. Parry should accompany
the mission.
The mission would go about their work in Nigeria by gaining the confidence of the
unions by personal contact and by discussion with employers, including Government
departments, and with the Labour Department. If necessary they might call a
conference of all concerned to reach agreement on implementation. They might
even advise setting up some formal body in which they could take part; but the
procedure would be kept quite flexible. In order to meet the Secretary of State’s point
about Enugu they would go there first with a view to assisting the workers and the
Colliery Board to establish a satisfactory negotiating and conciliation procedure. Mr.
Foot has explained that in his view it is likely that the Colliery Board, which is of
course a free agent in the matter, will decide after the publication of the Report that
it can have no further dealings with Ojiyi. This would obviously create a most
delicate situation and Mr. Foot has suggested that, if the procedure described above
is adopted, the Nigerian Government should advise the Colliery Board to defer any
decision of this sort until after the mission has done its work at Enugu, in which case
it may be unnecessary for any such decision to be considered. This appears an
essential part of the plan.
It was agreed at the end of the discussion with the Secretary of State on this
particular point that we should put down what had been suggested in the draft
despatch for the Secretary of State so that he could consider the matter further.
(2) Past Government policy with regard to the trade unions. The Commission has
criticised the Nigerian Government in paragraph 21 for not doing enough to help
build up the trade union movement on proper lines. While the Nigerian Government
fully accept that owing to the great difficulties the trade union movement, as the
Commission say, is in a most unsatisfactory state, they feel that this criticism is
unjust and, apart from that, is likely by giving a handle to extremist critics in Nigeria
to hamper the work of Government on behalf of trade unionism in the future. The
draft despatch from the Governor therefore gives very brief particulars of what the
Government has in fact done. This does not involve, if I may use the expression, any
head-on collision with the Commission’s observations and I think that this passage
from our point of view is quite unobjectionable.
(3) The Government’s difficulties in negotiating with the colliery workers before
and during the go-slow strike. The Nigerian Government feel it necessary to make
the point that in the period immediately preceding and during the go-slow strike
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there was no-one effective to negotiate with other than Ojiyi, who was quite
irresponsible. With regard to the Commission’s criticism that the notice of dismissal
of 50 hewers on the 10th November and following days was a major blunder
(paragraph 84 of the Report), the Nigerian Government wish to say that the decision
of the Colliery Board to do this may have been at fault in timing, but they wish to add
that ‘it was and remains this Government’s opinion that if go-slow tactics are
employed and negotiations and warnings have been of no avail, there is no
alternative to treating the behaviour of the workers as a breach of contract.’ This is a
general statement on which Mr. Grossmith has consulted the Ministry of Labour.
The original wording has been somewhat modified from the form quoted above in
the light of what the Ministry of Labour say and, in the light of his conversation with
the Ministry of Labour, Mr. Grossmith believes that the proposition is justifiable in
terms of United Kingdom practice.
(4) The Chief Commissioner’s7 actions. It is with regard to the criticisms of the
Chief Commissioner in Part X of the Report (paragraphs 97–112) that the greatest
difficulty arises. Sir J. Macpherson and his advisers feel strongly that the criticisms
made by the Commission about the Chief Commissioner are unjust and they think it
necessary that this should be stated in the despatch. After full discussion with Mr.
Foot, Mr. Gorsuch and I support this view. There are three points:—
(a) The criticisms of the Chief Commissioner stem from the Commission’s opinion
(paragraph 105 and following) that the Chief Commissioner treated the disturbances
at Enugu as a political agitation rather than an industrial dispute. The Nigerian
Government do not accept the correctness of this conclusion. Mr. Foot says that
there never has in his experience been a dispute in Nigeria which was more clearly an
industrial dispute only and it is the view of the Nigerian Government that the
distinction was clearly understood by the Chief Commissioner and other
Government Officers concerned. The Chief Commissioner’s intervention was due not
to his belief that this dispute was political rather than industrial, but to his primary
responsibility to maintain public security and the Nigerian Government wish to
bring this point out clearly in their despatch. I have read through the whole of the
Chief Commissioner’s evidence and there is no statement in it that he regarded the
dispute as political. There are (on page B. 64 of the evidence) two replies in answer to
the Chairman and Mr. H.O. Davies to the effect that he regarded the dispute as
having passed from an ordinary industrial dispute and that he decided that it had
passed the bounds of an industrial dispute on November 16th. We do not think that
this in any way invalidates the view referred to above. The meaning of these
statements is in our view that issues of public security had been raised with which he
was called upon to deal.
(b) The Nigerian Government wishes to state the view that the decision taken by
the Chief Commissioner to remove the explosives was a sound and wise one and that
it was right to send police to cover the operation—indeed, that had these precautions
not been taken the authorities concerned would have been seriously at fault. This is
not contrary to the conclusions of the Commission; indeed by implication they
accept in paragraph 110 that the explosives should have been removed. Their
criticism is that a final attempt was not made to negotiate with the strikers before
removing them. The Government’s comment on this is that there was nobody
7 ie Sir J Pyke-Nott
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effective to negotiate with and the Government wishes to point out in the despatch
that there was an acutely urgent safety situation at the mine. The Mines Department
had stated that they didn’t immediately make a formal order to close the mine on
safety grounds, since it was occupied by the strikers and the supervisory staff were
not able to enter it. Attempts by the police to prevent one shift entering the mine had
failed. If the Government failed to close the mine there might be an accident leading
to serious loss of life. If they took action to close it there was likely to be a serious
clash with the miners. It was felt necessary to remove the explosives before this
happened.
(c) The Commission states in paragraph 110: ‘Had the Chief Commissioner made
this appreciation of the situation . . ., we feel confident he would not have given the
drastic order to remove the explosives at all costs.’ The statement that he gave an
order to remove the explosives at all costs is incorrect. I am informed that there is
nothing in the evidence in support of this statement; indeed the only reference which
we have been able to find is contrary to it.8 When Mr. Bracegirdle9 was questioned on
this point he said that he was not aware that any such order had been given (page 182
of the evidence). Mr. Foot has talked to the Chief Commissioner and all the officers
who were present at his staff meeting and they all state that no reference to ‘at all
costs’ was made. Indeed this is entirely contrary to the Chief Commissioner’s attitude
and policy. He repeatedly emphasised the necessity for moderation and for avoiding
firing except in absolutely the last extremity. We are thus faced with the necessity for
considering direct contradiction of a statement of fact in the Commission’s Report,
which is obviously a very serious step to take. Since it appears that the Commission’s
statement on this exceedingly important point is incorrect, there seems to be no
alternative but to saying so; to do anything else would be very unfair to the Chief
Commissioner, apart from being wrong in principle.
(5) The position of Superintendent Philip. The Nigerian Government do not wish
to question at all the findings in Part XI of the Report or particularly in paragraph
119. The draft despatch therefore makes virtually no comment on this, but draws
attention to the essential substance of paragraphs 119 and also 120, where the
monstrous allegation that the shooting was prearranged is emphatically denied by
the Commission.
There is also the question of the action to be taken with regard to Superintendent
Philip; this clearly must be decided before the Report and comments are published.
We have discussed this matter with Mr. Johnson. Mr. Foot has explained that in the
view of the Nigerian Government’s legal advisers the wording used in paragraph 119
must have been designed by the Commission to prevent criminal proceedings
succeeding against Mr. Philip and we think also that it is designed to secure his
pension rights. The Nigerian Government had assumed that in the light of the
wording used there would be no case for disciplinary action against Mr. Philip. Mr.
Johnson supports this view and points out in particular that it would be unfortunate
if Mr. Philip were the only officer in respect of whom such action was taken. He was
in no way responsible for the miscalculations about the detailed arrangements for
removing the explosives; as the Report makes clear, these were the responsibility of
8 Cohen added here in the margin the words, ‘I do not know that any decision was quite taken in that way’.
9 R Bracegirdle, colliery manager.
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the colliery management. Mr. Johnson has recently seen Mr. Philip and describes
him as obviously being in a very poor state of health. He thinks that we ought to
arrange with him to be medically examined, in which case he thinks it quite likely
that he would be passed unfit for further service in the tropics. Alternatively he has
suggested that Mr. Philip should be transferred to another territory, which he thinks
could be arranged. We were all agreed that it was essential that Mr. Philip should not
return to Nigeria.
We discussed this matter with the Secretary of State and Mr. Cook. The Secretary
of State has, of course, formed no final conclusions. He was, I think, inclined to
accept the view that disciplinary action should not be taken against Mr. Philip and he
thought that retirement on medical grounds would probably be the least
unsatisfactory solution. The Secretary of State was extremely doubtful whether it
would be right to send Mr. Philip to another territory. If Mr. Philip is not passed
unfit, since he has only just reached the age of 44, the only ways in which he could be
removed are either by the elaborate disciplinary procedure under Colonial
Regulation 65 or by the signification of the pleasure of the Crown under Colonial
Regulation 64. Although we have not taken legal advice here on this, we think it
unlikely that in the light of the Report action under Colonial Regulation 65 would
succeed. Action under Colonial Regulation 64 would be extremely drastic in the light
of what the Report says; indeed it would be contrary to the view that disciplinary
action should not be taken. I suggest that you may wish to discuss this difficult point
with Mr. Johnson, Sir K. Roberts-Wray,10 Mr. Gorsuch and myself before advice is
submitted to the Secretary of State on it.
I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Grossmith (for himself and Mr. Parry),
Sir K. Roberts-Wray and Mr. Johnson. Clearly urgent decisions have got to be taken
on a number of points if we are to get the Report out by the 1st May. The Secretary of
State would like to discuss the matter again when he has been able to see the two
draft despatches. Spare copies of this are available and perhaps it might be useful to
let him and Mr. Cook have advance copies to look at. Mr. Cook has asked to read
through the more important parts of the evidence and we have given him the papers.
10 Sir K Roberts-Wray, legal adviser, CO.
104 CO 537/5795, no 46 27 Apr 1950
[Enugu shootings]: outward telegram no 526 from Mr Griffiths to Sir
J Macpherson on the CO reaction to the Fitzgerald Report
I have been giving my most earnest consideration to the Fitzgerald Report and the
two despatches to be published on it. I have discussed the matter at length with Foot
on four occasions.
2. The main purpose of this telegram is to tell you that after spending much time
in anxious personal study of both the Report itself and what you propose to say in
your draft despatch I do not feel able to dispute the main conclusions reached by the
Commission in Part X of their Report.1 I am fully aware of the strong views which
1 This section of the report covered the events of 16–18 Nov 1949 and criticised the chief commissioner,
Sir J Pyke-Nott and his advisers, for treating the dispute as political rather than industrial in origin.
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you yourself hold on this matter and it seems to me essential before we proceed
further that we should have a chance of personal discussion. I feel, therefore, that I
must ask you to fly to London as soon as possible for this purpose. Meanwhile I am
consulting my colleague the Attorney General on certain points and in particular on
the question of ‘at all costs’, which I recognise is of a rather different character to the
rest of the Commission’s remarks in Part X.2
3. I realise that it may be very inconvenient to you to come at this time when
Foot is already away, but I hope you will be able to do so and would suggest that if
possible you might be here by May 4th. Will you let me know whether you would
like us to ask Howe over for the discussions? Foot will also be near London at that
time.
4. Foot has, I understand, sent you a copy of the revised draft of your despatch in
a letter in bag No. 105 due to reach Nigeria on the 28th. In view of the difference of
opinion between us about Part X of the Report, I am sure you will agree that it would
be best to avoid any circulation of this draft at the present stage.3
5. I should also like to say something about the recommendations of the
Commission for future action. I have studied your telegram No. 107 Saving and
your telegram No. 527 to Foot. I do not think that there is any substantial differ-
ence between us. We are both fully prepared to accept the recommendations in
Chapters VI and XIII of the Report4 in principle and I believe that you agree fully
with my view that if the new machinery to be established is to be successful both
sides of industry must take a full part in its implementation with the assistance of
the Nigerian Labour Department and the experts from this country whom I am
anxious to send out. I agree with your view that the most important task of these
experts will be to assist in the implementing of the new arrangements, but I
believe that their advice on these arrangements will also be of the utmost value to
you. I have it in mind to secure the services of a really first-class man from the
T.U.C., together with a working miner who is an experienced trade union represen-
tative of the industry and a third person who would, if possible be selected in con-
sultation with the Employers Federation of the U.K. I would also propose to send
Parry. I recognise that the Labour Department in the persons you mention in your
telegram No. 527 already has men of experience in this field. The task of the
experts to be sent out would be to assist them but not in any sense to supersede
them.
6. I agree entirely with your view that the first task must be to get relations and
machinery at Enugu right and I would propose that the experts from here should
proceed to Enugu first. How they would proceed thereafter with regard to the wider
labour field would be a matter for them to discuss with Government.
7. We shall be able to discuss this aspect of the matter fully when you are
here.
2 Section 110 of the report criticised the ‘the drastic order to remove the explosives at all costs’, given by
Pyke-Nott. 3 See 107.
4 Chapters [sic, Parts] VI and XIII stressed the need for a system of industrial conciliation in Nigeria
independent of government and recommended the establishment of conciliation boards and a national
tribunal to consider disputes. It also recommended the creation of a ministry of labour.
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105 CO 537/5786, no 23, CP (50) 94 3 May 1950
[Constitutional review]: Cabinet memorandum by Mr Griffiths on the
proposals for revision of the constitution
The review of the Nigerian constitution which has been proceeding locally for the
last year has now been completed. The procedure adopted for this review, although it
involved full consultation with representatives of the people, was somewhat different
from that adopted in the Gold Coast. In August, 1948, just after H.M.G. had
announced agreement in principle to constitutional advances in the Gold Coast, the
Governor of Nigeria, with the approval of my predecessor, proposed to his Legislative
Council that after a preliminary period for the expression of public opinion the
constitution should be reviewed during 1949. This was accepted and at the Budget
Session in March, 1949, the Council agreed to a procedure for popular consultation
which was then put in hand. Conferences of representatives of the people were held
in every province and subsequently in each of the three Regions of Nigeria and at
Lagos. These were followed by a General Conference of representatives of the whole
country in January, 1950, before which a Drafting Committee had produced concrete
recommendations on the basis of the reports of the Regional Conferences. The
Report of the General Conference was subsequently discussed by the three Regional
Houses of Assembly (and the Northern House of Chiefs) and last month by a Select
Committee of the Legislative Council itself.
2. The Provincial, Regional and General Conferences were attended by the
unofficial members of the present Legislative Council and Regional Houses of
Assembly, together with a small number of officials. The process of consultation has
been most successful both in the political education which it has provided and in the
proposals which have emerged from it. The purpose of the consultation was to
produce agreed Nigerian views and the task of the officials was no more than to assist
the discussions. Their presence, however, helped to keep the Nigerian Government
closely in touch with the discussions. There was also close consultation between the
Nigerian Government and the Colonial Office during the later stages and the Chief
Secretary of Nigeria flew to London early in January specially for the purpose of
detailed discussions with my predecessor. The proposals which have emerged are
unanimous, except for minority reports by a few members on a strictly limited
number of points and for one remaining major difference between the North and the
rest of the country to which I will refer below. Subject to further discussion of a few
relatively minor points and to the satisfactory solution of this one major difference,
we now have a scheme of constitutional advance recommended by the
representatives of the people of Nigeria which in my view is entirely acceptable.
3. The existing constitution provides for a Legislative Council for the whole of
Nigeria, with an unofficial majority but with substantial official representation, and
Houses of Assembly for the three Regions, also with unofficial majorities but with
substantial official membership. In addition there is a House of Chiefs in the
Northern Region. The Regional Houses so far have advisory powers only with regard
to legislation and finance, but policy has been followed by the Nigerian Government
of devolving responsibility for purely regional subjects from the centre to the
Regions. This policy has worked very successfully and some advance in the powers of
the Regional Houses is now called for. The Governor’s Executive Council is purely
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advisory with a substantial official majority and the three unofficial Nigerian
members on it have no executive responsibility for departments of Government.
There is need for greater participation by Nigerians in the executive machinery both
at the centre and in the Regions.
4. The Select Committee of the Nigerian Legislative Council, in endorsing
generally the recommendations of the General Conference referred to above, has in
particular welcomed the proposals:—
(a) for greatly increased Regional autonomy within a united Nigeria;
(b) for giving Nigerians a full share in the shaping of Government policy and
direction of executive Government action in a Central Council of Ministers and
Regional Executive Councils: and
(c) for the creation of larger and more representative Regional Legislatures with
increased powers.
These general principles are, I am convinced, absolutely sound.
5. The main proposals are as follows:—
(a) The existing Legislative Council should be enlarged and at the same time the
numbers of officials on it should be reduced. The Nigerian members should, as the
majority of them are at present, be selected by the Nigerian members of the
Regional Houses from their own numbers.
(b) The Regional Houses of Assembly should be enlarged and the official
membership reduced. The Nigerian members should be selected through electoral
colleges the members of which would themselves be directly elected by the people.
The Northern House of Chiefs should be retained and a House of Chiefs should be
established in addition to the House of Assembly in the Western Region. No such
institution is required in the Eastern Region, where there is no comparable system
of traditional chieftainship.
(c) The Nigerian Legislature would approve the Nigerian budget and would retain
full powers of legislation on all subjects. The Regional Houses would have power to
legislate over a substantial field, subject to the power of the Council of Ministers to
refer back such legislation and, if necessary, ultimately to reject it if they
considered it to be in conflict with an overall Nigerian interest. The legislative
fields of the Nigerian Legislature and of the Regional Houses would thus overlap
considerably. It is recognised that eventually, as in most federal or partly federal
constitutions, the centre and the Regions should have separate and distinct fields,
possibly with concurrent powers over a third relatively limited field. But at the
present stage, when the Regional Houses will still be finding their feet, it is felt
that the central Legislature must retain unrestricted powers, while at the same
time the Regional Legislatures must be given powers to legislate over a number of
subjects. Experienced advice has been taken on the point in this country and as a
result of this I am satisfied that the arrangement proposed is suitable.
(d) In place of the Executive Council there should be established a Council of
Ministers with the Governor as President; six official members (the Chief
Secretary, the Attorney General, the Financial Secretary and the Chief
Commissioners of the three Regions, who would become Lieutenant Governors);
and twelve Nigerian members drawn, four from each Region, from the Legislative
Council. The Nigerian members would be Ministers, nine with portfolio and three
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without portfolio. The Council of Ministers would no longer, like the existing
Executive Council, be purely advisory to the Governor. It would formulate policy
and direct executive action. The Governor would have reserve powers which would
apply both to the Executive Council and to the Legislature.
(e) Regional Executive Councils would be established under the Presidency of the
Lieutenant Governor and with official and Nigerian members, the latter in the
majority. The Nigerian members would be Regional Ministers with or without
portfolio. The Regional Executive Councils would formulate policy and direct
executive action within the Region, subject to general directions on policy by the
Council of Ministers where the overall interests of Nigeria were involved.
6. It has been no easy task to obtain substantial agreement between the
representatives of the conservative and Moslem North and the more politically-
minded Ibos and Yorubas of the Eastern and Western Provinces. Three major
differences arose during the discussions; of these one has been settled, the second
disposed of for the time being and only the third remains to be resolved. The three
differences are:—
(a) The Northern representatives, while raising no objection to Ministers in the
other Regions, were opposed to having Ministers either at the Centre or in the
North itself. It is most satisfactory that they have now agreed to Ministers both at
the centre and in the North.
(b) The Northern representatives claim that finance should be divided between
the Regions on a per capita basis. This was a natural claim for them to make, as
they are at once the richest and most populous Region and that with the least
developed social services. On the other hand such an arrangement could not be
introduced immediately without disrupting the financial structure of Nigeria and
involving the retrenchment of essential existing services in the Eastern Region,
which is the poorest. It has been agreed that no formula covering the allocation of
finance can be introduced into the constitution, but that an expert and
independent committee should be set up to undertake an enquiry into the division
of revenue over a period of five years between the three Regions and the central
Nigerian services. The proposals of this committee would be considered by
representatives of the three Regions sitting in equal numbers under the
chairmanship of the Financial Secretary. The independent enquiry will be
conducted by Sir Sydney Phillipson, a former Financial Secretary of Nigeria,
Professor J.R. Hicks, of Nuffield College, Oxford, and an expert on federal-
provincial relationships who is to be appointed from Canada.
(c) The third difference between the North and the other Regions which remains
to be resolved relates to the composition of the Nigerian Legislature; this is
discussed in paragraphs 8 and 9 below.
7. There has been some difference of opinion about the treatment of Lagos, the
capital of the country, which with the immediately surrounding country areas has
hitherto been administered separately from the Western Region, of which it forms a
geographical part. On the basis of the proposals put forward by the Western and
Lagos Regional Conferences it was first proposed that Lagos should be included in
the Western Region; but the General Conference itself recommended by a majority
that it should be administered as an independent municipality not under the
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Western Region. The Select Committee of the Legislative Council has proposed by a
majority that Lagos should form part of the Western Region, but with special
safeguards to allow for its position as the capital. The three members of the
Legislative Council representing Lagos have submitted a minority report opposing
this, in spite of the fact that the representatives of Lagos at the General Conference
who were not members of the Legislative Council had taken the opposite view. I
propose to accept the majority view that Lagos should be included in the Western
Region.
8. The representatives of the Northern Region have throughout contended that
the North, which has more than half the population of the country, should be given
half the seats in the central Legislature. This would be a most unusual provision in a
single chamber Legislature under a constitution which already has some federal
elements in it and is likely to become more federal as the Regions develop. Moreover
it is hardly surprising that the Eastern and Western representatives should be
opposed to this arrangement, under which the North might well succeed in
dominating the Legislature. In spite of all the efforts of the Nigerian Government, it
has not so far been possible to resolve this difficulty. When the Northern
representatives were out-voted on the point in the General Conference their
spokesman stated that, if the point was not met, the North would press for separation
from the rest of Nigeria as was the case before 1914. The Northern delegates
thereupon prepared to leave the Conference, but were with difficulty persuaded by
their colleagues to remain, on the understanding that their view would be recorded
that, unless their point about representation was accepted, they would disassociate
themselves from the other recommendations of the Conference. In the Select
Committee of the Legislative Council the suggestion was made that, to meet the
difficulty, a bicameral Legislature should be adopted at the centre, the composition
of the House of Representatives being based on population and that of the Upper
House on equality between the three Regions. This proposal is to be further
considered by the existing Regional House and will come before the Legislative
Council at its meeting in September.
9. It is of the first importance to solve the difficulty about the composition of the
central Legislature. The unity of Nigeria must be the first aim of policy for the
country. Northern Nigeria is relatively rich in natural resources and its people have
great potentialities. It is absolutely dependent on the Eastern and Western Regions
for its communications with the coast, but at the same time it has much to
contribute to the country as a whole not only in money and material resources, but
through its traditions and its political stability. The new constitution must in my
view be so drawn up as to give the maximum encouragement to the building of a
united Nigeria. For this reason I am anxious to do all I can to encourage the three
Regions to reach agreement on the one outstanding point and I am advised that the
Governor would be much assisted in securing this result if I were to send him a
despatch for publication in the near future informing him that, subject to a
satisfactory settlement of this one outstanding issue and to further examination of
certain points of detail, H.M.G. would be willing to accept the recommendations of
the General Conference as amended by the Select Committee of the Legislative
Council.
10. I am sure that these proposals can safely be accepted. The scheme which is
put forward succeeds in my view in creating the relationship between the centre and
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 292
[106] MAY 1950 293
the Regions which is best suited to the present stage of development. It provides for a
more representative method of selecting members of the Regional Houses without
importing a system of direct election which would not work under present Nigerian
conditions. It gives Nigerians a large share of responsibility for the formation and
execution of policy both at the centre and in the Regions, while leaving the ultimate
responsibility for policy, and the means of exercising that responsibility if necessary,
in the hands of the Governor through the reserve powers which, as explained in
paragraph 5(d), he would still possess in relation both to the Executive Council and
the Legislature. The scheme represents a logical development of the existing
constitution, which was designed to promote regional development within a unified
Nigeria. In the extent to which it would transfer power to Africans it is similar to the
scheme recently approved for the Gold Coast, although it goes slightly less far than
that scheme. Above all it is a scheme recommended by the representatives of the
people of Nigeria after long and detailed consultation. I am assured that the great
majority of the people of Nigeria would accept the scheme, although the extremists
would no doubt say that it does not go far enough.
11. Subject to the concurrence of my colleagues, therefore I propose to send a
despatch to the Governor in the terms indicated at the end of paragraph 9 above. I
should propose that this despatch should be published at a date to be agreed with the
Governor and I would then make an announcement in the House of Commons.
106 PREM 8/1310, CM 30(50)6 11 May 1950
‘Nigerian Constitution’: Cabinet conclusions on the proposals for
reform of the Nigerian constitution
The Cabinet considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies
(C.P. (50) 94)1 out-lining the progress which had been made in reviewing the
Nigerian constitution and proposing that he should send a despatch to the Governor
of Nigeria indicating the Government’s approval, subject to a satisfactory settlement
of outstanding issues, of proposals which had been made by a General Conference of
representatives of the whole country in January, 1950, and amended by a Select
Committee of the Legislative Council of Nigeria.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies said that the new constitution would give
greatly increased regional autonomy, and would provide for the creation of larger
and more representative regional legislatures, with increased powers. Nigerians
would have a full share in shaping Government policy in a Central Council of
Ministers and in Regional Executive Councils. Difficulties had arisen from the fact
that the rich Northern Region, which contained a majority of the population and was
predominantly Moslem in character, feared that under the new constitution its
interests might be subordinated to those of the Eastern and Western Regions.
Accordingly, the Northern Region had pressed for equal representation with the
other two regions in the Central Legislative Council, and there had been some
danger that the Colony would be disrupted on this issue. It had now been suggested
that a bicameral constitution might be adopted, in which the regions would secure
1 See 105.
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the necessary safeguards through the manner in which the two Houses were
constituted; this was under further examination and would come before the
Legislative Council at its meeting in September. The Northern Region had also
claimed that finance should be divided between the regions on a per capita basis, and
arrangements had now been made for a committee to examine the financial
structure under the new constitution. The Governor of Nigeria was of opinion that,
unless the United Kingdom Government indicated at this stage that they were
prepared to adopt the proposals on which agreement had been reached in Nigeria,
the situation might deteriorate and the measure of agreement so far achieved might
be lost.
In subsequent discussion, attention was drawn to the importance of ensuring that
the administrative and other senior grades of the Nigerian Civil Service contained a
progressively increasing proportion of Nigerians, so that, as self-government was
progressively achieved, the transfer of responsibility at the administrative, as well as
the political, level could be effected smoothly. The success of the transition in India
had been largely due to the policy of increasing year by year the proportion of Indians
in the Indian Civil Service.
Rather similar difficulties arose in the industrial field, and an effort was now being
made to see whether more could not be done to influence Nigerian students who
come to this country at their own expense to take up careers other than the
professions of law and medicine, into which an undue proportion appeared to be
entering. The Colonial Development Corporation had agreed to sponsor a number of
apprenticeship schemes, with a view to securing, in Africa and elsewhere, that the
middle range of supervisor could be recruited from native-born sources.
The Cabinet:—
(1) Approved the proposals in C.P. (50) 94, and authorised the Secretary of State
for the Colonies to send for publication a despatch on the lines indicated in
paragraph 9 of his memorandum.
(2) Invited the Secretary of State for the Colonies to submit to the Cabinet a
memorandum indicating what steps were being taken to introduce an adequate
proportion of native-born administrators into the higher grades of the Colonial
Civil Service, particularly in African and other colonies which were progressing
towards self-government.
107 CO 537/5795, no 65 18 May 1950
[Enugu shootings]: despatch no 12 from Sir J Macpherson to Mr
Griffiths outlining his reaction to the Fitzgerald Report
I have the honour to refer to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry which I
appointed in December last, after consultation with you, ‘to enquire into and report
on the recent disorders in Nigeria, with special reference to the recent labour
troubles at Enugu Colliery and the events which followed’. I have studied the Report
with the greatest care with my advisers here, and I wish to record my gratitude to the
Commission for undertaking this arduous Enquiry and for making constructive
proposals which will be of the greatest assistance to the Government of Nigeria in
shaping its labour policy. The objectives which the Commission has outlined in this
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respect are unreservedly accepted by this Government, and I shall indicate in this
despatch the steps which it is proposed to take to achieve them.
2. Before I do so there are certain comments which I must make on the policy
followed and the decisions taken by the Government prior to the events at Iva Valley
on the 18th of November last year. I make these comments not only because I
consider that in determining future policy it is essential to make clear the attitude
which the Government adopted to the problems that arose, but because I feel
obliged, after the most anxious thought, to say that I do not concur in the views and
conclusions of the Commission on one important aspect concerned with the attitude
and the actions of the Chief Commissioner of the Eastern Provinces. I realise to the
full the seriousness of doing this and the obligation resting upon me to give a clear
explanation of my reasons.
3. First of all I must make a brief reference to the general policy of the
Government in relation to Trade Unions. The Government has repeatedly made it
plain that it wishes to see strong and responsible Unions built up and, in spite of
many setbacks due to the causes to which the Commission refers, a great deal of
practical evidence has been given of Government’s determination to carry out that
policy. Officers with long experience of work in United Kingdom Trade Unions have
been recruited to guide and advise the Nigerian Unions; a team of Labour Officers has
been recruited, some of them Nigerians, for conciliation work; where conciliation
has failed arbitrators have been brought from overseas at Government expense;
Whitley Councils on modern lines have been established; and recently scholarships
have been granted to Nigerian Trade Union leaders to take courses with United
Kingdom Trade Unions. The Trade Unions in Nigeria claim a membership of about
100,000. The Labour Department is a strong one, with a staff of thirty-seven Senior
Service Officers, and one of its main tasks is to assist and guide these Unions. A major
effort has been made to encourage Nigerian Trade Unions to develop satisfactorily
under a Trade Union Law based on the principles of United Kingdom legislation.
Progress has been made in the setting up of negotiating machinery and the work of
Labour Officers in the sphere of conciliation has had a considerable measure of
success. The Commission has suggested that the Government might have done more
to assist the Trade Union Movement, and I do not contest this view. Indeed I have, in
public speeches, referred to the need for improvement in industrial relations
generally and I agree that there is room for improvement in the relations between
Government and the Trade Unions. But I feel sure that if the members of the
Commission had had an opportunity of making wider enquiries, and of studying the
work done in Government Departments other than the Enugu Colliery, they would
have found themselves able more fully to appreciate the constructive work which to
the Labour Department and the Government have done in the encouragement of
Trade Unions and in the field of labour relations generally. The difficulties to be
overcome, some of which came to the notice of the Commission, have been and still
are great and it would be over-optimistic to hope for very quick or spectacular
progress, but the Government policy of encouraging the establishment of strong and
responsible Unions will be pursued with increased energy and with a renewed
determination to succeed. I refer later in this despatch to the kind of assistance we
hope to receive from the United Kingdom in furthering this policy.
4. Turning to the discussions and negotiations prior to the events of the 18th of
November, I desire to stress two major difficulties which faced the Government. The
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first concerns the use by the men of go-slow tactics. Whenever Ojiyi, the leader of the
Colliery Union, wished to wring some concession from the management he would
arrange for the miners to go slow, and he had little difficulty in persuading them to
do so, since by this means they could at the same time bring pressure on the
management, do little or no work, and continue to draw their pay. The action to be
taken to deal with these tactics was considered by the Government when the men
went slow in June last year (the Colliery Board had not then been established), and it
was then decided that every effort should first be made in negotiation to persuade the
men to resume full work; that if these efforts failed clear warning should be given
that action leading to suspension or dismissal would be taken; and that finally, if
those warnings were not heeded, a limited number of suspensions or dismissals
should be made. Warning notices were accordingly issued in June and the
consequences of disregarding them were made clear to Ojiyi, with the result that full
work was promptly resumed, thus allowing matters in dispute to be discussed in the
Colliery Whitley Council. When almost identical circumstances arose in November
(though no trade dispute was declared) the same action was taken. The warning on
this occasion, however, was disregarded and dismissals were consequently made. The
go-slow in November was not an isolated act but a continuation of previous events,
and the Union leader and the men were well aware from warnings previously given of
the action which would be taken when go-slow tactics were employed.
The second factor which must be emphasised is the extreme difficulty of dealing
with the miners themselves when negotiations with the Union had broken down.
Contact with the men had always been difficult owing to Ojiyi’s influence, but at this
stage his lying statements to the men had further poisoned their minds against the
management and had increased the hopes which they placed in him. It was felt that
further negotiations with Ojiyi himself could do no good in view of the deceit which
he practised on the miners in leading them to believe that arrears of pay were due to
them and his double dealing with the management and the Board; but he remained
the leader of the Union and his influence with the hewers was undiminished. He and
representatives of the hewers promised that work would be resumed, but when this
promise was not kept it is not easy to see with whom new negotiations could have
been opened. There was no other organisation which could represent the miners and
there was no reason to think that an appeal to the miners over the heads of their
Union leader and representatives, even if it could have been made, would have any
effect. It was the unanimous decision of the Colliery Board that negotiations having
failed the time had come to issue warnings of dismissal as had been done in June
with successful results; the warnings were followed the next day by notices of
dismissal of fifty hewers. These dismissals, and those which followed on the two
succeeding days, have been seriously criticised by the Commission, presumably
because they were regarded as premature. On this assumption I do not wish to
contest the Commission’s view, but I assume also that this criticism is not to be
regarded as implying disagreement with this Government’s general views that if go-
slow tactics are employed, and negotiations and warnings have been of no avail, there
may often be no alternative to treating the action of the workers as a breach of
contract.
5. I now turn to the events immediately preceding the shooting at Iva Valley, and
to the point on which I find myself unable to agree with the Commission’s
conclusions. The Commission concludes that the Chief Commissioner and the
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officers who were his immediate advisers regarded, or ‘diagnosed’, the miners’
dispute not as an industrial dispute but as a political agitation, and the Report states
as a fact that they treated the dispute as such. In this, it says, they erred. This finding
may turn on what is meant by a ‘political’ dispute. There was, I think, no suggestion
that the dispute had in its origin any intention to secure political aims. But the
conclusions of the Commission, as for instance in paragraph 107, leave little doubt
that it had passed beyond the realm of an ordinary industrial dispute in which the
men were content to seek their ends by peaceful industrial means. My own view is
that the Chief Commissioner regarded and treated the dispute as an industrial
dispute until disorder occurred and a threat to public security developed; and that
thereafter the steps he took were in discharge of his responsibility to maintain law
and order. I arrive at this conclusion not only from a study of the record of the
proceedings, but also from the communications I exchanged with him during this
period, and from discussions with him, though these did not form part of the record.
There is something more that does not appear in the record (I wish that it could have
appeared) but which is known to me beyond any question of challenge: that is the
Chief Commissioner’s devotion to the people of Nigeria and the passionate sincerity
of his desire and determination to help them to progress.
6. I well realise that it is not sufficient for my purpose to make general
statements regarding this matter, and I therefore propose to discuss in some detail
the attitude and actions of the Chief Commissioner. Whether he regarded, or
diagnosed, the dispute as a political agitation in the sense of one designed to achieve
political aims depends upon his attitude of mind at the time. So far as I can see from
the record of the proceedings it was not put to the Chief Commissioner when he was
giving evidence before the Commission that he regarded the dispute as a political
matter. I have referred to the communications which we exchanged at the time
which made it clear to me that he did not, and I have his assurance to this effect. On
the other hand he did, as his evidence makes plain, come to regard the dispute, after
disorders had occurred, as involving a threat to public security; but that does not
mean that he mistook it for political agitation.
7. I now turn to the question of the Chief Commissioner’s ‘treatment’ of the
dispute. The Commission’s conclusion that he treated it as a political agitation was
presumably arrived at as an inference from his actions. I have discussed, in
paragraph 4 above, the circumstances in which it was decided not to attempt to
reopen negotiations with the Union or the workers, but to proceed with warning
notices followed by dismissals. At this stage the dispute was regarded by everyone
concerned as purely industrial. The decision was taken by the Colliery management
and the Board, and the Chief Commissioner was not directly concerned. He accepted
the decision, which was in line with Government policy (though the timing is held to
have been at fault), but this acceptance in no way implies that he regarded the matter
as political.
I must here refer to the unfortunate fact that the officer who was standing by to
take over, from the 1st of January 1950, the duties of a new post of Senior Labour
Officer, Eastern Provinces, had arrived in Enugu only on the 9th of November. He
had not previously served in the Eastern Provinces and was unfamiliar with the
Colliery and the miners and with the background of the dispute. He rightly offered
his services to the Chief Commissioner, but when, on the 16th of November, he
suggested that a further approach to the miners might be made by him through the
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Union Executive, it was felt that the time when such intervention might have been
effective had passed. It must be remembered that when this offer was made a week
had passed since the issue of warning notices and that six days had passed since the
first notices of dismissal were given. Before these notices were given the Colliery
Board had done its utmost in discussions with the Union to break the deadlock and
in particular the Nigerian members of the Board, who were able to speak to the men
in their own language, had made the most strenuous efforts to persuade them to
resume full work. It was only when those efforts had failed, and the Union leader and
representatives of the miners had broken their undertaking that full work would be
resumed, that the decision was taken not to pursue further negotiations with the
Union. I maintain that in these circumstances the Chief Commissioner’s
endorsement of the Board’s attitude and his decision not to accept the proposal to
reopen negotiations at that stage do not establish a treatment of the dispute as a
political agitation.
Similar considerations apply to the criticism by the Commission of the fact that no
representative of the Labour Department took part in the staff conferences at which
major decisions were taken. The series of formal conferences took place from the
16th of November onwards—one week after the decision not to pursue further
negotiations—and these conferences were primarily concerned with problems of
public security.
8. In other respects the Chief Commissioner took two main decisions regarding
the trouble at Enugu. The first was to concentrate strong police reserves at Enugu
and the second was to have the explosives in the Colliery removed to a safe place. The
decision to have available a strong force of police was taken, as I know from
communications received from the Chief Commissioner at the time, for the very
purpose of ensuring, as far as was humanly possible, that the threat to public security
could be contained without recourse to stern measures; and his decision has in fact
been described by the Commission itself, as a wise one. The decision to remove the
explosives to a safe place is in my view by far the most important consideration in any
assessment of the Chief Commissioner’s treatment of the dispute, and I feel that it is
necessary to consider at some length the reasons which led to the decision.
9. The first disorder occurred on the 14th of November. The demonstrations by
the women have been described by the Commission as somewhat outside the main
current of events at the Colliery. I do not challenge this. In any event the
Commission has commended the police and the Local Authority, Enugu, for the
manner in which they dealt with these disturbances. But there was a vital factor in
the situation to which the Report does not refer. From the 14th of November the
miners had been in control of the mine, and owing to their attitude it had been
decided that the supervisory staff, which is responsible for ensuring that safety
precautions are taken, should not enter the mine. There was consequently an
increasing danger that, if the miners remained in the mine without safety
precautions being maintained, serious accidents possibly leading to loss of life would
result. The Inspector of Mines gave repeated warnings that the mine was unsafe and
would have to be closed, and that it would be necessary for the Mines Department,
which is entirely independent of the Colliery, to issue, in exercise of its statutory
authority, a formal order closing the mine. The formal order was in fact served on
the Colliery management on the morning of the 18th of November. Moreover, an
attempt made by the Police on the 14th of November to prevent one of the miners’
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 298
[107] MAY 1950 299
shifts from entering the mine had failed, the Police being overwhelmed and the men
forcing their way through. There was, therefore, reason to expect that a clash would
occur when a second attempt was made to prevent men from entering the mine in
compliance with the closure order which it was known would soon be made.
10. This situation held out the possibility, even the likelihood, of further disorder
on a serious scale since some seven thousand men were involved, and it was this that
made it essential for the Administration to intervene in the interests of public secu-
rity. I must emphasise that the first duty of the Chief Commissioner was to preserve
law and order, and it was in pursuance of this duty that he decided that the explosives
must be removed to a safe place. If the explosives had fallen into wrong hands the Chief
Commissioner would have been open to the most severe criticism to which there
would have been no satisfactory answer. I think that the decision to move the explo-
sives was correct, and if this is accepted, it will, I believe, be agreed that it was neces-
sary to use police to cover the operation. The Commission has suggested the
alternative of having the explosives guarded, but the presence of police guards might
have been a continuing provocation to the miners. I believe that the plan for a quick
removal of the explosives, covered by police protection, was sound. It was hoped that
since the stores were some distance from inhabited areas it would be possible to move
the explosives without opposition from the miners. Part of the operation was in fact
quickly completed without the police coming into contact with the miners, and I am
convinced that the removal of explosives at Iva Valley would also have been completed
without difficulty or opposition had it not been for the miscalculations regarding the
quantity of explosives to be moved and the means of moving them. This led to several
hours’ delay during which the crowd of miners collected. These miscalculations are
criticized by the Commission and I see no excuse for them. Had they not occurred the
whole objective would certainly have been carried out without a clash. When the
report is published I intend to take the matter up in consultation with the Colliery
Board. I can, however, see no grounds for inferring from the decision to remove the
explosives that the Chief Commissioner treated the dispute as political. It must be
stressed that the police were used for no other purpose than to ensure the quick and
safe removal of the explosives, and I state categorically that there was absolutely no
question of armed forces being used to break a strike. I should just add on this point
that the Commission states, apparently as a matter of inference to be drawn from the
evidence (although no such order was admitted), that the Chief Commissioner
ordered the police to remove the explosives ‘at all costs’. It is perhaps unfortunate that
the point was not put to the Chief Commissioner in those terms when he gave evi-
dence. He informs me that he certainly did not give such an order and did not con-
template that the order he did give could be so interpreted.
11. In the light of the considerations which I have advanced I am bound to say,
with a due sense of responsibility, that I consider that the Commission has been less
than fair to the Chief Commissioner and his advisers on this question of how they
regarded and treated the dispute. I fully appreciate the Commission’s view that the
situation at the Enugu Colliery was not a political agitation but an industrial dispute
but, in my view, upon that a security problem was superimposed. I also fully agree
with the Commission that it is of the utmost importance not to confuse industrial
and political issues. In Nigeria, as the Commission recognises, it is not always easy to
achieve such a separation, but in the Colliery dispute in early November the
distinction was clear to the Government and to all the officers concerned.
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12. With regard to the shooting at Iva Valley I have no comments to make on the
finding of fact which the Commission has recorded. The Senior Superintendent of
Police on the spot gave the order to fire because he believed that the police were in
imminent danger of being overwhelmed by a hostile and wildly excited crowd. The
Commission has found that in doing so he made an error of judgment and did not
measure up to that standard that might have been expected from one of his rank and
seniority, but that he acted in all honesty. The Commission has further found that
there is not a vestige of evidence to support the infamous suggestion that the
shooting was pre-arranged.
The police throughout the disturbances before and after the events at Iva Valley
were working in circumstances of great strain and difficulty, and I fully endorse the
commendation made by the Commission of the action taken in other centres in the
Eastern Provinces to carry out the primary duty of upholding law and order. Had it
not been for the restraint and steadiness of the police in face of great provocation
throughout these subsequent disturbances, which did become to some extent
political in nature, and the tireless efforts of the Chief Commissioner and his
Administrative Officers, the loss of life and damage to property must have been much
greater.
13. I turn now to the recommendations made by the Commission, and to my
proposals for taking prompt action in the directions which the Commission have
advocated.
In the first place I welcome the proposal that on Statutory Boards charged with
the running of Government-owned industries at least one of the members should, if
possible, have special experience of industrial relations. I hope, where possible, to
appoint men from the Nigerian Trade Union Movement to these Boards but, as the
Commission recognised, it may be some time before enough Nigerian Trade
Unionists with suitable experience to take part in the direction of industrial
enterprises are available. Until there are it will be necessary constantly to weigh the
advantages of so utilizing the services of the small number who are suitable against
the disadvantages of depriving the Trade Union Movement, temporarily at least, of
the stabilizing influence of these individuals. I am interested in the Commission’s
suggestion that in the meantime officers of the Department of Labour with wide
experience in dealing with problems of industrial relations should be selected to
serve on the Boards. Here again the services of such officers would presumably be
lost to their Department for the time being, and it will be necessary to consider the
effect on the Department.
14. I also welcome the emphasis which the Commission has given to the need for
Joint Production Committees, and I am confident that the Colliery Board will be in
agreement. This Government is fully alive to the necessity for consultation between
management and men on all matters of joint interest, and the constitution of
Whitley Councils with very wide terms of reference was a step in this direction.
Moreover, Departmental Consultative Committees have already been set up in most
Departments. I agree that an essential factor for the success of these and other
measures of collaboration is the appreciation by the worker of the connection
between a high level of production and his own well-being and practical benefit. In
the Enugu Colliery recent efforts have been made in this direction by an attempt to
create District Joint Consultative Committees. Such experiments are not always
welcomed by Trade Union leaders or immediately appreciated by the men, but I agree
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that persistent endeavours must be made to create the proper atmosphere of
confidence and co-operation so that progress may be made along the lines which the
Commission advocates. It is the intention that the Colliery Board should shortly
consider proposals put forward by the Chairman for the reconstitution of the Whitley
Council in the form of a Joint Industrial Committee with changes in membership,
terms of reference and procedure for the speedy resolutions of differences. For my
part I should welcome any assistance that you may be able to secure for us from the
United Kingdom in the drawing up of these proposals and in their implementation;
and I am confident that such assistance would be welcomed by the Colliery Board. I
regard this matter as of special urgency.
15. This Government also accepts in principle the proposal for Conciliation
Boards and some form of National Reference Tribunal. Proposals along these lines
were put forward by the Commissioner of Labour to the Brooke [sic: Brook}
Commission which investigated labour conditions following strikes on the Railway
last year, and the views of the Trade Unions were invited on the recommendations of
the Brooke Commission. I feel, however, that a fresh start should be made in the
light of the comprehensive recommendations now put forward. The first necessity is
to provide machinery, or improved machinery, whereby disputes can be dealt with by
round-table discussions between representatives of management and employees.
When these discussions fail a conciliator may be brought in, and only when every
possible effort to reach agreement by conciliation has been made should reference to
an arbitrating authority take place. The Commission has emphasised the need to
ensure that such an authority should be independent and impartial, and has urged
that a fully independent standing tribunal should be established to which disputes
could be referred when all attempts to reach a settlement by conciliation have failed.
The need for some independent tribunal has been increasingly apparent in recent
years. The Government has on several occasions brought out impartial arbitrators
from the United Kingdom, at Government expense, to deal with disputes affecting
different categories of Government employees. This procedure has disadvantages of
expense and delay, and the establishment of a permanent tribunal, constituted on the
lines of an Industrial Court, has very much to commend it. The tribunal or court
might consist of a President with wide experience of industrial relations recruited in
the United Kingdom, sitting with members drawn from a panel of residents in
Nigeria. In working out and implementing proposals on these lines I shall be grateful
to receive any advice and help which you can secure for us from the United Kingdom,
and I very much hope that the Trade Unions in Nigeria and the employers as well will
fully co-operate in the working out of a comprehensive scheme which will command
general support and confidence.
16. I have also given careful consideration to the Commission’s proposal that a
Ministry of Labour should be established. The suggestions which the Commission
has made in this connection are in principle fully acceptable and are in line with the
proposed constitutional changes now being evolved. Final decisions on the form of
the new Constitution have yet to be taken, but under the proposals made by the
General Constitutional Conference and supported by the Legislative Council a
Ministry of Labour would be formed in the Central Government under a Minister
who would be a Nigerian member of the Central Legislature. He would be advised by
officers with special experience of industrial relations and expert knowledge of Trade
Union practice in the United Kingdom. In the meanwhile I have decided to delegate
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to the Commissioner of Labour my powers under the Trade Disputes (Arbitration
and Enquiry) Ordinance to refer matters in dispute to a Board of Arbitration or to
appoint a Board of Enquiry.
17. Finally, I am glad that the Commission has endorsed the view that Statutory
Boards should be established to run what may be called commercial and semi-
commercial Government-owned enterprises. Over the past few years this
Government has made important progress in carrying out such a policy, and the
Marketing Boards, the Production Development Boards, the Cameroons
Development Corporation, the West African Airways Corporation and the Enugu
Colliery Board, which have already been established, are examples of the kind of
organisation which the Government increasingly proposes to establish, though the
Colliery Board is not yet on a statutory basis. An Ordinance establishing an
Electricity Corporation has just been passed, and it in now proposed to consider
whether other large quasi-commercial Departments of Government, such as the
Railway, cannot better be run by Statutory Boards. The aim is that the management
should be free to carry out its task and to deal with its staff and labour problems,
without the centralisation and restrictions which are necessarily imposed on
Government Departments. This form of organisation has advantages not only in
more efficient administration but in freeing the Government from direct
responsibility for dealing with industrial disputes. It has also the great advantage of
providing opportunities for Nigerians to take a share in the direction of the
enterprises as members of the directing Boards.
18. Every possible step will be taken as a matter of special urgency to push
forward with the action which I have described. It is of the utmost importance to
Nigeria that industrial relations should be improved, and that such a tragedy as that
which occurred at Iva Valley should never again mar the country’s progress. The
Commission has emphasised that recriminations over the past would bedevil that
progress, and has directed its earnest attention to the measures necessary for
achieving better labour relations in the future. The difficulties are certainly great,
but I and my officers will pursue our policy in the same spirit and I trust that in
doing so this Government will have the active co-operation both of Trade Unions and
employers.
19. I propose, with your approval to lay this despatch before the Legislative
Council at its next meeting.
108 CO 537/5795, no 69 19 May 1950
[Enugu shootings]: letter from Mr Griffiths to Mr Attlee on the
findings of the Fitzgerald Commission
I feel that before I leave for Malaya I ought to bring to your notice the Report, of
which I enclose a copy, of the Commission of Enquiry into certain disorders which
occurred at Enugu in Nigeria in November last.1 The Governor of Nigeria has just
visited this country for the purpose, among others, of discussing this Report with
me. The outcome of this discussion is that despatches, of which also I enclose copies,
1 ie the Fitzgerald report; enclosure not printed.
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are to be exchanged between us.2 The Report and a print containing the despatches
are to be published on Saturday, the 10th of June, both in Nigeria and here.
You will see from paras. 5–11 of the Governor’s despatch that he has felt obliged to
dissent from some of the Findings of the Commission. He has there set out the
reasons which he regards as weighty and compelling for his dissent.
There were two findings in para, 110 of the Report on which I found myself in
considerable doubt—viz
(1) That the Chief Commissioner erred in diagnosing the dispute as a political
agitation rather than as industrial in its character.
(2) That the Chief Commissioner gave an order to remove the explosives at all costs.
I had the advantage of the advice of the Attorney General on these two issues and I
enclose a copy of his memorandum3 to me.
Having given the most careful consideration to the matter I have felt compelled to
accept the Governor’s views on these two issues.
On certain other findings I have found myself unable to agree with the Governor’s
views, and these are set out in paras. 4 and 5 of my Despatch.4 You will note that I
have decided to support the Commission on:—
(1) Their criticism (at the end of para. 111 of the Report) that the Commissioner
of Labour was not summoned to Enugu to attend the consultations with the Chief
Commissioner, and that in his absence the Senior Labour Officer was not called
into consultation.
(2) I also support the Commission’s criticism that the offers of the Nwgo [sic:
Ngwo] Clan Council and of Mr. Honey to intervene in an effort to settle the dispute
were rejected (see paras. 99 and 100 of the Report).
(3) I also agree with the Commission (para. 110 of the Report) that the view that
an offer to negotiate would be regarded as a sign of weakness was not a sound view,
particularly since the alternative was the removal of the explosives as an operation
conducted by Armed Police.
I fully expect that the publication of the Report and the Despatches will arouse
considerable interest, both in Nigeria and this country, and may lead to acute
controversy. There will certainly be demands for a Debate in the House and I think
an early Debate after the House resumes on June 13th will be desirable.
In view of all these considerations I felt I should acquaint you of the position and
send you copies of the Report and the Despatches.
2 Not printed. See 107 and 109. 3 Not printed. 4 See 109.
109 CO 537/5795, no 71 22 May 1950
[Enugu shootings]: despatch no 323 from Mr Griffiths to Sir J
Macpherson on the report of the Fitzgerald Commission
I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 12 of the 18th May on the subject of
the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the recent disorders in Nigeria.1 I have
1 See 107.
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conveyed to the Chairman and Members of the Commission the gratitude of the
Nigerian Government to them for having undertaken this enquiry and for the care
and labour which they have devoted to the proparation of their Report, and have
associated myself cordially with your expression of thanks.
2. I have given much thought to the picture presented in the Commission’s
Report of the introduction and development of trade unionism in Nigeria, and to the
comments on that part of the Report which are made in paragraph 3 of your
despatch. The Commission has fully described the difficulties with which the
Nigerian Government were faced in giving effect to the declared policy of fostering
trade unionism. In the face of these difficulties I think that the policy followed by the
Government was basically the right one. A strong Labour Department was built up,
seasoned with officers who had long practical experience of the working of trade
unions in the United Kingdom. It was these officers who could give the movement in
Nigeria the expert advice and guidance which it needed. I have reason to know that
both you and your predecessors have been sincerely anxious to see trade unionism
successfully established; I am sure that you will be at pains at all times to see that
this policy is carried out with equal zeal in all Departments of the public service. I
think also that you are justified in pointing out that the Nigerian Government as an
employer has shown itself consistently ready in the past to submit to conciliation and
arbitration of labour disputes in which it has been involved.
3. The history of industrial relations at Enugu has been dealt with in great detail
in the Commission’s Report, and in your despatch you have explained the difficulties
with which the Colliery Management was confronted. Careful study of these matters
leads me to three conclusions. In the first place it is clear that the working of the
trade union organisation and the quality of union leadership at the Colliery were
seriously defective. Secondly the machinery for conciliation was unsatisfactory.
Thirdly the story of relations at the Colliery illustrates only too clearly the difficulties
of a position in which the Government, as a direct employer of labour, may find itself
under Nigerian conditions both a party and a judge in a dispute. I shall have
suggestions to make on the first two points later in this despatch against the wider
background of the future organisation of industrial relationships in Nigeria: I refer
specifically to my third point in paragraph 11 below.
4. I have carefully studied what you say in paragraphs 4 to 11 of your despatch in
regard to the events leading up to what occurred on the 18th November. I agree, as
you do, that the dispute was an industrial one, and having considered the whole of
the evidence I accept your assurance that the Chief Commissioner and the other
officers concerned so regarded it, and that so far as any other considerations were
present in their minds they arose from the responsibility of the Chief Commissioner
to maintain public security and order. But since the dispute was an industrial one I
feel bound to agree with the Commission that it is a matter for criticism that the
Commissioner of Labour was not summoned to Enugu to help with his experience
and advice. In his absence it was, I think, all the more regrettable that Mr. Honey,
who had arrived in Enugu on the 9th November to take up the post of Senior Labour
Officer, was not invited to be present at all the staff conferences and only attended on
the 16th November when his suggestion that a further attempt should be made to
negotiate a settlement was rejected. The Chairman of the Colliery Board and the
Colliery Manager were present at the Staff Conferences and I think it would have
been helpful if the Labour Department had also been represented in order to secure
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more balanced advice. It is true that Mr. Honey was not familiar with the Colliery or
the circumstances of the dispute. He was, however, an experienced Labour Officer
and he had received a telegram from the Commissioner of Labour instructing him to
make his services available.
5. I must say also that in spite of the many difficulties referred to in your
despatch I think that a further effort should have been made to negotiate with the
miners. I appreciate the efforts which had been made by the Board to persuade the
men to resume full work and in particular I commend the part which had been
played by the Nigerian members of the Board. Even if, however, there seemed little
prospect of a further effort to negotiate succeeding I agree with the Commission
that the attempt should nonetheless have been made. For this reason I also agree
with the view expressed by the Commission in regard to the offer to intervene by
the Ngwo Clan Council, and I think that the offer which Mr. Honey made on the
16th November to make another approach to the miners through the Union
Executive ought to have been accepted. The Chief Commissioner decided against
this proposal on the advice of the Chairman of the Colliery Board and of the
Colliery Manager that an offer to negotiate at that stage would have been regarded
as a sign of weakness by the men. I agree with the Commission that this view was
not a sound one. I realise, as the Commission does, how easy it is to be wise after
the event and I recognise the acutely difficult position in which the Chief
Commissioner was placed by the circumstances which developed as the dispute
went on. I am well aware of the efforts which he made throughout to preserve
order and to prevent any disturbance of the peace. But since the alternative was to
close the mine and remove the explosives I think that it would have been more pru-
dent to accept the offers by the Clan Council and by Mr. Honey to make a further
effort to negotiate with the miners.
6. I note what you say in regard to the actual events which followed at Iva Valley
on the 18th November and which are dealt with in Part X of the Report, and in
particular your disagreement with the Commission’s conclusion that the Chief
Commissioner had given an order that the explosives were to be removed ‘at all
costs’. I accept your assurance that the Chief Commissioner did not in fact give such
an order and I do not think that it can safely be inferred that the order which was
given was understood in this drastic sense. Nonetheless, for the reasons I have
already indicated I think it was a mistake at that stage to have made the removal of
the explosives an operation to be conducted by armed police. For the rest the
Commission’s findings are clear. There was a grave lack of foresight and planning in
the arrangements which the Colliery management made for the removal of the
explosives, and this added greatly to the hazard of the operation and contributed to
the difficulties with which the police were eventually faced. But after making
allowance for this the Commission has found that, although in all honesty, the police
officer in command did make an error of judgment in resorting to extreme measures
at the moment at which he did. I note that you have no comments on these findings
by the Commission and I concur. On the other hand I am glad to observe the
commendation which the Commission gives to the action which the Chief
Commissioner took after the 18th November. The Commission has made it clear that
these disturbances were political in nature, that they were admirably handled by the
administrative and police officers concerned and that where the police had to open
fire they acted justifiably in the discharge of their duty. I endorse fully the
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commendation of the officers concerned which the Commission has made, and in my
opinion it reflects, most creditably on the Nigerian Police and the Administration
alike that disturbances of this gravity were brought under control with so little loss
of life and without recourse to military assistance.
7. I turn now to the parts of the Report which are of the most importance for the
future—those which deal with the overhaul of the general conciliation machinery in
industry in Nigeria. Let me say at once that I agree emphatically with the
Commission that in so far as trade unionism in Nigeria is concerned there can be no
turning back; as the Commission says, trade unionism ‘must be made to work, and to
work as it has worked in Britain to the advantage of the workers and the advantage of
the State’. With that object in view the workers must recognise the desirability in
their own interests of the overhaul of trade union organisation which the
Commission holds to be necessary. At the same time the conciliation machinery in
all branches and at all levels of industry must be re-examined and where necessary
re-organised by agreement between employers and employed. The Commission has
made in Part XIII of its Report important proposals for the organisation of
conciliation machinery which will apply not only to the Colliery but to industry as
well. You have accepted these proposals in principle and have asked me for advice
and assistance in implementing them.
8. It is clear to me, and I know that you take the same view, that the task of the
highest urgency lies at the Enugu Colliery. The state of labour relations at Enugu at
present is too serious to allow of delay while action in the wider field of labour
relations in Nigeria as a whole is undertaken; the problem must be tackled at once of
setting up by agreement between the Colliery Board and the miners suitable
conciliation machinery at the earliest possible moment. It should not, however, be
necessary for action in the wider field to await the settlement of the immediate
problem at Enugu.
9. I accordingly propose, after discussion with you, to arrange for the visit to
Nigeria forthwith of a small group of experts in the field of trade union organisations
and labour relations. Provided that such persons can be made available I have in
mind that the party should consist of a senior official from the Headquarters of the
Trade Union Congress in this country, a colliery worker who is an experienced trade
union representative in that industry, an official of the National Coal Board with
practical knowledge of the organisation of labour relations and a fourth member
selected in consultation with the British Employers’ Confederation. I propose also to
attach to this party Mr. E. Parry, my Assistant Labour Adviser. The composition of
this party is designed to ensure that while close and detailed attention is given to the
Colliery, there should at the same time be an opportunity for a survey of industrial
relations in Nigeria as a whole. The exact programme of the party will be a matter for
later arrangement; it may be convenient that they should all go to Enugu in the first
instance, and that the colliery worker and National Coal Board member should stay
there for a considerable period in order to assist not only in the working out of
suitable conciliation machinery, but also in putting it into operation, while the other
two members of the party tour more widely in Nigeria. I trust that both the Colliery
Board and the miners will welcome the assistance which is being offered and the
opportunity of consultation in order to obtain advice on labour relations and union
organisation. The Board will also no doubt wish to consult the visiting experts fully
on the proposals which, as stated in paragraph 14 of your despatch, they will shortly
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be considering for the reconstruction of the Whitley Council in the form of a Joint
Industrial Committee.
10. It is not my intention that these experts should be constituted as a formal
Commission or that their functions should be merely to report and advise on a
scheme for conciliation machinery. What is now required is action to work out in
detail and put into effect the general principles recommended by the Commission in
Parts VI and XIII of the Report. It is in my view essential to future success that this
work should be performed by negotiation and free agreement between the two sides
of industry, and the visiting experts will be asked to assist both workers and
employers in this. For this purpose they will consult freely with all parties concerned
on both sides of industry and in particular with the Nigerian trade unions. I very
much hope that the unions will seize the opportunity of consulting with them and
seeking their advice on the organisation and functioning of the unions and that the
Government and public boards and corporations, as well as private employers of
labour, will equally make use of their help. You will no doubt also wish to consult
them on changes in trade union law and on the training of Nigerian trade union
officials.
11. I take up again at this point the third conclusion which I have drawn in
paragraph 3 of this despatch from study of industrial relations at Enugu in the past. I
welcome strongly your intention to set up statutory boards wherever possible to
control the commercial undertakings of Government. It will obviously not be
possible for the Government to divest itself entirely of the function of direct
employer of labour, but I am convinced that under Nigerian conditions the reasons
given in paragraph 17 of your despatch for setting up those Boards or Corporations
are compelling, and that the Government must free itself to the greatest extent
possible from the complications which, as the Commission has pointed out, arise
when the Government itself has the direct management of industrial and
commercial undertakings.
12. The events at Enugu were a shock to Nigeria and to this country, and the
publication of the Commission’s Report will attract renewed attention to them. It
would be most unfortunate if these tragic events had the effect of detracting from the
good work which your administration has done over such a wide field or of
discouraging you and your officers from carrying on that work with unabated
enthusiasm. I am glad to see that the Commission pays tribute to the Government of
Nigeria as progressive and liberal minded. I believe that tribute to be well deserved
and I endorse it. In the field of constitutional advance and in economic development
Nigeria is making notable progress under your administration with the full
participation of the representatives of the people; in the field of trade unionism and
labour relations a difficult stage has been reached. I am convinced that the right
course is to press on with the development of trade unionism, and that attention
should be devoted not to recrimination but to drawing lessons which will be of value
in the future. It is with that object in view that I have made the proposals in this
despatch for bringing in the best advice obtainable from this country. It is my earnest
hope that all parties in Nigeria will be prepared to accept this offer; I believe that it
represents an opportunity to open a new chapter in the history of industrial relations
in Nigeria.
13. I approve your proposal to lay your despatch before the Legislative Council at
its next meeting, and I wish you similarly to lay this despatch before them.
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110 CO 537/5795, no 76 5 June 1950
[Enugu shootings]: CO memorandum for Mr Attlee on the report of
the Fitzgerald Commission
The Commission’s Report and the exchange of despatches1 are concerned with three
major questions:—
(a) the labour policy of the Nigerian Government;
(b) events at the Colliery up to and including the shooting on the 18th November,
the disturbances which followed elsewhere, and the way in which these events
were handled;
(c) the system of industrial relations, with particular reference to the situation at
the Enugu Colliery and the need to improve union organisation and leadership
within Nigeria.
2. In regard to labour policy the Commission reviews the history of the
introduction of trade unionism into Nigeria, and points to certain shortcomings in
the Government’s approach to the problem, though in measured terms and with
appreciation of the difficulties. To members of the Trade Unions of Nigeria the
Commission speaks ‘with brutal frankness’, advising them strongly to overhaul their
organisations and choose more responsible leaders.
3. It is on the handling of the situation at the Colliery between the start of the go-
slow strike in early November and the events of November 18th that major contro-
versy may arise. The Commission has found that the Chief Commissioner of the
Eastern Provinces and his advisers erred in diagnosing and treating the dispute as a
political agitation rather than an industrial dispute; and the Report holds that the Chief
Commissioner’s actions were dominated by the conclusion that the dispute had passed
from the phase of an industrial dispute into a political agitation. The wording of para
110 of the Report also suggests that the Chief Commissioner gave the order to remove
explosives from the mine ‘at all costs’. The Governor, for reasons which are fully argued
in paras 5–11 of his despatch, dissents from the Commission’s finding that the offi-
cers concerned regarded and treated the dispute as a political agitation. His argument,
briefly, is that the dispute was not in fact regarded as anything but industrial by the
Chief Commissioner and his officers until disorder occurred and a threat to public
security developed and that the steps which the Chief Commissioner took (including
the decision to remove the explosives from the mine which led up to the shooting inci-
dent) were taken in discharge of his responsibility to maintain law and order.
4. The Governor also differs from the Commission on the question of fact
regarding the suggestion that the order was given to remove the explosives ‘at all
costs’. The Governor points out that this is apparently an inference drawn from the
evidence, that it was not put to the Chief Commissioner and that the latter has stated
that he did not give such an order and did not contemplate that his order could be so
interpreted.
5. The Secretary of State in his despatch has accepted the Governor’s assurance
that the Chief Commissioner and the other officers concerned regarded the dispute
as an industrial one, and that so far as any other considerations were present in their
1 See 107 and 109.
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minds they arose from the responsibility for maintaining public security and order.
The Secretary of State also accepts the assurance that no order to remove the
explosives ‘at all costs’ was given. On these two points, therefore, the Secretary of
State and the Governor agree in dissenting from the Report. The Secretary of State
states, however, that:—
(a) he agrees with the Commission that it is a matter for criticism that the
Commissioner of Labour was not summoned to Enugu to help;
(b) it is regrettable that the new Senior Labour Officer, who had taken up duties
on the 9th November, was not called in to the staff conferences until the 16th;
(c) in spite of the many difficulties, a further effort to negotiate with the miners
should have been made; in particular, as the Commission says, the offers of the
Clan Council and of the Senior Labour Officer (on the 16th November) to
intervene should have been accepted;
(d) it was, in the Secretary of State’s view, a mistake at that stage to have made the
removal of the explosives an operation to be conducted by armed police.
On the first three of these four points the Governor, while setting out his own
appreciation of the situation, does not challenge the view taken by the Commission.
On the fourth point the Governor’s expressed opinion is that the decision to move
the explosives was correct and that it was necessary to use police to cover the
operation. On this letter point, therefore, there is an expressed difference of opinion
between the Governor and the Secretary of State.
6. Controversy may therefore arise on the two points on which the Governor and
the Secretary of State dissent from the Report, on the question of the use of police in
the removal of the explosives, and possibly on the extent to which blame is
established and can be imputed to any particular officers. The Attorney General was
consulted on the two main points of dissent in particular, and the wording of both
despatches follows suggestions made by him. On the actual shooting there is a clear
finding that the Police Officer concerned made an error of judgment, though he
acted in all honesty. This is accepted both by the Governor and the Secretary of State.
7. The remainder of the Report and despatches deals with the need for
improvement in the system of industrial relations and the measures to be taken to
that end. Paras 9–10 of the Secretary of State’s despatch set out the assistance to be
rendered from this country in the way of expert advice and help. These proposals are
not likely to be controversial. The Commission’s advocacy of Statutory Boards to run
the Government-owned industries is also fully accepted in both despatches, and is in
fact in accordance with the Nigerian Government’s policy.
8. A printed copy of the exchange of despatches is attached.
111 CO 583/310/8, no 9 17 June 1950
[Enugu shootings]: memorandum by the National Emergency
Committee on the report of the Fitzgerald Commission
NEC comments and recommendations on the Fitzgerald Report
Commissioned by the General Meeting of the National Emergency
Committee to study the Report of the Fitzgerald Commission in connection
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with the Enugu Massacre and its repercussions in Nigeria, and make
recommendations, a Sub-Committee of Eight whose names are appended on
this document, met at 74, King George Avenue, Yaba Estate, for three nights
(June 12–14, 1950), and after a critical analysis of the findings of the
Commission, submit the following as their observations and
recommendations:—
Introduction
1. In our view, the reasoning of the Fitzgerald Commission, has proceeded from
certain basic assumptions which are in themselves false. These assumptions together
with the attitude of the Commission which is dealt with later in this memorandum,
have led to a number of untenable conclusions and astonishing, even insulting
remarks which abound in the Commission’s Report.
2. In dealing with the ‘Political Trends in Nigeria’, for instance, it is assumed
firstly that Nigerians as a whole and Nigerian nationalists in particular are politically
immature; secondly that British Rule in Nigeria is progressive, liberal-minded, and
beneficial to the people of this country; and thirdly that the beneficence and
advantages of this Rule have been stultified by the ‘subversive activities’ of a vocal,
extremist and minority class who always make ‘extravagant political claims’.
3. We emphatically disagree with these assumptions because, as we have said
before, they are false; and we strongly condemn the erroneous conclusions and
insulting remarks which flow from them.
4. The Commission has misconstrued the background to the present political
trends in Nigeria, and has failed completely to grasp the significance and the far-
reaching implications of those trends.
5. Since the advent of the British Rule, the white officials of the so-called
Nigerian Government have shown marked contempt for and consistent lack of
sympathy with the political, educational, and economic aspirations of the people of
Nigeria. Whatever advancement has been made in any of these departments of
human activities, has been due in the main to persistent agitation on the part of the
people, and partly to the fact that British self-interests happen to coincide at some
points with our own interests.
6. In spite of this notorious indifference to our best interests, the British
Government has dragged us into two major World Wars which were initiated without
our knowledge or consent, and which were fought for the purpose of advancing
British self-interests and of preserving what is often proudly described as British
Freedom.
7. During the last war our manpower and our economic resources were fully
mobilised and ruthlessly regimented. Our raw materials were bought at low prices
which were dictated by the British Government. Many of our boys laid down their
lives in various theatres of war. Many of the blind and the maimed among the
surviving ones are still with us. In short we gave our loyalty to Britain without
hesitation or stinting. We did hope that the freedom which was ours as of right
before we were deprived of it by the British, might be restored to us. But we had
hoped in vain.
8. The Richard’s [sic] Constitution was our first reward; it was cut and dried
behind our back and forced down our throat in spite of the strongest protest and
resistance.
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9. Furthermore, we hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are born free
and equal as to their rights; that political freedom (that is, the right of a people to
choose and reject its rulers) is the inalienable right of every nation; and that no nation
has any legal or moral right to impose its rule over another. It is, therefore, unnatural
and humiliating in the extreme for the people of Nigeria to be forced into a position
where they have to negotiate with Britain for their freedom. It is British might and
not British virtue that has compelled us to take this defensive and most humiliating
position. It is clear from the foregoing that we have reached a stage in this country
when the people will not tolerate a rule which is imposed upon them against their wish
and without their consent. It is also clear that all we are demanding from the British
Govt is our right to freedom and political self-determination. We have demanded noth-
ing more and nothing less. In our view, therefore, the Commission is most unreason-
able and unjust in considering our claim for freedom and for political
self-determination as extravagant. It is equally unreasonable and unjust to regard any
of our claim for educational, economic, and social advancement as extravagant.
10. In this connection, we denounce the subtle suggestion made by the
Commission to the so-called Nigerian Govt that the latter should embark on an
intensive measure of ‘divide and rule’ in order to put an end to what the Commission
wrongly describers [sic] as the ‘extravagant claims’ and the ‘subversive activities’ of
the ‘vocal extremists.’ We know that the men of ‘good hearts’ referred to in paragraph
18 of the Report do not include the Nigerian Nationalists. And for the Commission to
ask the Govt to mobilise these men of ‘good hearts’ to curb the subversive activities
of those anti-Govt forces is to advise Govt in effect to declare war on the nationalists
who legitimately and sincerely work for political freedom for Nigeria, and to incite
one section of the community against another.
11. In our opinion this advice is in keeping with the express view of Sir John
Macpherson himself who, shortly before the Enugu tragedy, declared that he would
use severe measures to suppress what he called extreme political and labour
demands, even if his doing so would mean the end of British Rule in Nigeria. Both
the suggestion of the Commission and the view of Sir John Macpherson, are in
keeping with the imperialist scheme, which is always designed to keep the Colonial
peoples in perpetual subjection by the relentless application of the ‘divide and rule’
policy, and of repressive measures against the nationalist class.
12. In concluding our remarks under this head, we like to observe that the
Commission carries its unfairness a little too far by anticipating the reaction of the
people and trying to stifle it in advance. Says the Commission in paragraph 20: ‘We
emphasise at the start that recriminations over the past always bedevil political
progress. If this report is to be used as a medium for such recriminations, and we
realise that it affords biased or narrow individuals ample opportunity to do so, then
our tasks will have been in vain.’
13. We are neither biased nor narrow-minded, though we are an interested party.
We do not intend to indulge in recriminations as such, or for their own sake. Indeed
it is our earnest desire to point our fingers to those points from where the so-called
Nigerian Govt has gone astray. We would be failing in our duty as leaders of our
people if we didn’t do so now. The incompetence, lack of foresight, and disregard for
African life which led to the Enugu shooting are by no means confined to that
tragedy. They are always with us, and unless we decry them at this psycholigical [sic]
moment, they may rear their heads again in other places.
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14. Above all, it is easy to advise us not to cry over split [sic] milk; but we cannot
refrain from nor can anyone conscientiously blame us for crying over the split [sic]
blood of our fellow-countrymen who were shot in cold blood and without
provocation at Enugu.
Part II
The shooting incident
15. The Commission has found that the shooting of unarmed African Miners at
Iva Valley was unjustified and unprovoked. The responsibility for this atrocity has
been fixed on Mr Pyke-Nott—the Chief Commissioner Eastern Regin, [sic] and Mr
Phillips [sic], the Senior Superintendent of Police. The Commission censured the
Chief Commissioner for treating an industrial dispute as a political agitation, which
resulted in his rejecting an offer of conciliation by a labour expert and the sending of
armed force to effect the removal of explosives at Iva Valley at all costs. On this point
we are in complete agreement with the Commission.
16. Even where honesty existed, the conduct of the Chief Commissioner in
regarding a purely labour dispute as a political unrest must be regarded as not only
scandalous, but also as evidence of incompetence and unfitness to assume such
heavy political responsibility as is placed on a person of his rank and high office.
Where, however, evidence has been led as in this case to show that the shooting was
pre-arranged and deliberate, the Chief Commissioner’s conduct is easily understood
as conforming to the common plan to break the strike of the Enugu Miners by armed
force in order to teach the Nigerian Workers a lesson.
17. The NEC cannot agree with the Commission in its findings that the shooting
was not deliberate. The order to remove the explosives at all costs which the
Commission found was given by the Chief Commissioner to armed Police necessarily
contemplated the use of firearms and at the best can only be interpreted as a
mandate to the Officer in charge of the detachment to open fire at his discretion.
18. Besides evidence of inadequate provision which was made for the removal of
the explosives at the Iva Valley, the alleged miscalculation as to the quantity of
explosives the infuriation of workers by constant parade of Police, and the detailing
of armed force, are all links in the chain of a concerted design to bring the miners
into clash with armed Police which must necessarily result in and perhaps justify the
use of firearms.
19. After a close study of the evidence and after taking into full consideration all
the surrounding circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that the shooting of
the defenceless miners was to say the least deliberate.
20. His Excellency the Governor argued in his dispatch to the Secretary of State
that the Chief Commissioner treated the dispute as an industrial one until disorder
occurred and a threat to public security developed. We must state at once that we do
not see any reliable evidence of a threat to public security in what was an ordinary
coal miners’ strike. The allegation that there were political agitators encouraging the
formation of terrorist parties and making efforts to acquire arms and explosives is
entirely without foundation and such position only existed in the figments of the
imagination of those who made such allegations.
21. We accept unreservedly the guilt of Mr Philip as the person responsible for
the shooting of the miners. Accordingly we entirely disagree with the extenuating
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remarks of the Commission when it stated that Mr Philip’s action was only an error
of judgement; that he acted in all honesty, but only failed to measure up to the
standard expected from one of his rank and seniority. We fail to see the proof of
honesty in a man who, without the slightest provocation, made use of all the forces
available to him to shoot down unarmed men and later made a report that shooting
was necessary in self-defence of his men who were being attacked by the miners—an
allegation which the Commission found to be false.
22. Again we cannot accept the view that the use of the entire firing power of Mr
Phillips [sic] was due to his lack of control over his men. It is quite clear that these
men were ordered to open fire. It is inconceivable that African members of a
stringently disciplined Police force as we have in Nigeria could of their own volition
fire at their own brothers without being so ordered by a Senior Police Officer. There
was no question of an error of judgement. The circumstances which might have led
to that were never established in evidence. If it was a fact that the attitude of the
miners was such that it manifestly threatened the safety of the Police, we have no
doubt that African Police men present would have been available to give evidence in
this connection. On the contrary, the witnesses who testified on behalf of the Police
as to the incident which occurred at Iva Valley were all European Police Officers. We
think that Mr Phillips [sic] is an irresponsible and callous Police Officer who ought to
be thoroughly condemned for recklessly wounding and taking the lives of harmless
coal miners. He should also be denounced as a co-operator in a common plan to
break an industrial strike in Nigeria by the use of armed forces.
23. As Nigerians we regard this shooting incident at Enugu as only a climax to a
continuous show of power, frequently manifested by British Administrators in
Nigeria as a constant reminder to African that they are completely at the mercy of
their rulers who have full backing of forces.
24. With regard to the shooting in other parts of the Eastern Region outside
Enugu, we only think it necessary to draw attention to a fact which the Commission
has overlooked that the only town where rioting was quelled without bloodshed was
Calabar, where an African Police Officer was in charge. No doubt he was able to enter
into the feelings of his country men and, with an understanding of his people, which
a Britisher does not possess, he was able to avoid unnecessary loss of lives.
25. We note here with regret that this credit was not given by the Commission to
the African Officer concerned. It is deplorable that the Commission tried to attribute
this singular success to other causes.
Part III
The attitude of the Commission
26. This leads us inevitably to examine the attitude of the Commission as a whole
in their treatment of the various establishments, organisations and individuals which
they had cause to comment upon in the course of their work. Anyone who has
carefully perused the report cannot fail to be struck by the discriminatory language
employed by the Commission.
27. The Commission lost no pains in justifying Govt establishments and British
Officials wherever possible and making excuses on their behalf, while on the other
hand on the least pretext a number of African controlled organisations,
establishments and individuals were condemned in the most rigorous language.
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 313
314 MACPHERSON AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW [111]
28. We have already referred to the manner in which the Commission attempted
to reduce the gravity of Mr Phillips [sic] offence and his guilt in so recklessly taking
the lives of the miners. Mr Pyke-Nott, the Sectary [sic] Eastern Provinces, Dr
Raeburn (Chairman of the Colliery Board), Mr Bracegirdle (the Colliery Manager),
the Secretary for Finance Eastern Province, the Assistant Commissioner of Police
were all described by the Commission as able Officials although it will be
remembered that these men formed the Chief Commissioners Council that
blundered so woefully by rejecting the services of Mr Honey and the Ngwo Clan
Council, and treating the industrial dispute as a political agitation.
29. Nigerian Administrative service which has caused the loss of the lives of 21
miners was described as a fine one, and even Mr Pyke-Nott was also regarded as a
competent Administrator. On the other hand African leadership both political and
labour was condemned in the strongest language. Nigerian Press was described as
irresponsible, and African witnesses as having concocted their evidence.
30. It is a matter of regret that the African members of the Commission have
found it necessary to associate themselves with such discriminatory language in the
Report.
31. The attitude of the Commission to African politicians and to the Press also
calls for comment. The Commissioners call upon the Government to mobilize
‘people of good hearts’ to constructive efforts in order to ‘curb the subversive
activities’ of ‘anti-Government forces’. There is no indication of who is to be the
judge of ‘people of good hearts’; and since they are to be mobilized by the
Government we have no doubt that they will find no difficulty whatever in
discovering them. We on our part are convinced from past experiences that the type
of Nigerians who alone can organize the ‘vital, fearless, political party’ which the
Commissioners call for can never be regarded by a man like Commander Pyke-Nott
as ‘people of good heart’.
32. The condemnation of almost the entire press of the country is a reflection of
the attitude of the Commissioners to nationalist activities in Nigeria as nearly all
newspapers in this country are attached one way or the other to nationalist
organisations.
Part 4
Industrial aspect
33. The National Emergency Committee is not primarily concerned with the
industrial aspect of the Commission’s Report as this is being intensively studied by
the National Labour Congress and other Labour Organisations. We note with regret,
however, that, except in its analysis of the events immediately leading up to the ‘go
slow’ of November 1949, the Commissioners have been too ready to put all the blame
for the deadlocks and set-backs in the Colliery upon the miners and their Secretary.
It was said, for instance that the men did not fully appreciate the relationship
between increased productivity and their wages and conditions. In the same breath,
but later in the report the Commissioners were forced to the conclusion that they
cannot suggest that ‘the drop in productivity is a result either of inefficient
management or of slacking on the part of the workers.
34. Again the Report (vide paragraph 45) blamed the workers for the failure of
the syndicate system recommended by the Long Award. ‘We are satisfied’ says the
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Report ‘that had the workers given their full co-operation the system proposed in the
long award could have been put into operation without difficulty and the immediate
consequences would have included an increase in productivity and higher wages for
the hewers and tubmen. The system was not introduced in the teeth of resistance of
the men. On the contrary the fullest discussion was entered into with the Union’s
representatives and the award was made only after they had expressed themselves as
being in favour. . . . The difficulties which followed must be regarded by any fair-
minded person as an indication of the needless bitterness and industrial dislocation
which must result when Trade Union Leadership is weak and irresponsible as it was
here. The workers suffered loss and hardship not (as they were wrongly advised)
because the Arbitrator’s proposals were unworkable but because their own leaders
did not have the authority and some of them did not have the will to convince the
men that there was not the slightest ground for suspicion and that the workers had
everything to gain and nothing to lose by carrying out the terms of the award.
35. But, when one reads the Report further, one will be convinced that but for
the fact that the Commissioners were only too ready to put the blame on the
workers, there really is hardly any ground why the miners should have any share
of the blame at all. For at page 19 (paragraphs 45–48) of the Report the following
passages occur ‘from the attitude of the Trade Union leaders . . . on industrial
basis’ [sic].
Part V: Summary
36. The NEC have appealed to the Nation to be calm and to hold itself in
readiness for direction. Conscious of the implicit confidence which the most
important sections of opinion in our country have in the ability of the NEC to guide
the Nation aright, through collective action, we have after mature deliberation, come
to the conclusion that, only the attain of SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR NIGERIA NOW
could prevent a recurrence of this disgraceful episode in our national history.
37. The evidence before the Fitzgerald Commission and the findings of that
Commission have vindicated the stand of the NEC that, the shooting at Enugu was
done deliberately and could have been averted but for official incompetence and
ineptitude.
38. The findings of the Commission in respect of the role of the Chief
Commissioner of the Eastern Provinces and the Colliery Manager indicate that these
high officials were guilty of ‘a grave lack of foresight and planning’ . . . and this added
greatly to the hazard of the operation and contributed to the difficulties with which
the Police were eventually faced.
39. The Commission had no doubt about the culpability of Mr FS Philip, a senior
Police Officer who, without provocation and justification, ordered the shooting of
unarmed miners, only to perjure himself when he realised the gravity of his
indiscretion. Justice and fairplay demand that an irresponsible Police officer of this
type should not escape from the warm embrace of our Criminal Code.
40. We have observed with a measure of satisfaction the recommendation for an
ex gratia grant to the dependants of dead miners, but note with regret the omission
to make any award to the injured miners. However, we feel that the amounts
recommended are parsimonious, and we suggest £720, which is an equation of ten
years’ wages on the average of the miners concerned.
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41. Since the Commission proved conclusively that the shooting was delirate
[sic] and that top-ranking officials failed to measure up to expectations which their
high office demands, it would be most inequitable to saddle the tax-payers of this
country with the responsibility not only of paying their salaries and perquisites but
also of footing a bill which was created by the inefficient prosecution of their duty.
Moreover, the so called Nigerian Government is answerable to the British
Government and not to the people of Nigeria. In the circumstances, it would be
unfair to expect the expenses incurred in connection with the Commission and the
ex gratia grants to be disbursed from the Nigerian revenue.
42. The conduct of His Excellency the Governor in seeking to defend one of his
high officials does not impress us, in view of His Excellency’s vicarious responsibility.
On the ground that the Governor and his executives are collectively responsible for
the administration of this country, we cannot but view with serious misgivings their
continuance in office.
43. We hereby register our satisfaction at the able and competent manner in
which the African Police Officer discharged his duty at Calabar without resorting to
the use of lethal weapons. This is evidence of a Police Officer who has not lost his
touch. That there was no loss of life at Calabar is exemplary of a Police Officer who
has lived up to ‘that standard that might be expected from one of his rank and
seniority’. In fairness to Mr RA Brown, Assistant Supt of Police, we wholeheartedly
endorse the commendation of the Commission on his exemplary conduct in
preventing further loss of life.
44. We are convinced that had the people of this country actively participated in
the management of Government affairs and enjoyed a greater measure of political
responsibility, the sordid events at Enugu might have taken a different turn. To
expect us to continue to have confidence in what has been proved to be an inefficient
bureaucracy is to strain our loyalty to our conscience and to our country. We believe
that SELF GOVERNMENT FOR NIGERIA NOW is both opportune and imperative.
45. We, therefore, charge the Nation to press for the implementation of the Ten
Points of our Recommendations. We urge every individual and group including the
political parties, trade unions, ethnical societies, peasants and farmers’
organisations, professional associations, ex-service-men’s unions, students’ and
youth associations, at home and abroad, jointly and severally, to rally to the call of
Nigeria-in-distress, by supporting these Recommendations and urging our foreign
rulers to respect our feelings and grant our demands.
46. We also call upon the Nation to regard the 4th day of July 1950, as a day of
National Mourning, when nationalists shall not work, shops and offices owned by
them shall not be opened for business, markets used by them shall be closed, and
newspapers owned by them shall publish a ‘Mourning Edition’.1
47. In conclusion, we appeal to the Nation for patience and urge our people to
stand by, holding themselves in readiness, and having an abiding faith and
confidence in the wisdom, tact and honesty of the national leadership.
1 In the event the Day of Mourning on 4 July 1950 passed off without incident. The NEC, which continued
to be active after July, not least in attacking racial discrimination at the University College, Ibadan,
eventually collapsed in late 1950.
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 316
[112] JUNE 1950 317
Part 6
48. Recommendations
In view of the foregoing facts and reasons, we are compelled to make the following
recommendations:—
1. That every European a on the Colliery Management connected with the
shooting tragedy should be dismissed.
2. That the present personnel of the Coal Board should be removed forthwith.
3. That the Chief Commissioner of the Eastern Provinces (Commander JG Pyke-
Nott) should be dismissed.
4. That Mr FS Philip, Senior Supt of Police who ordered the shooting should be
dismissed, his retirement and pension rights forfeited; and a categorical statement
from the Government that this step will be taken.
5. That Mr F S Philip shall be tried of murder at once in Nigerian courts.
6. That the financial award to the family of each fallen miner be £720.
7. That since the so-called Nigerian Govt is not answerable to the tax-payers of Nigeria
but to the British Govt the cost of the Fitzgerald Commission, which was occasioned
by the blunder of the former Govt, should be borne by the latter Government.
8. That both His Excellency Sir John Macpherson and Mr H M Foot, Chief
Secretary, under whose regime this blood bath afflicted Nigerian people, should
resign forthwith.
9. That since shooting occurred at Enugu, Aba, P Harcourt and Onitsha under the
command of European Police Officers, whilst id [sic] did not occur at Calabar,
where the Police was under the command of a Nigerian Officer we demand speedy
Nigerianization of the Police Force.
10. That we have no confidence in this inefficient and blood-stained
administration, and therefore, demand SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR NIGERIA NOW.
Signed
1 Dr Akinola Maja
2 Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe
3 Obafemi Awolowo
4 Mbonu Ojike
5 Chief Bode Thomas
6 FRA Williams
7 Marcus Osindero
8 FO Coker
112 CO 583/310/8, no 12 24 June 1950
[Enugu shootings]: inward savingram no 5 from Sir J Macpherson to
Mr Griffiths giving his reaction to the memorandum by the National
Emergency Committee on the report of the Fitzgerald Commission
I have now received from the National Emergency Committee a copy of their
‘Comments and Recommendations on the Fitzgerald Report’.1 An advance copy was
sent to you under cover of my Secret Saving No. 3. The present copy is sent to me for
my ‘information and immediate implementation’.
1 See 111.
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2. I do not propose to comment in detail on this document (a copy of which is
attached), for it is clear that no honest attempt has been made to analyse the Report
and its recommendations; the document is in effect a political pamphlet designed to
bring the Government into hatred and contempt. The whole intention of the
document can hardly be better described than in the words of a political extremist in
a letter which has come into the possession of the Police and which goes on to
discuss detailed plans for the assassination of the Chief Commissioner, Eastern
Provinces. He writes:—
‘Our newspapers are now trying to influence the public mind and when their
feelings have been provoked, then we shall proceed to formulate our plans.’
3. In accordance with this policy the Memorandum has received full publicity in
the Press, most of which is controlled by members of the National Emergency
Committee, and strenuous efforts are being made to whip up feelings. The success of
this policy is still in doubt. In the Eastern Provinces among the large number of
politically minded but generally ill-informed younger generation such propaganda is
popular and dangerous. There is no reason to suppose that it has affected the views of
the more sober elements as represented by the members of the Eastern House of
Assembly, who realize the dishonesty and absurdity of the National Emergency
Committee’s demands and who are still solidly behind the Chief Commissioner.
4. The situation in Lagos is somewhat similar, though with the difference that
the younger Yorubas are less interested than their Ibo brothers and are less easily
aroused. The general Yoruba view, and this applies not only to Lagos, but to the
predominantly Yoruba parts of the Western Provinces, was illustrated by a discussion
which the Commissioner of the Colony had with members of the Lagos Town
Council. They were generally of opinion that the Report was fair and were mainly
interested in the ex gratia payments to the relatives of the deceased which they
regarded as adequate.
5. As was to be expected reaction to the Report and to the National Emergency
Committee’s Memorandum in the North has been negligible except among the Ibo
settlers in the larger towns.
6. The problem which confronts me is to rally sober and moderate opinion which
though individually sound has not yet summoned up moral courage to express an
opinion. A first move has been made within the past few days. Judge Ademola called
on me privately on 22nd June to say that a group in Lagos is considering action to
rally the people of good heart throughout Nigeria. I have on two or three occasions
received a delegation from the National Emergency Committee but it is particularly
important that I should not give the impression that I regard it as a truly
representative body, taking the place of the chosen representatives of the people in
the Legislative Council and the Regional Houses of Assembly. My present intention is
therefore to ignore the Memorandum of the National Emergency Committee but
much depends on subsequent developments.
7. It will be seen from paragraph 46 of the Memorandum that the National
Emergency Committee proposes to organize a National Day of Mourning on the 4th
of July (the choice of date is significant). While this move is, like the rest, purely
political—the Nigerian Labour Congress, which is affiliated to the National
Emergency Committee, has openly declared that the object is to protest against the
Government—I am anxious not to give the National Emergency Committee the
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opportunity to say that a heartless and authoritarian Government will not even let
the people express their grief over the tragedy of last November. At the same time it
is of the greatest importance that the National Emergency Committee should not be
able to demonstrate its power to bring the Government machine to a standstill even
for a day. I am considering with my advisers the line which Government should take
and will inform you when I have reached a decision.
8. I do not now anticipate any major developments until the Day of Mourning
but I must warn you that the Chief Commissioner, Eastern Provinces, is, at present,
of opinion that there may be disturbances in the Eastern Region on that date.
113 CO 537/5786, no 41 26 June 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to A B Cohen
on the secretary of state’s draft despatch on the new constitution.
Minutes by A B Cohen and L H Gorsuch
In spite of urgent preoccupations I should have found time to write sooner about the
Secretary of State’s draft despatch on the Constitutional Review, copies of which I
brought back with me (the latest letter on the subject is Gorsuch’s secret letter No.
30453 of the 24th May). I am sorry.
2. During the first week in June I collected the Chief Commissioners and the
Commissioner of the Colony for one of our periodical conferences, and while they
were in Lagos I arranged for a full meeting of Executive Council, with all four
Nigerian members present, including those from the Regions. The draft despatch was
discussed at both gatherings.
3. Let me say at once that we are all extremely gratified by the prompt action
taken in London to consider with so much understanding the results of the
Constitutional Review to date. We are most grateful for the thought and effort given
to the matter and for the action taken in securing the general blessing of the Cabinet.
While I was in London I expressed the view that the publication of an encouraging
despatch from the Secretary of State at some suitable date (after the first flurry over
the Fitzgerald Report had simmered down and before the meetings of the Regional
Houses which are now likely to be in mid-August) would be extremely valuable
before the final stages of our discussions here. (This was the purpose you had in mind
when you sent your secret telegram No. 480 of the 18th April). The knowledge that
H.M. Government had given a general blessing to the Review so far as it had gone
would give great confidence to the responsible elements in the country and
particularly to the legislators, other than those who had made minority reports. It
would, I hoped, prevent any re-opening of discussion on major matters on which a
majority had agreed, and would help to get agreed conclusions on the remaining
major issue of the composition of the Central Legislature. I also hoped that our
comments on the draft despatch could be reduced to a minimum, our attention
being directed mainly to the question of the timing of publication of the despatch.
4. As our discussions here went on, however, it seemed to us that certain parts of
the draft despatch, notably the suggestions regarding the selection of Ministers and
the additional safeguards proposed for the representation of Lagos at the Centre,
would not only be controversial in themselves but might well re-open controversy on
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a number of other points on which agreement has been reached, and might hinder
rather than help to secure agreement on the outstanding question of the
composition of the Central legislature.
5. I had allotted a full day for a conference with Chief Commissioners and other
officials on various subjects, including the draft despatch, and I had arranged for the
Executive Council meeting to be held on the following day. Unfortunately, we got so
immersed in other matters mainly relating to the Review on the first day (our
afternoon session, at which we discussed with certain Heads of major Departments
the relations between the Central Directorates and the Regional Departments, and
the future of the Civil Service under advanced regionalisation, went on until 8.30
p.m.) that we had no time fully to consider the draft despatch before the Executive
Council meeting. In Executive Council a great deal turned, of course, on the
reactions of the Nigerian members, and we left the field very much to them in the
early part of the discussion. They were very pleased about H.M. Government’s
reception of the proposals made to date but they were concerned about the
suggestion regarding further Lagos safeguards, and, in a lesser degree, about the
suggestion regarding the selection of Ministers. They felt that if any despatch from
the Secretary of State were to be published at this stage it would be better if it did not
include any reference to controversial matters.
6. Most of the discussion turned on the position of Lagos, and here the views of
Dr. Abayomi, who speaks with special authority regarding Yoruba opinion in Lagos
and in the Western Region, and of Dr. Ibiam, who is similarly qualified in respect of
Eastern (and particularly Ibo) opinion, were of particular importance. Dr. Abayomi
strongly opposed the proposal that the members of the Western House of Assembly
who would represent Lagos in the Central Legislature (a minimum of two) should be
selected by those members of the Western House representing Lagos itself. He said
that he was confident that the Western House as a whole would elect the best men to
represent the West, including Lagos. He was strengthened in this view by his hope
and belief that under the system of election adopted for Lagos (and this will certainly
not be more restricted than the franchise granted to the new Lagos Town Council
under which voters will not be required to register since there will be an electoral
roll containing the names of all adults who have resided in Lagos for six months),
Lagos will send to the Western House far more worthy and representative members
than is the case at present. He also strongly opposed the suggestion that one of the
four members of the Council of Ministers drawn from the Western Region must be
appointed from the members representing Lagos. It was perhaps not surprising that
Dr. Abayomi, who though a Lagosian is also a Yoruba, should hold these views, but
the interesting thing is that Dr. Ibiam fully supported him. The discussion in Council
was very frank, as always, and we faced up squarely to the danger that a non-Yoruba
from Lagos, or a noisy politician belonging to any tribe, might be ‘squeezed out’
when the Western House of Assembly selected its members for the Central
Legislature, but Council was unanimously of the opinion that taking the long view
the additional safeguards suggested were undesirable.
7. As regards the selection of Ministers, we argued the pros and cons in
Executive Council at some length but came to no firm conclusion. As stated above,
however, anxiety was expressed lest the opening of discussion on any major matter at
this stage, resulting from a suggestion by the Secretary of State, might prejudice the
final stages of the Review here.
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8. On the following day we had another long discussion—at the official level.
This ranged over the whole field of Constitutional Review, including the composition
of a Central Legislature with two Houses. As regards the draft despatch, we directed
our attention mainly to the question of the effect which publication would be likely
to have on the work of the concluding stages of our Constitutional Review, with
particular reference to the two controversial suggestions regarding the selection of
Ministers and the extra safeguards for Lagos. Before dealing with these points, I
should mention one other passage in the draft which came up specifically; this was
paragraph 4 dealing with the rejection or reference back of Regional legislature [sic:
legislation] which appeared to conflict with a major overall Nigerian interest. We
warmly welcomed the proposal that the Secretary of State should stress the need for
full consultation between the Regions and the Centre so as to avoid to the maximum
possible extent the introduction into Regional Legislatures of legislation which
would so conflict. We felt, however, that such consultation, at whatever stage it took
place, should be between the Council of Ministers and the Regional Executive rather
than the Regional Legislature, and that the joint committee which would try to
resolve the matter if conflicting Regional legislation were passed should be
representative of the two Executives. This seems logical and it would be the Regional
Executive which would—except in the case of a Private Member’s Bill or Motion—
have introduced the legislation. We hope, however, that prior consultation as
suggested would make the need for a joint committee very remote. We assume that
the consultation proposed would be a matter of constitutional practice, rather than
that provision for such consultation should be written into the Instruments, but I am
open to conviction on this point. Incidentally, we noted that the draft despatch
follows the wording of the Enugu Select Committee in supporting that the power of
rejection would lie entirely with the Council of Ministers, but it seems to us that
constitutionally it should be the Governor as the representative of His Majesty who
should have power to reject legislation, or at least the Governor in Council as you
suggested in paragraph 5 of your letter to Foot of the 23rd February in this series.1 If
this is correct, the wording should be that the Governor would have power to refer
back or reject Regional legislation on the advice of the Council of Ministers, or that
this power would rest in the Governor in Council.
9. As regards the additional safeguards for Lagos we felt confident, in our
discussion at the official level, that the Executive Council advice on this point was
sound, and in this we were not prompted by our distrust (shared by all responsible
Nigerian opinion) of the present Lagos elected members. Lagos has a political
importance beyond its size and it is right that at least two Lagos members should go
forward from the Western House to the Central Legislature, but if the ‘new West’ is
to be a Region the selection of the members to go to the Centre should be done by
the entire House. (In Executive Council Mr. Obaseki raised the interesting point of
what would happen if the selection were left to the Lagos members themselves and
they could not agree! Another suggestion—not favoured—was that the two Lagos
members with the largest number of votes should go forward. Moreover, important
as Lagos is in the body politic, it was felt that its population of 230,000 (less than one
per cent of the population of Nigeria) did not justify a prescriptive right to one of the
four ministerial posts to be filled from the Western Region. Calabar, though with less
1 See 95.
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reason, would claim a similar right in the Eastern Region, and other towns, such as
Port Harcourt, might follow suit. It is true that it is proposed that the Cameroons
should have one of the four ministerial appointments from the Eastern Region, and
this choice will be made from a very thin field, but this can be justified by the status
of the Cameroons as a Trust Territory in respect of which we have special obligations,
and it is fully in keeping with the spirit of the Report of the Trusteeship Council’s
Visiting Mission if we adhere to the proposal made by the General Conference.
10. Our discussion on the proposed change in the method of choosing Ministers
ranged wide. We all liked the proposal on its merits. In the short and medium term,
it is most desirable that the Governor and the Lieutenant Governors should have a
considerable say in the choice of the Nigerians who as Ministers will play a major
part in the making and direction of policy: in being spokesmen on their subjects in
the Legislatures: and in putting policy across around the country. And in the long
term the proposal leads on naturally, as the draft despatch says, to the time when a
Prime Minister will appoint his own ministerial colleagues, and will be himself solely
responsible for the distribution of portfolios. Moreover the Ministers in the Chamber
of Ministers should not (as I fear they will), regard themselves as Regional groups
representing Regional interests, but should be a team looking at the problems of
Nigeria as a whole and should feel responsible to the Legislature as a whole. We did
not look for the snags but they emerged as the discussion went on.
11. You will recall that during our talks in London Foot and Howe, from their
respective experiences as Chairman of the Drafting Committee and Chairman of the
General Conference, felt that your proposal would not be acceptable to our
legislators. Reference was made to the possibility that the Central Legislature might
‘knock down’ the Governor’s selections one by one until the majority got the
Ministers of their own choice; the Governor would then be responsible for an
unsatisfactory Minister. The same thing might happen in a Region. I do not regard
this danger as great unless the new legislators thrown up under the Revised
Constitution are very much worse than I expect but there is a much more important
point which I mentioned to Gorsuch in London, and that is that we foresee
considerable objection being taken to the proposal to submit to the vote of the whole
Central Legislature the names of the Ministers from each Region. Your proposal
would rightly emphasise the unity of Nigeria and the fact that the Council of
Ministers would be taking part in the direction of Nigerian policy, and in any case the
Minister chosen by a Region could have his appointment terminated by a two-thirds
vote of all the members of the Legislature; but we felt that the Regions would not
accept the proposed change, and that discussion about it would cause unhappiness.
The North would suspect that the members from the Eastern and Western Regions
would vote against the Northern names put forward unless or until they got as
Ministers from the North representatives whom the North might regard as too lively.
Similarly, the East and West might fear that Northern influence would eliminate the
more progressive representatives from the South, with a view to the selection of
more sedate Ministers.
12. In any case your proposal could not be discussed without regard being had to
the form and composition of the Central Legislature, which would vote on the
resolution putting forward names of Members for appointment to the Council of
Ministers, because the Regions would want to know what their voting strength would
be. As the legislators understand the position, the composition of the Central
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Legislature is the only major issue left for discussion. In considering the relative
merits of a bicameral and a single chamber Legislature at the Centre there will
inevitably be keen argument about the relationship of the Central Executive to a
bicameral Central Legislature, and different views are likely to be expressed by the
different Regions. I myself have no doubt that if there are to be two Houses (which is
my present bet) the Lower House should be the dominant House, but if, as appears
inevitable and incontrovertible this House will have fifty per cent Northern
representation, the Eastern and Western Regions might demand that the Upper
House which will reflect equality of the Regions (and which I should expect to have
only revisionary or delaying powers) should have larger numbers, which would alter
the original proportions at the Centre, particularly if the Houses were to meet in
Joint Session, and greater powers. This is likely to be resisted by the North. If, on top
of all this argument, a proposal is introduced that Members of the Council of
Ministers should be chosen otherwise than by the Members of the Central
Legislature from their own Regions there will be room for endless complications.
The Chief Commissioner Northern Provinces, told us very bluntly that the Northern
Representatives are tired of talk. They have it clearly in their minds that the only
major matter left for consideration is the composition of the Central Legislature, and
they want to get a quick and firm decision in that, if not by agreement in Nigeria
then by a decision in London. If various other matters which they regard as settled so
far as local discussion is concerned, such as the method of selecting Ministers and
additional safeguards for Lagos, were now to be reopened, Thompstone very much
fears that Northern opinion would harden still further and that the Northerners
might even start a movement to revoke ‘concessions’ (as they regard them) which
they have already made.
13. We discussed various other suggestions, including one that after informal
consultation and a certain amount of horse-trading amongst all the Members of the
Central Legislature, an agreed list of Ministers might be drawn up for presentation to
the Central Legislature, but in the end we came to the conclusion that there was a
real danger that an attempt at this stage to secure agreement to a new method of
selecting Ministers, as a result of a suggestion by the Secretary of State, might wreck
the prospects of solving by agreement our main remaining problem. I do not entirely
reject the possibility that the proposal might come up for consideration at some
stage in our discussions here, otherwise than as a suggestion from the Secretary of
State, though on the one hand I feel that discussion in the Regional Houses
(especially in the North) would be undesirable and even dangerous and on the other
hand there are objections to discussing at the Centre proposals which have not been
considered at the Regional level. We realize of course that the final decision rests
with His Majesty’s Government but we felt that it was best that the Secretary of State
should not publicly make this, or any new, suggestion at this stage. When the time
comes for a final decision regarding the selection of Ministers it will be necessary to
take account of the danger that the enforcement of a method not generally
acceptable to the Nigerian representatives might make it impossible to get a Council
of Ministers established.
14. In the light of all this, it seems to us here that the choice lies between not
publishing any despatch from the Secretary of State and publishing a despatch
limited to an expression of approval of what the Secretary of State is prepared to
approve, without introducing controversial matters. My own view is that for the
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reasons given in paragraph 3 of this letter it is most desirable that the second course
be followed. I should expect that the Secretary of State might wish in that event to
make a wider reservation than is represented by the phrase ‘subject to further
examination of certain points of detail;’ for example, he might say that he might wish
to comment later on certain aspects of the review. Subject to that, it would ideally
meet our points if the following changes were made:—
Paragraph 4 Rejection or reference back of Regional legislation. Make the
changes suggested in paragraph 8 above.
Paragraph 8 Method of selecting Ministers. Stop at the word ‘Regions’ in line 11
but add ‘I should not wish to be committed at this stage to
approval of the method of electing Ministers.’
Paragraph 12 Additional safeguards for Lagos. Delete the last two sentences.
15. I am sorry to suggest so considerable a modification in the character of a
draft despatch which was discussed with me in London. But after anxious thought,
and as a result of discussion here, I feel sure that the best chances of arriving at a
satisfactory solution of our problems will be provided by the publication of a
despatch which is limited at this stage to conveying a general blessing on the work of
the Constitutional Review to date.
16. I shall write separately about the representation of special interests in the
Central Legislature (Gorsuch’s letter of the 24th of May) and about the question of a
special Council for the Southern Cameroons (paragraph 14 of your letter to Foot of
the 23rd of February). And I hope that we may be able shortly to give you some
indication of how the Regions are tackling the question of constituencies and
elections to Regional Houses.
Minutes on 113
Mr. Gorsuch
This important letter arrived at 12.30 this morning, and I have been able to give a bit
of thought to the point which it raises.
As regards paragraph 4 of the draft despatch (paragraph 8 of Sir J. Macpherson’s
letter) I don’t think that any serious difficulty arises. If they prefer that the joint
committee should be representative of the Regional Executive rather than Regional
Legislature I should not myself raise any objection. But in the last sentence of
paragraph 4 of the despatch it might be preferable to use phraseology, suggested
below, which would leave the matter a little vague at this stage. I used the term
‘Council of Ministers’ because that was the term used by the Select Committee. I
suggest that we should adopt the term ‘Governor-in-Council’ instead. I have marked
in pencil on the draft at 40 the amendments which might possibly be made.
As regards paragraph 12 of the despatch I am not disposed to argue too strongly
against omitting the last two sentences about additional safeguards. I put these
sentences in very much for consideration and was surprised when Sir J. Macpherson
and his colleagues accepted them; but accept them they did quite willingly. What I
am concerned about is that the Yorubas in the Western Region are getting away with
it too much. Clearly whatever is said if some of the Lagos members in the west were
Yorubas and the others Ebos there would be a strong chance of the Yorubas rather
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than the Ebos being elected. Similarly, a Lagos member might never get to the
Council of Ministers. The answer to the second point is I think that it would be up to
the Lagos Members to make themselves agreeable to the rest and in that case they
might be elected. Nevertheless I think that we must accept the view that these two
sentences should be excluded from the despatch, at the same time telling the
Governor that that does not necessarily mean that we should not want to suggest
raising the point again at a later stage for consideration should some compromise
appear desirable.
The real difficulty arises on paragraph 8. We have always made it clear that we
attach importance to our suggestion on this point, both in discussions with Mr. Foot
in January and before and since. We cannot depart from our view on this point
without seriously embarrassing the Gold Coast Government and compromising on
what seems to be an important principle. I am not happy about the suggestion that
we should stop at line 11 simply saying that the S. of S. would not wish to be
committed at this stage to the approval of the method of electing Ministers. That may
arouse still more suspicions of our intentions than an actual statement of what we do
intend. I therefore suggest that we should go on to the point which I have marked in
the draft with some amendments and should in effect leave it that it is clearly
inappropriate to consider this matter further until the composition of the Legislature
has been settled, but that what should be aimed at is a system of appointment by the
Governor in consultation with members of the Central Legislature from the Regional
Council, and in the case of the Regional Legislatures by the Lieutenant Governor in
consultation with the members of that Legislature.
As regards paragraph 3 of the despatch, I suggest a variance slightly different from
that suggested by the Governor.
These are merely my suggestions for you and Sir T. Lloyd to consider. If you agree
with them I suggest telegraphing them as soon as possible to Sir J. Macpherson so
that the despatch in its amended form can be approved and issued, if possible by the
20th July. Like Sir John Macpherson I definitely prefer the proposal to publish an
amended despatch than not to publish one at all. That would I think be a weak line to
take and in any case would involve going back on something which has been
approved by the Cabinet. I have written a brief note to Sir J. Macpherson, of which I
enclose a copy.
A.B.C.
1.7.50
Sir T Lloyd
Please see the Governor’s letter at 41, and Mr. Cohen’s minute and letter at 42, on
the subject of the draft despatch on the Nigerian constitutional review.
The points at issue are as follows:—
Para 4 of despatch. See para 8 of the Governor’s letter. The Governor suggests two
amendments: first, in lines 9 and 10 of para 4 to substitute for the words ‘power of
the Nigerian Council of Ministers’ the words ‘power of the Governor on the advice of
the Council of Ministers.’ I think this is correct; the power under the Constitution
would be exercised by the Governor in Council and not by the Council itself.
Secondly, the Governor wishes the Joint Committee, referred to in the last line but
four of the para., to be representative of the Council of Ministers and the Regional
Executive rather than the Regional Legislature. Here again I agree with the
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Governor; it is, as he says, the Executive and not the Legislature which is responsible
for the policy which caused the legislation in question to be propounded.
Para 12 of despatch. See paras 6 and 9 of the Governor’s letter. The Governor’s
suggestion is that the last two sentences of para 12 should be omitted, on the ground
that the suggestion of further safeguards for Lagos from here would have the effect of
reviving controversy. I think we should accept his advice on this point.
Para 8 of despatch. See paras 7 and 10 to 13 of the Governor’s letter. This is diffi-
cult. The Governor would prefer that the despatch should withhold comment entirely
on the method of selection of ministers, while making it clear that judgment is reserved
on this point. For the reasons given in his minute and letter, however, Mr. Cohen is
anxious that something should be said at this stage to indicate the Secretary of State’s
preference for a system whereby the Governor or the Lieutenant-Governor has a say
in the selection of ministers. As you know, the recommendation of the General
Conference as regards the Central Executive was that the four members of the Council
of Ministers from each region should be selected by the members of the Central
Legislature from that region. In the Gold Coast it has been arranged that the names
of ministers shall be proposed by the Governor to the Legislature after previous con-
sultation and approved by vote of the Legislature; and it is possible that if a different
system is adopted in Nigeria, it may be difficult to hold the position in the Gold Coast.
This question involves a matter of principle as well as of tactics and I suggest that in
order to save lengthy minuting you might prefer to discuss it with me.
There is one final point. The Governor suggests that if we make the amendments
which he suggests we may wish to make in para 3 of the draft despatch a wider
reservation than is suggested by the phrase ‘subject to further examination of certain
points of detail’. This is in fact the exact phrase used in the Cabinet paper (see para 9
of 33a);2 but in view of subsequent developments I suggest that the phrase might be
amended to ‘subject to further examination of details in the light of that settlement’.
L.H.G.
10.7.50
1 See 105.
114 CO 537/5789, no 7 30 June 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from A B Cohen to Sir J Macpherson
on a meeting between commercial firms and Mr Griffiths concerning
the constitutional review
[This meeting followed concerns expressed by firms that, if a bicameral legislature was
established in Nigeria, the members nominated to represent special interests might be
allocated to the junior house. Concerns were also expressed concerning the implications
for special interests of the establishment of regional houses of assembly. In response, RJ
Vile minuted, ‘It is important to retain the goodwill of the commercial firms in West
Africa if only because on their activities depends the economic health of the territories.
Furthermore, the special conditions which obtain in West Africa do give the firms the
right to make special representations about constitutional development’ (CO 537/5789,
no 1, minute by Vile on a letter from ARI Mellor to Griffiths, 15 June 1950). The meeting
with the secretary of state on 27 June was the result. Present were representatives of
several firms including UAC, John Holt & Co., Cadbury Bros., Shell Co. of West Africa.,
Taylor Woodrow and the Bata Shoe Co. The delegation was led by ARI Mellor, a director of
the UAC. Mellor had been present at a similar meeting with Creech Jones on 19 Dec 1949,
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concerning the place of representatives of special interests in the Gold Coast constitution,
BDEEP series B, vol. 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I, 72.]
As you know, the commercial firms had a meeting with the Secretary of State on
the 27th June to make representations about constitutional reform in Nigeria, I
enclose a copy of the memorandum they gave us before the meeting and a note of
what happened at the meeting.1
You will see that the firms had a very full opportunity to explain their point of view
and that the Secretary of State promised that he would transmit their views to you
and that there would be a further meeting when he had your views.
Their main points may be summarised as follows:—
(a) The firms seek an assurance that commercial interests are a matter of concern
to the Secretary of State.
(b) They sought advice on the best manner in which they could make
representations in Nigeria in support of their views.
(c) They claimed that three nominated members in the Central Legislature were
not enough and suggested that additional nominated members might be
appointed without the right to vote.
(d) They urged the importance of including nominated members in Regional
Houses.
(e) They asked for a non-discrimination clause in the constitution.
(f) They suggested the early appointment of an Economic Advisory Committee to
the Nigerian Government.
The Secretary of State would like a fairly early expression of your views on the
points raised by the firms. We have thought it easier to give you our views in a semi-
official letter rather than a despatch because they are necessarily extremely tentative
at this stage. I will deal with their main points one by one.
(1) An assurance that commercial interests are a matter of concern to the
Secretary of State. This seems to us to present no difficulty. Such an assurance in
general terms was given in the House of Lords by Lord Listowel last year in relation
to the Gold Coast and I am sure you would agree that there could be no possible
objection to the Secretary of State informing the firms at the further meeting with
them that both he and you recognise that the firms have a most important part to
play in the development of Nigeria and that both he and you are anxious for close co-
operation with them. The Secretary of State at the meeting this week emphasised the
importance of the firms identifying themselves as far as possible with the aspirations
of the people of the Colonial Territory and he could, I think, appropriately repeat
this.
(2) The best manner of making representations. In the case of the Gold Coast we
told the firms that on questions of general policy relating to the constitution it was
probably better that they should make their representations here. I think that the
same applies to Nigeria. The head offices are all in London and on these broad
questions of policy it is probably easier for the discussions to be with them when it is
a question of having a meeting with the firms en bloc. Would you therefore agree to
our telling the firms that we think it best to pursue the discussion here, but it may be
1 Enclosures not printed.
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that at a later stage local discussions would be desirable, in which case we will let
them know?
(3) Representation of the firms in the Legislature. First of all I should tell you
what has happened in the Gold Coast over this. The Coussey Committee2
recommended that there should be two members of the Legislature selected by the
Chamber of Mines and the Chamber of Commerce. The firms thought that this was
not enough and asked for eight members. The Secretary of State suggested to Arden-
Clarke3 that there might be six members of general economic or other experience
nominated by the Governor (of whom some would no doubt be drawn from the
firms). The Governor suggested six or eight such nominated members in a speech to
the Legislative Council; the suggestion was not enormously well-received in the
press or, I gather, in the Legislative Council, but it was agreed to refer it to the Select
Committee which was to consider elections and constituencies. This made no
concrete recommendation, but did not at any rate turn down the proposal. The Gold
Coast Government do not think that they are likely to get agreement locally to
having six members and their latest proposal is that, in addition to the two members
suggested by the Coussey Committee with the vote, the Governor should have the
right to nominate six persons of general experience in economic or other questions
who would be members for the whole life of the Legislative Council but would not
have the vote.
I discussed this proposal with Arden-Clarke and Saloway4 the other day. Both
Arden-Clarke and I were a bit doubtful whether the firms would accept this idea and
we were therefore considerably interested when Samuel5 quite spontaneously put
forward the same idea in relation to Nigeria at the meeting with the Secretary of
State. He was supported by several of the others and, as we have heard nothing since,
we may assume that the firms would be satisfied with such an arrangement in
Nigeria if it were adopted. I have since had another talk with Arden-Clarke and we are
now both inclined to think that the Gold Coast Government’s proposal to which I
have referred above would be the best course to adopt for the Gold Coast. I have
written to Saloway, who is today returning to the Gold Coast, to inform him that we
are inclined to take this view, but that Arden-Clarke will not want to reach any final
conclusion until he has had a talk with Spears and Mellor either at the end of July or
early in August.
Meanwhile we are considering here whether the proposal to have non-voting
nominated members would create any embarrassment elsewhere either inside or
outside Africa. There is, I suppose, the possible risk that elected members elsewhere,
e.g. in Trinidad, might use this change in West Africa as an argument for denying all
nominated members the vote. On the other hand, the proposed nominated members
for the Gold Coast and Nigeria are in rather a special category, and we are inclined to
doubt whether this risk is a serious one. As I say, however, we are going into the
matter here and I will let you know as soon as we have done so what our view on this
point is.
2 The Coussey Commission was set up in 1948 to examine proposals for constitutional reform in the Gold
Coast, Rathbone, part I, 62. 3 Sir Charles Arden-Clarke, gov of the Gold Coast, 1949–1957.
4 R H Saloway, colonial secretary, Gold Coast, 1950–1951; chief secretary and minister of defence and
external affairs, 1951–1954. 5 Frank Samuel, UAC.
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Subject to anything which emerges in relation to other territories, I myself am
inclined to think that Samuel’s suggestion (which is in effect the same as the
suggestion made by the Gold Coast Government) does represent a useful way out of
the difficulty which we are in over this matter. The firms themselves recognise that it
would be embarrassing to them if the relatively small number of members whom
they are claiming were, through some grouping in the Legislature, put in the
position of being able to influence the vote, one way or another. They would certainly
want to avoid such a situation and the expedient of having non-voting members
would enable them to do this, while at the same time their members would have full
power of debate and discussion in committee. We should like you therefore to
consider whether it would not be possible to have in addition to the thee members
recommended, by the Ibadan Conference a provision empowering the Governor to
nominate, say, eight persons of general experience as members of the Legislature
without the vote. This would not be completely unprecedented, since you already, I
think, have power to nominate extraordinary non-voting members; the only
difference would be that the present extraordinary members are nominated, I believe,
purely ad hoc, whereas the others would be, as I have said, for the whole period of the
Legislature. If there were eight such additional members, they would not of course
all necessarily be drawn from the firms; you quite naturally want to nominate
Africans in this way. The firms were not prepared to commit themselves on the
question whether some of their members would be in the Upper House if there are
two Houses, but I got the very definite impression that they would press for them all
to be in the Lower House.
(4) Representation in Regional Houses. The Secretary of State started off by
discouraging them from pressing this point too strongly, but the firms’
representatives argued that the Regional Houses in Nigeria would have very
considerable and increasing powers and that they were deeply concerned in the
business which would be transacted in these Houses. They therefore argued that they
ought to have representation. It was pointed out that under the Ibadan Conference
proposals there might be a means of getting some of them in in the Northern House,
where there is provision for members nominated by the Assembly; but that of course
there could be no undertaking that the Assembly would wish to nominate
representatives of European firms. For the east and west no such provision is
included. The firms suggested that their alternative proposal for members without
the vote might help in this respect. Would you consider whether this would be
possible? I must say that I think that there is something to be said for the firms’ case
and if it were possible without provoking too much controversy to provide for some
nominated representatives in all three Regional Houses without the vote, then I
think that the firms would be very satisfied. If you feel that this is not possible, an
alternative would be that each House should have the right to co-opt on its own
committees or even in the House itself expert advice from outside. The firms would
no doubt regard this as less satisfactory.
(5) Non-discrimination. It has been agreed with Arden-Clarke that a clause based
on the Ceylon constitution definitely prohibiting legislation discriminating either in
favour of or against particular sections of the community on grounds of race or
religion should be included. The alternative would of course be for such legislation to
be reserved for His Majesty’s pleasure. The disadvantage of this, however, would be
that when at some stage in the future provision for reserved legislation disappears,
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this provision would disappear with it. In Ceylon the prohibition of discriminatory
legislation still remains now that the country has become fully self-governing. We
are putting the same provision into the Gold Coast constitution in the hope that the
same will in future happen there. We think that we ought to proceed in the same way
in Nigeria and I very much hope that you will agree. Provision would not only rule
out legislation discriminating against European firms; it would also rule out
discrimination as between different sections of Nigeria. I enclose a copy of the Ceylon
provision.
As regards the proposal for an Economic Advisory Committee, the Secretary of
State told the firms that he was in general in favour of the closest co-ordination
between them and Government, but that machinery for securing this was a matter
for you to consider. In other words, we think the proposal a good one in principle,
but how it should be put into effect is a matter which can only be considered in the
light of local knowledge. We hope that you will be able to let us give the firms a
reasonably forthcoming answer on this point.
115 CO 537/5263, no 49? June 1950
[‘A survey of communism in Africa’: FO Research Dept memorandum;
part two, regional survey—‘British West Africa’ [Extract]
. . .
British West Africa1
222. Communism, in the sense of a coherent philosophy or an organised and
disciplined party, is still non-existent in British West Africa. Although certain
individuals have shown characteristics associated with members of organised
Communist Parties, and in some cases have even worked for a limited time with the
British Communist Party, none of them, on present information, is now a Party
member. The native ‘liberation’ movements with which they are associated are,
however, more vocal and more widely dispersed than those of British East Africa, and
the activities of the most extreme of them, such as the former Zikist Movement in
Nigeria and the Convention People’s Party in the Gold Coast, must be considered as
serving the long-term interests of Communism. As in the French and Belgian
territories, these movements have taken hold over communities in which the spread
of education, commerce and industry has led to a breakdown of traditional tribal
organisation and allegiance, and such a breakdown may be regarded as a prerequisite
to the active growth of these movements. As might be expected, these communities
exist, for the most part, in the thickly-populated and relatively advanced coastal area,
and elsewhere in the larger towns.
223. Although the British Communist Party officially regards its sphere of
influence as confined to the United Kingdom (see Part I, para. 27), it considers West
Africans to be more mature politically than other Africans and has, accordingly,
taken several practical steps since the end of the war to encourage their political
aspirations: it has organised special study classes on the basic principles of
1 BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana part I, 85 includes the sections on the Gold Coast and
Sierra Leone from the same document.
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Communism for West Africans in the United Kingdom; the Party’s West Africa
Committee has invited sympathisers to attend its meetings; copies of the
Committee’s Africa Newsletter, circulated in the United Kingdom, find their way to
West Africa; finally, the Committee has assisted and encouraged the activities of the
West African Students’ Union (W.A.S.U.) in the United Kingdom and has maintained
personal contact with the West African National Secretariat (W.A.N.S.).
224. These two bodies have co-operated closely. The W.A.S.U., the older of the
two, was formed in 1927 as a purely social concern for the welfare of West African
students in the United Kingdom. From the start it has represented every shade of
political opinion, but the tendency has been for an energetic minority of Communist
sympathisers to take an altogether disproportionate part in its direction. The
W.A.N.S. was founded in 1945 with its headquarters in London, and had as its first
chairman and secretary B. A. Renner and Kwame Nkrumah of the Gold Coast (see
para. 237). Although both these men have had contact with the British Communist
Party, the W.A.N.S. was never under Communist control. There is no indication that
it has been active since early in 1949, and it appears to have died a natural death.
225. A further body which, by supporting the forces opposed to colonial rule, can
be considered as furthering the long-term aims of Communism, is the African
League. It seeks to combine the interests of both East and West Africa, and has
adopted a strong racial character by the total exclusion of non-Africans from its
membership. Its organ African Arrow is essentially ‘nationalist’ and not Communist
in tone, and there is evidence that the British Communist Party regards its strongly
racial character with suspicion.(30)
226. The Soviet organs in Moscow have occasionally referred with admiration to
the ‘national liberation’ movements in Nigeria and the Gold Coast, and Communist
propaganda reaches the chief towns of British West Africa, but the Soviet Union is
not represented in this area, and commercial contacts are almost non-existent. The
Bata Shoe Company and its subsidiary firm, Czechoslovak-Nigerian Export and
Import Company, do, however, form a medium of contact between British West
Africa and Czechoslovakia. These Companies have sent some Africans to their works
at Zlín in Czechoslovakia for technical training skilfully combined with political
indoctrination, while Czech Communist agents from Zlín have paid reciprocal visits
to Nigeria. It is possible that Bata may become a main channel for the dissemination
of Communism in British West Africa, but so far its political activities have been on a
small scale. There are now several Nigerians studying at universities in Prague, while
the bodies in Nigeria and the Gold Coast with W.F.T.U., W.F.D.Y. and W.I.D.F.
connexions provide a means of contact between British West Africa and Communist-
controlled organisations in Paris.
Nigeria
227. The chief ‘liberation’ organisation, the National Council of Nigeria and the
Cameroons (N.C.N.C.), which stands for the overthrow of British colonial rule and
the creation of independent Nigeria, cannot be described as Communist in any sense.
Its founder-president, Dr. Nnamdi Benjamin Azikiwe, has stated categorically that he
(30) The latest information indicates, however, that the British Communist Party is attempting to
penetrate and capture the African League. In February, 1950 it appears that the League sought affiliation
with the ‘Rassemblement Démocratique Africain.’
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is not a Communist; but he has had talks with Palme Dutt and other British
Communists and has visited the Czech Embassy in London. According to his own
statement, he would be prepared to co-operate on a purely reciprocal basis with any
person or group in sympathy with his aims, but would never allow himself to become
a tool in other hands. The British Communist Party is critical of Azikiwe and
suspicious of his purely nationalist aspirations. No evidence was found of Communist
inspiration behind the rioting at the Government coal mines at Enugu in November,
1949.
228. Until recently there was an extremist splinter group of the N.C.N.C., the
Zikist Movement, headed by Nduka Eze, which claimed to be working for the
establishment of a United States of West Africa. Although Eze has Communist
sympathies, the movement accepted Communist technique and some of its members
studied Communist literature, there was never any indication of Communist
inspiration behind it. Its enrolled membership was about 800 or 900. In February,
1950, the houses of some of the principal members of the Movement in Lagos and
the provinces were searched by the police, and material considered prima facie as
seditious was found in several of them, including that of the Secretary-General, H. M.
Okoye, who was arrested, convicted of sedition and sentenced to 33 months’
imprisonment. On 13th April the Zikist Movement was declared an illegal
organisation. About a month later, however, Mr. Jaja Wachuku, a leading Zikist
figure, founded the ‘New Africa’ party at a meeting presided over by Azikiwe.
Although Wachuku declared that the party would not use violence, there is little
doubt that it will constitute the Zikist Movement in another form.
229. The former Nigerian Trade Union Congress, at one time affiliated to the
W.F.T.U., had a secretary-general, A. A. Adio-Moses, and a president, T. A. Bankole,
who were in touch with the British Communist Party in 1945–46. Early in 1949, the
Ibo faction within the T.U.C. broke away and formed the Nigerian National
Federation of Labour (N.N.F.L.), led by Nduke Eze (see para. 228), whose expressed
aim was to undermine the T.U.C., which he regarded as being too constitutional in
its approach to be of any use for political purposes. By the end of 1949 the N.N.F.L.
was firmly established, and would have achieved a dominant position but for the
refusal of the influential Railway Workers’ Union to join forces. In February, 1950, it
began to publish its own newspaper, Labour Champion. This organ is pro-
Communist in tone and is fed to some extent by Communist propaganda received
from abroad. Furthermore, the N.N.F.L. had contacts with the British Communist
Party (and the Daily Worker) and with the W.F.T.U., the W.F.D.Y. and the Council on
African Affairs in New York.(31) The latest development is that the N.N.F.L. and the
Nigerian T.U.C. have joined forces to form the Nigerian Labour Congress with the
Labour Champion as its organ. In mid-June, 1950, the new body claimed a
membership of 60 unions.
230. Of the two youth movements in Nigeria, the Youth Congress of Nigeria and
the Cameroons and the Nigerian Youth Movement, the former, formed in 1947, has
close associations with both the N.C.N.C. and the former Zikist Movement. It is
affiliated to the W.F.D.Y. and some of its members correspond with Communist
(31) In January, 1950, the International Bureau of the Free German Youth (F.O.J.) offered the N.N.F.L. five
university places, ten in secondary schools and ten in recuperative centres of the German Democratic
Republic.
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youth organisations in Europe. The Congress was represented at the Budapest World
Festival of Youth (see Part I, para. 23) of August, 1949, by Bankole Akpata, who has
been studying in Prague since 1948. (As far as is known, there are at least three other
Nigerian students at universities in Prague.) The second body, the Nigerian Youth
Movement, is a Yoruba organisation—in contrast to the Ibo Youth Congress—and is
not thought to have Communist leanings. In February, 1950, it was reported that the
Nigerian Youth Movement and the N.C.N.C. had formed a temporary alliance to
flight for self-government under the name of S.G.N. (Self-government Now). It
seems doubtful, however, whether the Ibo and Yoruba elements represented by these
two organisations will ever fuse sufficiently to form a permanent alliance.
231. There is one further Nigerian body with Communist connexions—the Egbu
Women’s Association, which is affiliated to the Women’s International Democratic
Federation (W.I.D.F.). Its leader, Mrs. Ransome Kuti, a teacher, is, however, the only
member of the Association known to hold Communist views.
232. Dr. Azikiwe runs a press in Lagos, which produces a number of newspapers,
the most important of which is the West African Pilot. During the past two years,
these papers have shown a markedly increased tendency to use news items and
articles favourable to the Soviet Union in support of their campaign against
‘imperialism.’ Articles from Tass, the Soviet Monitor and the Telepress Agency have
become increasingly common, while there has also been a number of articles
attributable to no particular source but bearing the hallmarks of Cominform
inspiration.
233. The circulation of foreign Communist literature is still not great, but has
been increasing over the past year. Copies of the R.D.A. organ Réveil (see para. 215)
have been seen in Lagos, while publications such as Africa Newsletter, produced by
the Africa Committee of the British Communist Party, Soviet Weekly, Tep, the
Czech organ of the Bata Shoe Company, and the Guardian from South Africa have
been distributed in some of the larger towns, as well as other pamphlets and text-
books produced by the British and South African Communist Parties. There is,
however, no evidence of any Communist literature having been translated into the
vernacular.
234. During the past year a noticeable trend has been the increased liaison
between the Nigerian nationalist extremists and the Communist-directed
‘Rassemblement Démocratique African’ (R.D.A.) in French West Africa.(32) Certain
members of the R.D.A. branch at Porto Novo in Dahomey appear to have visited
Lagos during the summer of 1949 and to have attempted to form a R.D.A. branch
there. Mention must also be made of the visit of the three French Communist
deputies, General Plagny, Admiral Moullec and M. Jacques Mitterand, to Lagos in
October, 1949, accompanied by Theodore Hazoume of the R.D.A. Dahomey branch
(see para. 218). On their part, the leaders of the N.C.N.C. are believed to have
expressed a desire to establish regular contact with the R.D.A. branches at Porto
Novo, Cotonou and elsewhere. It has been reported that while Azikiwe was in Paris in
February, 1950, he met R.D.A. leaders and discussed with them the formation of a
bloc ‘composed of all the political organisations in Africa.’
(32) Gabriel d’Arboussier, Secretary-General of the R.D.A., has contributed several articles to the Labour
Champion (see para. 229) in the past six months.
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116 CO 537/5787, no 52 15 July 1950
[Constitutional review]: despatch no 464A from Mr Griffiths to Sir J
Macpherson on the proposals for constitutional revision
I have now been able to study the Reports of the General Conference at Ibadan and of
the Select Committee of the Legislative Council on the review of the Nigerian
constitution and to discuss these with you.1 I note that general agreement has been
reached, subject to certain minority reports, on all questions except one and that this
one major question, the composition of the Nigerian Legislature, is being referred
back for further examination by the Regional Legislatures and the Legislative
Council. I believe that it may be helpful if, without commenting on this one point of
difference, I inform you of the views of His Majesty’s Government on the remaining
recommendations.
2. First of all I wish to pay tribute, on behalf of His Majesty’s Government, to the
success of the constitutional review. Conference of Nigerian representatives have
been held in the Provinces, following in many cases discussions at the divisional
level; there have been further Conferences in the three Regions and for Lagos and the
Colony; finally a General Conference representative of all parts of the country met at
Ibadan in January and its recommendations have been considered by the Regional
Legislatures and the Nigerian Legislative Council. In the view of His Majesty’s
Government the recommendations which have emerged are of the utmost value. I
have been particularly impressed by the wide measure of agreement reached. All who
have taken part in the constitutional review are to be congratulated on their
contributions and Nigeria is to be congratulated on the results; these have amply
justified the initiative which you took in 1948 in proposing that such a review should
be undertaken and the decision of the Legislative Council to accept your proposal.
3. The Select Committee of the Legislative Council has warmly welcomed the
proposals of the General Conference:—
(a) for greatly increased regional autonomy within a united Nigeria;
(b) for giving Nigerians a full share in the shaping of Government policy and
direction of executive Government action in a Central Council of Ministers and
Regional Executive Councils; and
(c) for the creation of larger and more representative Regional Legislatures with
increased powers.
I am in full agreement with these proposals and the main purpose of this despatch is
to inform you that, provided that a satisfactory settlement can be arrived at on the
composition of the Nigerian Legislature and subject to further examination of details
when the constitutional review is completed in Nigeria, His Majesty’s Government
will be willing to accept the recommendations of the General Conference with the
variations suggested by the Select Committee of the Legislative Council in its Report
dated April 1st, 1950. In the following paragraphs I propose to comment on some of
the main recommendations; I shall not comment on points of detail.
4. The proposal to give increased powers to the Regional Legislatures represents
a logical development from the present constitution which established these
1 See 90 and 101.
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Legislatures and in my view is fully justified by the successful working of the existing
Regional Legislatures. I welcome the recommendation that the Regional
Legislatures should be given power under the constitution to approve or reject the
annual budgets of the Regions and to legislate over a substantial range of subjects of
particular interest to the Regions, subject to the power of the Governor on the advice
of the Nigerian Council of Ministers to refer back or if necessary to reject legislation
which appears to that Council to conflict with a major overall Nigerian interest. I
believe it to be right that this latter power should rest with the Central Executive
rather than with the Central Legislature as was originally proposed; the procedure
for exercising it will need to be carefully worked out. I hope that arrangements may
be made for consultation between the Regions and the centre so as to avoid to the
maximum possible extent the introduction of legislation into Regional Legislatures
which would conflict with an overall Nigerian interest. If, however, on any occasion
legislation is passed by a Regional Legislature which is considered by the Nigerian
Council of Ministers to be in conflict with such an interest, then I would suggest that
a joint committee representative of the Council of Ministers and the Regional
Executive concerned should be established with a view to agreeing amendments to
the legislation which would make it acceptable to both parties.
5. I note the recommendation that the Nigerian Legislature at the centre should
continue to have full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government
of Nigeria, without any restriction. It follows that there will be a substantial overlap
between the legislative functions of the Central and Regional Legislatures. I believe
that at the present stage, while the Regional Legislatures are still gaining experience,
this arrangement will be found the most appropriate; but at some stage in the future,
as Nigeria develops further towards a federal state, it may well be necessary, as it has
been in other countries, to establish separate and distinct fields of legislation for the
centre and the Regions, with a reduction in the range of subjects over which they
have concurrent powers.
6. One of the most important features of the proposals is the recommendation
that Regional Executive Councils should be established under the Presidency of the
Lieutenant-Governors of the Regions, and consisting of official members and
Nigerian Ministers drawn from the Regional Legislatures, the latter being in a
majority in each case. The proposal that the Chief Commissioners should in future
be called Lieutenant-Governors appropriately symbolises the increased powers to be
given to the Regions. I fully agree also that, with these increased regional powers,
Nigerian members should take a full part, with their official colleagues and under the
leadership of the Lieutenant-Governors, in the formulation of policy and the
direction of executive action in the Regions, subject to the general direction of policy
by the Nigerian Council of Ministers in matters affecting overall Nigerian interests.
7. I have made it clear how much importance I attach to the principle of greater
regional autonomy. One of the great advantages of encouraging the Regions to
develop each along its own characteristic lines will be that by that very process the
unity of Nigeria will be strengthened. I wish to make it clear beyond all doubt that
His Majesty’s Government attaches the very greatest importance to building up a
unified Nigeria on the basis of the three component Regions. The three Regions
depend closely on each other and will continue to do so, and any tendency to break
up Nigeria into separate parts would in the view of His Majesty’s Government be
contrary to the interests of the peoples of all three Regions and of Nigeria as a whole.
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I therefore warmly welcome the recommendations for a strong Central Legislature
and Executive for Nigeria. Final recommendations for the composition of the
Legislature remain to be made. As regards the Executive, the important proposal is
made that a Nigerian Council of Ministers should be established under the
Presidency of the Governor with six ex officio members and twelve Nigerian
Ministers, four from each Region, drawn from the Central Legislature. It is proposed
that the Council of Ministers should formulate policy and direct executive action for
Nigeria. I fully accept this proposal, as I am convinced that it is essential at the centre
as in the Regions that Nigerians drawn from the Legislature should take a full part,
along with their official colleagues and under the leadership of the Governor, in the
shaping of general Government policy and the directing of executive action.
8. The proposal is made by the General Conference that the Ministers at the
centre and in the Regions should be elected by the respective Legislatures and that
the arrangements for the distribution of portfolios among these Ministers should be
settled at the centre by the Governor in Council (i.e. the Council of Ministers) and in
the Regions by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council (i.e. the Regional Executive
Council). I entirely agree with the principle that, at this stage of constitutional
development, the Legislatures should have a voice in the appointment of Nigerian
members to the Executive at the centre and in the Regions; but the method of
appointing Ministers and of distributing portfolios is clearly a matter on which final
decisions cannot be taken until the composition of the Nigerian Legislature has been
settled. You will, however, be aware that in this country and in many other countries
in the Commonwealth and elsewhere where there is an established party system, the
Prime Minister appoints his own Ministerial colleagues and is himself solely
responsible for the distribution of portfolios. I have no doubt that, when the stage of
fully responsible government is reached, the same arrangement will be adopted in
Nigeria. There would in my view be advantages in establishing, on the creation of a
ministerial system in Nigeria, a procedure for appointment of Ministers which will
lead on smoothly to the adoption of this arrangement when the time is ripe. As, at
the stage now under discussion, the Governor will preside over the Council of
Ministers and the Lieutenant-Governors over the Regional Executive Councils, I
suggest that the aim should be to arrive at a procedure under which members of the
Council of Ministers are selected in consultation between the Governor and 
the members of the Nigerian Legislature representing each region, and members of the
Regional Executive Council are selected in consultation between the Lieutenant-
Governor and the members of the Regional Legislature.
9. I agree with the recommendation of the General Conference that the
appointment of a Minister, but not of course of an ex officio member, should be
terminated in the event of a vote of no confidence in him being passed by a two-
thirds majority of the Legislature concerned. It will, I am sure, be agreed that this
power should not be lightly exercised, and for that reason I suggest that the majority
should not be two-thirds of the members present but two-thirds of all the members
of the Legislature in question. I suggest also that individual members of the Council
of Ministers or of the Regional Executive Councils should be under an obligation to
carry out and support in the Legislature, the policy and decisions of the Council. A
member of a Council who felt himself unable to carry out this obligation should
resign and, in case he refused to do so, it should be provided in the constitution that
the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor should be empowered in these circumstances
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to terminate his appointment, with the agreement of the majority of the Council of
Ministers or the Regional Executive Council.
10. Great importance clearly attaches to the arrangements for the election of
members of the Central and Regional Legislatures and I have noted with much
interest the recommendations of the General Conference on this matter. I make no
comment on the arrangements for the election of members of the Central
Legislature, since a final recommendation on its composition remains to be made. As
regards the Regional Houses of Assembly, it is proposed that the members should be
elected by a system of indirect election through provincial electoral colleges in the
Northern Region and divisional electoral colleges in the Eastern and Western
Regions; that the primary elections in each Region should be direct; and that the
detailed arrangements should be worked out in each Region and examined by the
House of Assembly of that Region. I do not wish to prejudge this examination, but I
would point out that the representative character of the Regional Houses of Assembly
and, if they are to select the members of the Central Legislature, of that Legislature
itself, will depend ultimately on the primary elections in the Provinces and Divisions.
It is in my view most important that the arrangements for these primary elections
should ensure that the members elected to the Provincial and Divisional electoral
colleges should be genuinely representative of all the peoples of the areas concerned;
that the elections should be free and fair; and that the form of election should be
properly adopted to the circumstances of each area. For this last reason I welcome
the proposal that the arrangements should in the first instance be worked out in the
Regions themselves; I shall await the results with much interest.
11. During the course of the constitutional review different opinions have been
expressed as to the future of Lagos. The joint Lagos and Colony Conferences and the
Western Regional Conference proposed that both Lagos and the rural districts of the
Colony should be included in the Western Region for legislative and administrative
purposes. The General Conference at Ibadan by a majority agreed as far as the rural
districts of the Colony were concerned, but recommended that the independent
municipality of Lagos, as capital of Nigeria, should be kept outside the Western
Region. A minority report signed by seven representatives of the Western Region,
three representatives of Lagos and one of the Colony, but not by the representatives
of Lagos and the Colony on the Legislative Council, contested this recommendation
and argued that Lagos should be included in the Western Region. The majority of the
Select Committee of the Legislative Council came to the conclusion that Lagos
should be included in the Western Region, subject to certain important safeguards.
The representatives of Lagos and the Colony on the Legislative Council, however,
submitted a minority report supporting the majority of the General Conference.
12. I recognise that there is much to be said in support of both views; but I have
come to the conclusion that the view of the majority of the Select Committee of the
Legislative Council which clearly has the support of a substantial body of opinion but
not of all opinion in Lagos itself, should be accepted. If it were not accepted, Lagos
would have to [sic: be] separated for legislative and administrative purposes from the
rural districts of the Colony, which are unanimously recommended for inclusion in
the Western Region; and I understand that there are felt by many to be strong ties
between Lagos and the rest of the Colony, which have been administered together for
so long. Although I believe that Lagos should be included in the Western Region, I
am sure that its position as capital city must be safeguarded and I therefore welcome
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the proposals of the majority of the Select Committee that all central services in
Lagos, including particularly the port and railway, should remain a central
responsibility under the direction of the central Government; that all expenses
arising from the special needs of Lagos as the capital should be met by the allocation
of funds from the central Government; that the annual estimates of the Town
Council should be submitted not only to the Regional Executive Council of the
Western Region but also to the Nigerian Council of Ministers; and that at least two
members representing Lagos in the Western House of Assembly should be selected
by that House to sit in the Central Legislature.
13. The allocation of finance between the three Regions and central Nigerian
services naturally assumed much importance during the constitutional review. I
welcome the proposal of the General Conference that an expert and independent
committee should be set up to undertake an enquiry into the division of revenue over
a period of five years between the three Regions and the central Nigerian services;
that the proposals of this committee should be considered by representatives of the
three Regions sitting in equal numbers, with a representative of Lagos, under the
chairmanship of the Financial Secretary; and that recommendations should be
submitted to the Governor and by him to the Secretary of State to take effect at the
same time as the introduction of the new constitution. The Committee has already
been appointed and has started work.
14. There is one other matter directly arising from the proposed changes in the
constitution to which I should like to refer. The grant of increased powers to the
Regional Legislatures and the setting up of Regional Executive Councils will, I
believe, if the new arrangements are to work statisfactorily, involve a further
strengthening of the administrative machinery in the Regions and a re-examination
of the relations between the central directorates of the technical departments at
Lagos and elsewhere and the regional branches of those departments. With the
appointment of Regional Ministers for certain subjects, further administrative
devolution of responsibility to the Regions will, I think, be found necessary and it
may well be found desirable also to raise the status of the Regional Deputy Directors
of certain departments to that of Regional Directors. The Central Directors would
then cease to be directly responsible for the purely regional activities of these
departments; their function would be to advise the Governor and the Council of
Ministers on general policy and to provide the regional directorates with technical
advice and assistance not available to them in other ways. I have no doubt that these
matters are receiving your careful attention.
15. I have already dealt with the minority reports on the position of Lagos. As
regards the other minority reports, I have studied them closely, but I do not think
that it would be justifiable to set aside the recommendations of the large majority of
the General Conference. On the proposal that Nigeria should be divided not into
three Regions but into a considerably larger number of units based on ethnic
grouping, I would point out that the three Regional Conferences, the Conference for
Lagos and the Colony and the General Conference all either explicitly or implicitly
recommended that Nigeria should consist of three Regions, although the Western
Regional Conference would have preferred that they should be called States. If the
alternative proposal for a larger number of smaller units were adopted, not only
would the financial and administrative relations between the central and the
component parts be made much more difficult, but those component parts would
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themselves be weakened, whereas it seems clear to me from studying the results of
the constitutional review that it is the desire of the great majority to strengthen the
Regions and to give them more legislative and executive power. On the minority
reports regarding the system of election. I would point out that while the Eastern
Regional Conference and the Lagos-Colony Conference suggested leaving the
method of election to the decision of the regions themselves, both the Northern and
the Western Regional Conferences, as well as the General Conference, recommended
indirect election to the Regional Houses of Assembly through electoral colleges at
the Provincial or Divisional level. I see no reason to depart from the recommen-
dations of the General Conference and I do not wish to add to what I have said in
paragraph 10 of this despatch, except to point out that from the point of view of those
who are in favour of direct election, the proposal that the primary elections in each
region should be direct represents an important advance.
16. I have one final point to make. When the existing constitution was
introduced in 1947 it was stated that it would be subject to general review after a
period of nine years and that certain features of it would be subject to review after
three and six years. Its operation was so successful that you decided, with my
predecessor’s approval, to propose a general revision in the third year of its operation
and this proposal, as I have already stated, was accepted by the Legislative Council.
The reforms which have been recommended as a result of that review are, I believe,
both sound and necessary and they certainly represent a logical development from
the existing constitution. I do not myself think it wise to fix definite timetables for
constitutional advance, whether these take the form of laying down that a particular
change will be made after a given period of years or of stating that no review will take
place until a given period has elapsed. Constitutional advance must in my opinion
depend on the political development of the country concerned. At the same time too
frequent constitutional changes are to be avoided; if changes are made too often they
are bound to have an unsettling effect on the political and economic life of a country.
For that reason, although I would not be in favour of fixing any stated period within
which review will be ruled out, I would nevertheless urge that, when the new
constitutional arrangements have been introduced, they should be allowed to
operate for a reasonable period before further changes are considered.
17. I shall await with the greatest interest the final recommendations to be
submitted on the subject of the composition of the Nigerian Legislature.
117 CO 537/5787, no 64 17 Sept 1950
[Constitutional review]: inward telegram no 1374 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Griffiths on the recommendations of the Select
Committee of the Legislative Council concerning the composition of
the central legislature
Constitutional Review.
During meeting of Legislative Council which ended 16th September, a Select
Committee to which all Unofficial Members and 7 officials were appointed made the
following recommendations:—
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(i) In the present circumstances, it will be preferable to have one House rather
than two in the Central Legislature.
(ii) In view of respective population of the regions, representation of Northern
Region in Central Legislature should be equal to the representation of the other
two regions together.
(iii) There should be 148 members in the Central Legislature.
(iv) For the present, the Governor should continue to preside.
(v) Six members should be appointed by the Governor to represent the interests
which in his opinion are not otherwise adequately represented.
2. A minority report presented by three Lagos members1 favoured two Houses,
and reiterated objections to representation of special interests.
3. When report of Select Committee was debated in full Council of 16th
September report was adopted without division, only the three Lagos members
opposing.
4. The Western members did not vote in Select Committee since they did not feel
free to vary the recommendations of the Western House in favour of two Houses but
they did not oppose the adoption of the Select Committee report and are, I believe,
well prepared to accept the majority.
5. During debate in the Council of 16th September, Eastern members spoke
strongly in favour of mutual confidence between regions, and Balewa and Yahaya
Ilorin on behalf of the North warmly supported the need for co-operation in a United
Nigeria.
6. I regard this outcome as extremely satisfactory. Fears of separatism on the
part of the North are ended and the atmosphere of enthusiastic co-operation between
regions in which debate finished is a very good augury for the future Constitution.
1 The three Lagos members were Adedoyin, Azikiwe and Olorun-Nimbe.
118 CO 537/5787, no 69 22 Sept 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from H M Foot to A B Cohen on
discussions with chief commissioners concerning the constitutional
revision
You will have seen our telegram1 reporting the result of the Legislative Council Select
Committee on the composition of the Central legislature and I am sure that you will
agree that the main result achieved was as satisfactory as it could be. Since the
Legislative Council dispersed on Saturday last there has been a good deal of
mischievous comment in the more extreme local press which is still talking about
Northern domination, but in spite of that I believe that there is an overwhelming
majority of public opinion in favour of the decisions reached by the Legislative
Council, coupled with a sense of great relief that the miserable prospect of increasing
antagonism between North and South has been avoided.
The purpose of this letter is not to discuss the main decisions on the question of
the composition of the Central Legislature but to bring you up-to-date on
1 See 117.
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discussions which we have had over recent weeks with Chief Commissioners and
subsequently at an informal meeting of Unofficial Members of the Legislative
Council. On the Governor’s direction I wrote a series of letters to Chief
Commissioners early this month setting out certain preliminary ideas about some of
the main outstanding questions to be decided in connection with the constitutional
advance and we had a long discussion with Chief Commissioners on those questions
on the day preceding the Legislative Council meeting. Later last week I had an
informal discussion on a number of points with Unofficial Members.
We shall of course reply in detail to the points raised in your letter of the 5th of
September and the legal memorandum to which that letter refers but it will take
some time to consider the many points there raised and I thought that we should let
you know in advance how discussion on a number of important questions has been
going.
I should also mention that on the Governor’s direction I am replying separately to
your letter which dealt with the requests put forward by the commercial delegation
which saw the Secretary of State in London.2 It will be sufficient as far as those
requests are concerned to say now that we were very pleased to get the decision of
the Select Committee to increase the representation of special interests in the
Central Legislature from three to six. Rogers put this forward in Select Committee
and as usual he played his cards very well. I should add that in the informal
discussion which I had with Unofficial Members (which took place before the Select
Committee on the composition of the Central Legislature sat) I raised the question
whether there might be representation of special interests in Regional Legislatures.
Although I did not attempt to bring the discussion to a final conclusion it was
apparent that the Northern members were not opposed to this idea and that some of
the members from other Regions are also likely to agree to it. The fact that we
obtained agreement on increasing the special interests’ representation in the Central
Legislature and that we have made some progress towards getting agreement that
there should be similar representation in the Regional Houses will be helpful to you
when a further meeting with the commercial delegation takes place in London.
One of the principal matters which we have discussed at considerable length with
Chief Commissioners is the time table for bringing the new constitution into effect.
We first of all had in mind that the draft Instruments might be referred to the
Legislative Council in March next year and that they should then be put in final form,
taking into account any changes which the Legislative Council might wish to
suggest. We now think however that it is unnecessary to put the draft Instruments to
the Legislative Council and indeed that it is undesirable to do so since it would give
members an opportunity of raising again all the questions which have already been
disposed of by the Ibadan Conference and subsequent consideration in Select
Committee and the Council. Instead we think we should aim at getting the
Instruments into final shape as quickly as possible in the hope that they can be
promulgated shortly after the Budget meeting of the Legislative Council in March,
1951. There is however quite a number of important points on which you and we
may want to vary the recommendations of the Ibadan Conference and the Legislative
Council and in addition there are some important questions to be settled before the
Instruments are drawn up which have not been considered either at Ibadan or by the
2 See 114.
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Legislative Council. Our idea is that when these points have been sorted out the
Secretary of State might address a despatch to the Governor, first of all welcoming
the recommendations of the Legislative Council on the composition of the Central
Legislature and then going on to make suggestions and ask the Governor’s advice on
a list of outstanding points. This arrangement would leave us free either to call a
special meeting of the Legislative Council later this year to consider these
outstanding points or possibly to call in Unofficial Members of the Legislative
Council to consider the points in an informal meeting. The sort of points we have in
mind which might be dealt with in this way are the method of appointment of
ministers and distribution of portfolios and the question whether Central legislation
must be first taken in Regional Legislatures. If this procedure is agreed we should
hope that the despatch from the Secretary of State could reach us within say a couple
of months from now.
We also considered with Chief Commissioners when we could hope to get the
new Legislative bodies established and our first aim was to have a shake-down
meeting of the new Regional Houses and of the new House of Representatives
towards the end of 1951. That would enable the Houses to settle questions of proce-
dure at a preliminary meeting before undertaking the big task of dealing with the
1952/53 Budget. The Acting Chief Commissioner Western Provinces was inclined to
urge some postponement and suggested that the existing Legislative bodies should
deal with the Budget for 1952/53, the elections for the new Legislatures taking
place in the summer of 1952. His point was that it is necessary to give a great deal
of time to making preparations for the new elections and he fears that if we rush
things we shall not get the best representation. Most of us however felt strongly
that we cannot delay things for yet another year and that we must do everything
possible to get the Instruments ready for promulgation early next year (not later
than April or May) and then proceed with the elections (which will take several
months) as soon as possible thereafter. We felt that if there were further delay we
should be playing into the hands of those who wish to sabotage orderly constitu-
tional progress.
I shall now turn to a number of separate points:—
Ministers’ salaries
The discussion which we have had on this matter has not unnaturally excited a
good deal of interest, particularly among the Unofficial Members of the Legislative
Council. During my informal talk with them I told them the rates of salary payable
in such places as Ceylon, Jamaica, Trinidad and the Sudan and also told them that
the Gold Coast had in mind a rate as high as £2,500 a year. A good deal of the dis-
cussion turned on the question of whether ministers should be permitted to retain
private sources of income and the prevailing opinion amongst Unofficial Members
is that they should not, and that salaries should be fixed at a sufficiently high rate
to compensate ministers for losing their private income. We think that there can
reasonably be a distinction between the salaries of ministers at the Centre and
ministers in the Regions and we also think that ministers without portfolios might
be paid less than the others. No decision of any kind on the rates has been
reached. On the official side I think that we feel that about £1,500 for Central min-
isters and about £1,000 for Regional ministers might be about right but we may
have to go higher than that, particularly if private sources of income are ruled out.
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One good point about giving up private sources of income which was mentioned is
that ministers who come from outside Lagos will usually have to abandon their
occupations by reason of the distance of Lagos from their homes and it would
clearly be unfair to put any ministers who come from Lagos at an advantage in
this respect.
Allowances for members of legislatures
As you know our present system is to pay a fairly high daily allowance (£5.5.0d a day)
to members of Legislatures for days on which they are absent from their homes on
duties connected with their work in the Legislatures. This arrangement is not
altogether satisfactory—it is suggested that it tends to prolong meetings of the
Legislatures! We think that when the new constitutional arrangements are
introduced we might switch to a system of paying a yearly salary. In view of the size
of the new Legislatures we hope that it will be possible to keep these salaries low—a
figure of £200 a year for members of Regional Houses was suggested with an
additional £200 a year for those who also serve in the Central Legislature.
Distribution of subjects amongst central ministers
We do not see much difficulty in the distribution of subjects amongst Regional
ministers but distribution amongst Central ministers is not very easy. Our present
suggestions are as follows:—
(i) Minister of Labour Labour
(ii) Minister of Fuel & Power Mines
Colliery
Electricity
Hydro-electric projects
Survey
Geological survey
Irrigation
(iii) Minister for Transport Railway
Marine
Civil Aviation
Road Transport
Meteorology
(iv) Minister for Industries
& Commerce Industries
Commerce
Marketing & Exports
(v) Minister for Posts &
Telegraphs Posts & Telegraphs
Public Relations
Broadcasting
Printing
Statistics
(vi) Minister for Public Works Public Works.
As for the three central ministers to deal in the House of Representatives and the
Council of Ministers with regional subjects we suggest:—
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(i) Minister for Agricultural Agriculture
Development Forestry
Fisheries
Animal Husbandry
(ii) Minister for Social Services Education
Health
Welfare
(iii) Minister for General Purposes Town & Country Planning
Land
Co-operation
Local Government
Local Industries
Community Development
Water Supplies
Functions of ministers
You will remember that the proposed functions of the Council of Ministers and
Regional Executive Councils were defined by the Ibadan Conference as being to
formulate policy and to direct executive action (the Council of Ministers in overall
Nigerian matters and in relation to Central Departments and the Regional Executive
Councils in Regional matters).
The functions of ministers (both Central and Regional) were defined as follows:—
(a) initiation of discussion of policy in the Council
(b) introducing into the House and answering therein all business affecting his
subject or subjects
(c) ensuring in co-operation with the executive Head of the Department
concerned that the decisions of the Council, as they affect his subject, are carried
out. (This function does not, of course, apply to Central Ministers dealing with
mainly Regional subjects).
The most important point of all, in our opinion, is that decisions of policy are to be
taken not by individual ministers but by the Councils. It follows from this that the
main duty of ministers is to take part in discussion and decision on policy in the
Councils and since all decisions on all matters (except those too trivial to refer to
the Councils) must be taken in the Councils a very heavy volume of work will fall on
the Councils. As far as the Council of Ministers is concerned I expect that meetings
will have to take place at least once a week for most of the year and I imagine that
frequent meetings of Regional Executive Councils will also be necessary.
In view of the importance of the Councils and their work it seems quite clear to us
that the work of Secretariats (both Central and Regional) will mainly be to serve the
Councils. Since Secretariat files should not normally be circulated to Ministers, it
will be necessary for Secretariats to prepare explanatory notes for prior distribution
to members of the Councils on almost every subject to be discussed and decided by
the Councils. That alone will throw a considerable new strain on Secretariats. In
addition it must, I think, be made quite clear from the start that decisions of the
Councils must be communicated by Secretariats to Departments and not by
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Ministers to Departments. It follows from that that the work of Secretariats will not
be reduced but increased and that makes it essential to ensure that our existing
Secretariat machinery should not be weakened just at the time that this increased
strain is certain to come. Moreover it must be remembered that Secretaries at the
Centre and in the Regions will have to spend much more of their time in future
sitting in the Councils and in the Legislatures. Our conclusion from this is that we
should avoid any major reorganisation in the Secretariat system we know at this
time.
You will see that our proposals for an embryo ministerial system differ a great deal
from what is proposed in the Gold Coast (our proposals are much nearer the
Jamaican model) and that in consequence we do not intend to split our Secretariats
either at the Centre or in the Regions in the way that the Gold Coast proposes. We
have in mind that each minister should, where possible, have an office in the
Department with which he is associated and that he should have a Secretary of about
D.O. seniority to obtain for him material which he requires from the Secretariat and
the Department in question. In addition he will of course have frequent meetings
with the head of the Department and occasional meetings with the Chief or Civil
Secretary.
The main purposes which we have in mind are that we must avoid making the
ministers feel that they are full fledged ministers on the English model at this stage
and that we must keep existing Secretariats free to take the additional strain which
we know is coming.
We realise that there is a number of arguments for division of the Secretariats on
the lines which the Gold Coast proposes but the essential point which we wish to
emphasize is that in Nigeria decisions of policy are to be taken not by individual
ministers but by the Councils. In our view that necessitates the continuation of
undivided Secretariats both at the Centre and in the Regions.
Service reorganisation
It is generally agreed here that all unestablished staff and daily paid employees
serving Regional Authorities should become the sole responsibility of Regional
Authorities.
Secondly it seems to us that each Regional Executive Council should be free to
draw up a scheme for a Regional Junior Service. We have considered whether we
should attempt to create Regional Junior Services in the next few months so that
they would be in operation before the constitutional changes are brought into effect.
This would be a big undertaking at a time when we have so much else to do—and it
seems to us that in any event it would be wrong to do the job by administrative
decision now. The decisions should really be taken by the Lieutenant Governors-in-
Council. There are all sorts of complicated and important questions to be decided
regarding recruitment, salary scales, discipline and pensions—to mention only a
few—and it is, we think, for the Lieutenant Governors-in-Council under the new
regime to take such decisions.
We also have in mind that some of the Regions may not wish to tackle this job
early on and will be content to carry on for some time under the existing
arrangements whereby Junior staff from a Central Service is posted to the Regions.
We should raise no objection if the present system is continued in one or more of the
Regions for as long as they wish.
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If and when a scheme for a Regional Junior Service is drawn up in any Region
the Government would be prepared to allow members of the existing staff serving
Regional authorities to transfer to the new Regional Service if they wish to do so.
It would however be some time before new recruitment and transfer could fully
meet Regional needs and in the meantime it could no doubt be arranged for sec-
ondment from the Central Service to the Regional Service. One great advantage of
tackling the problem in this way would be that no existing member of the Central
Service would be able to claim that he had been forced to give up his rights as a
member of the Nigerian Service. There are of course all sorts of subsidiary prob-
lems which will have to be considered (e.g. pension schemes and staff negotiating
machinery) but the general proposition that Lieutenant Governors-in-Council
should be free to prepare schemes for Regional Services, with the present Nigerian
Service continuing as at present in the meantime, seems to us sound and work-
able.
Senior officers (and Junior officers too) who are posted to the Regions for service
under the Regional authorities would of course be fully responsible to those Regional
authorities and the only interference from the Centre would be in respect of transfer
from Region to Region which would be arranged in consultation with the Regional
authorities concerned.
As far as the Senior Service is concerned we take the view that there should
however be no attempt to split it into four (three for the Regions and one for the
Centre) and we believe that any such division would be contrary to the general
Nigerian interest.
The only other main question concerning Government staff which I need mention
now is the proposal to establish a Public Service Commission to advise the Governor
on recruitment, training, promotion and discipline of all Government staff, Senior
and Junior, except in respect of holders of superscale posts and members of Unified
Services. You will remember that the Ibadan Conference proposed that matters of
discipline should be dealt with by a Privy Council but at present our view is that it
will be preferable to establish a Public Service Commission, and I believe that is your
view too. We are examining various models and will put up our proposals about a
Public Service Commission separately. The Commission would of course deal only
with centrally employed staff and if Regional Junior Services are established in the
future it will be for consideration whether similar Commissions should be
established in the Regions.
Selection of ministers and allocation of portfolios
I raised this matter at the informal discussion with Unofficial Members and pointed
out that in the Secretary of State’s despatch he had suggested that members of the
Executive should be selected in consultation between the Governor or the Lieutenant
Governors and members of the Legislatures concerned. We did not attempt to reach
a final conclusion but several members agreed that it was necessary to give very
careful consideration to the Secretary of State’s views.
I am sorry to seem obstinate about this but personally the more I think the matter
over the more I remain of the opinion that the system proposed by the Ibadan
Conference whereby ministers would be elected by the Legislatures would be the
best. An additional argument which emerged from the discussion with Unofficial
Members is that the Secretary of State’s proposed system envisages the development
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of a party system. It may well be that parties grow up in the different Regions but I
find it very difficult to picture the emergence of national parties which could cut
across Regional divisions. Indeed it may be that we shall never have in Nigeria a state
of affairs where two or more parties cover the whole country. It therefore seems to
me that the arguments used in respect of the Gold Coast constitution do not apply to
Nigeria where we propose to work a unique federal system. You will no doubt wish to
discuss this matter further with the Governor.
Central bills in regional houses
Another matter raised in the informal discussion with Unofficial Members was the
question of whether it is necessary in the new arrangements for Central legislation
to be discussed first of all in Regional Houses. Some of the members thought that
it would be necessary to maintain this practice so that members of the Central
Legislature should know the feelings of their fellow members in Regional Houses
before expressing their views at the Centre. One compromise proposal which was
put forward during the discussion was that Central bills should merely be laid on
the Table of Regional Houses for debate there only in the event of a member mak-
ing a specific motion. We did not attempt to reach a final conclusion but I myself
think that if and when the point is again put to Unofficial Members they will most
of them be anxious to retain the present system in spite of the delays which it
causes.
Reorganisation of departments
We have for some time past been hard at it working out in detail how Departments
are to be fully regionalised. Some of the main Departments can be comparatively
easily divided into three Regional Departments, e.g. Education and Agriculture,
whilst other Departments which are about to be constituted into Corporations or
have already been so constituted will of course remain permanently central. There
are other Departments, such as the Police, Survey, Public Relations and Accountant-
General which will probably be regionalised to the greatest extent possible in order
that each Regional administration shall have available to it technical advice on such
aspects of the working of those Departments as can be appropriately administered
regionally. There are a hundred and one complicated problems to be settled in this
matter of departmental reorganisation. We have to decide, for instance, which
specialists should be retained at the Centre on the staff of the Departmental
Inspectors General on grounds that it would be uneconomical to attempt to provide
a specialist on the subject in question for each Region. We also have to consider
whether, for instance, big Central stores such as that of the Public Works
Department should be retained at the Centre or whether Regional stores
organisations should be provided. A greater difficulty is that of providing the
additional housing and office accommodation which will be required in the Regions.
We must, of course, make sufficient progress with this Departmental reorganisation
to ensure that when the new Constitution comes into force Regional Directors of
regionalised Departments can perform their obligations to Regional Executive
Councils, but I anticipate that the whole process of devolution cannot be fully
completed for maybe two or even three years. We have a small Committee which is
consulting with each Head of Department and working out a cut and dried scheme
for approval in each case as soon as possible.
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Electoral system
A great deal of thought is being given in the Regions to the extremely difficult matter
of the electoral system to be introduced for the new Constitution. In some ways the
decision of the Legislative Council to recommend a Central Legislature of 148
members simplifies the task but there are many big snags and differing
circumstances in the three Regions. The matter is being discussed with Unofficial
Members of Regional Houses and we hope to call a conference here in a month or six
weeks’ time to try to work out final proposals.
I am afraid that even this long letter does not mention many of the important
points which we still have to deal with. I hope that within the next week or two we
shall be able to send you a thorough commentary on your recent letter. Meanwhile
we have started working out rough draft Instruments here and AA Williams, who is
helping in this, will be in England early in December carrying with him our views on
points still then outstanding. He will be available for discussion in the Colonial Office
until the Instruments are put into final shape.
Before then it would be of the greatest assistance if the Colonial Office
draughtsman (McPetrie?) could come out here for a few weeks for discussions with
us. The ideal would be for us to send him some very rough drafts in about a month’s
time and for him to come out at the beginning of November to discuss them, but we
should be glad to see him in the second half of October if that would be more
convenient to him. I am sure that discussions with him here would save a great deal
of time and correspondence—and speed is now of the greatest importance.
119 CO 583/316/10, no 9 25 Sept 1950
[Islamic associations]: inward savingram no 2357 from H M Foot to
Mr Griffiths on the possible arrival in Nigeria of Muslim teachers from
Egypt. Annexures.
Minute by M Phillips
Your 1825 Saving of 26th July1
1. (a) Nothing is known of the Association of Supporters of Islam.
(b) The Muslim Congress of Nigeria is a properly constituted body of some
standing amongst the Muslims of the Western Provinces of Nigeria and Lagos
Colony. Its executive personnel do not, however, as a whole command the
confidence of Government. A note on the organisation is attached as Annexure A.
2. Assistance could be given to the Muslims of the Western Provinces and Lagos
Colony through the Muslim Congress.
3. This Government would view the arrival of such a mission with disfavour.
4. In view of 3 above, not applicable.
5. The main native languages and English (not Arabic)
6. While we would find it difficult to prohibit the entry of such missionaries we
would be much happier if they did not come. Al Azhar2 is an institute for which
1 This savingram followed an inquiry by the Egyptian ambassador in London to the FO in June 1950 about
the possibility of sending Muslim teachers to Nigeria.
2 ie Al-Azhar University, Cairo.
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little good can be said from the point of view of this Government. A copy of Lord
Milverton’s (then Sir Arthur Richards) Secret Despatch of the 3rd of October 1947
addressed to H.M. Ambassador in Cairo is attached as Annexure B to explain why
this view has been adopted. The request contained therein was referred to the
Egyptian Foreign Ministry but nothing further was heard of the matter.
2. We would naturally not wish that the passages underlined should be conveyed
to the Egyptian Ambassador in their present form and the Foreign Office will no
doubt use its discretion as to how our case should be presented.
3. We very much hope that the Egyptians can be headed off. The line to take
might be that the organisations to which reference is made are of no great
importance and do not operate in the Northern Provinces where the majority of
Nigerian Moslems live; that a visit to Nigeria at the invitation of these organisations
would therefore be ill-advised; and that the language difficulty (the language in most
schools attended by Moslems is Hausa and to a lesser extent Yoruba and English)
makes it difficult to see how Egyptian teachers could be usefully employed in
Nigerian schools.
Annexure A to 119: Note on Muslim Congress of Nigeria
The Muslim Congress of Nigeria was started about the middle of 1948 at Ijebu Ode by
Mohammed Effendi El-Amin Kudaise with the object of bringing together all
adherents of the Moslem faith. Beyond that they seem to have no particular aims and
objects and their activities have mostly been confined to issuing pamphlets regarding
the pilgrimage to Mecca. So far they have shown no interest in politics and it is
probable that Kudaise started the movement for the purpose of collecting
subscriptions. None of the people connected with the Congress are of any political or
religious significance. The Present [sic: word missing] is Hadji Hassain Mohammed,
a painter and building-contractor by trade and Imam of a small mosque at Ijebu Ode.
The Vice-President is Abdul Kasim Lawal, also the Imam of a small mosque. The
Assistant Secretary is Ismaila Adebule, a petty trader who deals in patent medicines.
All of these are natives of Ijebu Ode. The principal man behind the movement is
Kudaisi, the Secretary. After leaving school he was employed by Witt and Busch and
then joined the Government service as a telegraphist in the P and T, from which he
was dismissed after being sentenced to two years imprisonment for theft. In 1945 he
went on the pilgrimage to Mecca. He spent 18 months in Saudi Arabia and the Sudan
and founded his Congress on his return. The fact that he did so suggests that he had
some contact with the Muslim Congress, which is a subversive and Communist-
tainted organisation which the Egyptian Government has recently proscribed. It was
probably from them that Kudaisi got the idea for his organisation and its name. He is
an obvious point of contact but so far there has been no reason to suspect that he is
in fact linked up with the Middle East organisation.
Annexure B to 119: despatch from Sir A Richards to HM ambassador, Cairo, 3 Oct 1947
I have the honour to refer to your despatch of the 26th of July on the subject of the
University of Al Ashar’s wish to send two ulema to Nigeria to give religious
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instruction to the Moslem population and to say that I am reluctant to accede to the
request submitted by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs in this regard without
further information as to the proposed Mission. As you will be aware, the political
situation in Nigeria is at present most delicate, and there is danger that
Government’s far-reaching plans for Development of the Territory may be
prejudiced, and in part disrupted, by irresposible demands for immediate political
autonomy. It is, therefore, of first importance that attempts to rally the support of
the constructive elements of the community for sound and progressive measures
should not be impaired by extremist anti-British propaganda.
2. As a result of a report submitted by the Lecturer in Arabic Studies at the Kano
School of Higher Arabic Studies who visited Egypt in December last year it was
decided that no public assistance could be given to Nigerian students to go to Al
Azhar University where, so this offer stated, the prevailing atmosphere of crude
nationalism was so inimical to study that many courses had only a nominal value. An
extreme case quoted to him was a term reduced to ten working days only by students’
strikes and disturbances of a similar nature.
3. I am most anxious that the projected Mission should not be used as a cloak for
the spread of anti-British propaganda and before giving a final decision on this
subject, I should be glad to know the names of the two ulema and to receive such
information as you may be able to furnish regarding them and their proposed
activities, and particularly as to the areas in which it is intended these should be
conducted. I should also welcome an expression of Your Excellency’s views on Al
Azhar University and as to the extent to which its official representatives might abuse
their mission by indulging in propaganda of the type referred to.
Minute on 119
The Nigerian Government is not anxious to encourage any tendency to unite
Moslems of the Northern Provinces in a way that might prejudice the unity of
Nigeria as a whole. In consequence the line proposed in (9) is consistent with
previous trends and I think we can endorse it as in draft now.
Mr. Bourn, Mr. Barton may like to see after issue.
M.P.
29.9.50
120 CO 537/5787, no 74 12 Oct 1950
[Constitutional review]: CO note of a meeting with Sir J Macpherson
on repercussions on the Nigerian civil service, the position of the
Secretariats and European interests
Repercussions on the Colonial Service in Nigeria
The following points were made in discussion:—
(a) Changes in West Africa made necessary by the advance towards self-
government would clearly affect the character of the unified Colonial Service and
their effect would need to be closely watched.
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(b) The outcry in the Gold Coast about appointments to the posts of Secretaries to
the new Ministries had brought to the fore an issue that was of concern to Nigeria
also. The Secretary of State, as the recruiting agency and responsible for
promotions, was vitally concerned in the issues raised by increasing Africanization
of the Service. The principle of promotion on merit had to be upheld.
(c) It would probably be necessary in West Africa to dispense with the Secretary of
State’s control of promotions below certain superscale posts, except when the
Governor specifically asked for outside recruitment (which would be either from
inside the Colonial Service or without). At present posts with emoluments below
£600 a year could be filled locally. This lower limit of £600 might be raised to a
more appropriate level or alternatively there might be a list of posts, promotion or
recruitment to which needed the Secretary of State’s approval.
(d) The progress of Nigerianization was of great interest to local politicians. In
accepting the Report of the Commission on the subject in 1948, the Nigerian
Government had agreed to the recommendation that ‘no non-Nigerian should be
recruited for any Government post except when no suitable and qualified Nigerian
is available’ and the position of the local African had in consequence to be
constantly borne in mind.
(e) There were very few Africans at present in high posts in Nigeria who could be
considered for promotion to such posts as Heads or Deputy Heads of Departments.
In this respect Dr. Manuwa of the Medical Department was a valuable exception.
(f ) It was possible that the West African territories would become more and more
self-contained for staff as progress towards self-government went on. For the
present, however, outside recruitment, especially for such posts as qualified
Veterinary Officers and Agricultural Officers, was likely to be needed for some
time, though African recruitment of lawyers and doctors should increase. It was,
however, most valuable for Nigeria to have people with experience of other
territories transferred on promotion.
It was agreed that
C.S.D. should consider changes likely to be necessary in Part I of Colonial
Regulations, the relevant portion on Appointments being Section A of
Chapter III.
Position of the Secretariats under the new constitution
The following points were made:—
(a) The Secretary of State had accepted the Nigerian Government’s views on the
position and functions of Ministers. Colonial Office misgivings were based not on
political doubts so much as on doubts about the mechanics of the system. It was
recognised too that the system proposed for the Gold Coast went much further
than that envisaged for Nigeria.
(b) The views of the Nigerian Government had been set out in Mr. Foot’s letter
(see pages 8–10 of the letter, dated 22nd September).1 The main job of the
Secretariats would be to service the councils. The Ministers mainly affected by the
way in which the Secretariat at the centre was organized would be those dealing
with subjects purely central in character. If the proposed system was to be
criticised, some alternative should be put forward.
1 See 118.
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 351
352 MACPHERSON AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW [121]
(c) The official view in the office was that the Jamaican experiment had not been a
successful one. The system proposed for Nigeria might encourage friction between
African and European Ministers since the feeling might arise that the influence of
European Ministers through the Secretariat was paramount. The Minister should
feel he had a close and formal link with the Secretariat rather than one through a
secretary of D.O. status, otherwise he would not feel sufficiently linked with policy
in the field over which his post extended.
(d) The alternative seemed to be for the Principal Assistant Secretary in the
relevant branch of the Secretariat to service the Minister direct. Much necessary
advice on the difficulties of the new job would have to come from someone high up
in the Secretariat rather than from within a Department. Hence it seemed wrong
to retain the existing Secretariat arrangements.
(e) It was recognised that these internal arrangements were a matter for the
Nigerian Government, but it was felt that the views of the Colonial Office should
be made known.
It was agreed that
the views of the office on this matter should be sent to the Chief Secretary for
the consideration of the Nigerian Government.
European interests
It was pointed out that:—
(a) Special interests would quite likely be represented in each of the Regional
Legislatures by three members.
(b) The Ceylon clause on non-discrimination was not suitable for Nigeria but if an
appropriate one could be drafted the Nigerian Government would consider it.
(c) The Secretary of State was committed to holding further talks with the
European firms in London.
It was agreed that
approval should be sought for a meeting in the near future between Sir J
Macpherson and Mr. Gorsuch on the one hand and the European firms on the
other.
121 CO 537/5787, no 78 20 Oct 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from H M Foot to A B Cohen on the
selection of ministers under the new constitution
In my letter of the 14th of October I promised to write to you separately about the
question of the selection of Ministers.
We well appreciate the force of the arguments for the system decided upon in the
Gold Coast but it may be as well if I restate the arguments for the alternative system
proposed by the Drafting Committee, unanimously approved by the Ibadan
Conference and accepted by the Legislative Council. Here are the main arguments
for the system of election by the Legislative bodies.
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(1) The proposal for election of Ministers was strongly supported, indeed it was
regarded by some of the Nigerian members as vital, when the discussions took
place in the Drafting Committee.
(2) It will be a pity, when H.M.G. has accepted nearly all the main
recommendations coming from Nigeria, if on this point (which will, I am sure, be
regarded as important in Nigeria) disagreement is unavoidable; such disagreement
would provide ammunition for those who are opposed to orderly constitutional
advance.
(3) Anything which savours of nomination is disliked by Nigerian politicians: this
dislike is not altogether reasonable but it is strongly felt.
(4) I can see no difficulty in changing at some future date from the elected system
to a system such as that practised in the Sudan or Barbados whereby selection of
Ministers is undertaken in consultation with an elected Leader of the Legislature
or with the leader of the majority party: indeed I think that the first would be a
natural and logical development in due course but we all agree that we don’t want
an elected Leader of the Legislature at this stage, nor do we see national parties
emerging for a long time to come, if ever, in Nigeria.
(5) As you say, the Governor under the new constitution will of course remain
ultimately responsible for the administration of the country but I am not quite
sure about the analogy between the Governor or the Chief Secretary and a Prime
Minister. The Prime Minister who chooses his Cabinet (without consultation with
the House of Commons) by virtue of the strength of his following in the House of
Commons is in a quite different position from the Governor or Chief Secretary as
regards selection of ministers.
(6) We suggest that since Nigeria is to operate a constitution on a federal basis
(which is quite different from that proposed in the Gold Coast) it should be
possible to justify a different practice here from that which the Secretary of State
has decided upon in the Gold Coast.1
(7) As far as Colonial precedents are concerned is it not reasonable to look not
only to the Gold Coast but also to the advanced constitutional systems in
operation in Jamaica and Trinidad?
(8) It is argued that the system of election would be more likely to lead to useless
Ministers being appointed, but since the approval of the Legislatures is to be
required the Legislatures will be in a position to insist on their nominees by
turning down the Governor’s or Lieutenant Governor’s lists.
(9) The Governor or Lieutenant-Governor would be placed in a most
embarrassing position if his list were rejected.
(10) If the original list were rejected the Governor or Lieutenant Governor would
have to preside over a Council in which some, or even all, members had reached
the Council in spite of the Governor’s wish to have a different membership, and
this would militate against the mutual confidence between the Governor and
Lieutenant Governors and their Councils which is so necessary.
(11) Consultation with all unofficial members of the Legislatures before
preparation of the Governor’s and Lieutenant Governor’s lists would be well nigh
impossible when Regional Houses (including Houses of Chiefs) are to have about
1 Cohen aded in the margin, ‘No! I don’t see this’.
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112 members in the North, 130 in the West, and about 80 in the East and when in
the Central Legislature there will be 68 members from the North and 34 each from
the East and West.
(12) Consultation with some unofficial members and not with all might well lead
to suspicion and complaint.
(13) The Legislatures are to have the power to remove members of the Councils
by vote and it seems to us undesirable to allow the Legislatures to remove a
Governor’s nominee.
(14) There must be some Ministers who are of poor calibre and we regard that as
an argument for leaving selection to the Legislatures, rather than the Governor
being held responsible for their appointment.
There is a further complication arising from the semi-federal nature of our
constitution. From the elected members of Regional Houses there have to be found
(a) Regional Ministers
(b) Members of the House of Representatives, and
(c) Central Ministers.
If the Lieutenant Governors were to make their pick of the best men for Regional
Executive Councils those men would be ruled out from consideration as possible
members of the Council of Ministers (since it is inconceivable that a man should be
both a Regional and a Central Minister). We cannot picture that the Lieutenant
Governor would be able to settle with the Governor which members of the Regional
House should be earmarked for Regional Ministries and which for Central Ministries,
since the decision on which members of Regional Houses go up to the House of
Representatives is one solely for Regional Houses. The only satisfactory way in which
I can see the complicated processes of selection taking place is this: Members of
Regional Houses would themselves get together and decide which of their number
should be elected to Regional Executive Councils. These would probably not be
elected to sit in the House of Representatives at all in view of their heavy obligations
in the Regions. At the same time members of Regional Houses by consultation
amongst themselves would decide which of their number were best fitted to go to the
Council of Ministers and these would of course be included in the Regional
representatives elected to sit in the House of Representatives. We do not suggest that
this practice need be laid down in the constitutional instruments (as far as they are
concerned it would be sufficient to provide, as we propose, that Regional Ministers
should be elected by Regional Houses and Central Ministers elected by the Regional
blocs in the House of Representatives). But I can see no other way in practice
whereby the decision as to who should go to Regional Executive Councils and who
should be ear-marked for the Council of Ministers could be satisfactorily worked out.
In general terms the case is this. We are to work a constitution very different from
that proposed for the Gold Coast. The peculiarities of our semi-federal arrangement,
coupled with the fact that the Regional Houses are to elect the members of the
House of Representatives and the size of the unofficial membership of the
Legislatures, make it difficult or impossible to apply the Gold Coast system here. In
any event we see disadvantages in Nigerian circumstances in the Governor and
Lieutenant Governor preparing lists of ministers which could be rejected by the
Legislatures and we see no difficulty later on in a transition from the system we
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propose to a system whereby Ministers would be appointed on the recommendation
of elected Leaders of the Legislatures.
I am sorry to have written at such length. I was tempted to write even more to give
detailed examples of the difficulties in which any system other than that we propose
would, I believe, cause. I hope that what I have written will at least indicate that we
have not reached our opinion without a lot of careful thought.
122 CO 537/5789, no 29 31 Oct 1950
[Constitutional review]: CO note of a meeting to discuss
representations made by commercial firms on the constitutional
proposals
[It had been agreed by the Legislative Council in Sept that the House of Representatives
to be established under the new constitution should have six seats reserved for special
interests; this was compared to the three seats in the Legislative Council allocated under
the Richards constitution. However, commercial firms pushed also for representation in
the new regional houses of assembly to be set up under the revised constitution, as they
had had in the regional councils established by Richards. In the event it was agreed that
three seats in each House of Assembly would be reserved for special interests. Present at
the meeting on 31 Oct, in addition to Gorsuch, Macpherson and Vile of the CO, were A R I
Mellor (UAC and Joint West Africa committee), F Samuel (UAC), Sir F Whyte (Bata Shoe
Co.), H J Rawlings (John Holt & Co. Ltd.), N Edwards (Cadbury Bros. Ltd.), C Leach
(Nigerian Chamber of Mines), J D Latham (Nigerian Hardwood Co. Ltd), R H Bugler
(Shell Co. of West Africa Ltd.), L Olorenshaw (Taylor Woodrow Ltd.) and E Hallett (UAC).]
Mr. Gorsuch referred to the meeting which the representatives of the European
interests had had with the Secretary of State on the 27th June1 and explained that the
object of the present meeting was to enable the representatives to hear from the
Governor an account of developments which had taken place in Nigeria since that
date and to discuss with him the points previously raised which were still
outstanding. He added that the representatives would remain at liberty to ask for a
further discussion with the Secretary of State if they so desired.
Sir John Macpherson referred to the recommendation recently agreed upon by the
Legislative Council that there should be six members nominated by the Governor to
represent interests which in his opinion were not otherwise adequately represented.
He said that the total number in the proposed single Chamber Legislature, namely
148 members, was large; this latter figure had been based on the idea of divisional
representation in the Southern Provinces. He said that there had been some
criticism in Nigeria on the proposal to grant six seats on the ground that it might
give the European officials and nominated members together a balance of power in
the Central Legislature. It was, however, expected that the nominated members
would observe the same practice as in the past in abstaining from voting on purely
African matters. The Governor emphasised that the representatives of the special
interests in addition to their knowledge and experience must also have the time to
take a full part in the work of the Legislature.
On the question of representation in the Regional Houses, the Governor said that
no decision had yet been reached. There had been informal talks with members of
the Regional Legislatures and it would be considered by the Regional Houses at their
1 See 114 and 120.
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meetings in December. He himself appreciated the force of the argument that in view
of the extent of the devolution to regions which was contemplated under the new
Constitution, representation of the commercial interests in the Regional Houses was
desirable.
Mr. Mellor said that the commercial interests while anxious to be fully co-
operative over the new Constitution, wished to be sure that any representations
which they might have to make were put forward at the appropriate stage and before
final decisions were taken. Sir John Macpherson said that the review in Nigeria had
proceeded by close collaboration at all stages between officials and unofficials and the
recommendations which had been put forward had emerged from this process of
collaboration. He hoped that on the matter of representation in the Regional Houses
the commercial interests would notify their views to the Nigerian Government as
soon as possible while the matter was still in the stage of consideration in Nigeria. He
would be glad also to have personally from them any views they might have on this
question of special members.
Mr. Gorsuch said that in his published despatch of the 15th July2 the Secretary of
State had announced the approval of His Majesty’s Government in general terms of
the recommendations which had emanated from Nigeria, subject to a satisfactory set-
tlement of the question of the composition of the Central Legislature, and to further
consideration of outstanding points of detail. An agreed recommendation on the com-
position of the Central Legislature had now been received from Nigeria to the effect
that there should be a Single Chamber Legislature and that the representation of the
Northern Region should be equal to that of the other two regions combined. Joined to
this was the recommendation that there should be six representatives of special inter-
ests in the Legislature. There would probably be in the near future an announcement
that H.M. Government accepted the two major recommendations regarding the com-
position of the Central Legislature, but this would not include any reference to the
number of members for special interests recommended and if the firms wished to
make further representations on this point it was now open to them to do so. As
regards representation in the Regional Legislatures, no recommendation has yet been
received from Nigeria and until it had been received there was no question of the
Secretary of State taking any decision. When such recommendation was received it
would be communicated to the representatives of the commercial interests and they
would have effective opportunity of making representations to the Secretary of State
if they wished before the final decision was taken.
The question was raised whether in the event of there being nominated members
in the Regional Legislatures and one of those nominated members being elected by
the Regional House to represent it in the Central Legislature, he would count as one
of the six special representatives in the Central Legislature. No final view was
expressed on this point, but it was generally considered reasonable that he should be
regarded solely as a representative of the region.
After discussion the firms agreed to an expression of opinion that six members were
adequate in the Central Legislature. It was understood that the Governor was at lib-
erty to nominate persons other than Europeans to these seats but what the Governor
had in mind was primarily the nomination of European business men who would be
able to bring to the debate their expert knowledge of commercial and mining affairs.
2 See 116.
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The meeting then discussed the question of writing a non-discrimination clause
into the Constitution. Sir John Macpherson said that he felt that the Ceylon clause
was not suitable for Nigeria owing to its emphasis on religion and that the chapter in
the Government of India Act 1945 was also inappropriate and too long. This was
generally agreed and it was further agreed that the clause should be wide, general
and short. The representatives of the firms said that they attached much importance
to such a clause appearing in the Constitution and asked for the opportunity of being
consulted upon it before the final decision was reached.
The question of an Economic Advisory Committee was briefly discussed. It was sug-
gested that such a Committee might give useful support and protection to Ministers
subject to outside pressures. The Governor said that he was not at present clear about
the composition and functions of the Committee which the representatives of the
firms had in mind and it was agreed that they should let him have their views in greater
detail on these points. It was agreed that any such Committee would be outside the
Constitution and that its value would lie in the opportunity which it would give to
experts in economic affairs to partake in an advisory service, the benefit of whose
advice would at all times be available to the Government.
Mr. Mellor on behalf of the commercial interests expressed their appreciation of
the opportunity which had been given them to discuss these matters with the
Governor.
123 CO 537/5787, no 85 14 Nov 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from A B Cohen to H M Foot on the
functions of ministers under the proposed new constitution
In my letter of the 10th October about the Constitution I said that we should be
writing again on the subject of the functions of Ministers, as we had considerable
doubt about the proposal to retain the present Central Secretariat largely in its
present form. We have now had the opportunity of further discussion with the
Governor on this point, and as our doubts are still not resolved I think it best that I
should put them to you in some detail.
2. Perhaps I might clear the ground at the start by saying that in the case of
Central Ministers for regional subjects, and in the case of Regional Ministers, we
agree that there should be no need for the system of Permanent Secretaries; and
what follows in this letter applies only to the Central Ministers for central subjects. It
has been agreed that the functions of a Minister are:—
(a) initiation of discussion of policy in the Council;
(b) introducing into the House and answering therein all business affecting his
subject or subjects;
(c) ensuring in co-operation with the executive Head of the Department concerned
that the decisions of the Council, as they affect his subject, are carried out.
On pages 8 and 9 of your secret and personal letter of the 22nd September,1 you have
emphasised that the principal function of a Minister is to participate in taking
1 See 118.
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decisions on policy in the Council of Ministers as a whole, rather than to fulfil
ministerial functions as we understand them in this country in the direction of his
department or group of departments. On this assumption you go on to explain that
Secretariat files would not normally be circulated to Ministers, but that they would
be briefed by the branch of the Secretariat concerned as may be necessary for
carrying out their functions under (a) (b) and (c) above. You also emphasised that
decisions of the Councils must be communicated to Departments by Secretariats and
not by Ministers.
3. We find it very difficult to see how this could be expected to work smoothly in
practice for very long. Under the distribution of subjects which you have suggested in
your letter of the 22nd September, four of the six Ministers for central subjects would
be responsible for a group of departments and not, as in the case of the other two, for
a single department. Each of these four would, therefore, be served not by a single
officer or even branch of the Secretariat but by several officers or branches, and for
purposes of co-ordination he would have a Secretary who by reason of his seniority
could be in fact little more than a Private Secretary. We can see that as regards
function (a) above, the Minister should normally be able, with the aid of briefing
from the Secretariat and discussion with his Heads of Department, to initiate and
carry on in the Council of Ministers discussion on policy matters relating to his
subjects. He should also be able under function (b) to deal in the House with subjects
which have previously reached Council of Ministers’ level. But there are a
multiplicity of matters in the day to day administration of the Government which,
though important, do not reach the level of high policy which would require
discussion in the Council of Ministers, and must in fact be disposed of without
reference to that Council unless it is to be hopelessly clogged with work. It is in this
respect that we see difficulties arising and a conflict of functions developing. Such
matters are not all within the competence of the Heads of Branches of the
Secretariat; they may under the present organisation need reference to the Chief
Secretary or even to the Governor. Under the new dispensation to whom is this
reference to be made? Is it to be to the Minister and, if necessary, through him to the
Governor; or is it to be along present channels in the Secretariat to the Chief
Secretary or Financial Secretary as the case may be? And if it is to be one of the latter,
in what way is the Minister to be kept in touch if the matter is decided without
reference to the Council of Ministers? He may well have to deal with such a subject in
the House or to answer questions on it. He is not going to be in an easy position if the
matter has been settled round and over him, nor is he likely to take kindly to
discussing and answering questions on subjects in the discussion of which he has not
participated and the decision on which has been taken without consulting him.
4. Something of the same difficulty seems to us to arise on what I may perhaps
call the downward traffic of business under function (c). The Minister will have par-
ticipated in the policy decision in the Council of Ministers, but according to your plan
the policy decision is communicated by the Secretariat direct to the Department con-
cerned and not by the Minister (or apparently on his authority). It is not going to be
easy for him to ensure that the policy decision is in fact being put into execution. If he
neither conveys the decision himself nor has access to Secretariat files in which
progress will presumably be recorded, in the absence of these records he will be in the
position of having either to depend on his memory or to confine his actions under
function (c) to cases in which the Secretariat thinks fit to prompt him into action.
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5. The combined effect of all these considerations seems to us to be that it is
unlikely that the system of ministerial responsibility, even in the modified form
which you have in mind, will run harmoniously in practice side by side with the
present centralised Secretariat hierarchy; or that Ministers themselves will be
content to operate under these conditions for very long. It seems to us that the
restriction which you wish to impose on the activities of Ministers individually, as
opposed to Ministers in Council, could be effectively maintained even after the
Secretariat was reorganised into a system of Permanent Secretaries, bearing in mind
that the three most important portfolios, whose functions extend over the activities
of all Departments of the Government, remain in official hands. We cannot help
feeling on the other hand, that the continued existence of the Central Secretariat in
its present form will be irksome to Ministers from the outset, and that you will before
long be forced into reorganisation with Permanent Secretaries in the case of Central
Ministries for Central Subjects.
6. I have gone into this rather fully because it is our unanimous feeling at the
official level here, from Lloyd downwards, that the system which you have in mind is
not likely to endure for long, and that you would be well advised to consider very
carefully before final conclusions are reached whether it would not be better to
reorganise the Secretariat, to provide Permanent Secretaries for the Ministers for
central subjects, at the inception of the new Constitution.
124 CO 537/5787, no 88 20 Nov 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter (reply) from H M Foot to A B Cohen on
the functions of ministers under the proposed new constitution
Thank you for your letter No. 30453 of the 14th of November about the functions of
Ministers under our new constitution.1 I notice that in this letter you deal only with
Central Ministers and their relation with the Central Secretariat, but the same
considerations apply to Regional Ministers and Regional Secretariats and I should
like to get the further views of Chief Commissioners on the most important points
which you raise. This I shall do, but as I am just off to the Cameroons for ten days I
am making this reply to your letter at once and I shall write again when Chief
Commissioners’ comments come in.
I wish that we could discuss the issues which your letter raises rather than write
about them for I believe that they are of fundamental importance and it is difficult to
deal with them in correspondence without writing at great length. If, as I now expect,
I get home in January or February next I look forward to a full discussion with you
then.
I don’t think that it will be irrelevant to go back to first principles. The path of
Colonial constitutional advance is already well-trodden and the various stages are
now fairly well accepted. First the Legislatures are made more representative, then
elected rather than nominated members are admitted to Executive Councils and
then gradually the elected members are given duties and powers in regard to
departments or subjects in order to train them to become Ministers in the sense
1 See 123.
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understood in Great Britain. I believe that there will be the greatest danger,
particularly in West African conditions, if an attempt is made to telescope these
stages. The road to a full ministerial system must in my opinion lie through the
experience in joint responsibility gained in Council. We are all confident here that
good decisions can and will come from Councils with Nigerian majorities. But we
definitely have not yet got enough individual Nigerians with the experience and
integrity to exercise the very wide measure of administrative authority which a
Minister exercises in England. I am convinced that if at one jump we try to create a
system under which Nigerian Ministers exercise such responsibility we shall fail, and
the results of all the good work which has been done and is being done will be
brought down. The purpose must surely be to move gradually towards a full
Ministerial system through a conciliar system. In the first stage the emphasis should
be on the importance and power of the Councils and not on the importance and
power of the individual Ministers. Never before, as far as I know, has an attempt been
made in a Colonial territory to give full Ministerial powers at one jump and I am
quite certain that it would lead to disaster if we attempted it here.
I believe that this view is generally acceptable to responsible Nigerian opinion.
When I put the direct question to the Nigerians on the Constitutional Drafting
Committee whether they wanted decisions on policy to be taken in the Councils or
by individual Ministers they all unhesitatingly replied that they wanted the Councils
to decide policy. I believe that the same answer would be given by any thinking group
of Nigerians.
You may think that the Ministers who emerge under our new constitution will
object to our system. That is a danger, but I feel sure that it can be averted. We
should not of course be negative and restrictive in defining their duties: rather we
should emphasize that their duties are not restricted to their subjects but that their
main and overriding duty is to take part as equal members in discussion of all
questions of policy which come before the Councils.
In thinking about these matters I have tried not to be unduly influenced by my
experience in Jamaica but there, with full Colonial Office approval, we set our faces
against giving Ministers wide executive responsibilities in the early stages. We took
the line that they must first learn to exercise joint responsibility in the Council. If we
had not done so I believe that constitutional advance would have completely broken
down in Jamaica long ago—and as far as political experience is concerned the West
Indies are far ahead of West Africa.
Here the functions of Ministers have been clearly defined in the recommendations
of the Ibadan Conference and those recommendations have been accepted by the
Secretary of State, so you may say that this discussion of general principle is
unnecessary. I do think, however, that it is vital to remember what we are attempting
at this stage. We are attempting to work a system whereby policy is decided in a
Council of Ministers at the centre and Executive Councils in the Regions, with
Central and Regional Ministers exercising functions in the Councils and Legislatures
and also exercising functions in regard to the carrying out of the policy decided in
the Councils. Under the agreed definition of Ministers’ powers Ministers are not to
make or decide policy except as members of the Councils, and their executive
function is limited to ensuring that the Council’s decisions or policy are carried out.
That is the system we propose to carry out and the system naturally has the most
direct and important bearing on Government organisation.
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In considering what changes in Government organisation are necessary it is surely
wise to study what has been done in other territories in which advanced constitutions
are operated. We didn’t alter the Secretariat organisation in Jamaica when the 1944
constitution was introduced nor, I believe, was the Secretariat organisation in the Sudan
altered when they introduced their new constitution a year or two ago. The fact that we
are proposing to work a conciliar system, rather than a ministerial system on the U.K.
model, makes it essential, we think, that the existing Secretariats should be maintained
for the present. The strain which is to be imposed on the official machine by all the
changes to be made in the next few years, including particularly the huge task of region-
alisation, is very great and I think that it would be the gravest mistake to reorganise the
whole of our Secretariat system just when that increased strain is coming.
I think that you may over-estimate the number of decisions which will have to be
taken in the Secretariats under the new system (other than on the subjects which are
the responsibility of the official members of the Councils). Policy decisions will be
taken in the Councils and on every-day departmental matters there need and should
not be many questions which cannot be settled by a Head of the Department in
consultation with his Minister. Our present Central Secretariat is made up of four
main branches. The Political (and security) branch and the Finance branch must be
maintained for they will have more rather than less to do in future. The Civil Service
Commission will presumably become the servant of the new Public Service
Commission. That leaves only the Development branch and this branch is mainly
occupied not with giving day to day decisions on departmental affairs but in dealing
with policy matters which will in any event have to go to the Council of Ministers.
When once policy has been decided there will be no need for reference from the
Departments to the Secretariat: the carrying out of the agreed policy will be a matter
for the Minister and the Head of the Department.
If, as I say, the Political (and security) branch of the Secretariat and the Finance
branch must in any event be maintained (the Civil Service Commission being also
retained as a separate entity) you will appreciate what a great increase in headquarters
staff would be required if new Ministries were to be created for all the Central Ministers.
The existing Development branch could not be entirely disbanded and we should there-
fore have to find most of the new under-secretaries and the staff to work under them
from outside our present Secretariat. We are already alarmed at the increased costs
which the new Councils and Legislatures will involve. Regionalisation of the depart-
ments will also lead to increased costs (e.g. in increased housing and office accom-
modation at Regional headquarters) and, although our objection to the immediate
creation of new Ministries is not mainly financial, we are naturally most anxious to
avoid still greater additional expenditure arising from the constitutional changes.
I also think that you may under-estimate the value of the close association which
should exist between Ministers and Heads of Departments dealing with their
subjects. I expect Ministers to be in the closest contact with Heads of Departments
and to get most of their briefing direct from them. The Minister would get his
information of progress and development in Departmental work much better from
them than from Secretariat files.
As to communication of decisions of the Councils to the Departments I really don’t
see that there need be any objection to this being done by Secretariats. The decisions
are those of the Council and delay and possibly confusion might arise if
communication of these decisions to Departments were left to Ministers.
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The system I advocate worked perfectly well in Jamaica. We intended to create at a
second stage a system of permanent under-secretaries in the Secretariat whose
subjects would correspond to those of Ministers (without setting up separate
Ministries) and it may be that by now they have made some progress in that direction
but I assure you from my own practical experience that we should have come to grief
if we had attempted to split the Secretariat as they are doing in the Gold Coast when
we introduced the 1944 Jamaica constitution.
I well appreciate that a system of official undersecretaries must be contemplated in
the future but that should come at a subsequent stage and not at the stage we intend
to operate at first which, as I have emphasized, is based on the responsibility of the
Councils rather than individual Ministers deciding policy.
You say that a Minister under the system we propose might feel that matters were
being settled ‘round and over him.’ I don’t think that any such situation need arise.
The Ministers will know that policy decisions are taken in the Councils of which they
are members. They will have their work cut out to keep abreast of the many and
varied subjects with which the Councils have to deal. They will be in close and
constant contact with Heads of Departments dealing with their subjects. They will
have to familiarise themselves with a wide range of departmental problems, and,
quite apart from their duties in the Councils and the Legislatures (the Councils will
meet frequently), they will have to work out plans with Heads of Departments for
carrying out approved policy, tour and inspect departmental work and institutions,
receive deputations and sit on various committees. I think that they will have quite
as much to do as they can manage and I do not think that they would wish to spend a
lot of their time working on files in a Ministry.
All my instinct and experience leads me to believe that in Government machinery
as in political development we should not destroy what we know can work, but that
rather we should proceed gradually, changes in Government organisation keeping
pace step by step with constitutional advance. The splitting of Secretariats and
setting up of separate Ministries should, I feel convinced, not be attempted now.
I have made several references to experience in Jamaica and I hope that you won’t
therefore think that the proposals I have made are some fad of my own. Marshall and
Pleass and all the Regional representatives I have already consulted are of the same
opinion as I am.
125 CO 537/5787, no 86A 24–27 Nov 1950
[Constitutional review]: minutes by A B Cohen and Sir T Lloyd on a
draft letter to H M Foot concerning the selection of ministers under
the new constitution
Sir T Lloyd
A letter to the Acting Governor of Nigeria is required in reply to his letter of the 20th
October (78),1 in which he puts forward the arguments as he sees them in favour of
sticking to the proposal of the General Conference at Ibadan that regional and
central Ministers should be elected by the respective Legislatures. Sir J Macpherson
1 See 121.
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has not yet taken a definite view on this matter himself. He has told us that Mr.
Foot’s views on this are primarily his personal views and it is clear that he (Sir J
Macpherson), although he has not made up his mind, sees a great deal of force in our
arguments in favour of the appointment of of Ministers by the Governor and
Lieutenant Governor in consultation with members of the Legislature.
The Secretary of State has already in paragraph 8 of his published despatch of the
15th July2 set out the case for the appointment of Ministers not by election but by
consultation between the Governor and the Lieutenant Governor and the
Legislatures, and has argued in favour of giving the Governor and Lieutenant
Governor a definite say in this process. We had been hoping that the Nigerian
Government would now work out a procedure to give effect to the Secretary of
State’s decision, but this has not so far been done because of the doubts expressed in
Mr. Foot’s letter. I do not propose in this minute to summarise the arguments
against Mr. Foot’s view. The two most important ones are:—
(1) Since the Governor (and Lieutenant Governors in the Regions) will be
ultimately responsible for the administration, it is wrong that they should have no
say in the selection of Ministers. This seems to us to be of great importance as a
matter of principle.
(2) The adoption of election in Nigeria would be gravely embarrassing to the Gold
Coast, where we have insisted that the Governor should have a say in the
appointment of Ministers. As Sir C Arden-Clarke says in his letter of the 25th October
(79), it was only after the most careful consideration that the conclusion was reached
that election of Ministers by the Legislature should be ruled out.3 There is to my
mind no real force in Mr. Foot’s argument in paragraph 6 of (78) that the semi-
federal character of the Nigerian constitution would justify a different practice in this
respect from the Gold Coast. My own view is that the time has come to make it clear
to Mr. Foot that we are not prepared to accept his arguments in favour of the election
of Ministers. This point is covered in paragraph 10 of Mr. Gorsuch’s draft which,
while not conveying an absolutely final decision, states that the Secretary of State
would find it most difficult to depart from the view which he has already expressed.
I submit for approval Mr. Gorsuch’s draft, which seems to me an admirable
statement of our case.
A.B.C.
24.11.50
S. of S.
This draft maintains the line taken, with your approval, in para 8 of no 52.4
It is important to do that both on merits and because the election of ministers in
Nigeria would be most embarrassing to the Gold Coast.
This draft does not convey a decision but (see para 10) presses Mr Foot to accept
our view.5
T.K.L.
27.11.50
2 See 116.
3 For the handling of this issue in the Gold Coast, cf BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I,
60 and 64. For the organisation of ministries in the Gold Coast, cf, ibid, 82.
4 See 116. 5 For the final version see 126.
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126 CO 537/5787, no 87 28 Nov 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from A B Cohen to H M Foot on the
selection of ministers under the new constitution
We have been giving very careful consideration to the arguments set out in your
letter of the 20th October on the subject of the selection of Ministers.1 I need hardly
say at the outset that we fully share your anxiety to avoid disagreement on this
important subject, with the consequences which it might have, especially when, as
you say, it has been found easy to achieve agreement on nearly all the main
recommendations. But apart from any views which we may hold on the principle
which is at stake, we have to bear in mind the warning which Arden-Clarke has given
us in his letter of the 25th October, of repercussions in the Gold Coast. I must,
therefore, necessarily write at some length to you.
It will help to define the issues more clearly if I say, first of all, that in the light of
the arguments which you have adduced there is one change which we should like to
suggest to you in the procedure for the selection of Ministers which was put forward
for consideration in paragraph 7 of my letter of the 10th October.2 We are impressed
by the passage on pages 4 and 5 of your letter which deals with the task that
confronts the Regional House when it has been constituted and assembles for the
first time. As you say, there will have to be found from the Regional House (a) the
Regional Ministers, (b) the bloc which will represent the region in the Central
Legislature and (c) the four Central Ministers. It seems to us that there are strong
arguments in favour of all three things being done as one process. It may well be
argued that the questions who should be the Ministers in the region and who should
be the Regional Ministers at the centre should be for decision not only at the same
time but by the region itself. It might well be, for instance, that a man who was well
suited to be a Central Minister could not undertake the task, although he might find
it possible to accept a regional ministry; and subject always to the Governor’s
concurrence, it seems to be for the region to dispose of its available resources in the
way in which it thinks best. If the Ministers for the centre are selected by an
authority who is not essentially of the region, there may grow up a tendency (which
will increase with the degree of devolution to the region) to keep the best men in the
region, and this may apply both to Ministers and to representatives.
I should like, therefore, to modify the proposals made in my letter of the 10th
October to the extent of substituting the suggestion that it should be laid down in
the constitution that Regional Ministers will be selected by the Lieutenant-Governor
in consultation with the Regional House, and that the four Central Ministers from
the region should be selected by the Governor on the recommendation of the
Lieutenant-Governor after consultation with the Regional House. The procedure
would then be that there would be consultation between the Lieutenant-Governor
and the Regional House in which the choice of both the Regional Ministers and the
four Central Ministers would be made; the Lieutenant-Governor would then consult
the Governor about the latter and obtain his concurrence; and the appointment of
the four Central Ministers would then be confirmed by resolution in the Regional
House. It seems to us on further consideration that this is a better arrangement than
1 See 121. 2 Not printed.
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hiving off the bloc which is to go to the Central Legislature from the Regional House,
and leaving the Governor thereafter to deal with that bloc in regard to the selection
of Central Ministers.
It may be argued that if the selection of the Central Ministers were entrusted to
the Regional House to this extent it might cause those Ministers to go to the centre
with a feeling that they had a purely regional mandate in their pocket; and that this
would militate against the feeling of unity at the centre which you are so anxious to
create. There is, we feel, no doubt that in the Council of Ministers the individual
Minister would feel himself under an obligation to speak for and protect his own
regional interests, but this seems natural and unavoidable whatever the method may
be of choosing him. On the other hand the tendency would be strongly corrected by
the very nature of his work at the centre. He would have, both in the Council of
Ministers and in the Legislature, to speak for and answer questions on subjects
referring to all parts of Nigeria, on some of which his own region might be concerned
little if at all; for instance, a Minister from the west might have to debate and answer
questions on postal and telegraphic communications in the north or east, and so on.
The effect of this would be to instill into Ministers a ‘Nigerian’ habit of thought; and
indeed it is the Nigerian-wide nature of their responsibilities which provides the
justification for the arrangement whereby a Central Minister whose appointment
derives from the region or the regional bloc is removable by a vote of the whole
Central Legislature.
I now come to the main point at issue between us, i.e. whether Ministers should be
elected or whether they should be selected. Before commenting, in the light of the
change in our proposals explained above, on the arguments in favour of the former
course set out in your letter, I should like to restate certain principles which seem to
us to be basic to the argument. However he may be chosen, a Minister, whether in
the region or at the centre, must inevitably have a dual responsibility; he must be
responsible to the Lieutenant-Governor or Governor so long as the latter retains the
ultimate responsibility for the administration, and at the same time he is responsible
to the Legislature. That being so, is it not desirable that both parties should bear a
share of the responsibility for choosing him? If the Minister looks solely to his
Legislature for appointment, does it not materially weaken the authority of the
Governor or Lieutenant-Governor to enforce responsibility on him? Secondly, we
ought to bear in mind the criteria which should govern the selection of a Minister.
He should have ability and integrity; he should be able to work as a member of a team
(we note how much you place the emphasis on the Minister functioning as one of a
circle of counsellors rather than as the holder of a particular portfolio); and he
should be likely to be acceptable both to the region and, if he is a Central Minister, to
the Central House. One question which I think we must ask ourselves is whether the
combination of these criteria is more likely to be achieved by a process of selection,
by consultation or by the hazards of an election. May there not be men who by virtue
of their qualities would command the confidence both of the Governor or the
Lieutenant-Governor and of the House, but who might fail to obtain election to
ministerial rank because they lacked the ephemeral quality of popular appeal?
Thirdly, if a Minister has obtained his position by election, might not difficulties arise
if the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor found it necessary to move for his
demotion? In a case where the Minister had fallen short in his observance of the
prescribed rules of conduct (which would have been laid down by the Governor) or
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was guilty of disloyalty in regard to collective responsibility, it would in all
probability be easier to secure assent to his speedy and discreet removal if the
responsibility for his original appointment had been shared and had not lain entirely
on one side. On the other hand, if the Minister in question had been elected, the
regional bloc might feel it incumbent on them to justify him and oppose his removal.
I now come to the detailed arguments in your letter. We appreciate the point in
paragraph 3 that nomination is disliked by Nigerian politicians, but we doubt
whether a system which begins with consultation and culminates in an affirmative
resolution by the House could be justly regarded as coming under that description.
Indeed we hope that as the system proposed gives the Regional Houses in practice a
very big say in the disposition of their representatives, it will be more palatable to
Nigerians as a whole and enable them to accept the constitutional provision that
appointment shall be formally by the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, as the case
may be, in consultation with them. It would also have the great advantage of
preserving the position vis-à-vis the Gold Coast.
You have suggested in paragraph 6 that the federal nature of the Nigerian
constitution should make it possible to justify a difference in practice between
Nigeria and the Gold Coast. We fully agree that considerable differences in the
structure of the constitution are inevitable and that so far as variations in practice
are imposed by that difference of structure they can be justified. But this appears to
us to be a simple matter of principle, and we do not see how it would be possible to
justify the necessity for such differing systems of appointment of Ministers.
In paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of your letter you have referred to the difficulties and
embarrassments which might arise if the names put forward by the Governor or
Lieutenant-Governor were rejected. We should hope that prior consultation would as
a rule avoid this possibility, though we realise that it is not always possible to be
certain about it. But in any case we do not see that the Governor or Lieutenant-
Governor would be in a worse position if some of his original choices had fallen by
the way than if he had to deal with a Council which had been constituted by election
without his having any say at all in the choice of candidates. Under the latter system
it might happen, at the worst, that in the building up of mutual confidence between
himself and his Council he would have to start from scratch, with Ministers many of
whom he would not himself have voluntarily proposed for appointment.
As regards paragraphs 11 and 12, we realise the difficulties over consultation with
bodies of the size of the Regional Houses; but whichever system of appointing
Ministers may be adopted, the first business of those Houses must be to choose the
regional bloc for the Central Legislature and we believe that it should not be too
difficult for the Lieutenant-Governors to consult with some of the leading members
of the House who would themselves take the general view. The objection raised in
your paragraph 13 to allowing the Legislatures to remove a Governor’s nominee is, I
think, met by what I have said about nomination above; under the arrangement
proposed the Legislature would share with the Governor the responsibility for the
original appointment of the Minister. Similarly as regards your paragraph 14, the
responsibility for having appointed Ministers of poor calibre would be shared.
We have now, I think, set out fully the arguments on either side. You will
remember that in paragraph 8 of his published despatch of the 15th July,3 the
3 See 116.
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Secretary of State made the suggestion that the aim should be to arrive at a
procedure under which members of the Council of Ministers and of the Regional
Executive Councils should be selected by a process of consultation. We have,
therefore, thought it advisable to bring the subsequent correspondence to the
Secretary of State’s notice. He has asked me to let you know that he will reserve a
final decision until you have had the opportunity of considering and replying to this
letter after such consultation with your advisers as you may think necessary. At the
same time he wishes you to know that he would find it most difficult to depart from
the view which he has expressed in his despatch and that he is strongly reinforced in
this feeling by the representation which Arden-Clarke has made. He very much
hopes, therefore, that on further consideration you will find it possible to fall in with
the proposal that the method of selection rather than election shall be adopted for
the appointment of Ministers in Nigeria.
I have sent copies of this letter to Macpherson and to Arden-Clarke.
127 CO 537/5787, no 89 7 Dec 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from A B Cohen to H M Foot on the
functions of ministers under the proposed new constitution
Many thanks for your secret letter of the 20th November about the secretariat
arrangements under the new constitution.1 It is very good of you to have set your
views out so fully and, like you, I wish that we could discuss it. I shall certainly look
forward to doing so in February.
2. I note that you are obtaining the views of Chief Commissioners and we shall
look forward to hearing from you again when you have done so. But, as I said in
paragraph 2 of my letter of the 14th November,2 we are not suggesting that there
should be Permanent Secretaries or Under-Secretaries in the regional secretariats. It
may be useful, therefore, if I reply to your letter now.
3. Reading through my letter again and your reply I feel that I might have set the
position out as we saw it rather more clearly and that I must have given you the
impression that we were basing our arguments in favour of what we suggest as much
on political as on administrative grounds. There are admittedly political arguments
in favour of the course we have suggested, as my letter makes clear; but our view is
based primarily on administrative arguments. We of course entirely accept that the
position of Ministers is to be different in Nigeria from what it is to be in the Gold
Coast; that has been settled by the Secretary of State’s acceptance of the
recommendations of the Ibadan conference. It was not our intention to suggest that
the functions of central Ministers dealing with non-regional subjects should be
enlarged. We were addressing ourselves simply to the problem of providing the best
administrative machinery to enable these Ministers to carry out their function,
which each of them will have, of ‘ensuring in co-operation with the executive head of
the department concerned that the decisions of the Council as they affect his subject
are carried out’.
1 See 124. 2 See 123.
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4. Put very briefly, the difficulty which we see about the Nigerian Government’s
proposals is that, whereas on the one hand each of the nine members of the Council
of Ministers responsible for non-regional subjects (i.e. including the three ex officio
members) will have responsibility for his own group of subjects (although this
responsibility in the case of the African Ministers will be confined to ensuring that
the decisions of the Council are carried out), on the other hand when you come to
the administrative level there will be certain officers in the secretariat who, although
they will be dealing with the subjects with which the African Ministers are
concerned, will not be part of the staffs of those Ministers. I understood from the
Governor in discussion that there would in fact be officers at Principal Assistant
Secretary level in the secretariat dealing with each of the groups of subjects allotted
to African Ministers. To whom will these secretariat officers be responsible? They
must be responsible to some member of the Council, just as the Cabinet Secretariat
here is responsible to the Prime Minister. I take it that in fact they will be responsible
to the Chief Secretary. If so, the position will be that while Ministers are working
with departments on their own subjects, there will be Secretariat officials working on
the same subjects who will be responsible not to those Ministers but to another
member of the Council of Ministers, i.e. the Chief Secretary. The Cabinet Secretariat
system works effectively here because the officials in it are simply concerned with the
conduct of Cabinet business and not with policy. Knowing as I do the very important
part which Secretariat officers at present necessarily play in advising on policy, I do
not see how you can simply convert them into the equivalent of members of the
Cabinet Secretariat here. If I am right in thinking that you cannot, and indeed
should not at this stage, then it seems to us that, even allowing for the relatively
limited functions of Ministers proposed under the new constitution, you are in
danger of laying up administrative trouble, as well perhaps as political trouble, by
keeping officers dealing with Ministers’ subjects outside the Ministers’ own
organisations.
5. You suggest that we may have underestimated the value of the close
association which should exist between Ministers and heads of departments dealing
with their subjects. I can assure you that we have not overlooked this fact. Indeed it
is just because of the obvious importance which attaches to this association that we
have felt serious doubts about keeping the secretariat officers also dealing with these
subjects outside rather than inside the Ministers’ organisations.
6. I think that you ought to know also that as far as we are aware there is no
precedent for what you are suggesting in Nigeria except in Jamaica. The system
which you are proposing to adopt was not adopted in India, nor in the Sudan. The
Sudan secretariat, as you know, was divided into three parts before the new
constitution under the Civil Secretary, the Financial Secretary and the Legal
Secretary. I am told that the new ministries set up under Sudanese Ministers are
quite independent in accordance with the normal arrangements.
7. When we discussed this question with the Governor here we agreed that, since
it was he and the Nigerian Government who had to work the system, it must
ultimately be for him to decide what machinery should be established. He for his
part, however, agreed that we ought to let you know our doubts about your proposals
and that was the purpose of my letter of the 14th November. If, after you have
considered the matter further in the light of your consultation with Chief
Commissioners and have taken into account what I have said above, it is finally
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decided to adhere to your proposals, we shall not seek to argue the matter further. I
have, however, thought it right to set out the position as we see it again because, as
you know, all of us at the official level who have handled the matter here believe that,
if the proposed system is introduced, it will be found after a short time—and by that
I do not mean a period of years but one of say a year or a year and a half—that it is in
fact after all necessary to break up the secretariat and to provide Ministers with
Permanent Secretaries, or Under-Secretaries or Principal Assistant Secretaries or
whatever you like to call them. Our contention therefore is that it would be better to
do this at the start.
8. I am afraid you may feel that this is just another of those theories of what
Milverton3 once called ‘the intellectual dreamers of Whitehall’. However that may be,
I can assure you that, whatever the Nigerian Government decides to do and whether
you go on with the present Secretariat system or modify it, once a decision has been
taken we at this end will of course do everything we can to help make it a success.
9. Finally may I say that I had hoped to have a talk with the Governor on this
subject, but he had a bad cold on the day we had arranged for this and has now gone
off to Scotland. I did, however, tell him very briefly how we felt and repeated the
point I have just made, namely that we felt that it must be left to him to decide on the
machinery to be established after he had considered our comments in the light of
local views. I am sending him a copy of this letter.
3 ie Sir Arthur Richards, cr Baron Milverton of Lagos and Clifton, 1947.
128 CO 537/6782, no 1 15 Dec 1950
[Anti-communist propaganda]: CO note of a meeting held to discuss
measures to counter communist propaganda in Nigeria
Mr. Cooper1 underlined the urgency and importance of the problem of providing
material to counter Communist propaganda material which was now arriving in
Nigeria in large quantities. In recognition of the need the Nigerian Government was
making additional funds available to the Public Relations Office for the purchase and
preparation of suitable material, but in addition assistance would be required from
London.
During discussion the following points emerged:—
1. The appeal of communist propaganda in Nigeria
(a) Africans are impressed by Soviet successes in world affairs.
(b) Propaganda about race equality in Russia is effective, particularly in view of
the African’s awareness of the racial policy of South Africa, a member of the
Commonwealth.
(c) There is much value to Communist propaganda in the ‘strong man’
personality of Stalin.
(d) While Africans are probably not much interested in Communist ideology, they
are likely to be influenced by Communist propaganda alleging that Russia will
help them to gain independence.
1 Public Relation Officer for the Nigerian government.
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2. Counter-propaganda themes. The following themes should be exploited:—
(a) Russian imperialism and aggression and enslavement of free peoples and
nations.
(b) Britain’s record in the creation of Sovreign [sic] States.
(c) Nigeria’s future place as a sovereign [sic] state within the Western system.
3. ‘Angling’ of publicity material
(a) Anti-Communist material should not have a pro-British slant, but should
interpret the world situation from an anti-Communist angle, presenting the
‘Western’ rather than the British point of view.
(b) Anti-Communist material should be kept separate from pro-British material.
(e.g. a pamphlet opening with a denigration of Russia and leading up to praise of
Britain would be suspect to Africans).
4. Target. The immediate target should be the intelligentsia.
5. Media
(a) Pamphlets should have priority. They need not necessarily be illustrated, but
should be attractively presented and about 30 to 40 pages. They could be both
distributed free to libraries and reading rooms, and sold to the public at a very low
price.
(b) A book of cartoons would be useful, but caution is necessary in the use of
ridicule.
(c) Mobile film vans reach an audience of about two million a year, but their
impact is on a section of the population below the immediate target.
(d) Broadcasting is still in the early stages, but its influence will grow and should
be well established in about two years time.
6. Trade Unions
(a) Special material is wanted, particularly that published by the I.C.F.T.U.
(b) The T.U.C. has approached the Colonial Office with the suggestion that they
should supply industrial notes for the Colonial press. The most effective way of
ensuring publication of these notes would be for the T.U.C. to supply them direct
to the press in Nigeria.
(c) An I.C.F.T.U. delegation is at present in West Africa.
7. British Council. The British Council is doing invaluable work, particularly in the
all-important field of race relations. Its activities are more acceptable to Africans
than those of Government Departments, and every effort should be made to expand
its activities.
8. Propaganda machinery
(a) The Public Relations Department, Nigeria, should avoid apparent embroilment
in direct anti-Communist propaganda activity since this would prejudice the
success of its primary task of explaining Government to the people. It could best
take action by stimulating anti-Communist propaganda through unofficial
channels. (e.g. the Nigerian Bureau of Publicity has published a pamphlet on
Korea for the Department. The Department is encouraging Nigerian politicians to
establish a ‘Freedom bookshop’.)
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(b) In dealing with Communist propaganda problems in West Africa the
Information Department of the Colonial Office would work through the newly
appointed Adviser on Overseas Information.
(c) Anti-Communist material will have to come mainly from London. It will prob-
ably be necessary to set up an editorial unit as part of the Adviser’s organisation.
(d) Consideration should be given to setting up an organisation in London on
similar lines to the ‘Soviet News’ agency in Rosary Gardens. It might be called
‘Friends of Freedom’. Its functions might include:
(i) Production of counter-material to that despatched to Africa by the ‘Soviet
News’ Agency. In this connection steps should be taken to ascertain the
contents of parcels despatched to Africa by the ‘Soviet News’ agency before they
leave this country.
(ii) Production of a ‘News-letter’
(iii) Production of other anti-Communist material e.g. an anthology from anti-
Communist books such as ‘The God That Failed’.
(iv) Sponsorship of lectures.
(e) In order to make fuller use of Administrative Officers, a confidential guidance
on world issues should be arranged from London for adaptation locally.
(f ) A commentary on current issues (on the lines of the wartime VERITAS) for
publicity use should also be supplied from London.
Action points
(a) Production of a pamphlet showing up Russian imperialism, as in paragraph
4(a). Information Department.
(b) Consideration to be given to the organisation of a service of confidential
guidances. Information Department.
(c) Consideration to be given to the organisation of a commentary on current
issues. Information Department.
(d) Steps to be taken to ascertain the contents of parcels despatched from the
‘Soviet News’ agency. Defence Department (Ref. para 8.(d)(i) above).
(e) Consideration to be given to setting up an organisation on similar lines to the
‘Soviet News’ agency. Information Department
(f ) The approach by the T.U.C. suggesting that they supply industrial notes to the
Colonial press to be followed up. Information Department
(g) Arrangements to be made for the Adviser on Overseas Information to attend
the meeting of the West African Council on the 22nd and 23rd January.
Information Department
(h) A suitable communication to be sent to the West African Governments
outlining the steps already taken or proposed to be taken in providing anti-
Communist material. Information Department
129 CO 537/5790, no 8 30 Dec 1950
[Constitutional review]: letter from H M Foot to A B Cohen on the
electoral system under the new constitution
Since your letter of the 23rd of November about the electoral system under the new
constitution was received full discussions have taken place in the three Regional
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 371
372 MACPHERSON AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW [129]
Houses and we had a meeting here last week with Regional Secretaries to review the
whole position.
I am enclosing copies of the Regional recommendations.1 I doubt if you will wish
to read them all through but a glance at them will show that there is a good deal of
divergence on detail and some major differences.
Following our discussion with Regional Secretaries draft electoral regulations are
being prepared and we shall send you this draft as soon as possible. You will see from
that draft that we are anxious to make the regulations as simple as possible and to
eliminate minor differences between the Regional recommendations, so I do not
propose to go into detail now.
There are, however, one or two major questions which emerge from the Regional
discussions to which I should invite attention at once.
We propose that in each Province there should be a Chief Electoral Officer
(normally the Resident) with Electoral Officers (normally District Officers) and
Returning Officers appointed by him. The Electoral Officers would be given wide
powers to direct how the elections should be conducted and no complaint or appeal
would lie to the Courts or to any authority higher than the Chief Electoral Officer.
The Electoral Officers would, for instance, have power to prescribe the areas in which
the primary elections should take place and the method of conducting the primary
elections (this would enable variation in practice and procedure to meet local
circumstances without the necessity for carrying too much detail in the electoral
regulations).
The method of election in the Provincial or Divisional Electoral Colleges will,
however, be defined more closely in the regulations. The Chief Electoral Officer or an
Electoral Officer will preside in these Colleges where election will be by secret ballot.
The next major point is that in the North and the West there is the strongest
feeling that the well-known and well-understood system of indirect election should
be maintained. I well realise the theoretical objections to the indirect method (and
the other objections mentioned in your letter) but I feel sure that we must accept the
Regional recommendations on this. In the West there will not be more than one
stage between the village elections and the Divisional Electoral College but in the
North, where distances are so great and the population of some of the Provinces is so
large, there will often be several stages.
The other most important point is that in the North and West there is the
strongest determination that there shall be some injection of Native Authority rep-
resentation and that there shall also be some means whereby persons who do not
come up from the village elections are given an opportunity of being elected to the
Regional Houses. The North propose to achieve these purposes by having not more
than 10 per cent N.A. representation in the Provincial Electoral Colleges and by giv-
ing the Colleges freedom to elect to the Regional House anyone who is qualified to
vote in the Province. The West propose to achieve the object by providing that
there shall be a maximum of 50 per cent N.A. representation in the intermediate
colleges (between the village elections and the Divisional Electoral Colleges) and by
giving the intermediate colleges the power to elect not more than 10 per cent of
the representatives to go forward to the Divisional Electoral Colleges from outside
1 Not printed.
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their own number. In the East when the proposal was put forward that Electoral
Colleges should have the power to elect to the Regional House people who were not
members of the Electoral Colleges the proposal was unanimously and firmly turned
down!
It is a pity that these differing proposals look so untidy but the questions of
principle are two—firstly, should there be any N.A. representation in the electing
bodies and, secondly, should the electing bodies be empowered to elect other than
those included in their own number. You have already said that you see no objection
to the second principle. As to the first—participation of N.A. nominees—I told you
that I personally do not favour it in principle but I am now fully convinced that we
must give way on this to Regional opinion (which is not by any means merely
conservative opinion). Many of our legislators are at present elected by the N.As. We
are making a big advance away from that system but I am now persuaded that in the
North and West to deny N.As any participation at all in the coming elections would
be going too far at one jump (the justification for eliminating the N.As altogether in
the East lies, of course, in the fact that the N.As have never played the important role
in the East that they play in the North and West). Moreover if it is accepted that the
N.As may participate I think that we may also agree that in the method of their
participation we should be guided by the wishes strongly—indeed almost
unanimously—urged by the Regional representatives.
I shall not comment further until I can send you the draft regulations which will
make our purposes and proposed methods clearer. I shall them comment in detail on
the points raised in your letter of the 23rd of November. The purpose of this letter is
merely to send you the Regional recommendations and to let you know our reactions
on the most important questions at issue.
130 CO 537/6781, no 3 23–24 Jan 1951
[Communism in West Africa]: minutes of a meeting (item 3) in Accra
of West African governors held to discuss counter-measures against
the spread of communism in West Africa
Coordinated drive against communism
The following general conclusions were reached:—
(i) there was now ample evidence that the Soviet Union as part of a general
campaign was directing propaganda towards British territories in West Africa. This
intention had been explicitly stated in the Cominform press and was confirmed by
the greatly increased quantities of literature arriving in Nigeria and the Gold Coast
since the beginning of December.
(ii) there was no evidence yet of a similar influx of literature into Sierra Leone and
the Gambia and it appeared likely that Nigeria and the Gold Coast had been
selected as targets because of the increase in recent years in nationalist feeling in
those territories.
(iii) the material was being routed generally through Post Office mails both by sea
and air. It was noted that there was no evidence yet of material entering in any
quantities British territories over the land frontier from French West Africa.
(iv) the propaganda material, particularly the periodicals, were extremely
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attractively produced and it is evident that a considerable amount of money is
being spent on this campaign.
(v) in all West African territories there were no Communist organizations of any
significant proportions to whom such propaganda could be directed. There was
however a large and increasing number of literates produced by Governments’
development policy who, in the absence of other material, would provide outlets
for propaganda of this kind. It was agreed that one of the first aims of policy should
be to protect this newly-created reading public from such propaganda.
(vi) the meeting noted that a considerable part of the propaganda was prepared in,
or despatched via, the U.K. The Governors expressed their disquiet that it should
be possible for such material which was subvertive of all our aims in Africa to be
prepared in and despatched from the centre of the Commonwealth without any
counter-action by the authorities in the U.K. They suggested that if such counter-
action were not possible, stops should at least be taken to ensure notice being
given to West African Governments of the despatch and nature of consignments of
communist propaganda from the U.K.
The meeting further examined in greater detail the following aspects of action
against Communism:—
(a) Counter-propaganda in West Africa (see also WAC (51)2)
Opportunity was taken of Mr Ingrams’ visit to West Africa to discuss his future
plans with him.1 The following points were made in the discussion:—
(i) the meeting understood from Mr Ingrams that while agreement had been
given in principle for the provision of funds for counter-propaganda, actual
expenditure was still dependent on Treasury approval of detailed plans. The
Governors expressed the hope that in view of the urgency of inventing a
counter-campaign there would not be undue delay in approving any schemes
put forward and that, having regard to the expenditure being incurred on the
Russian side funds would be made available in adequate amount. They hoped
that should there be delay in reaching a final decision it might be possible to
make an ad hoc beginning in the provision of counter-propaganda material.
(ii) they approved in principle of a suggestion put forward by Mr Ingrams that a
system of ‘panels’ should be set up in the West African territories for the
purpose of advising his organisation on the effectiveness in particular areas of
material issuing from London and of any adaptations of the overall campaign
required to suit varying local conditions and agreed separately to examine the
proposal further in detail.
(iii) they emphasised the importance of counter-propaganda being ‘positive’
rather than ‘negative’ i.e. it should emphasise the advantages presented to Africa
by the opportunities of constitutional advance offered by us. The aim should be
to immunise the West African from a disease threatening him, not to cure him
of a disease from which he was not yet suffering.
(iv) questions of terminology required careful consideration; the use of the
term ‘imperialism’ even bracketed with the word ‘Russian’ was for instance
inadvisable.
1 W H Ingrams, adviser on overseas information, CO, from 1950.
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(v) they welcomed the suggestion for the establishment of an organisation
called ‘the Friends of Freedom’, as suggested in the note on the Colonial Office
meeting of the 15th December (see Appendix II to WAC (51)2).2 They
understood that financial provision for such an organization would be separate
from that already agreed upon for Mr Ingram’s post and that the organization
would appear to be a commercial publishing house. They also agreed that the
organisation might usefully be responsible for the organization of discussion
groups. Such groups would most expediently be started in the U.K. and then be
spread in West Africa as members of U.K. groups returned there.
(vi) they further felt that the conclusions of the meeting of 15th December that
the immediate target should be the intelligentsia required some modification. It
was equally important that attention should be paid to trade unionists. The
‘immediate target’ should in fact cover all persons literate in English.
(vii) they considered it desirable that Governments should see pamphlet
material at the draft stage. Governments would consider points which from the
varying local points of view it would be useful to stress in pamphlets.
(viii) Governors also expressed the hope that any guidance material sent to
them should normally be marked ‘Secret’ rather than ‘Top Secret’ as with the
former grading a Governor would have discretion to decide whether, if it was
useful so to do, he might consult responsible Africans on the local application of
the guidance in question.
(b) Matters arriving out of the Inter-Colony Special Branch Conference,
September, 1950.
(i) Action in regard to communist literature
It was noted that the Secretary of State had in his circular despatch of the 25th
May 1950 expressed the view that there should be the maximum similarity of
practice in regard to subversive publications, at any rate within each geographical
region. It was agreed that in present circumstances in West Africa, the region
within which it was desirable to aim at similarity of practice was confined to
Nigeria and the Gold Coast. The Governor of the Gambia and the representative of
the Governor of Sierra Leone agreed however that should a situation develop in
their territories similar to that now existing in Nigeria and the Gold Coast as far as
the import of subversive literature was concerned it would most probably be
decided to adopt the same practice as at present obtaining in the Gold Coast.
The Governor of Nigeria recognised the desirability of Nigeria and the Gold Coast
keeping in step in these matters. He further agreed that in the present state of
relations with the U.S.S.R. it might well become necessary to ban all communist
literature and all communist activities. The main difficulties which it was felt in
Nigeria, lay in the way of adopting a selective banning of literature were:—
(1) the difficulty of finding a satisfactory test for determining whether or not
individual works should be banned:
(2) the physical work involved in the examination of literature in the quantities
at present being imported to see whether it should be banned or not.
(3) the risk that the adoption of such a policy by Government would antagonise
independent African opinion and so weaken Government’s own position.
2 See 128.
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The Governor of the Gold Coast described present practice in that country. He
suggested that in the present conditions in which all were agreed that the U.S.S.R.
was attempting to subvert established authority in British territories in West
Africa for its own ends, there was a case for banning all material emanating from
known Communist sources. It was not however the policy in the Gold Coast to ban
works on Communism (e.g. those of Lenin) which could be regarded as academic
textbooks. On the other hand, all past and future issues of a periodical which had
once been banned were similarly excluded and these two factors operated to
reduce the physical task of examining intercepted material. As regards the
necessity of keeping independent African opinion on the side of Government he
emphasized that under the Gold Coast legislation the power to prohibit the
importation of publication was exercised by the Governor-in-Council ie by a body
which contained three African members and was under the new Constitution to
contain a much higher proportion of Africans. He added that there had in fact been
little or no public agitation in the Gold Coast against the use at present being
made of these powers.
The Governor of Nigeria undertook to consider the question further on his return
to Nigeria and to inform the other Governors of his final decision. [Action:
Governor of Nigeria.]
(ii) Declaration of prohibited immigrants
The meeting agreed:—
(1) that it would not be practicable to adopt as a policy that whenever one West
African Government declared an individual to be a prohibited immigrant, the
other Governments should automatically follow suit but
(2) that each Government should continue to inform the others whenever it
declared any individual to be prohibited immigrant.
131 CO 583/307/1 2 Feb 1951
[Constitutional review]: minute by A B Cohen on the electoral system
under the proposed new constitution
Sir T Lloyd
The West African Department, Mr. McPetrie and I have been having discussions this
week with Sir H. Foot, Mr. Williams of the Nigerian Secretariat and Mr. de Winton, a
Crown Counsel in Nigeria who is dealing with the drafting of the instruments, about
the Nigerian constitution.1 These discussions have gone very well. We were able to
settle provisionally a number of points of detail and substance and to go through
certain parts of the draft which had been prepared. Mr. McPetrie is going to Nigeria
later in the month and will be taking part there in discussions with the Governor, the
Chief Commissioners and the legal officers concerned with the instruments. As a
result of these discussions I hope that all the outstanding points of principle will be
settled and that the instruments can be completed in time to bring them into force
before the end of June. I may mention here that the Nigerian Government have now
1 J McPetrie, senior legal assistant, CO. See 116.
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accepted our view about the method of appointment of Ministers.2 This will be done,
as we have proposed, by consultation between the Lieutenant Governor and the
members of the Regional Houses at the regional level.
There are certain points in relation to the electoral system which we think should
at this stage be brought to the attention of the Secretary of State and I think that the
Secretary of State will wish to discuss them with Sir H. Foot and the department. I
have provisionally arranged 3.30 p.m. on Thursday, February 8th, when Sir H. Foot
will again be in London. The recent correspondence on this subject is registered at
Nos. 2, 6, 8, 9 on 1950 file, and 1 on this file.
The main points are as follows:—
(1) Method of legislating for the elections
The normal procedure is for a general enabling clause to be contained in the
constitution and for the actual arrangements for election to be laid down by local
Ordinance. This procedure has been followed in the Gold Coast. There are, however,
strong reasons against adopting this procedure in Nigeria arising from the fact that
the new constitution will be semi-federal. In the view of the Nigerian Government it
would be objectionable to give the power to settle the electoral procedure to the
Central Legislature. After lengthy negotiations the North’s claim to have half the
elected seats in the Central Legislature has been conceded and Sir H. Foot informs us
that there will be the strongest objections in these circumstances on the part of the
East and West to allowing the electoral procedure to be settled by the Legislative
Council, since this would in effect place the Northern members in the position of
being able to exercise an almost decisive influence over the arrangements. On the
other hand it would clearly be inappropriate to leave it to each Regional House to
settle the electoral arrangements, seeing that the vast majority of the members of the
Central Legislature are themselves elected by the Regional Houses.
In the circumstances the Nigerian proposal is that the electoral arrangements
should be laid down by the Governor in Council in regulations issued under the
constitution. This fits in well with the conception of the Governor in Council
(Council of Ministers) as not only the chief instrument of policy but also as a sort of
arbitral body between the three Regions. The Governor in Council is going to
perform a similar function in relation to regional legislation, that of deciding
whether it overrides an overall Nigerian interest and should not therefore be
assented to. The Council of Ministers will consist of the Governor as President, six
official members (the Chief Secretary, the Legal Secretary, the Financial Secretary
and the three Lieutenant Governors) and twelve Nigerian members, four drawn from
the members representing each Region in the Central Legislature. It is thus a body
which is fully representative of Nigeria. Another point is that the arrangements for
elections have in fact been prepared after lengthy discussion by Select Committees of
the Regional Houses, so that they are in fact in accordance with the wishes of the
people.
In the circumstances I feel sure that we can accept the Nigerian Government’s
recommendation that the arrangements for elections should be prescribed in this
way. Mr. McPetrie quite agrees. It is proposed, as in the Gold Coast, to have a brief
interim Order in Council in advance of the main instruments under which
2 Sir T Lloyd minuted ‘Good’ in the margin here.
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regulations for electoral preparations may be made at as early a date as possible. This
will allow the arrangements for the elections to go forward quickly. It is hoped that
this Order in Council may be made during April.
(2) Methods of conducting elections
The General Conference at Ibadan proposed that the elections to the Regional
Houses should be indirect through electoral colleges at the divisional level in the
East and West and at the provincial level in the North. It recommended also that the
primary elections in each Region should be direct. In commenting on these
recommendations in his published despatch of the 15th July, the Secretary of State
wrote as follows:—
‘Great importance clearly attaches to the arrangements for the election of
members of the Central and Regional Legislatures and I have noted with
much interest the recommendations of the General Conference on this
matter. I make no comment on the arrangements for the election of members
of the Central Legislature, since a final recommendation on its composition
remains to be made. As regards the Regional Houses of Assembly, it is
proposed that the members should be elected by a system of indirect election
through provincial electoral colleges in the Northern Region and divisional
electoral colleges in the Eastern and Western Regions; that the primary
elections in each Region should be direct; and that the detailed arrangements
should be worked out in each Region and examined by the House of Assembly
of that Region. I do not wish to prejudge this examination, but I would point
out that the representative character of the Regional Houses of Assembly and,
if they are to select the members of the Central Legislature, of that
Legislature itself, will depend ultimately on the primary elections in the
Provinces and Divisions. It is in my view most important that the
arrangements for these primary elections should ensure that the members
elected to the Provincial and Divisional electoral colleges should be genuinely
representative of all the peoples of the areas concerned; that the elections
should be free and fair; and that the form of election should be properly
adapted to the circumstances of each area. For this last reason I welcome the
proposal that the arrangements should in the first instance be worked out in
the Regions themselves; I shall await the results with much interest.’
In dealing with the minority reports the Secretary of State wrote in paragraph 15 of
his despatch as follows:—
‘On the minority reports regarding the system of election, I would point out
that while the Eastern Regional Conference and the Lagos Colony Conference
suggested leaving the method of election to the decision of the regions
themselves, both the Northern and the Western Regional Conferences, as well
as the General Conference, recommended indirect election to the Regional
Houses of Assembly through electoral colleges at the Provincial or Divisional
level. I see no reason to depart from the recommendations of the General
Conference and I do not wish to add to what I have said in paragraph 10 of
this despatch, except to point out that from the point of view of those who are
in favour of direct election, the proposal that the primary elections in each
region should be direct represents an important advance.’
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The three Select Committees of the Regional Houses in the North, East and West
have now submitted virtually unanimous reports (enclosures to No. 8). The Eastern
report has adhered very closely to the recommendations of the Ibadan Conference
and no point arises on that. Elections will be through electoral colleges at the
divisional level and there will only be one tier of colleges in this Region. In the North
and the West, however, the recommendations of the Select Committees have
departed in certain respects from the recommendations of the General Conference.
(3) Electoral Colleges in the North and West
In the West it is proposed that there should be two levels of electoral colleges, the
divisional electoral colleges and the district or intermediate electoral colleges below
them. In the North it is proposed that in addition to the provincial electoral colleges
there should be three lower levels, Emirate Native Authority or divisional colleges,
district colleges and village area colleges. It was, I think, inevitable that, in view of
the relatively primitive nature of most of the Northern Provinces and of the great
size of the Provinces and populations concerned, there should be at any rate one
extra level of electoral college in the North. In my letter of the 23rd November at No.
6 (page 3) I expressed the hope that we should be able to avoid an extra level of
electoral college in the West and that, if an extra level was found necessary in the
North, there would not be more than one. This hope has not been realised; but, in
the light of what Sir H. Foot says in his letter at No. 83 and what he has since told us,
I feel sure that we cannot reasonably oppose the unanimous wish of the Nigerian
representatives in the West and the North. I therefore recommend that we should
accept this particular recommendation.
(4) Native Authority representatives
Both we and the central Nigerian Government would have preferred to avoid special
Native Authority representation in the process of election. There will be no such
special representation in the East, where indeed Native Authorities are very weak. In
the North, however, it is proposed—and this represents a very strongly held view—
that on the provincial (that is the final) electoral colleges there should be
representatives chosen by the Native Authorities and their Council up to a maximum
of 10% of the members of the colleges. This seems to me a very moderate proportion
of the total and I think that we can certainly accept this recommendation.
For the West, however, the position is less easy. The West propose that up to a
maximum of 50% of the district (or intermediate) electoral colleges should be cho-
sen by the Native Authorities. Our view is that this proportion is altogether exces-
sive. There is to be a House of Chiefs, for the first time, in the West with
concurrent powers with the lower Regional House. This House will consist of a cer-
tain number of Obas or Chiefs ex officio and in other areas a representative chosen
by the Native Authorities. It seems to us inappropriate that in addition to this
House of Chiefs the Native Authorities should have a 50% representation in the dis-
trict or intermediate electoral colleges. We fully recognise that this represents the
unanimous recommendation of the Western Select Committee and that it is no
doubt supported by the strong popular regard in the Western Provinces for Chiefs
and Native Authorities. We recognise also that the Native Authorities are them-
selves becoming increasingly representative of the whole community and not only
3 See 129.
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the traditional elements. None the less we think that, if this arrangement is
accepted, it is not going to be at all easy to defend against the strong criticism of
the political elements, who will describe it as undemocratic. Lagos is to be included
in the Western Provinces, with the support of its Yoruba inhabitants but not
entirely to the satisfaction of the others, including the politically-minded Ibos who
live there. It seems to us that this heavy representation of Native Authorities in the
electoral process for the lower House may increase the risk of a rift in the Regional
Legislature between the traditional and more modern elements. Sir H. Foot tells us
that there is already criticism of having an extra level of electoral college and of
having any representation of Native Authorities at all. Our view is that it would be
much better to limit this representation on the district electoral colleges to, say,
25%.
Sir H. Foot entirely supports our view in substance. He shares our objection to the
arrangement proposed by the Western Regional House. But he feels very strongly—
and this represents the view of the Nigerian Government generally—that it would be
a great mistake for the Secretary of State to refuse to accept this recommendation,
which is unanimous. He thinks in particular that this would be a great slap in the
face for the Native Authorities, who are already under pressure from the more
politically-minded elements of the people; there is certainly a great deal of force in
this point. Sir H. Foot thinks that it would be perfectly proper for the Secretary of
State to express his doubts about this arrangement in a published despatch, but he
thinks it important that the Secretary of State should none the less accept it as
having been recommended by the representatives of the people.
It is clear that because of this difference of opinion between ourselves and Sir H.
Foot—it is the only one—the Secretary of State will want to discuss the matter with
us.
(5) Representation of minorities
There is a danger, at any rate in theory, that in certain areas minorities might not be
adequately represented. This is particularly so in the North, where the Province will
be the unit for the final elections to the Regional House. The Northern Select
Committee has specifically rejected the proposal that each tribal area or Emirate
should be given a proportion of the seats on the Regional House for the Province
(para. 16 of first enclosure to No. 8). Thus, in theory at any rate, it might come about
that in the Kano or Sokoto Province all the members elected represented the Kano
or Sokoto Emirates. The pagans in many areas might go unrepresented, while in all
parts of the country stronger minority groups might not get adequate
representation. To some extent this is inevitable under any system. Moreover the
pagans have virtually nobody who could take any useful part in the proceedings of
the Regional Houses. After discussion with Sir H. Foot we all agree that the proper
course is for the Secretary of State to say in a despatch which will be published that
he has noted this problem and that he trusts that those concerned can be relied upon
to give fair representation to the minority groups in their selections. He would go on
to say that, if this does not happen at the first election, it will clearly be necessary to
consider before the second election whether some specific arrangement should be
made for the representation of minorities. I feel sure that this is the right way to deal
with this particular point rather than to attempt to lay down specific arrangements
for the representation of minorities.
X
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(6) Lagos
The present arrangements for election at Lagos will continue and there will be a
direct election from the Municipality to the Western Regional House, the only
modification being that the election would be to that House rather than as at present
to the Central Legislature.
(7) Electoral procedure
In view of the vast size of Nigeria and its backwardness, it is clearly not possible for
the first elections to lay down detailed procedure on the U.K. model. We have always
taken the view that elections must be conducted by methods suitable to the area
concerned and any other arrangement would indeed be impracticable. It is a great
step forward to have elections at all and I am sure that we must support the Nigerian
Government in their view that in most parts of the country a simple and flexible
procedure for elections will be necessary. In some areas—probably in most of the
Eastern Provinces—registration will be adopted, the tax certificates being used. The
same will apply to some towns elsewhere. But generally in the North and East the
village elections on the first occasion will be by more rough and ready methods
under the supervision of the electoral officers (who will normally be administrative
or other Government officers, but not always so). It will be for the Chief Electoral
Officer of each Province to decide whether an area should be a registration area or
not.
Inevitably the electoral officers will have to be given wide discretion. I am sure that
this is the only way of conducting the elections successfully. The original Nigerian
proposal was that electoral petitions should be barred from courts, but Sir H. Foot
has agreed provisionally to a suggestion by Sir K. Roberts-Wray that this should only
apply to elections up to the level of the final electoral college. In other words, if this
is adopted, the courts will be able to deal with petitions against proceedings in the
final electoral college, but not of course in so far as these relate to complaints against
earlier parts of the proceedings. I think that this is a good modification; but I am sure
that it would create a hopeless mass of litigation if petitions to the courts were
allowed in respect of the lower levels of electoral colleges.
Sir H Foot has suggested that the Secretary of State might say in the despatch on
the electoral arrangements that, while he recognises the necessity for relatively
simple methods on the first occasion, he hopes that it may be possible to work out
more precise methods by the time that the next general election is held.
These are the points for discussion. The Secretary of State may like to start the talk
by asking Sir H. Foot to describe the procedure generally.
I am sending copies of this minute to Sir H. Foot, Mr. Gorsuch and Mr. McPetrie.4
4 Sir T Lloyd minuted at the end, ‘I should like to take part in this discussion.’
132 CO 537/6782, no 19 6 Feb 1951
[Communism in Nigeria]: CO note on alleged communist payments
to trade unions in Nigeria
The general intention of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) to infiltrate
into and otherwise use trade unions in the Colonies needs no elaboration. In July
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 381
382 MACPHERSON AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW [133]
1949, this Federation decided to set up Regional Liaison Bureau, who are to be
responsible for assisting trade union organization in their regions to carry out WFTU
decisions, for conducting propaganda, and for establishing contacts not only with
affiliated centres but also with other trade union organizations which do not belong
to the WFTU. They are required to report every three months to the Secretary-
General of the WFTU. The bureau which directly concerns African Colonial
territories was to be one of the subjects of discussion at the proposed Pan-African
Trade Unions Congress, originally called for October 1950 at Duala (and concerning
the present position, see (2) on this file.)
This file shows:—
(a) Nigeria reports that the local manager of the ‘Daily Times’ had obtained
reliable information from local trade union sources that £2,000 had been paid over
by a foreign Communist organization to the United Africa Company’s Union and
lodged in the Continental Bank at Lagos. It was also said that £200 of this £2,000
had been paid to the Nigeria Labour Congress which is affiliated to the WFTU.
The ‘Daily Times’ story was published on the 18th January and was also
published on that date in the London ‘Daily Mirror’.
(b) Section 5 of the Nigeria Exchange Control Ordinance prevents the making of
any payment to or for the credit of a person resident in the scheduled territories by
order or on behalf of a person resident outside except with permission of the
Financial Secretary, this permission has in fact been given in ‘blanket form’.
Moreover, the Ordinance gives the Financial Secretary powers to require
information only for the purpose of securing compliance with the Ordinance.
(c) It was suggested to Nigeria that consideration should be given as to whether
any action can or should be taken to prevent payments as this coming into the
hands of the recipients in West Africa; and Nigeria has replied that under existing
law such subventions, provided they are made in sterling are legal transactions,
and new ad hoc legislation would appear to be impracticable unless or until
Communist activities as a whole are proscribed in British West Africa.1
1 The original of this document has been retained by the FCO under section 3 (4) of the Public Records
Act, 1958. Sections have been blanked out. They appear under (a) after ‘the WFTU’ and under (b) where a
section is missing before ‘section 5’ begins. This document was followed by efforts by the CO to see if
legislation could be drawn up to oblige banks in Nigeria to reveal information on payments from
communist sources. Such legislation, it was decided, would have been impossible to draft.
133 CO 537/6782, no 23 8 Feb 1951
[Constitutional review]: CO note on a meeting held with Sir H Foot to
discuss communist activity in Nigeria
General
Mr. Cohen said that he wanted to be sure enough was being done at this end to
counter Communist propaganda and to encourage an understanding of the positive
side of British policy. It appeared that Communism was more of a problem in Nigeria
than anywhere else in Africa, partly due to the difficult labour situation. It also
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seemed that the percentage of Nigerian students in this country who were
Communists was higher than that for students from any other colonial territory.
Sir H. Foot said that the Conference of the West African Governors had had this
problem on its agenda. On the negative side, the Governor was reconsidering the
question of banning individual books and he thought it was probable that proposals
on this point would be coming from Nigeria shortly. Positively, he felt not enough
had been done either here or in Nigeria in the past. The average administrative
officer was not a good publicity man. However the advent of Mr. Chalmers as Head of
the Broadcasting Service had been most welcome and the development of
broadcasting should be a great help to government publicity. The Gaskiya
Corporation had done valuable work and the Marketing Boards had recently
recruited a man called Hennessy for publicity work; he would work under the P.R.O.
but his salary would be met from Marketing Board funds.
Sir H. Foot said that it would be most helpful to Nigeria if Mr. Carstairs1 could visit
them for a short while to see things for himself and give a fillip to the work already
being done. This visit could best take place when Mr. Cooper, the P.R.O., returned
from leave. Mr. Cohen said he thought such a visit was essential. Mr. Carstairs agreed
it would be most valuable. He would need to wait for the return of Mr. Ingrams from
his tour of West Africa (mid-March) but would hope to go out to spend some six
weeks in West Africa before the Conference of Information Officers in June.2 It was
agreed to pursue this question with Mr. Thomas.3
Sir H. Foot said he was sure the right policy was being followed in Nigeria, but it
was not being put over with sufficient force to the people. As far as communism was
concerned, the counter-measures now being discussed were being conceived in good
time. The security authorities and the police were liable to take an exaggerated view
of the extent of communist activities. The communists in Nigeria were having a
rough time and the recent revelations about the money Eze had received had led
even the West African Pilot to come out with an attack on communist influence.
Literature
Sir H. Foot felt that while the Nigerian Government could do a lot to publicise the
positive side of their achievements the counter-propaganda work could best be done
from London. In any case it would be difficult to persuade the Nigerian Finance
Committee to find the money for such a move. There was an insatiable demand for
reading matter in Nigeria as the C.M.S. travelling bookshops had found. Cheap
subsidized pamphlets with plenty of facts addressed to farmers, trade unionists and
so forth, should go down well. These pamphlets besides describing the evils of
communism could also eulogise the British political system, local government, etc.
It would be helpful if an organisation could be built up which would give local
vendors in Nigeria a rake-off for literature sold. It would also be valuable to keep in
close touch with the American P.R.Os in Lagos. Sir H. Foot mentioned in passing
that Mr. W. Aitken M.P.,4 who was connected with the Express newspapers, had
recently visited West Africa and had been most enthusiastic about e.g. press
1 C Y Carstairs, ass sec, CO, director of information service from 1950.
2 See 130. 3 A R Thomas, ass sec, CO, establishment officer.
4 W T Aitken, Conservative MP for Bury St Edmunds, 1950–1964; nephew of Lord Beaverbrook.
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developments in the Gold Coast; Mr. Aitken proposed to speak about the West African
Press in the Commons when opportunity offered.
Mr. Carstairs emphasised the importance of keeping a separate organisation for the
anti-communist work and not for example mixing up the British Council with it. He
said that work had already started on the preparation of pamphlets. He agreed with
Mr. Cohen that not too much time should be spent on swopping drafts back and forth
with Nigeria but that there should be a periodical review to see how the pamphlets
were being received in West Africa. 100,000 copies of part of the Prime Minister’s
speech against communism at Forest Hill had gone out to Nigeria. A list of bad points
of presentation, which should be avoided, was being drawn up. It seemed likely that
material on the relation of communism with Islam and with rural life would be valu-
able. More writers were needed to make presentable a mass of rather indigestible mate-
rial which already existed. Mr. Cohen said that Vernon Bartlett might be able to assist.
On the question of the money, which Eze had recently received from communist
sources in Europe,5 Mr. Cohen said that the Colonial Office would take the problem
up with the Treasury to see if anything could be done.
Students
Mr. Cohen said that the extent of communism among students in this country was
often exaggerated. The British Council was doing most valuable work and
Government-sponsored students were well catered for. The core of the matter lay in
the development of individual friendships between colonial students and the peoples
of this country. Mr. Carstairs said a lot was being done socially by way of tea parties
etc. But the communists were able to attract those who loved to talk politics. He
thought it ought to be possible to stage political discussions through existing hostels
and societies to meet this need. Sir H. Foot observed that care would have to be taken
in such discussions to see that extremist groups did not dominate the proceedings.
Mr. Cohen felt that there was room for at least five hostels in London on the lines
of that at Hans Crescent, and the Nigerian and Gold Coast Governments ought to be
able to help on the financial side. Sir H. Foot said that the view of the Nigerian
Finance Committee was that too much money was already being spent on students
in view of the general financial position and it would be most difficult to persuade the
Committee to contribute any more. He thought some of the new C. D. & W. money
might be used.
5 This refers to the concern which was expressed within the CO at payments from Eastern Europe that
were said to have reached a number of Nigerian organisations and individuals, and particularly £2,000
which was reported to have been transferred in early 1951 from Czech sources to Nigerian trade unions
with which Nduka Eze was connected (CO 537/6781). See 132.
134 CO 583/307/1, no 7 16 Feb 1951
[Constitutional review]: letter from L H Gorsuch to Sir J Macpherson
on the electoral system under the proposed new constitution
In my letter of the 7th February in which I gave you an account of the discussions we
had with Foot I promised that I would write again after Foot had seen the Secretary
of State about the proposed electoral arrangements in Nigeria.
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I enclose a copy of the minute1 which I wrote when submitting these questions to
the Secretary of State, as I think this will give you the fullest possible account of the
questions which arose. The Secretary of State saw no objection to the method of
legislating for the elections which is proposed in Nigeria, as he fully appreciated the
reasons why Regulations made by the Governor in Council were the only practical
method in the circumstances. The Secretary of State is also ready to accept the
proposals for the methods of conducting elections in the north and the west through
an electoral pyramid; there are disadvantages in a system of several electoral stages,
but on the other hand it is the expressed wish of the Regional Houses that the
elections should be conducted in that way.
There is, however, one recommendation which the Secretary of State would find it
most difficult to accept; that is, the proposal that in the Western Region there should
be up to 50% of Native Authority representation in the intermediate electoral
college. He raises no objection in principle to Native Authority representation in the
electoral system, and is ready to accept the recommendation made in the North; but
the proportion proposed in the West seems to him excessive. Foot explained that the
Native Authorities in the West represented an extremely important element in the
life of the community and one in which ordinary people took very great pride. He
referred to the policy of broadening the basis of representation in Native Authorities,
which has had a considerable amount of success in the West, and drew attention to
the danger that refusal by the Secretary of State to accept a recommendation which
had been worked out after considerable discussion would have a damaging effect on
the prestige of Native Authorities, which would be particularly unfortunate in the
light of the policy of progressive democratization of those authorities. He made the
point that in the existing Constitution the Native Authorities alone constitute the
equivalent of an electoral college and that it is in any case a considerable advance to
reduce their position by 50%.
The Secretary of State’s objection to the proposal lies in the degree of control over
the composition of the Lower House which it might give to the Native Authorities.
They will clearly play a large part in the choice of members of the Western House of
Chiefs. An injection of 50% Native Authority representation into the intermediate
electoral college for the other House might well mean that, by securing the support
of a fraction of the other representatives in the college, the Native Authorities would
in fact dominate the proceedings of the college and secure a clear majority of Native
Authority representation in the final college. We discussed with the Secretary of
State the possibility of avoiding this by laying it down that Native Authority
representation in the final college should be limited to 50% also; but the objection to
such a proposal is that a maximum tends to become in practice the figure which is
always worked to, and a vested interest might thus be created in favour of the Native
Authorities which would set up an obstacle to further amendment of the
Constitution in future in a more democratic direction.
The Secretary of State feels that agreement to a 50% representation for the Native
Authorities, whether at an intermediate stage or at both intermediate and final
stages, might well evoke criticism in this country to which it would be difficult for
him to find an effective answer. If, as seems possible (though you will be the best
1 Not printed.
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judge of this), criticism arises in Nigeria from the nontraditional elements on the
ground that the scales are being too heavily weighted in favour of the traditional
authorities, there is little doubt that such criticism would be taken up in this
country.
In these circumstances the Secretary of State would like you to consider as an
alternative that there should be up to 25% Native Authority representation in the
final electoral college. Foot thought that this, as a new proposal, might be easier for
Western opinion to accept than up to 25% of the intermediate colleges. The
Secretary of State thinks that this arrangement could be justified on the grounds of
the importance of the Native Authorities in the West and the fact that they contain a
very high proportion of the people who are most suited to be members of the
legislatures. This proportion would not, however, give them a dominant voice in the
electoral procedure or be likely to evoke the criticism that so much weight was being
given to them as to render the elections undemocratic. Unless you have strong
reasons for not wishing to do so, the Secretary of State would like you to put this
alternative proposal to the people concerned in the Western Region in such way as
you think fit, explaining the difficulties which he sees in the present proposal and
making it clear that he is anxious that a share in the electoral procedure, which
adequately recognises their status and interests, shall be secured for the Native
Authorities by mutual agreement.
On the other points I need only say that the Secretary of State accepts the
arrangements which have been made as adequate at this stage to cater for the
representation of minorities, but he will wish in his published despatch to draw
attention to this problem. Similarly he will wish to draw attention to the desirability
of working out more precise electoral methods by the time of the holding of the next
General Election. We shall, of course, be consulting you at a later stage about the
wording to be used in such a despatch.
135 CO 583/307/1, no 8 27 Feb 1951
[Constitutional review]: letter (reply) from Sir J Macpherson to L H
Gorsuch on the electoral system under the proposed new constitution
This is a reply, ad interim, to your Secret letter of the 16th of February (reference
No.30453/14) about our electoral arrangements.1 A full reply will be sent after I have
had discussions (about the West) with Hoskyns-Abrahall who will be here in a day or
two.
I am very glad that the Secretary of State generally approves the electoral
arrangements which, as Cohen pointed out in his minute of which a copy was
enclosed with your letter, are in accordance with the wishes of the people.
As regards the Western Region, I note that the Secretary of State feels that a 50%
representation for the Native Authorities, whether in the intermediate or final
Electoral Colleges, or in both, might evoke criticism in the United Kingdom which he
would find it difficult to answer. I shall discuss with Hoskyns-Abrahall and my other
Advisers what we can do about this. But I am quite certain (and this is the main pur-
1 See 134.
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pose of this letter) that it would be exceedingly dangerous to mention it to any Africans
from the Western Region until after I know what the reactions are to the statement I
propose to make in my opening address to Legislative Council on the 1st of March
about inter-Regional boundaries. Foot told you about this difficult and explosive sub-
ject. The Members of the Western House of Assembly, the Obas, and the educated com-
moners like Awolowo all feel very hotly about this, and I shall be enormously relieved
if they accept my statement which makes the matter one of personal confidence in me.
I know that if I were to tell Members of the Western House of Assembly now, while
they are still steamed up about the Inter-Regional Boundary, that the Secretary of
State found it impossible to accept the electoral arrangements they have proposed
then I should have the gravest apprehensions about the attitude of the Western
Members in the forthcoming Legislative Council. They feel that intransigence paid
dividends to the North and they might well be disposed to stick to their threat (made
at the last House of Assembly meeting) to refuse to work out electoral arrangements
(or even to have anything to do with the revised Constitution) unless they received a
satisfactory answer to their claims on Ilorin Province.
I may say that I do not hold any special brief for the Western arrangements
regarding the 50% Native Authority representation. But I have always taken the line
that these electoral arrangements were, within limits, matters for Regional decision,
and the 50% was a compromise. I have been told that the Egbe Owo Oduduwa, who
include in their ranks most of the progressive people like Awolowo, agreed to this
compromise provided that pressure was exerted regarding Regional boundaries.
Certainly there has been no criticism of the arrangements either in the ‘National’ or
in the Regional Press.
We propose, at next week’s meeting of Legislative Council, to lay on the table the
reports of all three Regions on electoral procedure. This will at least give any Member
an opportunity to raise the question.
If we get over the Regional Boundary question successfully, I shall discuss with
Hoskyns-Abrahall the question of whether, and if so how, we can put to the West the
Secretary of State’s alternative proposal for representation of up to 25% Native
Authority representation in the final Electoral College.
I shall report developments.
136 CO 583/307/1, no 10 30 Mar 1951
[Constitutional review]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to A B Cohen
on the electoral arrangements for the Western provinces and on the
formation of the Action Group. Minutes by M Phillips, R J Vile and
L H Gorsuch.
[The debate about the electoral arrangements for the Western region was finally resolved
with the CO decision, conveyed in an outward telegram, no 491, to Sir J Macpherson on
24 Apr 1951, in CO 583/307/1, no 13, to accept his proposals as outlined in this letter.]
This is a follow-up of my letter to Gorsuch of the 27th of February1 about electoral
arrangements in the Western Provinces.
1 See 135.
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We got through Legislative Council without any outburst from the West in open
Council on the subject of the Inter-Regional boundary, but feelings ran pretty high.
After my statement on the opening day—when I took the very unusual course of
making the matter a question of personal confidence in myself—Sir Kofo Abayomi2
told me that the West were saying that I ‘had done a big Yoruba on them’, meaning
that by adroit action I had placed them in a difficult position. This seemed promising,
but later the Oni of Ife3 asked to see me. He feels as strongly as anyone about the
boundary and though he understands the reasons for my attitude, he had been
unable to convince the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and he urged me to tackle the boundary
question now. I refused to give ground but I gave him some additional ammunition
to use in argument with the Egbe people, and I also offered to receive a delegation
from them, at his request, if he judged this to be desirable. He failed to persuade
them to accept the position as determined by my statement and I then, with
Hoskyns-Abrahall, had a session with three representatives of the Egbe Omo
Oduduwa (Awolowo, Oyedeiran, Headmaster of the Methodist Boys School and a very
nice person, and Bode Thomas) introduced by the Oni. We had a very frank
discussion but again I refused to budge, pointing out that any move to enquire into
the claims of Yorubas in Ilorin Province to be taken with the West would
immediately lead to clamour for boundary adjustments by others—e.g. the Kabba-
Yagba and the Ogori in Kabba Province, and the claim of the ‘Western Ibos’ in Benin
Province to go East. (References to these claims and others had been made in
speeches in Legislative Council a day or two before by Azikiwe and Nyong Essien).
The next thing would be a resuscitation of the demand for a ‘Central Region’, and
encouragement would be given to the demand, inspired by the Missions, to split the
North into two Regions. If we got involved in all these we might as well give up hope
of getting the new Constitution introduced within two years or more, or perhaps ever
in anything like its present form. I believe that in their hearts they saw the force of
my arguments but they would not admit this, saying only that they would report
back to their organisation.
That was nearly three weeks ago and I have heard no more from them. I don’t
believe that the Yorubas have the sustained strength of character to ‘walk out’ on the
new Constitution over this (after all the new Constitution as it has emerged is very
much what the Egbe Omo Oduduwa and the Yoruba Movement wanted) but there is
no disguising the fact that the Yorubas do feel very strongly on the boundary
question; that they are suspicious of Government’s attitude to the North; and that
anything which they would regard as a rebuff to the Yorubas might cause them to
stick their toes in. Much depends on their reactions to the recommendations of the
Hicks Commission on Revenue Allocation.4 It is a very good report but Hicks, in
carrying out an academic exercise in a very realistic way, could not refrain from
2 Sir Kofoworola Abayomi, physician and politician; founding member of the Lagos Youth Movement;
president of the NYM, 1938; member of the Legislative Council, 1938–1940; chairman of University
Teaching Hospital, Ibadan, 1951.
3 Oba Adesoji Tadeniawo Aderemi I, Ooni of Ife, senior traditional ruler among the Yoruba; member of the
Legislative Council from 1947; member of the House of Representatives from 1951; minister without
portfolio, 1951–1955; appointed first Nigerian Governor of the Western Region, 1960.
4 This refers to the Hicks-Phillipson Commission, established in 1950 to examine the allocation of revenue
between regions; J R Hicks and S Phillipson, Report of the Fiscal Commission on Revenue Allocation
(Lagos, 1951).
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‘showing his working’, with the result that there are parts of the Report which can be
used by each Region—and especially the North and West—to complain bitterly. We
are living very dangerously until we know whether we can ‘sell’ the Report to the
Regions.
It is about time that I came to the subject of this letter! After the first excitement
about my statement on the boundary had simmered down, Hoskyns-Abrahall had
discussions with Unofficial Members of the Western House of Assembly, who were in
Lagos for Legislative Council, about Native Authority representation in the electoral
colleges in the West. They gave consideration to your suggestion that instead of this
being up to 50% in the intermediate electoral college it should be up to 25% in the
final electoral college, but they reaffirmed their view in favour of the original
arrangement. They pointed out that this recommendation was the result of long and
careful deliberation and was agreed to in the Western House of Assembly by a
majority of 17 to 1—all Unofficial Members—and they stated that any change now
would not be acceptable.
It seems to me that there are two aspects of this matter which require
consideration. The first is whether we accept the view that the arrangement, on its
merits, is sufficiently ‘democratic’. The second is whether, even if this is answered in
the affirmative, it may lead to criticism by the non-traditional elements in this
country which would be taken up in the United Kingdom and embarrass the
Secretary of State.
On the first point I am bound to say that if the West wants it like that it does not
shock me. And although I appreciate the danger, to which reference was made in
Gorsuch’s letter No. 30453/14 of the 16th of February,5 that a maximum tends in
practice to become the fixed figure, Hoskyns-Abrahall assures me that in some areas
the proportion prescribed will be much less than 50%. I discussed the matter briefly
the other day with the Resident of one of the more progressive Western Provinces
and he told me that the 50% arrangement was just what his people wanted. The
taxpayers will be brought together to choose one man to go to the intermediate
college and the Native Authority will also choose one. These two will go forward to
the intermediate college and from there it is entirely open. We have as yet no
Nigerian political party with organizing powers comparable with those of the C.P.P.
in the Gold Coast. Within the past week, however, the left-wing elements of the Egbe
Omo Oduduwa, which sets out to be cultural rather than political, have announced
the formation of an ‘Action Group’, led by Awolowo, which is frankly political, and
have announced their intention of sweeping the field in the Western Region
elections.6 Their manifesto, of which I enclose a copy,7 is moderately worded, and the
development is probably not unhealthy. But even if they remain reasonably
responsible there will be a temptation to send young speakers into the villages to
stand on soap-boxes and promise a new heaven upon earth. Where Native Authorities
are progressive and are carrying out their functions with confidence and to the
satisfaction of the people, the soap-box orators will, I think, fail. But in the more
backward areas the simple villagers may be carried away and may make a choice of
representatives which they will later bitterly regret. In these circumstances, a good
5 See 134.
6 The Action Group, which first began meeting in 1950, was formally launched at Owo in April 1951.
7 Not printed.
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leavening of sound persons from the Native Authorities, who have learned to take
responsibility by performing public services, will, I suggest, be no bad thing.
I turn now to the second point: the probable reactions. I cannot, of course,
promise that there will be no criticism, even at this late stage, from non-traditional
elements. But I said, in my letter of 27th February, that there had been no criticism
of the Western Electoral arrangements, either in the ‘national’ or in the Regional
press. That is still the position. Azikiwe had put down questions for answer in
Legislative Council earlier this month, about the electoral arrangements in all three
Regions. We had, as I indicated in my earlier letter, laid on the table the reports from
all the Regions on electoral procedure, but supplementaries were not asked and no
motion was made on the subject. Moreover, Hoskyns-Abrahall tells me that Awolowo,
in conversation with Shankland, Secretary Western Provinces, said that the Egbe
Omo Oduduwa were quite happy about the electoral arrangements. And you will note
that the manifesto of the Action Group, though it aims at Self-Government now and
makes a passing reference to ‘a change in the present electoral system’, does not
criticize the Western electoral arrangements within the framework of the revised
Constitution and proposes to run candidates. My guess is that there will be no
criticism of these arrangements in advance of the elections.
I should like to have discussed the whole question frankly with Awolowo but this
would not be appropriate. The 25% suggestion has been put to Western Unofficial
Members of the Legislative Council and they do not favour it. It is now a matter for
the Secretary of State’s decision whether he will refuse to accept the 50%
arrangement. The only other matter on which the Secretary of State is taking a
strong line is the question of the method of selecting Ministers, and this is by
agreement with the Nigerian Government though not after consultation with
Legislative Council. I am obliged to say that in my view it would look somewhat out
of proportion if a strong line were taken on a matter which is after all very much one
for Regional, not even Nigerian, decision.
Minutes on 136
It was agreed in discussions with the Secretary of State in February that we should
go back to the Governor on the proposal to have 50% Native Authority
representation in the intermediate electoral colleges of the Western Region under
the new constitution, and it was suggested to the Governor as an alternative that
there should be 25% N. A. representation in the final electoral colleges. We now have
at (10) Sir John Macpherson’s views on this alternative.
The Governor discussed the alternative proposals with the Chief Commissioner,
Western Provinces, and with unofficial members from the West at the recent Budget
session of Legislative Council, and it is clear from (10) that they stick to their
original recommendations.
The arguments in favour of the original proposal now seem to be these:—
(a) Public opinion in the West is very agitated over the problem of regional
boundaries. The Governor has stated he does not propose to do anything about
this until after the inauguration of the new constitution, and has made it an issue
of personal confidence in himself. There may also be difficulties with the West over
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the Revenue Allocation Commission’s Report, now under consideration. To
administer a ‘further rebuff to the Yorubas’ by seeking to change a
recommendation, approved by the unofficials of the Western House by 17–1,
might lead to trouble.
(b) N.A. representation will provide a ‘good leavening of sound persons . . . who
have learned to take responsibility by performing public services’ against the
irresponsible elements, that may secure the favour of backward voters unused to
soapbox oratory.
(c) Non-traditional elements in Lagos and the West have not as yet shewn any
signs of revolt against the proposed electoral system; in fact Awolowo and the
Yoruba ‘Action Group’, which would seem to be the sort of organisation catering
for such critics, is preparing to fight the elections in the West under the system
proposed, without apparently making an issue of that system.
(d) Above all the decision on this question is a decision of primary concern to the
West. The proposals that have emerged are themselves the result of reconciling
conflicting views and it would be therefore unwise to upset them.
Whatever we may think about these arguments as a whole (and (b) above is not very
convincing, to say the least) my feeling is that it is clear that 50% representation for
N.A.s in intermediate electoral colleges is what the representatives of the Western
Region want and it will now be exceedingly difficult to reject. I think we shall have to
accept the point but draw attention in the published despatch which is to issue to our
misgivings expressed in (7). I do not think at that time there is likely to be any
sustained campaign against the electoral structure.
M.P.
4.4.51
We have consistently tried, in the consideration of the Nigerian constitutional
proposals, to accept wherever possible proposals to which Nigerian public opinion
was committed. In this particular question we were concerned lest the arrangement
proposed was designed primarily to strengthen the hands of the traditional element,
and to give Native Authorities a predominating voice in the elections.
The facts that Dr. Awolowo, who is the reverse of a ‘traditional element’ (he has
indeed frequently been a successful trouble-maker), accepts the present proposals,
and that, in the light of the S. of S’s suggestion, there is the unanimous view that the
original proposals are preferable, suggest that the arrangements proposed by the
Western House are fair and acceptable. In these circumstances I suggest that we can
only accept those recommendations.
The Governor does not say in his letter what views he would have if the S of S
wished to express any misgivings in his published despatch. It would, I suggest, be
best to confine any remarks in that despatch to a statement on the lines of X of Mr.
Cohen’s minute of 2/2.8
There is a certain amount of urgency about this matter, as the Governor will wish
shortly to issue the Electoral Regulations.
R.J.V.
6.4.51
8 See 131.
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 391
392 MACPHERSON AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW [137]
Mr. Cohen
I am inclined to advise, in view of (10), that we should accept the Nigerian view on
the 50% arrangement. You may wish to discuss.
L.H.G.
11.4.51
137 CO 537/7166, no 20 15 Apr 1951
[Constitutional review]: despatch no 147A from Mr Griffiths to Sir J
Macpherson on the CO’s decisions concerning the composition of the
central legislature and the selection of ministers
In paragraph 8 of my Despatch No. 464A of the 15th July, 19501 on the proposals for
constitutional reform in Nigeria, I referred to the recommendations made by the
General Conference at Ibadan that the Ministers at the centre and in the regions
should be elected by the respective legislatures, and that the arrangements for the
distribution of portfolios among these Ministers should be settled at the centre by
the Governor-in-Council and in the regions by the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council.
I said that these were matters on which final decisions could not be taken until the
composition of the Nigerian legislature had been settled; but I went on to suggest
that the aim should be to arrive at a procedure under which members of the Council
of Ministers are selected in consultation between the Governor and the members of
the Nigerian legislature representing each region, and members of the Regional
Executive Council in consultation between the Lieutenant-Governor and members of
the Regional legislature.
2. The composition of the Nigerian legislature has now been settled, and much
thought has been devoted to the methods to be adopted for the selection of Ministers
and the allocation of portfolios. After careful consideration His Majesty’s
Government has thought it advisable to decide these two issues in a manner different
from the recommendations of the General Conference. I propose to set out in this
despatch the reasons which have led His Majesty’s Government to these decisions.
3. I should like in the first place to state certain principles by which, given the
form which the new Nigerian Constitution is to take, it seems to me that the choice
of Ministers should be governed. A Minister, whether in the region or at the centre,
must inevitably have a dual responsibility; he must be responsible to the Lieutenant-
Governor or Governor on whom rests the ultimate responsibility for the
administration and at the same time he is responsible to the legislature. This being
so, it seems to me desirable that both parties should bear a share of the responsibility
for choosing him. Secondly, in deciding on the method of choice of a Minister it is
necessary to bear in mind the qualities which it is desired to obtain in him. He
should have ability and integrity; he should be able to work with each and all of his
colleagues as a member of that particular team; and in the present circumstances in
Nigeria he should be acceptable to the region from which he derives. It is the view of
His Majesty’s Government that this combination of qualities is more likely to be
1 See 116.
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obtained by a process in which selection by consultation takes some part than by
election alone.
4. As was stated in paragraph 8 of my Despatch No. 464A, His Majesty’s
Government are anxious that, from the outset, a procedure for appointment of
Ministers should be adopted which will lead on smoothly to the stages of further
evolution towards self-government. With this in mind, and after careful weighing the
considerations in the preceding paragraph of this despatch, they have come to the
conclusion that the system of appointment laid down in the Constitution shall
provide for selection by a process combining the elements of consultation and
approval by the Legislature rather than by election. The procedure for which the new
Constitution will provide is that Regional Ministers will be appointed by the
Lieutenant-Governor after consultation with members of the Regional House, and
that the four Central Ministers from the region will be appointed by the Governor on
the recommendation of the Lieutenant-Governor after consultation with members of
the Regional House. In both cases formal appointment will be made only in
pursuance of a resolution of the Regional House concerned.
5. It will be seen that this procedure varies in one respect from the suggestion
made in paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 464A, in which the proposal was that
members of the Council of Ministers should be selected in consultation between the
Governor and the members of the Nigerian legislature representing each region. A
Regional House, when it has been constituted and assembles for the first time, will
have to find the Regional Ministers and also the members who will represent the
region in the Central Legislature. The third step which will then be necessary will be
to find four Central Ministers from the region. There are strong arguments, as I
believe you agree, for taking all these three steps as part of one process. Immediately
the composition of a Regional House is known, it will be necessary to decide with full
regard to the principles set out in the third paragraph of this despatch, which of
those members who are best fitted to be Ministers should devote the major part of
their time to regional business and which to the business of central government. It
might well be that if a decision were taken as regards Regional Ministers alone, some
of the most suitable aspirants as Central Ministers might no longer be available for
selection. The procedure will accordingly be that, at the same time as the members
to represent the Region in the Central Legislature are being elected, there will be
consultation between the Lieutenant-Governor and the members of the Regional
Legislature in which choice of both the Regional Ministers and the four Central
Ministers will be agreed upon; the Lieutenant-Governor will then consult the
Governor about the latter and will obtain his concurrence: and the Regional House
will then be asked to confirm the appointment of the four Central Ministers by
resolution in the same way as it will confirm the appointment of the Regional
Ministers.
6. I have considered whether Central Ministers selected in this way by
consultation with the Regional House might be disposed to feel that their
responsibility lay towards the Region alone rather than towards the centre and
whether this would not militate against the feeling of unity at the centre which is so
necessary. I feel, however, that any such tendency would be quickly corrected by the
nature of a Minister’s work at the centre. He will have to deal with questions of a
Nigerian-wide nature, and also, on occasion, with questions with which his own
Region might not be directly concerned. The effect of this would be to instil into him
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a Nigerian habit of thought; and indeed it is the Nigerian-wide nature of ministerial
responsibility at the centre which provides the justification for the arrangement
whereby a Minister whose appointment derives from the region is removable by a
vote of the whole Central Legislature. In short, by appointment he derives from the
Region; but once appointed his responsibility is to Nigeria.
7. I feel confident that the members of the General Conference and all others
who have taken part in framing the new Constitution for Nigeria will realise that if in
this one respect His Majesty’s Government have not accepted the recommendations
which were evolved in Nigeria, it is because His Majesty’s Government are anxious,
as I have said, to see a system adopted from the outset which will evolve naturally
into the more advanced form of self-government which lies in the future.
8. I shall be glad if you will cause this despatch to be published.
138 CO 537/7166, no 8 15 May 1951
[Constitutional review]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to A B Cohen
on the differences between the new constitution and the proposals
made at the Ibadan conference. Annexure
Now that the drafting of the Constitution Instruments is nearing an end—thanks in
great measure to the devoted labours of McPetrie—and the main Order-in-Council is
shortly to appear, we have been wondering whether publication of these documents
should not be accompanied by publication of an official expression of views on your
side or ours, or both. It is, I suggest, somewhat remarkable that although the idea of
revision of the Constitution was taken up nearly three years ago and a succession of
conferences has considered every aspect of it since, there have been so far only three
formal communications-our despatch No. 11 of the 24th March, 1949, on the
procedure suggested for the process of revision,1 our further despatch No. 16 of the
27th April, 1949, on the length of time this would take, and the Secretary of State’s
despatch No. 464A of the 15th of July, 1950, conveying H.M.G.’s views on the General
Conference proposals, and sent at our suggestion.2 There has, of course, been much
demi-official correspondence and a great many personal discussions have taken
place, but I think the absence of official interchange of views may be taken as a
measure of the degree of confidence that has prevailed between the Colonial Office
on the one side and ourselves on the other.
None the less I feel we are coming to a stage where something more must be
officially said for public consumption. I anticipate that when the Instruments are
published a great deal of attention will be directed on them to see how far they really
implement the recommendations of the General Conference, as modified by
Legislative Council at its two meetings last year and whether there are any striking
differences. A certain amount of modification of those recommendations in detail
has, of course, been inevitable, and there has had to be some introduction of new
matter to fill in the gap left by the General Conference—which after all was only
concerned with very broad outlines. But there has also been at least one very
substantial divergence in the matter of choosing Ministers.
1 See 65. 2 See 116.
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We thought here that it would be a good idea to prepare a statement showing the
various divergences and additions. The material might come in useful if an exchange
of despatches were to be decided on, and in any event it attempts to summarise the
general differences between the Instruments and the publicly agreed proposals here.
I enclose six copies of this statement, drawn up as a memorandum. It deals with the
executive and legislative organs proposed for the Constitution, and with certain
matters of legislative procedure, but says nothing about the Public Service
Commission, safeguards for the Civil Service, or finance. We take it that on the first
two of these points the Secretary of State will send us a despatch similar to his
despatch No. 492 of the 19th December, 1950, to the Gold Coast, and finance will
probably have to be separately treated after we have made up our minds on the
Revenue Allocation Report.
So far as divergences from the General Conference proposals are concerned, by far
the most important is the change in the method of selecting Ministers. We have
readily adopted the Secretary of State’s view on this subject but we have not had
consultations here, although I have informed my Executive Council of the proposed
change. You will remember that the General Conference was quite clear on wanting
election in preference to selection after consultation, and in the circumstances we
feel that the system approved would best be introduced by a despatch from the
Secretary of State explaining the reasons for the change, in pursuance of the
argument in paragraph 8 of his despatch of the 15th July last year. Such a despatch
could be published at the same time as the Instruments; and as this particular matter
is bound to have attention focussed on it here we should very much like, if it can be
so arranged, to see it in draft first.
It is for consideration whether there should not be another exchange of
despatches, covering a wider field and including the other matters mentioned in the
attached paper. There may be other points to which the Secretary of State would
wish to refer in some detail, such as the electoral arrangements. I should, of course,
be very ready to convert the memorandum attached into a formal despatch, with
recommendations, and the Secretary of State might be prepared to approve the
recommendations and then to go on to make any points thought desirable. But I feel
sure that any despatches of this nature intended for publication should be dated later
than the Colonial Office despatch on the selection of Ministers.
I should be very grateful for your views on this.
Annexure to 138: Memorandum on certain features of the constitutional
arrangements
I. Preliminary
It has been sought to frame the revised Constitution of Nigeria mainly on the basis of
recommendations made by a series of representative conferences. The extent to
which these were found acceptable by His Majesty’s Government, subject to further
examination of detail, has been indicated by the Secretary of State in his Despatch
No. 464A of the 15th of July, 1950. The recommendations were themselves based on
the proposals of a series of village and local meetings invited to express their general
views on the broad outlines of constitutional change, and for the purpose of drafting
the various Instruments a substantial degree of elaboration, co-ordination and
11-(Doc100-138)-cp  15/7/01  7:29 am  Page 395
396 MACPHERSON AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW [138]
detailed modification of the recommendations has inevitably been found necessary.
In particular, the General (and final) Conference failed to reach agreement on the
major issue of composition of the Central Legislature, and the subsequent re-
consideration of this matter by Regional Houses and Legislative Council involved
divergence to some extent from other proposals for which general agreement had
been obtained.
2. The Instruments also incorporate one major departure in principle from the
General Conference proposals, occasioned by the necessity of bringing the practice to
be prescribed into line with the correct constitutional position.
3. The main variations between the contents of the Instruments and the
Conference recommendations relate to:—
(a) the executive arrangements, with reference to:—
(i) the method of selection of Ministers (this is the major matter mentioned in
para.2 above);
(ii) the extent of the executive authority of the Central Government;
(iii) the number of Regional ministers;
(iv) the provisions for terminating Ministerial appointments;
(b) the composition of the Legislatures, specifically with reference to:—
(i) the size of the Central and Regional Houses and basis of representation
therein;
(ii) the representation of special interests;
(iii) the choice of Presiding Officers;
(iv) the electoral arrangements.
(c) procedure in respect of legislation, with regard to:—
(i) the power of the two Houses in a bicameral Legislature;
(ii) the disallowance of Regional Legislation;
(iii) the Regional consideration of Central legislation.
The variations or modifications in question are set out in that order.
II. Executive arrangements
4. Selection of ministers. The development of this issue constitutes the
outstanding divergence from the General Conference recommendations. The
Conference proposed that the twelve non-official Central Ministers should comprise
four Ministers from each Region, and that each such group of four Ministers should
be elected by the members from the Region concerned in the House of
Representatives. Regional Ministers were to be elected by members of Regional
Houses. These recommendations were made after a strong majority vote had been
recorded in favour of the election of Ministers as against any system of selection by
the Governor or Lieutenant-Governors, whether with or without consultation with
the Legislatures.
5. In paragraph 8 of his Despatch of the 15th of July the Secretary of State
expressed his desire that a system of selection be established which could develop in
due course into the appointment by a Prime Minister of his own Ministerial
colleagues, and suggested the desirability of procedure under which members of the
Central and Regional Executives would be selected by the Governor or Lieutenant-
Governors in consultation with the Legislature concerned.
6. It was subsequently further pointed out by the Colonial Office that:—
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(a) A Minister will be responsible not only to the Legislature, but also to the
Governor or Lieutenant-Governor, who retains ultimate responsibility for the
administration of his charge. Accordingly the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor
must have a voice in his selection;
(b) it is impracticable to leave to the hazard of popular election the choice of men
for office requiring ability, integrity and tact;
(c) should a Minister be guilty of disloyalty or breach of the prescribed rules of
conduct the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor would find embarrassment in
removing him if he owed his position to popular vote;
(d) Ministerial talent should be used to the best advantage whether in the Regions
or at the Centre.
The Colonial Office therefore proposed the alternative procedure of selection of
Regional Ministers by the Lieutenant-Governors in consultation with the Regional
Legislature, and of each group of Central Ministers by the Governor after
consultation between the Lieutenant-Governor and the Regional Legislature
concerned. In both cases approval of the Regional Legislature by resolution would be
sought to the appointment.
7. These proposals are in conformity with the Secretary of State’s view, but
contain a modification of his original suggestion in view of Regional Houses having
to find from amongst their number not only Regional Ministers but also members of
the House of Representatives and potential Central Ministers—a process of selection
which might well be carried out at one stage as far as possible.
8. It has been agreed that the Colonial Office view should be accepted but it has
not been possible to arrange for further consultation on any appreciable scale of
representative opinion on the point. Having regard to this circumstance and to the
clear recommendation made by the General Conference (by 34 votes to 9) in favour
of a system of pure election, it is thought desirable that the decision should be shown
to be one made by the Secretary of State and that it might be so expressed in a
Despatch to be published.
9. Executive authority of the central government. In paragraph 7 of his
Despatch the Secretary of State indicated the importance he placed on preserving
and strengthening the unity of Nigeria, and the welcome which he gave to
recommendations for a strong Central Legislature and Executive. It therefore seems
necessary that the over-all and over-riding authority of the Central Government
should be clearly expressed in the Constitutional Instruments, and that the authority
of Regional Executives should be clearly defined in such a manner that, while in no
way seeking to derogate from the degree of autonomous evolution proposed for the
Regions, the subordination of these Regional Executives should be placed beyond
doubt. The necessity of such definition, important as it is in principle, is further
reinforced in respect of detail by the re-organisation of various major Departments to
conform with the Regions’ new status. In some cases Regional Departments will be
required to perform agency functions for the Central Government, and it is
important that the Central Government should be able to ensure that its
requirements and instructions are duly observed. There should, therefore, be some
elaboration of the recommendation of the General Conference that a Regional
Executive Council should formulate policy and direct executive action subject to any
general instruction on the grounds that the major overall Government of Nigeria is
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involved. It is considered that the Governor, on the advice of his Council, should be
able, from time to time, to give to the Lieutenant-Governors of a Region special
directions with respect to the exercise of the executive authority of the Region for the
purpose of ensuring good government in Nigeria. Such directions would normally
relate to the subject listed in the General Conference recommendations as
appropriate for Regional legislative jurisdiction, but could also include other
instructions which it may be necessary for the Head of the Government of Nigeria to
issue from time to time.
10. Number of regional ministers. The number of Ministers in the Central
Executive was closely defined by the General Conference and in view of the necessity
of giving each Region equal representation in the Council of Ministers there is no
occasion to vary this recommendation. In respect, however, of Regional Executives,
the General Conference proposed that there should be five official members and nine
Ministers in the Northern and Eastern Regions, and three official members and nine
Ministers in the Western Region. The position in respect of the Western Region has,
of course, altered, by reason of the subsequent recommendation of Legislative
Council that Lagos and the Colony should be included, for administrative and
legislative purposes, within the Western Region, and it would therefore seem
appropriate that the maximum number of official members of the Western Regional
Council should be five, in line with the figure for the other two Regions. The number
of Ministers to be found from amongst members of Regional Houses was not
prescribed by the General Conference with any regard to the volume of work which
might fall to these Ministers or to the division of subjects which might appear
practicable. Examination of these points has shown that it may not be necessary, at
the outset of the Constitution at least, to have so many as nine Ministers selected in
each Region from the Regional Houses, and it now proposed that in the Northern
and Western Regions the minimum number of such Ministers should be six and the
maximum number nine, and that in the Eastern Region the minimum number seven
and the maximum number nine. The actual number of Ministers selected would vary
in each Region according to the volume and nature of work. A higher minimum
figure has been proposed for the East in order to provide for one Minister from the
Trust Territory of the Cameroons, as recommended by the General Conference. In
view of the responsibility resting on the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, the
distribution of portfolios amongst the Ministers should be at their discretion.
11. Termination of appointment of ministers. It was proposed by the General
Conference that the appointment of Ministers at the Centre and in the Regions
should be terminated in the event of an adverse vote by the Legislature, specified as a
two-thirds majority of members present of the House of Representatives at the
Centre, and a two-thirds majority of a joint meeting of the House of Chiefs and
House of Assembly in the Northern and Western Regions, or a two-thirds majority of
the members present in the House of Assembly in the Eastern Region. It is proposed
to vary this recommendation in so far as the Northern and Western Regions are
concerned in order to prevent the possibility of the numerically stronger House
imposing its opinion on the other House, and it is now recommended that a Regional
Minister in the Northern or Western Region should be removed in the event of an
adverse vote of two-thirds of the members of the House from which he was selected.
12. These various provisions do not, however, cover the contingency of a
Minister refusing to abide by the policy decided by his colleagues in the Council of
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Ministers or in the Regional Executive Council and refusing to resign, and yet
against whom an adverse vote from the Legislature cannot be obtained. In order to
deal with such cases the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor should have the power to
terminate the appointment of a Minister, and such a provision is proposed for the
Constitutional Instruments.
III. Legislatures
13. Composition of House of Representatives. This constituted the main ques-
tion upon which the General Conference could not agree in January, 1950. As the
result of further discussion it was eventually possible to reach a settlement in
Legislative Council in September of that year, when it was proposed that the
House of Representatives should consist of six official members, six members rep-
resenting special interests and one hundred and thirty six elected members, of
whom half would represent the Northern Region, and the other half the other two
Regions in equal proportions. The large size of this Legislature—substantially
larger than that proposed by any Regional Conference or by the General
Conference—was a concession by the Northern unofficial members of Legislative
Council in response to the agreement by the other two Regions that the North
was entitled to representation at the Centre equal to that of the Eastern and
Western Regions together. Such agreement was given explicitly by the Eastern
unofficial members, and was considered to be implicit in the Western members’
attitude of refraining from pressing the objections previously voiced in the
Western House of Assembly.
14. Basis of representation at centre. The membership proposed for the House of
Representatives was also founded on the desire to give adequate representation, so
far as possible on a divisional basis, to all parts of the Territory. (The original figure
for the calculation was in fact the thirty four divisions of the Eastern Region). The
Western Region is still in favour of divisional representation, and intends proceeding
on this basis. Each of the other two Regions, however, recommends a separate
system.
15. (a) North. In the North it had always been the intention that representa-
tion at the Centre should be on a provincial basis, and the General Conference
had recommended that in respect of the Northern Region at least one member
should be selected to represent each Province, and that the number of members,
from amongst the total Northern membership, to be selected by the House of
Chiefs, together with the method of their selection, should be determined by the
two Northern Houses in joint session. A Select Committee of the two Northern
Houses subsequently proposed that each Province should be represented at the
Centre by at least one member from the House of Chiefs and one from the House
of Assembly, and the balance of the Northern members should be elected with
regard to individual qualifications, special local interests, and the principle of pro-
portional representation in that order. The Order-in-Council has now been 
drafted to provide the minimum provincial representation recommended—the
representatives being elected by a Joint Council of the two Northern Houses sit-
ting together.
16. (b) East. The Eastern House of Assembly has pointed out the inequities
which could arise in that Region from a divisional basis of representation at the
Centre, in view of the disparity—in some cases the marked disparity—in the size and
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population of various divisions. (The range in population is as much as from 28,000
in Ikom to 547,000 in Owerri, and Calabar Province, with seven divisions, has only
two-thirds of the population of the Owerri Province with five divisions). The
recommendation in respect of the Eastern Region now is that minimum
representation of each Province of the Region at the Centre be specified, and the
balance of members for the House of Representatives be elected by the Eastern
House without further restriction, so that the Eastern House will be able to reconcile
the claims of population with the desirable objective of electing the most suitable
individuals.
17. Composition of regional houses. Whilst settlement of the composition of
the House of Representatives has not called for any re-consideration of the size of
Houses in the Eastern or Western Regions, the Select Committee of the two
Northern Houses has recommended that there should be a marked increase in the
members of the two Northern Houses under the new Constitution. It is now pro-
posed that the Northern House of Chiefs should contain fifty chiefs and the
Northern House of Assembly ninety elected members in addition to certain official
members in each House. This increase has been recommended partly in order to
provide a wider field of selection for the increased number of representatives to be
sent to the Central Legislature, and partly in order to make a substantial body of
men already engaged in public affairs available for the numerous statutory Boards
and Committees presently in existence or about to be created as the result of con-
stitutional change.
18. Special interests. A request was made by certain commercial interests in
the United Kingdom for the accord of special representation to such interests in
Regional Legislatures as well as in the House of Representatives. This proposal
has not been put formally to the existing Regional Houses, but informal consul-
tation indicates that such representation in Regional Houses of Assembly would
be acceptable. In the North the three members contemplated for such interests
would be included amongst the ten members already provided primarily for
securing the representation of minority communities. It had originally been pro-
posed by the General Conference that these ten members in the Northern House
of Assembly would be elected to the House by the members who had already
found their way there by the ordinary electoral process. It is considered, however,
that in respect of all the Regional Houses, including the Northern, it will be
necessary for all these special members to be selected by the Lieutenant-
Governor in his discretion, but after such informal consultation as may be
possible and desirable.
19. Presiding officers of houses. In respect of both the House of Representatives
and the Regional Houses, the General Conference proposed that each House decide
its own method of selecting its own Presiding Officer. It seems necessary to depart
from this recommendation both at the Centre and in the Regions.
20. (a) House of Representatives. In September 1950 Legislative Council
proposed, as an integral part of its recommendations for the Central Legislature, that
the Governor should preside. This recommendation has its origin in the Northern
opposition to any provision which would lead to the appointment or election as
Presiding Officer of a Southern politician who could rule an Emir out of order or fail
to maintain dignity and impartiality in the conduct of business. The other Regions
have accepted the Northern point of view. It is thought to be wholly inappropriate
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that the Governor, as Head of the Executive in a Constitution designed to evolve
towards self-government through responsible Ministers, should continue to preside
over a Legislature, but to permit the House of Representatives to choose its own
Presiding Officer would not meet the situation, as such a provision would re-awaken
Northern suspicion and, if a member of the House itself were chosen, would alter the
carefully adjusted basis of representation between the North and South. The best
solution is thought to be a provision appointing the Governor as Presiding Officer
but authorising him, with the consent of the Secretary of State, to appoint a
President. Such a provision would enable the Governor, when the probable Northern
reactions appear favourable, to appoint a person such as a suitable retired Judge or
Law Officer (preferably African) from outside the ranks of the House, and withdraw
himself from its deliberations. When the House of Representatives first meets,
however, the Governor will have to preside.
21. (b) Regional houses. With regard to Regional Houses, the recommendation
of the General Conference was at variance with the recommendation of Regional
Conferences, and on so purely Regional a matter these recommendations might be
re-examined. In the North it had been proposed that the Chief Commissioner (i.e.
Lieutenant-Governor) and a Senior Resident should preside over the House of Chiefs
and House of Assembly respectively. It is suggested that the Lieutenant-Governor
should preside over the House of Chiefs and that he appoint a President of the House
of Assembly, who in the first instance would probably be a Resident. The Western
Regional Conference proposed that the State Governor (i.e. Lieutenant-Governor)
should preside over the House of Assembly and that the House of Chiefs should select
a president from amongst its own members. It would be inappropriate that the
Lieutenant-Governor should preside over the ‘Lower’ House and it is suggested that
the Lieutenant-Governor should preside over the Western House of Chiefs, and
appoint a person to be President of the House of Assembly. The Eastern Regional
Conference proposed that the Chief Commissioner (i.e. Lieutenant-Governor)
preside over the Regional House. This recommendation might be followed, and the
Lieutenant-Governor be empowered to appoint a Vice-President from within the
membership of the House to preside in his absence.
22. Electoral arrangements. Details of the electoral arrangements for electing
members of the Regional Legislatures are being fully worked out, on the basis of the
Reports of the Select Committees of the various Regional Houses laid on the table of
Legislative Council in March this year. (Copies have been supplied to the Colonial
Office). In view of the disparity in size, communications and administrative structure
of the various Regions it has, of course, not been possible to arrange such details
with any degree of uniformity. It is contemplated that in the Eastern Region village
meetings will elect representatives to divisional electoral meetings, which will then,
in turn, elect representatives to the Regional House. The pattern will be somewhat
similar in the Western Region, except that in certain areas there will usually be
another intermediate stage between the original electoral level and the electoral
college. In the Northern Region it is intended that there will be some two or three
tiers between the original electoral meetings and the provincial electoral colleges.
The Northern Region are now prepared to agree to a uniform age of at least 21 years
in respect of candidates to Regional Houses, although still retaining insistence on
candidates being male Nigerians who have resided for three years in the Region. It is
proposed that the arrangements finally approved be given effect by means of
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Regulations issued by the Governor under the authority of the Imperial Order-in-
Council.
IV. Procedure in legislation
23. Powers of houses in bicameral legislature. As regards the powers of the two
Houses in the bicameral Regional Legislatures of the North and West, the General
Conference recommended concurrent and equal powers for each House, with
disagreement between the two Houses in either Region resolved by a majority vote of
the two Houses in joint session. Whilst ordinary legislation can no doubt be
appropriately introduced for the first time before either House of a bicameral
Legislature, it would be in accord with modern democratic theory and practice for
money Bills to be introduced in the first instance before the lower, or more directly
representative, of the two Houses. An elaboration is therefore proposed on the lines
of the Ibadan Conference proposals, with the variation, in so far as a deadlock
between two Houses is concerned, that in such an event each of the two Houses
should select an equal number of representatives to sit in joint session, and decide
the point of difference by majority vote. This emendation of the General Conference
proposal would prevent the numerically stronger House imposing its wishes on the
other.
24. Disallowance of regional legislation. Legislation emerging from Regional
Legislatures is then, as proposed by Legislative Council in April, 1950, to be referred
to the Governor-in-Council and would, in the light of the General Conference
proposals, be examined to see whether it was in conflict with any major overall
Nigerian interests or with any convention or agreement binding on Nigeria, or with
the fiscal policy of Nigeria. In view of the considerations indicated in paragraph 9 of
this Memorandum it should be the function also of the Governor-in-Council to
determine whether the Regional legislation relates to a matter in respect of which
the Region can properly make laws, whether any expenditure authorised is on
subjects specified in the Regional financial field, and whether it is consistent with
any executive directions given to the Region by the Governor-in-Council. Should the
legislation offend all or any of these stipulations, and the offending provisions not be
curable by mere amendment, it is suggested that the legislation be disallowed;
should the point in issue be curable by amendment without invalidating the whole of
the legislation, it is suggested that the legislation be referred again to the Regional
Houses involved, for consideration only of the amendments proposed by the
Governor-in-Council.
25. Central legislation in regional houses. As regards Central legislation, the
General Conference proposed continuance of the present system whereby Central
legislation is debated first in Regional Houses which are mainly advisory bodies. The
position in the new Constitution will, of course, be materially altered by reason of the
Regional Houses acquiring legislative powers and a defined field of jurisdiction, and
as, in addition, the Central Legislature will be composed almost exclusively of
members elected from Regional Houses, there should be no great necessity for
Regional Houses to debate Central measures as well as their own Regional measures.
It is proposed, therefore, that whilst Central Bills will be laid on the table of Regional
Houses, no debate should take place on them unless a definite motion is made to that
effect.
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139 CO 583/307/1, no 22 15 May 1951
[Constitutional review]: despatch (reply) no 17A from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Griffiths on the composition of the central and
regional legislatures and on the selection of ministers in the new
constitution
In your despatch No. 464A of the 15th of July, 1950,1 on the review of the
Constitution of Nigeria you conveyed to me the views of His Majesty’s Government
on the major recommendations of the General Conference held at Ibadan in 1950
and the variations proposed by the Select Committee of Legislative Council in April
of that year. The readiness of His Majesty’s Government to accept the constitutional
proposals generally was much appreciated in Nigeria and contributed greatly towards
a settlement of the main issues which were then outstanding. In your despatch No.
147A of the 15th of April, 1951,2 you have conveyed to me the decision reached by
H.M. Government on the method of selecting members of the Council of Ministers
and of the Regional Executive Councils.
2. Foremost among the questions outstanding at the date of the earlier despatch
was the composition of the new Central Legislature. This matter was brought to a
definite conclusion last September, when Legislative Council recommended that the
new Central Legislature should consist of 148 members, of whom 68 would represent
the Northern Region, 34 the Eastern Region, and 34 the Western Region. The
Western Region members would include at least two representatives of the municipal
area of Lagos and the Eastern Region members would include one representative of
Calabar. The Eastern members would also include at least four from the Trust
Territory of the Cameroons by reason of the basis of representation to which I refer
later in this Despatch. The other twelve members of the Legislature would be 6
official members (the Chief Secretary, the three Lieutenant-Governors, the Attorney-
General, and the Financial Secretary) and 6 members appointed by the Governor to
represent interests and communities which, in his opinion, were not otherwise
adequately represented.
3. The increased size of this Legislature, which is substantially larger than that
proposed by any of the Regional Conferences or by the General Conference, was
designed to give adequate representation to all parts of Nigeria and of each Region. It
was at the same time thought necessary to increase the number of members to be
appointed to represent special interests because it was considered that the figure of
three previously proposed would be inadequate in this enlarged Legislature to
represent the interests now being brought into existence by the rapid economic
development of Nigeria.
4. It is a matter of much satisfaction that the composition of the Central
Legislature has now been settled in a manner acceptable to all Regions and that you
were able to announce in the House of Commons last November that H.M.
Government has accepted the arrangements made.
5. The consideration of this issue involved the re-examination to some extent of
recommendations already put forward by the General Conference, and as these
1 See 116. 2 See 137.
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recommendations were themselves based on the proposals of a series of popular
meetings at different levels invited not to prepare a detailed constitutional scheme,
but to express general views on the broad outlines of constitutional change, a
substantial degree of elaboration of the details has inevitably been necessary for the
purpose of drawing up the Constitutional Instruments. I propose to indicate in this
Despatch the main elaborations of detail which have appeared necessary.
6. In the matter of the composition of Regional Legislatures it has been
recommended by a Select Committee of the two Houses of the Northern Regional
Council that there should be a marked increase in the members of the two Northern
Houses under the new Constitution. It is now proposed that the Northern House of
Chiefs should contain 50 Chiefs and the Northern House of Assembly 90 elected
members in addition to certain official members in each House. This increase has
been recommended mainly in order to provide a wider field of selection for the
increased number of representatives to be sent to the Central Legislature, but partly
also in order that there may be a sufficient number of members available for the
numerous Boards and Committees at present in existence or likely to be created.
7. Provision had already been made in the proposals for the Northern House of
Assembly that, in addition to the elected members, there should be ten other
members selected to represent interests and communities not otherwise adequately
represented, and it is now proposed that not less than three of these should be
persons intimately acquainted with the economic affairs of the Region and similarly
that three members should be appointed to the Western and Eastern Houses of
Assembly to represent special interests. This proposal to the Regional Houses has not
been put formally, but it is understood that it will be generally acceptable. The
special members of Regional Legislatures will be selected by the Lieutenant-
Governors concerned, after appropriate consultation, and to this extent there will be
a departure from the proposal of the General Conference that the ten special
members of the North should be selected by the other members of the Northern
House of Assembly.
8. The increase in the size of the new Central Legislature now proposed has led
also to re-consideration of the method of election of its members. The General
Conference at Ibadan proposed that representatives of the Eastern and Western
Regions should be elected in such a way as to give representation at the Centre to
each division of those two Regions. This proposal continues to be favoured by the
Western Region, but the Eastern House of Assembly has pointed out the inequities
which could arise in that Region from a divisional basis of election, in view of the
disparity—in several instances a marked disparity—in the size and population of
divisions. The recommendation in respect of the Eastern Region now is that the
members of the House of Representatives to be elected by the Eastern House shall
include not less than two members from each of the seven Provinces. In electing the
balance of members the Eastern House will be able to take into consideration the
distribution of population as well as the need to elect the most suitable people. In 
the North it has always been the intention that representation should be on a
Provincial basis and the General Conference recommended that there the number of
members to be elected by the House of Chiefs and the method of their election
should be determined by the Houses of the Northern Regional Council in joint ses-
sion. It has now been proposed by a Select Committee of the two Northern Houses
that each of the twelve Provinces should be represented by at least one Chief and
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one member of the House of Assembly, and that, subject to this proviso, the 68
members required for the Central Legislature should be elected by a Joint Council
consisting of an equal number of representatives from each of the two Northern
Houses.
9. Copies of the Reports by the Select Committees of the various Regional
Houses on the arrangements for electing members to the Regional Legislatures—a
matter in which you have expressed much interest—have already been forwarded to
you and have received your general approval. In view of the disparity in size,
communications and administrative structure of the various Regions it has not, of
course, been possible to arrange the details of electoral procedure with complete
uniformity. But the method will everywhere be popular election through electoral
colleges, except in Lagos, where election will be direct as at present. In the Eastern
Region the representatives elected by the people at the primary elections will form
divisional electoral colleges, which will themselves elect representatives to the
Regional Houses. The procedure will be similar in the Western Region, except that in
many areas there will be another intermediate stage between the primary elections
and the divisional electoral colleges. In the Northern Region, with its greater
distances, it will be necessary to have two or three tiers between the primary
elections and the provincial electoral colleges. The Select Committees of the
Regional Houses for the Northern and Western Regions have recommended that
Native Authorities should participate in the electoral arrangements for those Regions
at the appropriate level and this recommendation has general support in the two
Regions. It is a reflection of the importance of Native Authorities in the life of the
Northern and Western Regions and the arrangement will ensure that in these
Regions the Native Authorities can make available for service in the Regional
Legislatures men of experience and ability who might not otherwise be eligible for
election. I wish to pay tribute to the care with which the Select Committees of the
Regional Houses have worked out their recommendations for electoral
arrangements. I am satisfied that in the terms of paragraph 10 of your despatch of
the 15th July, 1950 these arrangements will ensure that the members elected will be
genuinely representative of all the people of the areas concerned; that the elections
will be free and fair; and that the form of election will be properly adapted to the
circumstances of each area.
10. It has been found necessary to re-consider the question of presiding officers
for the various legislatures. It was recommended by Legislative Council in
September 1950 that the Governor should preside over the House of Representatives.
I appreciate the reason for this recommendation, but as progress is made towards a
system of responsible government, it would be inappropriate for the Governor, as
head of the Executive, to continue to preside over that House. I accordingly
recommend that provision be made for the Governor to appoint for the House of
Representatives a permanent President who, I suggest, should not be a member of
the House. Until such a President is appointed the Governor himself would continue
to preside over meetings of the House.
11. The recommendation of the General Conference that each Regional House
should decide its own method of selecting its Presiding Officer was at variance with
the recommendations of the Regional Conferences and it seems reasonable to re-
examine those recommendations. In the North it had been proposed that the
Lieutenant-Governor and a Senior Resident should preside over the House of Chiefs
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and House of Assembly respectively. I recommend that the Lieutenant-Governor
should preside over the House of Chiefs and that it be for him to appoint the
president of the House of Assembly. The Western Regional Conference proposed that
the Lieutenant-Governor should preside over the House of Assembly and that the
House of Chiefs should select a president from amongst its own members. Here, too,
I recommend that the Lieutenant-Governor should preside over the House of Chiefs
and that it should be for him to appoint the president of the House of Assembly. The
Eastern Regional Conference proposed that the Lieutenant-Governor should preside
over the Regional House. This recommendation should, in my view, be followed, and
I also consider that the Lieutenant-Governor should be empowered to appoint a Vice-
President from among the members of the House to preside in his absence.
12. I now turn to deal with the executive authority at the Centre and in the
Regions. In your despatch of the 15th July, 1950, you emphasised the importance
which you attached to the principle of regional autonomy, but at the same time you
stated in very clear terms the importance which you attached to preserving and
strengthening the unity of Nigeria and you welcomed the recommendations of the
General Conference for a strong Central Legislature and Executive. I consider it a
matter of the highest importance that the overall and over-riding authority of the
Central Government should be clearly expressed in the Constitutional Instruments,
and that the authority of Regional Executives should be clearly defined in such a
manner that, while there is no derogation from the degree of autonomy proposed for
them, their subordination on matters of general policy to the Central Executive is
placed beyond all question. There should therefore in my view be some elaboration in
the Constitutional Instruments of the recommendation of the General Conference
that the Regional Administrations should formulate policy and direct executive
action subject to any general instructions issued on the grounds that the major
overall interest of Nigeria is involved. The Central Government must be in a position,
when necessary, to give to the Regional Administrations special directions with
respect to the exercise of the executive authority of the Regions for the purpose of
ensuring good government in Nigeria. It is implicit in the conception of the overall
authority of the Central Government that this power to give directions should relate
to the subjects listed in the General Conference recommendations as appropriate for
Regional legislative jurisdiction, as well as to the wide range of other subjects in
which it will be necessary for the Central Government to safeguard from time to time
the overall Nigerian interest.
13. In your despatch of the 15th of July 1950 you drew attention to the need to
evolve a system whereby the selection of members of the Council of Ministers would
be made in consultation between the Governor and the members of the Nigerian
Legislature representing each Region, and the selection of members of the Regional
Executive Councils would be made in consultation between the Lieutenant-
Governors and members of the Regional legislatures. I have had the opportunity of
personal discussion with you on this question and have now received your despatch
No. 147A of the 15th of April, 1951, setting out the considerations which have led His
Majesty’s Government to decide on a process of selection so designed as to be capable
of leading, in due course, to a system of selection similar to that obtaining in the
United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries. You have also pointed out the
advantages of carrying out selection of Central Ministers at the same time as
selection of Regional Ministers. The arguments which you have advanced in this
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matter seem to me, if I may say so with respect, wholly conclusive, and although, in
one respect, the arrangements involve a variation of the general conference proposal,
they remain in keeping with the sentiments inherent in it. I am accordingly satisfied
that there will be general agreement with, and acceptance of, the decision which His
Majesty’s Government have reached.
14. In dealing with the composition of the Regional Executives the General
Conference proposed that there should be five official members and nine Ministers in
the Northern and Eastern Regions and three official members and nine Ministers in
the Western Region. The position in respect of the Western Region has of course
altered by reason of the subsequent recommendation of Legislative Council that
Lagos and the Colony should be included, for administrative and legislative purposes,
within this Regions, and it is clearly desirable that the Western Executive should be
as large as those proposed for the other Regions. I recommend accordingly that the
maximum number of official members of the Western Regional Council should be
five as for the other two Regions. The number of Ministers to be found from among
members of Regional Houses was not prescribed by the General Conference with any
regard to the volume of work which might fall to these Ministers nor to the division
of subjects which might prove practicable. Examination of these points has shown
that it may not be necessary, at least at first, to have as many as nine Ministers
selected in each Region from the Regional Houses, and it is now proposed that in the
Northern and Western Regions the minimum number of Ministers should be six and
the maximum number nine, and that in the Eastern Region the minimum number
should be seven and the maximum number nine. A higher minimum figure has been
proposed for the East in order to provide for one Minister from the Trust Territory of
the Cameroons, as recommended by the General Conference. The actual number of
Ministers selected would vary in each Region according to the volume and nature of
work. The distribution of portfolios among Ministers at the Centre and in the
Regions should be at the discretion of the Governor and the Lieutenant-Governor
respectively.
15. It was proposed by the General Conference that the appointment of Ministers
at the Centre and in the Regions should be terminated in the event of an adverse vote
by the Legislature. Such a vote was to be carried by a two-thirds majority of members
present of the House of Representatives at the Centre; a two-thirds majority of a joint
meeting of the House of Chiefs and House of Assembly in the Northern and Western
Regions; or a two-thirds majority of the members present in the House of Assembly
in the Eastern Region. To avoid the possibility, in so far as the Northern and Western
Regions are concerned, of the numerically stronger House imposing its opinion on
the other House, it is now recommended that a Regional Minister in the Northern or
Western Region should be removed in the event of an adverse vote of two-thirds of all
the members of the House from which he was selected. In the Eastern Region the
vote required would be of all the members of the House of Assembly.
16. Even with these provisions, however, it would still be possible for the case to
arise of a Minister who refused to abide by the policy decided by his colleagues in the
Council of Ministers or in the Regional Executive Council and at the same time
refuse to resign. In order to deal with such a case the Governor or Lieutenant-
Governor should have the power to terminate the appointment of a Minister, and I
recommend that such provision be made in the Constitutional Instruments.
17. I come now to the question of legislative procedure, more particularly in
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respect of Regional legislation. Regions are being given the right to legislate on a
specified range of subjects, but the Central Legislature can legislate on all subjects,
including those specified for Regions. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine
whether the Central or Regional law should prevail in the case of conflict. I suggest
that the simplest arrangement is for Central legislation existing at the time of the
inauguration of the new Constitution to prevail until such time as Regional
legislation is enacted and replaces it wholly or in part. Occasion may subsequently
arise—but in all probability only very seldom—when the Centre has to take
legislative action on the same aspect of the Regional subject: the Regional law
existing at the time would then become inoperative to the extent indicated in the
Central legislation. I do not anticipate any serious conflict of legislation in this
matter.
18. The General Conference recommended concurrent and equal powers for
each House in the bicameral Regional Legislatures of the North and West, any
disagreement between the two Houses in either Region being resolved by a majority
vote of the two Houses in joint session. While ordinary legislation can no doubt be
appropriately introduced for the first time before either House of a bicameral
Legislature, it would be in accordance with modern democratic theory and practice
for money Bills to be introduced in the first instance before the more directly
representative of the two Houses, that is to say the House of Assembly, and I
recommend an elaboration of the Ibadan Conference proposals on these lines. I
would further vary the proposals, in so far as a deadlock between two Houses may
arise, by recommending that in such an event each of the two Houses should select
an equal number of representatives to sit in joint session to decide the point of
difference by majority vote. This amendment of the General Conference proposal
would prevent the numerically stronger House from imposing its wishes on the
other.
19. Under the proposal of the Legislative Council in April, 1950, legislation
passed by Regional Legislatures is to be referred to the Governor in Council for
examination, in the light of the General Conference proposals, to determine whether
it is in conflict with any major overall Nigerian interest, with any convention or
agreement binding on Nigeria or with the fiscal policy of Nigeria. In view of the
considerations which I have put forward in paragraph 12 of this Despatch, I
recommend that it should also be the function of the Governor in Council to
determine whether the Regional legislation relates to a matter in respect of which
the Region can properly make laws, whether any expenditure authorised is on
subjects specified in the Regional financial field, and whether it is inconsistent with
any executive directions given to the Region by the Central Executive. Should the
legislation offend any of these stipulations, and the offending provisions not be
curable simply by amendment, then the legislation must be disallowed; should the
point in issue be curable by amendment without invalidating the whole of the
legislation, amendments would be suggested by the Governor-in-Council for
adoption by the Regional House concerned, no doubt after close consultation
between the Central and Regional Governments.
20. The General Conference proposed continuance of the present system
whereby Central legislation is debated first in Regional Houses. The position in the
new Constitution will of course be materially altered in that the Regional Houses will
no longer be merely advisory but will have their own legislative powers over a defined
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field. Since moreover the Central Legislature will be composed almost entirely of
members elected from Regional Houses, there should be no necessity in the normal
course for Regional Houses to debate Central, as well as their own Regional, bills. I
propose, therefore, that while Central Bills will be laid on the table of Regional
Houses, no debate should take place on them unless on a definite motion to that
effect.
21. The recommendations made in this Despatch have already been discussed
with yourself or your advisers and I trust that you will find yourself able to give
formal consent to their incorporation in the Constitutional Instruments. I have not
covered in this despatch questions of financial allocation or procedure, arising out of
the Report of the Revenue Allocation Commission, or matters relating to the Civil
Service, as these will more appropriately be the subject of separate communications.
22. Finally I would refer to the strong indication in paragraph 16 of your
Despatch of the 15th of July 1950 of your view that the new constitutional changes
should be allowed to operate for a reasonable period before further changes are
considered. With this view I fully concur. The changes now to be introduced are the
result of a long series of meetings and conferences representative of all shades of
opinion and interests in this Territory. The broad measure of general agreement
reached is, I consider, evidence in itself of the timely nature of these reforms, which
are in many features the logical development of the political system inaugurated in
1946. It indicates also the widespread desire by men of goodwill to give those called
upon to operate the changes—that greatly increased number of Nigerians who
henceforth, both at the Centre and through the devolution of responsibility to the
regions, will bear a full share in the shaping of Government policy and the direction
of executive action—a clear and uninterrupted opportunity to prove that their
capacity is in keeping with the trust placed in them. By reason of the magnitude of
the issues involved, and because of the vital importance for the Nigeria of tomorrow
of ordered political, economic and social development today, these men will carry a
heavy burden, particularly in the unsettled world conditions in which they begin
their task. But I would record my conviction that, with goodwill and a general
readiness to work in the interests of Nigeria as a whole, they will not fail, and that
this new political advance will be proved by them to have been fully justified.
140 CO 537/7166, no 8 25–28 May 1951
[Constitutional review]: minutes by R J Vile and L H Gorsuch on the
remaining issues requiring decision for the proposed new constitution
In submitting, as I now do opposite, the first draft of the despatch to be published
about the constitutional Instruments to give effect to the proposals for a new
Constitution in Nigeria, it is I think desirable first of all to give some account of the
course of events which have led up to the present situation where we hope that the
Constitution Order in Council will be promulgated in June.1
1 The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951, establishing the new constitution, was promulgated
on 29 June 1951.
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It was in 1948 that Sir J. Macpherson first suggested that the existing Nigerian
Constitution should be reviewed. The procedure adopted for the review involved
nation-wide consultation and it culminated in a General Conference held at Ibadan
in January 1950. The recommendations made by this General Conference are for easy
reference attached loosely opposite, and they left unsolved at that time one major
question, the composition of the Central Legislature. This question was again
considered by a Select Committee of Legislative Council in April 1950 which after
considering various possibilities remitted further consideration of the matter to
Regional Houses. At the same time the Select Committee reached a number of
important decisions about the recommendations of the General Conference, notably
that Lagos should be included in the Western Region, that the Central Executive
should have the power of referring back or rejecting regional Legislation and that
disagreements between the two House of Regional Legislatures in the North and
West should be referred to a joint meeting composed of equal numbers of both
Houses. In May the major questions raised by the recommendations of the General
Conference were referred to the Cabinet which approved the line of policy taken by
the Secretary of State in his published despatch of the 15th July 1950, of copy of
which, together with a copy of the Select Committee report, is also attached loosely
opposite. In this despatch the Secretary of State said that His Majesty’s Government
accepted the recommendations made subject to the further examination of details
when the constitutional review is completed, together with variations suggested by
the Select Committee of April.
The next important step occurred in September when Legislative Council met
again and adopted a report of its Select Committee that there should be one House in
the Central Legislature, that in that House Northern representation should be equal
to that of the other two regions together, that there should be 148 members in that
House, that the Governor should continue to preside and that there should be six
special members. In November 1950 the Secretary of State informed the House of
Commons that he accepted the recommendations of the Select Committee of
September. Since that date no public announcements have been made about the
views of His Majesty’s Government and the time has been taken in the consideration
of the drafts of the constitutional Instruments. We have now reached the point where
the major part of the final draft has been sent to Nigeria for their comments and with
the exception of a small number of outstanding points agreement has been reached
with the Nigerian Government on all major questions of principle. The only major
point of difference which has arisen is not really one of constitutional principle but
concerns the question whether there should be provision for detailed financial
procedure in the Order in Council. The situation here is that it would not be possible
to provide any detail for financial procedure if the Order is to be promulgated in
June, and although we have not yet heard from Nigeria we can, I think, assume that
they will not wish to hold up the Order in Council on this score.
There is, I think, no need to argue the case for a published statement by His
Majesty’s Government on the Nigerian Constitution as it is to be promulgated in the
Order in Council. The previous despatch was printed in Nigeria and copies were
made available to the press in the United Kingdom, but it was not printed in the
United Kingdom. This despatch is, I suggest, of far greater importance and therefore
it seems necessary that it should be printed and published in the United Kingdom. I
would also suggest that it should be published in the Colonial series and not as a
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command paper. The date of publication should, I suggest, be the date on which the
Order in Council is laid before Parliament. This does not leave us much time and the
Governor has asked if he may have the opportunity of commenting on the terms of
the despatch.
The purpose of the despatch, I suggest, is to explain the fundamental purpose of
the constitutional change, to explain the points on which His Majesty’s Government
have not found it possible to accept certain of the recommendations made and to
refer to two questions which, although not included in the Order in Council, are
nevertheless highly relevant to it, those of revenue allocation and the electoral
arrangements. Before I go on to mention the points in more detail, it is, I think,
necessary to consider whether the Cabinet requires to be consulted again. In 1950
the Cabinet approved the general line of policy which the Secretary of State proposed
to follow and the present action proposed is completely consistent with the policy
which has been approved. Nevertheless the promulgation of this constitution is a
matter of such importance that I suggest it is necessary for the Secretary of State to
circulate to the Cabinet a paper for information showing what it is that he now
proposes to do.
The important matters to which reference needs to be made in the despatch have
also been considered by the Nigerian Government, and we have from them a memo-
randum enclosed with Sir J. Macpherson’s letter which arrived during the considera-
tion of the nature of the published despatch. The draft contains an account of the
reasons why some recommendations on these matters have not been accepted and I
only propose here to indicate the ways in which different views have been arrived at.
(a) Composition of central legislature
The General Conference made no recommendation on this point and the
recommendation made by the Select Committee of September 1950 has been
followed.
(b) Review of regional legislation
The recommendations of the General Conference (III F) have not been followed but
instead the recommendation at para 6 of the April Select Committee report has been
followed. The opportunity has been taken to add a further function in respect of
regional legislation to the Central Council of Ministers, i.e. to decide whether
regional legislation is within the powers of a Regional Legislature. The alternative
was to leave this matter to the courts to decide and it was felt that this would not be
satisfactory in Nigerian circumstances.
(c) Executive authority
The recommendations of the General Conference (IV B 1) left in considerable doubt
the ability of the Nigerian Government to enforce its will on regional
administrations. In view of the need to ensure that the unity of Nigeria is not
damaged and in order to take account of the ultimate responsibility of the Governor
for the administration of the territory as well as to provide for the ability of the
Central Government to get services performed on its behalf by regional
administrations properly executed, provision is being made in the constitutional
Instruments to ensure that the Central Executive can give directions to Regional
Executives on any matter. The relevant section in the draft Order in Council occurs
in Chapter V at Section 114.
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(d) Selection of ministers and allocation of portfolios
Considerable discussion has taken place with the Nigerian Government about the
recommendations made by the General Conference which were that unofficial
members of the Central Council of Ministers and Regional Executive Councils should
be elected and that the Councils themselves should decide the allocation of
portfolios. Following the letter sent at (81) on the 1950 papers, the Governor said
that he was willing to accept the Colonial Office view. He has informed his Executive
Council but the decision is not known to anyone else in Nigeria. The relevant
sections of the draft are Sections 121, 123, 124, 125, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147,
148, and 149. These sections give effect to the proposals in the letter at (81) on the
1950 papers. In the memorandum sent by Sir J. Macpherson at para 8, the suggestion
is made that this decision should be shown to be one made by the Secretary of State
and that it should be so expressed in the published despatch. I think we can accept
this suggestion which clearly reflects the course of the discussion and I have
attempted in the draft opposite to meet the suggestion made.
(e) Special members
In the case of the Central Legislature we are following the recommendation made by
the Select Committee of September. In the case of the Northern Region, we are
following the recommendation made by the General Conference. In the case of the
Western Region, the proposal incorporated in the constitutional Instruments has
been discussed by the Chief Commissioner with members of the Regional House and
accepted by them. In the case of the Eastern Region, the Chief Commissioner
engaged in informal discussions and has reported that the proposal is acceptable. No
public announcement has been made in Nigeria of this decision.
(f ) Presiding officers
Although the General Conference recommended that each House should choose its
own Presiding Officer, it has not been considered in the discussions which have
taken place since November that this would be desirable or practicable. In the
memorandum furnished by Nigeria in paras 19 to 21 are set out the reasons why it is
preferable in these instances to follow the recommendations made by Regional
Conferences rather than recommendations of the General Conference.
I do not think it necessary to comment on the question of revenue allocation. The
Governor has said that he hopes to let the Secretary of State have his final
recommendations in two months and that it would be possible for the Order in
Council on revenue allocation to be promulgated in October. Separate consideration
is being given to its despatch. On the question of electoral arrangements, we have
already suggested separately to Sir J. Macpherson at (15) on 30453/14 the line which
might be taken in the published despatch and I have drafted on this basis.
I should finally say that the draft now submitted has been carefully checked by Mr.
McPetrie, to whom I am grateful for a number of valuable suggestions.
R.J.V.
25.5.51
Sir T. Lloyd
Work on the Nigerian Constitutional Instruments is now approaching completion.
The final drafts are in course of agreement with Nigeria and will shortly go for
printing, and the Instruments will be presented to a meeting of the Privy Council
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which it is hoped will be towards the end of June. The Nigerian Government are
anxious that fairly detailed financial provisions shall be made by Order-in-Council,
but these will in any case be dependent upon the decisions finally taken on the report
of the Revenue Allocation Commission which is at present under consideration in
Nigeria. There must, therefore, be in any case a separate financial Order-in-Council,
over which there is no immediate urgency.
The following questions now require decision and action:—
(1) Is any further reference to the Cabinet or to the Prime Minister required? A
copy of the Cabinet paper of May 1950 will be found at 33A on the 1950 file and the
Cabinet conclusions are at 34. As the general policy of constitutional reform was
approved at that date further reference to the Cabinet may be unnecessary, but I am
not sure whether the Secretary of State will wish to send a short note to the Prime
Minister.
(2) Consultation with the Ministry of Defence. A very full letter was sent to the
Ministry at 22E on the 1950 file in April 1950 and at 23A the Ministry replied
agreeing that defence interests will be satisfactorily safeguarded under the new
arrangements. I do not think, therefore, that any further reference to them is
necessary.
(3) Information to Commonwealth Relations Office, other Colonial Governments,
Foreign Office and our representatives in the U.S.A. There is a copy opposite of a
background Intel which was issued in April of this year. I think that, concurrently
with the promulgation of the new Instruments, we should arrange for the issue of a
further document of this kind in which the main features of the new Constitution
will be summarised.
(4) Exchange of further despatches between the Governor and the Secretary of
State for publication. In this connection please see the Governor’s letter at 8
opposite. As he suggests in para 3 of that letter, we shall have to issue in due course a
despatch from the Secretary of State on the lines of the Gold Coast despatch No. 492
on the subject of the Public Service Commission and safeguards for the Public
Service. The financial side will have to be the subject of a separate despatch also in
conjunction with the financial Order-in-Council. There will presumably also have to
be a despatch on ministerial responsibility on the lines of the Gold Coast despatch on
that subject. It remains to consider what published despatches should accompany
the issue of the new Instruments. The Governor seems to contemplate in 8 that there
should be three such despatches:-
(a) a despatch from the Secretary of State setting out his reasons for the decision
in regard to the selection of Ministers;
(b) a despatch from the Governor to the Secretary of State incorporating the
material in the memorandum forwarded with 8;
(c) a despatch from the Secretary of State in reply giving his approval of the
various changes and developments covered by this memorandum and
commenting generally on the Constitution.
You will see that before 8 arrived Mr. Vile, in collaboration with Mr. McPetrie, had
been working on a draft despatch to the Governor to be published simultaneously
with the new Instruments. While this draft will provide valuable material, my feeling
is that it would be better for several reasons that all the modifications and
developments, which have occurred in the working out of the Constitution since the
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Secretary of State’s published despatch No. 464A of July 1950 (loose copy opposite)2
and which have emanated from discussions in Nigeria, should be dealt with in a
reporting despatch from the Governor. The despatch from the Secretary of State in
reply would give his formal approval to these modifications and developments, would
add comments in amplification of No. 464A where necessary (e.g. electoral
arrangements) and would deal with the broader aspects of high policy which are
involved in the new Constitution. It is indeed possible that we could work into these
two despatches references and explanations on the subject of selection of Ministers
which would avoid the necessity of having a separate despatch on this subject while,
at the same time, making it clear, as the Governor wishes us to do, that the decision
on this particular point has been that of the Secretary of State.
I think it would save time and further minuting if I could discuss these points with
you, and if you agree I will bring Mr. Vile and Mr. McPetrie.
L.H.G.
28.5.51
2 See 116
141 CO 583/307/1, no 16 28 May 1951
[Constitutional review]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to L H Gorsuch
on electoral arrangements under the proposed new constitution
This is in reply to your secret letter No. 30453/14/51 of the 11th of May in which was
discussed the question whether the Secretary of State in a despatch on the revised
Constitution, for publication, should say anything about the electoral arrangements
in general and about the Western Provinces’ arrangement in particular.
I know that I need not defend, to the Secretary of State or any of you in London,
the system of indirect election by means of primary elections and Divisional and
Provincial electoral meetings. The Secretary of State has accepted the arrangements
as suitable for Nigeria at this stage in her development. I know, too, that from a
distance (e.g. in less informed quarters in Parliament) they may look rather ‘bush’
and not fully in line with Western ideas about the mechanics of democratic elections,
and that as we become more mature politically we shall probably want to conform
more closely to these Western ideas. (Even so, I take leave to doubt whether our
thousands of stout-hearted warlike pagans, who don’t wear clothes but usually carry
a couple of spears, will be ready for the ballot box, and direct elections, even in five
years time. Despite all our efforts to fit them for the impact of civilization—for good
or ill—there are areas, such as Gwoza where I was last month, which our self-styled
political leaders could not visit without a District Officer and an escort; otherwise
they would almost certainly be bumped off, and perhaps eaten!)
My anxiety is that I feel that it is not easy for the Secretary of State to make a
pronouncement about adopting better—or ‘more precise’—arrangements in five
years’ time without appearing to criticize, if only by implication, our proposed
arrangements, and, by a natural extension, our entire Constitution. This would play
into the hands of the wreckers and confusionists.
The proposed arrangements are, as you know, favoured by the overwhelming
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majority of thinking Nigerians (many, of course, think that the pace is dangerously
fast) and go as far as informed opinion would be prepared to let us go. Moreover, in
spite of occasional references to the desirability of direct election by universal adult
suffrage and to the ‘bogus’ nature of the new Constitution, the older political
‘parties’, and several new mushroom growths, are all campaigning vigorously already
on the basis of the approved electoral arrangements, with a view to capturing seats at
every stage.
I sincerely believe that these arrangements will give a truer representation than
anything more sophisticated. And the issue is wide open. My guess is that the
‘professional’ politicians and their so-called political parties will have considerable
success, particularly in the larger centres of population. And I am quite certain that
it is better to have some of the more extreme elements inside the structure, where
they will learn by having to take responsibility, rather than that they should all be
outside throwing bricks at it. But though we have statesmen in the Regions (and I
hope for Nigeria’s sake that they will be successful at the polls) our self-styled
political leaders have shown few signs of honesty or sincere desire to serve their
country. A pronouncement by the Secretary of State which implied that the new
Constitution was not progressive enough would be a splendid plank for their election
campaign. And if they came to power they would be likely to use that argument to
press immediately for further changes in the Constitution. I don’t want to start
discussions now about our next Constitution! We want to make this one work and to
be able to devote all our energies to more profitable pursuits than Constitution-
making!
So far as the Western and Northern Regions are concerned the electoral
arrangements are a good deal more progressive than was recommended in the
respective Regional Conferences. For example, it was originally proposed by the
Western Regional Conference that
‘the Electoral Colleges shall be organized by the Local (Native) Authorities
but the Electoral Colleges may include non-members of the Local (Native)
Authority Council as well as members’.
Now, as you know, there will be free primary elections in the West as elsewhere,
and though provision is being made for an injection of up to 50% of Native
Administration representation at the intermediate stage between primary elections
and the Divisional Electoral Meeting or College, I understand that in many areas the
proportion will not be anything like so much as 50%.
The North, too, has moved quite a long way. As a measure of their advance I need
only remark that some months ago the Chief Commissioner, and others, were
wondering how to ensure that the Native Administrations were not totally
unrepresented in the House of Assembly! Originally the North proposed to exclude
all Southerners from taking any part in the elections in that Region. Now, although
they still insist upon three years’ residence as a qualification for election to the
House of Assembly the voting qualifications, restricted to males, are the same for all,
and the same as in the other Regions.
In the light of all that I have written I most earnestly hope that the Secretary of
State, in discussing our electoral arrangements, will emphasize that they have been
worked out by the Regions themselves and are suited to our needs and
circumstances; and that he will refrain, as far as he feels able to do so, from appearing
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to reflect adversely upon them by anticipating future changes. In short, it is the final
sentence of your penultimate paragraph which bothers me.
P.S. I am still very worried about the North-West boundary question. Recently it
has been squeezed out of the press by the polemics of party politics—with the
elections in view—but the Egbe Omo Oduduwa have so far refused to give an
undertaking not to prejudice the issue by fomenting the Yoruba elements in Ilorin
Province, and the activities in Ilorin of their emissaries are making the Emir very
angry and causing much trouble for the Administration. Moreover, the N.C.N.C.
have started on a series of tours throughout the country and everywhere they are
playing upon any quarrels or alleged grievances. We are keeping our fingers
crossed!
142 CO 537/7166, no 17 27 June 1951
[Constitutional review]: letter from Mr Griffiths to Mr Attlee on the
progress of the constitutional review
Prime Minister
Nigerian constitution
You will recall that in May, 1950, I circulated to the Cabinet a memorandum on the
Nigerian Constitution (C.P. (50) 94),1 in which I explained the main proposals for the
reform of the Constitution which had emerged from the nation-wide discussion at all
levels from the village upwards. The Cabinet approved those proposals, which can
best be summarised as providing for:
(i) greatly increased Regional autonomy within a United Nigeria;
(ii) giving Nigerians a full share in the shaping of Government policy and in the
direction of executive Government action in a Central Council of Ministers and
Regional Executive Councils; and
(iii) the creation of larger and more representative Regional Legislatures with
increased powers.
Now that the draft constitutional instruments which give effect to these proposals
are about to be laid before His Majesty in Council on the 29th June, I think that you
may wish to have an account of subsequent developments.
2. When the Cabinet approved the proposals which I put forward in May, 1950,
there still remained to be settled the question of Regional representation in the
Central Legislature. Agreement on this point was reached in Nigeria in September,
1950, the Northern Region, which has more than half the population, securing half
the seats in that Legislature, and I informed the House of Commons in November,
1950, that I had accepted this arrangement.
3. Suitable publicity will be given to the promulgation of the constitution
instruments and there will be published an exchange of despatches between the
Governor and myself to explain the more important aspects of the new Constitution.
The Governor and his Officers have worked extremely hard to ensure that the new
1 See 105.
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Constitution should be inaugurated without delay. You will recall that the review of
the Constitution began in 1948 on the initiative of the Governor and its successful
conclusion has owed much to his ability and to the soundness of the policy of ever-
increasing participation by Nigerians in the affairs of Government.
4. The future timetable of events will now be as follows. Elections will begin in
July. They will take the form of indirect elections through a system of electoral
colleges in which the primary elections will be direct. In some parts of Nigeria it may
take as long as five months to complete the elections. The new Regional Legislatures
will meet for the first time in December and the new Central Legislature in January,
1952.
5. Finally, in order to complete the constitutional instruments, a further Order-
in-Council will be required in October to make provision for the division of revenue
between Central and Regional Governments, following the principles recommended
in the report of an expert Commission which have been generally accepted in
Nigeria.2
2 Attlee briefly acknowledged this letter, at no 38, on 28 June, ‘. . . I am glad to have this report of
satisfactory progress’.
143 CO 537/7167B 28 June 1951
[Constitutional review]: letter from A B Cohen to A R I Mellor on the
representation of special interests in the new constitution
[This letter followed the meetings of representatives of business firms with the secretary
of state in June 1950 and with CO officials in Oct 1950 about the place for special interests
in the new constitution. See 114 and 122.]
When you called to see me on the 21st June we discussed the questions of special
members in the Central and Regional Legislatures under the new Nigerian
Constitution, and of the form in which it was intended to ensure that the principle of
non-discrimination was provided for in the constitutional instruments. I promised to
confirm in writing what I said to you on these two matters.
The constitutional instruments will provide for the appointment of three special
members in the Eastern and Western Houses of Assembly to represent special
interests. In the Northern House of Assembly provision will be made for the
appointment of ten nominated members to represent special interests, of whom
three will be appointed to represent commercial interests—although this will not be
stated in the instruments. These special members in Regional Legislatures and the
six special members who are to form part of the Central Legislature will be
nominated ‘to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented’. As I told
you at our meeting, and as the Governor has already made clear in discussion with
you and Gorsuch explained in his letter of the 28th February, it does not necessarily
follow from this that all fifteen members—i.e. six at the centre and three in each of
the regions—will be expatriate commercial employees. The Nigerian Government
expect that most, if not all, of the fifteen will be representatives of commerce, but
they do not regard themselves as bound in any way to fill all fifteen seats with
expatriates. 
On the question of the non-discrimination clause we have in the light of the Gold
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Coast provision considered very carefully whether such a clause could be included in
the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council. The matter has been fully considered in
Lagos by the Nigerian Government with the assistance of the Colonial Office legal
draftsman and has subsequently been considered by the Colonial Office here. The
difficulty lies in the differential land legislation in Nigeria designed to protect tribal
rights. It is essential as a matter of policy to maintain this legislation and it may be
necessary to amend it. A general prohibition of discriminatory legislation in the
Nigeria Order in Council will not therefore be possible. The Gold Coast Government
when they had this point to consider did not think that it would lead to comparable
difficulty there. We have considered the possibility in Nigeria that we might draw up
a clause which would specifically exempt certain classes of legislation from the
general prohibition on discriminatory legislation, but we are advised that such a
clause would not necessarily confine discrimination to the present field and would
not therefore be effective. In these circumstances we have not felt able to pursue that
particular suggestion.
Another consideration of considerable importance which I mentioned to you at
our meeting is the fact that under the new Nigerian Constitution the Governor will
retain his reserve powers precisely in their present form. In these circumstances, and
in the light of the difficulties to which I have referred in the preceding paragraph, we
have been led to the conclusion that it is preferable to include the clause about non-
discrimination in the Royal Instructions to the Governor. We are satisfied, as I think
you will be, that the protection which will be given by the obligation placed upon the
Governor to reserve for His Majesty’s pleasure before bringing into operation all
legislation which in his opinion imposes disabilities or restrictions on one racial
community to which other communities are not subject, will fully suffice to
safeguard the position. Equally we see no reason to suppose that at any future stage
of constitutional development in Nigeria it will not be possible, should this be
considered desirable, to ensure that provision to make discriminatory legislation
completely ultra vires is included in any future constitutional instruments.
The arguments which I have mentioned in this letter are intended to be
confidential, but you said that you would wish to circulate this letter to the members
of your Committee and of course we should have no objection to your doing so.
144 CO 583/307/1, no 23 30 June 1951
[Constitutional review]: despatch no 270 from Mr Griffiths to Sir J
Macpherson expressing congratulations on the completion of the
constitutional review
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 17A of the 15th
May1 dealing with the new constitution of Nigeria. As you say in paragraph 21 of this
despatch, the recommendations made in it have already formed the subject of
discussion between the Nigerian Government and the Colonial Office. The drafting of
the constitutional instruments has been a task of particular complexity, and has
necessarily taken much time and thought. It was, indeed, for the purpose of
1 See 139.
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shortening as much as possible the time which the work of drafting would take that
one of my Legal Advisors visited Nigeria in February for full discussion of the draft
constitutional instruments with yourself and your advisers. I am in agreement with
all that you say in your despatch and your recommendations have been incorporated
in the constitutional instruments, which have now been promulgated.
2. His Majesty’s Government and the people of this country have watched with
great interest and sympathy the progress of the constitutional review in Nigeria. I
wish to take this opportunity of endorsing what you say in paragraph 22 of your
despatch and expressing the confidence of His Majesty’s Government in the ability of
the peoples of Nigeria to work the constitution and to make it a living instrument for
the political progress of the country. The constitution is designed to give a greatly
increased measure of responsibility to Nigerians for the conduct of their own affairs
and, while granting increased autonomy to the three Regions, to build up a strong
and united Nigeria. It has been a matter of great satisfaction to me that the proposals
for the new constitution have been worked out so fully and with such a great
measure of agreement within Nigeria itself and that His Majesty’s Government have
been able broadly to accept them. In sending you the warmest wishes of His Majesty’s
Government for the success of the new constitution I should like to express my
appreciation to you for the initiative you took in 1948 in suggesting that the time
had come for a review of the constitution and my conviction that the policy of
bringing Nigerians into greater participation in the control of their own affairs will
continue with even greater success in the future.
145 CO 554/403, no 1 22 Aug 1951
[Nigerianisation]: inward savingram no 2594 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Griffiths outlining the number of Nigerians employed in the
senior service
Your Saving No. 1828 of 21st July. Nigerianization of the Senior Service.
Present position is as follows:—
(i) (a) Direct appointments to Senior Service since August, 1948 81
(b) Promotions to Senior Service since August, 1948 303
(c) African officers in the Senior Service in August, 1948 172
(d) African Senior Service Staff in the Railways in August, 1948 36
(e) Regrading of 9 A.M.OO and 2 A.V.OO 11
Total African Senior Service officers now serving 603
Subtract 4 officers in the Colliery, one casualty and 1 reversion 
to Junior Service 6
Net total 597 1
(ii) Total approved Establishment for Senior Service excluding 
Colliery and Electricity Corporations but including Railway and 
posts under Development Plan 4600
1 M Phillips noted in an accompanying minute dated 3 Sept 1951 that Nigerians comprised 16 per cent of
the senior service.
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(iii) Total actual strength of Senior Service 3730
(iv) Normal annual wastage from retirement, invaliding etc 
(corrected figure) 207
(v) Awards made under the Nigerianization Report:—
(a) Scholarships 283
(b) Training Courses 115
Total 398
2. The total under paragraph 1(v) above includes a number of partial awards.
There are in fact 3 or 4 full awards still to be made out of the total of 385
recommended by the Nigerianization Commission.
3. I regret that it is impossible to give any realistic estimate of the future rate of
Nigerianization. So far, Nigerianization has proceeded at the rate of approximately
140 per year. This rate may be increased in 2 or 3 years’ time when Government
Scholars become available in larger numbers. But many Scholars will be returning to
or entering the employment of Voluntary agencies; moreover, it is impossible to
assume that the Senior Service will be Nigerianized at an even rate. Nigerianization
naturally proceeds very such faster in some Departments than in others.
146 CO 554/235, no 2 Sept 1951
[Northern Nigeria]: informal notes by B E Sharwood-Smith on the
present political situation in the Northern Nigerian emirates
Note: No reference is made herein to the highly important and potentially explosive
situation in the non-Moslem areas of Adamawa and nearby territories but the same
principles as are outlined herein are, appropriately applied, relevant.
(a) Present political trends in the North are not, in any degree, the result of
popular demand neither are the people as a whole, in any sense ready, still less
anxious, for a more responsible part in the management of their affairs. Regrettably
‘Freedom from interference’ and continued ‘Freedom from responsibility’ are still a
cherished aspiration on the one hand and a cherished heritage on the other as far as
the mass of the population is concerned. Political awakening has yet to come and it is
our responsibility to see that the awakeners are persons of integrity and experience
and not self-seeking charlatans.
(b) All that we have so far got in the North is a class movement, with in certain
areas in particular a definite racial bias (Habi v Fulani). This class movement has two
wings. On the one hand there are the more experienced N.A. officials. The Senior
African staff of Gaskiya1 and leading members of the Northern Peoples Congress. On
the other hand there is the Northern Elements Progressive Union which draws its
recruits from the younger and more irresponsible members of the literate and semi-
literate classes. A high proportion of Chiefs and leading personalities in the Emirates
are prepared to co-operate with the moderate progressives. N.E.P.U. on the other
hand and all its works is anathema to them.
1 Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo (‘Truth is worth more than a penny’) was a Hausa language newspaper published
by the Gaskiya Corporation, a government-owned printing and publishing body.
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(c) It has been stressed that so far neither the N.P.C. or N.E.P.U. have any popular
backing but it must be equally stressed that, should the administration (Regional and
N.A.) fail to maintain the confidence of the people as a whole and fail to educate them
to the true facts of the current situation, there is little doubt that the carpet-bagging
demagogue will quickly step in and, by making statements that cannot be
substantiated and promises that cannot be fulfilled, swing popular opinion in the
direction of a revolt against the existing regime. Such a denouement can be only too
easy for a practised agitator working on an emotional and unenlightened peasantry,
already unduly exploited by a corrupt officialdom. Should there be a period of social
or economic distress due to famine or disease there could well be trouble, for the
northern agitator has come to stay and he is learning the classic techniques of his
trade and acquiring financial support from outside the Region.
(d) To take the other side of the picture. At the present time 90% of the population
unsubjected so far to outside influences, is completely loyal, sometimes blindly loyal,
to its Chiefs. Therefore, to stampede or over-persuade these to concede, too
precipitately, authority which they still feel deeply it is their moral and religious duty
to retain would result in the antagonising of the great mass of the population for the
sake of the fickle favour of the vocal few. Decentralisation and delegation must come
as rapidly as possible but only in terms of the ability of a modernised machine to take
the strain. It would be the height of political unwisdom to forfeit the confidence of
the Chiefs in our good faith. We must carry with us the progressive emirs and they
will carry with them in their turn the more reactionary of their number.
(e) It is most important to realise that the recent report of the J.S.C. on Native
Authorities, Councils etc. constitutes in fact a very considerable advance both in
terms of what the Chiefs as a body could be expected to concede, and equally
important, what the people as a whole are ready from the point of view of political
and administrative advancement to accept.
The Chiefs, especially the more enlightened ones, are not so much jealously
clinging to privileges; they honestly feel that they will be betraying their peoples’
true interests if they hand over too much authority too soon to small sections of the
community whose motives, they, in certain cases mistrust and whose lack of
experience is patent to all. As regards high appointments, as matters stand, with very
few exceptions the best people available are, in my experience, appointed to all posts
of responsibility and, as far as possible, the wishes of the local population are taken
into consideration in local administrative appointments and public opinion in the
case of central posts.
The substitution of a method of ‘direct election’ for one of ‘selection after
consultation’ would in the case of important member posts soon play havoc with the
administration. The public would, at the present stage of its political development,
naturally elect the type of man who would worry it least with reforms and
innovations and a state of stagnation would follow.
(f) I was continually finding myself perturbed during the recent Cambridge
Conference by the insistence on ‘pattern’ which characterised the ‘academics’
combined with a failure or refusal, to realise the necessity for studying the problem
of personnel. Delegation there must be, but the personnel must first be found and
trained and for some time onward supervised. A complex of Councils and
Committees is of no value whatsoever until the manning problem is solved. On the
supervisory side the administrative staff is already more than fully occupied, to the
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exclusion of other important work, on duties connected mainly with the new
Constitution. Do let us get that in working order first. We can then try to use for
local Government all suitable human material that has been brought forward
whether the individuals in question have secured election to the Legislatures or not.
In the meantime the process of educating public opinion at all levels for its
responsibilities can go ahead in readiness for wide-spread operations in the field of
Local Government in 1952.
(g) Over and above this process I fully endorse the proposal that a suitable full-
time officer should be appointed to further the recommendations of the J.S.C. when
finally approved, provided that the eye of the administrative staff is not taken off the
constitutional ball for a further number of months and provided further that
attention is concentrated on pilot schemes rather than on a general overhaul.
(h) (i) To return to the question of the future of the two main political movements
in the North, the N.P.C. and the N.E.P.U. Regrettably the N.P.C. has lost a lot of
ground in recent months owing, partly, to the fact that its leaders and principal
adherents are busy men for whom politics can only be a part-time occupation, and
partly to the lack of a sufficiently positive and sufficiently publicised policy. The
N.E.P.U. leaders on the other hand, (vide the Kano ‘Comet’) are without other
employment, without inhibitions, without loyalties and without scruples. The
policy and tactics of the movement appeal to the imagination of the young N.A.
employee class, which needs, very naturally, some outlet for its emotions and
aspirations, and also to the younger elements of the mixed trading classes in Kano,
in particular, who resent the status of social inferiority imposed on them by the
Fulani ruling families and their supporters. Some youthful members of this same
class, incidentally, are also adherents of N.E.P.U. probably from a mixed sense of
adventure and hopes of a short cut to personal advancement and gain in political
channels.
(ii) It is very important that note should be taken of certain sinister aspects of
N.E.P.U., the idealisation and hero-worship of the leader, the distortion of local
history in the movement’s interests, the arrogation of the right to intervene
directly in the administration of the area and finally, the creation of badged, if not
yet uniformed gangs of young cyclist ‘storm troopers’. This technique is only too
familiar to us in Europe and any tendency to view it with tolerance or to sublimate
it in this instance because it has its roots in colonial soil should be strongly
resisted.
(iii) N.E.P.U.’s main weakness is its shameless assumption of omniscience, the
arrogant attitude of its youthful members to parents, elders and to all in
established authority and, more than anything, its mercenary and unhallowed
alliance with the infidel N.C.N.C. This last step taken to ensure publicity space in
the Zik Press and funds for future campaigning has made the movement and its
members to all orthodox Moslems and to all who fear ultimately its domination of
the country.
(iv) N.E.P.U.’s main strength, on the other hand, in the political field derives from
its press campaign against corruption in the N.A. service. There is no rival organ to
point out that this corruption is universal and that, so far from being confined to
senior officials and District Heads, it is most rampant among the very classes from
which N.E.P.U. draws its most vocal members. The roots, in point of fact, are
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deepest in Government service, in the Railway administration and in the
Department of Post and Telegraphs where it is so closely organised that all efforts
on the part of the Police and the Departments concerned have so far failed to make
any impression upon it.
(i) To turn to the future. There can be no progress without stability, neither can
we hope for stability until the responsible progressive elements in all communities
get together and produce a policy sufficiently positive to fire the imagination of the
young and sufficiently realistic to enlist the support of the present ruling classes who
after all, with all their defects, know their complex job well and know too that their
principal detractors are, for the most part, ignorant even of its simplest elements.
(ii) In common with the Government machine itself at the lower levels the
prevalence of corruption and the exploitation by officialdom of the individual is the
most vulnerable aspect of the present N.A. system. This weakness can and must be
brought within bounds if the system is to justify itself in the eyes of the people and in
the eyes of the outside world. Because it is endemic and universal, it cannot be
eradicated. It can, however, be controlled.
(iii) A step has already been made successfully in this direction in Kano, for
instance, where the trouble is far more prevalent than again for instance, in Sokoto.
Less successful attempts have been made to induce the leading trading and
governing families to sink their differences and that stability is essential to both and
a union of power, experience and wealth is the best way to achieve that stability.
(iv) It is probable that the Fulani feel that the coming elections will result in a
body of moderates manning the new House of Assembly, and that they have nothing
to fear. They do not yet see, for the most part, that unless they take action, the
radicalism that has won the day in the Wogi area of Kano in the face of the apathy of
the orthodox, will soon cross the city walls and spread thence to the main centres in
the Districts.
(v) The main hope for the future is an N.P.C. revival backed by the more
progressive Chiefs and supported by the more responsible of those who now adhere
to N.E.P.U. because there is no attractive alternative. The Editor of ‘Gaskiya’, with
whom I had a long discussion in July, is one of those who is aware of this fact. He
possesses more competence than most to bring it about given support and advice.
Footnote
The foregoing notes were originally jotted down for the personal information of Mr.
Hudson.2 They were not intended for a wider circulation. Since seeing them for the
first time in typescript I have made four or five minor amendments. In retrospect 
the notes seem to advocate the use of the brake, the steering apparatus and the
accelerator in that precise order i.e. the adoption of a somewhat over-cautious policy.
Such was not at all the intention. Subject to attention being paid to the major
hazards detailed, all three ‘aids’ should be used in the order and to the degree most
appropriate. The use of the brake permits acceleration over short stretches and
skilful steering at speed enables obstacles to be bye-passed before they actually
obstruct!
2 R S Hudson, head of the African Studies Branch, CO, 1949–1961.
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Finally, I discern an intolerant attitude towards the present leaders of N.E.P.U.
This is freely admitted. An intimate knowledge of the activities and the personalities
of the individuals concerned leaves no room for any other outlook in anyone who
cares for freedom, decency and true progress. One can respect the honest though
misguided zealot and feel sympathy for the less irresponsible enthusiasms of African
studentdom. N.E.P.U. leaders are of different metal.
147 CO 554/235, no 4 5 Nov 1951
[Local government reform]: CO minutes of a meeting with Sir J
Macpherson to discus local government reform in Northern Nigeria
The meeting was held at the Governor’s suggestion in order that he might have the
opportunity of informing the Colonial Office pending the despatch of an official
communication, of the line of approach taken by the Nigerian Government to the
proposed reform of Local Government in the North.1 To this effect, he outlined
certain points communicated to him by the Chief Secretary.
The Governor prefixed his remarks by speaking highly of Mr. Sharwood-Smith’s
skill and services in preserving unity among the Emirs at a time when new ideas
might easily have caused a split between them.
The following points were then considered:—
(a) Status of the emirs under the new proposals
The grievance of the bulk of Northern peoples have continually to be borne in mind
as a background to the problem of reform or ‘development’. The Emir has always
appeared to them as chief in his own right, so that acceptance of the concept of
Chief-in-Council might prove difficult. Nevertheless, it was essential that this
relationship should evolve; the development of a Chief-and-Council was dangerous
and strongly to be resisted. Far from exercising control over his council the Emir
must be bound by it.
The meeting fully endorsed the necessity of fostering this relationship.
(b) Necessity of internal evolution
Agreement was also expressed on the necessity of making any reform spring from the
ruling classes themselves; it should on no account be imposed upon them. For this
reason the proposal for an outside Commission of Enquiry should be resisted. The
new structure must evolve, from within. It was at the same time stressed that, in
order to avoid an upheaval with force at a later date, fostered by undesirable parties,
constitutional development and the elimination of corruption must be speedy.
(c) Appointment of a commissioner for local government
It was agreed that it was essential to install such an officer in the North to provide
the required driving force toward reform, rather than leave encouragement and
acceleration to be a duty performed by the Residents. In this connection, the name of
1 This followed the Maddocks and Pott report into local government in the Northern region, which was
completed in Dec 1950 and considered by a Joint Select Committee of the Northern Regional Council the
following year.
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Mr. Farley-Smith2 was put forward, it being felt that he is a man highly suited for this
important task. His attitude to the proposed reforms should be ascertained.
As a further step, the Governor announced his intention of stressing to the
Residents of the Northern Provinces at a forthcoming meeting the extreme urgency
of the matter.
2 T Farley Smith, senior district officer, 1946; administrative officer, 1947; staff grade, 1949.
148 CO 554/286, no 16 13 Nov 1951
[Revenue allocation]: memorandum by R J Vile on the Nigeria
(Revenue Allocation) Order in Council, 1951. Minutes by A B Cohen
and Sir T Lloyd
The 1946 constitution for Nigeria set up Regional Councils which apart from
advising on draft bills for enactment by the Nigerian Legislative Council also
exercised certain financial powers concerning the spending of money allocated to the
Regions by the Nigerian Government. The situation was then that the Regions had a
modicum of responsibility and financial power but in practice they often were
subject in all respects to the power of the Central Government of Nigeria. No
revenues were assigned to them by law and they had no powers of legislation.
When the 1946 constitution was reviewed in Nigeria a major feature of the
recommendations for a new constitution was the grant of certain powers of
legislation to the Regions together with executive responsibility for a number of
Departments. These proposals were accepted by H.M.G. in the U.K., and the Nigerian
(Constitution) Order in Council, 1951, divides Nigeria into three Regions and
constitutes for each Region a Regional Legislature with power to legislate on a
prescribed list of subjects, notably agriculture, health, social welfare, education,
public works, local government and the borrowing of money. Regional Legislatures
may also spend money on a number of additional things including Administration,
the Nigerian Police and Public Relations. The effect of these changes will be that the
Northern Region is likely to have to meet an expenditure of £41⁄2 millions in the
forthcoming financial year, the Western Region an expenditure of £41⁄4 millions and
the Eastern Region an expenditure of £33⁄4 millions. These sums are greater in
aggregate by some £41⁄4 millions than the expenditure incurred by all three Regions
two years ago.
In order to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the problems which would
undoubtedly arise in considering the method of allocating revenue to the three
Regions an Expert Commission of Enquiry investigated the matter in 1950 (the
members were Mr. J. R. Hicks of Nuffield College and Sir S. Phillipson, Nigerian
Special Commissioner, assisted by Mrs. Hicks). This Commission reported early in
1951 and its recommendations were considered by a committee, presided over by the
Nigerian Financial Secretary, consisting of five members drawn from each Region
(the Committee of Sixteen).
The Commission recognised that the ideal solution would be to give to Regions rev-
enues of their own which would suffice to meet their needs. The only revenues imme-
diately available for this purpose were those already given to the Regions under the
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existing system and a sales tax on motor spirit which the Regions could impose to
replace the present customs duty. These revenues were insufficient and the
Commission had therefore to consider what other revenues could be properly given
by the Nigerian Government to the Regions. They recommended that one half of the
tobacco tax should be given to the Regions in accordance with Regional consumption
of tobacco (the principle of derivation), that an amount (the capitation grant), which
should be the same in each Region in any one financial year, should be paid for every
adult male taxpayer in the Region (the principle of needs), and that grants to cover
expenditure on grants-in-aid to educational Voluntary Agencies and to cover expendi-
ture on the Nigeria Police should be paid to the Regions (the principle of national
interest). The Commission also recommended that a grant equal to 50% of the expen-
diture on Native Administration Police should be paid to Regions.
The Committee of Sixteen accepted these recommendations except that they pro-
posed by a majority that 100% of the tobacco tax should be allocated to Regions. The
figures now available for the probable yield on tobacco tax show that this proposal would
give one Region, the West, almost all the money it needs to meet its expenditure with-
out any capitation grant, but the two other Regions would require substantial capita-
tion grants to enable them to meet their expenditure and this would give the West a
very large surplus indeed. Because of the cost to the Nigerian Government of adopting
this proposal (some £21⁄4 millions) the Acting Governor of Nigeria has recommended
that the share of tobacco tax allocated to the Regions should be 50% (as recommended
by Hicks-Phillipson). The Acting Governor has also recommended an elaboration of the
Commission’s proposal that Regional expenditure on the Nigeria Police should be met
by a grant from central revenues. Apart from some other minor adjustments of the
Commission’s recommendations which are required for administrative purposes the
Acting Governor recommends that the Commission’s proposals be accepted. The pro-
posals have been examined in the Colonial Office and discussed with the Governor.
The Commission also proposed that there should be paid to the Northern Region a
grant not exceeding £2 millions, on the grounds that the Northern Region had
received less from central revenues in the past than the other Regions. The Committee
of Sixteen recommended that this sum should be increased to £3 millions but the
Acting Governor has been unable to accept this variation because there is no case to
support it and the Nigerian Government cannot afford to deplete its reserves.
It is now proposed to embody the recommendations, made by the Commission and
supported by the Acting Governor, in a Nigeria (Revenue Allocation) Order in
Council which is to be laid before the Privy Council at its meeting on the 4th
December. This Order will provide that Regions shall derive revenue from matters in
respect of which Regional Legislatures are competent to make laws. It will also
provide that one half of the tobacco duties shall be allocated to the three Regions in
proportion to Regional consumption, that all the customs duty on motor spirit shall
be similarly allocated until it has been replaced by a sales tax, that a capitation grant
shall be paid to the Regions from Nigerian revenues, and that an education grant, a
police grant and 50% of the cost of the Native Authority police forces shall also be
paid from Nigerian revenues to the Regions.
At the time of the promulgation of the Order in Council it is intended to publish
the exchange of the despatches between the Acting Governor and the Secretary of
State. Drafts of these despatches are attached to this memorandum. The concurrence
of the Acting Governor has not yet been received in these drafts.
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Minutes on 148
Sir T. Lloyd
Mr. Vile’s memorandum gives the background of this matter.
The allocation of revenue as between the three Regions of Nigeria and the Central
Nigerian Government has been one of the most difficult matters to handle in
connection with the new constitution. The North, which generally speaking has less
developed services than the other Regions, is labouring under a sense of grievance on
the ground that whereas a very large part of the economic strength of Nigeria comes
from the North and the North has more than half the population, they have not had a
fair share of expenditure. In order to deal with the matter the Commission referred
to by Mr. Vile was set up and made what in my view was a really brilliant Report,
ingeniously producing what is a practical solution in terms of the division of money,
and succeeding in basing this on certain justifiable principles. The Nigerian
Committee of 16 which considered the Report accepted it generally, but the North
and the West did a pretty disgraceful piece of horse trading, under which the North
was to get a £3 million capital grant instead of £2 million, as recommended by the
Hicks-Phillipson Commission, and all Regions to get 100% of the tobacco duties,
instead of 50% as recommended by the Hicks-Phillipson Commission—this latter
change would have particularly favoured the West.
Since the Commission reported and the Committee of 16 sat it has become evident
that, as a result of the changed plans by the tobacco industry, there is going to be an
enormous increase in revenue from tobacco duties. This makes any question of the
Regions getting 100% of the tobacco duty quite absurd, since this would throw out
the balance between the Regions and the Centre recommended by the Hicks-
Phillipson Commission, while, apart from that, the finances of the Central Nigerian
Government would be gravely impaired. The Nigerian Government have, therefore,
after very anxious thought, recommended that the Hicks-Phillipson Commission
should be accepted. We have discussed the matter at length with Sir John
Macpherson and Mr. Gray, the officer on the financial side of the Nigerian
Government who has been most closely concerned with this problem. We have come
to the conclusion that the Nigerian recommendation is the right one.
We are now in the final stages of completing the Order in Council designed to give
effect to these arrangements. It will come before the Privy Council on the 4th
December. When it is published it is to be accompanied by an exchange of
despatches. The draft of the Nigerian despatch has been discussed here with the
Governor and Mr. Grey and we have suggested a number of amendments to it. We
have sent these together with the draft of the brief reply from the Secretary of State
to the Acting Governor for his comments and Sir John Macpherson himself also has
copies. It is unlikely that any substantial comments will be made. We therefore
submit the drafts for the approval of Ministers.
A.B.C.
14.11.51
Minister of State
Mr. Vile’s very useful memorandum at No. 16, when read with Mr. Cohen’s minute
overleaf, will I think give you all the information that you need for a study of the two
drafts (flagged A and B) now submitted below the memorandum.
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Draft B is a revise of a draft (No. 1 on the file) prepared in Nigeria and submitted by
the Acting Governor. The revision has been carried out in consultation with Sir John
Macpherson and one of his senior Finance Officers (Mr. Grey) now in this country. I
have sent Mr. Vile a note on two points of detail arising on draft B. There is no point
in this draft to which I need draw special attention.
Draft A, which has been prepared here, is of a reply to the Acting Governor’s
despatch. Beyond accepting the local proposals it says very little, but as a matter of
form it has been referred to the Acting Governor for concurrence.
Finally, there is still under preparation the draft of an Order in Council giving
effect to all these proposals. That Order is expected to come before the Privy Council
on the 4th of December. The Secretary of State will, of course, still be in Malaya then
and arrangements should be made, if you agree, for you to attend the Council since it
is customary for one of our Ministers to be present whenever the Council has before
it a Colonial Order of any importance.
Nearer the time the Department would let you have a brief note about the Order in
Council in case H.M. should ask questions as he sometimes does.1
T.K.L.
14.11.51
1 Mr Lennox-Boyd noted (19 Nov): ‘I agree with both drafts and I will go to the Privy Council on Dec 4th.’
149 CO 554/286, no 36 Nov 1951
[Revenue allocation]: CO note for Mr Lennox-Boyd concerning the
Nigeria (Revenue Allocation) Order in Council, 1951
The Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1951 divides Nigeria into three Regions.
In each Region a Regional legislature will have power to legislate on a prescribed list
of subjects including agriculture, health, social welfare, education, public works and
local government, and the power to spend money on these subjects as well as on
additional matters including Administration, Police and Public Relations.
In the past all revenues in Nigeria have belonged to the Nigerian Government. The
purpose of the Nigeria (Revenue Allocation) order is to assign revenues to Regions.
The revenues so assigned are:—
(a) All revenues derived from matters in respect of which Regional legislatures
can make laws
(b) A sales tax on motor spirit: such a tax cannot be introduced at once and
meanwhile all the customs duty on motor spirit is assigned to the Regions.
(c) One half of the tobacco tax.
(d) A capitation grant paid from Nigerian revenues which is calculated on the
number of taxpayers in each Region multiplied by a capitation rate which is the
same for all Regions.
(e) Grants from Nigerian revenues to cover expenditure on grants-in-aid to
educational voluntary agencies.
(f ) Grants from Nigerian revenues to meet expenditure on the Nigerian Police.
(g) Grants from Nigerian revenues equal to 50% of the expenditure on Native
Administration Police.
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The revenues derived from these sources will be sufficient to permit Regions to
finance the services for which they are responsible. Because of the unequal
development of Regions the West will be better off than the North and the North
better off than the East in the immediate future but this state of affairs is not likely to
continue for long.
The Order also provides for payment of a £2 millions capital grant to the Northern
Region as recompense for past failure to spend in the North as such public revenue
per head of population as has been spent in the other Regions.
150 CO 554/290, no 3 19 Dec 1951
[Elections to Houses of Assembly]: inward telegram no 1749 from Sir
J Macpherson to T B Williamson on the outcome of the regional
elections
[Elections to the regional Houses of Assembly under the new constitution were held
between July and Dec 1951. These elections took place under an electoral college system
involving several stages. In the East, the NCNC won 65 of the 84 seats, in the West the AG
won 44 of the 80 seats contested but this number was increased by defections from the 30
or so NCNC seats thereafter. In the North, all NEPU candidates were defeated and the
NPC, still a very inchoate organisation, won an overwhelming majority, though a number
of representatives of middle belt parties were also returned. The issue to face the
administration once the elections were completed was the selection of members to
represent the Houses of Assembly in the House of Representatives; increasingly parties
took a ‘winner takes all’ view of this. In Dec Chief Bode Thomas,1 on behalf of the AG, sent
a telegram to the Labour Party in Britain, complaining at delays in the calling of the first
meeting of the Western House of Assembly and the failure to consult the majority leaders
in the Houses of Assembly over the choice of ministers; the Labour Party forwarded this
telegram to the CO who requested information from Macpherson. This episode
culminated in Jan 1952 in the AG’s successful manoeuvre to prevent Azikiwe, who had
won one of the five Lagos seats in the Western House of Assembly, from being nominated
to one of the two Lagos seats in the House of Representatives. By agreement, three of the
Lagos members (all of whom belonged to the NCNC) were to refuse to stand in order to
allow Azikiwe a clear run for the House of Representatives; in the event, and to allegations
of bribery and corruption, Ibiyinka Olorun-Nimbe and Adeleke Adedoyin refused to do so
and Azikiwe failed to be elected by the AG-dominated House; Azikiwe was thus sidelined
as leader of the opposition in the West.]
Begins. You will, of course, have realised that background to all this is war between
Action Group and N.C.N.C.
2. Main business of first meeting of Regional Legislature will be:—
(a) Election of Members of House of Representatives, and
(b) Consultation about choice of Regional and Central Ministers. Meeting will be
briefly suspended so that Lieutenant-Governor can fly to Lagos 14th January for
(c) consultation with me about the choice of Ministers (this has not been made
public yet). They will then return
(d) to obtain formal resolution from the Regional House on the choice made.
It is not essential that meetings should open simultaneously but no one
Legislature can proceed beyond stages (a) and (b) until all are ready for (c). I invite
reference to paragraph 5 of S. of S’s despatch No. 147 A.2 You will appreciate that it
1 Chief Bode Thomas, Balogun of Oyo; founding member and deputy leader of the AG; Federal Minister of
Transport, 1952–1953. 2 See 137.
12-(Doc139-178)-cp  15/7/01  7:30 am  Page 429
430 MACPHERSON AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW [151]
would be unsatisfactory and dangerous for one Region to be four weeks ahead of the
others with stage (b) completed, but in enforced idleness. If there is a long interval,
between (b) and (d) the greatest difficulty is to be expected in getting (d) through
(see second sentence of paragraph 5 below).
3. First meeting of Western House was tentatively fixed by the Chief Commissioner
for 10th December on the understanding that he would go to stage (a) only, but date
was not officially published. Eastern Region, at the same time, proposed to open for
business up to stage (a) only on 17th December. When it became apparent that North
could not open meeting before the first week in January and stage (c) could not, there-
fore, be reached until the middle of January, Western meeting was fixed for 7th
January. Eastern Region have similarly postponed until the 5th January.
4. As regards consultation with Action Group leaders, Chief Commissioner was
in difficult position until elections in Lagos and Benin had been completed and while
the party affiliations remain subject of Press controversy.3 In spite of N.C.N.C. claim
to the contrary, it now appears that Action Group adherents form the majority in
Western House of Assembly and Shankland had private consultation with Action
Group leaders last week. They are meeting Chief Commissioner tomorrow at his
invitation. This has not been made public. Intention of Constitution (ommission
?was that) Regional Legislature as a whole, not majority parties where they exist,
should have voice in the selection of Ministers. See section 128 of Order in Council,
paragraph 8 of S. of S. despatch No. 464 A of 15th July 1950,4 and paragraph 5 of S. of
S. despatch No. 147 A. Action Group, however, is determined completely to dominate
the Western Legislature and the Executive Council and so far as possible to exclude
others from the House of Representatives. In particular, such is their hatred and
jealousy of Azikiwe that they mean by hook or by crook to prevent him coming to the
House of Representatives. I believe their strategy in this matter misguided, but I
doubt if they will change and present view of Chief Commissioner West is that he
must play along with them (much as the Governor of the Gold Coast does with C.P.P)
if the machine is to work at all. Fortunately they want what we want and are
conscious of the need of our help, though they will not say so publicly.
5. Situation is very fluid but should be clearer after talks tomorrow. Fulminations
of Action Group were provoked by fear that N.C.N.C. would use period of postpone-
ment to wean away supporters. They should not be taken too seriously. It is a young
organisation and realises it is at disadvantage in the struggle with N.C.N.C., being
unknown overseas. You may get more telegrams of similar nature. Ends.
3 The Western elections were completed in Sept, but the elections for Lagos and Benin did not take place
until Nov and Dec respectively. 4 See 116.
151 CO 554/290, no 9 31 Dec 1951
[Constitutional review]: inward telegram no 199 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on a meeting with leaders of the Action
Group concerning the new constitution
My telegram No. 1790—Action Group.
Chief Secretary and I received Action Group leaders on 28th December. Main (who
will be acting L-G Western Region from 22nd January when Hoskyns-Abrahall leaves
12-(Doc139-178)-cp  15/7/01  7:30 am  Page 430
[151] DEC 1951 431
on retirement until return of Marshall) was present, also Shankland, Acting Civil
Secretary, Western Region. Awolowo brought with him Bode Thomas and Maja.1
2. The meeting lasted 21⁄2 hours. There was some pretty plain speaking—on both
sides—but the atmosphere was quite good. Agreed communique (their draft) said, in
part, that ‘A number of subjects arising as a result of the introduction of the new
Constitution were considered. The discussions took place in a frank and cordial
atmosphere and to the satisfaction of all those present.’
3. Although there was a large measure of agreement, they are still electioneering
and playing politics—rather naively. They make special point that they must prove to
their people that Nigerian Constitution is not inferior to that of the Gold Coast; thus
justifying decision to co-operate. At this meeting I did not feel we could risk a break
with them by turning down flat their less desirable demands, but I think I may have
persuaded them to go slow on most of them, at least until there has been
consultation with other Regions. The matters in question are as follows:—
(a) Salaries of Ministers. They want salaries of Ministers, with portfolios, to be
raised to £2,500 and to be the same in the Regions as at the Centre. I said that
salaries of Central Ministers must be fixed first—after discussion in Council of
Ministers. They agreed but will probably promise their Regional Ministers that
Western Region Budget meeting in February will raise salaries well above amounts
already tentatively fixed.
(b) They want Parliamentary Under-Secretaries to relieve Ministers and enable
them to tour. I am afraid that this is a case of copying Gold Coast and of finding
‘Jobs for the Boys’. I told them that I had an open mind on the question, but I was
not convinced that the amount of work justified these appointments. Why not wait
and see? I was afraid that they might hinder rather than help close co-operation
between Ministers and Heads of Departments in the initial stages at least, and I
didn’t like one Region starting this on its own. It was agreed that the other
Regions should be told of this idea and that their views should be sought.
(c) Leader of Government Business. This, to my mind, is the most dangerous and
undesirable of all the demands of the Action Group and I intend to do all in my
power to kill it. It is another instance of copying the Gold Coast. They argued that
Lieutenant-Governor would constantly want to consult the Leader of the majority
party before raising a question in Executive Council and that leader ought to have
status. I countered by saying that in my view Gold Coast had gone wrong on this.
In any case, our Constitution, as agreed by General Conference, provided that ex
officio members (who for a long time will be all expatriate) should be part of the
very fabric of the Constitutional Structure. Party politics had come sooner than
expected, but it would be wrong and dangerous to pretend that we had party Prime
Minister anywhere, by whatever bogus title he was called. I am not sure how far I
shook them on this, but they know that I am resolutely opposed to it and they also
know that there can be no question of a similar thing at the Centre, at least until
such time as there are Nigerian parties. I do not think they will press the issue
pending consultation with Ministers from other Regions. And Awolowo assured
me with a broad smile that they would not ‘walk out’ on this.
1 Dr Akinola Maja, medical practitioner and politician; president of NYM, 1944–1951; chairman of
National Emergency Council, 1949–1950, president of Egbe Omo Oduduwa from 1953. Known as ‘Father
of the AG’.
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(d) President, Western House of Assembly. You will have seen the record of
discussion of this matter at meeting which L-G Western Region had with Action
Group on 18th December. At our meeting here leaders agreed that qualifications
required were competence and impartiality and that the person must be
recognised to be impartial. They get the point that if anyone were appointed
against whom any colourable accusation of bias could be levelled, their position
would be seriously weakened. They still feel they are ‘committed’ to accepting only
a Nigerian as President of the Western House, and suggested that the duties of
President be carried out by an African Judge. The Chief Justice understandably
does not like the idea of a Judge being seconded, still less doubling the duties, as
he fears that his value as a Judge would be impaired. Action Group suggested
Jibowa who has since told Chief Justice that he agrees with Chief Justice’s
objections in principle, and furthermore would not wish to accept the job himself
if it were offered him. I am still urgently exploring other possibilities if only to tide
us over first formal meeting next week. Thereafter Action Group might feel
confident enough to make no protest about appointment of acceptable expatiate.
In any case, I do not believe they will go to the limit of obstruction on this.
4. I did my utmost to convince Awolowo of our sincere desire to co-operate, but I
also told him that they must respond. Once we get started, he cannot work together
with us and at the same time continue his tirades of abuse in the Press.
152 CO 967/173 8 Jan 1952
[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to Sir T Lloyd
on the impact of Gold Coast policy on Nigeria
[The first meeting of the new Legislative Council in the Gold Coast with Nkrumah as
leader of government business, took place in February 1951. Nkrumah’s determination to
press for further constitutional change, and Arden-Clarke’s willingness to accommodate
him, clearly posed difficulties for Macpherson’s hopes that Nigerian political leaders and
officials would be given a breathing space to adjust to operating the 1951 constitution. On
18 December 1951 Awolowo and other AG leaders met the chief commissioner of the
Western region explicitly to stress their determination to obtain as much power for
political leaders in Nigeria as their counter-parts had obtained in the Gold Coast. The
immediate pressure facing Macpherson when he wrote this letter was that the first
meeting of the Nigerian Council of Ministers was due to be held on 26 January and the
House of Representatives shortly after. (See 155). Subsequently in February 1952
Macpherson visited London for discussions with Lyttelton concerning the implications of
the appointment of Nkrumah, in March, as prime minister of the Gold Coast.]
Arden-Clarke is probably discussing the future of the Gold Coast with you as I
write.1 He told me about his visit and suggested that I might go out to the airport as
he passed through here yesterday. I was very glad to do this, and I took with me
Benson and Scrivenor2 because I thought that we should be concerting together
plans to ensure (with the help of His Majesty’s Government, including financial help
if necessary) that, in spite of the withdrawal from the Gold Coast Legislature of the
1 Arden-Clarke met with Lloyd at the CO on 9 Jan 1952. See BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed,
Ghana, part I, 112.
2 T V Scrivenor, civil service commissioner, Nigeria, 1947–1953.
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Motion on Lidbury, expatriation pay, or some equivalent inducement, would
continue to be paid to our chaps in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria.3 (We had been
following events in the Gold Coast with intense interest, and I called my people
together for a ‘war talk’ as soon as I heard of the rough passage that expatriation pay
received in the Gold Coast Legislature).
When we met at the airport the discussion was on a totally different basis from
what I had expected. Had I not been in so critical a position at the moment—with
Ministers to be chosen, in the Regions and at the Centre, within the next ten days—I
should have jumped into the aircraft with Arden-Clarke, trusting that the Secretary
of State would approve, ex post facto, my leaving my charge! Arden-Clarke told me
what he proposed to ask H.M.G. to agree to—i.e. (a) that the existing situation in the
Gold Coast should be recognized to the extent of calling Nkrumah Prime Minister
(whatever the restrictions on his ‘portfolio’ in the matter of defence, external
relations, etc.); (b) that the logical next step would be the disappearance of the ex-
officio Members of the Gold Coast Executive (possibly retaining an Attorney General
in the back-ground and employing expatriate Financial and Economic Advisers); and
(c) a threat to liquidate all District Officers over a period of five years. As regards
timing, I understood Arden-Clarke to say that he hoped that the announcement
about changing Nkrumah’s title to Prime Minister might be made at the end of this
month.
Let me say at once that I have always fully realised the gravity of the task that was
given to Arden-Clarke, and that I have watched with admiration the way in which he
has kept going what I have referred to as his ‘continuing miracle’. I have feared for
some time that Nkrumah would feel that he had to do something dramatic to
maintain his position, and I have feared that this would take the form of demanding
the elimination of the ex-officio Ministers. But I confess that when Arden-Clarke told
me that he was pressing for agreement to changes of this nature the shock was very
great, because I was bound to think of the effects here which would, I fear, be
catastrophic, despite our brave hopes. What made the shock worse was the news that
discussions had taken place with Nkrumah in London many months ago, and that
the former Secretary of State had agreed that it would be necessary to allow
Nkrumah to win further political advance along some such lines as these.4 With great
restraint, I made no comment to Arden-Clarke (we talk the same language and I
greatly admire him) but I am bound to say that I consider that the failure to tell us
about these conversations is very hard to understand—having regard to the great
and ever-increasing repercussions here from events in the Gold Coast.
As I say, I realise very clearly the critical situation in the Gold Coast. All I ask is
that in considering what action may be necessary there to save the Gold Coast for the
Empire you in London will not fail to realise that the result may be to pose the same
question for Nigeria. We are in a much stronger position than the Gold Coast,
because of our size and diversity. But let no one think that we are safe. The Regional
Houses are meeting now, as I write, and decisions are being made about the
representation in the Central Legislature, and about the Ministers who will be
3 Report of the Commission on the Civil Service of the Gold Coast, 1950–1951 (chairman, Sir D Lidbury)
Accra, 1951. See Rathbone, part I, 99. 
4 Griffiths met Nkrumah in London in June 1951 to discuss proposals for further constitutional change in
the Gold Coast. See Rathbone, part I, 103.
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acceptable. I shall know the position more clearly in a week’s time, but already it
seems fairly clear that I shall have a sedate Northern Region (for a time; Thompstone
himself thinks it is too safe); an Eastern Region dominated by the N.C.N.C.; and a
Western Region dominated by a thrustful Action Group which, as you know, is
modelling itself on the CPP. Difficult as that team would be to drive in ‘Nigerian’
harness, I was not pessimistic about the outcome. Both political parties had decided
to try out the new Constitution, and responsibility has a sobering effect. But if the
concessions proposed by Arden-Clarke are given to the Gold Coast I shall have the
gloomiest forebodings about the future here. It is virtually certain that the Action
Group in the West and the N.C.N.C. in the East will get together and demand
immediate changes in the Constitution along Gold Coast lines, or will vie with each
other in the extravagance of their demands. The North as at present represented will
not be stampeded (thank God for their 50 per cent representation) but I foresee a
sharp cleavage between North and South, and the collapse of our hopes and plans for
a strong and united Nigeria.
Against this setting, the question of expatriation pay and the continued
employment of expatriate officers—not least District Officers—appears to be of
almost secondary importance. So far from being reasonably confident that we can
make the new Constitution work, thus enabling us to hold the position in Nigeria
until the politicians have learned, or been compelled by healthy public opinion, to
work on reasonable, co-operative, albeit progressive lines, the whole constitutional
position that we have build up so carefully is likely to be thrown into the melting pot.
I believe that five-sixths of the people of Nigeria would be desolated by the idea
that District Officers might be withdrawn, but those five-sixths are incoherent and
inarticulate and would be unlikely to be able to make their views heard against the
extremely vocal one-sixth (or even less) who would inevitably clamour to follow
the Gold Coast’s lead. So far from being able to fend off, in the interests of the
moderate politicians and thinking men of Nigeria and the vast silent rural popula-
tion, any suggestion for a Leader of Government Business, we should be faced
immediately, in the South at least, with a clamour for Prime Ministers and, in due
course, for the exclusion of Official Members. We have a very large number of
expatriate officers in Nigeria, the great majority of whom at the present moment,
despite financial anxieties, too much work—especially paper work—and slight anx-
iety about the future, have not lost their ‘vocation’, are on their toes, intensely
interested in our developments, political and other, and cheerfully looking forward
to working out their careers here. The effect on them of Arden-Clarke’s pro-
gramme can be well imagined, even if it were still possible to offer them reason-
able conditions of service.
But the main thing is that our new Constitution has still every chance of ensuring
that the co-operation between British and local people in local government, at the
official level, and at the Ministerial level, will be developed and maintained for many
years to come: up to the time in fact when the then Governor of Nigeria would be in
a position to report to the Secretary of State that public opinion throughout Nigeria
was so overwhelmingly pro good government and pro British ideals, institutions and
practices, that he could quite safely advocate complete self-government; and that
Nigerians themselves would either be able to fill all the important posts remaining in
expatriate hands or, more likely, would themselves wish to retain Britishers there. If
Arden-Clarke’s programme is adopted that becomes a pipe-dream, and we may well
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join the number of those Colonies who have had to fight a rearguard action doomed
to defeat.
I gathered from Arden-Clarke that his object was to win time for the emergence of
a moderate political party which could form a reasonable opposition to the CPP as at
present constituted. Quite frankly, if there is any pipe-dreaming about, the thought
that two or three years in the Gold Coast would be sufficient to achieve this seems
the dreamiest I have ever heard of.
This is a hard letter for you to receive at this time—just as it is a hard letter to
write. I have tried not to be parochial but to look at Empire interests as a whole. And
the dilemma is a painful one. All that I ask is that in weighing up the Gold Coast
situation full thought will be given to the effects here.
I shall write you separately about our plans for a salary revision, including
expatriation pay, and about the sort of arguments we might use with our politicians
(Himsworth will be in London in a few days and can tell you how our minds are
working). We must go on with these plans because I refuse to give up hope, but a
slide in the Gold Coast will stack the dice against us in an almost impossible way.
153 CO 554/260, no 9D 18 Jan 1952
[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to Sir T Lloyd
on the impact of developments in the Gold Coast on the prospects for
the 1951 constitution
Your secret and personal telegram No. 80 of the 16th of January was handed to me at
11 p.m. that evening when we were in the midst of a large party for the Pakistani
delegation. (Earlier in the day I had completed my ‘Cabinet-making’ and the three
Lieutenant-Governors had flown back to put the names to the Regional Legislative
Houses).
Benson and I went out to the Airport early on the 17th and had an hour’s talk with
Arden-Clarke. It was—as always—friendly and understanding.
Nationalism, once it is in the saddle, rides hard. I know, too, that once a country is
set on the road towards responsible Government it is very difficult to hold the
position at a transitional stage. In giving you my assessment of our position and
prospects I am very conscious of the fact that I am doing this before (but less than
ten days before) I meet my Council of Ministers for the first time,1 and that in telling
you of my high hopes (before I learned last week about impending events in the Gold
Coast) for the success of our planned advance I may be indulging in some pipe-
dreams myself.
We have by a process lasting almost three years deliberately given this country a
Constitution that is in advance of its true capacity, and in doing this I have been
seriously criticized not only by many of my stout-hearted British Officers, but by a
great many truly patriotic Nigerians. These honest people, who know only Nigeria,
had not fully realised, when I started, what was happening in other parts of the world.
We couldn’t put a ring fence round Nigeria, and we had to take the initiative, and not
wait to be overtaken by events, because of what was happening, and is continuing to
1 See 155.
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happen, in the Gold Coast, the Sudan, Libya, etc. etc. We had to assess the situation,
calculate the risks and make a brave cool plan. Then we had to go at it with
everything we had.
We are now bringing into force—before the end of this month—a Constitution
which is not what the extremists want but is that chosen by the people, accordingly
to their varying degree of understanding. And we think that if we can get a straight
run at it for even six months we can make a success of it, establishing mutual
confidence between Ministers, Chiefs, Commoners, and British officials, who are all
part of the very fabric. There are dangers, of course, but there has been a great
increase in political consciousness, by reason of the wide discussions that have taken
place, at all levels and all over the country, in the course of the review of the
Constitution; and there is much less danger than before that the decent simple
peasants will be taken for a ride by a small group of extremists with a lust for
personal power. And those who thought I was going dangerously fast now see what I
was getting at: they appreciate the checks and balances and safeguards that exist: and
they begin to think that the thing will work.
I know more than I did when I wrote on the 8th January about the complexion of
the Regional and Central Legislatures and policy-making Councils.2 The North,
though still worried lest they be carried along at a break-neck pace by political
Southerners, whose way of life they do not admire, have wisely made concessions to
constructive critics of the Emirate system, and they have chosen for me at the Centre
their best men among the young men. In the East, although there has been a swing
away to the N.C.N.C. band wagon from the few old stalwarts who were returned to
the House of Assembly, the majority party gives hopes of being reasonably
responsible. At least they have excluded from consideration for Ministerial posts the
wildest and least worthy of their number. The Action Group in the West are riding
high and will push us hard but they want to make the Constitution a success.
These are the reasons which give us hope that with all the dangers we may make a
success of the Constitution. Responsibility is very sobering and we shall be bringing
the new Ministers hard up against tough problems. But if we were now to be faced
with a clamour for further political advance, as the extremists, who have at present
lost much of their power, would wish, then the whole fabric might fall apart.
You may well ask why if I feel reasonably confident about the situation I should get
so worried about so small a thing as changing Nkrumah’s title from Leader of
Government Business to Prime Minister, especially as Arden-Clarke says that this
merely recognizes a state of affairs which already exists. (This is on the assumption
that Arden-Clarke can resist for a significant period of time the abolition of the
Official Ministries, and that the process of removing up to 52 British Administrative
Officers from the Gold Coast, to other territories, will remain only a threat).
The answer lies in the following considerations.
The Action Group in the West feel that to justify their willingness to co-operate in
making the Constitution a success they must be able to prove to their people that it
is not inferior to the Gold Coast Constitution. (Awolowo has said this to me in
terms). That is why they were pressing for a Leader of Government Business in the
Western House of Assembly, and were making the other demands referred to in
2 See 152.
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recent correspondence. If Nkrumah is made Prime Minister (just as our House of
Representatives is meeting for the first time) I do not believe that Awolowo could
refrain from making a similar demand, at least for the West. Note that the Action
Group have just squeezed Azikiwe out of the House of Representatives and that he is
planning a fierce counter-attack. If they failed to clamour for concessions similar to
those granted to Nkrumah (despite their shorter experience) they would play into the
hands of the enemy.
Although I have hopes that the N.C.N.C. in the Eastern Region will not be too
irresponsible, they could not let the Action Group in the West show themselves more
hot for advance than the N.C.N.C. in the East. I don’t see how they could help either
joining with the West in their demands, or, more likely, outbidding them.
All this would get us off to a hopeless start. But that is not all. If Nigeria were small
and homogeneous one might, conceivably, in spite of the danger to the decent folk,
to traditional authority and to the country as a whole, give in to demands for further
concessions such as those proposed for the Gold Coast. But we are neither small nor
homogeneous. And our North, unlike the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, is
strong and conscious of its strength and of its power (arising not least from the fact
that it has more than half the population of the country). The North nearly broke
away during the review of the Constitution, but are at present reasonably satisfied.
(To show that even now they want reassurance, I enclose a copy of a letter from the
Sultan of Sokoto to the Lieutenant-Governor, Northern Region. I am working on
this now and will be addressing you on the subject very shortly).3 If a clamour for
further concessions is raised by the South I believe that the North would seriously
consider withdrawing from the whole set-up.
You suggest that when the West and East demand innovations similar to those
given to the Gold Coast I should tell the Party leaders that I understand the basis of
their demands but that they first must give proof ‘as the Gold Coast have done’ of
their capacity for high Ministerial Office. Quite frankly that horse won’t run. Any
assertion that the Gold Coast have given such proof, if it could be made, would be
challenged by the Action Group, who would claim, with some justification, that in
spite of their inexperience they have as much ability as, and much more sense of
responsibility than, the C.P.P. In any case they, and the East, would not think in
terms of any period of probation that would give our Constitution a chance, or keep
the North in.
I think you will see why any question of a joint statement by Arden-Clarke and
myself is out of the question, much as we should like to help in this way. This letter is
not a plea that concessions (already apparently promised) should not be given to the
Gold Coast. It is not for me to judge what is right and practicable for the Gold Coast.
(I tried to show in my letter of the 8th January that I understood the Gold Coast
situation very clearly). You know me well enough to be certain that whatever
happens we shall plug on and will not look for an alibi if our work for Nigeria is
brought to ruin. I have given you the best assessment I can. And, as I promised
Arden-Clarke, I have given it as dispassionately and undramatically as possible. I wish
I were giving the assessment after three months of working with my new Ministers,
because by that time, if we are not knocked off our stride by extraneous influences, I
3 Not printed.
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shall be able to predict with fair confidence what effect extraneous circumstances will
have on Nigerian leaders (all new men), with whom we shall then be on terms of
mutual confidence. I forgot to ask Arden-Clarke what was the special virtue in
announcing the first concession at the end of this month, but I assume it is because
the Budget Meeting starts then. The timing couldn’t be worse for us because our
House of Representatives meets for the first time on 29th January. Given six months
I think we might ‘wear’ the effects of concessions in the Gold Coast. Given three
months I could give you my assessment with full confidence in its reliability.
154 CO 554/260, no 9G 24 Jan 1952
[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: outward telegram no 1 from Sir T Lloyd to
Sir J Macpherson replying to Macpherson’s concerns about the impact
of developments in the Gold Coast on Nigeria
Personal for Macpherson from Lloyd. Begins.
I have shown to Secretary of State your letters of 18th and 19th January in reply to
our telegram No. 80.1 I have also shown him Arden-Clarke’s letter of 18th January to
me which emphasizes that if the changes he has proposed for the immediate future
are not (repeat not) made, the repercussions in the Gold Coast may reasonably be
expected to have a more serious effect on the success of the Nigerian experiment
than the comparatively modest suggestions he has put forward.
2. Immediate point is that the Secretary of State is concerned, when putting
Arden-Clarke’s suggestions to the Cabinet, to give them some indication of probable
repercussions in Nigeria and how they might be handled. He has it in mind to say
that the Gold Coast changes are likely to evoke early demands for creation of posts of
Prime Minister in West and East Regions of Nigeria and that in order to retain
initiative he proposes to authorize you, when the Gold Coast changes are announced,
to offer to have Nigerian constitution amended so as to provide for posts of Leader of
Government Business in West and East, and in North if North want it. Leaders of
Government Business would rank in precedence in Regional Executive Councils
immediately after Civil Secretaries, but in other respects position of ex officio
members would not (repeat not) be affected.
3. In suggesting this course we have not (repeat not) overlooked your savingram
No. 199 dated 31st December, 1951,2 particularly paragraph 3 (c), but in the light of
your subsequent letters to me we think you may agree that it would be wise to
anticipate, on lines proposed above, the clamour for further advance which you
foresee. By offering this advance we should hope it would be possible to hold position
for a further twelve months or so and then to consider, in light of experience gained,
whether further step to provide for Prime Ministers would or would not be justified.
We also hope it would be possible for you successfully to resist, for a very much
longer period, any attempt to undermine the position of the ex officio members.
4. We appreciate that you had good reasons for taking the line which you did with
the Action Group leaders on the 28th December3 and only justification we can think
of for offering early amendment of Nigerian constitution would be that political par-
1 See 153. Letter of 19 Jan not printed. 2 See 151. 3 See 151.
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ties with majorities in each region had emerged as a result of elections, a state of affairs
not (repeat not) expected when constitution was worked out. We would not (repeat
not) offer Leader of Government Business post in Council of Ministers on ground that
no one party had majority in House of Representatives or in Council.
5. Secretary of State hopes you will regard this line of approach as feasible and
prudent. He welcomes your suggestion that you should fly home on short visit about
3rd February. He fully realises how difficult this will be for you but feels sure that it is
very desirable and is most grateful to you for proposing it. From Arden-Clarke’s point
of view it is important that matter should be put to Cabinet within next two or three
weeks at latest so that amendments to Gold Coast constitution can be made at Privy
Council meeting expected at end February or early March.4
6. I am repeating this telegram to Arden-Clarke. If you and he have not
exchanged copies of your letters to me of 18th January I hope you will do so. Ends.
4 See BDEEP series B, vol. 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part I, 115.
155 CO 1039/1 26 Jan 1952
[Council of Ministers]: conclusions of the first meeting of the Council
of Ministers [Extract]
1. Oaths
The Oath of Allegiance and the Ministerial Oath were taken by all Members of the
Council.
2. Introductory Remarks by the President1
His Excellency said that the procedure in the Council was to be informal and that he
hoped Members would speak from their chairs. His Excellency welcomed the
Members of the Council and said that he was looking forward to working together
with them. It was his confident hope that their deliberations would be friendly, frank
and fruitful. He assured the Ministers of his wholehearted co-operation and that of
his officers. Speaking from his heart he said that he felt no clash of loyalty between
being British and thinking ‘Nigerian’. His aim and that of the expatriate officers was
so to help the country to progress, soundly and harmoniously, that when the time
came the Nigerian people, of their own volition, would decide to stay within the
British Commonwealth and Empire. He was convinced that this was good both for
Britain and for Nigeria.
His Excellency said that the most notable characteristic of the country apart from
the Africans’ quick response to friendship and the fact that we all laugh at the same
kind of jokes, was its diversity. He referred not only to the diversity of race, religion,
language, vegetation and climate but to the differences in stages of development. We
had doctors, lawyers, judges, professional and business men and an Inspector-General
of Medical Services. We had traditional authorities. We had a decent simple village
folk, artizans and craftsmen. We also had people living a primitive life as it might have
been several hundred years ago. But it was all African diversity. We had no white set-
tlement problem and no Indian problem. The destiny of the country was therefore
1 ie Sir J Macpherson
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quite clear and certain. There remained this question of the pace of advancement. His
Excellency felt that the pace would be decided by responsible Nigerians and British
people together. If we have a united country and responsible elements were predom-
inant the pace could be quicker. It would, however, be a betrayal of trust if power got
into the hands of irresponsible people who might exploit the silent rural population.
Our aim should be construction and not confusion, we must let the country get into
the hands of selfish people with a lust for power. The ability was there and experience
would come quickly. British officers were all out to help.
His Excellency said that he had studied the Richards Constitution before he knew
that he would ever return to Nigeria and from his previous experience in this
country, short as it was, he thought how right it was, particularly as it brought in the
North on terms acceptable to them. He thought two criticisms of that Constitution
had some validity:—
(i) it was formed without open consultation, though this would have been difficult
at the time it was introduced, and
(ii) it might shut out educated and progressive people who wished to play their
part in the affairs of the country.
On coming to this country he had at first thought that it would be best to spend
several years in the development and improvement of local government, before
further advance in the superstructure. This had not been possible because of the
legitimate aspirations of the people for further advance and because of the pressure
of events in other countries. He had therefore decided to put it to the people
themselves to talk the whole matter over and the discussions at all levels resulted in
the recommendations on which the Constitution is based. Apart from the
Constitutional framework itself which was by and large what the people asked for the
discussions at all levels had greatly increased the political consciousness of the
people. This would help them to resist confusionists.
His Excellency was convinced that Regional autonomy was right. This leads to
efficiency and enables the Regions, in a large measure to control their own affairs;
but this must be within a strong and united Nigeria and we had to be careful to resist
any tendency for the centrifugal force to increase to the point where a Region might
contemplate breaking away. Should there be a clash of interests, we must approach it
with honest minds and respect for the other man’s point of view. We must work for
the good of Nigeria. If we succeeded we should be able to give a fine example to this
strifeworn world of how to progress without strife or violence. This would be a very
great work not only for our own people but as a contribution to the world . . .
156 CO 554/598, no 3 19 Mar 1952
[Political parties]: CO note on the political beliefs of the three
principal parties in Nigeria
(1) Action Group
The Action Group campaigned during the elections on an appeal to Yoruba solidarity
against the threat of Ibo domination (in the form of the N.C.N.C.) and used the
slogans:—
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‘Freedom from British Rule,
Freedom from Ignorance,
Freedom from Disease, and
Freedom from Want.’
Its programme, set out in several policy papers, is generally moderate and contains
many sound proposals for improvement.
The Action Group accepts the new constitution as a valuable step towards the
control of policy by Nigerians, and thus towards eventual self-government. It regards
the European official as a victim of divided loyalties, who serves Nigeria only in so far
as his interests co-incide with those of Empire, and who has a lack of incentive to
build up at the required speed the prosperity and living standards of Nigeria.
Nigerianisation of the Civil Service is thus an aim of prime importance, which, given
the will, could be achieved within five years. It is, however, recognised that
expatriates will be required, especially in specialist tasks, for some time to come, and
efficiency is not to be sacrificed for the sake of principle. Expatriation allowances
should be abolished and entry into the Civil Service should be by competitive
examination alone, with a road to the top for all who merit it.
The Action Group wishes to reform local government in the West (Awolowo is now
the Regional Minister) in order to reduce the influence of the Chief and Elders in
favour of elected representatives, and thereby to create a strong and efficient local
administration which would be free from corruption.1 Self-government at this level
should be conceded at once, and the people left free to determine the form of local
government they wish to adopt, provided that it is democratic and retains as its core
the well-established institution of Kingship, though enlightened Kingship.
In other spheres, Action Group advocates in general a programme of expansion. It
wants a considerable increase in educational facilities in the West, covering free
compulsory education between the ages or 5 and 13, the establishment of secondary
and technical schools, an extension of adult and rural education and teacher
training. It requires the immediate improvement of communications, and postal and
telegraphic services. It believes a well-balanced agriculture to be essential, and
accuses the Agricultural Department of victimising the peasant through the
Marketing Boards, which, though commendable in principle, do not at present
employ the profits satisfactorily and are held to be unrepresentative of large sections
of those primarily concerned with production. Health services should be developed,
be free for all workers, and more Nigerian doctors should be trained. Private practice
by Government Medical Officers should be terminated. A Nigerian Mineral
Corporation should be established to take over all private companies, syndicates and
operators, and would then control the production of all minerals; it is hoped that this
would stimulate production and broaden the base of Nigeria’s economy, which is at
present too dependent upon agriculture.
(2) National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons
Alone of the three major parties, the N.C.N.C. has not to date published any official
party programme or policy papers, so that its aims have to be deduced from the
sometimes conflicting and usually opportunist speeches of its leaders.
1 See 159.
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The party’s watchword has been ‘self-government for a United Nigeria by 1956’; it
is the most nationalist of the three parties. It takes the view that British rule must
go, that only a unified Nigeria would be strong enough to accomplish this, and
therefore that the new constitution is a retrograde step in that it does not establish a
central unified government. It is strongly opposed to the Action Group.
Dr. Azikiwe, the N.C.N.C. President, has made frequent attacks upon the terms of
the new constitution. He said in 1951 that N.C.N.C. would not co-operate in working
it nor would its members accept ministerial office. This attitude, however, has been
rejected by the N.C.N.C. in the East, where it has had to incorporate more moderate
elements in order to secure a majority in the Regional House. A.C. Nwapa, the
Deputy Leader of the party, has characterised reports that the N.C.N.C. would
boycott the legislature as ‘nonsense’, and Azikiwe himself has now conceded that the
party will co-operate in the working of the constitution, but will encourage its
revision at an early date. Azikiwe is in fact behaving as a model leader of the
opposition in the Western House of Assembly.
At the Party Conference held at Kano in August 1951, the N.C.N.C. while agreeing
not to publish its political programme, re-affirmed its intention to campaign for self-
government by 1956 and emphasised the need to resist the infiltration of
communism. In addition, speeches reported in the press have declared in general
terms that the N.C.N.C. if returned to power, would–
(i) provide for the education of every Nigerian child, and
(ii) provide improved health facilities, including hospitals, clinics, etc.
The lack of any coherent N.C.N.C. policy derives from its previous lack of
organisation and the domination of it by Dr. Azikiwe. It now has to work out a policy,
and will probably take much the same line as the Action Group in detail, while
seeking every means to oppose it on principle.
(3) Northern People’s Congress
The N.P.C., formerly a body dedicated to cultural ends, represents moderate
Northern opinion which viewed the action of the Northern Elements’ Progressive
Union in aligning itself with the N.C.N.C. as betraying the special interests of the
North. It was therefore formed into a political party in order to contest the N.E.P.U.
at the elections.
The N.P.C. has declared its aims as being:—
(i) to preserve Regional autonomy within a United Nigeria;
(ii) to undertake local government reform in the North within a progressive
Emirate system.
(iii) to ensure that the voice of the people is heard in all the councils of the North
i.e. through elected representation.
(iv) to retain the traditional system of the appointment of Emirs, but with a wider
representation on the Electoral Committee.
(v) to improve the standards of education throughout the North, while retaining
the Regional cultural influence.
(vi) to eliminate bribery and corruption in every sphere of Northern life.
(vii) to achieve eventual self-government for Nigeria with Dominion status within
the British Commonwealth.
(viii) to preserve one North, one people, irrespective of religion, tribe or rank.
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The N.P.C. will oppose anything which would in its view imperil Islam or damage
the interests of the Northern Region, but provided no attempt is made to encroach
upon these interests it is likely to support many Southern proposals for reform and
progress. The party has declared that, as long as Action Group keeps to its present
professed policy the N.P.C. will co-operate; in general, it can be said to stand for a
cautious advance towards reform and self-government, and knows that the hard facts
of life in the North make it impossible to dispense with British guidance as quickly as
might be possible in the East and West.2
2 This document was largely prepared by T R Godden (assistant principal, CO) and R J Vile.
157 CO 554/313, no 1 19 June 1952
[Deadlock over ministerial powers]: inward savingram no 2440 from
Sir J Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on the Action Group’s criticisms of
the constitution. Annexes
Minute by T B Williamson
[The establishment of regional governments in early 1952 soon revealed the
determination of the AG and NCNC both to push their powers under the 1951
constitution to the utmost and to show that the constitution was ultimately unworkable
and would need further review. It was in response to the situation outlined in this
document that the CO first realised the legal problem with the 1951 constitution, that
one regional House of Assembly could not be dissolved without all of them being so, an
issue that was to have important consequences for the handling of the Eastern region
crisis of 1953. See 171.]
During the past ten days we have been having what almost amounted to a
Constitutional crisis with the Western Ministers (including the Central Ministers
from the West). The position has been very fluid and this made it difficult to report
sooner, though I should, of course, have done so at once if a walk-out had at any time
appeared imminent. Chief Secretary, Lieutenant-Governor Western Region and I
have spent hours in discussions, day after day.
2. To give a full picture I think it best to send you the following attachments:–
(a) Memorandum by the Western Ministers submitted on 9th June.
(b) Note of discussion which took place on 10th June with all Western Ministers,
including the four Central Ministers from the West. I was assisted by the
Lieutenant-Governor Western Region, Chief Secretary and Attorney-General. This
note explains how the meeting came about, and deals with the discussion on
Constitutional aspects of the Western memorandum. It does not record the
discussion regarding relations between Ministers and officials. The Ministers have
some grounds for complaint because there undoubtedly have been (not only in the
Western Region) cases of tactlessness and clumsy treatment of Ministers at
Headquarters and when touring but most of the allegations were without
substantial foundation and were due to hypersensitivity, suspicion or inflated ego.
The crux of the matter was their declared intention not to cooperate with the Civil
Secretary. (They are jealous of his position and accused him of arrogating too
much power to himself.) This was a direct challenge which had to be dealt with.
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(c) Note by Lieutenant-Governor Western Region of a talk he had with Awolowo
on 12th June.
(d) Copy of a letter of 18th June from me to Lieutenant-Governor Western
Region, recording talks I had with Abayomi and Awolowo (separately) on 14th
June.
3. I am still too close to these events to attempt a confident assessment of the
situation, but I do not believe that the Western Ministers have any desire to wreck
the Constitution. They have made grandiose promises and are beginning to be
worried about their inability to implement them. And they get badly ‘needled’ by
N.C.N.C. attacks and criticisms. They have the substance of power but are desperately
anxious to show to the public that this power is exercised by them and they resent it
when unimportant Gazette notices etc. are signed by officials. I shall report
developments but at this stage I am satisfied that it was the part of wisdom to
continue to be patient. There is a chance that relations may greatly improve.
Memorandum presented to His Excellency The Governor by Mr. Obafemi Awolowo,
leader of the Action Group at a meeting held by His Excellency The Governor with
central and regional ministers of the Western Region on Tuesday 10th June, 1952
In August, 1948, His Excellency the Governor announced his willingness and
readiness to have the old Constitution, generally known as the Richard’s [sic]
Constitution, reviewed. Shortly after this decision and upon the recommendations of
a Select Committee of the Legislative Council discussions concerning the nature of
changes desired took place all over the country in what were commonly known as
constitutional conferences which started from the divisional level and culminated in
the Ibadan General Conference. At this Conference the views of the country as a
whole were expressed and agreement reached on practically all points except the
question of the composition of the Central Legislature and the position of Lagos.
These two points were later resolved at the LEGCO meetings one held at Enugu and
the other in Lagos.
2. The Secretary of State, in his despatch to the Governor dated the 15th of July
1950,1 dealing with the review of the Constitution of Nigeria, at a time when the only
outstanding issue not yet resolved was the question of the composition of the Central
Legislature, stated as follows:–
‘Subject to further examination of details when constitutional review is
completed in Nigeria His Majesty’s Government is willing to accept the
recommendation of the General Conference with the variations suggested by
the Select Committee of the Legislative Council in its report dated the 1st of
April 1950.’
This statement which constituted an assurance given by the Secretary of State was
accepted in good faith in Nigeria and the Country believed that it was going to have a
constitution as proposed by the Ibadan Conference with the amendments of the
Select Committee of the Legislative Council.
1 See 116.
12-(Doc139-178)-cp  15/7/01  7:30 am  Page 444
[157] JUNE 1952 445
3. At the 1951 Budget Session of the Legislative Council the Governor
announced his hope that the constitutional instrument would be signed by the
middle of that year and that the election would start soon thereafter.
4. It was the assurance given by the Secretary of State that the proposals of the
Ibadan Conference were acceptable and the warning about the early elections given
by the Governor that inspired the very lively electioneering campaigns that soon
followed. As the constitutional instruments have not been published by that time
there was no doubt that the campaigns then going on throughout the country and
the public interest which they stimulated centered round a constitution which was
proposed by the Ibadan Conference.
5. It is interesting to note that the Nigeria Constitution (Order in Council 1951)
was only published early in July, the month when the elections started. The
instructions under the Royal signed manual were made and published in November
of the same year, and the Nigeria (Revenue Allocation) Order in Council 1951 was
made and published in December 1951. In the last two cases the publications were
after the elections were concluded in the Western Region.
6. When, however, these constitutional instruments were published it became
clear that there had been a wide departure from the proposals which were made at
Ibadan and which, as has been stated by the Secretary of State, was acceptable to the
British Government. The reasons for some of the variations were explained in the
despatch from the Governor to the Secretary of State which was published along
with the Order in Council. There remained, however, a number of other very
important amendments to the Ibadan constitutional proposals which were embodied
in the New Constitution and to which there was no reference in any of the published
despatches. Important among these are the following:—
(1) Power given to the Governor or the Lieutenant-Governor to exercise certain
powers, not being power to veto, without obligation to consult the Council of
Ministers or the Regional Executive Committee as the case may be.
(2) Restrictions with regard to bills and motions affecting the public service.
(3) Disqualification of persons from being elected as members of the House of
Assembly on grounds of previous conviction for sedition and other offences not
mentioned in the Ibadan Conference proposals.
7. These three points warrant the following observations:—
(1) It was the intention of the Ibadan Conference to constitute the Regional
Executive Committee the policy making body without any restrictions other than
the Lieutenant-Governor’s power of veto and his reserved powers. As the
Constitution stands now, however, the Lieutenant-Governor need not consult or
take the advice of the Executive Committee on a number of very important
subjects that affect the general welfare and progress of the people of the Region.
This, no doubt, weakens considerably the position of the Ministers and the
Regional Executive Committee and makes it very difficult, if not impossible in
certain cases, for the party in power to carry out the policy upon which it was
elected.
(2) It was surprising and disconcerting to find in the Constitution restrictions
with regard to bills and motions affecting the public service. The effect of these
restrictions is that it is no more possible or lawful without the consent of the
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Governor to debate the conditions of service, the salary or allowances and pensions
or gratuities of any public officer. In order to appreciate the changes made it is
necessary to note that under the old law there was no such restriction and the
Legislative Council had unrestricted rights to deal with any of these matters. This
change in the Constitution has occasioned surprise and has been resented because
no-one thought that the New Constitution tion has been designed to take away any
of the old and established authorities of the Nigerian Legislature.
(3) The disqualification of persons from being elected as members of the House of
Assembly on grounds of previous conviction for sedition is, to say the least, unfair
and certainly does not derive its authority from any proposals of the Ibadan
Conference. When it is considered that nationalists all over the world are in the
main generally liable for conviction for sedition it can easily be said that this was
designed to exclude the nationalists of this country from participation in the
Government of their country.
8. These changes were undoubtedly made without any consultation with the
people of this country and they constitute by themselves additional powers being
given to officials and the curtailment of the powers which the people had expected to
exercise under their own proposals as made at the General Conference and which in
fact they had the right to exercise under the Old Constitution. In view of the
arguments already advanced it is needless to say that the changes in the Constitution
are by themselves unacceptable.
9. Judging from the spirit which accompanied the review of the Constitution
both on the part of His Excellency the Governor on one side and the people on 
the other, it was felt that no useful purpose would be served by challenging the
Constitution in the middle of the elections as it was believed that in any case 
the spirit of the Ibadan constitutional proposals would always be preserved and will
prevail. It is now, however, five months since the operative chapters of the
Constitution have been put into operation and it is necessary to examine how the
Constitution has been functioning and the attitude of the country towards the new
set up.
10. From the onset it became clear that the interpretations given to the
constitutional provisions by the officials on the one hand and by the majority of the
Ministers on the other are completely at variance. The officials appeared to believe
that the Constitution has effected no great changes in the general running of
Government business and are generally most reluctant to yield ground for the
Ministers. The Secretariat was retained as the office serving the Council of Ministers,
the only body whose authority officials were willing to recognise. They were of the
opinion that Ministers had no individual responsibilities and consequently no
executive power. This conviction and attitude of the official are clearly discernible
from the attitude towards the Ministers. Administrative procedure were issued and
circulated to all Heads of Departments before they were discussed and approved by
the Council of Ministers. When, however, the Council of Ministers altered the
procedure at one of its very first meetings and thereby challenged the conception of
the officials as to the effect of the constitution, it was noteworthy that the changes
made by the Council were never circulated, nor communicated, to Heads of
Departments and the Ministers had to raise the point four months later when they
saw no change in the administrative machinery of the Government.
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11. It is under this atmosphere of non-cooperation that Ministers have been
called upon to work the Constitution. The Action Group Ministers in the Western
Region and a good number of Ministers in the Council of Ministers have resisted, and
continue to resist, the non-cooperative attitude and the disloyal conduct of the
officials. A considerable portion of the time and energy of Ministers is now being
spent to assert their rights under the Constitution and to ensure that workable
administrative machinery, in keeping with the new set up and which will ensure
efficiency, is provided.
12. So far, neither the changes in the Ibadan proposals which the constitutional
instruments revealed, nor the attitude or conduct of the officials have been brought
to the attention of the public. This is because it is the intention of the Action Group
as a Party to give the Constitution a fair trial and because further we believe that the
Governor would be willing to do all that is possible to ensure that the spirit of the
Ibadan proposals guided the operation of the Constitution and that he would be
ready and willing also to ensure that his officials displayed the proper attitude to the
Constitution and are willing to cooperate fully with the Ministers and be loyal to the
Government.
13. After five months of trial, however, it became clear that it is the letter and not
the spirit of the Constitution that the officials intend to make their guide although,
as has been stated, this Constitution varies considerably in very many vital aspects
from that which was proposed and was given the blessing of the country at Ibadan. It
also became evident that a good number of officials are not willing to be loyal to the
new Government as now constituted. There have been instances of disloyalty,
conspicuous among which are the following:—
(a) Mr. Robinson, the Resident, Ijebu Province, having been intimated of the
desire of the Government to introduce local government reforms, convened a
meeting of all the Obas and Chiefs of Ijebu Division and made all efforts to
persuade them to reject the proposals which the Government of the Western
Region was bringing and even went to the extent of setting up a Committee of
Chiefs to resist the local Government reforms.
(b) On the same subject, a Mr. Henry, D.O. at Kukuruku held meetings with the
Native Authorities in his Division and tried to convince them that the proposals for
reforms initiated by the Minister for Local Government are not to their best
interests and that his own proposals (which he had contained in a pamphlet) were
to be preferred to that of the Minister (and that petitions were to be forwarded to
the Government to that effect).2
14. In the Western Region, the Civil Secretary has allocated to himself
supervisory powers over the Ministers and Heads of Departments have consequently
felt themselves more closely connected with the Civil Secretary than with their
Ministers. He has made it difficult for the Regional Heads of Departments to
appreciate their responsibilities to their respective Ministers and has gone to the
extent of writing confidential reports on the activities of Ministers which he
circulated among Residents who, no doubt, are subordinate civil servants to
2 A marginal note against (b) here reads, ‘deleted at the request of the author at the Meeting on the 10th.
June. (intld.) O.A.’
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Ministers. The attitude and conduct of this officer has been a source of constant
annoyance and depression for Western Regional Ministers who have now come to the
definite conclusion that they can no longer accept him as their colleague in the
Western Regional Executive Council.
15. Having given the fullest consideration to the events of the past five months
and the manner in which this Constitution has been working Ministers of the
Western Region, both Central and Regional, have found it necessary to set out a
number of points which it is believed ought to be clearly settled and accepted by all
concerned in the working of this Constitution. They are as follows:—
(a) That a Minister must be regarded as Minister of the Governor or the
Lieutenant-Governor as the case may be, and as such he is sworn principal adviser
on questions of policy for the Executive as a whole is collectively responsible.
(b) That a Minister is the agent of the Council of Ministers in the Department
which comes within his portfolio and for which he is responsible to the Governor
and answerable to the Council of Ministers and that as such all communications
from the Executive to the Department must be made through him or separate
ministerial organisation serving his portfolio.
(c) That Heads of Departments should not be separately and privately consulted by
the Governor or Lieutenant-Governor on a point which is included in the portfolio
of a Minister.
(d) That power for action in all legislation should not be given to a Head of
Department, but to the Minister acting under the direction of the Regional
Executive or the Council of Ministers as the case may be.
(e) That Lieutenant-Governors should consult Ministers and take their advice in
respect of all powers vested in him excepting the power to veto.
(f ) That proper separate Ministerial organisation should be established to serve
the portfolio of each Minister.
(g) That confidential reports on Ministers’ activities should cease.
16. Ministers of the Western Region, both Central and Regional, are convinced
that the points raised above are in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution and
form the basis of the political advance made under it. They hope that His Excellency
will find the points and the principles involved acceptable and would certainly share
the view that they are not in conflict with the spirit of the Constitution, and that His
Excellency would accordingly issue instructions and directions to give effect to them.
17. The people of this country have been very enthusiastic about the New
Constitution, which they believe is the embodiment of the proposals promulgated
at Ibadan. They are proud of their Ministers and genuinely want to give the
Constitution a fair trial. It is their belief that everyone of the points set out are
within the accepted principles underlying the constitutional changes. However,
rumours which have been in circulation relating to the defects and imperfectness
of the Constitution are making people restless and uneasy in mind. If, therefore, it
is eventually discovered that any of the points are unacceptable to His Excellency
the responsibilities of the Ministers are clear. They have the duty to inform the
country of the true constitutional position and of the conditions under which they
serve.
18. There are three other main points to which the attention of His Excellency
the Governor is hereby directed:—
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(1) The first of these points deals with the question of Regional autonomy. During
the discussions at the Ibadan General Conference it was generally agreed that each
Region would have complete autonomy in respect of a number of subjects and that
the authority of the Region in respect of these matters would only be questioned
where the overall interests of Nigeria is involved. The Secretary of State dealing
with that point in his despatch of the 15th day of July 1950 to His Excellency the
Governor stated as follows:—
‘I note the recommendation that the Nigerian Legislature at the centre should
continue to have full power to make laws for the peace, order and good gov-
ernment of Nigeria, without any restriction. It follows that there will be a sub-
stantial overlap between the legislative functions of the Central and Regional
Legislatures. I believe that at the present stage, while the Regional Legislatures
are still gaining experience, this arrangement will be found the most appropri-
ate; but at some stage in the future, as Nigeria develops further towards a fed-
eral state, it may well be necessary, as it has been in other countries, to establish
separate and distinct fields of legislation for the centre and the Regions, with a
reduction in the range of subjects over which they have concurrent powers.’ The
Western Region believe that the time has now come when separate and distinct
fields of legislation at the centre and the Regions should be established with a
reduction in the range of subjects over which they have concurrent powers.
(2) There is no doubt that in the Western Region a party system of government
has been established and has come to stay. Consequently it becomes necessary that
in this Region a new arrangement be made whereby recognition will be given to
this system of government. It is abundantly clear from the despatches of the
Secretary of State dealing with the Nigerian Constitution that it was expected that
changes would become necessary when this stage has been reached. The Western
Region therefore asks for a change in the Constitution which will give effect to the
party system of government.
(3) A Minister under the present set up has dual responsibilities. In the first place
he has to take charge of his portfolio and concern himself with initiating policy
and ensuring that the policy laid down by the Council of Ministers is given effect in
the departments. In the second place he has to take active part in the formulation
of policy with regard to every single aspect of Government activities in the
country. Besides this he accepts invitations for various public engagements and
interviews and has to undertake a tour of the country from time to time. In doing
this and fulfilling his other functions the Minister is naturally over-taxed. This
makes it absolutely necessary for the introduction of the office of Parliamentary
Under-Secretary attached to each portfolio. The Regional and Central Ministers of
the Western Region consider that the creation of this office is of supreme
importance and is absolutely necessary to ensure efficient running of the
Government machinery relating to the portfolio of each Minister.
Note regarding representations made to His Excellency the Governor by the western
regional ministers, and central ministers from the Western Region on certain
constitutional issues
On the 6th June Chief Bode Thomas approached His Excellency and stated that the
Western Ministers, including the Central Ministers from the Western Region, wished
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to see him very urgently because ‘things were not going well’. He asked that the
interview should take place on the following day. After consultation with the
Lieutenant-Governor, Western Region, it was agreed that the Ministers should first
submit a written note on the matters to be raised at a meeting and that an interview,
at which His Honour would, of course, be present, should be sought for a suitable day
in the following week.
On the 8th June, Chief Bode Thomas informed His Excellency that all the Western
Ministers were in Lagos—having cancelled their several tours (no doubt at great
inconvenience not only to themselves but to the people in the places they had
arranged to visit) and were very anxious to have the interview at the earliest possible
moment. By agreement with His Honour it was decided to fix the interview for the
10th June, and an undertaking was given that the promised paper would be
presented not later than the 9th June.
After noon on the 9th June His Excellency received a memorandum of which a
copy is attached. His Excellency had understood that the interview was sought to
raise matters that were peculiarly ‘Western’, but perusal of the memorandum showed
that it challenged various aspects of the Constitution itself—affecting all Regions and
the Centre. His Excellency decided not to cancel the interview, since the Ministers
had all assembled in Lagos, but when the meeting took place on the 10th June he at
once made it clear to the Ministers that he could not possibly give immediate
answers to the requests in the memorandum. Apart from the fact that the
memorandum had been received less than twenty-four hours before, it would not
have been proper for him to give answers, certainly not to Ministers from a single
Region. The other Regions were involved: the Centre was involved: and in certain
circumstances, Her Majesty in Council would be involved. This was readily accepted
by the Western Ministers, and the discussion on the 10th June was limited to
amplification by them of the contents of the memorandum, to explanation of certain
points by His Excellency, and to a general exchange of views. In particular, the
Governor dealt with allegations, which he challenged, that the Constitutional
Instruments involved ‘a wide departure’ from the conclusions of the General
Constitutional Conference, other than the variations explained in the exchange of
despatches between himself and the Secretary of State which were published with the
Constitution Order in Council.
The following notes deal with the more important matters discussed, affecting the
constitution.
I. The Royal Instructions to the Governor, Clause 4(2)(a)(iii)
The Royal Instructions to the Lieutenant-Governors, Clause 2(2)(a)(iv)
(Exception from obligation on the Governor and the Lieutenant-Governors to
consult Council of Ministers and Executive Councils respectively in the exercise,
otherwise than in the formulation of policy, of power conferred upon them by any
existing law (i.e. any enactment in force in Nigeria on 24th January, 1952) other than
a power expressed to be exercisable by the Governor in Council or the Lieutenant-
Governor in Council, respectively.)
His Excellency explained that this exception stemmed from the fact that under the
new Constitution Order in Council ‘the Governor’ meant the Governor in Council.
‘Existing legislation’ (all Central of course) gave power sometimes to the Governor
and sometimes to the Governor in Council. The distinction was deliberate and was
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fully understood by the legislators who passed those laws. The inclusion of this
exception in the Royal Instructions was done:—
(a) to save the Council of Ministers from being cluttered up with routine matters,
not unimportant, but largely administrative; and
(b) because some of the powers conferred upon the Governor by existing
legislation would, if we were legislating afresh, be made exercisable by the
Governor acting in his discretion.
In the few cases that have arisen at the Centre, His Excellency’s practice had been
to discuss the matter in the Council of Ministers so that the decision, which legally
was his alone, was taken with the knowledge of and in the light of the views of
Ministers. And, of course, where policy was involved (and it was possible to have
statutory powers which involved the formulation of policy) the Governor was bound
to consult the Council of Ministers and to follow their advice, subject always to his
reserve powers.
So far as the Lieutenant-Governors are concerned, there was of course no ‘existing
legislation’* which conferred power upon the Lieutenant-Governor (or Chief
Commissioner) in Council, but the same considerations applied, i.e. that some of the
powers conferred upon the Lieutenant-Governor by existing legislation would, if we
were legislating afresh, be expressed as being exercisable by the Lieutenant-Governor
in his discretion. The Governor said that he would like to have time to examine the
general issue more closely in the light of the representations in the memorandum,
and proposed to invite the Law Officers to make an examination of the existing
legislation with a view to general clarification.
During the discussion, it emerged that the significance of these provisions in the
Royal Instructions was realised by the Western Ministers only recently, when His
Honour consulted them regarding certain appointments to be made to the Western
Regional Production Development Board, at the same time pointing out to them
that, by reason of the relevant clause of the Royal Instructions, he was not bound to
accept their advice. This particular matter was complicated by the circumstance that
Mr. Awolowo, at the March meeting of the House of Representatives, had withdrawn
two motions recommending changes in the relevant legislation about Production
Development Boards so as to restore the position which existed prior to the
amending legislation of August, 1951; and that he had taken this action because he
understood that in practice the Lieutenant-Governors would consult their Executive
Councils and would accept their advice. After further discussion regarding the
practice followed by the Governor in these matters His Honour undertook, in this
particular matter of the Regional Production Development Board, to consult
Executive Council. The Western Ministers said they would be open to persuasion in
the course of this consultation, and on that basis His Honour agreed to accept their
advice.
II. The second matter raised under the head of variations from the Ibadan
Conference was the restriction with regard to bills or motions affecting the public
* It has since been pointed out that by the Adaptation of Laws Ordinance, 1951, a number of powers in
existing Ordinance which had been vested in the Governor in Council have been transferred to
Lieutenant-Governors in Council. 
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service. The Governor stated that the relevant provision in the Constitution Order in
Council (Section 85) was a mark of political advance. Such provisions were normal
when political advance, such as had recently been accorded to Nigeria, took place.
The purpose was, of course, to keep the service out of politics. Moreover, the
Secretary of State had an obligation towards those officers that he selects for the
Colonial Service, and the Governor had a very clear obligation to the whole Service—
both expatriate and African—not to deliver them over to politicians, however good.
His Excellency stated that he could hold out no hope whatever of any change being
made in this provision.
III. The third point under ‘variations’ related to the provision for disqualification
for election as a member of a House of Assembly (Section 42 of the Constitution
Order in Council and the second Schedule thereto) on grounds of conviction for
sedition within the five years immediately preceding the date of election. The
Governor recalled that the General Conference at Ibadan agreed that the existing
disqualifications should be accepted, and also agreed to a proposal, made by Mr.
Onyeama and seconded by Chief Bode Thomas, that, in addition, a person convicted
of any crime involving fraud, dishonesty, bribery and corruption, or of treason, and
sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months, should be disqualified
for the first five years of the new Constitution. When the constitutional lawyers came
to the drafting of the necessary provision they found that the only convenient and
appropriate solution was to specify chapters of the Criminal Code Ordinance, and one
other Ordinance. (cp. second schedule to the Constitution Order in Council.) They
included in the second schedule Chapters, VI, VIA and VII which relate to treason,
treachery, sedition and like offences. His Excellency said that he personally saw no
objection, but virtue, in this provision. He pointed out that sedition included the
promotion of ill-will and hostility between different classes of the population of
Nigeria and attempts to overthrow the Government. The representations of the
Western Ministers would be referred to other Regions for their views, and would be
considered by the Council of Ministers.
IV. In the course of the meeting the Western Ministers said that they had come to the
conclusion that the appointment of Parliamentary Under-Secretaries was necessary
for the proper conduct of business. The Governor observed that, whether or not this
would involve an amendment to the Constitutional Instruments, reference to the
other Regions was necessary.
V. A further request made during the discussion was that the Financial Secretary
should be removed from the Executive Council and his place taken by a Nigerian
Minister of Finance, although the Financial Secretary would continue to work as the
Head of a Department. The reason advanced for this change was that only a Nigerian
Minister, who was subject to removal from office by the electorate, would be
sufficiently imaginative and daring in the search for new revenue to implement his
Party’s programme. His Excellency stated that although the suggestion would be
referred to the other Regions, he personally would resist it with all the force at his
command. He pointed out that at every stage of the constitutional review it had been
agreed that the Chief or Civil Secretary, the Attorney General or Legal Secretary, and
the Financial Secretary would, as ex-officio members, be an integral part of the
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structure. Any challenge to this was a challenge to the whole fabric of the
Constitution.
VI. With regard to the view expressed in the memorandum that the time had now
come when there should be a clear definition between the legislative powers of the
House of Representatives on the one hand and the Regional Houses on the other, His
Excellency stated that in his view there had been totally inadequate experience to
justify any change at this stage.
VII. With regard to the request for change in the constitution to ‘give effect to the
party system of Government’, His Excellency requested the Western Ministers to put
forward in writing a more precise explanation. He guessed that they were thinking in
terms of a Prime Minister or a Leader of Government Business and it was indicated
that the guess was correct. The Western Ministers agreed to prepare a paper for
reference to the other Regions, and to the Council of Ministers.
VIII. Certain matters raised in the memorandum, and orally at the meeting,
referred to administrative and procedural matters not involving a challenge to the
Constitutional Instruments. The Governor pointed out that these matters were
already receiving the consideration of the Council of Ministers and a record of the
discussion that took place is irrelevant to the present note. This also applies to
discussion regarding co-operation and courteous exchanges between Ministers and
officials.
His Excellency undertook to transmit copies of the memorandum of the Western
Ministers, with a brief record of the discussion relating to Constitutional matters, to
the other Regions prior to consideration by the Council of Ministers.
Note by H F Marshall of a discussion with Mr. Awolowo on the 12th of June, 1952
I started off by remarking that until last week I had believed that Mr. Awolowo and
myself were following the same road and that it was going to be possible for us to go
along together, but the events of the last few days had put serious doubts in my mind
as to the possibility of continued co-operation. Attacks on myself did not worry me in
the least, my conscience was entirely clear and in any event I was not particularly
enamoured of high office. I had accepted my present appointment with considerable
doubt and it was my firm intention when the time came to leave it, to retire. In the
meanwhile I should continue to do what I conceived to be my duty.
2. Attacks on my Officers were an entirely different matter, particularly when
they were made behind my back. (Mr. Awolowo expressed astonishment). I would
recapitulate the events of the last few days. Last Friday we had a somewhat stormy
meeting of Executive Council, at which I thought that Mr. Awolowo had lost his
temper (Mr. Awolowo agreed). At that meeting I heard for the first time accusations
made against certain un-named Administrative Officers. The next I heard was that
Western Ministers, both Central and Regional, had asked for an interview with H.E.
After consulting me H.E. had agreed to grant an interview on the understanding that
the matters for discussion should be first put down in writing and submitted to
himself and to myself. On this understanding a meeting had been convened for
Tuesday. In practice I never got the memorandum and only saw H.E’s copy an hour
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before the meeting. At the meeting accusations were made against a number of
Officers in the Western Region. This was the first I had ever heard of such
accusations. I asked Mr. Awolowo what he and his fellow Ministers thought I was
here for. If they had complaints or worse, surely the person to come to was myself
before going to the Governor. If I could not, or would not resolve the complaints
there might be a case for an approach to the Governor, but there was certainly no
case for an approach behind my back. I asked Mr. Awolowo to explain.
3. Mr. Awolowo said that when he returned from the Benin Province it had been
his intention to bring to my notice his complaints about Mr. Henry, about the use of
Detectives, and other matters, but after consulting his colleagues he had decided to
collect further facts which it was intended should be presented to me in the form of a
petition. There had been delay in preparing the petition and before it was finally
prepared the Action Group had come to the conclusion that I was leading an
opposition and that an approach to me would have been useless. He stated that the
memorandum presented to H.E. had only reached him at 11.30 p.m. on Monday
night and that he had been unable to contact me then as he was leaving immediately
for Lagos.
4. I replied that when I took up office I had stressed the importance of removing
suspicion. I thought that it was entirely wrong for the Action Group, if they had
complaint, to wait to collect further facts. I admitted that it was one thing to speak
about removing suspicion, and that I fully realised that it was much more difficult to
remove suspicion from one’s mind. The safest way was to remove the cause for
suspicion and I pointed out that the best way to do this was to make an immediate
approach so that the complaints, if justified, could be put right and similar
complaints in the future could be stopped. Mr. Awolowo expressed full agreement
with my view and regret for what had happened.
5. I told Mr. Awolowo that I had been in on the new Constitution since its birth
and had always been a strong advocate of revision. It was inconceivable that it should
now be my intention to break the machine which I had had a small part in making.
Before I took up my appointment I had come to the conclusion that two major tasks
lay ahead of me. One was to get on a beam with the Action Group Ministers, and the
other was to ensure that the Service, not only worked the Constitution, but put their
heart into working it. I realised that the second of these tasks might be the more
difficult. I admitted that there were a number of Officers in the Western Region who
did not yet know, or appreciate, what had happened, and who had no enthusiasm for
recent changes. It was my job as I saw it to inspire such enthusiasm, but it was not
going to be easy, and under certain circumstances it might become impossible.
6. I said that I was particularly distressed at the attack which had been made on
Mr. Shankland3 and at the attitude which the Western Ministers said that they
proposed to adopt. Putting personalities aside, by adopting an attitude of non-co-
operation, the Action Group were raising a constitutional issue which, to my mind,
was of far greater consequence than any of the other issues which they had raised. It
was implicit in the Constitution that there should be Officials in the Central and
Regional Councils, and that these Officials should be appointed by the Governor. If
Ministers, by refusing to co-operate, thought that they were going to be able to
3 TM Shankland, civil secretary Western Region, 1951; deputy governor, Western Region, 1954.
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dictate to Government the persons who should be the Official Members of the
Regional Executive Council, they were raising a constitutional issue on which it
would be quite impossible for Government to give way.
7. I then turned to the specific complaints which have been made against Mr.
Shankland and stated that I did not consider that they were worth a row of beans. I
realised that there had been difficulty and possibly muddle over the question of
Ministers’ houses and Ministers’ offices, but I had thought that all that was past
history. The other three complaints referred to cases in which Mr. Shankland was
alleged to have consulted Mr. Awolowo about persons to be appointed to various
Boards and Committees and had then taken no action. The three cases in question
were the Committee to allocate American Cars, the Public Service Board, and the
Nomination of a Candidate to go to the United Kingdom. The last of these had been
disposed of at the meeting in Lagos. With regard to the Public Service Board, I took
full responsibility, the file had been lying on my side table for some weeks awaiting
an opportunity to discuss with Mr. Awolowo, but whenever we had been in the
Station together there had been more important matters for discussion and I had
never raised this particular one, which I regarded as unimportant. I said that if
embarrassment had been caused to Mr. Awolowo or others because action had not
been taken, Mr. Awolowo was at least partly to blame. I should have thought that it
was clear that such consultations were confidential and that the potential candidates
should not be told that their appointment was being considered until the
appointments had been approved by the approving authority, whether the approving
authority was the Executive Council, the Governor or the Lieutenant-Governor. I
regarded Mr. Shankland as a very able, capable officer and I was quite sure that the
Governor would not remove him at the request of any political party. I certainly
would resist any such move. If the Ministers refused to co-operate and the machine
broke down, the blame would be entirely at the door of the Ministers.
8. Mr. Awolowo, in reply, said that the Ministers had always felt that Mr.
Shankland was unsympathetic and cited the instance of the houses and offices for
Ministers. He said that the Ministers fully conceded the right of the Civil Secretary to
speak on any subject in Executive Council and that they would give him a fair
hearing. He agreed that with matters of routine it might be necessary for Ministers to
consult Mr. Shankland, but he thought that on important matters of policy it would
be better for Ministers to approach the Lieutenant-Governor direct. I said that I
understood that Mr. Awolowo was having an interview with H.E. on this subject on
Saturday and that I was not prepared to take the matter further at this stage, but I
hoped that Mr. Awolowo fully realised my views.
This part of the discussion then closed and both Mr. Awolowo and myself agreed
that the air had been to some extent cleared.
Letter from Sir J Macpherson to H F Marshall, 18 June 1952
This is to confirm, and amplify, the brief report I gave you by telephone on the
afternoon of the 14th June regarding the interview which Goble and I had with
Awolowo that morning.
I was glad to have before the interview your letter of the 12th June, with the record
of your conversation with Awolowo earlier that day. I fully endorse all that you said to
him, and I was glad to hear that the air had been cleared to some extent. It was on
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that basis that you and I agreed that it was unnecessary for you to travel to Lagos
again, to be present at my talk with him.
As I told you I had had a private talk with Abayomi on 11th June, the day following
our meeting with the Western Ministers. He was very glad to help, and later had a
long talk with Akintola. He had a session with Awolowo early on 14th June and came
round to tell me about it—just before I saw Awolowo.
He told me that in excusing his ‘interference’ he had reminded Awolowo of two
Youruba sayings. One was that if an elder saw a woman in a market with her baby on
her back, and noticed that the baby’s head was falling back, the elder could not
refrain from drawing the woman’s attention to this and putting the matter right. The
second saying was that if you gave a good cloth to a mad person, you should not be
surprised to find it in tatters! He told Awolowo that the Constitution must not fail by
reason of any actions of the Western Region and said that while I would do
everything possible to ensure harmony Awolowo should not think that I would
hesitate to use my reserve powers. He also referred to the relations of confidence
which existed between him and me and explained that I had consulted him.
Awolowo had told Abayomi about his talk with you and had said that he agreed
with you in toto. He had then gone over much of the old ground about non-co-
operation, advice being spurned and being treated as schoolboys, etc. Abayomi then
told him that he had committed a serious faux pas. Why had he not taken his
complaint to you? Surely the right thing to do was to hear the other side before
rushing to the newspapers. Awolowo had admitted his fault and in the course of
conversation conceded that 80% of the expatriate officers were doing their best to
make the Constitution work.
With diffidence and respect Abayomi put forward the suggestion that there should
be a frank talk between you and Tom Shankland and Awolowo.
Abayomi then left and Awolowo came in (there was no secrecy about Abayomi’s
involvement in the business). I considered it very desirable that Goble should be
present, I told Awolowo that my purpose in asking him to come and see me was not
to discuss the constitutional issues raised at my meeting with the Western Ministers.
On those [sic: these] action would proceed to consult the Regions and the Centre
(and London if necessary); decisions would be taken and the Western Ministers could
then determine what their line of action was to be. What I wanted to discuss was
their attitude to Shankland, which was immediate and vital, and their relations with
expatriate officers in general. At the end of our long meeting on Tuesday they stated
that while it was not within their power or competence to interfere in the posting of
officers, and while they would treat Shankland with courtesy as an individual, they
would refuse to have official dealings with him. Beyond remarking that this opened
up a broad vista of co-operation and teamwork in the Western Region, I restrained
myself at that late hour and in so big a meeting from saying what was in my mind.
But, of course, a quite intolerable situation would arise if they attempted to carry out
this intention. (Earlier in the meeting I had, of course, stated that I would not be
dictated to in the matter of posting officers).
I told Awolowo flatly that I would not move Shankland from his present post.
Quite apart from the injustice to Shankland if I did, any value that I might have to
Nigeria would be finished. The trust of the Service would be shattered; wholesale
resignations would follow; and there would be a complete breakdown in the running
of the country. It was equally impossible that there should be no official contacts
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between Ministers and the Civil Secretary. This would be a challenge to the
Constitution and would mean a complete showdown.
At this stage I broadened the discussion to deal with relations between the Action
Group and expatriate officers as a whole, notably the Administration, and I started by
recounting my interest in, and assessment of, Awolowo during the past years. I had
read his book [Path to Nigerian Freedom] before coming to Nigeria, but it was a long
time before I met him. I had easy contacts with members of the late Legislative Council
and Executive Council, but it had been much more difficult to have contacts, other
than social contacts, with unofficial Nigerians with no Legislative or official status. I
recalled that when the Legislative Council had its Budget meeting at Ibadan in March,
1949, my wife and I gave the usual series of parties, when staying at Government Lodge.
For receptions the lists of guests were prepared in Ibadan for my approval. On scruti-
nising them I noticed that Awolowo’s name was not amongst them, and on enquiring
the reason for this, was told by Hoskyns-Abrahall that Awolowo never accepted invi-
tations to Government Lodge. During my period of residence there, Government Lodge
was, in effect, Government House, but after reflection I had decided not to create dif-
ficulties between myself and the Chief Commissioner by adding Awolowo’s name. I
hoped that there would be other opportunities for us to meet.
Later I had spoken to Abayomi, who had given Awolowo a good chit, saying that he
was open to reason. Abayomi offered to invite Awolowo to come and see me, but I had
thought it best to let a meeting happen naturally. At one time (two or three years
ago) I had been disturbed at the apparent failure of officials in the West to get on a
beam with Awolowo. I spoke to Pyke-Nott about the matter and he told me a story of
how he had invited Awolowo to dinner, soon after his return from the United
Kingdom, and had received a stiff little note saying that when he was in the United
Kingdom it was war-time and people were too busy with the war to dress up. As a
result he had no dinner jacket. Pyke-Nott had replied that he had invited Awolowo to
dinner, not his dinner jacket, and in the end he had accepted the invitation and an
enjoyable evening followed. The fact remained that very few officers had been able to
get on friendly terms with him. Then I read a signed article by Awolowo—sometime
in 1949. So far as I could recollect, the article said that when his book was published
it got a good press in the United Kingdom. He was not surprised at that because the
United Kingdom press was a responsible body. When he returned to Nigeria,
however, and Europeans began inviting him to dinner and cocktail parties he ‘saw
the trap’: He had refused all the invitations except four. I assumed that Awolowo
thought that their motive was to quote some of the nice things he said about Britain
in his book and then to use him as a stalking horse. (Mr. Awolowo murmured
confirmation of this). This proved to me that any criticisms I might have had of my
officers were unfounded. It was obvious that Awolowo was hyper-sensitive and had a
complex about Europeans, particularly Administrative officers. I had wondered
whether something had happened to hurt him and to lead him to have this grudge. (I
have known it happen before in other non-European people). I did not despair,
however, as I thought that with political advance opportunities would occur for
Awolowo to take his part in Nigerian affairs and that he would then recognise our
good faith.
When the Constitution started several of the officers in the West had spoken with
admiration of Awolowo’s hard work and genuine desire to help the people; but they
also referred to his quick temper and prickliness. I myself was conscious that my
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contacts with him had been all too few apart from a few official meetings when I
received delegations of which he was a member. On several occasions he had found it
impossible to accept invitations to Government House. I deplored this but had not
‘pulled my rank’ on him, but had arranged that in future no invitation would be sent
to him unless he had indicated his intention of accepting it. During the meeting of
the House of Representatives in March I had suggested that he and I ought to have a
talk from time to time and he had agreed. I was sorry that this had not yet been
managed. Both of us were hard pressed and he lived more than a 100 miles from
Lagos.
I then came to the major issue of the Action Group’s attitude towards expatriates
and towards making the Constitution work. I did not claim that the faults were all on
one side. There were some officers, especially in the Provinces and Districts, who did
not yet fully understand the true purpose of the constitutional advance and who were
not enthusiastic about the recent changes. These officers had given long years of
faithful work to the people of the country, with whom their relations had been
completely friendly. Then had come the strain of a challenge to existing conditions,
not always made with courtesy or fairness.
Awolowo must realise that these officers, and I was talking particularly about
Administrative officers, were sincerely devoted to the people amongst whom they
worked and genuinely feared that they would be exploited by politicians. If Awolowo
reflected on the kind of politics we had had in Nigeria in the past few years he would
realise that their fears were not unjustified. I spoke, too, about the vilification and
the abuse which such officers had suffered from the press and otherwise. How could
he expect them not to be affected by this. They knew they were doing a good job for
the people. The villagers did not know much about the British connection or about
the Constitution. They did know that they had nearby a District Officer or an
Assistant District Officer, who would see fair play, and stop rackets, and the
Administrative officers were working hard and unselfishly to develop local
government and to improve the conditions of the people. They were no longer
autocratic, their help was coming from behind.
I went on to say that Awolowo must face the fact that under the New Constitution
officials (with politicians and natural rulers) are part of the very fabric of the
Constitution and you couldn’t make people co-operate by abusing them. You could,
however, enlist their help by a genuine approach. His Honour had already started the
process to bring full understanding of the position to all his officers.
My fear was that the politicians in Nigeria, notably the Ministers, would give public
expression to their belief that expatriate officers would be necessary for a long time
to come if there were not to be a complete breakdown of Government, a year too late.
By that time many of the best of the expatriate officers would have resigned and
those that remained would have lost their faith and sense of mission.
I then spoke about the Council of Ministers. In spite of the inherent difficulties due
to the fact that they represented different Regions, they had stayed together as a
team. Why was that? In part it was because all of us recognised the heavy
responsibility upon the Council for maintaining the unity of Nigeria. But in part also
it was because I, as President, had not been content merely to be impartial and
helpful and friendly. I had gone far beyond what anyone could reasonably expect in
being patient, particularly with the Western Ministers. I recognised their abilities and
good qualities; I liked than personally; and I believed that we were good friends. It
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was their duty to put forward forcibly the Western point of view, and they did so. No-
one queried that (though I often wished that Awolowo himself was in the Council of
Ministers so that he could hear the weight of opinion round the table). But I was
bound to say that it seemed to me that the main energies of the Western Region had
been directed, not towards the solution of the problem before us in the best interest
of Nigeria, but in a constant challenge to the position of ex-officio members, and to
efforts to change the mechanics of the Constitution so as to build up their own
prestige. I said that after a meeting of the Council of Ministers I was always
completely exhausted by the effort of keeping the proceedings friendly and of giving
full rein to all views, even if they were not directed towards getting the best solution
of the problem before us. And there had been instances, by at least one Central
Minister from the West, of boorishness and bad temper and grave discourtesy
towards me.
These difficult relations between Ministers and officials did not happen in the
other Regions. There the Ministers and officials were working together in harmony.
Why was it that there was this clash in the West? It could not be said that the
expatriates in the West are different from those in other parts of the country. His
Honour would do all that he could to ensure a full understanding of the purpose of
the Constitution amongst the officials there, but it took two sides to achieve co-
operation. The task before us was tremendous and we could not achieve success in an
atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. What was the future to be—war or peace
between the officials and the Action Group.
Mr. Awolowo said that he was grateful to me for arranging this interview and
appreciated what I had said. On a personal note, he confirmed in large measure my
assessment regarding his attitude to expatriate officers. Before he went to the United
Kingdom he had on many occasions tried to make constructive suggestions to
Administrative officers but he had always been slapped down. They would listen only
to the people who said the things they wanted to hear, and had no patience with
educated progressive-minded Africans. He had come to the conclusion that all
British officers were bad.
He then went to the United Kingdom to take a law degree, so that he could be
independent and speak his mind. It had not been so in business, though perhaps the
failure in that field was due to his own faults. In England he had had very friendly
relations with British people, and had made good contacts. He had then decided that
the British people were really good and were sincere in their intentions towards their
colonies, even if they were often rather ignorant about them.
He came back to Nigeria at the end of 1946 but found that there was no change in
the general attitude of expatriate officers. Nevertheless, from the date of his return
right up until 1948 he had not given expression to any critical views, because he had
a carry-over of feelings of friendship from his stay in the United Kingdom. As time
went on, however, he was made to feel that the Yorubas were not liked, although they
were loyal and law-abiding. The Government constantly gave in to noisy clamour of
agitators. What purpose was there in being good?
Awolowo then gave me the full assurance that they wanted to make the
Constitution work effectively. They had no other design at all. (I interjected a remark
that I had no such suspicion; my quarrel was with their attitude towards expatriates).
As regards expatriates, Awolowo stated that he fully realises that for many years to
come the country would need them. Even more would be required. Even if
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independence came they would still need expatriates, and he referred to the position
in India in that respect now. He did ask, however, that the expatriates should be
chosen very carefully. They must be so good that there would be no grounds for
criticism.
I referred to the fact that there was full employment in the United Kingdom, and
said that there were no long queues of people wanting to come to Nigeria.
Nevertheless, the great majority of expatriates recruited genuinely had their heart in
their work. As regards criticism, it was not enough merely to stop mass attacks in the
press on expatriates as a class. When individuals were pilloried in the press, all were
hurt, not least the best ones.
As regards the Council of Ministers, Awolowo explained that he had decided to stay
in the West because the Action Group had made too many promises and unless a
sufficient number of these were implemented they would not survive the next
election! As regards the Western Ministers at the Centre, he asked whether I could
not take them more into my confidence. I explained that I had to be very careful not
to appear to be playing one group off against another. Moreover, the Western
Ministers were so sensitive that I had been apprehensive about the effect of straight
talking to them. Awolowo had suggested that I might from time to time have private
conversations with a group of three, one from each Region. I agreed. I also said that
now that I had had a frank talk with him I should find it easier to do some straight
talking with the Central Ministers from the West.
So far as the relations between the Western Ministers and the ex-officio members
in the Western Executive Council were concerned, I was passing the whole business
back to Ibadan. I said that I would suggest to His Honour that he and Shankland and
Awolowo might have a frank talk, following the talk which His Honour had had with
Awolowo—which had cleared the air. I would watch the press carefully to see
whether attacks on expatriates ceased. And I would hope to hear good reports from
the West of a new spirit of co-operation and trust between the Ministers and the
officials.
Awolowo thanked me and said that he would look into the matter of the press. To
prove that he had no wholesale grudge against expatriates he instanced the very
cordial relations which existed between himself and his ‘Head of Department’—
Ronnie Brown—and between their wives, and he gave me to understand that he and
his people would make a genuine effort to establish good relations all round.
I am afraid this is a long rambling letter but I thought it best to give you a fairly
full account. I think that it has been worth while being patient and understanding.
Over to you and the best of luck.
Minute on 157
Mr. Godden has done a good précis of the main points in (1); but really all the
correspondence needs to be read, especially Sir J. Macpherson’s letter of the 18th
June to Mr. Marshall. I have sidelined some of the more remarkable parts of this.
Both the Governor’s and Lieutenant Governor’s handling of the Western Ministers
and particularly of Awolowo, can only evoke our admiration. (Incidentally we can feel
much more confident about the high level administration in Nigeria now that the
three new Lieutenant Governors are all in post.)
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I had a long talk with Mr. Benson about all these matters last week. He expressed a
hunch that, unless the Action Group mended their ways very considerably in the
immediate future, they would over-reach themselves and become so unpopular in
Nigeria and particularly with their ‘fringe’ supporters that they might lose their
majority in the Western Region and have to go out of office. In that event it might
only be possible to form a new Government in the West after further elections. But
he (Mr. Benson) had only recently discovered that there was no provision in the
Constitution Order for elections in any one region independently of the other two.
He said that he and the Governor, and the other senior officials, were absolutely clear
that generally speaking not a comma should be changed in the present Constitution
Order because once any changes were made there would be immediate pressure for
more and more changes. But the problem of elections in an individual region was
awkward. I said I would look into the point about elections under the constitution as
soon as possible (I have now sent a minute to Mr. McPetrie); but that while we were
sure Nigeria was right in being determined to resist at this early stage any changes in
the Order, I was not sure whether amendments might not be justifiable, and indeed
necessary, if they were required simply to prevent a breakdown in the working of the
constitution itself. Mr. Benson was inclined to agree with me on this.
If it were decided that constitutional amendments were necessary to permit of the
holding of elections in one region, it might be necessary to act at fairly short notice.
It is for this reason that I have already broached the question with Mr. McPetrie, and
I will report the outcome.
I think the reply to (1) should be in warm and congratulatory terms, and I have
amended the draft accordingly.
T.B.W.
4.7.52
158 CO 554/313, no 3 11 July 1952
[Deadlock over ministerial powers]: inward savingram no 2725 from
Sir J Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on the outcome of debates at the
Council of Ministers on the Action Group’s criticisms of the
constitution. Minute by TB Williamson
My Secret Saving No. 2440 of 19th June.
Representations by Western Ministers on Constitutional Issues.
The memorandum of the 9th of June1 by the Western Ministers was discussed at a
meeting of the Council of Ministers on the 4th of July, after the subject had been
considered by the Executive Councils of the Northern and Eastern Regions. Eastern
Regional Ministers regarded the issues involved as being of such importance as to
warrant consultation with the Central Ministers from the East, and Messrs Njoku and
Arikpo flew to Enugu for discussions prior to the meeting of the Eastern Regional
Executive Council. Central Ministers from the North were also carefully briefed with
the views of the Northern Regional Executive Council before the meeting on the 4th
1 See 157.
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of July. Copies of memoranda by the Northern and Eastern Executive Councils
dealing with the Western Ministers’ representations are attached.2
2. At the meeting on the 4th July I decided, on tactical grounds, to discuss
Ministerial Organization as a separate item before dealing with the Western
Ministers’ Memorandum. This subject was touched on in that Memorandum but the
Council of Ministers had been considering the problem independently for some time,
and the Western views on this issue were shared to some extent by Ministers from
other Regions. The situation, as you know, was that Ministers generally were not
happy about their ministerial organisations or ‘Ministries’, in so far as there was lack
of definition regarding the precise relationship between Ministers and Heads of
Departments, and also the means of discharging their responsibility under section
162 (b) of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951, of ‘ensuring, in
association with the appropriate public officer, that effect is given to decisions taken
by the Governor in Council of Ministers relating to such matter.’
3. Western Ministers had pressed, in a committee of the Council, for an
interpretation of the present Constitution which would charge Ministers with
responsibility for Departments rather than for the matters or subjects detailed in the
Third Schedule to the Order in Council. They were in fact asking for full ministerial
status similar to that of Ministers in the United Kingdom.
4. The Northern and Eastern Ministers, while agreeing that some changes in the
organisation of Ministers’ offices are desirable, were firmly of the view that such
change should be carried out within the framework of the present Constitution and
that no amendment of the Order in Council should be sought to furnish Ministers
with more extensive powers than those provided at present by the Order in Council.
5. This subject was dealt with without any serious conflict of view giving rise to
undue acerbity, and it was possible to reach a satisfactory understanding on the
relationship which should exist between a Minister and a Head of Department and
also on the extent to which a Department can be regarded as ‘forming part of ’ a
Ministry. It should now be possible to examine the practical possibilities of giving
effect to the desire of Ministers for separate Ministerial Secretariats with a fairly clear
conception of the nature of the organisation contemplated. The problem of finding
the necessary staff for such a reorganisation is the outstanding difficulty, but I
believe that Ministers appreciate the problem.
6. As soon as the Council turned its attention to the Memorandum by the
Western Ministers, it became apparent that the West had no support from either of
the other two Regions, and the discussion did not get beyond item II at page 3 of the
Note which formed the second enclosure to my saving under reference.
7. The discussion on item I of the note (provisions of Royal Instructions
regarding exercise of powers by the Governor and Lieutenant-Governors under
‘existing legislation’) was amicable and useful. The explanation given at the meeting
with Western Ministers on the 10th June (as recorded in the note) had clarified the
position, and the Lieutenant-Governors and I were prepared to consult our Councils,
and accept their advice, in cases in which, if we were legislating afresh, our powers
would not, in our opinion, be made discretionary. The Law Officers had produced a
tremendous list of discretionary powers under existing legislation, and it was quite
clear that a great many of these were concerned with functions which were quasi-
2 Not printed.
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judicial, or administrative, or concerned with the public service. And a host of other
matters would, if discretionary powers were removed, result in bogging down the
work of the Council of Ministers and the Executive Councils with business which,
even if not strictly so unimportant as to come within Clause 5 (1) (b) and Clause 3 (1)
(b) of the two sets of Royal Instructions, would not merit such treatment. The list of
powers under existing legislation will now be scrutinized by the Lieutenant-
Governors and myself, with a view to designating those which will continue to be
discretionary. I judge that you will not be surprised that we should have given
ground in this matter, having regard to the terms of your telegram No. 737 of the
16th June 1951. Meantime, existing practice is generally acceptable to Ministers both
at the Centre and in the Regions.
8. When the Council turned to item II of the note forming the second enclosure
to my saving under reference (restrictions imposed by Section 85 of the Constitution
Order in Council regarding bills and motions affecting the public service) it was at
once made abundantly clear that the Western Ministers had no support from the
other Regions on this point, and, indeed, that the Northern and Eastern Ministers
proposed to take a firm stand against any proposal which would entail a change in
the Constitution at this stage.
9. After one or two somewhat stormy exchanges between Western and Eastern
Ministers, which I did not check too soon, it was agreed that no useful purpose would
be served by pursuing any further the other matters raised in the memorandum put
forward by the Western Ministers, and the meeting was brought to a close.
10. It is still too early to say how the Action Group will react to this sharp defeat.
It is too much to hope for that they will retract anything but I believe that it has been
a shock to them to find that their present methods do not command the respect or
support of the rest of the country, and there may be, for a time at least, a serious
attempt to get on with the working of the Constitution in its present form, with
fewer attacks on the existence of officials who, as I constantly point out, are part of
the very fabric of the Constitution.
11. I believe that the Western Ministers would like to see changes made in the
Constitution to meet their own particular wishes (Prime Minister for the West etc.)
but that they would be strongly opposed to any major changes in the general
structure. They may now realise that any change in the Constitution Order in
Council would open the flood gates and play into the hands of those who oppose
Regionalization, Electoral colleges etc. Opinion in the Northern Region is
overwhelmingly in favour of leaving the Constitution untouched. I believe that the
Eastern Ministers, both Central and Regional, are sincere in their desire to maintain
the unity of Nigeria under a strong Federal Constitution. In part, however, they were
moved by dislike of the Action Group. And they cannot ignore the facts that they
belong to the N.C.N.C.—nominally at least—and that the Lagos end of the party
(including Azikiwe, Ojike, Balogun etc. not to mention the West African Pilot),
probably supported by a not inconsiderable section of the Members of the Eastern
House of Assembly, has declared its opposition to Regionalization and to Electoral
Colleges. With luck and good guidance we should be able to keep the Constitution as
it is for a considerable period but the possibility of an explosion (e.g. on the
separation of Lagos from the West or the North-West inter Regional Boundary)
cannot be discounted. For the time being we can be well satisfied with the outcome
of this recent flurry.
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Minute on 158
Mr. Gorell Barnes
The Governor’s savingram at (3) neatly summarises the outcome of the trouble with
the Action Group, about which you are already informed more fully from other papers.
The North’s reaction was just what one would have expected, and the East’s strikes
me as very sensible.
It is very difficult to summarise the position briefly, but in a nutshell it comes to
this. The West’s clamour for immediate changes in the constitution has found no
support in the North or East, and the Council of Ministers (including the Western
representatives for this purpose) have agreed to persevere with the constitution in its
present form. Amongst other things, the West’s proposal for Regional Prime
Ministers has been rejected. (Personally I was always rather doubtful whether
Awolowo would press this particular idea very hard at this stage: it struck me that
anyway he might not wish to see a Central Prime Minister so long as he himself was
not a Central Minister and not therefore in the running for the Central post. But
whether he really had ambitions that way or whether he is now thinking in terms of
a separate Western Nigeria—see below—remains to be seen.)
Further consideration will now be given, in the Council’s Sub-Committee on
Ministerial Organisation, to the practicability of establishing ‘Ministries’. It has been
agreed, the Attorney-General concurring, that ‘Ministries’ can be established under
the present Constitution Order for the purpose of assisting Ministers to carry out
their functions and responsibilities as defined in Section 162 of the Order. Their
relations with Heads of Departments have also been satisfactorily clarified and, for
the purposes of Section 162 (b), it has been agreed that a Minister may give
instructions to a Head of Department to ensure that decisions of the Council of
Ministers are carried out. It has also been agreed that Departments shall come within
the framework of Ministries (as of course they do in the Gold Coast) though naturally
they need not be housed under the same roof.
The compromise reached on the way the Governor and Lieutenant Governors shall
carry out Clause 5(1) (b) and Clause 3(1)(b) of their respective Royal Instructions is
sensible, and shows that agreement on these matters is possible where there is
goodwill and commonsense on all sides.
The conclusion of the matter will be found in paragraphs 10 and 11 of (3). The danger
that looms ahead, as Mr. Himsworth mentioned to me last week, is that if the West—
meaning in this context the Action Group—remain fundamentally dissatisfied, their
thoughts may turn more and more to secession. We can only watch—and pray. . . .
T.B.W.
21.7.52
159 CO 554/241, no 7 14 July 1952
[Western Region local government reform]: inward telegram no 951
from Sir J Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on the Western Region local
government bill
[This telegram followed the tabling of a parliamentary question by R W Sorensen, MP for
Leyton, concerning the local government bill introduced into the Western Region House
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of Assembly by Awolowo earlier that month. The bill followed the Eastern Region local
government ordinance of 1950 and was in some part modelled on it. It proposed
empowering the regional government to establish local authorities and introduced the
elective principle for choosing councillors; the lieutenant-governor’s powers—and
ultimately those of DOs—over local government were correspondingly curtailed. The CO
was unhappy with this and feared that the bill, both in itself and in the way it had been
introduced to the House of Assembly, undermined the constitutional division of powers
between the centre, understood as the British authorities, and Nigerian ministers in the
regions. The significance of this episode was that it showed the determination of the AG
leadership in the Western Region to utilise to the full the powers given them by the 1951
constitution. The amended Western Region local government law received royal assent in
February 1953. It was followed in 1954 by legislation to systematise succession to
chieftaincies.]
Your telegram No. 895.
Parliamentary Question: Local Government Proposals, Western Region.
I am sorry you should have been placed in embarrassing position through lack of
official information from me. I should have passed on to you informally such
information as was available to me, and I apologise for failure to do so sooner. I had
not contemplated possibility of U.K. Parliament being interested at this stage.
2. Blunt fact is that the matter has not yet been formally referred to Central
Government. I did not see the Bill until it appeared in the Gazette of 26th June. After
stumping the Region on the subject, Awolowo, with party majority in the Western
Executive Council, recently forced the bill through that body against strong advice of
Lieutenant Governor and Official Members that there had been inadequate
consultations and consideration of the proposals. Meeting was stormy, and
Lieutenant Governor warned his Ministers that they were running serious risk by
rushing matters. Bill will be introduced at meeting of Western House of Assembly
which starts on 14th July.
3. We have not yet worked out satisfactory arrangements to govern relations
between Council of Ministers and Regional Executive Councils in connection with
Regional Legislation and other matters. Subject is down for discussion in Council of
Ministers, but we have been too busy with other explosive subjects. I am advised,
however, that action taken by Western Government is legally and constitutionally in
order.
4. Under Sections 96 and 98 of the Constitution Order in Council, I could, on the
advice of the Council of Ministers, object to the bill when it is sent to me. I shall (gp.
emitted ? consult) you before assenting but, if the Bill goes through both houses in
the West, I do not expect to have strong grounds for objecting. There is broad
agreement on provisions of the Bill which, to considerable degree, implements
reform of native administration already carried out. It is also based in considerable
measure on Eastern Local Government Ordinance.1
5. Intention is that Local Government Inspectors should be drawn from serving
Administrative Officers (though, if provisions of the bill are not changed, I foresee
some battle when Ministers try to be selective). I do not like the proposal that
Lieutenant Governor in Council as Regional Authority should control staff. This
aspect will receive very careful consideration when the law comes to the centre.
6. As regards reply to parliamentary question, Marshall agrees that précis of
Ibadan Note of 11th June, which I have not yet seen, would provide satisfactory
1 The Eastern Region local government ordinance 1950.
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exposition of proposals. For the rest, you may wish to say that the Bill for Western
Region Local Government Laws, 1952 has not yet been considered by Nigeria
Government (possibly expressing surprise at this fact) or by you, and that you are not
in a position to comment on the merits of the proposals at this stage.
160 CO 554/414, no 2 12 August 1952
[Nigerianisation]: letter from Sir S Phillipson to J B Williams on the
establishment of a commission to review the progress of
Nigerianisation
You are probably aware that Mr. S.O. Adebo of the Nigerian Secretariat and myself
have been entrusted by the Council of Ministers with the task of conducting an
expert review of the policy of Nigerianization of the Civil Service in Nigeria and the
machinery for its implementation. Our recommendations are to be made to the
Council of Ministers.1
The subject of Nigerianization was, as you know, fully considered by a large and
representative Commission under the chairmanship of Foot in 1948.2 The Report of
that Commission which was submitted to the Governor on the 10th August in that
year formulated the policy which has since been followed with good results. It may
therefore seem odd that the subject should call for review rather less than four years
later and indeed, subject to the special problem mentioned in the next paragraph, no
question arises or could in normal circumstances arise regarding the basic policy of
appointing Nigerians to posts in the Senior Service ‘as fast as suitable candidates
with the necessary qualifications come forward’ and of surveying the Nigerian field of
recruitment before going to the non-Nigerian field. It is not, however, a matter for
surprise that following the recent constitutional changes those on whom power has
now so largely devolved should seek to satisfy themselves that the declared policy is
being carried out with resolution and energy and that there are no deficiencies in the
machinery which hinder the full and effective execution of that policy. Rightly or
wrongly, the belief prevails in Nigerian circles that under the present arrangements
oversea candidates have in certain instances been appointed to Senior Service posts
who are less fitted to hold such posts than some of the Nigerian candidates who were
found unsuitable by the Nigerianization process. Theoretically this does seem to be
possible because the process of oversea recruitment is so entirely separate from the
process established under the recommendations of the Foot Commission for first
giving consideration to Nigerian candidates; whether it has actually happened or not
1 S O Adebo, lawyer and civil servant; administrative officer, 1942; called to the Bar, 1948; assistant
financial secretary, 1954; administrative officer, 1955; permanent secretary, Western Region Ministry of
Finance, 1957. S Phillipson and SO Adebo, The Nigerianization of the Civil Service, a Review of Policy and
Machinery (Lagos, 1954), was submitted in April 1953 but not published until after the resumed Lagos
conference of January 1954. Its recommendations were thus overtaken by events and it was left to the
regional and Federal governments to evolve new policies for furthering Nigerianisation.
2 Report of the Commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor of Nigeria to make
Recommendations about the Recruitment and Training of Nigerians for Senior Posts in the Government
Service of Nigeria (Lagos, 1948).
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is of course another matter. Anyway it will be the duty of Adebo and myself to make
organisational recommendations designed to safeguard against this possibility.
Another and a very important problem arises from the attitude of influential
Northern Nigerian opinion to Nigerianization in its application to the North. Those
who at present speak for the North are strongly opposed to a policy which would, as
they see it, mean the ‘southernization’ of the North. They prefer to retain oversea
staff until such time as their own people can take over. Since the North is more
backward in Western education than the other two regions, the process of
Nigerianization there on this basis will be much slower than in the South. It is, I
think, very largely because this difficult question has arisen that the reviewing body
has been asked to review policy as well as machinery.
The foregoing paragraphs do no more than sketch in the background of a
complicated subject on which much could be written. The purpose of this letter is
not, however, to discuss these issues but to let you know that Adebo and myself will
be in the United Kingdom from about the 22nd September for ten days to a fortnight
in order to pursue our enquiry at the London end (I will actually be arriving in
London on the 10th September but the earlier part of my visit will be devoted to
Marketing Board and other matters). Naturally we will wish to have full discussions
with you, the officials of the Colonial Service Division and others able to give us
information and advice.3 I hope to be able before beginning enquiries in London to
let you have a memorandum of the points of particular interest to us. Meanwhile it
will perhaps suffice to say that we want to obtain the clearest possible idea of the
system of recruitment and appointment operated by the Colonial Office and the
Crown Agents in relation to the desiderata of our problem. We would also like to
obtain the broad facts relating to the methods adopted by H.M. Government in the
United Kingdom for recruitment to the higher Civil Service and for the safeguarding
the whole process of appointment to the Public Service against extraneous and
improper influence.
It would help us greatly if you would advise us regarding the programme of
discussions which we should follow. We want to make good use of our time. The
United Kingdom end is scarcely less important than the Nigerian end—or so our
initial approach seems to suggest.
I think that it would be a good thing if we were to give Nigerian students in the
United Kingdom an opportunity to submit memoranda and, if called upon, to give
evidence,4 but before I take active steps to arrange this through the Nigeria Office I
would like to know whether you or Keith have any views or advice to offer as to
procedure to be adopted, organisations and bodies to be seen and what not.
3 See 164. 4 Sir Charles Jeffries noted in the margin, ‘I should not encourage this.’
161 CO 554/309, no 1 13 August 1952
[Regional boundaries]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to W L Gorell
Barnes on political problems concerning the position of Lagos and the
boundary between the Western and Northern Regions
[Regional boundaries were to become a major issue of controversy under the Federal
constitutions established in Nigeria after 1951. Under the 1951 constitutional arrangements
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Lagos had been made part of the Western Region. This had been welcomed by the AG and
opposed by the NCNC which had hitherto dominated Lagos politics. Thereafter the NCNC
continued to press for the separation of Lagos from the Western Region. Behind this lay
the struggle for political power in Lagos between the NCNC, inheritors of the older
Macaulay-ite tradition in the city, and the AG (see 163). A further problem came with the
boundary between the Northern and Western Regions. By accepting the pre-1914
boundary between Northern and Southern Nigeria, the 1951 constitution left large
numbers of Yorubas, particularly those living in Ilorin emirate, in the Northern region
and this was to be a recurring issue of controversy during the remaining years of British
rule.]
You know that I have long been anxious about the effect that either or both of two
very explosive subjects might have on the new Constitution, and our whole set-up;
the subjects, of course, are the position of Lagos and the Western claim for the
revision of the inter-regional boundary between the West and the North. In the past
few weeks regional feelings have become very highly charged, and we are living
dangerously. I wish that I could make more time to keep you more fully and
frequently posted in all this, but the pressure is fantastic and the situation changes
from day to day. This letter will be hurried and possibly not very connected but it will
be followed up by more factual communications.
You have all the facts about the boundary dispute—correspondence ending with
your Saving No. 1760 of 8th June. I have no doubt at all that the right decision, as I
told the Secretary of State when he was here, is ‘no change.’ My present intention,
and I should welcome approval of my proposed course of action, is to make the
decision public in a Gazette Extraordinary two or three days before the adjournment
of the House of Representatives at the end of the meeting which starts on the 14th.
The best guess I can make is that publication would take place about the 25th, 26th,
or 27th August. Developments regarding the quarrel about Lagos may lead to a
change in this programme but a decision cannot be much longer deferred; the
arguments which led to this proposed date for publication are as follows:—
(a) The decision must be announced before I go on leave, which I hope to do on
16th September;
(b) It would not do if I flew off from Nigeria almost immediately after the
announcement of my decision!
(c) I don’t want to publish the decision before the House of Representatives meets
because it would greatly add to the general explosive atmosphere (the Western
Ministers have uttered dark threats about the ‘wrong’ decision wrecking the
Constitution);
(d) It would not look well to make the announcement immediately after the
Members of the House of Representatives had dispersed;
(e) Ten days’ notice is required of a Motion and if the announcement is made
within a few days of the adjournment on completion of business before the
Council there will not be time for notice of a Motion to be given before the
adjournment. (There is always the possibility, of course, that a Member may ask
for leave to move the adjournment for the purpose of discussing a matter of urgent
public importance. However, we must risk that).
All this depends on whether I can make time to write my ‘grounds of judgment’ and
get the Gazette printed on schedule. We shall be sending you a separate letter telling
you how regional views are developing on this subject, but I can say right here and
now that the campaign by the Action Group and the papers which support it has had
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the effect of creating a united and determined Northern opposition to any change in
the boundary. Even the dissident N.E.P.U. sides with the Northern Peoples Congress
and the Northern Houses of Assembly in this matter and if the N.C.N.C. takes its usual
line it will support its N.E.P.U. allies—and majority opinion in the North—in this
matter. The cumulative effect of (a) the rejection by the North and East of the Action
Group proposals for amending the Constitution Order in Council, (b) the rejection of
the Western claims for a revision of the boundary, and (c) of Northern and Eastern
support for Mbadiwe’s Motion (referred to below) to excise Lagos from the West might
well result in the Action Group Ministers denouncing the Constitution and refusing
to co-operate in running it. I have very much in mind the threat to law and order in
the Western Region which might result from any such decision.
It is the Lagos problem, however, which makes this informatory letter particularly
urgent. At our Budget meeting in March one of the Members from the East,
Mbadiwe, gave notice of a motion for the separation of Lagos from the Western
Region. All of us in the Council of Ministers realised the implications of this; if the
motion were carried we should inevitably be committed to making significant
changes in the Constitution Order-in-Council and the whole Constitution would be
in the melting pot. Eventually, the Central Ministers from the East persuaded
Mbadiwe to withdraw his motion.
In recent weeks, the anger of the North and East against the actions and attitude of
the West, as dictated by Awolowo and his Party, has been steadily rising. You know
the full story of the Western Ministers’ memorandum, and about the rejection by the
North and East of the Action Group proposals for amending the Constitution Order-
in-Council. The Ministers of the North and East—both Central and Regional—
rejected those proposals because they were determined to preserve the unity of the
country and to keep the present Constitution going. They are also influenced to some
extent by their annoyance with the Action Group. What particularly riled the East
was that they were made to look as if they were resisting progressive changes,
whereas certain aspects of the Constitution are not fully to the liking of the N.C.N.C.;
but they have refrained from suggesting changes because they realise that once we
tamper in any way with the Constitution Order-in-Council we can scarcely avoid
being committed to a further constitutional review.
At a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 1st August we discussed what
Government’s attitude would be to a number of motions, for the forthcoming
meeting of the House of Representatives, of which notice had been given. When we
came to Mbadiwe’s motion, the storm burst, and the Ministers from the North and
East told the Western Ministers exactly what they thought of them and their Party.
The gravamen of the charge was that whereas all the other Members of the Council
of Ministers were applying their minds to the problems before them with the sole
desire of furthering the interests of a unified Nigeria, the Western Ministers were
playing party politics. I enclose an extract from the conclusions of the meeting; they
might have read much more stormily!1
I have been at pains to make it abundantly clear that if the Constitution breaks on
this issue it will not be an argument between Britain and Nigeria but petty squabbles
between Nigerians themselves. Many sympathetic and friendly well-wishers in the
1 Not printed.
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United Kingdom and other countries will be gravely disappointed; and enemies
greatly encouraged. I made the point that a break-up at this time would be
particularly tragic coming as it would just after the successful visit of Nwapa to the
United Kingdom which demonstrated most clearly the degree of confidence imposed
by H.M.G. and the British people in this young Nigerian Government.
I cannot at present prophesy what the outcome of all this will be. The Central
Ministers from the North brought word, after the recent meetings of the Northern
Legislative Houses, that Mbadiwe’s motion would have strong support and that most
of the Northern Members of the House of Representatives would vote for it. They are
not very seriously concerned with the merits of the case and are moved mainly by
disgust of the actions and attitude of the Action Group, but they also have at the back
of their minds the fear which was expressed at the General Conference on the
Constitution, held at Ibadan in 1950, that a Northern ‘corridor to the sea’ is essential
and that Western control of Lagos and its port is a threat to the lifeline of the North.
Sharwood Smith was here for a couple of nights before sailing on leave on 5th
August, and I got him to have a very frank talk with the three Central Ministers from
the North. They now fully realise the consequences if the motion is passed, namely
that it would mean extensive changes in the Constitution Order in Council (and the
Revenue Allocation Order in Council). And we couldn’t avoid all the other
controversial issues coming up (Prime Minister, abolition of Electoral Colleges etc.).
I think they now hope to restrain the Northern floor members, by persuading them
that while they may criticize the West they should not vote for the motion, if it is
debated.
The East are of course much more heavily involved because the quarrel between
the N.C.N.C. and the Action Group centres largely on the position of Lagos, not least
because the merging of the Colony with the West stopped Azikiwe from getting to
the House of Representatives. The Yorubas, led by Awolowo, have long felt that
Lagos, which they regard as a Yoruba town, has been plagued by noisy irresponsible
politicians and hooligans from the East. The new Constitution enabled them to
reduce to negligible proportions the influence of these people in the Central
Legislature; notwithstanding the N.C.N.C. victory in the primary elections; then
Awolowo turned his attention to the Lagos Town Council, where the N.C.N.C. and its
allies hold 18 seats out of 24. Awolowo was dissuaded from dissolving the Town
Council, on the grounds that the best course was to let the electorate deal with the
situation. The projected Commission of Enquiry into the working of the Council
should greatly assist in ‘educating the electorate.’ Without waiting for the result of
the Commission of Enquiry, however, and without any consultation with people in
Lagos, Awolowo has announced far-reaching proposals for the reform of the Council,
including the abolition of the appointment of a Mayor, making Oba Adele the
‘ceremonial’ President and adding White Cap Chiefs, who would not have to be
elected. No bill has yet been presented to the Western House of Assembly, but a bill
has been passed postponing the elections (of one-third of the 24 members of the
Town Council) which would normally have taken place in October. (This bill has not
yet been to the Council of Ministers). In effect, Awolowo wants to give Lagos a Local
Government body more or less on the general Western pattern. The N.C.N.C. is
screaming about this retrograde proposal to replace a modern Town Council which
has a wholly elected membership based on adult suffrage, and an elected Mayor, with
an old-fashioned substitute. (They are only slightly abashed by the fact that they
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made similar proposals a few years ago before the present Oba, who is a solid
supporter of the Action Group, was appointed).
One further point about the Action Group position on Lagos. They claim that
Lagos is a Yoruba town and must remain so, but assert that they are not interested in
its role as capital of Nigeria. So far as they are concerned, they suggest that a new
capital be established somewhere else.
So much for the general pattern—or confusion! I don’t yet see the solution, but I
am not sitting back waiting upon events. One suggestion is that the motion should
be disallowed because, in its present form, it assumes that the House can change the
Constitution. But notice of a motion in similar terms was admitted in March (later
withdrawn); and the mover could be advised to change the form of the motion in
such a way as to make it admissible. I feel that it would be very unwise to rule it out
on a technicality, unless, by a miracle, there was tacit agreement to that course in all
quarters.
I see no hope of Mbadiwe being prevailed upon again to withdraw his motion,
unless there has been a truce of some kind. And that is really the best hope of
surmounting the crisis. The first gesture or concession ought to come from the
West, followed by a generous response from the other side. Awolowo is not the sort of
person to do this, but in spite of the highly-charged atmosphere I do not despair of
the Central Ministers getting together and working out some compromise which
they can urge upon the Members from their Regions. The Central Ministers are quite
good friends and there is a clear realization in the Council of the need to keep the
Ship of State on an even keel. The only jarring note is when the Western Ministers
keep ‘looking over their shoulders’ at the Boss (Awolowo) and do not open their
minds to compromise. There have been recently some tentative gropings towards a
burying of the hatchet by the main antagonistic parties. And Pant the Indian
Commissioner from East Africa, who, as you know, recently spent two weeks in
Nigeria, did a very good job, even if he is a little ‘smooth.’ He met the Ministers, both
in the Regions and at the Centre, and in all his conversations, and speeches, he
stressed the value and importance of belonging to the British Commonwealth (he
said this in a broadcast), and spoke about the dangers of communalism, and the need
to resist communism by capturing the imagination of the people. My people were
very greatly impressed.
I have told the Central Ministers that it is primarily their responsibility to find a
solution, but I am having talks with them individually and in groups; and they know
I am ready to help, at any time of the day or night, to bring people together. I am also
discreetly enlisting the support of individual responsible Nigerians outside the
Council.
If we break on this it will be tragic, because none of the Regions, and least of all the
Council of Ministers, wants any change in the main structure of the Constitution
now or in the near future. If it breaks we shall have to set about putting the pieces
together again, but it will be a serious set-back, and I doubt if we could continue to
have a single country.
We can arrange the business of the House so that this particular piece of dynamite
doesn’t get taken before the 20th of August, or a little later. Much will depend on
what we can do after the Members assemble in Lagos about the 12th or 13th—night-
time confabs in smoke-filled hotel bedrooms etc. in the American style. I shall try to
let you know about developments.
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P.S. I dictated this several days ago. All the Lieutenant-Governors are now here
and we are searching for a solution. One possibility is that Government should put in
a prior motion reaffirming the status quo of Lagos in the Constitution but expressing
the conviction that before any Regional legislation is passed by the West affecting the
position of Lagos there should be some prior consultation. The West who regularly
claim that following their defeat any measure which involves amendment to the
Constitution should be agreed by all, may regard this as an unbearable defeat.
162 CO 554/676, no 10A 6 Sept 1952
[Deadlock over ministerial powers]: inward savingram no 3641 from
Sir J Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on the AG attacks on the
constitution and on regional boundaries
Sequel to the representations by Action Group Ministers on Constitutional Issues.
In my secret savingram No. 2440 of the 19th of June1 I gave an account of the
attacks launched by the Action Group on certain provisions of the 1951 Constitution
which, in their view, prevented the establishment of effective Ministerial control over
both Regional and Central affairs. Later, in my savingram No. 2725 of the 11th of
July2 I informed you of the hostile attitude of the Northern and Eastern Executive
Councils and of the Council of Ministers to the Western proposals. Sufficient time
has now elapsed to enable me to make a more confident assessment of the reaction of
the West to the rejection of these demands to which they were so deeply committed,
but which they had wisely, and fortunately for them, not publicised.
2. On the 9th of July, shortly after the Council of Ministers reached its decision
to reject the Western proposals for constitutional reform, Awolowo, the leader of the
Action Group, addressed a mass meeting of his supporters in Lagos in remarkably
conciliatory terms. The Action Group, he said, accepted the 1951 Constitution
although fully conscious of its defects. No Constitution was perfect and the Action
Group believed that as time went on the defects in the Nigerian Constitution would
come to light and would be removed, He had in mind three major matters which
required adjustment and they were (a) the removal of control of the Civil Service
from the hands of the Governor, (b) the failure of Government to establish effective
Ministerial control over Departments and (c) the retention by the Governor and
Lieutenant-Governors of powers vested in them by legislation enacted prior to the
setting up of the 1951 Constitution. These pronouncements were not, as might have
been expected, followed by a press campaign nor were they seriously pursued in the
Western House of Assembly which met shortly afterwards, on the 14th of July.
Awolowo’s parting shot on the subject was delivered at that meeting where ‘amidst
great cheers’ he relegated constitutional changes to a conveniently distant future and
declared that the Action Group was ‘irrevocably committed’ to the attainment of self-
government within five years. The rejection of the Action Groups’s proposals was also
followed by a very marked improvement in the relationship between the Western
Regional Ministers and the official Members of the Western Regional Executive
1 See 157. 2 See 158.
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Council, based on a much more realistic view, on the part of the Action Group, of the
inter-dependence of the Regions in a united Nigeria.
3. This more conciliatory attitude can be attributed partly to the salutary impact
of Eastern and Northern opinion on the Party and partly to the evident willingness of
the Council of Ministers to examine proposals for Ministerial reorganisation and for
further delegation of powers, at present in the hands of Lieutenant-Governors, to
Lieutenant-Governors in Council. The discussion of the Western Region Local
Government Bill at the July meeting of the House of Assembly and the attacks of the
N.C.N.C. on the measure aroused widespread Regional interest and enabled the Party
gradually to cease reference, without undue loss of face, not only to its constitutional
claims but also to another issue on which it was no less deeply committed—namely,
the revision of the boundary between the North and the West, in favour of the West.
4. Interest in the constitutional issues raised by the Party receded still further
(for the present) as the date fixed for the meeting of the House of Representatives
approached and it became clear that the N.C.N.C., as distinct from the Eastern
Ministers and the Central Ministers for the East, intended to resume its campaign for
the severance of Lagos from the Western Region and to move a motion to that effect
in the House of Representatives, I have briefly described the reaction of my Ministers
to this proposal in communications ending with my telegrams Nos. 1196 and 1197 of
the 19th of August. For the purpose of this savingram the importance of the
N.C.N.C.’s move was that for the first time for some months the Action Group found
itself on the defensive and strongly resisting a proposed change in the Constitution.
When, therefore, the President of the House ruled the N.C.N.C. Motion out of order
and the Government reaffirmed the special position of Lagos in the Constitution and
announced its intention of seeking expert advice on the financial and administrative
arrangements in other capitals to assist it in dealing with the problem of Lagos
within the framework of the Constitution, the decision was applauded by the Action
Group members. The West came out of the business well in that they have extricated
themselves without too much loss of face from the constitutional impasse into which
they had rushed. At the same time they can be said to have aligned themselves, for
the time being at least, with majority opinion against early changes in the
Constitution.
5. The cessation by the Action Group of the press campaign for revision of the
inter-Regional boundary (referred to in paragraph 3 above) and its ‘victory’ in the
status of Lagos issue appeared to offer a suitable opportunity of announcing my
decision in regard to the last of the major constitutional issues on which the West
had taken a stand. As I informed you, in correspondence ending with my savingram
No. 3537 of the 30th of August, I therefore decided to announce my decision in
regard to the boundary on the 3rd of September.3 It is not yet possible to be sure that
the Action Group will reconcile itself to this further blow to its aspirations but there
are signs that their experiences of the last two months, described above, and their
desire to retain Northern support on the status of Lagos issue will induce the party to
accept the decision, for the present at least. Up to this date (5th September) there has
been no Press reaction. Significantly, neither the Zik press nor the Action Group
papers have so far made a single Editorial comment.
3 Macpherson announced on 3 September that the boundary between the Northern and Western Regions
would remain unchanged and that Lagos would remain part of the Western Region.
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163 CO 554/309, no 9 15 Sept 1952
[Position of Lagos]: inward savingram no 3776 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Lyttelton on the constitutional position of Lagos [Extract]
Motion to separate Lagos from the Western Region
In correspondence ending with my secret telegram No. 1197 of 19th August I
informed you of the serious threat to the stability of the present Constitution which
resulted from the determination of N.C.N.C. Members of the House of
Representatives (as distinct from Eastern Regional Ministers and Central Ministers
from the East) to press a Motion in the following terms:—
‘Be it resolved that, in the interest of national unity and fraternal fellowship
among the Regions of Nigeria, Lagos be separated from the Western Region
and henceforth remain independent of any and all the Regions of Nigeria.’
The purpose of this communication is to recount the measures taken to deal with
the situation and to give some background information.
2. You are aware, of course, that the position of Lagos has been a bone of con-
tention between the main political parties in the South (N.C.N.C. and Action Group)
ever since the review of the Constitution was undertaken, and I need not recapitulate
the history of this matter, the settlement of which is set out in paragraphs 11 and 12
of your predecessor’s Despatch No. 464A of the 15th July, 19501, published with the
Constitution Order in Council. The Lagos electorate has on several occasions’ demon-
strated that it is preponderantly N.C.N.C. in outlook or, more accurately, that it
favours Azikiwe and his associates, rather than Awolowo and the Action Group, but
the Action Group secured a very substantial majority in the Western Region elections
(with the signal exception of those held in Lagos) under the new Constitution; and its
leaders, who held the view that the Yoruba town of Lagos has been plagued for years
by noisy and irresponsible elements from the Eastern Region, lost no time in giving
proof of their intention of correcting that situation. Their efforts have been directed
to gaining2 [. . .] power politics, and the N.C.N.C. party, and elected members from the
East generally, have not failed to understand what was intended.
3. During the Budget meeting in March, notice of a motion for the separation of
Lagos from the Western Region was given by Mbadiwe, a floor member from the
East. As President, I allowed it to go on the Order Book, because I did not consider
that I had power to do otherwise, though I should probably have asked the Member
to change the wording so that it would do no more than ask the House to express an
opinion on the subject matter of the motion. When, however, the Council of
Ministers considered the matter in March, all the Ministers appreciated that
acceptance of the motion would inevitably lead to vital changes being made to the
Constitution. They resolved to oppose the motion if it were moved, but, since even a
debate on the subject would lead to unsettlement, the Council decided that the
Central Ministers from the East should endeavour to persuade Mbadiwe to withdraw
his notice of motion. In this they were successful, but the Member had, of course, the
right to ask for it to be restored to the Order Book.
4. It is not difficult to understand why the request was made for the notice of
motion to be restored for the August meeting. Not only had the Action Group pressed
1 See 116. 2 The text in the original is broken at this point and approximately six words are missing.
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on with their intentions to gain party control of Lagos but they had upset both the
Northern and Eastern Regions by their unilateral demand for the revision of the
Constitution to give them greatly extended powers in their Region. (I refer to
correspondence ending with my saving telegram No. 3641 of the 6th September).3
The Eastern Ministers, both Regional and Central, were opposed to any change in the
Constitution at this stage but the N.C.N.C. as a party (which must be distinguished
from Eastern Ministers) has never disguised the fact that there are certain aspects of
the Constitution that do not meet with their wishes (particularly the system of
electoral colleges and the merging of Lagos with the Western Region), and the
Eastern Ministers were angry because by their opposition to the Constitutional
changes proposed by the Western Ministers they were made to look unprogressive.
The Northern Ministers, both Regional and Central, were no less angry with the
Western Ministers because of their aggressiveness and overweening pride.
5. When last month the Council of Ministers again came to consider its attitude
towards the motion of which Mbadiwe had given fresh notice, the Ministers, in their
hearts, were no less anxious than before to keep the Constitution intact. It was made
clear, however, by the Central Ministers from the North that the motion, if debated,
would get considerable support from the Northern Members of the House. Although
the reasons were not stated, it was obvious that this was in part due to irritation with
the Action Group Ministers, and to a desire to teach them a lesson. Not only was this
argument likely to override, amongst the less thoughtful Members, the desire to keep
the Constitution intact; there was the further thought that the West might wish to
secede, and if that were to happen, the North would wish the port of Lagos to be inde-
pendent of the Western Region. I do not believe that the Eastern Ministers, whether
Regional or Central, were in favour of the motion being brought forward (the tail of
N.C.N.C. floor Members is liable to wag the Eastern Ministerial dog) but they, too, sus-
pected, wrongly as I think, that the Western Region had it in mind to secede, and were
less ready than in March to resist the motion, or to attempt to persuade Mbadiwe to
withdraw it. The Central Ministers from the West argued, with justification, that as
their proposals for changes in the Constitution had been rejected by the other Regions
on the grounds that it was not desired to make any changes at present, the same con-
siderations should lead the Council of Ministers resolutely to oppose the motion.
6. I kept postponing the issue in Council of Ministers while I had consultations
with individual Ministers, groups of Ministers, Lieutenant-Governors, and private
individuals upon whom I could rely. One suggestion that I favoured was the earlier
introduction of a Government motion which would assert the Government’s view
that no changes should be made in the Constitution at this stage, would reaffirm the
special status of Lagos; and would go on to record the conviction of the Government
that it would be within the spirit of the Constitution that no legislation affecting
Lagos should be introduced into the Western House of Assembly until after prior
consultation between the Lieutenant Governor in Council and the Governor in
Council. This, while saving the main stand of the Action Group, would have clipped
their wings to a considerable extent.
7. Before the Council of Ministers had decided what its attitude would be to the
motion, if debated, the Gordian knot was cut by Mr. E.A. Fellowes, as President of the
House of Representatives. Entirely on his own iniative, he decided that the motion
3 See 162.
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was out of order, that is ‘disorderly’, and was not debatable in the House. The
statement which he eventually made in the House in answer to a Private Notice
question from the mover, was as follows:—
‘Paragraph 5 of the Constitution Order in Council, 1951 says that Nigeria shall
be divided into three Regions. Within those Regions it is competent for the
Governor to alter the boundaries, and so forth, as set out in the Order in Council.
But the Motion which I was considering said that Lagos should be taken out of
all three Regions and made into an entity of its own. It seemed to me, therefore,
beyond doubt that such a Motion validated would require an amendment of the
Order in Council. But if you look at Paragraph 12 of that same Order in Council,
Honourable Members will see that the power to amend the Order in Council is
expressly reserved not to any Authority in Nigeria, but to the Sovereign in
Council. It therefore seemed to me that the Motion must be out of order.’
Mr. Fellowes had no doubt about the correctness of his action, and he has assured me
that he did not have also at the back of his mind the thought that he was helping us
out of a very serious political ‘jam’. Be that as it may, he has a very good knowledge of
the Nigerian political set-up and I can never be sufficiently grateful to him for his help.
8. Mr. Fellowes communicated his decision to Mbadiwe, and to the Government,
on the 16th August, and on the two following days the Council of Ministers met to
consider the situation. The outcome was a unanimous decision to seek expert advice
on the financial and administrative arrangements made in other capitals, particularly
federal capitals, and to consider this advice ‘within the framework of the
Constitution’. The decision to seek such expert advice was not a device to gain time;
it was genuinely felt that if we had some principles, and rules of practice, to guide us,
the difficult problems connected with Lagos could be approached otherwise than
with passion and prejudice. (For example, non-Western Ministers pointed out that
the country as a whole might wish to spend large sums of money on making Lagos a
worthy capital; it should not be left to the Western Region to decide such questions,
or to meet the bill alone). The real argument in Council turned, surprisingly, on the
question whether or not the Government should make a statement in the House
regarding its position. For reasons which were not easy to fathom neither the
Western nor the Northern  Ministers favoured any statement by the Government. I
always try to avoid a situation in which the ex-officio Members and the Ministers
from a single Region carry the day. In this case, the situation was eased by my
suggestion that the Council should first decide on the terms of a statement, if it were
decided that one should be made. After this had been achieved the Council decided by
a majority (Officials and East) that a statement should be made.
9. This was done by the Chief Secretary immediately after the President had given
his grounds for ruling Mbadiwe’s motion out of order. It was in the following terms:—
‘Under the Constitution Lagos has a dual function. It has been merged with
the Western Region and it is the capital and principal port of Nigeria. The
dual function gives rise to difficult problems relating to finance and
administration and these have for some time been exercising the minds of the
Council of Ministers. The Council have, therefore, decided to seek expert
opinion on the financial and admiistrative arrangements in other capitals,
especially in federal countries and will give consideration to such opinion
within the framework of the Constutition.’
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10. I was not, of course, present in the House at the time, but I was informed
that the statement was warmly received by both the Western and Eastern Members,
and with silent relief by the Northern Members. The Western Members were
obviously pleased by the statement that the problems of Lagos would be considered
‘within the framework of the Constitution’, while the Eastern Members applauded
the reference to the dual function of Lagos and the announcement that expert advice
would be sought.
11. Both the Action Group and the N.C.N.C. later hailed the Government state-
ment as a ‘victory’. The intentions of the Action Group in the matter of achieving power
in Lagos remains to be seen, and I am now not without hope that they will consult the
Council of Ministers before introducing legislation in the Western House of Assembly
affecting the Lagos Town Council. Although they were justified in arguing that the
Government should be no less brisk about turning down an Eastern suggestion which
would have involved changes in the Constitution than it had been in rejecting their
own earlier proposals, they came out of this crisis rather better than they deserved. I
was the less sorry about this because I was about to publish my decision on the Regional
boundary between the North and the West. Two heavy knocks in quick succession
might have caused the Action Group Ministers, both Regional and Central, to resign
and to refuse to co-operate in working the Constitution. The Western Central Ministers
have assured me that they do not want to break away. They went on to say, however,
that the peoples of this country were never united until the British united them. Once
this welding and unifying force has begun to release its hold ‘the future is for deci-
sion’. They fully recognise the great advantages from staying united with the other
Regions, but ‘if the sacrifice demanded of them were too great, they might have to be
content with something less than the ideal’. I do not take this very seriously but the
Action Group Ministers are afflicted with a persecution mania, claiming that it was
Western money which built up the country but that the other Regions show no grat-
itude for their sacrifice.
12. It appears that the N.C.N.C. (whatever that is at present) consider that their
aims in respect of Lagos are possible of achievement within the terms of the
Government statement and intend to pursue those aims after expert advice has been
obtained. It can be said that the difficult situation created by the motion has been
overcome for the present but the N.C.N.C., though committed to a policy of giving
the Constitution a ‘fair trial’, will not readily abandon their determination to alter
the status of Lagos. Much will depend upon what happens to the N.C.N.C., to which
the Eastern Ministers both Central and Regional, ostensibly belong. These Ministers
are not, in my opinion, likely to continue indefinitely to pay lip service to the Party as
operated by such people as Kola Balogun and Mbonu Ojike. (Where Azikiwe stands at
present is uncertain). But responsible Ministers like Njoku and Arikpo have at
present little influence outside their own Divisions (by the people of which they were
‘drafted’ into politics). Nwapa carries more weight with the public of the East, but all
three of them, and the Eastern Regional Ministers, who are of like mind with him,
will have to be careful about breaking away from the N.C.N.C. if the voters continue
to back the noisy and irresponsible members of the Party. The Central Ministers from
the West could help a great deal by recognising the difficult position in which their
Eastern colleagues on the Council are placed, and I have been urging them to do
this. The North is watchful, and, I quote, more neutral between East and West than
formerly . . .
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164 CO 554/404, no 5A 2 Oct 1952
[Nigerianisation]: CO note of a meeting with Sir S Phillipson and Mr
Adebo to discuss recruitment for the Colonial Service in Nigeria
Sir Sidney Phillipson explained that, notwithstanding the policy of Nigerianisation of
the Civil Service in Nigeria which had been adopted in accordance with the
recommendations of the Foot Commission, local public opinion had recently
indicated some dissatisfaction in regard to the recruitment of expatriate officers, and
it had been alleged that cases had occurred where persons recruited in the United
Kingdom for certain posts had appeared to be no better qualified for these posts than
local candidates who had been turned down by the Nigeria Civil Service Commission.
It had therefore been decided by the Council of Ministers that a Commission should
be appointed to conduct an expert review of the policy of Nigerianisation of the Civil
Service and the machinery for its implementation, and to make recommendations.
2. A general discussion followed in which the following points were made.
(1) Where set qualifications for a particular post could be laid down a uniform stan-
dard of selection would not be difficult; and where this was not already done, it might
help in the case of Nigeria to lay down specific qualifications. On the other hand,
too rigid insistence on exact qualifications might deprive Nigeria of good men.
(2) In the matter of general suitability, on grounds of character and background,
it must be recognised that just as those responsible for selection in the United
Kingdom would not claim to be able to judge the suitability of Nigerians, so those
responsible for selection in Nigeria would not be in a position to assess the full
suitability of United Kingdom candidates.
(3) Criticism in Nigeria had arisen not so much in respect of administrative
officers but of departmental officers. It was stated, for instance, that accountants
and customs officers had been sent out from the United Kingdom with no better
qualifications than Nigerians who had already had long practical experience. It was
however pointed out that in filling the lower ranks of the senior service it was not
only a matter of finding people capable of doing the work of those ranks. Regard
must be paid to the need to create a field from which officers could be selected for
posts of the highest responsibility. Men who were promoted to the senior service
late in their careers were at a disadvantage in this respect and it was therefore
necessary to bring in some younger men by direct recruitment to a cadet class.
3. Sir Sidney Phillipson went on to explain that it was their present intention to
recommend the establishment of a Public Service Commission in Nigeria and it
would be necessary to satisfy this Commission that a uniform standard of selection
was maintained.
It was suggested that it might assist if there was closer liaison with the Nigeria
Office in London.1 A possible arrangement would be for a representative of the Public
Service Commission to be attached permanently to that Office, so that he would be
available for consultation. When sending indents for recruits to the Colonial Office or
to the Crown Agents Nigeria might then ask that in the case of such-and-such
vacancies (i.e. vacancies for which there might be possible local candidates to be
1 The Nigeria Office was opened in London in March 1950.
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considered in competition with outside recruits), this representative should be
consulted before a final selection was made.
It was made clear that, once a vacancy had been definitely remitted to the
Secretary of State to select a candidate, there could be no question of his selection
being subject to review or confirmation by the Public Service Commission.
4. A further point raised was the relationship of the Nigeria Civil Service to the
unified Colonial services. Mr. Adebo felt that a unified service prejudiced the chances
of Nigerians being appointed to senior posts. Sir Charles Jeffries said that in large
Colonies the unifed service tended to create vacancies for senior posts by the transfer
of officers on promotion to smaller Colonies, and he felt that on balance Nigeria
would lose if it cut loose from the unifed service, especially in respect of the smaller
Departments. Mr. Adebo said that in the case of the Colonial Audit Service it was
understood that experience in more than one Colony was essential to promotion and
that this automatically prejudiced the chances of Nigerians for promotion, as
Nigerians were not members of the unified service and they could not be transferred
to other Colonies. It was explained that the Colonial Audit Service was a special case,
and it was suggested that Sir Sidney Phillipson and Mr. Adebo should discuss this
point with the Director-General of Colonial Audit.
5. Mention was made of the position of Nigerian overseas students. Sir Sidney
Phillipson said that it was their intention to recommend the establishment of a
Register of overseas students so that the Nigerian Public Service Commission could
take them into account when considering vacancies in Nigeria. This Register would
cover students in the United States, Canada and other places overseas as well as in
the United Kingdom. Clearly, the machinery for maintaining the Register would have
to be closely linked with arrangements now under consideration for bringing the
responsibility for supervising students under the Nigerian Commissioner’s Office in
London, leaving the placing of students in Universities in the hands of the Director of
Colonial Scholars, at least for the time being. He considered that while the
representative of the Public Service Commission in London, who would be closely
associated with the work for students, might be changed periodically, the officer in
charge of the executive work in connection with students should be permanent.
6. Mr. Adebo felt that it would be desirable to recruit more officers on short term
contract, in order that they could be replaced in due course by the large number of
Nigerian students now under training. He said the Crown Agents agreed that certain
classes of appointment could be filled on contracts. Mr. Whittle2 advised against this
for appointments filled by the Colonial Office, as it would seriously handicap
recruitment. The Sudan and the Gold Coast were already experiencing difficulty in
this respect through eliminating or restricting the opportunities for pensionable
employment for overseas officers. Sir Charles Jeffries felt that with the large
expansion of the Civil Service in Nigeria it should not be difficult to absorb all
Nigerians who were properly qualified for appointments.
7. Finally, Sir Sidney Phillipson referred to the possibility in future years of polit-
ical opinion in Nigeria desiring to see the number of expatriate officers reduced more
rapidly. No doubt ordinary wastage would help to solve this problem; and it must be
remembered that if a material reduction in expatriate officers took place too quickly,
2 R A Whittle, service in Uganda; principal, CO, 1939; ass sec (temporary), 1944; principal, 1956–1961.
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there would not be enough qualified Nigerians to fill the senior posts. It had been sug-
gested that Nigerians should be appointed as understudies to senior officers or that
special compensation should be given to expatriate officers who were superseded by
Nigerians. Sir Charles Jeffries said the Secretary of State clearly could not undertake
to recruit expatriate officers if there was any possibility of unfair discrimination
against them in the matter of promotion. Captain Newbolt3 added that for so long as
Nigeria wanted expatriate officers it was very important that they should be received
in a spirit of welcome. Sir Sidney Phillipson expressed the hope that a spirit of part-
nership in the non-political sense would be built up between Nigerian and expatriate
officers until the time came when Nigerians could stand entirely on their own feet.
3 Capt A F Newbolt, assistant private secretary to the secretary of state, 1919–1930; principal, 1930; ass sec
1944; visited West Africa for the CO, 1946.
165 CO 554/312, no 8 21 Nov 1952
[Ministerial titles]: inward telegram no 1815 from A E T Benson to
Mr Gorell Barnes on the impact of Sierra Leone policy on Nigeria
Following for Gorell Barnes.
Your secret and personal telegram No. 105.
Sierra Leone Ministers.
Frankly, this worries me. We have great difficulties here as a result of calling people
who have only conciliar responsibility ‘Ministers’ instead of ‘Members’. But, apart
from this, I fear the immediate reaction here to calling officials in Sierra Leone
‘Ministers’ would be suggestion (which could be contradicted to the few who will
listen but not the many who will not) that Sierra Leone had a more advanced
constitution than Nigeria.
2. Besides this, agitation might begin here for a parallel move, the intention
being then to claim that the three official ministers, or some of them should be
replaced by Nigerians, whilst officials became Permanent Under Secretaries.
Compare with the Gold Coast.
3. Notwithstanding the establishment here of separate ministers, intention is
that ex-officio members will retain present titles, both at the centre and in the
regions, and these members have executive duties and powers derived directly from
the Governor and Lieutenant Governors. Clear and consistent effort is evident here,
particularly on the part of the Western ministers at the centre to achieve for
ministers individual executive responsibility. This effort reveals itself in numerous
different ways and, inevitably, creation of separate ministries (repeat ministries) will
be used as a spring-board for stronger attacks. Already we are countering demands to
substitute in power of conferring ordinances ‘the Minister’ for ‘the Governor’. Latest
suggestion is to substitute ‘Council of Ministers’ for ‘Governor in Council’. Strongest
opposition is always expressed to powers conferred e.g. on the Financial Secretary,
and from now on it will, I think, be almost impossible to confer any powers on the
Chief Secretary by ordinance or regulation. If ex-officio members were called
ministers the (? position) in this respect would be untenable.
4. For these reasons, I should hope not to have to resist additional pressure
which change of titles in Sierra Leone would inevitably put on us.
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166 CO 554/241 21 Nov 1952
[Western region local government reform]: minute by E O Mercer on
a possible threat to the powers of the central government and the
danger of secession by the Western Region
Mr. Williamson
Mr. Oxley1 and Mr. Hudson have now commented on Mr. Benson’s reply (48) to our
(46), (47) has not been commented upon by Nigeria.
It is clear that Mr. Benson is seriously disturbed lest objections by the Secretary of
State, of which the Acting Governor’s Legal Advisers are not convinced of the
justification, should provoke a political crisis . . .
Mr. Oxley maintains his view that parts of the Bill2 are ultra vires and still considers
that assent should be withheld on that ground. He has discussed the matter with Mr.
McPetrie, but will be very happy if, after Mr. Williamson and Mr. Gorell Barnes have con-
sidered his views, the papers are referred to Sir K. Roberts-Wray for final legal opinion.
The main political considerations seem to me to be two, and contradictory:—
(i) if the Lieutenant-Governor has to withhold his assent, the likelihood of an
immediate first-class crisis provoked by Mr. Awolowo and other Western Ministers
in the Region and at the Centre,
(ii) if assent is given, the fact that a dangerous concession will have been made to the
power of Regional Governments, with the effect of seriously weakening the power of
the Centre. One step will in fact have been taken towards making it a rubber stamp.
Apart from the question of assent, it seems to me that, if Sir K. Roberts-Wray upholds
Mr. Oxley’s opinion, we must not fail to make Central Ministers aware of the dangers to
themselves implicit in the Bill, which contains within it not a little of what we know to
be the Action Group’s and Western Region’s ideas for greater regional autonomy, possi-
bly with the latent idea of facilitating a later secession. On the question of assent itself,
it seems to me that if Mr. Oxley’s view is upheld assent must be withheld.
In the circumstances I have not drafted a reply to (46) until you and others have
seen these papers.
1 H L M Oxley, assistant legal adviser, CRO. 2 See 159.
167 CO 554/241 27 Nov–1 Dec 1952
[Western Region local government reform]: minutes by W L Gorell
Barnes and Sir T Lloyd on the CO reaction to the Western Region
local government bill
Sir K. Roberts-Wray
Sir T. Lloyd
You have not yet seen the Western Region Local Government Bill, of which a copy is
behind (15) and which looks like landing us into a constitutional crisis in Nigeria.
[2.] We first heard of this Bill when Mr. Sorensen asked a question in the House
about it (see exchange of telegrams with Sir J. Macpherson at (6) and (7)); and you
will see from (7) that although the Bill was about to be introduced into the Western
House of Assembly on the day on which he telegraphed, it had not then been referred
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to the Central Government.1 In the letter at (8) I expressed, in the mildest possible
way, the hope that we should have an opportunity of looking at the Bill with the help
of our Local Government Advisory Panel; and in (14) the Governor’s deputy said that
he would wish to have the Secretary of State’s comments and those of the Advisory
Panel on the Bill which had by then passed through both Houses of the Regional
Legislature before he assented to it (not actually the correct phrase—see below).
Copies of the Bill finally reached us on the 25th September under cover of the
savingram at (15) which asked only for the comments of the Secretary of State’s
Local Government Advisory Panel. The Department then arranged for the Bill to be
examined as rapidly as possible both by that Panel and by the Legal Department.
[3.] At this point I should digress to summarise briefly the procedure laid down
in the Nigerian Constitution for the consideration of Regional Bills. Section 96(1)
lays down that, when a Bill has been passed by both Legislative Houses of a Region,
the Lieutenant-Governor shall send it to the Governor (that is, in this context, the
Governor in Council—see Section 146(2)) who may object to the Bill on any one of
three grounds, of which one is that it relates to any matter with respect to which the
Legislature of the Region has no power to make laws. Sub-Section(3) of the same
section states that the validity of any objection which is taken to a Bill under this
section shall not be called in question in any court. If the Governor does not object to
the Bill it is presented to the Lieutenant-Governor for assent. If the Governor objects
to the Bill and decides that the ground for his objection cannot be eventually
removed by amendment of the Bill, then the Bill lapses. If the Governor objects and
decides that the ground for the objection can be removed by amendment of the Bill,
the Legislative Houses of the Region are informed, via the Lieutenant-Governor, of
the required amendments and, if those amendments are duly and properly made, the
Bill is presented to the Lieutenant-Governor for assent. When a Bill is presented to
the Lieutenant-Governor for assent, he, acting in his discretion, but subject to any
instructions addressed to him through a Secretary of State, can either assent, refuse
to assent or reserve the Bill for the signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure (Section
101(1)). Finally, under Section 102(1), any law to which the Lieutenant-Governor
has given his assent may be disallowed by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State.
[4.] To revert now to the main story, the Western Ministers in the Council of
Ministers, no doubt fearing the consequences if the Bill has not become law by the
time of Mr. Awolowo’s return from his grand tour on the 6th December, began to
become restive at the end of October (see letter and telegram from Mr. Benson at (43)
and (45)). (They were apparently informed (though not with much justification) that
the Secretary of State had insisted on being consulted at this stage). Having worked
fast, we had by this time got the comments both of the Local Government Advisory
Panel and of the Legal Department; and at this point I would refer you to the com-
ments of the Advisory Panel at (42) and of the Legal Department in Mr. Oxley’s minute
of the 21st October. After I had considered these comments in consultation with all
concerned, it became clear that there was considerable doubt about the wisdom of
some of the provisions about the position of local authorities in regard to the mainte-
nance of law and order, about the functions which it was proposed to entrust to local
authorities in regard to matters of customary law, and about the proposed arrange-
ments for the control of local authorities’ staffs. More serious, it was the view of the
1 See 159.
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Legal Department that several provisions of the Bill were ultra vires the Regional
Legislature. These points are discussed in the exchange of telegrams at (46) and (48),
in Mr. Oxley’s minute of the 21st November with which should be read paragraphs
4–10 of the superseded draft flagged X below, and in Mr. Hudson’s minute of the 20th
November. After discussing the matter further with all those concerned, I have come
to the conclusion that the right course is for the Secretary of State to send a formal
despatch to the Acting-Governor on the lines of draft A opposite, and for this despatch
to go out to Nigeria under cover of a personal letter from myself to Mr. Benson on the
lines of draft B opposite. Meanwhile I would propose, subject to approval, to telegraph
to Mr. Benson on the lines of draft C opposite.
[5.] I hope these drafts are self-explanatory. The only point on which I myself feel
any real doubt at all is the point at which the Secretary of State would intervene, if he
had to intervene formally under the terms of the Constitution. The relevant passage
in the draft despatch at A is based on the assumption that he would intervene by
instructing the Lieutenant-Governor not to assent to the Bill. By the passage at Y in
his minute of the 21st November Mr. Oxley implies that the Secretary of State could
intervene by instructing the Governor in the exercise of his powers under Section
96(2) of the Constitution; but I cannot myself see how this is possible having regard
to the fact that ‘Governor’ in this context means ‘Governor in Council’.
[6.] Whilst I myself have no wish to question the advice tendered by the Legal
Department on any count but this, the action which we are bound to take on this
advice may cause a constitutional crisis in Nigeria (though personally I am hopeful
that, as our objections are, at any rate in the main, constitutional objections and not
policy objections, it may not do so). I therefore think it right to submit the papers
through Sir K. Roberts-Wray so that he can confirm the validity of this advice.
[7.] Whilst I have consulted those concerned individually on nearly all the points
of particular interest to them during the course of thinking out the drafts submitted
opposite, there has not actually been time to circulate those drafts for comments. I
am accordingly now sending copies of this minute and of the three drafts to Mr.
Williamson, Mr. Oxley and Mr. Hudson. If Mr. Oxley has any comments he will no
doubt send them direct to Sir K. Roberts-Wray. If Mr. Williamson or Mr. Hudson
have any comments, I should be grateful if they would let me have them as soon as
possible.
W.L.G.B.
27.11.52
Secretary of State
I must trouble you with this because there is a possibility (though not in my view a
serious risk) of a clash of interest between the Western Region of Nigeria and the
Central Government; that clash might (though this again I regard as unlikely) lead
on to a constitutional crisis for which the Western Region Ministers would blame us
rather than Lagos.
The issue is whether the Western Region Local Government Bill can be allowed to
reach the Statute Book in its present form or whether (and this is the course we
strongly advise), either many clauses in it must be deleted or the Central Legislature
must pass a law bringing within the competence of the Western Regional Legislature
matters with which those clauses deal.
You need not, I suggest, read more than the third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of
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Mr. Gorell Barnes’ minute of the 27th of November and paragraphs 1–3 and
paragraphs 14–15 of the draft despatch.
I hope that you will also have time to look at the draft telegram (marked C) and the draft
semi-official letter (marked B). As stated in the latter we cannot afford to let this slide if
only because to do that would be to defeat the intentions, and the letter, of the constitution
in the matter of the division of powers between the Centre and the three Regions.
This is urgent in that if the Council of Ministers is to intervene, as we are suggesting,
they must do so by the 13th of December (see No. 49) and that gives us very little time
within which to get the despatch out to Nigeria to amend it if necessary to meet local
views (see the penultimate paragraph of Draft B) and to circulate the despatch and
other documents to the Council of Ministers for their consideration next week.
May we proceed as in these three drafts?2
T.K.L.
1.12.52
2 Lyttelton minuted ‘Yes’.
168 CO 554/662, no 2 28 Nov 1952
[Press attacks]: circular by L H Goble1 to all civil secretaries on the
Nigerian government’s response to press attacks. Appendix B
Certain Government Officers may, in moments of depression, wonder why in given
cases either no overt action, or what may appear to them to be only half-hearted
action, is taken about the deliberate misrepresentation of Government policy and
attempts to discredit the servants of Government which are a feature of certain
sections of the Press to-day. The purpose of this Circular is to tell officers what action
is possible and what is not possible, and to describe some of the difficulties there are
in dealing with Press Attacks of the kind made in Nigeria to-day.
2. Press attacks are of two kinds: first, those on Government policy generally;
and, second, those on the character and/or behaviour of individual officers. The
procedure in relation to the first may be summed up briefly as follows. If the matter
appears primia facie to be seditious, it is referred immediately it comes to notice to
the Law Officers; thereafter:—
(a) in certain cases a prosecution is instituted;
(b) in certain cases a Press Release directly correcting the misrepresentations is
issued;
(c) in certain cases misstatements are corrected by indirect means.
Failing all these
(d) in certain cases no further action is taken. These different lines of action are
dealt with in the following paragraphs.
3. Sedition. For the past eighteen months a system has been in operation
whereby the whole of the Nigerian Press is examined by the Central and Regional
Security Officers and all prima facie seditious matter is, through certain channels,
brought to the notice of the Attorney-General, together with any political
1 L H Goble, administrative secretary, Nigerian government, 1952..
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considerations which the Administration sees fit to bring to his notice. The decision
whether to prosecute or not is, however, solely a matter for the Attorney-General.
The considerations which he must take into account in making his decision were
discussed in a speech which Sir Hartley Shawcross made in Parliament on the 29th
of January, 1951, and a copy of the relevant parts of this speech are attached to this
circular as Appendix ‘A’1 to enable officers to appreciate these considerations. The
Attorney-General has usually given his fiat for a prosecution if he is satisfied both
that the matter in question is in fact seditious and that there is a reasonable prospect
of a conviction, followed by a substantial penalty. The latter point is important, for
the public interest suffers if there is an acquittal or a conviction followed by a fine of
only a few pounds. Technically seditious matter appears frequently in the local press
but much of it does not warrant prosecution. It is of interest to note that since the
beginning of 1950 there have been 10 prosecutions of newspapers for sedition or
similar offences involving 6 different newspapers. All the prosecutions have been
successful, one editor has gone to prison (for four months) and a total of £1,930 has
been exacted in fines. Newspapers fear these prosecutions and a successful one
usually has a sobering effect which may last for several months.
4. Press releases. In certain circumstances, but only in certain circumstances, a
press release may be of value. This is particularly so when it is important that the gen-
eral public should know the true facts in full. As against this the fact that the release
is accurate and true is unfortunately often outweighed by the fact that editors are
growing steadily cleverer in counteracting its effect. They preface the release with
‘Officialdom states’ and conclude it with an editorial note designed to confirm readers
of the paper in their acceptance of the original misrepresentation. Sometimes it is, of
course, not only useless but positively dangerous to follow up the editorial note with
a further correction: to enter into a wrangling match of this nature is to play into the
editor’s hands. Moreover, to ensure publication these press releases have to be paid for
at advertisement rates, and there is no point in financing the operations of such news-
papers. The question of time is also particularly important. It may be that a newspa-
per misrepresents an incident that has occurred in a distant province in the North: if
a report on the facts is called for by this office it may take several weeks before a reply
can be received, and a press release at that late date may merely result in giving
renewed and wider publicity to a matter which may have been forgotten or never
noticed. (Individual officers can help to prevent such delays by informing the
Secretariat concerned of the true state of affairs without loss of time).
5. It will be seen that the publication of a press release must depend on the
particular circumstances of each case; and because of the disadvantages inherent in
this procedure it must frequently happen that the right course is to eschew it, and to
go for indirect press releases.
6. Indirect releases. It is often more effective to counteract a misrepresentation
by indirect means than by an outright contradiction. For example, there may be a
release to all newspapers on a matter in which an account of the true state of affairs
in a particular case is inserted without reference to the particular newspaper’s
misrepresentation. Then again there are letters to the paper by private individuals.
There is no need to go into details but a close examination of the Press by the
understanding eye will reveal how much is achieved by these oblique methods. Cases
1 Appendices A and C not printed.
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have occurred not infrequently when the offending newspaper itself finds published
in its columns an article or a letter which directly contradicts its own offending
article of a day or two previously.
7. ‘Masterly inactivity.’ Suffice it to say that if all the above lines of action have
been considered and discarded for one decisive reason or another this is the only
course open. But beyond this there is the consideration that to correct every trifling
error in the Press will not increase the public’s confidence in, or affection for, the
Government—it merely gives it the reputation of having a thin skin and a bad
conscience. Action can be taken only on the more serious cases: minor matters are
better, at present, ignored when account is paid to the fact that, apart from the ‘Daily
Times’ no Nigerian newspaper has a circulation of more than some 18,000 copies, a
certain number of which are taken on Government subscription.
8. Such is the position as it is at present. It all hangs ultimately on whether legal
process is the appropriate remedy in a given case or not. The question may naturally
be asked ‘Why not change the law?’ The answer is that that possibility has been very
carefully considered continuously over the past few years but the conclusion still is
that, for the present at any rate, new restrictive press legislation would be more likely
to worsen the situation than to mend it. Local editors will not lack skilled advice
from outside this country on how to turn it upon its originators. Some of the major
disadvantages of Press Legislation are set out in the extract from a Colonial Office
paper which is attached. (Appendix B).
9. Attacks on individual officers. These may be simply seditious attacks on
Government in another form, and if they are, then the considerations outlined in the
preceding paragraphs will apply. But where the attack is not seditious, but libellous,
the procedure is entirely different. The law of libel is singularly difficult and
complicated and no attempt can be made to summarise it here. It is necessary in the
first place to distinguish mere vulgar abuse from statements which amount, in law,
to defamatory allegations. In the first case it is useless to take legal action as it would
almost certainly fail. Government fully realises how upsetting such attacks can be
and how difficult it is to bear them with equanimity; but no action can usefully be
taken. In the second case, if the allegations are unfounded, the officer libelled may in
the circumstances set out in Appendix C, be sure of Government’s support, both
moral and material.
10. Appendix C is a note on legal proceedings arising out of the defamation of
Government officers. It will be appreciated that the note deals with official assistance
to Government officers, and not with the right of Government officers to institute
civil proceedings at their own expense which, subject to the provisions of General
Order 49, is exactly the same as that of any other individual in Nigeria.
11. It is emphasised that in the case of a libellous attack on a Government officer
the initiative rests and must continue to rest with the aggrieved officer. If the facts
are presented by him to the Law Officers, the Law Officers will examine them and
will, provided that the conditions set out in Appendix C are fulfilled, recommend that
His Excellency should authorise the officer to take legal proceedings and to receive
legal aid. If, therefore, an officer considers that he has been libelled in the course of
his duty he should put up his case giving the full facts, with the least possible delay
through the Civil Secretary or Chief Secretary who, if the circumstances warrant it,
will forward it to the Law Officers.
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Appendix B to 168: Extract from memorandum attached to a letter from Mr Creech
Jones to Sir J Macpherson, 24 February 1949
The press in the African colonies
Press Legislation
35. The methods mentioned above may not be all immediately practical.
Nevertheless they represent, in howsoever small a degree they may be applied, a
definite advance over any form of restrictive legislation.
36. Such legislation may be inevitable, for the time being, and may be effective in
a country where the Press is very primitive. It is, however, not in accord with the
spirit of the times. It is entirely non-constructive and can never result in the
establishment of a responsible press, even though it may more or less effectively curb
the activities of an irresponsible one.
37. Apart from hostile reaction in foreign countries, it is almost invariably
greeted by adverse press comment in the United Kingdom: and serves to foster,
among the millions of people in the United Kingdom who have no idea of the
Colonial background, ideas of reaction and repression.
38. It can only be effective too, in inverse ratio to the acumen of the editors at
which it is aimed.
It is not difficult for an editor, not only to evade restrictive press laws, but to make
their operation ridiculous.
39. Even the ‘right of rejoinder’ is a two-edged weapon. Legislative powers to
enforce publication of a correction to an untrue statement may be effective for a
time. But in a Colony with a well developed press, there is a real danger that an
intelligently malicious editor may publish, with the correction, another equally
untrue and perhaps quite fantastic statement which he will be ordered to contradict
the next day; thus reducing the whole business to absurdity.
40. There is also the danger that if one untrue statement is compulsorily corrected,
the remainder of the paper, which may contain many half truths or perversions of the
truth, will be given a sort of hall-mark as not having been denied by the Government.
41. In this connection (while it may be thought necessary in some cases to main-
tain the ‘right of correction’) consideration might be given to enlisting the co-operation
of independent but knowledgeable and authoritative persons (for example, pensioners,
or well-disposed legislative councillors) to write quickly letters of correction.
It is recognised however, that this course may present difficulty and will be in
some cases ineffective.
42. It will often be found more efficacious not to try and chase a mis-statement
by a denial: but to grasp the opportunity, which some fresh piece of news may give, to
re-state the whole matter in its correct form by means of a press conference or
communique.
169 CO 1039/2, no 72 3 Dec 1952
[Powers of central ministers]: conclusions of a meeting of the Council
of Ministers [Extract]
[From the start of the operation of the 1951 constitution, ministers pressed to be allowed
to issue instructions to heads of departments; the governor however, saw ministers
primarily as advisers whose job was simply to formulate policies within a conciliar
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system. This raised broader issues of the relationship between ministers and officials and
the degree of power allowed to ministers under the constitution. This came to ahead, as
this extract shows, during a debate over the Commonwealth Economic Conference and
Nigeria’s membership of the sterling area, with Bode Thomas’s surprise at learning that
secret correspondence passed between the governor and the secretary of state which was
not made available to ministers.]
1. Commonwealth Economic Conference
The Minister of Transport1 said that he found it most embarrassing to be asked to
advise on this subject at such short notice and he was not satisfied that it was in the
interests of the country to be part of the sterling area. He did not consider Nigeria
had been fairly treated by being asked to advise on this subject without more
warning, particularly when the plans for the Conference had been laid some time in
advance. He wanted it put on record that since the last meeting of the Council when
he had learned that some correspondence passed between the Secretary of State and
the Governor which was not automatically seen by Ministers he had been seriously
considering his position and felt that he would have no alternative but to resign. He
was most disappointed in the way the Council of Ministers was expected to work both
in this regard and in the way decisions could be asked for at such short notice. He
found himself in some difficulty in continuing to support this Government if this
were the way it was to be treated.
The President2 drew the Minister’s attention to the fact that at any time during the
eleven months in which this Council had been in existence he and every other mem-
ber of the Council had been at liberty to put forward a paper on the subject of the ster-
ling area if he wished the Council to decide to leave the sterling area. The position with
regard to the subject before the Council was that Nigeria was today within the sterling
bloc, and, being a member, its views had been requested. He himself regretted as much
as anyone the shortness of notice and the Secretary of State had expressed his regret
that the time was so short, but had pointed out that Her Majesty’s Government was
not in a position to decide whether or not to include the proposal on the Agenda of the
Conference until it had been fully prepared by the official experts . . .
7. Governor in Council and Council of Ministers
Previous reference: CM(52)65th Meeting, Conclusion 4(1) (i).
The Council had before them a memorandum by the Acting Attorney-General,
CM(52)469.
The Minister of Transport said that it was now clear that there was a difference
between the Governor in Council and the council of Ministers, and that it was now
also clear to him that the Governor had a special position which was different from
that which he held as President of the Council: the Governor might on specific
occasion act by virtue of his special powers and not on the advice of the Council. He
also felt that, from the information the Council had received that the Governor
undertook personal correspondence with the Secretary of State, the Governor might
act on instructions from the Secretary of State without taking or against the advice
of the Council without informing the Council.
In continuance of the quotation of Clause 5(2)(a) from Royal Instructions, the
Acting Attorney-General read extracts from clause 4 of the Royal Instructions, which
set out when the Governor must consult with the Council of Ministers and when the
1 ie Bode Thomas. 2 ie A E T Benson.
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Governor must act in accordance with the advice of the Council, and quotations from
clause 5(1)—when the Council need not be consulted. The Acting Attorney-General
also referred to the Letters Patent 1951.
The Minister expressed the view that the change in the Constitution should be
reflected by reference in new legislation to the Council of Ministers in place of the
Governor in Council.
The President said that it had always been known that under the Constitution there
were certain powers reserved to the Governor. The Governor’s reserved powers had
never been used since the new Constitution had been introduced and it was in his per-
sonal view, inconceivable that the Governor would use these powers and go against the
advice of the Council without giving to the Council his reasons. He could not commit
Sir John MacPherson on this point, but he would make this discussion known to him.
He could not understand any feeling of suspicion which one or two members of the
Council had voiced on the question of the Governor’s own correspondence with the
Secretary of State. It was quite clear that under the present Constitution any instruc-
tions which might be sent to the Governor from the Secretary of State could only take
effect contrary to the advice of the Council in a case on which the Governor used his
reserved powers. The Governor was bound to consult the Council on all matters save
those quoted by the Attorney-General from the Constitutional Instruments.
A brief discussion followed on the question whether the legislature could remove
the reserved powers from the Governor by writing in legislation the expression
‘Council of Ministers’ instead of ‘Governor in Council’ and it was suggested that as
the Council from time to time was prepared to give up rights by giving duties under
certain Ordinances to the Governor at his discretion, so the Governor might on other
occasions give up his reserved powers by giving duties to the Council of Ministers
instead of the Governor in Council.
On this point the view was put forward that if the Council decided to put into
legislation the terms ‘Council of Ministers’ instead of ‘Governor in Council’, it might
oblige the Governor to use his reserved powers in relation to that very decision itself.
This would place him in a difficult position. If he did not use his reserved powers
when the matter was before the Council, he might have to use them later, after the
Ordinance had been passed by the legislature, when the Bill came before him for
assent in Her Majesty’s name.
The Council:—
Agreed that the discussion had been useful and agreed to leave the matter for the
time being.
170 CO 554/241, no 50 4 Dec 1952
[Western Region local government reform]: despatch no 3529 from
Mr Lyttelton to AET Benson proposing amendments to the Western
Region local government bill
I have the honour to inform you that I have now completed my examination of the
Western Region Local Government Bill, of which you were good enough to send me
20 copies in your confidential telegram No. 3876 Saving of the 23rd September.
2. I warmly welcome the purpose of this measure which, as I understand it, is to
provide the legislative framework within which a modern system of local government
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can be developed within the Western Region as rapidly as circumstances permit. (I
understand that similar developments are already being pressed forward in the
Eastern Region under the legislation which was enacted by the Nigerian Legislature
under the old Constitution.) I have also been much impressed by the care and
thought which has clearly been devoted to the preparation of the Bill. It is therefore
with the very greatest regret that I have reached the conclusion that the Bill as at
present drafted raises important legal difficulties. I am sure, however, that it will be
in the best interests of all concerned if I bring these difficulties to your notice and to
that of your Government without further delay.
3. The legislative powers of a Regional Legislature which are conferred by Section
91 of the Constitution are to make laws for the peace, order and good government of
the Region with respect to any matters specified in the Third Schedule to the
Constitution and to any matter declared by a Central law to be within the competence
of a Regional Legislature. The Central Legislature is thus able to confer on a Regional
Legislature any part of its own legislative power and, therefore, to enable a Regional
Legislature to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Region with
respect to matters other than matters specified in the Third Schedule to the
Constitution. But, so far as I am aware, the Central Legislature has not yet done so.
4. This being so, I am advised that certain provisions of the present Bill are, or in
some cases may be, ultra vires the Regional Legislature. My Legal Advisers have
called attention to the provisions in the following list, which may not, however, be
complete:—
(1) the prevention of crime (clause 58 and, consequentially, clause 161, clause 57
is much less questionable since it is, in the main, restricted in its operation to the
limits of the Councils functions).
(2) the declaration and modification of local customary law (except as respects
customary land tenures) (clause 60);
(3) the carrying and possession of weapons (clause 71(47));
(4) the migration of persons from or to the area of a council (clause 71(48));
(5) child betrothals (clause 71(74));
(6) native marriages, including dowry and divorce (clause 71(84));
(7) all matters for the peace, good order and welfare of persons within the area of a
council (clause 71(86));
(8) Bye-laws (clause 77); subsection (1) so far as it enables bye-laws to be made
under Central law and subsection (2) so far as it goes beyond the purpose of items
9 to 16 in the Third Schedule to the Constitution;
(9) title to land (clause 185(5));
(10) legal proceedings against a council, particularly as respects proceedings
outside the Region (clauses 206 to 209 and possibly other provisions in Part VIII).
5. It is reasonably clear that these matters do not fall within any item in the
Third Schedule to the constitution unless they come within item 20. It may be
argued that a Regional Legislature could, by virtue of item 22, give to native courts
jurisdiction in some of the matters specifically referred to above: but I am advised
that it is very doubtful how far that is the case and that, in any event, this question
does not really arise, since those provisions are not related to the jurisdiction of
native courts. The matters stated in item 20 are ‘local government including the
constitution and powers (including the power to levy rates) of native authorities,
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township authorities, and other local authorities established for the purpose of local
or village administration’. I am advised that under item 20 a Regional Legislature
may confer on a local authority
(a) powers relating to any matter mentioned in the Third Schedule itself
(including matters declared by a Central law to be within the competence of the
Regional Legislature), and
(b) such additional powers as are necessary to enable the local authority properly
to discharge its functions.
6. None of the matters listed in the preceding paragraph appear to fall under
either of these headings and the question arises whether any other powers may be
vested in a local authority under item 20. On this question my Legal Advisers are of
the following opinion:
(1) The answer to this question is in the affirmative, if only because, there being
express limitation in most of the items after item 22 in the Schedule to matters
mentioned in the Schedule, a court would be unlikely to hold that a similar
limitation upon the scope of item 20 is to be implied.
(2) It is hardly necessary to state, however, that there must be some limitation, for
if power on any subject whatever could be conferred upon a local authority under
item 20, the restriction under the constitution upon the legislative field of a
Region would be largely nullified. For this reason, there seems little, if any, doubt
that the provision mentioned in sub-paragraph (7) of the above list, which would
appear to cover any matter whatever, would be ultra vires.
(3) Further guidance may be obtained from other items in the Schedule. Thus,
the express mention of customary land tenures in item 11 and the registration of
marriages in item 21 would appear by clear implication to exclude the provisions
regarding customary law betrothals and marriages referred to in sub-paragraphs
(2), (5) and (6) in the list; and the definition in items 9 to 16 of the Schedule of
subjects relating to land casts serious doubt on the validity of provisions regarding
to land referred to in sub-paragraphs (8) and (9) of the list.
(4) Beyond this, the answer to the problem depends upon whether the subject
concerned is one which may properly be regarded as coming within the expression
‘local government’. It is difficult to draw a line between matters which satisfy this
test and those which do not, but it is suggested that it is relevant to consider, first,
whether the exercise of the power in question may affect the interests of
authorities, persons or property outside the area of the local council and, secondly,
whether the subject is one which has customarily been treated as a matter within
the functions of native or other local government authorities. In illustration of
this suggestion, my Legal Advisers refer to subjects specified in the definition in
clause 2 of the Bill of ‘local government purposes’ most, if not all, of which would
appear to satisfy the test, subject in some cases, such as paragraph (a), to certain
limitations. They are of opinion that there is considerable doubt whether provision
regarding migration of persons (sub-paragraph (4) above) is valid, since it may
affect persons outside the local council’s area. Moreover, the question of
movement of persons from place to place within Nigeria seems to be a matter of
direct concern to the Central Government, especially where movement from one
Region to another may be involved. With regard to sub-paragraph (8) so far as it
relates to subsection (1) of clause 77, a Central law may deal with any subject, and
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it seems clearly ultra vires for a Regional law to confer power to make bye-laws for
the purposes of a Central law which vests functions in a council in matters not
within the competence of the Regional Legislature. Any such power should be
conferred by Central law. The remaining sub-paragraphs, namely (1) and (3),
would appear to depend largely upon whether the subjects in question have in the
past been treated in Nigeria as matters of local government, a question upon
which your Legal Advisers are, of course, in a better position than mine to advise.
7. In most respects these legal difficulties could, of course, be overcome by Central
legislation, passed under section 92 of the constitution before the provisions in ques-
tion are enacted, declaring these matters to be within the competence of the Regional
Legislature; but in the case of clause 71(86) of the Bill, there are special considera-
tions. The purport of this paragraph, when read with clause 77 of the Bill, is to enable
a council to be given a power to make bye-laws which is virtually unlimited as to its
field. It follows that, in order to bring the matters covered by the clause within the
competence of a Regional Legislature, the Central Legislature would have to pass an
enactment conferring upon that Regional Legislature powers which were similarly
unlimited. It may well be argued that it would not be within the letter of the
Constitution Order in Council for the Central Legislature to confer such powers upon
a Regional Legislature, on the ground that the words ‘any matter’ in section 92 imply
that the Central Legislature is to consider each subject individually and cannot prop-
erly make a declaration embracing every matter. Even if it is thought that this argu-
ment would be unsound, such a step is one which the Council of Ministers would no
doubt wish to ponder most carefully before proposing. If they decided against it and it
were still desired to confer these powers upon local authorities in the Western Region,
they could, of course, be conferred by a Central Act (as they have been in the East).
8. There is an additional point concerning Clause 71 (84) of the Bill. In view of the
words, ‘including . . . divorce’ which appear in this paragraph, I am advised that, so
long as this paragraph stands part of the Bill, the Bill will come within paragraph 7(1)
(a) of the Royal Instructions to the Lieutenant-Governor dated 27th November, 1951,
and that accordingly the Lieutenant-Governor would be obliged to obtain Her
Majesty’s instructions before assenting to the Bill. As will be seen from paragraph 12
of this despatch, I have some doubts about the wisdom of entrusting the local author-
ities, at any rate in the early stage of their development, with the power to regulate
and control such matters as native divorce. But, provided it is made clear that the para-
graph applies only to native divorce I should not on this account alone consider that
the Lieutenant-Governor should be instructed to withhold assent from the Bill.
9. I now turn to the substance of the individual provisions of the Bill. I have
already sent you under cover of my telegram No. 332 Saving of the 6th November the
comments of the Local Government Advisory Panel. I hope that these comments will
be found helpful and will be taken into account in the implementation of the Bill;
and that such of the changes which they recommend as may be acceptable will be
incorporated in the measure at the first suitable opportunity.
10. There are only one or two points of substance on which I would wish to offer
comment. These are dealt with in the immediately following paragraphs.
11. I invite your attention to the comments of my Local Government Advisory
Panel on Clauses 57(1) and 160 of the Bill. The Native Authority police have hitherto
come under the traditional native authorities who, as part of the system of indirect
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rule, were traditionally responsible for maintaining law and order. This responsibility
was recognised and confirmed in the Native Authority Ordinances. The effect of the
measure at present under consideration will be that in Western Nigeria, as in many
other parts of Africa, many of the functions hitherto carried out by native authorities
will in future be carried out by local authorities with a majority of elected members.
But the field of activity of these new bodies will not be the same as those of the tradi-
tional authorities: they will have some functions which the traditional authorities did
not have and which in the past, if they have been performed at all, have been performed
by the Central Government on the other hand, not all the functions performed by the
traditional authorities can suitably be performed by authorities composed mainly of
elected members. In this connection it appears to me that the functions to be allotted
to local authorities in respect of the maintenance of law and order and the employ-
ment of police require very careful consideration. Whilst I welcome the wide powers
of control given to the Regional Commissioner of Police by the present Bill, there
seems to me to be some possibility, under the terms of the Bill as at present drafted,
that the local police might become the agents of local authorities with elected majori-
ties, instead of remaining guardians of the Queen’s peace. For example, the fact that
under Clause 160 as at present drafted members of the force will be required to obey
all lawful orders of councils whose functions are to include those in Clause 57(1) and
may include those in Clause 71 (46) might give rise to the danger that a council, on
the pretext of preventing breaches of the peace, might give directions to the police for
political reasons rather than for the maintenance of the Queen’s peace. The whole
problem of the part to be played by local authorities in the maintenance of law and
order and of the relationship of those authorities with the local and national police is
one of considerable complexity, about which I hope to address you further in due
course. Meanwhile I suggest, for consideration, that the above considerations should
be borne in mind in the implementation of the Bill and that, as soon as a suitable
opportunity presents itself, the words ‘the council and’ should be deleted from Clause
160 of the Bill. I would also suggest that, at the first suitable occasion, Clause 162
should be amended so as to have effect only within the area of the council’s authority
since there seems to be a danger under the present wording of members of local forces
seeking to exercise their powers outside that area.
12. In their comment on Section 60 of the Bill my Local Government Advisory
Panel raised the question whether it is appropriate that local councils consisting
mainly of elected members should become the bodies to make declarations and
modifications of native customary law. The same question suggests itself in regard to
such questions as child betrothals (Clause 71 (74)) and native marriages, including
dowry and divorce (Clause 71 (84)). This is a question on which there may be many
views and on which I should certainly not wish to be dogmatic. I cannot help
wondering, however, whether these are matters which are more suitably dealt with
either by legislatures or by traditional authorities.
13. Finally, I wish to refer briefly to those provisions in Part IX of the Bill which
are concerned with the appointment of local authorities staff and with arrangements
for maintaining discipline amongst such staff and for regulating their conditions of
service, promotion, etc. It is always a matter of some difficulty to devise
arrangements which, whilst leaving adequate authority to the local government
bodies themselves, provide sufficient insurance against undue political influence
being brought to bear on staff matters either from within those bodies or from
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outside. I feel sure that all concerned with operating this part of the Bill will be fully
conscious of the undesirability of local government staff being subjected to undue
political influence and that, if it is found that this point is not adequately safeguarded
by the present provisions, the desirability of amending them will be considered. I
therefore confine myself to drawing attention to the importance of this matter.
14. I should be glad if you would bring the contents of this despatch to the
attention of the Council of Ministers when they have this Bill under consideration.
The points to which I have drawn attention in paragraphs 9 to 13 above seem to me
to be of some importance; but I have not, on these points, thought it necessary or
proper for me to do more than to put forward suggestions which, if they are
acceptable, will, I hope, be either taken into account in the implementation of the
Bill or borne in mind when an opportunity arises to amend it. The points which I
have raised in paragraphs 2 to 8 above are, however, of a different kind; and as at
present advised, I do not see how the Bill can properly be allowed to reach the statute
book unless and until most, and perhaps all, of the provisions listed in paragraph 4
above have been deleted or the Central Legislature has passed a law bringing the
matters with which they deal within the competence of the Regional Legislature;
and, as is pointed out in paragraph 7 above, there is substantial doubt whether such a
law of the Central Legislature would be valid so far as clause 71(86) is concerned. I
am advised that it is also open to question whether a law relating to a subject
brought within the competence of a Regional Legislature under section 92 of the
constitution would be valid if the Bill had been passed by that Legislature before the
date of the enactment of the Central law, even if it is assented to after that date.
15. I greatly hope that it will prove possible to overcome these difficulties
without undue delay so that the constructive work of setting up a modern system of
local government in the Western Region of Nigeria can go forward; and I suggest for
consideration that the Bill should now proceed with the provisions which would or
might be invalid deleted, and that an amending Bill should be introduced if and when
a Central law has been enacted under section 92.
171 CO 554/599, no 9 22 Dec 1952
[Eastern Region crisis]: inward telegram no 1974 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton reporting the NCNC’s expulsion of three
central ministers
[This telegram, reporting the start of the Eastern Region crisis that continued for most of
1953, refers to the opening shots in the struggle between those members of the NCNC
willing to operate the constitution as far as possible, and those determined to show it was
unworkable. The ensuing split in the NCNC raised numerous issues and not least that of
party control over central ministers.]
You will have seen reports of expulsion of Nwapa, Njoku and Arikpo, Central
Ministers, from the N.C.N.C. Party. This was attempted by Zik at the Annual N.C.N.C.
Convention held at Port Harcourt in September, but failed when the Convention,
which was well attended, decided to support the Constitution. Further Convention
thereupon called by Zik at Jos for the 10th December, fortuitously attended by only
three members of the Eastern House of Assembly and one Eastern Minister without
Portfolio, Awgu. Remaining delegates mainly Zikist, including number of Lagos
12-(Doc139-178)-cp  15/7/01  7:30 am  Page 494
[172] JAN 1953 495
Yorubas. Jos Convention decided not to work the Constitution and to expel the three
persons named.
2. On the 20th December, meeting at Enugu attended by the three persons
named, all Regional Members except (possibly, though this is not yet clear) Awgu and
one other, and many leading members of the Eastern House passed vote of solidarity
with, and confidence in, the three persons named.
3. Appreciation follows by air mail earliest possible. In the meantime, view
commonly expressed is that this time Zik has over-reached himself.
172 CO 554/744, no 9 15 Jan 1953
[Islam in Nigeria]: Nigerian government note on Muslim religious,
social and political movements in Nigeria [Extract]
. . . 9. It will be clear from the preceeding paragraphs that Moslem movements
cannot be considered solely in their Northern Regional or Western Regional setting,
or in their Nigerian setting. The unity of Islam and the equality of all true believers in
it are ideas which tend to transcend national frontiers and, as communications
improve, Nigerian Moslems appear to be responding more and more strongly to the
international currents of thought which affect Islam today.
10. One of the first signs that the conservative Moslems in the Northern Region
were becoming aware of political currents in the outside world was observed in 1948
when prayers were said in Northern mosques for the success of the Arab struggle
against the Jews. Nigerian Moslems form by far the largest block of Moslems south of
the Sahara and the attention which Moslems from outside the area have recently paid
to them is a recognition not only of this fact but of the fact that Nigerian Moslems
themselves are becoming increasingly aware of their own importance as a group. The
visit of the Algerian Tijani, Sidi ben Omar in 1950 marked a great increase of
intercourse between the Tijanis of Morocco, French West Africa and Nigeria. Egypt
has also been showing very considerable interest in the affairs of Nigerian Moslems.
Most of the approaches from this direction have been made in the name of Al Azhar
University in Cairo. As early as 1948 the University was in correspondence with the
Society for Promoting Moslem Knowledge, a Yoruba organisation with Ahmadiyya
leanings, based on Lagos, and the suggestion was made that students might be sent
to Cairo for Islamic education. Nothing came of this move. In 1950 the Egyptian
Ambassador in London informed the Foreign Office that a Lagos body known as the
‘Supporters of Islam’ (which, as far as is known, does not exist) and the so-called
Muslim Congress of Nigeria at Ijebu-Ode in the Western Region had asked for ulemas
(professors) to be sent to Nigeria to teach in Islamic schools.1 In 1951 Al Azhar, with
the backing of the then King Farouk, made a further effort to impress itself upon
Nigeria and offered scholarships on a large scale apparently to both the Muslim
Congress and the S.P.M.K. The Northern Moslem Congress, a Northern Region
organisation closely connected with the political body known as the Northern
Elements Progressive Union, was also apparently interested in these scholarships,
but interest died down when Government made it known that University degrees
obtained at Al Azhar could not be accepted as a qualification for employment in
1 See 119.
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Government service. But while the main Egyptian effort was directed towards the
Yorubas of the Western Region, moderate Moslems in the Northern Region also
showed interest and the Committee appointed to administer the Northern Self-Help
Development Fund provisionally allocated £6,000 to finance the education of
students in Islamic studies and did for sometime cast its eyes towards Al Azhar
University. A Dr. M. El. Fahham, one of the ulemas of the University, toured Nigeria
in 1951 ostensibly to examine the study of arabic education, but probably with the
real purpose of co-ordinating arrangements for the award of scholarships.
11. There have been indications in recent years that Moslem affairs within
Nigeria are tending to assume a stronger political bias than formerly. In 1948
antagonism to Christian missionary penetration in the North first began to be openly
voiced by a small minority in the Northern Regional House of Assembly. It has always
been the aim of the Government of Nigeria to discourage religious intolerance and so
far the policy has been pursued with success, but there are many indications that the
intransigence of the reactionary elements among Moslems in the Northern Region is
growing and is affecting local politics. The political dislikes of Northern Moslems are
not confined to missionaries, however. Early in 1949 Moslems of all persuasions in
the North made it clear that they took the strongest objection to the publication in
the ‘West African Pilot’ of a series of public lectures by a supporter of the N.C.N.C. on
the subject of ‘Christ, Mohammed and Zik’, which contained an intemperate attack
on Islam and, in particular, on the character of the Prophet. Some of the Northern
Moslem distrust for the political party known as the ‘Northern Elements Progressive
Union’ can be traced to the fact that many of its aims are identical with those of the
N.C.N.C. and that members of the N.E.P.U. who are also members of the Northern
Moslem Congress have had contacts on a number of occasions with the Ahmadiyya-
tainted Muslim Congress of Nigeria at Ijebu-Ode.
12. Northern Moslem solidarity was still further strengthened about the middle
of 1950 when pagan and Christianised groups in the ‘Middle Belt’ of the Northern
Region, formed a Middle Zone League and began to make demands for the creation
of a fourth region in which they could run their own affairs and be free from politi-
cal domination by the Moslems of the North. Northern Moslems have taken this
threat seriously and have done everything in their power to meet the legitimate
demands of the peoples of the Middle Belt and to keep them within the Northern
Regional fold.
13. A further sign of the growing importance of Moslem opinion in Nigeria was
the ready acceptance by the House of Representatives in August, 1952 of a Motion
praying Government to meet Moslem wishes for a two day holiday on the occasion of
each of the public holidays of Id el Kabir and Id el Fitr. Both the N.C.N.C. and the
Action Group show awareness of these developments and in recent months their news-
papers have shown themselves anxious to sympathise with the aspirations of Moslems.
14. It would be quite untrue to say, however, that their [sic] exists in Nigeria
today any political movement which can speak for a majority of the Moslems in
Nigeria. The Moslems in the Northern Region are by far the most coherent group but
political movements even in the North cannot be said to be inspired mainly by Islam.
In the West and in Lagos Islam can only be said to have had a very minor effect on
politics although there are, as Monsieur Mangin pointed out in his Report on Moslem
movements in Nigeria, signs that the new generation of Yoruba Moslems now being
educated in Moslem schools for the first time is likely to strengthen the solidarity of
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Moslem opinion in the Western Region and to be much less tolerant than the present
generation of educated Yoruba Moslems brought up in Mission schools.2
15. It is probable that the views expressed in these paragraphs would confirm
French Administrators trained by Professor Montagne and his colleagues at the
School for Higher Moslem Studies in Paris in their belief that British West African
Governments are insufficiently alive to the potential dangers of Moslem political and
religious movements. They believe that the twin policies of assimilation and
centralisation of power, which are so firmly written into the Chapter of the
Constitution of the Fourth Republic dealing with the Overseas Territories, can only
be realised by strangling the political aspirations of the rival centralising
movement—Islam—which enjoins upon its adherents, as a sacred duty, its own
religious, social and political unity. These views are clearly reflected in the
instructions issued by the Ministry of Overseas France to the High Commissioner in
French West Africa in September, 1950:—
‘. . . Our Islamic policy shall aim at preserving friendly but watchful relations
with traditional Islam in view of the imminent dangers to the French cause
arising from the spread in West and Central Africa of Islamic forms which are
inspired by political programmes and anti-French ideas rather than by
mystical ideas and confessional disciplines.’
French observers of Nigerian Moslem policy, including Monsieur Mangin, tend to
assume that the conflict between these rival centripetal forces, which exists in
French West Africa, exists in Nigeria. Monsieur Mangin does indeed note the ‘very
pro-Moslem feelings of the British . . .’ but wrongly ascribes these feelings to ‘the
need to depend on the only stable political and social source of power able to
implement Indirect Rule’, namely the Emirs. In common with other French
observers he tends to overlook the fact that our policy of determined non-
intervention in matters of religion, so long as tolerance is shown, has proved itself a
strong stabilising factor and gives little scope to religious extremists whose most
potent asset would be intervention by European unbelievers. Nor does he give
thought to the possibility that such subversive Moslem movements as may exist are
far more likely to wither or be smothered by local Moslem opinion in the non-
interventionist climate of thought which obtains in Nigeria.
2 Louis Mangin, chef du bureau des affairs musulmanes, Afrique Occidentale Française. Mangin visited
Nigeria early in 1952 for a report he was writing on Islam in West Africa.
173 CO 554/235, no 34 22 Jan 1953
[Local government]: Nigerian government report on the progress of
local government reform in the Northern Region [Extract]
Introduction
In August, 1950, the Northern Regional House of Assembly accepted the motion of
M. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa calling for a commission of enquiry into the state of local
government in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria. As a result, the Maddocks-Pott
Report was prepared, giving a factual summary of the Native Administrations as they
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stood in November, 1950.1 The Report was then considered in July and August, 1951,
by a Joint Select Committee of the Northern Regional Council.
2. The recommendations of this Committee (which are given in the Appendix)
are of great importance.2 They have the combined approval and support of both
Chiefs and members of the House of Assembly. They represent the considered
opinion of all the most responsible leaders, traditional and elected, of the Region, and
a Committee is now proposing a re-draft of the Native Authority Ordinance to ensure
that its principles are embodied in the law. On these principles are based the policy
for the next period of development of local government in the Region. They provide
for a general pattern and it now rests with each Native Authority to implement the
principles. The effectiveness must be dependent, if developments are to be genuine,
upon the personnel available to staff and properly [sic] carry out the business of the
newly created or re-organised local bodies. This will take time, but the art of
government lies in the timing of each stage of development and no pre-arranged
timetable can be laid down. The Native Authorities have shown—with one or two
exceptions—that they are conscious of the dangers of remaining stationary or
reactionary. The danger of impetuous advance, creating the form without the
substance, is also recognised. As good bricks require straw, so do genuine local
government bodies require a minimum of trained staff and literate members.
3. The object of this present report is to summarise what progress has been made
since the Maddocks-Pott report, up to mid-1952—a period of just over 18 months. It
is proposed to give first a general view of the more important developments, followed
by a summary of progress of each of the main types of administrative bodies, This is
supplemented by a number of Appendices giving detailed notes of the more
interesting council systems that are now being evolved, and an analysis of
expenditure of District Council Funds from one Province to show what practical
results are being achieved.
Part I
4. Reviewing the state of Local Government in all its various stages after a period
of eighteen months, there is no doubt that generally there has been considerable, if
uneven, growth. Eighteen months is not a long period and to be able to present
startling results would indicate a period of revolution instead of a process of
evolution. Reports, however, from most areas show that in one level or another of the
Local Government structure there has been solid progress. This development has
been most noticeable in the higher levels in the establishment of Native Authority
Advisory (Outer) Councils and in District and Urban Councils, but not so much at the
village level. This is not surprising; education has hardly, if at all, touched the
villages, and they remain the home of custom and tradition with little or no money
to spend and few demands for change. It is at the centre of the district and in the
urban areas that the urge of the people to be associated in public affairs is beginning
to be felt, and it is here that there is enough money to produce results to make
regular attendance at meetings worth-while. The Native Authorities, recognising this
urge, have co-operated in meeting its needs.
5. The administrations in the Northern Provinces may be, generally speaking,
1 See 147. The report by K P Maddocks and D A Pott, Report on Local Government in the Northern
Provinces of Nigeria (Kaduna, 1951) was completed in Dec 1950. 2 Appendices not printed.
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divided into two categories, the first, in which there are the highly-populated Emirates
with financially sound and over-centralised Native Administrations, which require to
delegate authority and functions; the second, in which are found the small units, some
highly centralised in themselves but poor financially, independent and parochial in
outlook and which require to federate and combine their meagre resources in order
to be able to provide for common and essential services. In the one a degree of author-
ity should be devolved to lower units; in the other surrendered to superior units.
6. In the first category lie the ‘classical’ Emirates of the North. Here the Native
Authorities have, with few exceptions, accepted the paradox that devolution of
executive power and authority will, by satisfying modern local aspirations, self-
expression and initiative result in the strengthening and not the weakening of their
own authority. They have continued in increasing numbers to create district and
urban councils, giving them greater financial and executive power in accordance
with their cash and competence.
7. Again, accepting a second principle of government, by no means easy for
them, that the more the public is permitted openly to discuss and criticise
administration, the stronger and more popular will be their position, they have
established Advisory (Outer) Councils. These Councils contain members
representative of the widest range possible of responsible public opinion, and usually
have an elected majority. Leading traders, farmers, artisans; members sent up from
District or Village Councils; representatives of ‘minority tribes’; sophisticated
members of the House of Assembly—all are to be found in these Advisory Councils,
and they are at liberty to discuss all matters that affect their community. N.A. policy
has thus been brought to the public forum, and local government need no longer be
regarded as an esoteric art, the exclusive right of the aristocracy. It is now an
occupation in which many who have the desire and the public support are now
taking part, particularly in the Urban and District Councils. A comparison of the
original with the most recent minutes of most councils where there has been
adequate administrative supervision will prove this; so also the growing interest of
the people in elections, particularly in the urban areas.
8. Finally, perhaps the most significant evidence of progress is found in the
motion of the Sultan of Sokoto, passed unanimously by the House of Chiefs in 1952,
recommending that, in order to recognise the position of a chief as laid down by
Moslem Law, the status of ‘Sole Native Authority’ be replaced by ‘Native Authority in
Council’. The House of Chiefs later assented to a bill originating in the House of
Assembly, defining the functions of a Native Authority in Council. (See Appendix B).
This legislation is a refutation of considerable force of the charge that has often been
levelled against the Native Authorities of this Region that they enjoyed a position of
absolute power in name and in law.
9. The last eighteen months have, therefore, given proof in action and in outlook
that the chiefs of the highly-centralised administrations are prepared to adapt
themselves and their status to the changing conditions that are transforming a
feudal society into a democracy.
10. In the second category mentioned above lie most of the Middle Belt
administrations—governing societies of a very mixed and heterogeneous nature.
Here, as the following sections of this report will show, a variety of administrative
systems have been, or are in the process of being created, in order to build up
fragmentary societies into groups, federations or associations bringing with this
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loose form of unity the political and financial strength that is necessary to meet the
demands and requirements of the modern individual.
11. In Ilorin the creation of groups and group area councils sending their own rep-
resentatives to be members of the Native Authority ‘Outer’ Council has proved success-
ful in uniting the intensely independent clans to the stronger central body of a Yoruba
Emirate. In Kabba, five small independent Native Authorities and one Subordinate N.A.
have agreed in principle to federate, and only the creation of a suitable form of federa-
tion is now lacking. In Plateau Province, the independent pagan tribes of Jos Division
have held an inaugural meeting of an Advisory Council, and in Pankshin Division the
primitive pagan chiefs have met quarterly for the past two years at a ‘Conference of Chiefs’
and are growing accustomed to discussing matters of common interest. In Numan
Division of Adamawa Province, there were, two years ago, a variety of Native Authorities—
a Chief in Council, a Council and three Chiefs. These have since merged into one Native
Authority, a Council of Thirteen, covering the whole Division, the former authorities
becoming Subordinate Native Authorities to the new Native Authority.
12. In Benue, the need for some organisation to provide for common services
beyond the resources of the individual authorities is leading to consideration of ways
and means, possibly in the form of Joint Committees, and in Idoma there has been a
strengthening of the Intermediate Council and the Native Authority Council in order
to try to meet executive as well as judicial responsibilities. In Makurdi, an ingenious
method of election described in detail in the Appendix E has been devised in order to
satisfy both tribal loyalties and ward interests in an urban area of mixed peoples.
13. In Niger and Zaria, Provincial Councils have been evolved to meet the need for
provincial discussion and agreement on matters of common interest. At present these
bodies have no statutory recognition but it is probable that this will come in due course
and with it, possible [sic: possibly], certain limited executive functions and authority.
An interesting feature in the Niger organisation is that the political constituency is
related to the administrative unit and there is an unbroken chain of representation
from the lowest village council right up to the top provincial council, thence the
provincial representatives go on to the Regional and Central Legislative bodies.
14. Thus one finds that during the past eighteen months, in every province, in one
level or another, from bottom to top of the local government structure, the adminis-
trative units have been and are being consistantly subjected to criticism, enquiry, revi-
sion or complete reorganisation, with the guiding principle running through that the
public be provided with the opportunity of associating themselves with their own gov-
ernment as soon as they become willing and competent to do so. . . .
174 CO 554/241, no 55 22 Jan 1953
[Western Region local government reform]: despatch no 195 from Sir
J Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton reporting objections expressed by
ministers on the handling of the Western Region local government bill
[The issue of the Western Region local government bill was considered at a meeting of the
Council of Ministers on 16 Dec 1952. At this meeting L H Goble, the acting chief secretary
and acting president of the council, reported that the secretary of state had declared the
bill ultra vires; in response ministers, believing that the Council should have had 
the opportunity to examine the bill before the CO, ‘expressed strong resentment at the
manner in which this matter had been handled . . . the view was expressed that the action
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of the secretary of state indicated lack of confidence in the Council . . . members felt
therefore that the secretary of state should . . . not do anything which might give the
impression that the effective power in this country still lay with him’ (CO 1039/2, no 74,
conclusions of a meeting of the Council of Ministers). This despatch was the result.]
I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 3529 of the 4th of December1 in
which you informed me of the legal difficulties raised by the Western Region Local
Government Bill, and to inform you that the Bill was considered in the Council of
Ministers on the 16th of December.
2. The Council advised that for the reasons set out in your despatch I should
object to the Bill under section 96(2)(a) of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order-in-
Council. It agreed however that the grounds for objection to the Bill could
conveniently be removed by amendment of the Bill in the following manner:
Clause 15 In paragraph (c) for ‘Nigeria’ substitute ‘the Region’.
Clause 60 In sub-clauses (1) and (2) for ‘any subject’ substitute
‘land tenure’.
In sub-clause (3) for the subject to which it relates’ 
substitute ‘land tenure’ wherever the phrase occurs.
Clause 71 Delete paragraphs (48), (74), (84) and (86).
Clause 77 In sub-clause (1) delete ‘or Ordinance.
Delete sub-clause (2).
Clause 161 Delete’, or to exercise the powers of an authorised 
officer within the meaning of the Protectorate Laws 
(Enforcement) Ordinance, or both’ and ‘Cap. 180.’ in
the marginal note.
Clause 174 Delete sub-clause (1)
Clause 185 Delete sub-clause (5).
Clauses 206 to Delete
209 inclusive
I have therefore informed the Lieutenant-Governor, Western Region, in accordance
with section 99(1) of the Order in Council, that I object to the Bill on the grounds
that it relates to matters in respect of which the Western Regional Legislature has no
power to make laws; and I have sent him a statement of the required amendments.
3. The Council would be prepared to see restored to the Bill all of the provisions
now to be deleted with the exception of Clause 71(86). An Ordinance to delegate,
under section 96 of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, such legislative
powers as would enable these provisions to be replaced is now under preparation
with a view to its introduction at the March meeting of the House of Representatives.
4. Before agreeing upon this action members of the Council expressed strong
resentment at the manner in which this Bill had been handled and requested me to
inform you of their feelings in the matter. They felt that the position of the Council
had been prejudiced by the fact that, while the Constitution Order-in-Council lays it
down that a Bill shall come from the Region to the Council of Ministers, advice had
been received from you before the matter had been considered by the Council, which
in fact fettered the Council’s freedom. However excellent and welcome such advice,
the Council, when it came to consider the Bill, found itself with no opportunity to
express its own opinion but felt compelled merely to endorse the advice received.
1 See 170.
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This, the Ministers felt, indicated lack of confidence in the Council of Ministers, and
was likely to place Ministers in a difficult position politically.
5. The procedure with regard to assent, or refusal to assent, to Regional Bills and
disallowance of Regional Laws is laid down in sections 95–102 of the Nigeria
(Constitution) Order-in-Council, 1951. Under this procedure a Regional Bill which
has been passed by both the Legislative Houses of a Region is sent to the Governor,
who, after consulting with the Council of Ministers, may object to it for any of the rea-
sons set out in section 96(2) of the Order-in-Council. If he does not object to it the
Lieutenant-Governor may, subject to any instruction addressed to him under Her
Majesty’s Sign Manual and Signet or through a Secretary of State, declare that he
assents, or refuses to assent, thereto, or that he reserves the Bill for the signification
of Her Majesty’s pleasure thereto. Finally, even though a Lieutenant-Governor has
given his assent to it, a law may be disallowed by Her Majesty through a Secretary of
State. There is no specific provision in the Constitution Order-in-Council in accor-
dance with which instructions would be given by the Secretary of State before the Bill
had been considered by the Governor and returned to the Lieutenant-Governor.
6. As I have said, members of the Council of Ministers felt that, in the absence of
any such specific provision in the Constitution Order-in-Council, intervention of the
Secretary of State at a stage before the Council had formally considered the Western
Region’s Bill the inference could only be that they were not free to take their own
decision in the matter and were not yet regarded as capable of doing so. A logical
conclusion of such procedure would be that all Regional legislation should be sent in
draft to the Colonial Office for examination by the Secretary of State’s advisers before
it was put before the Regional Legislatures, and this, naturally, could only detract
most seriously from the authority and responsibility given to those legislatures.
7. I have informed the Council that the sole purpose which dictated the procedure
adopted on this occasion was to ensure that a sound and valuable law, free from legal
blemishes, and capable of immediate implementation, should come into force with the
least possible delay. I have also explained that your intervention in the matter resulted
from a question put to you in the House of Commons. When I agreed that the com-
ments of your Local Government Advisory Panel would be valuable I should, perhaps,
have forseen the situation that later arose, and I desire to express regret that I did not
do so. Notwithstanding this, Ministers feel that they were placed in a difficult position
and would welcome your formal assurance that your advice was in no way indicative of
a lack of confidence in the capacity and sense of responsibility of the Council of Ministers.
175 CO 554/599, no 25 31 Jan 1953
[Eastern Region crisis]: inward telegram no 137 from AET Benson to
Mr Lyttelton on the resignation of Eastern Region ministers
[The crisis in the Eastern Region that developed during 1953 had its origins in the
determination of Azikiwe to assert party discipline over those members of the NCNC who
held ministerial posts in the central Council of Ministers and in the Eastern Region
government. This was complicated by the fact that Azikiwe, although representing Lagos
in the Western House of Assembly, had failed to gain one of the Lagos seats in the House
of Representatives and thus held no central or eastern legislative seat (see 150). The
expulsion of three central ministers (Arikpo, Njoku and Nwapa) from the party in
December 1952 (see 171) because of their unwillingness to accept party instructions to
refuse to co-operate with the workings of the Council of Ministers, was followed by
12-(Doc139-178)-cp  15/7/01  7:30 am  Page 502
[176] FEB 1953 503
Azikiwe’s determination to assert party authority over the Eastern regional ministers
through a re-shuffle of portfolios. The result was the submission of the resignations of all
nine Eastern Region ministers on 29 Jan 1953. At the last moment however six of the
nine, led by Professor Eyo Ita, withdrew their resignations. The six were subsequently
expelled from the NCNC and party control over the members of the House of Assembly
was reflected in the passing of a vote of no-confidence in the Eastern government and the
refusal to pass the budget; the budget eventually had to be passed by use of the
lieutenant-governor’s reserved powers. Thereafter obstructionist tactics by NCNC
members of the House were designed to make government unworkable in the Eastern
Region. The six so-called ‘sit-tight’ regional ministers, together with the three expelled
central ministers, formed the National Independence Party with Eyo Ita as President.
Underlying this crisis were deeper tensions within the NCNC over Azikiwe’s
determination to assert his leadership as well as difficulties between Efik members such
as Eyo Ita, and the party more broadly.]
My telegram No. 134.
Situation East.
Facts are as follows:—
At about midnight 29th January all nine Regional Ministers wrote letters of resig-
nation and handed them to Dr. Azikiwe and Mr. K. O. Mbadiwe. At 07.00 30th January
six Ministers called on the Lieutenant Governor and withdrew resignation (which
Lieutenant Governor had not received). At 08.00 Azikiwe and Mbadiwe arrived and pre-
sented nine resignations and were informed that six had been withdrawn.
2. House met with everyone in normal place. Speech from the Throne delivered
and the Financial Secretary then introduced the budget. House adjourned midday
with no reference to these events.
3. In the afternoon Lieutenant Governor sent for the remaining three Ministers
Okpara, Muna and Awgu (who alone out of total had been promised new Ministries by
Azikiwe) and asked whether their resignations stood. Muna withdrew his resignation;
the other two apparently let theirs stand.1
4. Latest move reported this morning is that letter signed by 45 members of the
Eastern House has been sent to Lieutenant Governor stating that
(a) all Ministers have resigned
(b) he must recognise the new Ministers
(c) if he does not, vote of no confidence will be passed on Ministers in the House
and every Bill presented, particularly the Appropriation Bill, will be opposed.
5. I will keep you informed.
1 Solomon T Muna, Cameroonian politician; minister without portfolio, Eastern Region government; later
member of the KNC and then KNDP; vice-president of Cameroun, 1970. Generally, Cameroonian leaders
supported Ita in this crisis.
176 CO 554/318 18–20 Feb 1953
[Eastern Region crisis]: minutes by E O Mercer, T B Williamson, 
Sir T Lloyd and Mr Hopkinson on provision for carrying on the
administration of government in the Eastern Region
Mr. Williamson
As a result of discussion today between Mr. Peck, Mr. Rushford, Mr. Godden and
myself, the draft telegram opposite was agreed as the immediate reply to (6) on the
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question of how provision should be made for carrying on the administration of a
Region in the event of the Legislature or Executive Council ceasing to function. As
you will note, the Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, is regarded as fully
adequate for this purpose; fortunately the 1952 amendment to it provides that a
proclamation under the Order may be made so as to apply only to a specified part of
the territory, in other words, it may apply to one Region only.
On the question of whether it is necessary to declare an emergency in terms when
making a proclamation under the Emergency Powers Order in Council, Mr. Peck is
of the opinion that there is in fact no need to do so, although the fact that the Order
in Council is being used leads to a sufficiently clear deduction that a state of
emergency does in fact exist. The form previously used in Nigeria is at A on
14327/21/48. A precedent which could be followed would be that of the Malta
Emergency Provisions No. 2 Order in Council, 1951, in which the particular reason
for the current emergency was stated, but neither Mr. Peck nor I feel that this point
need be mentioned in our telegraphic reply to Nigeria.
The use of the Emergency Powers Order in Council in circumstances in which there
was no violence has already been considered in connection with other territories, in
particular Malta. In this connection you may wish to see the minutes on MED 333/8/02.
The Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, would of course provide only for
the first stage in any constitutional crisis such as is envisaged. For subsequent stages
further courses will have to be considered, among them the proposal in (6) for an
amendment to the Constitution, to provide for the separate dissolution of a Regional
Legislature. These are not of the first urgency, since the Emergency Powers Order in
Council provides for the immediate carrying on of government, but it is clear that
this latter is no more than a temporary expedient. Mr. Rushford has drawn up a brief
note (7) which is opposite, of the successive problems that might present themselves,
together with the possible remedies that would have to be considered. These envisage
the need to dissolve a Regional House which is no longer working and consider the
possibility that a newly elected House might also refuse to co-operate, thus repeating
the situation before the dissolution. Whereas the first stage of this situation might be
dealt with by an ad hoc Order in Council or by an amendment to the Constitution
such as (6) proposes, if the second stage were reached there would appear to be no
long-term alternative but an overhaul of the Constitution.
It is further necessary to consider the measures needed to deal with the effect of a
Regional situation such as has just been described, on the Central Legislature and
the Council of Ministers. It might in fact be possible for the Central Legislature and
Council of Ministers to carry on, as it were, with only two of its three constituents in
operation if only one Region were affected, although this would be politically
undesirable except as a short term measure. There is already provision in the
constitution for dissolution of the Central House and with it of the various Regional
Houses, and if no Regional solution could be found it would appear to be necessary in
the long run to dissolve the Central House and hold a general election throughout
the country. The alternative would be nothing less, so far as one can see, than a
general revision of the Constitution.
Although it is important to foresee all contingencies and, it seems to me that we
should discuss these further with Nigeria, it is only the stage of the dissolution of a
Regional House that (6) asks to be considered, apart from measures to continue
administration. Legal Dept will examine the draft amendment to the Constitution
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further. You will note that (6) suggests merely that it should be prepared for
submission to HM in Council, and not actually submitted until the emergency arises.
To my mind we would certainly wish to avoid amending the Constitution until it is
essential, but we may find, even if all steps are taken short of submission, that the
draft does not really fit the situation that has arisen and that some delay therefore
arises. The Emergency Powers O. in C. should cover this.
E.O.M.
18.2.53
Sir T. Lloyd (through Mr. Peck)
I mentioned (6) to you briefly yesterday.
There are two points
(a) the question of powers to provide for separate elections in the individual
Regions of Nigeria; and
(b) the question of powers to enable a Lieutenant-Governor to carry on the
administration of his Region if it is impossible to secure a quorum in the
Executive Council or Legislature because of a boycott.
We need more time to consider (a), but can reply at once on (b). I should like to do
so by telegram because, although we have not heard of any further trouble in the
Eastern Region for the last week, the Governor might have to act at short notice.
The Legal Advisers and my Department are satisfied (after some study of the
precedents, including the recent correspondence with Malta at (2)(4) & (5), on MED
333/8/02) that the Emergency Powers Order in Council, as amended, gives the
Governor all he needs. Our advice is set out in the draft telegram submitted
herewith, which Mr. Peck, Mr. Rushford and I dictated together this morning. I think
this is self-explanatory.
I am passing this through Mr. Peck so that he may take a final look at it on its way up.
T.B.W.
19.2.53
Minister of State
In the absence of the Secretary of State I am troubling you with this file since the
action which we are recommending ought, in my view, to have Ministerial approval.
In paragraph 2 of No. 6 the Governor of Nigeria asked for advice about the means
for carrying on the administration of the Eastern Region of that territory if Ministers
and members of the Regional Legislature boycotted the Executive Council and the
Legislature in such numbers as to make it impossible to secure a quorum. The
Governor was advised that the use of the Emergency Powers Order in Council for this
purpose would be inappropriate and suggested an amendment of the Nigerian
Constitution Order in Council on the lines of a section in the Government of India Act.
The opinion of the Secretary of State’s Legal Advisers is that the Emergency
Powers Order in Council could properly be used and would be more appropriate (as
well as speedier) than special legislation. I agree with that view and my reason for
submitting the file is that this would, so far as I can recall, be the first occasion of the
use of the Order in Council for any other than ‘emergency’ i.e. disturbance purposes.
It has been used on five occasions since the war (the places and dates of their use are
mentioned at X in Mr. Bunce’s minute of 22/8/52 on MED. 333/8/02) but each time
there was disturbance or other threat to peace and good government. We did
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contemplate the use of the Order in Council in other circumstances in Malta—see
paragraph 5 of No. 5 on the same file—but the need for that has not so far arisen.
If Ministers and members in the Eastern Region of Nigeria deliberately bring
about a break-down of government in that area they cannot reasonably complain if
Government acts quickly under whatever emergency powers are most readily
available, and I submit therefore that we should proceed as in this draft.
Paragraph 7 of Nigerian telegram No. 218 of yesterday, now attached to but not yet
registered on this file, explains the urgency.
T.K.L.
19.2.53
This seems to me all right, but on the face of it I should think we ought also to be
aiming at new elections.
H.L.D.H.
20.2.53
177 CO 554/260, no 16 27 Feb 1953
[Ministerial powers]: inward telegram no 250 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Lyttelton on the need to concede further powers to central
ministers. Minute by TB Williamson
[Macpherson’s determination to preserve a conciliar system for the Council of Ministers
eventually gave way in the face of pressure for a ministerial system modelled on the Gold
Coast. In early 1953 the Council began to be modified with the creation of the first four
ministries on the Gold Coast model.]
You are aware from correspondence and personal experience of the pressure which
has been exercised by Central Ministers, or some of them, ever since the Constitution
came into force, to stretch the interpretation of Section 162 of the Nigeria
Constitution Order in Council so as to permit establishment of Ministries and to
allow Ministers to control departments. Section in question was, of course, inserted
on the recommendation of the General Conference on Constitutional Reform
because, at that time, Regions did not relish the thought of Central Ministers from
one region exercising authority in other Regions.
2. I have given the widest possible interpretation to that Section. We are
establishing separate Ministries and I concede the right of Ministers to give orders to
Heads of Departments in order to ensure implementation of decisions of the Council
of Ministers. Ministers have expressed appreciation of this attitude and I thought we
had succeeded in satisfying their aspirations. I have now, however, been presented
with unanimous request from all Central Ministers with portfolios that they should
be given the same powers as Ministers in the Gold Coast. They realise that this can be
done only by amendment of the Constitution Order in Council and they press for
this. They claim to be supported by Regional Ministers from all three Regions and I
believe this claim to be well founded. (When I was in Kaduna last month Northern
Region Ministers spoke strongly in favour of this change).
3. I am convinced that we must concede this request in spite of my objection to
making any change in the Order in Council (other than provision for separate
dissolution of Regional Houses). If we continue to resist, the whole atmosphere will
be poisoned and I badly need the continued support of the Central Ministers, who are
as good as we can expect to get at this stage and better than any substitutes that
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might take their places. I am not without hope that concession on this point will
greatly improve relations in general.
4. I had hoped to approach this change gradually, but my hand was forced yester-
day when the Council considered the terms of my speech on the opening of the new
session of the House of Representatives on 3rd March. Notice of a motion has been
received from floor members for the grant of normal powers to Ministers. Ministers,
rightly as I think, pressed for a Government motion instead and urged reference to this
in the opening speech. They fully appreciate the importance of carrying you and Her
Majesty’s Government with us in this change and regret appearance of stampeding you.
5. I have agreed to say in opening speech on 3rd March, after reference to the ori-
gin of Section 162, that the Council of Ministers has had the question of the powers
and functions of Ministers under review for some time, in the light of the practical
working of the Constitution, and that proposals for far-reaching changes are being
considered, the results of which will be brought before the House of Representatives.
There will be many complications to work out, including relations between Central
Ministers who deal with regional subjects and Regional Ministers. I earnestly trust you
will not feel I have improperly committed you. Ministers assure me that they want only
this change and no other in the Order in Council and, in particular, that they have no
desire to change the provisions relating to control of the Civil Service. The blunt fact
is that if we were now framing the Constitution we should have no sufficient grounds
for imposing limitations contained in Section 162 regarding ministerial responsibil-
ity for implementing policy of the Council of Ministers.
6. It would greatly relieve my anxiety if you felt able to send a signal before 3rd
March expressing understanding of the situation.
Minute on 507
Sir T. Lloyd
In his telegram No. 250 at (16) Sir J. Macpherson makes it clear that he thinks it
essential for the Nigeria constitution to be amended so as to give Nigerian Ministers
the same powers as Gold Coast Ministers have. Briefly, the position is as follows.
Under the Gold Coast constitution the Governor may charge any Representative
Minister with the responsibility for any Department or subject. Ministers’ powers in
the Gold Coast are not dissimilar from those of Ministers in the U.K. They are in charge
of their Departments and, except when they think it necessary to take a matter to
Cabinet, they can take policy decisions on their own responsibility and give directions
to their Departments that they shall be carried out. The doctrine of collective Cabinet
responsibility of course applies, and if a decision which a Gold Coast Minister has taken
on his individual responsibility is challenged or criticised publicly, he can rely on the
public support of all his Cabinet colleagues. (At least this is how the system is sup-
posed to work and I think it is fair to say that on the whole this is how it does work).
The position in Nigeria is different. There is a long and complicated history behind
it—not all of which is clear from our files—but in short it comes to this. Neither at
the Centre nor in the Regions have Nigerian Ministers (apart from the ex-officio
Members, who incidentally are not called Ministers) responsibility for Departments.
They are charged with responsibility for ‘matters’ and they cannot take any policy
decisions on their own. Everything has to go to the Council of Ministers (or Regional
Executive Council). Moreover when the Council has taken a decision, the Minister’s
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responsibility is confined to ‘ensuring, in association with the appropriate public
officer, that effect is given to decisions taken by the Governor in the Council of
Ministers relating to such matter’. Hence the wording of section 162 of the
Constitution Order, which is as follows:—
‘162. In this Part “responsibility” for any matter means general responsibility
for—
(a) submitting to the Council of Ministers questions relating to such matter;
(b) ensuring, in association with the appropriate public officer, that effect
is given to decisions taken by the Governor in the Council of Ministers
relating to such matter; and
(c) conducting in the House of Representatives government business
relating to such matter.’
As Sir J. Macpherson indicates in paragraph 1 of (16), the fundamental reason for
this ‘conciliar’ system was because the Regions, and particularly the North, objected
at the Ibadan General Conference in 1950 to powers being given to a Central Minister
responsible for Regional subjects in pursuance of which he could decide policy
affecting a Region other than his own. Under the system decided upon and enshrined
in the present constitution, there is the safeguard that policy can only be decided by
Ministers from all three Regions sitting in Council, and in addition there is the
further safeguard provided by the fact that there are six ex-officio members in
Council plus the Governor as President.
We have felt for some time in my Department (a) that the conciliar system was so
cumbersome and threw so heavy a burden of work on the Council of Ministers that in
due course it would have to be modified; and more particularly (b) that it was
unreasonable to expect Nigerian Ministers to be content for much longer with
section 162 (b) of the Constitution Order. The Governor had hoped, by stretching
section 162 (b) to the utmost, that he had satisfied his Ministers aspirations. But it is
clear that he has failed to do so, and they are all now unanimous—significantly
enough including those from the North—in pressing to be given normal Ministerial
responsibility for their Departments.
I am quite sure, for my part, that the balance of advantage lies now in making the
change Sir J. Macpherson wants, even at the cost of amending the Nigeria
constitution in certain important respects. Accordingly, after discussion with Dr.
Mercer, I submit the attached draft telegram in reply to (16). Sir J. Macpherson has
asked for a reply to reach him by Monday night.
It will be noted that in this draft reply it is proposed to say that we assume that no
question of creating offices of Prime Minister will arise at this stage. I think this
assumption is correct because paragraph 5 of (16) says that Ministers have assured
Sir John that the only change they want is that they shall be given the same powers
as Gold Coast Ministers. There would therefore appear to be no suggestion of any
alteration in the precedence of Ministers in relation to the ex-officio Members. But
we had better put the point specifically.
I should mention one complication. It relates to Sierra Leone. The Secretary of
State has, within the last fortnight, accepted a recommendation from the retiring
Governor that a Ministerial system shall be introduced in Sierra Leone on the
existing Nigerian pattern. The despatches exchanged have now been published and
the drafts to amend the Sierra Leone constitutional instruments are in pretty well
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their final stage, ready for submission to H.M. in Council (we hope) on the 11th
March. We expect to hear from the Acting Governor of Sierra Leone within a few days
that the draft amending instruments are acceptable to him. (They are being taken
back to Freetown by the Attorney-General this weekend.) I have, however, throught
it right to inform Mr. Macdonald of this latest development in Nigeria, telling him
what the Governor’s view is and of the terms in which he will be speaking on the 3rd
March. I have added of course that I cannot anticipate the decision which will be
taken on Sir John’s telegram but that in any event we assume that there can be no
question of proceeding otherwise than in accordance with the recommendations
submitted by Sir G. Beresford-Stooke and approved by the Secretary of State.
I am sending a copy of this minute and of the draft telegram direct to Mr. Peck.
T.B.W.
28.2.53
178 CO 554/599, no 48 27 Feb 1953
[Eastern Region crisis]: inward telegram no 251 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on the continuation of government in the
Eastern Region [Extract]
[The problem for the government in dealing with the Eastern crisis was their inability to
dissolve the Eastern House of Assembly without dissolving all the regional houses (see 176).
It was clear that in order to get round this the 1951 constitution would have to be amended,
though this raised the danger of opening up the constitution for more radical changes (see
195). In the event the Eastern Region House of Assembly was dissolved on 6 May (see 199).]
Your telegram No. 213.
Parliamentary Question.
Little, save amplification, to add to my telegram No. 242.
2. Government continues in the East because the Executive Council remains
properly constituted. Legislature inoperative because of unconstitutional tactics
adopted by the N.C.N.C. Party caucus attempting to set up puppet government
answerable only to the N.C.N.C. Executive outside the Legislature. But Reserve
Powers enable essential legislation to be enacted by the Lieutenant Governor. These
are not (repeat not) emergency powers.
3. Copy of the Legal Secretary’s statement of 18th February leaves by bag No. 28.
Following are the main points:—
(a) Lieutenant Governor’s actions throughout legally and constitutionally correct.
(b) Six Regional Ministers had not resigned.
(c) Executive Council still properly instructed.
(d) Lieutenant Governor can revoke the appointment of a Minister only in two
ways: either after adverse secret ballot, or because of failure to carry out the policy
or decisions of the Executive Council (Section 130).
(e) Therefore no power to revoke the appointments.
(f) Further no power to dissolve the House save by the Governor’s dissolution of
all the Houses at once.
4. Statement followed, to the surprise of everyone, by Eyo Ita saying that he
might initiate approach to the Secretary of State to amend the constitution to permit
separate dissolutions . . .
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179 CO 554/260, no 17 2 Mar 1953
[Ministerial powers]: outward telegram no 22 (reply) from Mr
Lyttelton to Sir J Macpherson agreeing to proposals to concede
further powers to central ministers
Your telegram No. 250.1
I have watched with admiration your efforts over past year to keep your conciliar
system (including section 162 (b) of Constitution Order) intact, but, as you may
recall from our talks in Lagos last year, I felt then that pressure for something more
like Gold Coast pattern might become irresistable. I agree therefore, subject to my
following paragraph, that you should make your statement on 3rd March, and I shall
be prepared at appropriate stage on receipt of formal recommendation from you to
advise Her Majesty in Council to amend Nigeria constitution to give Nigerian
Ministers powers similar to those of Ministers in Gold Coast.
2. I am, however, much concerned about use of words ‘far-reaching changes’ in
your paragraph 5. The changes in question are not (repeat not) far-reaching, and to
use the term would be impolitic as well as misleading. I must therefore ask you to do
your utmost, even at this late hour, to get agreement to substitute for ‘far-reaching
changes’ words such as ‘changes affecting their powers and functions.’
3. I note that all Central Ministers with portfolios support this change, and that
they have no desire to change provisions relating to control of Public Service. I hope
recommendation, when made, will also have unanimous support of all Regional
Ministers from all three Regions. I assume conciliar system would be abandoned in
Regions as well as at the Centre, but that there is no question of creating offices of
Prime Minister either at Centre or in Regions. Do you, however, intend that ex officio
Members shall be styled Ministers?
4. Please do not (repeat not) commit me publicly on this at this stage, and I
should be grateful if you will not (repeat not) disclose that you have consulted me.
5. Grateful to know what procedure and timetable you have in mind for proposed
changes, and particularly at what stage you expect to make formal recommendation
to me. As you know, amendments to constitutional instruments take time.
6. Grateful if you would also keep other West African Governors informed. I have
already warned Macdonald.2
1 See 177. 2 A R Macdonald, Colonial Secretary, Sierra Leone.
180 CO 554/400, no 1 13 Mar 1953
[Nigerianisation]: memorandum by M G Smith on the Africanisation
policy of the West African governments
Africanisation has been the policy of the Governments of the Gold Coast and Nigeria
for many years—in the case of the Gold Coast it was first enunciated in 1925 during
the Governorship of Sir Gordon Guggisberg. But lip service to this policy has not
involved, except in very recent years, any pressure to implement it and in the Gold
Coast, for instance, although it is now 28 years since the policy saw the light of day
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there is still no African head of any Department. The inaction, if not the policy, of
H.M.G. is therefore partly to blame for the present difficulties which the pressure for
accelerated Africanisation in West Africa is bringing. There is, however, another
major reason for these difficulties in that technical and social advances since the war
have so increased the demand for a larger Public Service performing tasks of much
greater variety that whether or not Africanisation had been pressed before the war it
would still have been necessary to bring in many more overseas officers in the
technical fields.
2. It is common ground that the maintenance of the efficiency and self-
confidence of the Public Services in the West African territories is a sine qua non of
the success of H.M.G.’s constitutional experiments there, as the territories contain
no substantial uncorrupt middle-class and no other reservoir of talent and
experience to protect the common people from exploitation by the very
inexperienced and not necessarily high-minded politicians they have voted into
power. The political struggle in West Africa is largely over and only the question of
the timing of further political advance remains. But the question of the preservation
of the standards and integrity of the Public Services is not yet resolved and should
perhaps now become the major concern of our policy.
3. On the political front, H.M.G. early recognised that self-government as the
expression of the new nationalist feeling was fast becoming the African goal and that
to win African good-will we must make strides towards granting this big enough to
involve an element of risk for us and big enough to convince the Africans that we
were handing over power out of conscious good-will and not grudgingly because of
internal pressure in the territories. On the political front in West Africa this policy
has been largely successful and as a result all the talk there now is of retaining the
Commonwealth link when independence is gained. But if we cannot protect 
the position of the Public Services these new countries may either enter the
Commonwealth—or be rejected by it—not as self-respecting nations but as African
slums.
4. If we are to tackle this question effectively we must start as we did on the
political issue with frank and not reluctant recognition that rapid Africanisation is
now a pressing, perhaps the most pressing, local objective, and we must therefore
seek to further it and to make it clear that we do further it by positive acts of policy
and not merely stand by in passive acquiescence while Africanisation of an
unbalanced sort is brought about by purely local devices. Only thus can we hope (if at
all) to win enough African good-will over our attitude to Africanisation to give us a
chance of being allowed to guide its progress.
5. It seems to me that to achieve this we may have, though the Governors, to
argue out again in both Nigeria and the Gold Coast the basis and objectives of
Africanisation and to try to get Ministers to accept a series of propositions on the
following lines:—
(a) It is fully recognised by both H.M.G. and the local governments that ultimate
complete Africanisation of the Public Service is a proper and inevitable corollary of
the constitutional changes that are taking place.
(b) At present political advance, which as a deliberate transfer of power can be
achieved quickly, has outstripped the rate of Africanisation of the Public Service
which depends on the attainment by many individuals of knowledge and
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experience which can be gained only over a comparatively long period of time; and
urgent steps must be taken to bring the two into line.
(c) The rate of Africanisation and the rate of political advance can be brought into
line by one of three methods:—
(i) political advance can be retarded.
(ii) standards of service can be so lowered that the efficiency and integrity of the
Government machine is seriously impaired.
(iii) some lowering of the efficiency of the Service may be accepted while all
available steps are taken to speed up recruitment to this lower standard.1
The difference between (ii) and (iii) above is one of timing—in (iii) you agree to
take longer over the job. But (i) is presumably unacceptable locally and (ii) we
should strongly urge to be indefensible on every ground. We must therefore get
(iii) to be the agreed objective so that further discussion is on how far standards
can safely be lowered and on the timing of the programme.
(d) Any lowering of standards would come at a most inconvenient time. Because
of recent great technological advances, because of the pressure of local demand for
increased education and other social services and for economic development, and
because political advance itself increases the complexity of, and the strains on, the
Government machine, the current need is for a larger and more efficient Public
Service. The public which elected the new West African Governments is therefore
entitled to have put squarely to it what insistence on over-hasty Africanisation
would mean: far from consolidating political advance it would at best seriously
retard the promising economic and social progress made since the war, and
discourage needed further investment of overseas capital, and at worst it might
lead to a voluntary mass exodus of existing overseas officers which would largely
paralyse the machinery of Government. A Minister without a Ministry is decorative
rather than useful.
(e) In urging therefore that Africanisation should not be pressed at a rate and in a
manner seriously prejudicial to the interests of serving overseas officers, H.M.G. is
not concerned merely to protect the interests of these officers—that perhaps could
be achieved through an adequate compensation scheme—but with guarding
against a mass exodus that would stultify H.M.G’s. own policy of promoting the
orderly development of self-governing institutions in West Africa.
(f ) There is a further consideration. Public Service standards can be lowered by a
stroke of the pen. They can be raised only with great difficulty over a long period,
for public servants of poor quality, accepted when standards are lowered, cannot be
ejected when it is sought to raise the standards. But the West African Governments
have not merely internal but external aims: they are looking to the day when self-
government shall have reached the point of international recognition and they can
seek their own place among the nations and perhaps as full members of the
1 Williamson minuted on this (14 Mar): ‘I do not agree that we should, publicly anyway, accept any
lowering of standards. The traditionally high standards of the British Civil Service, whether in the U.K. or
in its overseas territories, are something which, like the integrity of the Service, we ought to fight to
maintain. . . . I would say that present standards in some overseas territories (including the Gold Coast)
are low enough already. Furthermore, once there were any lowering of efficiency, it would be
impracticable to draw the line: under pressure of opinion and events we should constantly be pushed
lower and lower’. See also, BDEEP series A, vol 3, D Goldsworthy, ed, The Conservative Government and
the End of Empire 1951–1957 part II, 245 & 246.
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Commonwealth family. They will find great difficulty in achieving these aims, and
in particular in being accepted as equal partners in the Commonwealth, if the
efficiency of their governmental machinery is sufficiently impaired to make them
potentially economic and defence liabilities and generally below the standards
expected of members. A low standard of government would also do little good to
the general cause of African nationalism. The ultimate independence of the Gold
Coast and Nigeria is not in question. What is in question in the eyes of the world is
the social, political and economic levels at which these territories are capable of
sustaining their independence.
(g) The West African Governments should also appreciate another implication of
drastic Africanisation. Part of the emotional demand for Africanisation is based on
a natural desire to prove Africans to be at least as efficient and responsible as
Europeans. But this claim, as it is often pressed, goes much further than a claim of
equality and approaches a point of absurdity. No European would claim that an
inexperienced European junior officer, however distinguished his academic career,
could in a year or two accumulate the experience and judgment required of the
holder of a very senior post in the Public Service. Yet it is on the belief in the
fitness of Africans for promotion as rapid as this that part at least of the case for
accelerated Africanisation rests.
(h) With so much at stake H.M.G. do not therefore consider it unreasonable to
counsel a certain restraint in pressing Africanisation programmes to a point that
may cause chaos in the Public Service, and suggest that if the issues involved are
fairly put to the public this counsel will be accepted. But H.M.G. are anxious to do
all they can actively to promote rapid Africanisation and point out that their bona
fides in this respect cannot be questioned as they have already taken the major
steps necessary to ensure ultimate Africanisation by promoting the great projects
for University and Technical Colleges as well as by awarding many scholarships to
the major seats of learning in the U.K.
(i) H.M.G. are therefore prepared to co-operate to the full in any measures that
will speed up Africanisation while substantially protecting the standards of the
Service. It is recognised that some lowering of standards is called for just as some
political risks had to be taken to launch the new constitution. This might involve
the following measures:—
(i) H.M.G. attach the highest importance to the practical training of the
Africans in the Service and are prepared to assist this both with money and with
experienced personnel from the U.K.2
(ii) H.M.G. are considering means of creating a U.K. fund for the payment of
pensions into which Colonial Governments could make annual payments that
would rid them of further pension liability in respect of officers for whom the
payments were made.3
(iii) H.M.G. are prepared to discuss means of funding the present pension
liabilities of the West African Governments.
(iv) H.M.G. are prepared to discuss suitable compensation terms for officers
whose services can be dispensed with as suitable African replacements become
2 Williamson added here ‘A programme will need working out’.
3 Williamson added here ‘Sir J Macpherson’s idea: but he suggested confining to future recruits’.
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available. (This might reassure serving officers that their interests will be
protected when the time comes and reassure local governments that they can
dispense with serving officers without a major row with H.M.G.)
(v) Further pensionable recruitment should be undertaken only in exceptional
circumstances or where, as perhaps in the case of Northern Nigeria, it continues
to be the expressed wish of the territory or region concerned.
(vi) H.M.G. undertake wherever possible to offer transfers to other Colonial
territories to officers whose services are no longer required in West Africa. (The
possibilities of these transfers must vary greatly from time to time and between
one Service and another.)
(vii) H.M.G. suggest that to avoid friction on both sides and to provide for the
careful and efficient management of the Africanisation programme, a permanent
body at working level should be set up in each of the territories concerned within
the present machinery of Public Service Commission and Establishment Section.
There should be both African and European members on this body and the Public
Service unions should either be represented on it or have easy and direct access
to it. This body should initially review and then keep under review the state of
and prospects for the Africanisation of each Department of Government. These
reviews might bring to light a variety of circumstances:—
(a) It might appear that the prospects of complete Africanisation of a
particular Department within say five years were firm enough for it to be
possible to ask the Secretary of State if he could seek within that period to
transfer all remaining European officers in the Department.
(b) On the other hand, the prospects of Africanisation might appear so
remote that an assurance, couched in suitably guarded terms, might be given
to the overseas officers concerned that their services would be required for
the foreseeable future.
(c) There might appear a positive reluctance of Africans to enter particular
vocations which, in the interests of Africanisation, would have to be overcome
by some special inducement or form of direction.
6. The preceding suggestions for tackling the present difficulties over
Africanisation are obviously extremely tentative; some of them would involve H.M.G.
in considerable expenditure; others of them are by no means new or are already, to
some extent, being implemented. But the essence of the matter cannot I think be
challenged: the Africanisation issue has now become so important that we can no
longer stand aside and leave it to be tackled by piecemeal local arrangements nor can
we hope to avoid or defer its unpleasant implications without facing it in detail with
the African Ministers. For example, the argument previously used, that to discuss
compensation terms openly would encourage African Ministers to dispense earlier
than they would otherwise have done with overseas officers, no longer has validity as
they are already considering, with more enthusiasm than judgment, how to do this.
Our only chance to achieve a rational settlement of these important issues is that,
possessing as we do in both Nigeria and the Gold Coast very distinguished Governors
who still command great personal influence and prestige in their territories, we
should arm them with every argument we can think of and every proof of H.M.G’s.
good-will that we can muster to enable them to discuss the issues with their
Ministers with complete frankness and with a view to reaching understandings that
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will take account both of West African aspirations and H.M.G’s. own objectives, and
that can be put for approval before public opinion in West Africa.
181 CO 554/366, no 19 16 Mar 1953
[Marketing boards]: note by E Sabben-Clare on the politicisation of
the Regional Production Development Boards
[Concern within the CO about the politicisation of marketing boards was prompted by the
AG’s changes to the membership of the Western Regional Production Development Board
in July 1952, action that prompted reports of growing political influence over the Board
during the latter months of the year and led to this note by Sabben-Clare, administrative
officer, Nigerian government. T R Godden minuted on this note on 27 Mar: ‘The attitude
of the Action Group members of the Western Board to its civil service members and
officers and to ‘interference’ from the centre is well in accord with the party line, and so
far at least, does not seem to have produced any major blunders. Potentially the most
disturbing situation seems to me to exist in the east, where at least two members of the
Board are leading lights of the Azikiwe faction, and where their faction may well secure
further power. In such an event it is very doubtful if any successful restraining influence
could be exercised on a reconstituted Board by the Chairman or the General Manager’
(CO 554/366).]
1. Composition
The present membership of the Boards is given in the attached schedule.1
2. An examination of this Schedule will show that on all the Boards there is a
large proportion of members of the Regional Houses and that those members are
drawn from the predominant political groups in each Region. These facts are shown
in summary form in the tables below:—
Northern Board—Members 12
Members in Northern House of Chiefs 4 x
Members of Board in Northern House of Assembly 3 x
Members in Central House of Representatives 5 x
x All supporters of the N.P.C.
Western Board—Members 15
Members of Board’s Executive Committee 5 ∅
Members of Board in Western House of Chiefs 1 ∅
Members of Board in Western House of Assembly 4 ∅
Members of Board in Central House of 0
Representatives
∅ All supporters of the Action Group.
Eastern House of Assembly—Members 10
Members of Board in Eastern House of Assembly 7 X
Members of Board in Central House of
Representatives 3 X
X All supporters of the N.C.N.C.
(These figures exclude the Chairman. In the North he is the Financial and
Development Secretary and, as such, a member of the House of Chiefs and of the
House of Assembly. In the West and East he is the Development Secretary and, as
such, a Member of the House of Assembly.)
1 Not printed.
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3. Selection
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Regional Production Development Boards Ordinance (No.
27 of 1951) prescribe that the majority of the members of the Boards shall be
appointed by the Lieutenant-Governors. Constitutionally, such appointments are in
the Lieutenant-Governor’s discretion, but it is now the practice for Lieutenant-
Governors to consult their Councils before such appointments are made. This
practice started in consequence of an administrative instruction resulting from an
agreed decision of the Central Government in 1952.
4. Party politics probably enter less into appointments on the Northern Board
than elsewhere. The Acting Chairman of the Northern Board wrote recently on the
subject in part as follows:—
‘Our Board members are drawn from the same class of Northern Nigerian as
provides us with our Ministers, and party politics, to date, have not affected
the selection and appointment of members—In the Northern Region no
political significance is attached to membership of the operations of the
Board. Only a week ago the Executive Council of the Northern Region agreed
with my proposal to advise His Honour to approve the nomination of a man of
Eastern origin with businesses in Makurdi and Enugu, to membership of the
Northern Region Development (Loans) Board. He was the best nomination
(from the Middle Belt) for the appointment and no significance was attached
to his tribe, creed or political views.’
It will be noted that in spite of this the members of the Northern Board in the
Regional Houses belong to the N.P.C. and it is doubtful whether a leading politician
of the opposition, the N.E.P.U., would have a chance of becoming a member.
5. However that may be, the position in the West is quite clear. The chances of a
proclaimed opponent of the Action Group being chosen for the Board are at present
nil. In the East this would have been true until recently for opponents of the N.C.N.C.
Since the split in the party during recent months, it is impossible to forecast what
sort of member would have a chance of selection, but it will almost certainly remain
true in the East that the group which ultimately wins the present struggle for power
will see to it that political opponents are not chosen for the Board. This would be in
line with past developments in the East referred to in the following paragraph.
Indeed, it has been rumoured that membership of the Board has lately been held out
as a reward for present support of one group or the other.
6. In the East all but one member of the Board who were unofficial members of
the Eastern House of Assembly at the time when the Boards were set up in 1949 lost
their seats in the elections for the present House in 1951. The Executive Council was
consulted regarding the new appointments and apart from one independent (Mr.
Prince Abbi), all the new selections were N.C.N.C. members. These members
included Mr. K.O. Mbadiwe and Dr. Orizu who have been prominent in the recent
attempt to wrest power from the present group of Ministers in the East.
7. Operation and Administration
Northern Board. On all Boards there is a certain amount of control exercised by
British officials owing to the fact that the Development Secretary of each Region is
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the Chairman. (It so happens at the moment that there is no substantive holder of
the post of Development Secretary in any of the Regions.) As one would expect, the
influence of British officials is most marked in the operations of the Northern Board.
Not only is the Financial and Development Secretary Chairman, but the Deputy
Development Secretary has recently been appointed ‘Agent’. The Agent’s task is,
under the Chairman’s supervision, ‘to control the routine administration of the
Board and to ensure that the work of the Board is duly co-ordinated with that of
Government’. It is not clear how his duties will dovetail with those of officers of the
Board such as the Director of Operations (Administrative), the Director of Operations
(Technical) and the Secretary, but the arrangement at any rate shows willingness on
the part of the Board to accept assistance and guidance.
8. Western Board. The picture in the West is very different, and the Action Group
members who are in the majority are impatient of any official control. They have set
up an Executive Committee, which is in fact a Board within a Board; it meets three
times a month and insists on practically every administrative detail being referred to
it by the Chairman; its decisions are referred when necessary to the full Board, which
nearly always endorses them. The Committee consists of five Action Group
supporters and the Chairman.
9. Moreover, the Western Board has decided to appoint a General Manager who
would ‘relieve the Chairman of much routine administrative duties leaving the latter
with, apart from presiding at meetings, general direction and policy in collaboration
with the rest of the Board’s members’. The Board’s reason for this decision is that it
must ‘resist the temptation to adopt a civil service approach to its problems’ and that
since it ‘has taken or is on the point of taking far-reaching policy decisions on
industrial projects likely to involve commitments of hundreds and thousands of
pounds of public money . . . it is simple prudence that the Board should take a bold
business approach’. The General Manager should be responsible for ‘forward
planning, investigation and execution of the Board’s industrial and agricultural
projects’, and should be ‘Chief adviser on general policy’. No ceiling has been put on
the salary for the post but the holder will in any event be paid not less than £5,000 a
year. In spite of this a suitable candidate has not so far been found.
10. One reason for this may be the irresponsible criticism of expatriate staff indulged
in by the Action Group from time to time. A recent example of this is given in a memo-
randum put to the Board by Mr. A.O. Rewane, an Action Group supporter and Manager
of a Lagos night-club, on the appointment of a permanent Secretary to the Board. Mr.
J.C. Gunton, an Administrative Officer, had been acting as Secretary on secondment
for some time, but had refused an offer to transfer from the Administration to the
Board’s service. It was admitted by all on the Board that Mr. Gunton had given excel-
lent service and it was noted that he was willing to continue working for the Board on
secondment. Mr. Rewane, quite legitimately, pressed in spite of this for the appoint-
ment of a permanent Secretary. He did so in a memorandum of which the following
two extracts are typical:—
‘The Board’s business has developed to the stage when, if it is to succeed, it
must be run on pure business lines, with which civil servants are deplorably
unacquainted. For example, it is gratifying that in the Accounts Section,
where there is no seconded officer with a civil service mentality to clog the
wheels, the work has been of a highly satisfactory standard. . . .’
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and
‘The point here is that while employees with professional qualifications have a
professional reputation to maintain and therefore lay out special efforts to
acquit themselves creditably, civil servants on secondment, unless similarly
qualified, have no such qualms and are more concerned with their position
vis-à-vis General Orders, Colonial Regulations and Financial Instructions’.
These are not exceptional specimens of Mr. Rewane’s style, and the influence of this
gentleman on the Board unfortunately seems considerable.
11. Eastern Board. The Eastern Board, like the West, decided to recruit a
General Manager, and recently appointed Mr. Robson to this post on a non-
pensionable salary of £3,500 a year. The appointment was made as a result of
advertisement and politics played no part in the selection. While the Eastern Board
are as determined as the West not to be kept in official leading strings, there has
certainly not been in their memoranda the same acrimonious note as is found in Mr.
Rewane’s efforts mentioned above.
12. Functions
The published reports of the operations of the Boards are available in the Colonial
Office, and what is wanted here, presumably, is a note on the extent to which those
functions are influenced by political considerations. In the North the answer is
probably nil. The Board is occupying itself mainly with useful schemes for the
improvement of Northern agriculture, such as the provision of machinery for the
Sokoto Mechanised Rice Scheme and the protection of the livestock industry by
financing the campaign against the cattle tsetse, Glossina morsitans.
13. The West and East, on the other hand, naturally pay attention to the vocal
demand in those Regions for industrialisation, sometimes going ahead on their own
with schemes which overlap or might have been better undertaken by others. The
Western Board for example, have tentative plans for cement and paper manufacture
and for the establishment of a spinning and weaving mill, all of which could with
advantage have been co-ordinated with the Central Government’s own plans for
these industries. The Minister of Commerce and Industries has made tentative
suggestions to the Regions, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, on the
setting up of a Ministerial Committee for Economic Co-ordination, with which 
the Chairman of the Board would be associated, but so far nothing has come of it. The
two main difficulties are likely to be, first the determination of each Regional
Government and Regional Board to make its own decisions, without interference
from Lagos, and secondly, even if agreement to the formation of a Committee is
secured, managing to arrange meetings at a time which will be convenient for all
those concerned. As the Chief Secretary to the West African Inter-Territorial
Secretariat is well aware, it is most difficult to obtain a quorum even at important
meetings, because of the many calls Ministers and senior officials already have on
their time.
14. An interesting example of the influence of political considerations and
nationalism on the economic policy of the Boards recently occurred in the West over
the banking of the Board’s deposits. Until recently these deposits have been placed in
the Bank of British West Africa. The Western Board decided, however, to remove
£500,000 and place it on deposit in the National Bank of Nigeria for two years at an
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interest rate of 2% a year. This interest rate is that payable by the Bank of British
West Africa for money placed on deposit at twentyone days’ notice. In spite of the
disadvantageous terms offered by the National Bank, the Board was determined to
move the money for political considerations, and was at one time in such haste to do
so that there was a risk of incurring further losses through insufficient notice being
given for the transfer. There has been no such development as yet in the Eastern
Region, but it is common talk that if the N.C.N.C. is successful in its struggle for
power in the East the funds of the Eastern Regional Production Development Board
will be placed in the African Continental Bank. There are good grounds for believing
that a somewhat imperfect distinction is maintained by those responsible for that
Bank between the judicious commercial investment of funds deposited with it and
the application of those funds to the Party’s political purposes.
15. Political considerations are also likely to influence the future scope of all the
Boards’ activities. As the Colonial Office is aware, these Boards were originally set up
for strictly limited purposes which were defined in the Regional Production
Development Boards Ordinance (No. 27 of 1951). A Board might only use its money
for schemes which were of direct benefit either to the producers of the crops with
which the appropriate Produce Marketing Board was concerned, or of benefit to the
area in which such crops were produced. Any attempts to widen the scope of these
activities have so far been resisted on the ground that they would be unfair to the
producers of those crops, who would be indirectly subsidising economic activities for
the benefit of the rest of the population.
16. On the other hand, many members of the Boards and many members of the
Regional and Central Houses now hold the view that they and they alone are the
representatives of the producers and can say how the producers would like their
money to be spent. In line with this, the Eastern Regional Executive Council have
recently had a Bill prepared to give the Eastern Regional Board powers to undertake
schemes for the economic development of the Region as a whole. Professor Eyo Ita,
speaking in the Central House of Representatives on March 11th, appeared to regard
the Boards as much the most appropriate agency for Government economic
development; what role in such development he considers should be left to the
Regional Governments is not clear. The Minister for Commerce and Industries had
hoped to discuss this Bill with the Lieutenant-Governor and others in the East
during the recent session of the Regional House, but this was not possible owing to
the political crisis. No further progress has been made with the Bill at present, and it
certainly will not come forward at this present meeting of the House of
Representatives. It has the support at present of the Lieutenant-Governor, Eastern
Region, and a number of senior officials, who consider that if it is not passed the
Eastern Regional Government—and other Regional Governments—may well turn as
an alternative to a demand for large grants from Marketing Boards funds to finance
both social and economic development. It is known that Mr. Awolowo is is pressing
Sir Sydney Phillipson to sponsor a grant to the Western Region of £4 million by the
Cocoa Marketing Board.
17. To sum up, since each of the Boards is composed largely of men in politics,
the economic policies of those Boards are naturally influenced by the political beliefs
of members. These political beliefs are probably most sharply defined in the West,
and consequently that Board has shown the Action Group’s typical keen desire for
industrialisation, coupled with its suspicion of foreign capital and expatriate staff. It
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was typical of the Board that it eventually obtained the services of Messrs. Ethelburga
Agencies to run the two new rubber factories which are being established in the West
on a Managing Agency basis, and did not try to induce this firm to put money of its
own into the venture. However, it would be fair to say that even in the West the
general pattern of the Boards’ activities is not moulded by doctrinaire beliefs. There
are plenty of activities undertaken by that Board, as by the others, which are plain,
straightforward and useful schemes for economic development. The most marked
characteristic of the Boards is not the influence of politics on their policy but their
independence and vigour. All three Boards are more than ready to make their own
decisions and to go ahead with plans that they think economically desirable,
regardless of what the Central Government and sometimes even what the Regional
Government may have to say. As has been mentioned above, this tendency naturally
leads to difficulties over co-ordination, but on the whole it is a good tendency and
one that the Central Government is determined not to check by imposing a stifling
control which would have nothing to recommend it but administrative convenience.
It is known that the Action Group are concerned to see that the Western Regional
Production Development Board makes a success of its work—although the Group’s
views of the methods by which success is most likely to be achieved are not always
such as to command official confidence. It is known also that the Action Group are
concerned to see that no cause is given by members of the Board for allegations of
impropriety and certain members of the Board have recently been called to task
because of their behaviour—but again, the Group’s views of what is or is not
impropriety are very much their own and would not extend to disowning Mr.
Rewane’s literary style.
182 CO 554/254, no 20 16 Mar 1953
[Gold Coast and Nigeria]: inward telegram no 337 from Sir J
Macpherson to Sir T Lloyd on the impact on Nigeria of developments
in the Gold Coast
[During late 1952 and early 1953, the pace of constitutional change in the Gold Coast
increased. On 5 Mar 1953, Sir T Lloyd wrote to Macpherson outlining the likely changes
that would occur; these included the abolition of ex-officio ministers to create an all-
African Cabinet, the creation of a second chamber to include chiefs and representatives of
special interests, with limited delaying powers and extensive electoral reform to include
direct elections and universal adult suffrage. Further, it was likely there would be a White
Paper outlining the new Gold Coast constitution in June 1953, followed by elections to a
new, all African, assembly in mid-1954. Lloyd further intimated that this might be
followed by the Gold Coast applying for membership of the Commonwealth with the right
to attend Prime Ministers’ conferences on terms of full equality. See BDEEP series B, vol
1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part II, 123.]
Following for Lloyd.
Your secret and personal letter of 5th March.
Proposals for Gold Coast amount to almost complete self Government in 1954, and
they will be openly debated in Gold Coast in June this year.
2. You ask for my assessment of the effect on Nigeria and invite me to agree that
resistance to these demands, involving major collision between Her Majesty’s
13-(Doc179-225)-cp  15/7/01  7:32 am  Page 520
[182] MAR 1953 521
Government and the Gold Coast, almost certainly resulting in the use of sanctions,
would have greater damage on our position in Nigeria than acquiescence.
3. I infer from your letter that you have been re-reading correspondence
beginning with my letter to you of 8th January, 1952,1 as a result of which I visited
London in February. Value of that visit was seriously affected by the fact that the
Secretary of State had already been committed by his predecessor.
4. Lieutenant Governors are here for House of Representatives and their views
and mine, and those of my Senior Official Advisers, are unanimous. I doubt whether I
can get those views across adequately otherwise than by personal visit, but short
answer is that I am unable to agree with the proposition in paragraph 2 above, and
believe choice with which Her Majesty’s Government is faced is between being
prepared to use sanctions against the Gold Coast now, and being forced to use
sanctions against part or parts of Nigeria slightly later.
5. I stand by everything in my letters of 8th January and 20th May, 1952. We
have held the country together and much good work has been done. Had it not been
for the constant comparison with the Gold Coast, situation would have been very
encouraging. Southern politicians would not have felt compelled to press for advance
and would have allowed time for the main inter-regional jealousies to be overcome.
But the Gold Coast political advance, actual and bogus, has been a persistent canker.
Southern political parties regard it as ‘national disgrace’ that Nigeria should be
constitutionally more backward than the Gold Coast, and therefore outbid each other
with demands for constitutional advance, which they know in their hearts is
premature. North rightly wants to give full trial to constitution which has been in
operation for little over a year. Northern opinion has advanced very fast, but recent
events, described in the next paragraph, have revived their fear of being stampeded by
the South.
6. You will recall the demands of the Western Ministers last June.2 There has
been constant pressure for the powers of Ministers to be the same as the Gold Coast.
In the past two weeks, notices of motions by Southern Members for debate during
the current meeting of House of Representatives include such subjects as self
Government in 1956: change of constitution to be made by House of Representatives,
subject to ratification by Her Majesty in Council: Select Committee to suggest
changes in the constitution: Nigerian President for House of Representatives, etc.
And in speeches, Southern Members have advocated replacement of Chief Secretary,
Financial Secretary and Attorney General by Nigerian Ministers, also removal of Lt.
Governors from the Council of Ministers and regionalisation of the police. Effect of
these notices and speeches has already been to harden the Northern attitude to such
extent that we may have a serious showdown in the Council of Ministers before
Easter.
7. No one would pin the label of reactionary on me or my senior advisers. All of
us believe in, and have faithfully followed, declared policy of Her Majesty’s
Government to permit constitutional advance as quickly as is consonant with
reasonable measure of good Government in the interests of the people. Our objective
is to keep united Nigeria in the Commonwealth of its own volition. This is good for
Britain and good for Nigeria. We are prepared to take risks, and my answer to your
1 See 152. 2 See 157.
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question would be different if Nigeria were homogeneous and closely knitted. But it
is not. It is held together solely by the influence of British officials.
8. Effect of conceding the Gold Coast demands must be greatly to strengthen
insistent demand by Southern politicians for sweeping constitutional changes. They
would utterly reject any suggestion by Her Majesty’s Government that similar
concessions were premature for them, but such concessions would be totally
unacceptable to the North, and acceptance of such demands by Her Majesty’s
Government would lead to categorical demand by the North for separation. Nor
would disintegration stop there. South would not be united. In the East there would
be irresistible demand for complete separation of the Cameroons from Nigeria, with
all the resulting local and international complications, and within the Eastern and
Western Regions, splits would almost certainly occur on ethnic lines. If Nigeria splits
it will not be into two or three parts but into many fragments. If concessions are
granted to the Gold Coast now, it is my carefully considered opinion that, within very
short time, it will be necessary either to use sanctions against the North (there are 17
million of them and they would rightly regard themselves as betrayed by us) to
compel them to accept Southern proposal or to resist to the utmost Southern
proposal which, once similar proposals have been accepted in the Gold Coast, would
itself require the use of sanctions.
9. If the Gold Coast demands are resisted and sanction of force has to be applied,
there will be sharp reaction amongst the Southern politicians, local press and
subversive elements. But firm stand by Her Majesty’s Government in refusing to
acquiesce over hasty political advance in the Gold Coast would be welcomed by
considerable majority of the people in Nigeria, and I should not expect security
situation to arise which would cause serious embarrassment to Her Majesty’s
Government. Alternative is the disintegration of Nigeria. Even without further
constitutional advance in the Gold Coast, we are going to have difficult time as a
result of present clamour by Southern politicians for sweeping changes, especially as
the demands will be rejected mainly, if not entirely, by the North and official votes in
Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives. Extremists will be
encouraged, but rejection will bring great relief to considerable body of local
opinion.
10. In this telegram I have referred only to the Nigerian situation and have not
presumed to comment on the Gold Coast problems. I am not unmindful of the very
difficult problems which the Secretary of State and Her Majesty’s Government have
to face in other parts of Africa and in regard to colonialism as a whole but, if the Gold
Coast demands are conceded, I greatly fear Her Majesty’s Government will be faced
very shortly with a still more difficult problem in Nigeria.
11. I am very ready to fly to London for discussion but, as I have said, situation in
the Council of Ministers on constitutional issues is likely to be tense, at least for the
next two weeks, and I believe it would be most dangerous for me to leave Nigeria
before Easter. I trust, therefore, that the Secretary of State will not find it vitally
necessary to take the Gold Coast proposals to the Cabinet before the Easter recess. If
he must, you will, I think, agree that in spite of everything, there would be no
alternative but for me to fly to London before the recess.3
3 Macpherson attended meetings with Arden-Clarke at the CO on 15 Apr. See 190.
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183 CO 554/318, no 19 21 Mar 1953
[Amendment of the constitution]: outward savingram no 31 from Mr
Lyttelton to Sir J Macpherson on proposed amendments to the
constitution
Your Savingram No. 521 dated 3rd March, 1953.
1951 Constitution: Measures for Continuing Regional Administration.
I have noted that you consider that, for the present, it is politically preferable not
to seek an amendment of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council 1951 on the
lines of Section 45 of the Government of India Act, 1935. I had previously assumed
that in proposing this amendment you had in mind the situation that was then
arising in the Eastern Region but I now note that it was the possibility of boycott in
the Western Region that led you to seek my views on the possibility of this
amendment to the constitution. But whether the situation is of the Western or of the
Eastern Region, my advisers remain of the opinion that the powers conferred by the
Emergency Powers Order in Council, 1939, need not be regarded as applicable only
to extreme situations involving violence and public disorder but are appropriate for
just such a situation as you envisaged, thus appearing to make unnecessary any
amendment of the Constitution Order in Council on the lines of the Section of the
Government of India Act, 1935, to which you refer. This was the tenor of my Secret
and personal telegram No. 13 of the 20th February, in which (see paragraph 4) I
expressed the view that it would be politically preferable to make use, should the
need arise, of existing powers rather than to introduce an amendment to the
Constitution itself of such a radical nature. The words ‘for the present’ in paragraph 2
of your savingram No. 521 appear to indicate that you might still, in certain
circumstances, wish to propose an amendment to the Constitution itself; and so that
I may be quite clear as to your views on this matter, I should be grateful for your
further comments in the light of the foregoing. I have noted your paragraph 3.
2. On the second proposed amendment to the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in
Council, 1951, to provide for the separate dissolution of Regional Houses and for
which a draft, together with a legal note, accompanied your Priority Savingram No.
344 of the 6th February, I am, as my personal telegram No. 14 informed you,
prepared (subject as mentioned below) on receipt of a recommendation from you to
advise Her Majesty in Council to amend the Order in Council so as to provide for the
separate dissolution of a Regional Legislature and for the holding of separate
elections in a Region. My legal advisers have now examined the draft amending
legislation submitted with your savingram No. 344. Enclosed herewith is a revised
draft for the amending Order together with a Note by my legal advisers.1
3. With regard to the proposal in paragraph 5 of your savingram No. 521, I have
given further consideration to this in consultation with my advisers and now,
notwithstanding my telegram No. 265 of 7th March, have doubts about its
advisability. It seems to me that, constitutionally, the power to dissolve is, more
perhaps than any other, one in the exercise of which a Governor should be formally
bound to seek and accept the advice of his Executive Council (subject, of course, to
1 Not printed. See 195.
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the exercise of his reserved executive power, to which you have referred). The
argument put forward in the fourth sentence of paragraph 5 of your savingram No.
521, viz. that the electorate at large is not familiar with the provisions of the
constitutional instruments, could, it seems, be applied for or against almost any
proposal for their amendment.
4. Moreover if this provision is to be made in respect of the power of Lieutenant
Governors to dissolve, will it not be necessary, logically, to make a similar
amendment in the case of the Governor’s power to dissolve? And would not this be
open to considerable criticism?
5. In any case, if the power to dissolve is to be discretionary, so also should be the
power to prorogue. The practice in this country is normally to prorogue first, and
then to dissolve.
6. I should be glad to have as soon as possible your further views on these points.
It would be convenient if these could be included in your general comments on the
revised draft amending Order, which is so drafted at present as not to confer
discretionary powers on the Lieutenant-Governor.
7. While you will, I am sure, agree that it is important that we should between us
achieve an agreed draft for the Nigeria (Constitution) (Amendment) Order in Council
at an early date, I would not propose to take steps to submit the draft Order to Her
Majesty in Council unless and until I receive your formal confirmation that you wish
this to be done. I should be grateful if you would confirm that this is in accordance
with your wishes.
8. You will, I have no doubt be considering what amendments if any, will be
required in Regulations made under Sections 63 and 75 of the Constitution Order to
provide for the holding of separate elections.
9. It would be convenient if you could reply separately to the two matters dealt
with in this communication, namely (a) provision for the use of emergency powers
and (b) draft amendment of the constitution to enable a Lieutenant-Governor to
dissolve the Legislature of his Region.
184 CO 554/260, no 28 24 Mar 1953
[Self-government motion]: inward savingram no 676 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on a debate in the Council of Ministers on
the AG motion for self-government in 1956. Minute by T B Williamson
[One of the most bitter episodes of North-South tension in these years followed the AG
motion for self-government by 1956 (the year the 1951 constitution was due to expire),
put down in the House of Representatives for 31 Mar 1953 by Anthony Enahoro. This
motion was discussed by the Council of Ministers on 18 Mar. For Northern leaders the
prospect of self-government by 1956 raised fears of an independent Nigeria dominated by
southern politicians; the Sardauna of Sokoto therefore moved an amendment to replace
‘1956’ with ‘as soon as practicable’. Macpherson, faced with a deeply divided Council, and
attempting to maintain a conciliar system, argued that ministers should abstain from
speaking or voting in the House debate. On the 27 Mar the Council agreed on this line,
with the four Northern ministers joining with six officials to outvote four Western
ministers and Dr Endeley, the Cameroon minister; the three remaining Eastern ministers
abstained. This prompted the resignation of one Western minister, the Ooni of Ife, before
the motion on self-government was considered. See 192. The debate in the House of
Representatives was a heated affair, culminating in uproar following a slighting reference
by Awolowo to Shehu Uthman dan Fodio (1754–1817), leader of the Muslim jihad that
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had established the Sokoto Caliphate and ancestor of the Sardauna. The AG and NCNC
members walked out and the House adjourned. The remaining three Western ministers,
Thomas, Akintola and Prest, immediately tendered their resignations. Both on arriving
and leaving the House the Northern representatives were heckled and abused by the
Lagos crowd; further abuse occurred during their train journey north and yet more
subsequently appeared in the press. These tensions were to contribute to the tragedy of
the Kano riots of May. See 203.]
My Telegram No. 383, Crisis in Council of Ministers.
At a meeting of the Council on 13th March one item was to discuss the line to be
taken on an Action Group Motion praying me to appoint a suitable Nigerian as
President of the House of Representatives. In this connection, see your secret and
personal Despatch NO. 27 of 3rd April, 1952. Discussion was acrimonious. Western
Ministers, Bode Thomas and Akintola, harangued the Council on their right to
express in the House their own personal views, regardless of their position as
members of the Council of Ministers, and pressed for permission for a free vote in the
House of Representatives with officials abstaining. Northern Ministers, particularly
Mohammadu Ribadu, said hard bitter words against the Western Ministers. Eastern
Ministers and Prest helped official members to calm the atmosphere and eventually a
decision was taken, by a large majority, that the Government should leave the debate
to floor members and should neither speak nor vote. Bode Thomas had made it plain
that this was merely a preliminary canter and that the real difficulty would arise on
other Action Group motions, particularly that for self-government in 1956. Motion
about President was not reached on Private Members’ day on 17th March.
2. On 18th March Council considered the line to be taken on the Action Group
motion by Mr. Enahoro that self-government in 1956 should be accepted as a
primary political objective. Northern amendment, of which notice had been given by
Sardauna of Sokoto, would delete ‘in 1956’ and insert ‘as early as practicable’. I
enclose the relevant extract from the Conclusions of the meeting, from which you
will see how sharp was the division of opinion, though tempers were controlled.1 The
North at first pressed strongly for affirmative vote for the amendment but when Bode
Thomas and Akintola for the West, with some support from the East, pressed for
freedom for Ministers to speak and vote as they liked, in House of Representatives,
officials abstaining, Northern Ministers were very ready to accept the challenge.
Eastern Ministers have sympathy for the motion (self-government in 1956 must be a
plank in the programmes of all Southern political parties including new party in
process of formation by responsible elements in Eastern Region) but they recognise
the danger to the unity of Nigeria and would welcome any compromise short of
political suicide. Oni of Ife, Nwapa and Prest were sound and conciliatory and two
last were in favour of all Members of Council refraining from speaking or voting in
House of Representatives. I made it clear that officials would play full part in this
issue and when tempers showed signs of rising deferred further discussion until 20th
March.
3. I enclose the relevant extract from Council proceedings on 20th March. After
one and a half hours: discussion Bode Thomas ‘blew up’ and made a completely
uncontrolled scene. He was prevented from flinging out of the meeting only by a firm
and decisive order from the Oni of Ife—Spiritual Head of the Yorubas. Nwapa in
1 Enclosures not printed. The precise words of the motion were ‘as soon as practicable’.
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statesman like words stated the case for complete abstention by the Government in
the cause of unity. At one stage I hoped to get fairly large majority for this course but
the air had to be cleared and hard words were said. Northern Ministers were cool,
hard and determined. They said that for fourteen months they had gone to the limit
in trying to work with Western Ministers as friends and brothers in the interests of
Nigerian unity, but they had been deceived. They knew the pace at which they wished
to travel but they did not wish to retard the progress of any other Region. Let
separation take place now peacefully and not, as they were bound to fear, at the last
minute before Britain’s departure as in India and Pakistan. Division later would be
accompanied by chaos and bloodshed. Western Ministers’ reply to this was by all
means let us split now rather than that we should be kept in bondage by slow-moving
North. Eastern Ministers believe in unity of Nigeria but are very conscious of effect
on their position if they fail to appear as eager nationalists as others.
4. Northern Ministers firmly rejected Western argument that the dispute was not
between the Regions but between H.M.G. and Nigeria. In reply to the argument that
the matter did not properly come within purview of Council of Ministers, it was
pointed out firmly that matter under discussion would affect good government of the
country not in 1956 but now. Council had clear responsibility for welfare and good
government of the country and was the body upon which the unity of country rested.
It could not evade that responsibility and must at all costs remain united in the eyes
of the public.
5. As reported in my telegram under reference, no decision was reached on 20th
March and no solution that will keep Council of Ministers together is yet in sight.
Most desirable development would be shift in the attitude of the Action Group. I do
not say they do not believe in self-government in 1956 but I feel sure that the real
reason for introducing this motion is not, as the North believes, in order to bulldoze
the North into acceptance of Southern pace of political advance, but to outbid
Azikiwe and the N.C.N.C. We have reason to believe that opinion in the Action Group
is not unanimous about the introduction of this motion and that some members of
the Party realise that is is likely to defeat the object which it purports to seek, that is,
self-government for Nigeria as a whole in 1956. Nevertheless, Party discipline is
strong and all members are likely to vote as ordered. Even if the Action Group were
prepared to throw overboard Bode Thomas (who is a strong protagonist of the
motion and probably inspired it) and Enahoro (who is the only influential party
member in the mid-west Provinces of the Western Region which are susceptible to
N.C.N.C. blandishments) I do not see how they could withdraw the motion without
loss of face. (Their political ineptitude constantly gets them committed to ill-
conceived courses of action from which it is impossible to extricate themselves.) But
a full realisation of the consequences of pressing the matter hard (including the
boost that a threatened break-up of the country would give to the N.C.N.C. which has
always argued that Regionalisation would create three Nigerias) may result in Action
Group speeches in the House being less immoderate than they had planned.
6. Though situation is fluid, it appears probable that Council of Ministers will
decide to move dilatory motion or its equivalent immediately question is proposed in
House of Representatives. Bode Thomas almost certainly, and Akintola probably, will
defy this decision, or any decision other than full support of the motion, and will
make fiery political speeches in the House. They will then have to be dismissed under
Section 152 (2) of the Constitution Order in Council. This might lead to a boycott by
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the Action Group but fear of a dissolution and fresh elections in which N.C.N.C.
might have considerable success is likely to restrain them.
7. Whatever may be the result of this Cabinet crisis and the debate on the
motion, it is quite clear that the views of the Northern Central Ministers on this issue
reflect the views of the Northern Regional Ministers and the overwhelming majority
of the Northern Members. The harm already done to the unity of Nigeria is very great
indeed. Even if somehow we scramble through the immediate crisis the Northerners
are determined, after this meeting of the House of Representatives is over, to
undertake a complete re-assessment of the position of the North—probably at an
extraordinary joint meeting of both Northern Houses. The North is our sheet anchor
and has constantly supported Government. If they felt betrayed they might look for
help in achieving independence to Egypt or Pakistan or other Moslem countries. All
possible steps will be taken to ensure that both North and West realise full
implications of separation and to bring home to them that future lies in continued
association (possibly in some modified form) with the rest of Nigeria.
8. As I pointed out in my Telegram No. 337, further advance in the Gold Coast
must simultaneously increase the fears of the North and compel southern politicians
to press with greater conviction for sweeping changes here.2 If the unity of Nigeria is
to remain our objective a very firm stand by H.M.G. will be necessary in the near
future. The strength of the measures necessary in Southern Nigeria to make such a
stand successful will depend largely on H.M.G.’s action in the Gold Coast. The use of
sanctions to compel Northern Nigeria to remain tied to a South which was granted
concessions is out of the question.
Minute on 184
Sir T. Lloyd
I think you may wish to let Ministers see Sir J. Macpherson’s savingram, and
enclosures, at (28), which explains what happened in the Nigerian Council of
Ministers when they discussed an Action Group motion due to be debated in the
House of Representatives that self-government in 1956 should be accepted as a
primary political objective.
It will be seen from this communication that a sharp cleavage arose in the
Council, and that the whole problem of the unity of Nigeria was called in question.
Sir John’s assessment, in paragraph 7, is that ‘the harm already done to the unity of
Nigeria is very great indeed’.
The position actually reached is set out in paragraph 6, which makes it clear that
the Governor may, in certain circumstances, have to dismiss two Western (Central)
Ministers, Bode Thomas and Akintola, from office. If he takes this action under
Section 152(2) of the constitution it will be because he considers that they have
‘failed to carry out the policy, or any decision, of the Council’.
I think the Secretary of State and Minister of State may wish to know in advance of
this possible eventuality, as well as of the general position. Furthermore, the
Secretary of State is seeing, on the 1st April, Mr. Griffiths and the other members of
2 See 182.
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the Labour Party delegation which visited West Africa in January, to hear their
impressions; and as it is probable that Mr. Griffiths may repeat to the Secretary of
State what he said to Sir J. Macpherson in Lagos, namely that H.M.G. ought to regain
the initiative in handling constitutional problems in Nigeria, the Secretary of State
will doubtless wish to be brought right up-to-date.
For convenience of reference I have placed, at (29), a copy of the note which I sent
to you yesterday which outlines the history of constitutional developments in the
Gold Coast with particular reference to repercussions in Nigeria.
It is becoming increasingly clear to me that if the unity of Nigeria is to be
preserved, and Nigeria as a whole kept within the Commonwealth, a fairly radical
overhaul of the present Nigerian constitution will have to be undertaken soon. I do
not feel ready to put forward any definite proposals at the moment because we all
need more time to think. But I feel sure, if I may say so, that the advice which Mr.
Gorell Barnes gave to Sir John Macpherson last autumn (please see minutes of 28th
October on this file), and of which you reminded Sir John in your letter at (27), that
the Southern Regions might have to be given a greater degree of autonomy than the
North, opens up one important line of advance. In addition the Secretary of State has
already agreed in principle (see (17)) to amend the constitution so as to give Nigerian
Ministers individual responsibility for Departments. I believe we may also have to do
something to solve the burning problem of the position of Lagos as part of the
Western Region. There may be other matters requiring revision also.
I cannot help feeling that Sir John’s real difficulty is not so much what has been
happening, and what is likely to happen in the Gold Coast, as that he has been trying
to work an almost unworkable constitution. There has been almost continuous
friction for months about the position of Lagos, the limitations on the functions of
Ministers, and the powers of the Centre in relation to regional legislation. I believe it
is matters of this kind rather than developments in the Gold Coast which have led to
the present crisis in the Council of Ministers and elsewhere in Nigeria.
I suggest a reply to (28) might be sent as in draft herewith.
T.B.W.
27.3.53
185 CO 554/277, no 1 27 Mar 1953
[Amendment of the constitution]: minute by I B Watt on changes to
the constitution
[It was clear even before the self-government debate in the House of Representatives at
the end of March that the CO was considering changes to the constitution. On 25 Mar
1953 Sir T Lloyd wrote to Macpherson, accepting that the changes in the Gold Coast (see
182) would make constitutional change in Nigeria inevitable and suggesting that ‘part of
the solution to this will eventually have to be found along the line of giving, in due time,
the southern regions a greater degree of autonomy than the north’ (CO 554/260, no 27,
Lloyd to Macpherson, 25 Mar 1953). Watt’s minute, reproduced here, shows how far
thinking had progressed along these lines.]
Mr. Williamson
Your minute of 21st March. I have seen the telegrams from Sir John Macpherson
(No. 337 and No. 676 Saving) and have tried to sort out the constitutional issues
which would be prominent in efforts to solve a largely political crisis.
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2. I have seen the West African Department files to which you refer, and have
discussed with Mr. Huijsman and Mr. Godden with great profit to myself.
3. In this minute I shall try to identify rather than solve the main constitutional
problems which, I think, must be overcome if the present difficulties are to be
surmounted, and a more sure basis laid for Nigeria’s future.
4. The crisis comes mainly from the dissatisfaction felt by influential politicians
in the West and East regions with the Central Government, which they consider
concedes too much to the position of the Northern region; this dissatisfaction is
already serious enough to threaten the unity of the Colony, and will intensify if and
when there is a constitutional change in the Gold Coast. The Governor, I think,
realises that, if a United Nigeria is to be preserved for the future, it may be necessary,
at this stage, to permit the three regions to develop at different constitutional speeds.
Our main problem therefore is how to change the present constitution so as to
permit this, and at the same time retain sufficient unifying force through the Central
Government to ensure that it is a united Nigeria which will ultimately achieve
nationhood.
5. Some sort of federal arrangement seems thus to be required, but the
circumstances in Nigeria are different from those in which federations are usually
created. These result as a rule from a number of countries or provinces recognising
that they have sufficient common interests to make it worth their while sacrificing
some parts of their individual identities and surrendering some of their powers of
self-government to a Central government. In Nigeria unhappily it appears to be
necessary to bring about a federal arrangement by a Central Government which
already exists, devolving some of its authority to provinces which want more, not
less, identity and self-government. Some Ministers have apparently been talking in
Council about India and Pakistan, and the political situation in Nigeria today almost
suggests that the difference between the discordant regions might more logically be
handled as the India/Pakistan split was handled, rather than by a federal treatment
which posits a desire to go forward together. However, the policy of the Governor,
and of H.M.G., will, I assume, be to arrest the tendency to split, and do what is
practicable to ensure the eventual unity of the Colony.
6. With all diffidence, I suggest that we consider amending the Constitution to
provide for something on the following lines:—
(a) A federal form of government consisting of the Central Government and the
three Regional Governments.
(b) The Regional Governments is the West and the East could be given, as and
when appropriate in each of them, universal adult suffrage, and an all-elected
Ministerial system; the North could continue to work through electoral colleges
and retain greater official influence in its Executive.
(c) There would be exclusive and concurrent lists of subjects upon which the
Central Government alone, and the Central and Regional Governments,
respectively, could legislate; on all other matters the Regional Governments would
alone have power to legislate. The subjects on the exclusive list would be few in
number, notably external relations, defence, Colony economic policy, the Public
Service, customs etc. (i.e. those at present handled main by the Chief Secretary
and Financial Secretary’s Offices). The list of subjects on which Regional
Governments are at present empowered to make laws would be expanded in
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consequence and they would take over much more of the work at present being
done by the Central Ministries, which latter would be much reduced in size and
scope, and some of which would be abolished.
(d) The Central Legislature would be constituted largely as it is at present, and
likewise the Central Executive. There would be more Ministers without Portfolio,
but the equal representation of Regions in the Council of Ministers would remain.
The composition of the Central Executive, and the relations between the Governor
and the Central Executive would have to be as ‘advanced’ constitutionally, as those
in the most ‘advanced’ of the regions.
(e) It would be necessary to provide the Supreme Court with authority for
constitutional interpretation, i.e. to settle disputes about the extent of Central and
Regional authority. To the extent that the political differences between the
Regions took the form of bickerings about constitutional interpretation, some part
of their settlement would thus be transferred to the Courts from the Governor and
the Secretary of State.
(f ) The present Article 96 of the Constitution which gives the Central Government
power to disapprove Regional legislation would, surely, have to go; but the
Lieutenant-Governors and the Governor would retain their powers of certification
and their discretion in vetoing or reserving Bills.
(g) Members and Ministers in the Central Government would be drawn, as at
present, from Members of Regional Legislatures. Most true federations forbid this,
but it seems essential to preserve the conception of a united country, and to retain
for the Central Government the services of the leading political figures. They
would also be ‘exposed’ (if I may use the word) to the advice and persuasiveness of
the Governor, and, through him, of the Secretary of State.
7. It would be essential, I think, to preserve to the Central Government as much
as possible of control of economic and financial policy and administration; this might
be the easier because of the disproportionately high contribution which the Northern
region makes to the total Colonial revenue. It is only as a united Colony that
Nigeria’s economic future, on which her political happiness depends, can be properly
fulfilled.
8. I hope that these notes may at least help to clarify for these concerned some of
the main points. I am ready to discuss whenever you wish.
9. I am sending copies of this minute to Mr. Gorell-Barnes, Mr. Peck, Dr. Mercer,
Mr. Huijsman and Mr. Godden.
186 CO 554/241, no 63 30 Mar 1953
[Western Region local government bill]: despatch no 667 from Mr
Lyttelton to Sir J Macpherson replying to criticisms of his
intervention over the Western Region local government bill
I have the honour to refer to your Secret despatch No. 195 of the 22nd January1 in
which you informed me of the conclusions reached by the Council of Ministers on
the 16th December last concerning the Western Region Local Government Bill.
1 See 174.
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2. I have noted the action which has been taken, and which it is proposed to take,
with respect to the Bill, as recorded in the second and third paragraphs of your
despatch.
3. It is with surprise and regret that I have learned of the strong resentment
expressed by the Council of Ministers at my having placed them in possession of my
views on the Bill before they had considered it. I should be glad if you would assure
the Council that, my object was to help them in furthering the passage into law with
the least possible delay and difficulty of an obviously important measure.
4. My first knowledge of the Bill came, as you have said, from a Question which I
was called upon to answer in the House of Commons, and this led me to suggest that
I might be given an opportunity of seeing the Bill and of seeking the advice on it of
my Advisory Panel on Local Government, whose comments I felt sure from
experience would be of value to the Western Regional and Nigerian Governments.
When I had received copies of the Bill I also took the opportunity to obtain the
comments of my legal advisers who expressed the view that it was beyond the
competence of the Regional legislature to enact certain of the provisions included in
the Bill. I thought that the Council of Ministers would undoubtedly wish to know of
this opinion and I therefore asked Mr. Benson in my despatch of the 14th December
to convey to the Council the advice I had received. Although the terms of the
Nigerian Constitution impose no obligation upon me to do this, I find it hard to
believe that the Council of Ministers would have wished me deliberately to withhold
from them advice of such an important nature. Had I not asked that the advice be so
conveyed, one of two things would have happened. Either your advisers would have
drawn attention to the defects in the Bill in which case the result would have been
the same; or else they would not have done so in which case the action to remedy the
position, which the Nigerian Government have already set in train, would not have
been initiated till later, with consequent loss of time.
5. A spirit of friendly collaboration has characterised the relationships of
myself and my predecessors with the Governments of territories which have
achieved advanced constitutions, and it was in this spirit that I acted as I did. I
offer no apology for my action and I do not understand the conclusion drawn by
Ministers, referred to in paragraph 6 of your despatch, that my intervention in this
case at a stage before the Council had formally considered the Western Region’s
Bill means that all Regional legislation should be sent to me in draft. I have never
suggested or contemplated this, and I would point to the amount of Regional legis-
lation which has come into existence since the inauguration of the new constitu-
tion, very little of which I have seen before its final stages, and to the fact that in
no case has a Lieutenant-Governor been instructed to withhold assent from a Bill
nor has any law been disallowed. The difficulties which I foresaw arising over the
present important measure seemed to me to justify my asking Mr. Benson to
acquaint Ministers with them in order that the Council might deliberate the mat-
ter with a full knowledge of their existence. I readily assure Ministers that my
advice was not indicative of a lack of confidence in the capacity and sense of
responsibility of the Council.
6. I should like to take this opportunity to refer to an important aspect of the
working of advanced Colonial constitutions. The instruments establishing such
constitutions normally include provision for the intervention at successive stages in
the passage of legislation of the various constitutional authorities. There are thus
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stages at which submission to higher authority is constitutionally obligatory. I
cannot emphasize too strongly, however, my conviction of the value of, and need for,
early consultation between all those who will eventually have constitutional locus
standi in a legislative, or indeed an executive, act. Experience shows that such
consultation, carried out in a spirit of friendliness and mutual trust, often serves to
clear up misunderstandings and reconcile differences of opinion or, better still, to
prevent their arising—and nearly always results in agreement being reached. Nor
need it in any way blur the respective responsibilities of the various authorities
concerned; for, should agreement not be reached, it is always open for one authority
then to take the matter to the point when another has to decide whether or not to
exercise his constitutional powers of intervention.
7. The objections which have been raised by Ministers against my decision to
offer my advice when I did in the present instance, and hence against the principle,
which I hold to be of fundamental importance, that there should be early and
informal consultation whenever there is occasion for it, can only have arisen, it
seems to me, from some misunderstanding of our respective roles under the present
constitution of Nigeria. That constitution was not intended to set up a series of
entities each in opposition and concerned to widen their jurisdiction at the expense
of the other. On the contrary it was intended to provide a constitutional framework
within which the Regional Governments, the Central Government, and Her Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom could work together in the best interests of
Nigeria and its peoples. This being so the Secretary of State has, as I see it, not
merely the right but the clear duty to offer his advice at any stage if, by so doing he
considers that he can in any way assist the progress of Nigeria and the Nigerian
people. It is in this conviction that I myself have acted, and would wish to continue to
act. It is my hope that Nigerian Ministers, both Central and Regional, will in a similar
spirit, recognise the value of early, full and free consultation between Central and
Regional Governments on matters which may affect more than one Region or the
interests of Nigeria as a whole or in which more than one of the four Governments
are constitutionally concerned.
187 CO 554/260, no 34 1 Apr 1953
[Self-government motion]: inward telegram no 1 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton reporting on the debate in the House of
Representatives on the motion for self-government in 1956
My savingram No. 383.
Crisis in the Council of Ministers.1
On 27th March, the Council of Ministers decided by a majority to abstain from
speaking or voting on Action Group motion for self government in 1956. Four
Western ministers and Endeley dissented, and favoured free speaking and voting.
Remaining three Eastern ministers were neutral and did not vote.
1 See 184.
13-(Doc179-225)-cp  15/7/01  7:32 am  Page 532
[187] APR 1953 533
2. Motion was put down for debate Tuesday, 31st March. At 9.30 a.m. that day the
Oni of Ife told me that, having failed to persuade Action Group leaders to see reason,
he was under compulsion not to abide by the Council’s decision. He would not speak
but would vote. This would leave me no option but to revoke his appointment and to
avoid this, he felt bound to resign office before the motion was debated. He tendered
written resignation dated 30th March.
3. Debate on motion began at 10.30 a.m. After amendment moved by Sardauna
of Sokoto and duly seconded Oni, in a brief speech, stated his intense worry during
the past day and inability to stand aloof from the people of his Region on this matter.
Hence his resignation. Northern member then moved dilatory motion.2 Awolowo,
clearly taken by surprise, made intemperate and rash speech attacking the British
violently and Northerners by association with them. Reference to historic Fulani
leader, Othman Dan Fodio caused, at one point, extreme tension. He ended by
announcing that the West would walk out of the House, but members were recalled
by order from the Oni.
4. Mbadiwe then spoke for the N.C.N.C. group with the same ending, upon which
all N.C.N.C. and Action Group members (including ministers, Oni and Alake) left the
House.
5. There followed an excellent and forceful speech by Jaja Wachuku on behalf of
the new National Independence party supporting, in the interests of unity of Nigeria,
dilatory motion; condemning the original motion (with whose sense, however, he
and his party agreed) as ill timed, inept and mischievous; and castigating those who
had walked out, both as irresponsible and as would be dictators.
6. All remaining members of the Government and a few members of the National
Independence party still in Lagos, and all Northerners sat tight except Endeley who
‘went out to ascertain why members had walked out’ but returned later in the day to
his seat on the Government bench.
7. Dilatory motion duly carried with no dissentient, and the House went on to
public business before the sitting suspended at 1 p.m.
8. At 2.30 p.m. I received letters of resignation signed by ? Ezee [Bode] Thomas,
Akintola and Prest. Grounds therein were disagreement with the Council’s decision
on the self government motion, but by that time this was nonsensical as the course
of the debate had not, in the outcome, called for implementation of the Council of
Ministers’ decision.
9. Action Group members arrived at the House before 3 p.m. in the expectation
of hearing ex ministers make personal explanations, but learnt from the President
that no opportunity could arise in the midst of public business without taking seats.
House completed business and rose at 5.30 p.m.
10. I am sending a factual message to the House today, and I expect non factual
personal explanations to be given by three ex ministers, which are likely to have
strong anti official note, and improperly disclose details of voting within the Council
of Ministers.
11. These resignations are much to be preferred to the necessity, previously
envisaged, of dismissals.
2 i.e. a motion to adjourn, moved by Malam Ibrahim Imam.
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188 CO 554/260, no 40 2 Apr 1953
[Self-government motion]: inward savingram no 774 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on the resignation of Western ministers
over the motion for selfgovernment in 1956. Annex
Minute by T B Williamson
[One consequence of the fall-out from the self-government debate was, at least in the
short term, a political alliance between the AG and the NCNC. Another came with press
threats of violence that drew on the situation in Kenya, and followed Akintola’s raising of
the possibility of a Mau Mau-type rising in Nigeria in the House of Representatives in
March. On 16 Apr the Daily Service, an AG paper, editorialised under the heading ‘Mau
Mau or no Mau Mau?’: ‘If constitutional methods fail to bring us self-government we
reserve the right to adopt other methods . . . The Mau Mau, with all its terror, with all its
horror, may still be the way out of Nigeria’s bondage. If constitutional methods are
allowed to succeed, and if imperialist agents like Sir John Macpherson and his charming,
well-dressed, but politically egregious Benson would allow the peaceful attainment of
self-government by or before 1956, then there would be no soil in which Mau Mau or any
other form of extreme methods can germinate’.]
My telegram No. Pers. 1—Constitutional crisis.1
I enclose copies of correspondence exchanged with three Western Ministers with
Portfolio, regarding their resignation and the personal statements they proposed to
make to the House of Representatives.2
2. After Prayers in House on 1st April, the President read out a message from me
regarding the resignations. I enclose a copy.
3. At a later stage Bode Thomas and Akintola made personal statements. Prest
pleaded sickness and was not present but Bode Thomas said he was speaking for
him. Copies of the two speeches are enclosed. You will see that the speakers
totally disregarded the conditions on which they received permission to refer to
proceedings of Council of Ministers, and, in particular, that Bode Thomas dis-
closed how Members had voted and purported to describe the proceedings in the
Council, including my own attitude and my conduct of the proceedings. Comment
on the immoderate tone of the speeches is superfluous and it is unnecessary for
me to tell you that the mischievous allegation that ex-officio members had consis-
tently voted with the Northern Ministers against those from the West and the
East, is totally untrue. I recall no previous case, nor does any remaining Minister
or Member of the Council of Ministers, in which this has happened, and even in
this latest case three Eastern Members were neutral, because they knew that
Western Ministers were divulging information about Council proceedings. The
Attorney General was in the course of making an investigation into this when the
Ministers resigned.
4. After the personal statements had been made, Action Group and N.C.N.C.
Members walked out of the House. The President then permitted Njoku, Minister of
Mines and Power, to make a short statement from the Government Bench. He spoke
well. Arikpo, Minister of Lands, Survey & Local Development, who was in charge of
Government business then moved the adjournment of the House sine die, and in the
course of doing so managed to touch on the resignations and the attitude of the
1 See 187. 2 Enclosures not printed.
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Council of Ministers in a responsible manner. On the Motion for adjournment sine
die, Jaja Wachuku made another sound but sad speech opposing, on the grounds that
the untruths heard in the personal statements that morning should not go
uncontradicted. Two Northern Members then spoke, including the Sardauna of
Sokoto. His final remark was that the mistake of 1914 had now come to light (a
reference to amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria).
5. I was much concerned by the fact that the misrepresentations and untrue
allegations of the two former Ministers had to go virtually unchallenged in the
House. In particular, the three Central Ministers from the East are in a very difficult
position because their courage in taking an unpopular line in an attempt to preserve
the unity of Council of Ministers and of Nigeria has laid them open to further abuse
and allegations of being Imperialist tools. Accordingly, I gave a short broadcast over
the Nigerian Broadcasting Service last evening. I enclose a copy.
6. Azikiwe publicly embraced Awolowo outside House of Representatives after
the walk-out by Action Group and N.C.N.C. Members on 31st March, and there is a
talk of N.C.N.C. and Action Group link-up. Many of the political leaders in this
country are unpredictable and it is unwise to be categorical on this. There may be a
joining together against us (British officials) but neither party will be sincere and it
does not seem possible that any such alliance could last. You may be interested in the
attached record of my conversation with the Oni of Ife and the Alake of Abeokuta
when the former came to tender his resignation on 31st March. I saw the Oni again
today when he came to take leave of me before returning to Ife. He told me that he
was going to ‘get busy’ in calling the Western Obas together. On the subject of a deal
between the N.C.N.C. and Action Group he said that it would be in Yoruba character
if the Action Group met N.C.N.C. with an intention to deceive. But they were
enemies and could never be reconciled.
7. Responsible Yorubas in Lagos are greatly distressed and anxious and a number
of them have come to see me to express their views and sympathetic anxiety. They
fear, rightly, that the Action Group leaders in their present emotional state may
speak or act in such a way that they can never retract. (At the risk of overburdening
this communication, I enclose a copy of Awolowo’s speech on 31st March).
8. Members of House of Representatives have dispersed. The Lieutenant-
Governor, Northern Region will have discussions with Northern Central and
Regional Ministers at Kaduna on 4th April. He will have a difficult task to persuade
them to think in terms other than of separation but he is full of faith and hope and
works and will guide Northern thinking wisely and sympathetically.
9. It is too soon to attempt a full assessment of the situation or to suggest what
action or changes may be necessary. We are however thinking hard and I shall keep
you informed of developments.
Annex to 188: Note by HE of interview with the Oni of Ife and the Alake of Abeokuta
on 31 March 1953
The two Obas arrived at 9.30 a.m., in a state of considerable agitation and anxiety,
and asked to see me, about ‘the trouble in the West’.
2. They said that they had convened a meeting, in the Alake’s house in Lagos,
after the House of Representatives rose at 9 p.m. on 30th March. In addition to the
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two Obas, there were fourteen Action Group Ministers and Members, including Mr.
Awolowo, Chief Bode Thomas and Mr. Akintola. The meeting went on till after
midnight but the two Obas got nowhere with the politicians, though they had spoken
to them in ‘harsh tones’ about their misguided attitude over the motion regarding
Self-Government in 1956. They had come to me because they didn’t know what to
do.
3. I expressed understanding of their position but I gave them a strong pep-talk
on the survival of Chiefs. One danger to the system was that the Chiefs should fail to
move with the times. No less a danger was it continually to surrender to extremist
political party leaders. If they did this, not only would they let down their simple
peasant subjects, but the whole institution of Chieftaincy would be gradually shorn
of power and influence and would not survive except in a ceremonial sense. I
instanced the case of the Gold Coast Chiefs and the C.P.P.
4. The Oni said that the Action Group politicians were determined to destroy
Azikiwe. If they failed to pursue this Self-Government motion with the utmost vigour
it would mean death for the Action Group and the triumph of ‘that evil man Azikiwe’.
The Obas had criticised the Action Group severely for not consulting them in
advance. The politicians had apologised and had agreed not to fail in this again. The
Obas were determined to reassert their authority. After the meeting of the House of
Representatives finished it was their intention to call all the Obas together for a
secret conclave to decide upon their attitude. They would then meet the Action
Group leaders and get the position clarified. Certainly the Obas must have
representatives at all future meetings of the Parliamentary Committee.
5. I said that such action, desirable as it was, might come too late. Irreparable
damage might be done during the debate on Self-Government, particularly in the
splitting of the Council of Ministers. I had long thought that the Obas had been
unwise not to assert their authority sooner. The Oni, supported by the Alake,
explained that their reason for helping to establish the Action Group, and for
supporting them, was to save the Western Region from Azikiwe. The old stalwarts of
the Youth Movement had been nationalists too. They got rid of Azikiwe from the
Youth Movement but they had failed to defeat or destroy him. The younger
nationalist politicians of the West had undertaken to drive Azikiwe out of the West,
and for that reason the Obas had supported them. They did not love them—they too
were ‘enemies’—but they were ‘the lesser of two evils’.
6. I asked why the Obas, and particularly the Oni, could not make a stand now,
rather than later. Each surrender gravely weakened their position. The Oni replied
that if they gave evidence of disunity in the West the Consequences would be very
serious, though he was aware that this was not the last mischief the Action Group
would do. I then asked him point-blank what he intended to do when the motion was
debated. Surely he would abide by the decision of the Council of Ministers to abstain
from speaking or voting. The Oni said that he would not speak in the debate but that
he would be obliged to vote—to preserve the unity of the West. I then felt bound to
be cruel to him and said that he would be letting down his people. He would not be
acting according to his conscience and he was putting a political party before
Nigeria. That was not all. I should be obliged to revoke his appointment as a Central
Minister, on the grounds that he had failed in his duty to abide by a decision of the
Council of Ministers. That a great Oba should so act would be a shock to opinion
within and outside Nigeria. . . .
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Minute on 188
Mr. Gorell Barnes
Please see Mr. Huijsman’s minute of the 8th April.
You have already seen Sir J. Macpherson’s letter of the 1st April, and you will now
wish to see his savingram No. 774 of the 2nd April temporarily registered at (40). You
may also wish to let higher authority see this savingram, and perhaps the marked
portions of the enclosures. (As we shall need these papers on Tuesday of next week I
am sending them forward in red.)
It is clear that the discussions with the Governors next week will be concerned
with constitutional problems in Nigeria as well as the Gold Coast; as to which I have
already sent forward a memorandum. We shall have the opportunity for a
preliminary talk with Sir J. Macpherson on Tuesday the 14th April, as the ‘tripartite’
talks are not due to begin until 10.30 a.m. on Wednesday 15th, when Sir C. Arden-
Clarke will also be here.
I only wish to make one comment at this stage about the recent happenings in
Nigeria. Undoubtedly Sir J. Macpherson was faced with an acutely difficult position,
and one hesitates to offer any criticism. But I cannot help feeling that he put too
much of a strain on the Action Group Ministers in subjecting them to a decision that
they should neither speak nor vote on the motion about self-government by 1956. I
believe his wiser course might have been to have left all his Ministers free at least to
vote on the motion in accordance with the dictates of their individual consciences.
Had he done so the motion would almost certainly have been defeated, and he would
not have been faced with the resignation of all his four Western Ministers. It looks
very much, on our present information, as though he has ‘boxed’ himself; and it is
difficult to see how he is going to get any Western Ministers back into the Council of
Ministers. He will probably have to reappoint the four who have resigned.
I have written to Sir C. Arden-Clarke as herewith, so as to continue to keep him in
touch. With Sir T. Lloyd’s agreement I have sent him a copy of Sir J. Macpherson’s
letter of the 1st April, less the first and last paragraphs.)
T.B.W.
9.4.53
189 CO 554/260, no 73 7 Apr 1953
[Self-government motion]: letter from B E Sharwood-Smith to T B
Williamson on an examination of possible options for the future of the
Northern Region. Annex
I have got my Governor’s agreement to my writing to you (a copy will go to Lagos)
about certain aspects of recent developments in this country. Substantially, what has
occurred is that the Northern Members of the Central Legislature, resentful of, and
disgusted at, the manoeuvres, manners and methods of the Southern political
leaders and their followers, have found themselves mentally back where their
representatives were at the opening of the Ibadan Conference, with their worst fears
realised. They are now in effect demanding a complete reassessment of the position
with a view, in their present frame of mind, to asking for separation with some form
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of association at the Centre to protect their interests. This can be taken as the worst
possible alternative of all, and we hope to improve on it appreciably as time passes.
2. We ourselves are being as objective as possible, and are in the process of
assessing the situation from all angles with a view to presenting the Northern
Ministers with as reasoned a picture as possible of the factual background of the
situation in which they are now liable to find themselves. It will probably help if I
attach extracts from a directive issued by me as soon as the storm broke to my people
in Kaduna. My Governor has seen it and approved. I would be grateful if means could
be found for F.D.K. Williams,1 who is mentioned in paragraph 4(e) of the attachment,
to be assisted in the appropriate quarters in his enquiries. He will be instructed to
call at the C.O. and present himself to you as soon as convenient to him after his
arrival on leave, which will be towards the end of this month. It may be that he will
find that there are other sources of information that he could profitably explore—
examples are certain aspects of the Persian story and also the picture, past and
present, in Iraq (paragraph 4 (g) of the attachment).
3. I would be most grateful for any assistance that you can contrive in these
matters. I feel that I must think not only of the present, but also of the near and
middle distance in terms of developments to come.2
Annex to 189: Extracts from directive from lieutenant-governor, Northern Region,
Nigeria, to Northern Secretariat
2. . . . We must hope that this Northern feeling will moderate and do our best to
cause it to moderate, but I greatly fear that continuous fanning from without, and
what might be called the natural course of events, will result in, at best, only a
moderate abatement . . . .
3. We have already discussed the question of certain ‘exercises’ which we should
carry out to enable us to assess the position as correctly as possible in the light of:—
(i) the factual background in Nigeria
(ii) the experience of other countries.
4. These ‘exercises’ should be:—
(a) A ‘green light exercise’ designed to determine how the Northern Region could
most effectively, in terms of Nigeria, and satisfactorily, in terms of its own aspirations,
combine with the other two Regions on lines following those operative under the pre-
sent Constitution, subject to a modified form of association at the Centre.
(b) A ‘red light exercise’ designed to illustrate the effect on the Northern Region of
separatism, even on an agreed and friendly basis, from the other two Regions. The
‘exercise’ should cover in summarised form all the disadvantages, political, economic
and social. It should also cover ways and means, if any, of overcoming or
ameliorating the position, presumably again by an appropriate form of association at
the Centre. It should emphasise to what extent the 3 Regions of Nigeria are inter-
1 F D K Williams, administrative officer, Nigeria, 1941.
2 In his reply to this letter Williamson wrote: ‘We firmly believe that unity is in the best interests of all
regions of Nigeria, but we recognise that the only solution for present difficulties, and probably the only
hope eventually of achieving and preserving that unity, lies in some modified and looser form of
association at the Centre . . .’ (CO 554/236, no 46A, Williamson to Sharwood-Smith, 18 Apr 1953.)
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dependent, particularly in terms of internal trade, communications and the manning
of the Civil Service.
(c) A ‘red light exercise’ designed to illustrate the major implications, in terms of
Nigeria as a whole, of the achievement of self-government. I am thinking particularly
of
(i) external relationships
(ii) external representation
(iii) the effect on capital investment
(iv) the effect on the Civil Service
(v) the effect as regards defence in terms of land, sea and air; and finally
(vi) any other major implications.
I am aware that ‘exercise’ (a), the first draft of which has been completed, covers in
some degree a certain amount of what I have detailed above, but it will be impossible
at this stage to avoid this, my idea being that eventually, when we have completed
our series of ‘exercises’, we then proceed to co-ordinate a complete assessment. The
next exercise will be:—
(d) as a ‘red light exercise’, a study in summarised form of Liberia since its
attainment of sovereignty; with particular relation to the manner in which it has
faced its problems in terms of what should be expected of a modern sovereign state.
(e) the next exercise, also ‘red light’, should be a study of events in Burma since it
achieved independence and the effect of that event on the life of its people, politically,
economically and socially.
These two could be carried out by an officer on leave (Mr. F.D.K. Williams),
assuming assistance and advice from the appropriate Ministries in the U.K.
(f ) The next, an ‘amber light exercise’, should be a paper on Egypt under Cromer,
the object being to consider the future of the Administration in the Northern Region.
The functions of Cromer’s British Administrative Officers, the modification of these
functions, and the subsequent withdrawal of these officers should provide a very
interesting parallel. This can be conducted by Mr. Greatbatch.
(g) Finally, there should be an ‘amber light exercise’ on the administration of Iraq,
firstly under the British, and secondly since the achievement of independence . . .
6. The ‘exercises’ to which I refer in my fourth paragraph must be as objective
as possible. We must avoid partiality and we must avoid being over-affected
emotionally by nature of our close association with the Northern leaders and
Northern Peoples. We all know that a closely integrated and united Nigeria is the
optimum; failing that, we must get the best possible alternative. Three independent
Nigerias, inimical to each other and in danger of further sub-division, are what at all
cost we must avoid.
190 CO 554/260, no 76A 15 Apr 1953
[Amendment of the constitution]: CO note on a meeting with Sir J
Macpherson and Sir C Arden-Clarke to discuss constitutional
problems in Nigeria and the Gold Coast [Extract]
[Following the proposals for constitutional change on the Gold Coast that had emerged in
early 1953 (see 182) and the crisis over the Enahoro motion in the House of
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Representatives (see 184), Macpherson and Marshall visited London for discussions with
Lyttelton and Arden-Clarke. Two meetings were held on 15 Apr, the first chaired by Sir T
Lloyd and the second, reproduced here, by Lyttelton, Discussion of the Gold Coast is not
included; this can be found in BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana part II, 128.]
Review of the political situation in Nigeria
Sir John Macpherson, reviewing the political situation in Nigeria, said that it was not
good but that a month or so must elapse before it could be seen how matters really
stood.
2. In the East the National Independence Party (N.I.P.) might now be able to
establish a majority in the Eastern House of Assembly although they had Dr.
Azikiwe’s publicity machine and Press against them. The N.I.P. were optimistic and
inclined to favour an early reassembly of the House while the tide ran in their favour.
The N.C.N.C. were not keen on a dissolution and election, not only because they
knew it was a gamble whether they would secure a majority but because they did not
wish to face election expenses, especially in the extremely shaky state of the
Continental Bank which Dr. Azikiwe had raided—quite improperly—to the extent of
nearly £100,000 to bolster up the N.C.N.C. The first step would be for the present
House to reassemble but the Lieutenant-Governor took the view that this step need
not be hurried. By use of the Lieutenant-Governor’s reserved powers the Regional
Appropriation Bill had been passed and there was no essential legislation
outstanding. It was therefore possible that the House might not be recalled until
after the Coronation. It was desirable to give time for a knowledge of the situation to
percolate down to the villages where Ibo shrewdness might set opinion in favour of
the N.I.P. Already the declaration of neutrality as between the N.I.P. and N.C.N.C. of
all but one of the Cameroons bloc was a heartening sign and might even mean that
the N.I.P. would obtain Cameroons support in continuing the work of the House. If,
however, there proved to have been no significant change in the mood of the House
and Government business was still held up, then the Lieutenant-Governor would
have the alternatives either of inviting the less extreme N.C.N.C. members to form a
Government or; under the Constitution (Amendment) Order in Council which would
have then become law, to order a dissolution and fresh elections.
3. The attitude of the North over recent events was hard, cold, and implacable.
They had been angered by the consistent bad manners and political tricks of the
Southerners, and resented extremely the accusation that they were under the
thumbs of the British. They took the view that they had for 14 months tried hard to
collaborate with the South, but having met only with abuse they would prefer to
withdraw. Without a marked change of mood it was unlikely that it would be possible
to persuade the Northern members to attend another session of the House of
Representatives, anyway as at present constituted. The two Northern Houses were to
meet in succession in May and between the meetings there would be a joint meeting
of members of both Houses, but with no officials present, at which they would assess
their position. The North were clearly thinking of separation from the southern
Regions, but the Lieutenant-Governor would try to persuade them not to take any
drastic steps for the present.
4. In the West the House of Assembly was due to meet on the 4th May. The first
step to be taken would be to attempt to fill the vacancies created by the resignations
of the four Western members of the Council of Ministers. The Joint Council of the
Region was likely either to refuse any proposals from the Governor or to agree only
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to put forward the four Ministers who had resigned. (A telegram received in the
course of the meeting from the Olowo of Owo, Secretary of the Western House of
Chiefs, indicated that the latter course was the one that would be adopted.) The
Lieutenant-Governor intended to refuse to submit the names of two anyway of the
ex-Ministers, namely Chief Bode Thomas and Mr. Akintola, not merely because of
their bad faith in divulging the voting in the Council of Ministers over the issue of
self-government in 1956, but because of their almost certain responsibility for
leakages of information about the proceedings of the Council of Ministers over a
period. Although the exercise of attempting to replace the Western Ministers might
well prove to be a sterile one, it would have to be undertaken. The first steps might be
taken before the Western Houses reassembled but there would be advantage in the
procedure as a whole (which would involve the submission and resubmission of
various alternative names) not being undertaken at any great speed.
5. In reply to a question from the Secretary of State, Sir John Macpherson said
that the Eastern and Northern members of the Council of Ministers had been against
his coming home for consultations at this juncture, as they felt that much capital
would be made out of it by the Action Group and the N.C.N.C. who would claim that
this showed that the Council of Ministers was worried and anxious and unsure of its
position. He had told them that his intention was to bring the Secretary of State up to
date on the latest developments and not to determine future plans. He added that the
people of the Northern Region had throughout been loyal, trustworthy and reason-
able, although they were now beginning to wonder whether they might be let down
by Her Majesty’s Government. He felt it was unthinkable they should be so let down;
on every count, including that of numbers, the North had claims to consideration.
Course of action to be followed
6. Agreeing with Sir John Macpherson’s concluding sentiments, the Secretary of
State said that in his view the constitution would certainly have to be radically
recast. He would revert later to the imperfections in the present constitution and to
the changes likely to be necessary. His immediate concern was to settle what dilatory
tactics could be adopted which would give a chance for a more tranquil atmosphere
to develop.
7. Considerable discussion then took place in which the following points were
made:—
(a) The present constitutional set up corresponded neither with present feelings
nor with the facts. Radical constitutional revision, such as the Secretary of State
proposed and which took account of facts as they were, would be received with
relief in many quarters.
(b) The changes to be envisaged should include a looser form of association at the
Centre, which nevertheless safeguarded the interests of all three Regions, and
greater ‘autonomy’ in legislation for the Regions themselves, possibly over a wider
range of subjects than at present. The creation of separate Ministries and the
appointment of some (African) Parliamentary Under-Secretaries in the Regions
might also be agreed to. All Regions could be given the same degree of additional
‘autonomy’, as regards the creation of separate Ministeries etc., there would be no
objection to some differences between Regions, though no changes agreed for one
Region would be refused to either of the other two, if they wanted them.
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(c) A conference on the lines of the General (Ibadan) Conference of 1950 was no
longer possible and proposals for the best means of working out the constitutional
changes might have to come from the Secretary of State, even at the risk of
ultimate failure to secure general agreement on a new constitution being laid at
the door of Her Majesty’s Government.
(d) Nigerian co-operation in any discussions must be sought and there was reason
to hope that at any rate the North and the N.I.P. would agree to participate. The
West would be more difficult; Mr. Awolowo took the view that Her Majesty’s
Government ought to push the North into the speedier advance which the West
advocated.
(e) In due course a predominantly Nigerian conference or commission should if
possible be arranged in which all three Regions would be represented. The
chairman would probably have to come from outside Nigeria in any case, and all or
part of the proceedings might have to be held in London under the chairmanship
of the Secretary of State.
(f ) No public announcement should be made of a decision to overhaul the
constitution for the time being; certainly not until after the meetings of both
Northern Houses in May.
(g) The Minister of State, during his forthcoming visit to Nigeria to preside over
the conference about the Royal West African Frontier Force, should take the
opportunity to have private discussions with representatives of all three Regions,
beginning with the North if the timetable permitted.1 In such discussions the
Minister of State would have to be guided by the situation as he found it, but his
primary object should be to obtain the views of the Regions informally rather than
to state a policy. He could, however, say privately that Her Majesty’s Government
considered the constitution would without prejudicing the unity of Nigeria, have
to be revised, and he could refer to the possibility of changes as outlined in (b)
above.
(h) In such discussions the North might especially be assured, as from the
Secretary of State, that progress would not be made over their heads, and that they
would be fully consulted when the constitution was looked at afresh. To press
them too hard at this stage to agree to remain within a united Nigeria might cause
them to react violently against the idea.
(i) The West did not fully appreciate the seriousness of the attitude of the North
and the impetuosity and lack of political sense of its leader, despite his other
merits, would make it necessary to handle the West with the greatest care. It was
important that nothing should be done to alienate them further.
(j) Sir J. Macpherson emphasized that our aim had been and still was to bring a
united Nigeria to political maturity and that any changes either at the Centre or in
the Regions should be such as would further the achievement of that aim.
(k) There should be no suggestion of any weakening of the Governor’s powers.
(l) The preservation of a united Nigeria was regarded as of particular importance
in the comparatively poor Eastern Region and both the N.C.N.C. and the N.I.P.
supported it. Any suggestion of an intention to modify the powers of the Central
Government in such a way as to undermine that unity would render more difficult
the task of the N.I.P. in establishing itself against the N.C.N.C.
1 See 193 and 194.
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(m) Enquiries from Parliament and from the Press should not in the meantime be
answered by any definite statements of policy. It should be explained that the
Governor had reported to the Secretary of State in London and that the Minister of
State in his forthcoming visit to Nigeria would have the opportunity to learn the
views of representatives of all Regions; the problems however were complex and
would call for patient, unhurried and understanding consideration; no further
statement should be expected for some time . . . .
191 CO 554/260, no 62 15 Apr 1953
[Amendment of the constitution]: conclusions of a meeting held at
the CO under the chairmanship of Mr Lyttelton to discuss the need
radically to revise the constitution
It is agreed that the Nigeria constitution will have to be radically revised. But no
public statement to this effect should be made for the time being; certainly not
before the views of the North are known following the meetings of both Northern
Houses in May.
2. When the time comes, proposals for a revised constitution should, if possible,
be framed by a predominantly Nigerian commission or conference representative of
all three Regions. Outside help would be needed and probably a chairman from
outside Nigeria and circumstances might arise in which the proceedings or part of
them could preferably take place in London under the Chairmanship of the Secretary
of State. Every effort must accordingly be made to dissuade the leaders from the
different Regions from committing themselves to public statements which would
make it impossible for them to sit down together later on. But this may well prove
impossible; in which case the initiative may have to come from outside.
3. In his private discussions with Nigerian and Regional Ministers the Minister of
State will be guided largely by the situation as he finds it and his main objective will
be to listen rather than to speak.1 It is important that, when meeting the Northern
Ministers, he should not at this stage press them so hard to agree to remain within a
united Nigeria that they react violently against the idea. At the same time it is
important that, in his talks with representatives of the East, he should not over-
emphasize the necessity for a much looser association at the Centre, as the East
(‘good’ and ‘bad’ alike) favour a unitary constitution.
4. Accordingly the Minister of State’s basic line, in private discussion, should be
that H.M.G. consider that the constitution will have to be revised; and that, whilst
they still believe that unity is in the best interests of all Regions of Nigeria, they
recognise that the only solution of the present difficulties, and indeed the only hope
of eventually achieving that unity, lies in some modified and looser form of
association at the Centre at this stage.
5. Elaboration on this basic theme would be along the following lines:—
(a) The Regional Governments could be given greater ‘autonomy’ in legislation,
i.e. be less subject to ‘interference’ from the Centre and also possibly deal with
1 Hopkinson travelled to Nigeria on 17 Apr to attend the West African Forces conference in Lagos. During
his visit he met leaders from each region. See 193 and 194.
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more subjects; but they would all be given the same degree of additional
‘autonomy’.
(b) Other changes in the Regions such as the creation of separate Ministries and
the appointment of some (African) Parliamentary Under-Secretaries would be by
no means ruled out. In this respect there would be no objection to some
differences between Regions, though no changes agreed for one Region would be
refused to either of the other two, if they wanted them.
(c) It is inherent in the idea of a looser form of association that the interests of all
three Regions must be fully safeguarded by the arrangements to be made at the
Centre.
6. In dealing with enquiries from the Press etc., both the Governor and the
Colonial Office will for the time being take the following line. The Governor has
reported in London to the Secretary of State on the present position in Nigeria. The
problems are complex and call for patient, unhurried and understanding
consideration. The Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, during his forthcoming visit
to Nigeria to preside at the conference about the financing of the Royal West African
Frontier Force, will have the opportunity of hearing at first hand the views of
representatives of all three Regions. It is unlikely, because of the complexity of the
problems involved, that any further statement can be made for some time.
192 CO 554/262, no 221 15 Apr 1953
[Political situation]: Nigerian government notes of a discussion with
heads of department on the current political situation
Mr. Benson said that he had asked Heads of Departments to come together in order
that he might tell them something about the current political situation and the
events leading up to it, and might make an attempt to answer any questions which
they might raise. Had His Excellency been in Lagos it was, of course, a thing which
he would wish to do himself.
2. Some of those present might have a very fair picture of what had been
happening and would have the proper background in that picture: others might
know less, either about the immediately past events or about the fuller background
which led up to those events. All present were officials, and if they were to carry out
their various duties properly as officials they must have a certain part at least of the
facts behind the present crisis. All were bound by the Official Secrets Act and what he
was going to say was committed to their secrecy. They would only be permitted to
pass on any of it to their juniors if, in their considered judgment, it was both
desirable and necessary that those juniors should have the information in order to
enable them also to discharge their official functions properly.
3. Mr. Benson said that if anyone thought that the present political crisis had
arisen within the last four or five weeks only, he was under grievous error. This crisis
had been brewing ever since the beginning of 1952, and its origins went back even
before that to the time when the new Constitution was being drafted. They should
bear in mind certain facts about that time, and firstly that it was only with the
greatest difficulty that the North had been persuaded to come in under this
Constitution at all. They had only agreed to do so on the understanding that they
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should have a 50% representation in the House of Representatives, an arrangement
to which the West had strongly objected at the time, but which the East had
eventually persuaded them to accept. The East, more than any other part of the
country, had desired a united Nigeria and had shown themselves prepared to make
considerable compromises and even sacrifices in order to secure it.
4. They would remember also that at election time the Awolowo-Zik battle was at
its height. Awolowo and the Action Group had come to power in the West really on
one platform only; and that was that they would break down the power of Zik in the
West and no doubt, by implication, gradually in the East also: but the Westerners’
horizon had seldom been outside the boundaries of the Western Region.
5. Heads of Departments would also remember that at the time when the
Constitution was being framed and elections were taking place, there were two other
strong pressure points tending to divide Nigeria: firstly, the Ilorin boundary
question—a fight between the North and the West; and, secondly, the position of
Lagos—a fight between the East and the West, with the North also much interested
because of the North’s need for an outlet to the sea. At that time, as he had said, the
Awolowo-Zik battle was raging and the Eastern point of view was represented by Zik,
himself a detribalized Easterner and the strong supporter of the party within Lagos
which was both anti-Action Group and desired to keep Lagos out of the West. This
party controlled the vast majority of the seats on the Lagos Town Council.
6. The North had done a little horse trading over these two issues. They had said
‘Hands off Ilorin and we will support you in your demand that Lagos goes into the
West.’
7. The North kept its bargain and so the position of Lagos was determined. The
West, on the other hand, right from the beginning of 1952, directly they had got
what they wanted over Lagos, allowed the attack on Ilorin to develop all over again.
During the first four or five months of 1952, time and again Northern Ministers had
expressed to him (Mr. Benson) their disgust and rage at this breach of faith.
8. Ministers took office at the end of January, 1952, and even before that, but
after the Action Group had won its elections in the West, Awolowo and other Western
leaders came to see His Excellency and demanded things which were not in the
Constitution. They demanded a Nigerian President of the Western House; they
demanded Parliamentary Under-Secretaries; and they demanded a Leader of
Government Business. Right from that date the Westerners had never ceased their
demands either for amending the Constitution, or for whittling down its carefully
drawn provisions which ensured in the interests of all (and in complete accord with
the recommendations of the Ibadan Conference and the previous Regional
Conferences) that officials were part of the fabric. Western Central Ministers, and in
particular Bode-Thomas, raised such an issue almost every week from February,
1952, onwards. His method was to take a small unimportant item on the agenda (e.g.
to appoint a member of some Board or other) and to demand that before such
appointment were made the whole question of constitutional principle and practice
should be settled (e.g. that the Governor’s power of appointment should pass either
to a Minister or to a Regional Executive Council). He was continually also trying to
get powers away from the Centre to the Regions.
9. So much for general background. Mr. Benson now wanted to go through the
history of the months almost month by month, high-lighting certain near-crises,
which had only been solved by the greatest patience on the part of the Governor, and
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after the greatest forbearance by Northern and Eastern Ministers. Eastern Ministers
in particular had continually had themselves thrust into a most awkward
predicament: any opposition they might show to Bode-Thomas’ wilder flights made
them appear less progressive nationalists than the Action Group.
10. Right at the beginning of February, 1952, as part of the manoeuvres to stop
Zik from becoming a Member of the House of Representatives, Awolowo proposed to
dissolve the Lagos Town Council. It would be remembered that Lagos had to elect
five Members to the Western House, of which two must come forward to the Centre.
Lagos elected five N.C.N.C. candidates by overwhelming majorities. Zik then
arranged that three of those should refuse to accept nomination to the Centre, so
that he and one other would be sure, even in face of the Action Group majority in the
West, of coming forward. Bribes passed rapidly on all sides and in the end the Action
Group bribed Adedoyin to accept nomination to the Centre. So Zik was kept out. Zik
countered by getting the Lagos Town Council to offer Adedoyin the job of Town
Clerk, involving his resignation from the Centre: whereupon the Western Regional
Executive Council proposed, within their proper powers, to wind up the Lagos Town
Council and put in an Action Group-nominated Committee of Management. Ineptly
they also at the same time proposed to ask the Governor to appoint a Commission of
Inquiry into the allegations of corruption in the Lagos Town Council.
11. Now 90% of the object in all this was to keep Zik down: the other 10% a policy
of ‘Now we can show that under the Constitution we control Lagos’. There was
immediate fierce reaction from the East, including, of course, Eastern Central
Ministers; and the North’s reaction was annoyance with themselves. They had horse
traded with the West ‘Lagos to be part of the West’ in exchange for ‘Hands off Ilorin’,
and had never expected the West to show their iron hand in Lagos so blatantly and so
early.
12. The Acting Lieutenant-Governor, West, was in constant telephone
consultation with us here; and, by making it plain that in the last resort he would use
his reserve powers, managed to hold the fort against this attempt by the Action
Group to achieve what could be argued was a quite proper objective for a blatantly
improper motive. They finally accepted a Commission of Inquiry into the affairs of
the Lagos Town Council.
13. That, a week after Ministers had taken office, is a fair indication of the type of
policy to be pursued by the West consistently throughout the next fourteen months.
The matter, of course, came up in the Council of Ministers and Bode-Thomas,
Akintola and Prest all argued that Lagos was a matter for the West alone and that the
Centre had nothing to do with it, and that there must be no interference from the
Centre in the affairs of the Regions. North and East, on the other hand, stressed that
as Lagos was both the capital and the chief port of Nigeria the Centre was very much
concerned; and that action about Lagos should not be taken by the Western Region
without prior consultation with the Centre. It was then North and East versus the
West.
14. The whole of February was taken up with preparation for the Budget Meeting
of the House of Representatives, which was to open on about the 2nd March. The
Council of Ministers was persuaded generally to accept the Budget, necessarily
already prepared by the officials, and they had no real difficulty in doing this, save
over one thing: and that was ‘Personal Emoluments’. Personal Emoluments led the
Westerners immediately into a strong attack on expatriates, and the whole question
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of Nigerianisation was hammered at by them, with the Easterners also showing sharp
concern over the matter. The reaction of the North was sharp and instantaneous:
they said that Nigerianisation meant Southernisation and they would bitterly oppose
any increase in the number of Nigerians holding Senior Service posts in the North.
Here again, within a couple of weeks of the coming into force of the Constitution, a
vital pressure point comes to light. The North, who probably have a much better
realisation (because of their long generations of administrative experience) than have
either the East or the West, of what is involved in such phrases as ‘self-government’,
understand that the Civil Service of a country wields an enormous amount of power.
At that time virtually no Northerners held Senior Civil Service posts. (To-day only
thirty do so out of 700 Nigerians holding such posts). Their great, lasting and
increasing fear was and is that Southerners would get control of all these posts; and
their long and bitter experience has shown them that when a Southerner holds such
a post all the Junior Civil Servants under him also rapidly become Southerners.
15. This problem was solved by the inclusion in the Governor’s Speech from the
Throne of an announcement to appoint the Phillipson-Adebo Commission on
Nigerianisation. But the Northerners’ bitter fear remained and, indeed, during the
meeting of the House of Representatives a very strong Northern deputation met the
Chief Secretary to oppose even the posting of two Southerners to the North as
Administrative Assistants in Departments.
16. When the House of Representatives opened, Awolowo, extraordinarily
enough, was the first speaker on the second reading of the Appropriation Bill and he
promptly alienated a great deal of Northern sympathy. From then on the Western
Members of the House (even the Central Ministers from the West) were much more
often out of the House than in it, a fact which caused extreme offence to the North
who, with most N.C.N.C. members, were regularly in attendance. During that
meeting also, Awolowo ineptly showed his mistaken belief that he had only to lift his
finger and see the North follow him more or less blindly in opposition to the East.
The Action Group violently opposed the Lead-Zinc Bill and the Pioneer Industries
Bill. When Divisions were taken on these unanimously agreed Government
measures, Western Central Ministers were conspicuously absent from the House.
17. In June, Njoku circulated a paper to the Council of Ministers drawing
attention to the fact that it had previously decided unanimously to be bound by the
principle of collective responsibility, and to abide by, and show open support for, any
decision of the Council (the Notes on Administrative Procedure and the Code of
Conduct for Ministers, both accepted by the Council, with no dissentient voice, both
laid down this principle; and also, by the way, the important rule that no Minister
should take part in journalism). Njoku went on to draw attention to the fact that at
the March meeting certain Ministers had not always voted for the Government;
sometimes they had absented themselves from the House; or—on at least one
occasion had ‘unfortunately been too late to get into the lobbies before the doors
were closed’. Njoku asked the Council to decide that every Minister must be in his
place when a Government motion was being discussed and must go through the
lobbies in any Division. It is significant that this was put forward by an Eastern
Minister.
18. Going back to April. In that month Bode-Thomas and Akintola started a
strong demand for separate Ministries. At first all Northern Ministers were opposed to
it and so [sic: was] Nwapa. Gradually Nwapa and Ribadu were persuaded, and the other
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Eastern Ministers were also for it. But Abubakar remained constant in strong
opposition, fearing that such a change would inevitably be followed by further
changes. It was with the greatest difficulty that official members of the Council
persuaded him to remove his strong opposition even to the establishment of a
committee to consider the matter. The committee began its work and the Law
Officers decided that such an administrative arrangement could be made without a
change in the Constitution; and at the end of May, when the Secretary of State was in
Nigeria, he was approached by Ministers everywhere on the subject and readily
agreed to the suggestion for separate Ministries. The Committee then had to
continue its monumental task of finding both the staff and the accommodation
required.
19. And so to June, when the Action Group made a very strong concerted
demand for further constitutional advance. They demanded:—
(a) that power for action in all legislation should not be given to a Head of
Department or other official, but to the Minister concerned;
(b) that Lieutenant-Governors and the Governor should take the advice of
Ministers in respect of all powers (subject to reserve powers);
(c) that separate and distinct fields of legislation should be established for the
Centre and the Regions;
(d) that there should be a change in the Constitution to give effect to the party
system of government;
(e) that there should be Parliamentary Under-Secretaries;
(f ) removal of restrictions with regard to Bills and Motions affecting the Public
Service;
(g) removal of disqualification of persons from election on grounds of previous
conviction for sedition and other offences.
20. All these would have involved changes in the Constitution and both the East
and the North were solidly opposed to any such change. There were meetings of the
Council of Ministers to consider the demands; and in the end the demands were
rejected on the grounds that neither the East nor the North wanted any change in
the Constitution. Both East and North, and particularly the North, again felt
embittered with the Action Group and all its actions.
21. Meanwhile, there remained the Ilorin question, stimulated by provocative
speeches, and actions in Ilorin by Yorubas, particularly Lagosians from that part of
the world. On the 4th September His Excellency announced his decision on the
Ilorin boundary question and this was met by a silence from the West lasting about
six weeks—a reaction most surprising to the North. At this time Zik was starting his
come-back campaign in the East and he was building it mainly on an anti-Action
Group platform—the same platform as he had used to bring the independent
Easterners on to the band wagon at election time. Eastern Central Ministers sought
interviews with His Excellency and said that if only the West would give one sign that
they were genuinely interested in Nigerian unity they could defeat Zik’s manoeuvres.
His Excellency drew attention to this reaction of silence over the Ilorin question as
such a positive sign but, frankly, it was the only positive sign he could give other
than strongly expressed faith in the Action Group’s ultimate good intentions.
22. Throughout the whole of this period Bode-Thomas had continued to behave
atrociously in the Council of Ministers meetings. Whenever he found himself in a
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minority he lost his temper and gradually directed his attack on to the Governor
sitting as President of the Council. On every occasion His Excellency had shown
incredible patience, to a degree which exasperated the Northerners, but was
generally understood by the Easterners. It might, however, be of interest at this stage
to tell of a conversation which he (Mr. Benson) had had with Nwapa after Nwapa’s
return from the United Kingdom. Nwapa had said ‘I could never understand why the
Governor was so incredibly patient with all the rudeness and the ignorant blustering
of Bode Thomas, until one day at five minutes to seven in the morning I tuned in to
the B.B.C. while I was shaving. I listened to ‘Five Minutes with God’, or some such
broadcast, and the speaker said ‘Patience is a great virtue and we continually say that.
But no man is ever patient with the patience of God. God’s patience is a thing which
men cannot understand, and until we understand God’s motives for his patience we
never shall understand it’. Only at that moment did I understand Sir John’s patience
with Bode Thomas.’ The point of the whole thing was this—that nothing was holding
Nigeria together except the Council of Ministers. So long as the Council of Ministers
presented a united face before the country, so long could the three Regions be held,
in the face of all the points of pressure—Lagos, Nigerianisation, Constitutional
Advance, etc. etc.—together.
23. In October Awolowo went to India and during this period, while he was away,
there were considerable signs of two things:—
(a) of Ministers at the Centre getting closer and closer together;
(b) of manoeuvres by Awolowo’s rivals in the West to increase their power at
Awolowo’s own personal expense.
24. As regards (a); Ministers at the Centre were regularly holding private
meetings of their own immediately before Council meetings to decide what line they
would take on the subjects on the agenda. When they came into Council meetings it
was obvious that decisions had already been taken amongst themselves at these
preliminary discussions, leaving the officials with nothing to say. This was good
provided that in taking their decisions they had the full facts of the problem before
them, and we were fortunate in that not many controversial items appeared on the
agenda. There were, however, as throughout the past fifteen months there had
always been, the appalling inter-Regional jealousies and pressure points. One
example was the important decision which had to be taken as regards Revenue
Allocation—Capitation Rate for the forthcoming year, coupled with the very heavy
shortfall in tobacco revenue. It was an appalling problem, over which the Acting
Governor and the Lieutenant-Governors and all their official advisers had spent five
hours in conclave the evening before, discussing how on earth the separate Regions
could be brought to accept the right decision—a grant from the Centre for one year
to make up the shortfall. In the event the Council of Ministers disposed of the item—
and reached the right conclusion—in seven minutes, that conclusion being
announced on behalf of the Ministers by the Oni of Ife, who was put up as
spokesman. On the other hand, there was the question whether Nwapa should or
should not accept the Secretary of State’s invitation to attend the Commonwealth
Prime Ministers’ Conference in London at the end of November. The decision of the
Council was that he should, Akintola and Bode Thomas strongly opposing. The
arguments they adduced within Council were repeated again in the Daily Service in a
succession of five articles strongly attacking Nwapa and the Government on five
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successive days. All the Northern and the Eastern Ministers knew that Akintola had
written them; and all, of course, were fully aware that they had all agreed that no
Minister should ‘indulge in journalism, save on matters of literary or scientific
interest.’
25. At the beginning of November the Ilorin boundary question came up again:
there were inflammatory speeches and articles, culminating in the Oke-Odde riots, in
the course of which an attack was made on the local Native Court while it was in
session and a Court Messenger beaten to death. These riots were organised by Oke-
Odde ‘sons abroad’ in Lagos, but it was most difficult to convince the North that the
Action Group was not behind it. Or, if not the Action Group, at least the Egbe Omu
Oduduwa, with which of course the Action Group is most closely allied. Once more,
the Eastern Ministers came to see the Acting Governor and expressed their alarm and
their fears that if this was how the Action Group behaved they, the Easterners, had
no chance of defeating the Zikists in the East.
26. There followed the Jos Convention, organised by Zik, with a decision ‘in the
interests of Nigeria’ not to work the Constitution. And hard on its heels Awolowo’s
return from India and the Benin Action Group Convention, which decreed a policy of
non-fraternisation with the Governor. The Northerners were watching the increase
of Zik’s influence in the East and they were appalled at the Action Group’s attempts
to outbid him.
27. And then at the end of January and early February the Eastern crisis, with
Zik supporters showing complete irresponsibility and relying on intimidation and
corruption, of which everyone knew; the North again appalled that the steady
elements in the East could not command even a simple majority. Nevertheless at this
time, because of a common hatred for Zik and everything he stood for, the Council of
Ministers was more united than ever before. Eastern Central Ministers, it is true, had
shown signs of wavering, and the Northerners were very worried about that: but
when they finally came out firm in support of the Regional Ministers and severed all
connection with the old firm of Zik, Northern and Western and Eastern members of
the Council were solid together. The ‘good East’ also was very glad of the West’s tacit
support, but had the greatest difficulty in preventing it from being shown too openly
(which would, of course, have put Zik right back into the anti-Western position in
which in 1951 he was able to sway all the elected independents to join his band).
28. It was strange to think back to the weeks immediately preceding the House
of Representatives’ meeting and consider the astonishing degree of unity which then
existed amongst the Ministers. In spite of Abubakar’s grave misgivings earlier over
separate Ministries he and the other Northern Ministers-with-portfolio had all signed
a document with Eastern and Western Ministers-with-portfolio demanding that
Ministers should be given control of Departments. They made it plain that they
meant the same control as Ministers in the Gold Coast have.
29. The Government prepared to go into the House of Representatives in March,
1953, with such a feeling of unity in the Council as never before. They were solidly
united: for example on the whole of the Budget in the early days Eastern, Western,
and Northern Ministers made it clear in speeches that this was their Budget, and that
they accepted full responsibility for it.
30. A number of Motions had been put down by Private Members, and continued
to be put down during the first days of the meeting. It was soon apparent that eight
or ten of them were Action Group Party Motions, all in the name of Enahoro. The
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first four days of the meeting were spent in debating His Excellency’s speech from
the Throne and appalling damage to unity was done by Action Group members,
including Awolowo, in those four days. They demanded in turn the removal from the
Council of Ministers of the Financial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the
Lieutenant-Governors and ‘the dividing up of the Chief Secretary’s portfolio amongst
Ministers.’ There were strong attacks of expatriates—this time not on their pay but
on their presence. At each such demand and attack the Northerners grew steadily
angrier and more obstinate.
31. As was said at the beginning, if anyone thought that the Motion for self-
government in 1956 was the sole cause of the crisis he was in error. Apart from the
attacks on expatriates and the demands for further constitutional advance there were
four Motions which led up to the crisis:—
(a) that a Nigerian should be President of the House;
(b) that special scholarships should be awarded to train Nigerians for the Nigerian
Foreign Service;
(c) that there should be self-government in 1956; and (believe it or not)
(d) that a decency Bill should be introduced to prohibit nudity in Nigeria.
32. Without any exaggeration this last, which came before the House first, exer-
cised a very great effect. When considered in the Council of Ministers there was
complete unanimity of view that the Motion must be opposed by Government. In
the House Awolowo quite unexpectedly got up to support it. The North reacted
most strongly against what appeared to them to be a danger of Southern interfer-
ence with the administration of the pagan tribes in the North. Chief Bode Thomas
and Akintola ratted on the Government’s decision and asked for an emergency
meeting of the Council to reconsider Government’s attitude to the Motion. This
request was vigorously opposed both by the North and the East. Eventually Jaja
Wachuku introduced a dilatory Motion adjourning the debate, but the damage had
been done.
33. Both Northern and Eastern Ministers (and again particularly the North) were
disgusted and angered at seeing Western Ministers ‘rat’ on a decision which they had
fully supported in Council, simply because the Leader of the Action Group had taken
a different line in the House. Note also, incidentally, that the Mover of the Motion
was Mr. Okwu, an N.C.N.C. Member, and it was, so far as can be remembered, the
first occasion on which there had not been an automatic opposition from the Action
Group to anything which the N.C.N.C. proposed.
34. The next motion taken in the House was one asking for special Scholarships
for the Nigerian Foreign Service, and this was one of the Action Group Motions in
the name of Enahoro. Once more the decision in Council had been taken
unanimously: efforts were to be made to explain the futility of such a scheme to the
mover, upon which it was hoped that he would withdraw his motion; if he did not do
so the Government was to oppose the motion. Note again that this was a unanimous
decision of the Council.
35. Once again the Action Group Leaders went all out in support of the motion
in the House, and again they were joined by N.C.N.C. members, though not
unanimously. The North were angered once more by the constant reference to the
need of a Nigerian Foreign Service in 1956. Quite apart from the clear explanation of
the impracticability of the motion which had been given to the House, all Northern
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members were solid, and Government had declared its stand. A division, therefore
was unavoidable.
36. Bode Thomas and Akintola sat in their seats and Njoku and Abubakar
persuaded them to rise in their places en route for the division lobby. Awolowo
rushed round and told them in the hearing of these Ministers and of the Chief
Secretary, that they were not to vote. The Chief Secretary attempted to reason with
Awolowo, but he was in a berserk state and reiterated his orders to Bode Thomas and
Akintola, who obeyed them.
37. The next motion was that for the appointment of a Nigerian President of the
House. This had also been discussed in the Council of Ministers early in March, and it
had been a stormy meeting at which Ribadu, particularly, showed intense anger with
Bode Thomas and Akintola. A little background to this problem is necessary:
38. Early in 1952 the North had sought from the Secretary of State a secret
guarantee that the Governor was always to be President of the House; and failed to
get it. They had, however, got an assurance that the President of the House would
always be someone, acceptable to them. Their fear, of course, was that there would be
a Southerner as President. Prest and the Oni of Ife, and all other members of the
Council save Bode Thomas and Akintola were for complete abstention; and in the
face of Ribadu’s strong feelings and intense anger on the matter Bode Thomas
contented himself with saying; ‘All right, but this is only a curtain raiser. The really
important motion will have to be discussed later.’ (He was, of course, referring to the
1956 motion). Note, however, that he did not ask for his dissent to be recorded, and
there was therefore, an unopposed clear decision of the Council for abstention. (In
the event the motion never came before the House).
39. At the time when the self-government motion came first before the Council
of Ministers the split in its ranks was, therefore, wide. Ministers were even refusing to
meet informally outside the Council. The Northern amendment to substitute ‘as
soon as practicable’ for ‘in 1956’ had been tabled, and at the first of three grim and
difficult meetings on the subject Njoku said that if the question to amend it to read
‘as soon as practicable’ were put first, he would certainly support the amendment.
This, of course, could not happen: because the question had to be put in two parts—
firstly, ‘to leave out the words in 1956’ and only secondly ‘to insert other words.’ On
this, all Eastern Ministers and Prest spoke strongly for complete abstention, as in the
case of the motion on the President of the House. Akintola on the other hand said it
was a matter for Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, and not for the
Council of Ministers; that Ministers should speak as they wished; and that officials
should remain silent. The Northern Ministers declared that they were going
vigorously to oppose the motion, and emphasised the view that if officials abstained
they would be shirking their duty: officials must vote against the motion. There was,
therefore, at this stage a complete deadlock between Bode Thomas and Akintola on
the one hand and the Northern Ministers on the other; with Prest the Eastern
Ministers, and the officials all opting for complete abstention. The Oni of Ife was not
present. The Governor deferred the meeting in the hope of softening the Northern
attitude, and he further hoped that the Westerners would see the red light and
persuade their party either to drop the motion altogether, or agree that it should be
argued out on the floor of the House without involving the Council of Ministers.
40. At the next meeting no progress had been made with Bode Thomas and
Akintola, but the Northerners announced their readiness to accept complete
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abstention. This meeting was marked by two things; the cold, self-possessed,
statements made by all Northern Ministers in turn, in quiet, cool voices; and a
complete loss of temper by Bode Thomas.
41. The Northerners spoke as follows:—
‘For the last fifteen months we have gone far beyond any reasonable limit in
trying to make this Constitution work and co-operate with these people in the
South. We have had no difference with the Eastern Ministers which we have
not been able to resolve by compromise, but we can never work with these
people from the West. Now they have gone far beyond any limit which anyone
could regard as reasonable. You have spoken at length, Sir, about the unity of
Nigeria, and I tell you that is impossible of achievement. You and your
officials are the only people who have faith in that idea, or work for it, save
that some people from the East also believe in it. The West do not want it, and
we certainly do not want it. You have faith in it because you believe that it is
the best thing for Nigeria. It has nothing to do with the interest of Britain.
Both your faith and your works are in vain. We saw what happened in India—
rivers of blood flowed; and we saw what happened in Burma where blood is
still flowing; and our great fear is that you will do what you did in these places
and run out on us. Our prayer to you is this: Divide us now, and stay while
you divide us, and for sometime thereafter. We can shake hands now and go
our separate ways, and perhaps our children’s children will want to come
together again. But if you go out now at short notice the blood which flowed
in India will be nothing to the blood which will flow here.’
42. At this meeting Nwapa made a strong, statesman-like plea for total absten-
tion and was warmly supported by Prest and the Oni of Ife. Had it been possible to
take a vote then the voting would have been sixteen to two for complete absten-
tion. But, unfortunately, Bode Thomas became completely uncontrolled in the face
of the cold Northern speeches. He accused the Governor of plotting to thwart the
West and to delay self-government, and of bringing every kind of pernicious influ-
ence to bear on the North. It is difficult to remember precisely what he said, and
precisely what insults he hurled at the Governor and other Members of the
Council; because he was completely out of control: He jumped up out of his chair,
seized his papers and said he was not going to stay. On his way to the door he saw
the Governor’s eye fixed coldly on him and said, ‘I have your permission to leave?’
The Governor said, ‘I would prefer you to stay, Minister.’ He said, ‘I won’t stay,’
and started to walk out, upon which the Oni of Ife shouted to him twice in Yoruba,
and, after a long silence, he resumed his seat. When the question of a vote was
raised all members said they were in no fit state to vote, Njoku saying, ‘We cannot
even sit in our seats. How can we vote?’ Council proceeded to other business and
for ten minutes Bode Thomas sat in his chair mouthing—quite audibly to those
sitting within 10 feet of him—such phrases as ‘Bloody British’, and ‘Bring your
soldiers and shoot us down’. At the end of ten minutes he sought, and was
granted, permission to leave. Then Council continued on other business for
another hour.
43. That evening there was a christening party given by a Yoruba in Lagos. When
Prest and other Ministers got there they were told by other guests precisely what had
happened in Council, and what every member had said. Bode Thomas had preceded
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them. Members of the House attacked Prest on the stand he had taken, as they did
also the Eastern Ministers, one of whom was also present.
44. When the matter was reopened in Council at the next meeting in four or five
days time, Nwapa said that he found himself utterly unable to make any contribution
to the discussion in Council at all, because proceedings were not secret, and
anything he said in Council made his position politically, outside the Council,
untenable. Other Eastern Ministers and Prest were similarly affected, and the Oni
had clearly been ‘got at’. In this event a vote was taken on Government’s attitude in
the House of Representatives, and the Northerners and officials tabled ten votes for
complete abstention; Bode Thomas and Akintola made it absolutely plain that,
whatever the decision of Council, they intended to speak for the Motion; the four
Western Ministers and Endeley voted for free speech, and the three Eastern Ministers
with Portfolio refused to vote or utter.
45. It may be as well to note here that Bode Thomas’s subsequent statement in
the House of Representatives, ‘that continually the officials and the North voted
together to down the other members of the Council,’ was a complete lie. On only two
occasions in its life had the Council seen officials voting solidly with the members of
one Region against either the opposition or the neutrality of Ministers from the
other two Regions. This was one occasion. The other occasion was in August, 1952,
when the Council of Ministers had decided unanimously that expert advice should be
sought on the position of Lagos as part of the West on the one hand, and as the
capital and principal port of Nigeria on the other. Having decided that such
assistance would be sought, the Council considered whether a public statement
should be made to that effect. The officials and the Easterners then voted together for
a statement, against the West and the North. Never before had officials and
Northerners voted solidly together.
46. During the few days that remained before the motion for self-government
actually came up in the House, most strenuous efforts were made by the Oni of Ife,
the Emir of Katsina, Chief Arthur Prest and the Lieutenant-Governors, West, North
and East to avert the disaster. Again, the depth of Northern feeling on the matter can
be evidenced by the fact that all efforts to get the Northern leaders to meet the
Western leaders, or even the Northern Central Ministers to meet the Western Central
Ministers, failed. The Westerners were arrogant and blustered whenever they were
approached, and the Northerners were cold and determined. Nevertheless, Chief
Arthur Prest came, on one occasion, near to saving the day, and very near it on
another. He wrote a memorandum for Awolowo and the party showing how
dangerous it was (because only Zik could profit) to induce a crisis. Prest’s own story
was that Akintola was persuaded and Prest went to bed happy that night. Next
morning Awolowo sent for him and told him that he had misrepresented to him
opinion in the Council of Ministers, and that Bode Thomas had now given him a
more correct version. He intended, therefore, to go ahead with the motion. On the
next occasion Prest went one better by persuading Akintola to come along with him
and say that Prest’s memorandum represented the truth. An additional page was
added to it which Prest hoped to get Akintola to sign, but although Akintola agreed
with it he was unwilling to sign it. Nevertheless, at a party executive meeting
Akintola did state that Prest’s version, both of events and of feelings, was the true
one. The matter was argued for an hour and a half and at one stage Prest said that he
had won; but once again flights of oratory by Bode Thomas carried the party leaders
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and the majority opinion was to go ahead with the motion. It was of interest that
Prest stated that Enahoro was supporting him at this meeting, and that the day was
lost once more simply because of the loss of face which the Action Group would
incur by its withdrawal: Zik, was bound to make capital out of that loss of face.
47. Meantime the House was going through the business of Committee of Supply.
Mr. Benson said he did not intend to recount the events when the motion came before
the House, save to draw attention to the fact that there were some ten motions down
on the Order Paper that day, with the self-government motion last but one. There were
also a large number of questions. When the House opened all the questions but two
were withdrawn and all the motions were similarly withdrawn, so that the 1956
motion was immediately before the House, and by 10.30 Enahoro had finished his
speech moving it. At 9.15 that morning the Oni of Ife had tendered his resignation to
His Excellency, stating that he had no other course before him; the Action Group party
had compelled him to promise them that he would vote in favour of the motion though
he had no intention of speaking on it. When His Excellency enquired what he meant
by ‘compel’ he made it clear that he feared intimidation and gangs of hooligans in Ife,
and that he could not for long retain his Stool save by the support of the Action Group.
He asked whether, if he defied the decision of the Council of Ministers and voted for
the motion, His Excellency would have to revoke his appointment as a Minister, and
His Excellency told him that that would necessarily follow. He then said that the only
course he could follow therefore was to resign before the motion came up in the
House, because if he voted for the motion—as he would have to—he should not be a
Minister at the time when he defied the Council’s decision. The Oni’s course of con-
duct (as distinct from his lack of judgment and guts) was therefore entirely correct;
whilst, as the Governor’s broadcast had shown, the other Western Ministers had
resigned after the motion had been disposed of, and in circumstances in which the
turn of events had made it entirely unnecessary for them to resign at all. Mr. Benson
also drew attention to the fact that it must have been sheer obstinacy which, in these
circumstances, led the Action Group leaders to walk out of the House and the Action
Group Ministers to resign. Mr. Fellowes had since said, and every Member of the House
who had followed events in the East knew well, that the range of debate on a dilatory
motion was to all intents and purposes coextensive with the range of debate on a sub-
stantive motion. Certainly the whole question of self-government in 1956 could have
been discussed on the dilatory motion, and Mr. Enahoro himself could have had
another go on the subject.
48. In conclusion the Governor’s Deputy said he was quite certain that everyone
present and, indeed, every officer in Nigeria was now saying ‘Well, what does
Government intend to do about the matter?’ There was no answer to that question at
the present moment. The Council of Ministers was carrying on with its work; it was
properly constituted and the remaining Ministers from the East and the North were
determined to show just that fact. His Excellency in pursuance of an arrangement he
had made as far back as the beginning of March, had flown to the United Kingdom
where he was discussing the whole situation with the Secretary of State and Colonial
Office officials. The Northern Members of the House and all their political leaders
had lost no time in shaking the dust of Lagos off their feet: they had vowed that they
would never come back to Lagos; and the Northern Central Ministers had returned
under clear instructions that they were to continue their work as Ministers with two
objects in view:—
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(a) to show Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom that the North
would do nothing to alienate Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom’s
sympathies; and
(b) to watch the situation from the point of view of the North.
In such circumstances time was absolutely essential to allow tempers to cool and
objective thinking to begin once more. Pending His Excellency’s return there was
nothing to be done beyond making every effort to spread the truth of the events
leading up to the crisis; and it was with this in view that he had taken the earliest
possible opportunity to get Heads of Departments together, who, through their
junior officers, represented virtually the only sure means of disseminating truth in
this country at the present time.
49. Mr. Benson said that for the last fifteen months it was well known that all the
proceedings of the Council were being distorted to Western political leaders by Bode
Thomas and Akintola, but it had perhaps not been fully realised until the last few
weeks to what an enormous extent these misrepresentations had spread amongst
Yoruba leaders and leading personalities generally. It was his sincere opinion now
that such lies as that about the North and the Officials always downing the West and
the East had been generally believed—in the West anyway; that belief was practically
ineradicable. The first great problem then before Government was how to get as
much as possible of these distortions corrected.
50. Mr. Benson was asked a number of questions and in reply to them made the
following points:—
He agreed that it was most important that as much publicity as possible
should be given to the work that was still being done by remaining Members
of the Council. Ministers should be encouraged to broadcast, but these
broadcasts must not be politics.
It seemed unlikely that the Action Group would stage a boycott in the West. They
would carry on. It was indeed true that action taken to get the truth over to the
people might induce them to stage such a boycott, but this was, in his opinion, much
the less of two evils. He felt that great risks would have to be taken in order to get the
truth across to the people. One thing in particular was of great importance; it would
be disastrous if the opinion grew up that ‘self-government was a thing not to be
discussed. In his view self-government ought to be discussed ad nauseem by debating
societies, by village councils, by Native Authority meetings and by every kind of
meeting which could be called for the purpose. District Officers ought to encourage
such discussions, though they would have to be extremely careful, particularly in the
West, to present themselves rather in the guise of chairmen at debating societies, and
it would be intensely valuable if they could ensure that Members of the Legislatures
took part in those discussions; the object, of course, would be to get across to the
people what was meant by self-government: it was extremely doubtful if Awolowo
himself knew precisely what he meant by it; he certainly had no appreciation of its
full implications. Mr. Benson cited Awolowo’s repeated assertions that there were
more British in India today than there had been ever before. What Awolowo failed to
realise was that those British were not in Government posts. Awolowo wanted to
have British in key Government posts and have self-government at the same time.
The true victor in the whole business was, as had of course been foreseen from the
beginning, Zik. The Action Group’s position had not been strengthened by the crisis.
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They might have consolidated some small elements of gangster opinion in Lagos and
Ibadan, but the N.C.N.C. was certainly stronger in the West than it had been before;
they had worried a large number of Yoruba businessmen and, unless within the next
few weeks they could break the power of the Obas finally, they had put themselves
into a difficult position there. They would not feel in difficulty vis-a-vis the Obas
unless there were a dissolution of the Western House.
The Zik Awolowo alliance might last a few weeks but the pressure points were too
great and it could never be a true alliance. Eastern Central Ministers thought Zik
would now be torn as between West and East and they might be right, but if Zik was
as astute as he usually had shown himself he had nothing now to prevent him from
concentrating first on the East.
Immediately after the explosion he had believed that both the North and the West
could be brought back to an August meeting of the House of Representatives. He now
thought it most improbable that the North could be so persuaded.
Chief Arthur Prest’s illness on the 31st March had, of course, been a diplomatic ill-
ness. Mr. Benson had had, at Prest’s request, a long session with him a few days before,
at which he had blown off all the steam and fury in the world about Bode Thomas and
Akintola. But Prest had only one interest in view and that was to come back as a Central
Minister. He was instructed firstly ‘by fear of a knife in his back,’ and secondly by his lack
of money. He was compelled therefore to make the kind of statements in the press that
he had been making and to declare his solidarity with the Action Group.
It was as yet too early to give any ideas of what form a future association at the
Centre might take. At that moment the whole problem was to dissuade the North
from committing economic suicide and severing all their connections with the other
Regions. Heads of Departments must also realise that within the next few months we
should be faced not merely with a North and South split, but with other separatist
movements; the most glaring example was, of course, the Cameroons. If the N.I.P.
won in the East, then there seemed to him to be a chance of holding the position as
regards the Cameroons: if the Zikists won, there would immediately be the strongest
demand for separation of the Cameroons from the rest of Nigeria.
51. Finally, Mr. Benson asked Heads of Departments to be most circumspect in
what they passed on to their junior officers. The rule must be that they should only
pass on as much as it was necessary to pass on to ensure that those junior officers
should have sufficient information to enable them properly to discharge their duties
to Britain and Nigeria. They must, therefore, be in a position to contradict gross and
apparent misstatements of fact; at the same time they must not have, obviously, the
details of the proceedings in the Council of Ministers, which he had thought it proper
to give to Heads of Departments.
193 CO 554/260 no 71 24 Apr 1953
[Political situation]: inward savingram no 950 from Mr Hopkinson to
Mr Lyttelton on meetings with Nigerian political leaders
My Telegram No. 575.
Following Personal from Minister of State. Begins.
The following is a fuller summary of subject matter of telegram under reference.
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On 22nd April in presence of Governor I had private discussion on Constitutional
Crisis with two Northern Central Ministers, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and Shettima
Kashim.1 Mohammadu Ribadu was unable to be present.
2. The two Northern Ministers were clearly deeply disturbed by events and their
views, though expounded with great calm and dignity, were charged with emotion.
Abubakar, who acted as spokesman, stressed the long-standing differences between
North and South. Even before the 1947 Constitution the South regarded the North
as backward and ignorant and as offering blind obedience to anybody in authority
whether black or white. He said that in the North over 90% of officials of all grades
were Southerners. They brought their wives and families and other villagers with
them to fill local jobs as messengers, labourers, etc. For the North Nigerianisation
meant Southernisation. For this reason the North preferred British officers wherever
possible, until they had enough trained officials of their own, since they would in due
course return to United Kingdom and not impede Northern development. But
because of their preference for British officers South accused North of being British
stooges.
3. North had long been fearful in its relations with other Regions but had
nevertheless tried to work with them. In face of the trickery and insults which they
had experienced, however, they could see little purpose in continuing to attempt to
work together.
4. The North would have preferred to gain more experience under the 1947
Constitution before attempting a revision. But South were insistent on change.
Under the new Constitution the North asked for 50% of seats in Central Legislature.
East agreed for sake of Nigerian unity. At a meeting at Enugu West agreed to 50% for
North, provided Lagos became part of West. Abubakar not present at this meeting
and much regretted acceptance by his Northern colleagues of West’s conditions.
Eventually, West got Lagos but North obtained 50% of seats only in face of strong
Western protest that North was preventing West from achieving its national
aspirations.
5. Under new Constitution Northern Central Ministers’ strong regional feelings
were increased by provocation by South but Governor insisted on all working
together. Without Governor’s insistence on unity Northern Ministers would not have
stuck it.
6. Informal meetings of Central Ministers were started to iron out regional
differences but Western Ministers used these meetings to commit Northern
Ministers on matters before they were discussed in Council. Northern Ministers
would not agree to this and they were accused of frustrating political progress of
Nigeria. It became clear that Western Ministers were disclosing confidential Council
discussions. British officials were accused of dividing Regions on such issues as
North/West boundary revenue allocation and status of Lagos. But fact was that unity
maintained only through British insistence.
7. In latest crisis North had tried to help in reestablishing good relations
between the Regions by holding discussions with Action Group representatives at
Kaduna. These discussions were continued at Ibadan. At that time crisis in East
developed and Action Group said that the North and West must come together. Later
1 Shettima Kashim Ibrahim, minister of social services, 1952–1955.
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if responsible elements came to power in the East that Region could be brought in.
But at the same time an attempt was made by the Action Group and N.P.C. to get the
North to agree to a hurried Press Release on a coalition between the West and the
North. The North said that they did not oppose self-government for Western and
Eastern Nigeria but did oppose it for Nigeria as a whole. Because of this the South
accused the North (quite erroneously) of opposing self-government on British
instructions. In Lagos unruly bands of hooligans were organised to jeer at Northern
Members of the House of Representatives (including Emirs) at end of last meeting of
the House. It was clear to Abubakar that the South despised the North and were
doing all they could not only to attack them in the South but to foster movements in
the North aimed at over-throwing the present Northern leaders. In his view no good
could come to the North from co-operation with the South.
8. I told Abubakar that I fully understood and greatly sympathised with the view
he had expressed. The Governor had given the picture in broad outline to you during
his recent visit to London and the Governor had your full support. It was clear that
the present Constitution would not work. H.M.G. hoped that it would be possible to
keep a united Nigeria. But big changes would have to be made. In our view this
would mean giving far greater powers to the Regions. All this would need very careful
working out and would take time. We would favour wide powers of self-government
in the Regions but we should want something kept in the Centre. When revision
came each Region would have right to go as fast or as slow as agreed for other
Regions. We proposed to wait to see the results of regional deliberations during next
few weeks or month and hoped that meanwhile nothing would be said to prejudice
eventual consideration of problem by H.M.G. who in this matter were working in
best interests of the North.
9. The two Northern Ministers thanked me for what I had told them and said
they were grateful for the opportunity given to them of expressing their views
10. On 23rd April I had private informal meeting with A.C. Nwapa, O. Arikpo and
E. Njoku at their request, to hear their views. They spoke quite freely and frankly and
their general attitude was most friendly. They said that in their view Awolowo had
not planned this crisis but he had been manoeuvred into his present position out of
fear of Bode Thomas. In the Council of Ministers the Western Ministers had
consistently taken a regional line even when it conflicted with their party line, e.g.
over the proposed Cement Industry. They were not moved by the national interest if
regional interests were not also served. Sometimes Western Ministers had agreed to
proposals made in Council of Ministers but had gone back on them after talking
outside the Council to Awolowo whose aim was to build up the Western Region at the
expense of central unity.
11. In the Eastern Central Ministers’ view, it had been a great mistake to allow
Lagos to be part of the West. It gave the West great strength and fostered their
regional nationalism. They thought in terms of the Gold Coast for the Western
Region. It gave them the feeling that they were ripe for self-government and were
only held back from this goal by being tied to the other Regions.
12. In discussing possible ways of meeting the present situation, I threw a fly
over them as to the desirability of some looser form of association. But the three
Ministers reacted strongly against this idea. They said that regional autonomy was
just what the West wanted, and were in fact quite prepared to contemplate complete
separation. In the Eastern view Nigerian unity was all important and that meant
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maintaining a strong Centre. Without strength at the Centre there would be no
Nigeria. They did not think that the West should be allowed to break up the unity of
the country. In their opinion if Lagos were taken away from the West and made a
separate Federal Capital and if the West were then told firmly that regional autonomy
could not be permitted to prejudice national unity the West would give way. The
Eastern Ministers also thought that if the West wished to put back the same four
Ministers at the Centre there should be no harm in that since it would show that they
were willing to take part in working the Constitution and it would show the
foolishness of their action in precipitating a crisis. I pointed out that two of them had
blotted their copybooks badly and that, above all, it would not do to give any
appearance of weakness. On this they agreed. As for the North, they realised that they
felt sore and hurt but they thought that they had not been permanently estranged. In
their opinion some Northerners’ views on this subject were over-gloomy. On this
point, however, I said I would of course have an opportunity myself to hear the views
of other Northerners during my forthcoming visit to Kaduna.
13. With regard to the present tie-up between Azikiwe and Awolowo, the Eastern
Ministers thought that it could not possibly last. Azikiwe, although irresponsible and
self-seeking, was really interested in preserving Nigerian unity and on this there was
a fundamental cleavage between him and Awolowo.
14. I hear that Awolowo and Azikiwe are having a meeting to decide, among
other things, whether they should ask for a joint interview with me. If they do I shall
see them. I shall, of course, in any case see Awolowo in Ibadan.2
2 See 194.
194 CO 554/260, no 79 29 Apr 1953
[Political situation]: inward savingram no 8 from Mr Hopkinson to Mr
Lyttelton on a meeting with AG leaders [Extract]
[Following his meetings with Northern and Eastern leaders, Hopkinson met Awolowo and
the Executive Committee of the AG in Ibadan on 26 Apr. At this meeting Awolowo put
forward various proposals to amend the constitution, including the appointment of a
prime minister at the centre.]
. . . In replying, I dealt with number of detailed points he had made, and, in particu-
lar, I referred to the danger of breaking up Nigerian unity through forcing a break-
down in the constitution. It seemed to me very foolish for a man to set fire to a
house he was in, especially if it was his own. Awolowo had likened relations
between the Western and Northern regions to a man with a stone tied to his leg
who, if he wished to walk, could only cut off the stone. I suggested that a better
analogy was a man with a broken leg who needed time for a bone to set, and it
would be foolish to amputate the leg merely to gain time. Awolowo and his col-
leagues took the point.
I said that Her Majesty’s Government recognised that drastic revision of the
constitution was needed and that changes to be made should be in the direction of
greater regional autonomy. I personally saw no objection to appointment of
Parliamentary Under-Secretaries in regions, but there were clearly difficulties about
doing so at the centre. Aim of greater regional autonomy seemed to me to be
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incompatible with his proposals for build up of Central Government. Awolowo
appeared to appreciate the force of this.
I reserved my comments on the other points, but promised that they would be
carefully studied by Her Majesty’s Government. I emphasised that Her Majesty’s
Government wanted Nigeria to progress towards self government within the
Commonwealth. I had no feelings about date of 1956 or any other date. We had
immediate political situation to deal with and changes required in the constitution
would take time to work out. In answer to a question by Awolowo I said that time
needed would be months, not weeks, but I thought would be less than a year, I also
assured him that there would be full consultation. Meanwhile it was essential that
Action Group should not say or do anything to alienate other regions.
I met Awolowo, Awokoya1 and Enahoro in the afternoon to agree communique for
the press. Afterwards I took Awolowo aside and asked him what ideas he had for the
solution of the present crisis. At the morning session Bode Thomas had given
defence of his resignation and subsequent behaviour, which I had rejected. I realised
that for the Action Group it was a question of face. The Governor could hardly be
expected to accept the same four names. Awolowo had no suggestions to make, but I
urged him strongly to consider the problem in the interests of a wider settlement.
His attitude at the end of the morning meeting and in the afternoon was most
friendly.
Full report of the discussion follows by air bag. Ends.
1 Stephen Oluwole Awokoya, Western Region minister of education, 1952–1956.
195 CO 554/318, no 25 Apr 1953
[Eastern Region crisis]: CO note for Mr Lyttelton on the Nigeria
(Constitution) (Amendment) Order in Council 1953
[The Nigeria (Constitution) (Amendment) Order in Council 1953 to allow for the
dissolution of regional houses on the advice of regional executives was laid before
Parliament on 1 May 1953.]
Section 118 of the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951, provides that the
Lieutenant-Governor of a Region may prorogue the Legislative Houses of such
Region or either of them, and, further that the Legislative Houses of every Region
shall be deemed to be dissolved upon a dissolution of the (central) House of
Representatives. There is in the Order no provision to enable a Regional Legislative
House to be dissolved except on a dissolution of the House of Representatives.
Recent developments, in the Eastern Region of Nigeria in particular, have made it
clear that circumstances are liable to arise in which it may be politically desirable for
a particular Regional House to be dissolved, although no reason for a simultaneous
dissolution of the Houses in the other Regions or of the House of Representatives
may exist.
The particular circumstances in the Eastern Region, referred to in the last
paragraph, are that the National Executive Committee of the main political party of
that Region (the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons), has attempted to
force members of the Regional Executive Council to resign in order that the leader of
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the party, who is not himself a member of the Eastern legislature, might reallocate
portfolios to members more ready to follow the party line. This the majority of those
Members have declined to do, despite a motion of ‘no confidence’ in them adopted by
a majority in the Eastern Regional House. Although the continuation of these
Ministers in office is fully justified by the provisions of the existing constitution, the
business of the House has been interrupted and if the present uneasy situation
continues when the House in due course reassembles, it will be politically desirable
that the Lieutenant-Governor should be in a position to dissolve the House and
arrange for new elections.
The turn of political events in the Western Region makes it not unlikely that it
may also become desirable to dissolve the Houses of that Region.
The amending Order now submitted for the approval of Her Majesty in Council
provides for the separate dissolution of Regional Legislative Houses, for the
continuation of the Region’s representation in the (central) House of Representatives
and Council of Ministers pending the election of new regional representatives, and
for certain other consequential amendments.
196 CO 554/236, no 51 1 May 1953
[Political situation]: letter from B E Sharwood-Smith to T B
Williamson on relations between the Northern Region and Southern
political leaders
Firstly, we are delighted to hear that you are hoping to pay us another visit; we shall
look forward to seeing you.
Secondly, thank you very much for your letter of 18th April, and for your
undertaking to help FDK Williams. Now for my ‘system of coloured lights’.1 What I
meant to convey was that a ‘green light’ exercise would be designed to illustrate the
safest and best course to pursue, a ‘red light’ exercise would illustrate either what not
to do in terms of historical evidence elsewhere, or what might be done provided the
manifold dangers are fully realised, and, finally, an ‘amber light’ exercise would be
one which offered material from which useful lessons could be learnt, provided one
looked before leaping. I am sorry that I puzzled you. My intention was, in terms of
my own Secretariat, to make it clear that these exercises were to be undertaken with
differing objects in view. In other words, the exercise on the effect on the Northern
Region of separatism should not be undertaken with a view to showing how
separatism could be effected, but rather to show how extremely dangerous an
operation it would be.
To turn to the other matter you mention. My Governor has already attempted at
considerable length to persuade Awolowo that he has got the Northern picture
wrong, but without any success. My personal view is that you must bring yourself
regretfully to realise that Awolowo and his ilk, and Azikwe and his for that matter,
are just not interested in reforms in the Northern Region. In fact, to put it quite
bluntly, they would regard it as ‘so much bad news,’ because the North becomes the
stronger thereby. Awolowo’s plan, which he proclaims for all to hear, is to destroy
1 See 189.
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Northern unity by encouraging any extremist group he can find and exploiting any
grievances he can uncover. His present line, loudly published, is to persuade the
world that what he terms ‘the Sardauna Group’ is a mere ‘handful of invaders’, to use
his own expression, which is dominating the masses of the country. When the appeal
to the Region for a mandate is complete, you will learn how much there is in that
particular myth!
In terms of the progress of Nigeria, or I might even say the survival of Nigeria,
Messrs. A & Z. are principally what Messrs. A. & Z. say and do in public gatherings,
and what they write in their lamentable daily publications; i.e. their effect on the
public is what is relevant. They are hag-ridden by their ‘egos’, and it is highly
dangerous to sublimate them in any sense.
Finally, there is another matter. It has been fashionable in Nigeria and at home for
so many years to refer to the reactionary outlook and the corrupt practices
pertaining in the Northern Administrations. It has been, on the other hand,
unfashionable to refer to the probably far worse state of corruption existing in the
other Regions despite the almost daily admissions to this effect made both in the
Local Press and by Eastern and Western Members of the Legislatures. Such
exposures, for instance, as the Storey Report pass almost without comment. Were
such a Report written about Kano, for instance, one feels that the Heavens would
shake! I do not wish for one moment to pretend that we are better that we are. We, at
least, are getting on with the cleansing process where it is most necessary. It is not
inapt to remember that when the Elections took place in 1951, there were no
accusations of corruption in the North, whereas in the East and West the stench rose
to High Heaven.
197 CO 554/236, no 47 3 May 1953
[Northern Region]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to T B Williamson on
the changing political situation in the Northern Region. Enclosure:
letter from B E Sharwood-Smith to the Emir of Kano, Feb 1953
In my letter of the 5th of March (G. 103/54) about recent developments in the North,
I mentioned that Sharwood-Smith’s next target was Kano. You will be interested to
hear that he has again been successful in obtaining important changes.
The Emir of Kano’s Council consisted until recently of his eldest son, the Ciroma;
his younger brother, the Galadima; the aged and nearly blind Madaki; the equally
aged and conservative Wali, (who died a few months ago); and the Sarkin Shanu, who
alone had a secondary-school education and progressive ideas. In practice the
Council had very little influence and the Emir depended almost entirely on the
Ciroma.1
I now enclose copies of a letter which Sharwood-Smith wrote to the Emir of Kano
before his visit and of the informal note of his subsequent discussions with the
Emir,2 which will give you a good idea of the changes that have now been made. The
1 Alhajji Abdullahi Bayero, Emir of Kano, 1926–1953, died in Dec 1953. He was succeeded by his son,
Muhammad Sanusi.
2 Informal note not printed.
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most interesting development is the inclusion for the first time of a member of the
Hausa commercial community. Alhassan dan Tata is an old man and he may not take
a very active part in the Council’s deliberations, but the mere fact that he has been
accepted is in itself a big step forward and I have every hope that it may soon lead to
the inclusion of others who are not members of the ruling Fulani families.
When Sharwood-Smith forwarded the letter and informal note to us he remarked
on the astonishing change in outlook that had taken place in the North in recent
months. This, he considers, is fundamentally due to a growing realisation of the
implication of events and to innate commonsense in political matters. The Region is
waking up very rapidly.
Enclosure to 197
After greetings, I write to you concerning the matter of your Council, which, as you
are aware, has caused me grave concern dating from the time when I was Resident,
Kano. Under the pressure to which the traditional system of Government in the
North is now being subjected, it is quite impossible for there to be either a feeling of
confidence and stability or hope of real progress for Kano if your Council consists, as
it does now, to all intents and purposes, of the Ciroma and little else. I am fully aware
of the Ciroma’s administrative ability and of his experience and industry, but the fact
must be faced that in Kano there is a powerful and mounting opposition to the state
of things as they are, and the only way to counter that opposition is by broadening
and strengthening your Council. To leave matters as they are, I am convinced, will
only lead to disaster, and, may be before very long, to the disappearance of your
House from the high position that it now holds. Believe me, I write as a friend who
has known Kano for many years dating from 1924; I also write as a friend possessing
the very deepest respect for your personal integrity, deep knowledge, and sense of
justice. Unhappily the time has passed when one man alone, unaided by others of
wisdom, experience and authority could control the affairs of Kano. I must,
therefore, urge you to take heed of the advice that I and your Resident have so often
given, and that is to introduce fresh blood into your Council, so that it may be
strong, independent and, most important of all, trusted and respected by the people
of Kano.
Firstly, with regard to the post of Wali; I cannot under any circumstances accept
the recommendation which has been made. All my information is to the effect that
the present Alkali does not carry the respect or the confidence of the people. Neither
am I prepared to press any recommendation on behalf of the administration; such
things must come from within and not from without.
Secondly, with regard to the rest of your Council; I have a very [sic: great?] respect
for Sarkin Shanu’s ability and character, but he is heavily over-burdened and
unsupported. Equally, I agree that the Galadima can offer valuable advice on district
matters, but the Madaki has long passed his period of usefulness, and the time has
come when he should be retired. M. Bello is a Minister and his counsel is by that
nature to all intents and purposes lost to you except upon rare occasions. His duties
are, I know, being carried out by Alhaji Usuman Gwarzo, who is well-educated, but
who does not carry much weight of his own. I must earnestly urge you to adopt the
following courses:—
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(a) Firstly to recommend as a successor to the Wali a man whom I can be assured
has the respect and confidence of the people, both as a jurist and as a man.
(b) Secondly, honourably to retire the Madaki and to recommend a successor of
authority and experience whom the people of Kano will respect.
(c) Thirdly, to consider two further appointments:—
(i) One member of traditional standing, possibly drawn from the District Heads,
with modern education, to be in charge of certain of the services now the
responsibility of the Sarkin Shanu, whose burden should be reduced.
(ii) Another from amongst the commercial community.
As you are aware, it is from the more radical elements of this extremely wealthy,
powerful and sophisticated community that N.E.P.U. and the forces of disorder gain
their adherents. I am convinced, as I have often told you personally, that this
community has long felt itself under-privileged, both in terms of its share in the
administration of affairs and of its status, social and political, vis-a-vis the ruling
caste of Kano. Provided you choose the right man, you have much to gain and
nothing to lose by securing an alliance with this large and very influential section of
the Kano community. Should you and all you represent become further estranged
from them, the result could be disastrous. I ask you to consider very carefully what I
have written in this letter and to let me know what your conclusions are. I must
emphasise that what is to be done must come from within and not from without.
Failing a solution, I do not intend to impose any solution of my own; I should rather
feel myself compelled to ask you to seek advice on a broader front than is at present
available to you.
198 CO 554/261, no 92A 5 May 1953
[Amendment of the constitution]: CO note of a meeting with Mr
Lyttelton on the need to reform the constitution
The Secretary of State assured the Minister of State that the House would be
sympathetic to delay in making a statement on the situation in Nigeria before the
end of May. He felt that the present policy should be to wait until after the Northern
House of Assembly had met before making any statement to the House of Commons.
When such a statement was made he felt that the line should be to state that there
would have to be less Central responsibility in Nigeria and more devolution to the
Regions. In his opinion there should be some retracing of our steps; if too much were
done at the present moment it might result in a disintegration of Nigeria. Short of
adopting the suggestion of a non-political High Commission he felt that the list of
subjects should be revised in order to place more responsibility on the Regional
authorities.
Mr. Gorell Barnes felt that the nub was going to be the North’s view that there
should be no further politics at the Centre. He felt that the only way of getting over
this would be by ‘buying’ the North since the latter were afraid of domination by
Southern Civil Servants. He put forward the suggestion that this might be done by
putting the whole of a future slice of C.D. and W. Funds into the North. This
suggestion was not practicable now, in the opinion of those present. It was felt,
however, that this possibility should be kept in mind.
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The Minister of State pointed out that what had been discussed in Nigeria between
himself and the political leaders would probably soon leak out and that an early
statement would be desirable. There was some discussion on the machinery for
achieving a revision of the Constitution and it was agreed that early thinking was
required in the Colonial Office. It was agreed that a start should be made with
revising the list of subjects to be dealt with respectively by the Centre and the
Regions, with a view to seeing whether any further subjects might be devolved to the
Regions.
199 CO 554/318, no 38 6 May 1953
[Eastern region crisis]: inward telegram no 11 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Lyttelton on the dissolution of the Eastern House of Assembly
[The dissolution of the Eastern House of Assembly reported in this document effectively
marked a triumph for Azikiwe, who now resigned from the Western House of Assembly to
stand for election in the East. In the subsequent Eastern Region elections held in Sept-
Dec 1953, the NCNC won 72 of the 97 seats and the NIP of Eyo Ita only nine. Three seats
were won by the UNP and the 13 Cameroon seats by the KNC.]
My telegram Personal No. 5.
Eastern House of Assembly opened yesterday and first Government business was
motion to reappoint Muna as a Regional Minister.1 Motion lost by 45 votes to 32,
official and special members not, of course, voting. Ballot was secret, but it is
believed that four out of thirteen Cameroons members voted with N.C.N.C.
2. Government motion then introduced declaring united front with other
regions for self government in 1956 and proposing the establishment of a committee
to consult and negotiate with other regions for the achievement of this objective.
N.C.N.C. took the line that they had already made the position clear and no further
indication to the country on this question necessary. They (? could omitted) win self
government without the aid of N.I.P. Thereupon N.C.N.C. proposed dilatory motion,
which was carried. Note in (corrupt group ?passing) the anomaly that N.C.N.C.
members walked out of the Central House because dilatory motion had been moved
on the same subject by Northern members.
3. At subsequent meeting of the Executive Council the Lieutenant Governor was
advised unanimously to dissolve the Eastern House, and he will do so this morning.
Indications yesterday were that dissolution was expected and desired by both parties.
4. Above represents victory for Azikiwe and follows inevitably, like Greek tragedy,
recent activities by his arch enemies the Action Group.
5. General assessment of the present position follows earliest possible by bag. In
the meantime, you will appreciate that this result in the East can only harden
Northern determination not to compromise with the South. Eastern elections likely
to take between three and four months. Estimate of attitude likely to be adopted by
the N.C.N.C. towards loosening of association at the centre also follows. Your
telegram Personal No. 54 refers.
1 See 175.
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200 CO 968/401, no 110 7 May 1953
[Future of RWAFF]: minutes by J N A Armitage-Smith1 and R J Vile
on the decisions of the West African Forces Conference
[The West African Forces Conference which involved representatives from all four West
African colonies and the UK, was chaired by Hopkinson in Lagos between 20–25 Apr. The
major issues intended to be considered included the size of the West African military and
how its costs should be met, though much of the discussion in fact came to centre on
demands from the Gold Coast and Nigeria for greater control over their land forces.]
Copies are now available of the Report of the West African Forces Conference which
was held at Lagos at the end of April. I have sent one copy to Lt. Col. Russell-
Edmunds of the Treasury (who was present at the Conference); and I attach at the
back of the file three loose copies,2 of which I suggest Mr. Gorell-Barnes, Mr.
Williamson and Mr. Vile might care to take one each.
2. The main purpose of the Conference was to review the arrangements agreed at
the 1949 Conference for financing the West African Forces; but in the event a very
much wider field than this was covered, as the report shows. The chief interest of the
Nigerian and Gold Coast delegations, in fact, was not financial; it was rather a
determination to obtain a greater degree of control over their land forces than they
felt they had at present. This issue dominated the first three days of the Conference,
and explains the considerable length which has been given to the subject in the
report (see paragraphs 3 to 8).
3. The financial settlement which was eventually reached was satisfactory to all
the four West African Governments, though as I shall show later there is a tiresome
little legacy of the Conference which we shall have to settle with the War Office.
4. One of the chief merits of the Conference was the ‘full and frank’ discussion
that took place on subjects like African Officers’ pay, pension codes, training of
African Officers etc., which were not technically on the Conference’s agenda. Apart
from the fact that a number of loose ends were thus tied up, there is no doubt that
both the West African delegates and those from the U.K. found great mutual benefit
in exchanging points of view on these subjects in a way which might not have been
possible had the Conference been held in the U.K.
5. The report speaks for itself, but I should perhaps draw attention to the
following points in it:—
(1) I have already mentioned the comparatively large part of the report which is
devoted to the question of control of the local forces: see paragraphs 3 to 8. Some
difficulty was experienced in drafting these paragraphs, and the result is rather
long-winded; but the West African Ministers agreed to the form of words, and I
doubt whether anything much shorter would have been acceptable. It will be
noticed that the aim of these paragraphs is to make it appear as if this report was
the start of a new era in the history of the four territorial forces making up the
Royal West African Frontier Force. In fact much of these paragraphs is a re-
statement of the present position. In paragraph 6 however there is a
recommendation that the West African Governments should invite the Army
Council to appoint a General Officer Commanding in Chief, a proposal which was
1 J N A Armitage-Smith, principal CO, 1948; ass sec 1960. 2 Not printed.
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accepted without demur by the War Office representatives; and, more important,
in paragraph 7 there is the recommendation that an Army Advisory Council for
West Africa should be established: the idea is that this Council should meet at least
once a year to hear a report by the G.O.C. in C. of the existing state of the four
territorial forces, and to discuss West African Army matters in general; and that by
this means the West African Governments would feel that they were really ‘in’ on
the running of their Armies.
On this question of Armies, paragraph 4(a) recommends that each Government
should consider enacting legislation to provide for the integration of its Regiment
and supporting troops into a single military organisation known as, e.g. the
Nigerian Army, Nigerian Defence Force or any other suitable title. This question of
title proved impossible to decide at the Conference, and it was thought that it was
a matter which might well be further discussed in the Army Advisory Council.
From the U.K. point of view perhaps the most satisfactory achievement in this
section of the report is the full retention of the concept and functions of H.Q. West
Africa Command. Before the Conference opened we had understood that this
concept would be attacked on the ground that it was an organisation imposed
upon West Africa from outside and interfered with the growing tendency in the
minds of West African Ministers towards controlling their own individual
territorial forces. The War Office representatives, however, were able to satisfy
West African delegates that H.Q. West Africa Command was in fact carrying out a
whole number of very valuable and essential co-ordinating functions which
individual West African Governments were in no position yet to replace.
(2) Paragraphs 30 to 36 deal with the financial settlement. As will be seen from
paragraph 35, the total contributions offered by the four West African
Governments together amounted to £2,476,500. This was a little less than the U.K.
delegation were hoping for, but I am quite satisfied that it represents the
maximum which the territories can afford or can persuade their Legislatures to
accept. Indeed, the difficulty experienced by the Nigerian and Gold Coast delegates
in raising their figure is shown by their refusal to include in their contribution the
comparatively trifling cost of training African Officers.
The report is mercifully silent on the negotiations that took place about the U.K.
share of the cost. The West African delegates pointed out that they were not
interested in the distinction which the U.K. had to draw between the War Office
and the Colonial Services Votes, and consequently it was agreed that the total
money to be found from these two Votes should be shown as a single U.K.
contribution of £3,023,500. But behind this figure there lies a somewhat troubled
story. As paragraph 32 states, the services which the War Office agreed to accept as
a proper charge to the War Office Vote amounted to £785,000. Mr. Gardner began
by stating that figure as his offer, and later, under some pressure, he increased his
offer by £100,000. Before the Conference opened however he told the rest of the
U.K. delegation that he had £1 million set aside in his Vote for West African forces,
and stated that if pressed he would bid up to that limit. In the event however he did
not do so, even though it should have been clear to him that the West African
Governments had honestly reached their financial limit. In the difficult situation
created it became necessary for me to show that, although the Colonial Services
Vote was a residual Vote in this context, we were very willing to play a generous
part in the settlement, and I said that the Colonial Services Vote would bear
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£1,938,500. This had the effect of leaving the final £200,000 of the U.K. share
unaccounted for; and as Mr. Gardner declined to offer the further £115,000 which
he had been authorised by his superiors to do, I felt unable to make any further
concession on the Colonial Services Vote. There is in my opinion no doubt that we
should press Mr. Gardner very hard indeed to accept £115,000 out of this
remaining £200,000; and in order to avoid tiresome correspondence Mr. Gorell-
Barnes has, I believe, agreed to invite Mr. Gardner to a meeting. Mr. Gardner has
now returned from West Africa, and I will arrange the meeting at Mr. Gorell-
Barnes’ convenience.
(3) I need not comment in detail on the question of works services, beyond saying
that the Gold Coast Government’s contribution towards their cost is decidedly
generous, and the Nigerian Government’s by no means unsatisfactory. The
questions of African Officers’ pay, pensions, etc., will be dealt with on the
individual files.
(4) On the question of printing the report, I understood from Mr. Benson before I
came away that the Nigerian Government could handle that perfectly well. I have
told the War Office about this, and am awaiting their views. I do not think that it is
necessary for the report to be printed in this country.
I know that the West African Governments are extremely keen that the report
shall be approved by all the five participating Governments at the earliest moment.
I am sure that the Minister of State will agree that this is a fair statement of the
West African Governments’ views and that he will be willing to submit the report
to the Secretary of State as soon as possible.
J.N.A.A-S
7.5.53
The major impression which has been left on me by the report of the West African
Forces Conference is that it has been extremely valuable in getting the West African
Governments as they are now constituted to understand the functions of the Army,
and to support the measures which are necessary in order to ensure that there is no
gulf between the Army on the one hand and Governments and public opinion on the
other. Although it was not, as far as I could tell, the intention that the Conference
should primarily fulfil this function, I am sure that we can only welcome very much
indeed the full discussion which took place, and the recommendations under
paragraphs 3 to 8.
2. I think it is also safe to say that the educational effect of the Conference was
not confined to the West African Governments but also extended to the War Office
representatives. If this is the case then we should have less difficulty in the future in
persuading the War Office to take an understanding attitude towards military
problems in West Africa. The report contemplates further discussions in London on a
number of questions of particular difficulty, and I think we shall have to be careful to
ensure that the general atmosphere of understanding which now exists is not
dispelled in the later discussions.
3. Mr. Williamson may wish to comment further on the way in which the
Nigerian delegation appears to have been the only one in step from time to time. I
know the difficulties in West Africa in getting the Governments to agree on a
common attitude, and if no more progress can be made in this matter then we shall
have to accept the difficulties. I cannot however escape the impression that the
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Nigerian delegation were being unduly pernickety, and I wonder if this stickiness on
matters of relative detail does not derive much more from officials than from
Ministers.
4. Mr. Bourdillon will wish to comment on paragraph 5(2) of Mr. Armitage-
Smith’s minute above. When we have the proposed meeting with Mr. Gardner we
might at the same time, if Mr. Gorell-Barnes agrees, invite the Treasury to be present
so that even if we fail there and then to reach agreement with the War Office on the
allocation of the U.K. share between their Vote and ours we can nevertheless agree
with Treasury concurrence that the settlement of this question need not delay the
notification of H.M.G.’s approval of the report.
R.J.V.
7.5.53
201 CO 554/261, no 98 9 May 1953
[Political situation]: inward savingram no 1109 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on the need for a statement on the
revision of the constitution. Enclosure: An assessment of the political
situation in Nigeria on 9 May 1953
At our talks in London on 15th April1 it was decided that no pronouncement should
be made regarding the revision of the Constitution—so as to loosen association at
the Centre and to grant much greater autonomy to the Regions—until after the
Minister of State’s visit and until after the meetings to be held during May, of the
Legislative Houses of all three Regions.
It only remains for the Northern meetings to take place—they begin on the 18th
of May and should finish about the 25th—but recent developments point to the
absolute necessity for a statement to be made immediately thereafter, preferably
within a matter of days. I refer particularly to the victory of the N.C.N.C. in the
Eastern House of Assembly on the 5th of May, followed by the dissolution of that
House and an announcement by the majority of the Cameroons Members, led by Dr.
Endeley, that because of their insistent demand for separate Regional status they will
take no part in the Elections in the Eastern Region. It is also vitally important that
Her Majesty’s Government should not leave the Northern leaders in doubt about
their determination to fulfil their obligations to the seventeen million people of
Northern Nigeria.
Events in Nigeria at this time move fast and the situation can change from day to
day, but I feel strongly that we should be giving attention now to the kind of
statement that might be made by you on behalf of H.M.G.
To assist the consideration of this proposal I have had an assessment made of the
political situation as on 9th May, 1953, and I enclose a copy of this.
In the light of this assessment, which is made before the Northern Legislatures
meet and which may be altered by developments in the next week or two, the kind of
statement that I have in mind might be built up on the following framework:—
1 See 190.
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Experience over the past fifteen months has shown that it is not possible in
present circumstances for the three Regions of Nigeria to work together
effectively in a federation so closely knit as that for which the present
Constitution provides; H.M.G. in the U.K., while greatly regretting this, are
not prepared to compel any Region, against its will, to continue in such close
association; H.M.G. therefore envisage that the Constitution must be redrawn
to provide for greater Regional autonomy and for the removal of powers of
intervention by the Centre in matters which can, without detriment to other
Regions, be placed entirely within Regional competence, while at the same
time ensuring that the essential economic and defence requirements of all
Regions are secured. In order to ensure these vital requirements of all
Regions there will continue to be a need for a Central organisation, and the
form which that Central organisation should take, and the powers which
must be reserved to it, will now be the subject of urgent consideration. In this
work H.M.G. in the U.K. would wish to work in association with the leaders of
the people in all three Regions, and the first requirement, therefore, is to
decide how this work can best proceed. To this end H.M.G. will invite
representatives from each Region to visit London for discussions in the
Colonial Office and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. It is H.M.G.’s
intention to carry through the projected reform of the Constitution in the
shortest time possible, but in a territory of such a size, with so large a
population, with so many different groupings, and with so many shades of
public opinion, the work will inevitably take time. While that work is carried
out Nigeria will continue to be governed under its existing Constitutional
Instruments (which include the Letters Patent and the Royal Instructions to
the Governor and the Lieutenant-Governors) and it will be necessary for the
leaders in all three Regions to ensure that the Central Government is so
composed that it is enabled to carry out its caretaker task. That task will be
impossible if those composing the Central Council of Ministers are persons
who cannot work together; it is the clear duty, therefore, of the Regions to
ensure that the Ministers sent forward by the Regional Houses to the Centre
are people who will prove determined and able to work harmoniously with
the representatives of the other Regions; and any failure by those responsible
to recognise this essential requirement could only result in the use by the
Governor of his reserved powers to ensure that, during the necessary interim
period, the good government of Nigeria in the interest of all its people is
maintained.
It will be apparent that if a statement on the above lines is to achieve its object—to
put us into the position where, for at least a year, the territory can be administered
peacefully and effectively whilst the reform of the Constitution is carried out—a
considerable degree of firmness will have to be shown. Firmness must be shown to
the North, who must continue to play their part in both the executive and the
legislature at the Centre; this will go far more against the grain for them than is
generally recognised. Firmness must be shown to the East; if N.I.P. wins, to persuade
them that they must, in the interests of the East, accept a loosening at the Centre in
order to avoid the disappearance of the Centre; and if the N.C.N.C. win, to persuade
them of the same truth, and that they must send to the Centre people with whom the
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Ministers from the other Regions will be prepared to work. And finally, but most
immediately, great firmness must be shown to the West on this same last point; and
furthermore, on the point that power, for this interim period, will lie where the
present Constitution places it, and in the last resort with the Lieutenant-Governor
and the Governor.
I have not had an opportunity to consult the Lieutenant-Governors on this
proposal but they are visiting Lagos on 13th May and I shall let you have their views
immediately thereafter.
My reason for suggesting that Nigerian leaders should be invited to go to London
to discuss how the revision should be carried out is that it seems to me that if the
first talks take place in London—where the participants will be away from the tense,
emotional, quarrelsome atmosphere of Nigeria at this time—and if the discussion at
this first stage is restricted to the mechanics of the projected review, there may be a
reasonable chance that action towards the revision of the Constitution, with its truly
formidable problems, can start calmly. It was contemplated, at our talks on the 15th
of April, that part of the discussion on the revision of the Constitution should take
place in London.
I shall be most grateful if you can let me have, as soon as possible, your first
reactions to these proposals. There will be difficult problems to decide regarding
representation of Regions and political parties, and these have been aggravated by
the recent declaration by a part of the Southern Cameroons bloc. I shall send my
views on this aspect after consulting the Lieutenant-Governors.
I shall also keep you constantly informed of further developments as they occur.
Enclosure to 201
Political differences between Northern political leaders on the one hand and
Southern political leaders (excluding the Eastern ‘National Independence Party’) on
the other, the original causes of which were deep-seated, and which had been
hardening over many months, flared into an open breach on the 31st of March. The
spark which fired the magazine (but it was no more than this) was the Action Group
motion of Self Government in 1956.2
2. Northern political leaders returned to the North with two objects in view:—
(a) to check their firm belief that they had the North solidly behind them; and
(b) if they found that they had solid support, to stand on it and demand separation
of Northern Nigeria from the rest of Nigeria. (N.E.P.U. is not a negligible force
despite the discreditable nature of its present leaders, but although it will continue
to attack the Native Authority systems and gain support by uncovering cases of
oppression and injustice, it does not follow that its members are solidly with
Southern political parties. There are signs that N.E.P.U. may split on the North
versus South issue).
Both political leaders and Emirs stated categorically at the time that they would
never attend a further meeting of the House of Representatives. Northern Central
Ministers followed the other Northerners up to Kaduna two days later. When they
2 See 184.
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returned to Lagos on the 7th April they came with clear instructions that they were
to continue to do their work as Central Ministers; but only on the clear
understanding that there must be time for the drastic revision of the Constitution
which they had in mind, and that during that time the North must do nothing to
prejudice the North’s position vis-a-vis Britain. There was full and openly-expressed
realisation of the North’s dependence on Britain—
(a) to maintain peace; and
(b) to ensure that the North were permitted to advance politically at the rate at
which the North wished to go; and were not compelled to accept further political
advance at a time when it meant Southern domination.
3. The Lieutenant-Governor’s plan, in the face of this cold, implacable
determination, was to convince the Northern political leaders and Emirs by cold,
implacable facts and objective reasoning (at which the Northerners, when their
tempers are cool, excel) that it would be economic suicide for the North to sever, or
seriously weaken, their links with the rest of Nigeria. In the face of their then spirit it
was essential for the Lieutenant-Governor and his officers to show a complete
understanding of their point of view in order that they might keep with them in their
journey through the wilderness and lead them back, gently and firmly, to safety. For
this the Lieutenant-Governor and his officers also needed time, and this was provided
by the decision that a joint meeting of the Northern Houses of Assembly and Chiefs
should not take place until 18th May. The Lieutenant-Governor has hitherto been
successful beyond expectation,
(a) in dissuading Northern political leaders from making pronouncements which
they might later wish to retract. (The Sardauna of Sokoto’s broadcast early in April
and subsequent press releases did nothing more than explain to the North, and to
the country at large, the united stand Northern Members of the House of
Representatives had taken, and the reasons which led them to take that stand. Not
once has anything been said which could adversely affect the National
Independence Party in the East. There has been no attack on Azikiwe or the
N.C.N.C. There has, indeed, been no personal attack on any Southern political
leader save in so far as an objective account of happenings during the meeting of
the House of Representatives involved criticism of the actions of Action Group
leaders. The emphasis throughout has been on the North’s unwillingness to be
hurried along at a pace which the people of the North would not agree to their
leaders adopting);
(b) in persuading the Northern political leaders that, for the vital needs of the
Northern Region, there must be some form of association with the other Regions
at the Centre. Their ideas on this particular question are still necessarily vague. In
their meeting with the Minister of State at Kaduna they showed that they are
thinking of something on the lines of a High Commission like the East Africa High
Commission, but more limited in its scope. They have not excluded the idea of
some form of small Central Legislature and Executive to run essentially Central
organisations; but their hope is to arrange that those organisations and
institutions can, for the most part, be run by statutory corporations or self-
contained and self-financing departments; and their ideas on the composition of
any Central Executive and Legislature are that they should consist largely of
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British officers and, for the rest, of specially selected and nominated Regional
representatives. On one thing they are, and will continue to be, adamant: British
control of defence, including Police.
4. The Action Group representatives remained in, or kept visiting, Lagos for the
first week or ten days in April. Their newspapers and all their public utterances were
completely uninhibited, the main theme being condemnation of the Northern
political leaders as a reactionary minority (‘the Sardauna group’) working as tools of
the British, with two objects in view:—
(i) to keep down the alleged mass of popular opinion in the North which would
otherwise revolt against the Native Authority system and declare itself at one with
the Action Group;
(ii) to prevent the South from advancing politically at its proper and justified
speed to Self Government. The British and the Northern political leaders were
working hand-in-glove with these objects in view.*
5. When Action Group leaders returned to their Region they made it clear that
they intended firmly and vigorously to continue their Governmental work in the
Western Region. They realised that it is more than ever important for them to
maintain party solidarity. They know:—
(a) that some of their policies are unpopular with the people—notably the sharply
increased capitation tax;
(b) that the non Yorubas of the ‘Mid-West’ resent the Yoruba domination of the
party;
(c) that the Obas, though they have allied themselves with the Party, secretly fear
and resent its power and the consequent weakening of their own status and
influence.
Additional dangers are the spectre (which they themselves have brought to life) of a
triumphant Azikiwe; and personal rivalries within the party which might lead to a
struggle for personal power.
In the face of these difficulties and dangers Awolowo has set himself rigidly to
enforce a strong party ‘discipline’, and the existence of these difficulties and dangers
has enabled him to do this successfully. The party has felt compelled to refuse
overtures from the Centre (an invitation to send a Regional Minister to join the
Nigerian delegation at the Forces Conference was refused), and to insist that only the
four Ministers who resigned should fill the vacancies in the Council of Ministers.
6. The Action Group’s meeting with the Minister of State on the 26th April3
showed a readiness, indeed a desire, to weaken the bonds tying the Regions to the
* Note here the conflict between two basic fears:
(a) the intense, real, and openly-expressed fear on the part of the North that further political advance now
would mean (because Southerners hold so many key Civil Service and Commercial positions in the North)
complete Southern domination of the North; and
(b) the intense, real, but concealed fear on the part of the West that delay in further political progress,
when the North is catching up so fast, would mean domination of the West’s six million people by the
North’s seventeen million.
3 See 194.
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Centre, but always in order to bring more power to the political leaders in the Region
and to weaken the power of political leaders at the Centre. The quite impracticable
suggestion for a Prime Minister at the Centre and for an Upper House with equal
representation of all three Regions betokened either lip service to the idea of a united
Nigeria, or (once again) a complete misassessment of the strength of the North and
the solidity of Northern opinion. Most significant, because it has been most
consistent, is the demand that control of policy in regard to the Civil Service should
be removed from the Governor and given to the Legislature. Any Public Service
Commission which the Action Group would be likely to accept would have to have a
number of Action Group nominees on it.
7. Eastern representatives left Lagos very early in April. They were divided as
between N.C.N.C. and N.I.P., and they left Lagos to resume their own ‘domestic’
battle in the Eastern Region. Azikiwe, the only leader to emerge enormously
strengthened from happenings in the House of Representatives (on which he could
exercise no decisive influence until after the event), was astute enough, as was to be
expected, to permit his vital interests in the West to appear to be abandoned. (Appear,
because at any time in Lagos, his main stronghold, Azikiwe can come back and with
every chance of defeating the Action Group, if only for the reason that every Action
Group political manoeuvre has been dictated by the wish to ‘out-Zik Zik’—an
impossible task). In his resumed battle in the East he has had the whole local press
working for him: Action Group papers have taken off his shoulders much of the task
of shooting down the N.I.P.; his own ‘Pilot’ could avoid any attack on the Action
Group and concentrate on the glorification of Zik and his N.C.N.C. party; and the
‘Daily Times’, (interested under its present editor only in maintaining its circulation
by making its articles more sensational than those in the ‘Service’ or ‘Pilot’) could be
relied upon to help confusionism in its battle against objective thinking.
8. Azikiwe was content, therefore, to have one major campaign rally at Port
Harcourt, the constituency of Nwapa, against whom a new phrase ‘Nwapaism’ had
been coined to denote ‘Eagerness to obey the dictates of imperialism in order to
enjoy the spoils of office’. N.I.P. calculations as regards Azikiwe’s strategy were at
fault; and on the 5th May the N.C.N.C. proved in the Eastern House that they could
command forty-five votes against thirty-two (which figure did not include Official or
Special Members who hold eight seats between them) on a motion to reinstate, as a
Regional Minister, Muna, a Cameroonian. Dissolution of the Eastern House on the
advice of the Executive Council has followed.
9. The Minister of State’s meeting on the 28th April with National Independence
Party Ministers in the East showed, firstly, emphasis on a united Nigeria. It is the
East throughout who have been the protagonists for this conception. The difference
between the N.C.N.C. Party and the National Independence Party is that the latter
look at the problem objectively and are content to come to Self Government, within
a united Nigeria, at the time when they think the North can be persuaded to accept
it. Their estimate of the time needed is, of course, much lower than the North’s
present estimate, but they have grounds for their assessment. They point to the pace
at which the North has come along during the past fifteen months, and the readiness
of Northern Ministers to be persuaded and to compromise. What they do not
appreciate (partly because they are unwilling to see it) is the strength of feeling in
the North over the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Africans who hold
posts in the Public Service in the North (both Senior and Junior Service) are
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Southerners. (cp. footnote page 574, (a).) Unless this situation is changed there will
be no scope for Northerners when, after late start with Western education, they
become qualified. The Northern leaders say that it will take them many years to
convince the mass of the population of the Region that Northern Ministers and
officials can be trusted—as the British Administrative Officer is to be trusted—to
secure for the common man his essential rights. They are therefore determined to
have a separate Regional Public Service, and to fill the posts with as many
Northerners as possible—and, failing them, with overseas officers. Until they can
provide the men themselves they will not permit either the number or the power of
the British officials to be diminished in any way.
10. The N.I.P. demand (compare the Action Group demand) for the
disappearance of ex-officio members of the Council of Ministers and Executive
Councils arises because it has arisen in the Gold Coast, and is regarded as the next
step towards Self Government. There is also (contrast the North) the almost
complete lack in the South generally of the administrative experience which would
show the impracticability in the interest of good government of such a step at the
present time.
11. The demand for universal adult suffrage, which has consistently been one of
the key demands of the N.C.N.C., comes from the National Independence Party
leaders for a different reason: the impossibility which the N.C.N.C. would find under
an adult suffrage system of carrying out the same degree of bribery and intimidation
as the electoral college system permits.
12. Opinion in the East as between N.C.N.C. and N.I.P. is thus less divided than
might be expected. It is probable, however, that whichever party is returned to power
will find great difficulty in agreeing to any reorganisation at the Centre which might
either
(a) adversely affect the East financially; or
(b) circumscribe Eastern lebensraum: (by far the greater number of Civil Servants
and tradesmen from the South in the North are Ibos, and there is great pressure of
population on the land in the East).
13. The foregoing assessment does not mention the problem of the Trust
Territory of the Cameroons, which is of particular relevance to the situation in the
Northern and Eastern Regions, but which, of course, affects the general
constitutional issue, and H.M.G.’s position as the Administering Power. In para. 8 of
Nigeria Secret Telegram No. 337 of the 16th March4 it was stated that if Nigeria split
it would not be into two parts but into a number of warring segments; and it was
prophesied that there would be an irresistible demand for complete separation of the
Cameroons from Nigeria—‘with all the resulting local and international
complications’.
It appears that the first announced threat of disintegration has come from the
Cameroons, or a part of it. Following the N.C.N.C. victory in the Eastern House of
Assembly, and the subsequent dissolution of that House,5 the major section of the
Cameroons bloc of members (eight out of thirteen, led by Dr. Endeley) has declared
that they will take no part in the elections because they are determined to have
4 See 182. 5 See 199.
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separate Regional status. If the N.C.N.C. put forward candidates in the Cameroons
and elections can be held Dr. Endeley’s bloc may change their minds, but this
development, and its repercussions in the Northern Region (by which a part of the
Trust Territory is administered) and in the United Nations, make a review of the
Constitution all the more necessary and greatly increase the urgency of a
pronouncement being made by H.M.G. at the earliest possible moment following the
meetings of the Northern Legislative Houses, which are likely to end about the 25th
of May. The knowledge that the Constitution is to be re-examined may make the
Endeley bloc more ready to take part in the Eastern elections.
14. In making this assessment of the position at this date it must be emphasised
not only that the Northern Legislative Houses have not yet met but that at this time
of tension and emotion any estimate can be upset by any turn of events. There is,
however, one hard incontrovertible fact, and that is that Azikiwe’s victory in the East
will cause the North to be more determined than ever to have the greatest possible
degree of cleavage with the South. (Until Awolowo and the other Action Group
leaders began to play Azikiwe’s game the North regarded Azikiwe as the incarnation
of everything they dislike and fear in the South). To this extent the good work that
has been done by the Lieutenant-Governor and his officers has suffered a sharp set-
back. The N.I.P. whose representatives Northern leaders respect and with whom they
have declared their ability to work, represented for the North the only possible
political link with the South. Whatever may be our assessment of N.I.P. chances in
the Eastern elections which cannot be completed in less than three or four months!
time, the assessment made by Northern political leaders and Emirs today will
certainly be that the conclusion is foregone: the N.C.N.C. will win by their normal
methods of bribery and intimidation. Even if the Cameroons situation could be
temporarily straightened out, the Northern leaders would not be content to await the
outcome of the Eastern elections. They are impatient now. As soon as they have had
their meetings they will expect a pronouncement by H.M.G. in the U.K. both that
there will be a loosening at the Centre, and that H.M.G. in the United Kingdom will
remain in a position of control in Nigeria adequate to secure essential Northern
interests for as long as the Northern leaders wish to remain under British protection.
Unless they can be reassured that such a pronouncement will be made in the very
near future, the great difficulty now will be to persuade the North not to withdraw
their Northern Central Ministers from the Centre. Such a withdrawal would take
place immediately if there were the slightest sign by the Governor or by H.M.G. in
the United Kingdom that it was prepared to meet any Action Group demand which
affected the Centre and not the Western Region alone. And any suggestion that either
Bode Thomas or Akintola might return as Central Ministers would immediately
induce such a withdrawal.
15. The position in the West is that the Action Group have committed
themselves, apparently irrevocably, to a demand for Self Government in 1956 for a
united Nigeria. Awolowo has stressed that he means Self Government for a united
Nigeria, and that the British must compel the North to accept it. Nevertheless,
continually over the past fourteen months, and particularly over the last eight weeks,
Action Group politicians have stated that, if needs must, they would go for complete
Regional autonomy with separation from both North and East. It is probable that the
Action Group will decline to accept any loosening arrangement which did not leave
them with complete authority over the forces of law and order in the West. Inevitably
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any loosening which takes place will be condemned by the Action Group as due solely
to imperialist manoeuvres: if the British cannot keep the West in bondage the British
will at least, with the help of their stooges, keep the North in a state of slavery, in
order that Britain may have groundnuts, tin and columbite. Note here that any
influence which the Obas exercised two months ago has now—at least temporarily—
disappeared; and nothing can revive that influence while the Action Group remain
undisturbed in power in the Western Region. Note also, however, that the Obas
would, if there were a dissolution in the West, exercise a certain influence at the
village election level.
16. The Action Group are also publicly committed to accepting no alternatives as
Central Ministers to the four resigned Ministers.
17. It is difficult to estimate how long the uneasy alliance between the Action
Group and the N.C.N.C. will last. Already it has lasted longer than most people
expected and on the 6th May it survived a difficult test when the Bill to reform the
Lagos Town Council was passed—the N.C.N.C. opposition contenting itself with a
statement that the Ordinance would be repealed when they came to power. Much
depends upon whether Azikiwe decides to stand for election in the East or to remain
in the Western House. There is a difference of opinion in the Party on this issue, and
no decision has yet been taken. It appears inconceivable that the alliance could
continue once the position of Lagos under any re-drawn Constitution comes under
discussion.
18. The Eastern Region specialises in producing the unexpected, and it is not by
any means beyond doubt that in the Elections in the East Azikiwe will secure an
outright victory for the old guard of the N.C.N.C., and other similar noisy and
extreme candidates. The N.C.N.C. has, however, a party organisation and it has its
Press. N.I.P. is greatly handicapped in the fight, and the Government newspaper (a
weekly) and a Government-controlled broadcasting service cannot fight political
campaigns. It is therefore likely that the party machine, unscrupulous as it is in
employing intimidation and corruption, will win.
19. The best assessment that can be made at present of the attitude of the various
political parties towards a review of the Constitution with the objective of loosening
the association at the Centre and giving much greater autonomy to the Regions
might, with considerable reservations, be summarised as follows:—
N.P.C. regard the review as essential and, at the best, want the association at the
Centre to be reduced to the absolute minimum.
The Action Group will be in favour of the review, with the intention of securing
complete power in the West. They know that association at the Centre must be
loosened and that there can be no advance at the Centre, but they will not
openly admit this, and will charge H.M.G. (and the North) with responsibility
both for retarding the political advance of a united Nigeria and for dividing
Nigeria. They refuse to recognise the true situation in the North and will try to
foment such disruptive forces as they can find in that Region.
N.I.P. will know in their hearts that the review is necessary but they will not
admit this, partly because they truly desire to maintain a united Nigeria, both on
visionary grounds and because financially the Eastern Region is least able to
look after itself; and partly because any such admission would be political sui-
cide for them in the face of the consistent N.C.N.C. plank of ‘one Nigeria’. They
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want to co-operate with the North but deceive themselves in underestimating
the strength of Northern feeling against the South as a whole. 
N.C.N.C. claim to be a nation-wide party and have always been in favour of a
united Nigeria—preferably in the form of a unitary State, though they might
give the colour of a federation by creating eight or more provinces (or ‘States’)
based on ethnic grouping. They intend to achieve power first in the East, and
later in the West, and to wreck the present Constitution or anything that resem-
bled it. Like the Action Group they hope to disrupt the North and would be
quite undeterred by the thought that a period of chaos would result. Their
approach to a review would be destructive, not constructive.
N.E.P.U. will continue to attack the Emirate system but the majority of the Party
will be in sympathy with the stand of the N.P.C. against domination by the South.
It is possible that the Party may split on this issue.
202 CAB 129/61, C (53) 154 13 May 1953
‘Constitutional developments in the Gold Coast and Nigeria’: Cabinet
memorandum by Mr Lyttelton [Extract]
[This memorandum, which was considered at the Cabinet meeting of 27 May, was
prompted by proposals for further constitutional advance in the Gold Coast. These
included the abolition of ex-officio ministers and an increase in the membership of the
Legislative Assembly which would thereafter consist only of members directly elected by
universal adult suffrage; elections for the new Legislative Assembly were envisaged for
1954. The creation of such an all-African Cabinet was, of course, a prime demand of
political leaders in Nigeria. See BDEEP series B, vol 1, R Rathbone, ed, Ghana, part II,
131. In the Cabinet discussion, Lyttelton pointed out that the collapse of the 1951
constitution ‘provided an opportunity of according a larger measure of autonomy to the
14 million Moslem inhabitants of the Northern provinces who were more favourably
disposed to this country than the Southern Nigerians’. (CO 554/261, no 137, extract from
Cabinet conclusions, 27 May 1953.]
. . . Nigeria
13. I have taken into account the possible repercussions of these developments
on West Africa, particularly in Nigeria, and have consulted the Governor of Nigeria
about them. At one time he was apprehensive lest they should quicken still further
the demand for political advance in the Southern Regions and thus lead to divisions,
and strife, between the South and the conservative North. But as my colleagues will
be aware, the latent discord between the three Regions has already been brought to
the surface by recent events in Nigeria and in particular by the debate on 31st March
in the House of Representatives on a private member’s motion about the attainment
of self-government in 1956.
14. As I informed the House of Commons on 22nd April, the situation in Nigeria
is complicated and will require further patient and careful study. But I am clear that
the present cumbersome constitution will have to be radically revised and that the
best hope of preserving the unity of the territory will lie in seeking to reach
agreement on some modified and looser form of association at the Centre. The
Governor agrees that this would probably have to be coupled with some measure of
political advance—for example, the widening of the responsibilities and functions of
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Ministers—but that the arrangements at the Centre would have to be such as to
satisfy the North that their interests were effectively safeguarded.
15. A further constitutional advance in the Gold Coast will not make a difficult
situation in Nigeria any easier. But by and large Nigeria’s future will, I think, be
settled by events in Nigeria; and in any case I see no alternative but to proceed in the
Gold Coast on the lines I have described which, as the Governor has advised me,
represent the minimum concessions if we are to secure peaceful and ordered
progress by successive stages.
Conclusion
16. My colleagues will wish to take note of the position now reached in both
territories. When the final proposals of the Gold Coast Government are received later
this year I will consult them again. I may need to consult them before long about
Nigeria.
203 CO 554/428, no 3 17 May 1953
[Kano riots]: inward telegram no SX 1176 from HQ West Africa
Command to Mr Lyttelton reporting the outbreak of serious
disturbances in Kano
[The Kano riots which began on 16 May and lasted for four days, saw the most serious
inter-ethnic fighting in Northern Nigeria since the start of British rule. The immediate
spark came from the decision of the AG to hold a rally in Kano on 16 May to be addressed
by Akintola as part of a northern tour designed to attack ‘reactionary elements’ and ‘the
dutiful allies of British Imperialism’,1 but underlying this were longer term resentments
between northerners and southerners living in the cities and towns of the North,
resentments further provoked by the self-government debate in the House of
Representatives on 31 Mar and its aftermath (see 184). Although the AG rally was
cancelled at the last moment by the authorities, rioting between the inhabitants of Fagge,
the old caravan quarter of Kano, and southerners living in the Sabon Gari (‘strangers
town’) broke out during the afternoon of 16 May. The riots rapidly became
straightforward clashes between Hausa and Igbo, which were exacerbated on the one
hand by complaints that most of the NPF contingents in Kano consisted of southerners
and on the other by suspicions that the Kano NA had prompted the rioting. Troops and
extra police were brought in by the authorities, though the former were not deployed, and
Macpherson broadcast an appeal for calm. A State of Emergency throughout the
Northern Region was declared on 18 May (and not rescinded until mid-July) and it was
only on 20 May that order was fully restored. The official figures reported 36 dead and 241
injured but other estimates speak of up to 50 killed. 61 people were sentenced on charges
arising from the riots. Report on the Kano Disturbances, 16th–19th May 1953 (Kaduna,
1953).]
Political demonstrations by North Nigerians against Southern politicians led to
serious disturbances Kano, North Nigeria, afternoon 16th May. Rioting began again
morning 17th May. Situation reported as deteriorating. Regional Government has
requested military assistance. Detachment 100 of Nigeria Regiment en route from
Kaduna, e.t.a Kano 17.00 hours, with two further companies following. Full sitrep
will follow.
1 Cited in G O Olusanya, The second world war and politics in Nigeria 1939–53 (Lagos, 1973) p 157.
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204 CO 554/261, no 104 17 May 1953
[Political situation]: inward telegram no 700 from Sir J Macpherson
to Mr Hopkinson on the need for an immediate statement on the
revision of the constitution
Your telegram Personal No. 56.
Following for Minister of State.
Begins.
Constitutional Position.
I am dismayed to realise that the House of Commons will be in recess from 22nd
May until 9th June. I fully appreciate the desirability of statement by the Secretary of
State being made in the House but sands are running out here and although advance
announcement in the Lords on 20th May should help to cool things down I cannot
(repeat cannot) give assurance that the position can be held until 10th June. This was
my considered view even before the flare up in Kano today, which is being separately
reported.
2. Savingram follows with account of the latest that there is. Main points are as
follows:—
(a) opinion generally, including responsible opinion, is increasingly critical of
this Government’s failure to take action or even utter.
(b) East. Central Ministers from East are very disheartened and threaten to resign
from the Council of Ministers. They say if they resign Central Ministers from the
North will follow suit, but this is not certain. They strongly press for
postponement of the elections in Eastern Region pending statement by Her
Majesty’s Government and the revision of the Constitution. Alternatively, and
preferably, they press for dissolution of the House of Representatives involving
fresh elections in all three Regions. Dates for election in the East will become
immediate issue in the Council of Ministers. Lieutenant Governor of East wants
announcement made on 1st June, elections to start 1st July. Regulation must be
approved by me in Council and Eastern members will vote against. Upon the
attitude of the Northern members will depend whether the majority of the Council
approves the programme leading to the resignation of the Eastern Ministers or
disapproves leaving me the difficult choice between postponing the elections
(which would lead to eruption of N.C.N.C.) or using reserve powers to enforce the
election programme which would probably lead to the resignation of all the
remaining Ministers. My present intention is to stall on the election dates at least
until statement has been made by the Secretary of State. I am doing all I can to
hearten the Eastern Ministers and to retain them on the Council.
(c) West. Civil Secretary had long private conversation with Awolowo on 14th
May. Latter stated that dissolution of the House of Representatives would be
regarded by Action Group as abrogating the present Constitution. Demand of his
party for immediate self government would, at once, become operative and they
would make election issue of this. He favoured major adjustments to the present
Constitution, more or less on the lines indicated to you. This should be carried out
with the least possible delay at round table conference of representatives of all
Regions (4 members from each) to be held outside Nigeria under strong impartial
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chairman. He also objected that return of 4 ex-Ministers could not be delayed
indefinitely. Party had set dead-line and if the demands had not been met by then
action already planned would be set in train. He refused to disclose date of the
dead-line (I am trying to discover this) or evoke plan (probably civil disobedience
and the encouragement of strikes on the railway).
(d) North. Meetings of the Legislature start, as you know, on 15th October.
Meantime provocative action of the Action Group in sending delegation led by
(?Akintola) to Kano has touched off magazine there—separately reported. Azikiwe
similarly plans provocative action and encouragement of dissident elements in the
North by arranging meeting of N.C.N.C. Executive at Kaduna on 19th May. He has
been advised not to go to Kaduna.
205 CO 554/428, no 24 21 May 1953
[Kano riots]: inward savingram no 1192 from Sir J Macpherson to Mr
Lyttelton giving details of the disturbances in Kano
Disturbances in Kano
It is now possible to give a fuller report on the disturbances in Kano which broke out
on the 16th of May, though some time must necessarily elapse before detailed
information is available.
2. As you are aware, deep resentment was caused throughout the North by the
treatment afforded to the Northern Members of the House of Representatives during
the Budget Meeting in March and this resentment was exacerbated by the subsequent
Press campaign in the Action Group and N.C.N.C. papers.1 In the light of this,
nothing could have been more ill-advised or politically inept than for the Action
Group to stage a rally in Kano and for the N.C.N.C. to call a meeting of its Executive
Committee at the very time when all the Northern Chiefs and political leaders were
due to assemble there to discuss major political issues and especially the relationship
between the North and the South.
3. Shortly after a visit by the Sardauna to Kano in the middle of last week, the
local branch of the N.P.C. decided to stage a demonstration on the 15th of May
against the proposed visit of Akintola and other Action Group leaders on the
following day. It also decided to ask all Kano Native Authority employees of Northern
origin to stay away from work on the 16th of May to demonstrate their solidarity in
objecting to the Action Group meeting. It is understood that Malam Wada, a Member
of the House of Representatives and a senior Native Authority official, visited the N.A.
Public Works Department on May 15th and made an ill-advised and inflammatory
speech to the employees. The N.P.C. protest meeting and procession, which is stated
to have been about 2,000 strong, were nevertheless orderly and free from incident.
There is no doubt, however, that the activities of the N.P.C. led to a heightening of
tension and increased resentment against the Southern population. Southern
members of the population, on their part, were clearly preparing for trouble and an
increase in the sale of matchets—the traditional weapon of the Ibo—was reported.
1 See 184.
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4. On the morning of the 16th of May the general tension throughout the city
and suburban areas was such that the authorities decided that the permit for the
Action Group meeting, which had already been issued, must be withdrawn. All
possible steps were taken to calm popular feeling.
5. Rioting broke out during the afternoon. It is not known exactly how the
rioting started, but it is reported that at about 3.15 p.m. gangs of hooligans armed
with matchets gathered in several areas and that some stone-throwing occurred
between rival mobs. The Police intervened and made a small number of arrests but
owing to the widely dispersed nature of these incidents, they were unable to restore
order. Throughout the afternoon and evening raids by groups of hooligans from the
predominantly Northern suburb of Fagge were followed by retaliatory attacks by
groups of Ibos from the predominantly Southern suburb, known as the Sabon Gari.
It appears that as soon as these disturbances began nearly all Yorubas kept well away
from the troubled areas, and that the fighting was almost entirely between Hausas
and Ibos. It had in fact, ceased to be political or in any way related to membership of
the Action Group or the N.P.C. and had developed along tribal lines. Casualties by
evening totalled two killed and fifteen injured and admitted to hospital. Three Native
Authority Police were also slightly injured.
6. All was quiet during the night but early next morning mobs gathered again
and a major clash between the inhabitants of Fagge and the Sabon Gari would have
occurred but for the action of the Police who struggled all day with a reasonable
degree of success to keep the opposing forces apart. They were reinforced early in the
morning by 100 additional Nigeria Police from Kaduna and during the day, another
100 Police and two Companies of Infantry were flown to Kano in transport aircraft
sent from Lagos. A Battery was also sent up by road in an infantry capacity. Despite
the reinforcements, which arrived piecemeal during the day, it was impossible to
prevent isolated encounters and it was later found that several of the Hausa corpses
had been emasculated. The situation became a little quieter during the night but on
the morning of Monday, 18th May, the situation again became extremely ugly, both
sides having reached a state of hysteria. Only with the greatest difficulty was a major
battle prevented and some looting by Northern rioters took place both in the Sabon
Gari market, in African shops on the edge of the commercial area and at one or two
places within the city walls. Further atrocities took place during the morning; at
least nine persons being soaked in petrol and burnt.
7. During the day barbed wire was flown up from Kaduna and by nightfall a
barbed wire obstruction had been erected by the military between Fagge and the
Sabon Gari. By afternoon the fever began to work itself out and it became possible for
Southerners living in the Fagge area to be evacuated to the Sabon Gari and for
Northerners in the Sabon Gari to be evacuated to Fagge. A number of Southerners
living inside the City walls were also moved into the Sabon Gari.
8. By Tuesday morning the position had greatly improved and it seems unlikely
that there will be any further incidents in this area. Casualty figures to date are 46
dead and 205 treated or admitted to hospital. Full details of the tribal composition is
not yet available but it is understood that there were no recorded Yoruba fatalities
and that only seven Yorubas are in hospital. Of the rest, the proportion between
Northerners and Easterners is roughly 60 : 40% and the majority of the Northern
casualties are people of no fixed occupation. It should perhaps be pointed out that
while the rioters of Northern extraction were armed largely with cudgels, spears,
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swords and bows and arrows, the Southerners had a number of Dane guns and
shotguns as well as matchets.
9. There has throughout been no evidence of any anti-European feeling amongst
the Northern population but some racial feeling was shown by the Southerners. Only
one actual attack has been reported, however, and that was on the car of a Medical
Officer who was taking injured Northerners to hospital. The Medical Officer
fortunately escaped injury.
10. The behaviour of the Sabon Gari leaders, once they could effect some
measure of control over the rioters has been excellent, as too has been the attitude of
the Native Authority officials.
11. The Lieutenant-Governor has commented on the courage and discipline of
the Police and also on the complete disregard of personal danger shown by both
Administrative and Police Officers, together with members of the Council of the
Emir of Kano who penetrated into danger areas at a time when the mob was
uncontrollable. He also praised the gallantry of four European unarmed Special
Constables who attempted to rescue a Southerner from murder and subsequent
incineration without any regard for their personal safety.
12. I will keep you fully informed of further developments.
206 CO 554/261, no 122 21 May 1953
[Constitutional revision]: outward telegram no 608 from Mr Lyttelton
to Sir J Macpherson giving the text of his statement to the House of
Commons on the decision to revise the constitution
I made following statement in the House of Commons today. Begins.
Recent events have shown that it is not possible for the three Regions of Nigeria to
work together effectively in a federation so closely knit as that provided by the
present Constitution. Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, while
regretting this, consider that the Constitution will have to be redrawn to provide for
greater Regional autonomy and for the removal of powers of intervention by the
Centre in matters which can, without detriment to other Regions, be placed entirely
within Regional competence. It is at the same time necessary to ensure that the
common economic and defence requirements of all Regions are secured. In order to
ensure these vital requirements of all Regions and at the same time to preserve the
common interests of all the peoples of Nigeria there will of course be a continuing
need for a central organisation. The form which that central organisation should
take, and the powers which must be reserved to it, will require careful study. In the
work of redrawing the Constitution Her Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom would wish to co-operate as closely as possible with the leaders of the
people in all three Regions. The first requirement is to decide how this work can best
be carried out. To this end Her Majesty’s Government will invite representatives from
each Region to visit London for discussions with the Secretary of State. It is Her
Majesty’s Government’s intention to carry through the projected reform of the
Constitution in the shortest time possible, but in a territory of such a size, with so
large a population, and with so many different groupings and many shades of public
opinion, the work will inevitably take time. While that work is carried out Nigeria
13-(Doc179-225)-cp  15/7/01  7:32 am  Page 584
[207] MAY 1953 585
will continue to be governed under its existing Constitutional Instruments, and it
will be necessary for the Central Government to be so composed that it can carry out
its task in the meanwhile. It is the clear duty of all the Regions to assist the Governor
by ensuring that the persons composing the central Government are able and
determined to work together during this interim period. It is equally the clear duty of
Her Majesty’s Government to ensure that in all circumstances government in Nigeria
is effectively carried on in the interests of all the peoples of the country. Ends.
2. Various supplementaries were asked as to whether statement had been
discussed with Nigerian Ministers. Text of these will follow as soon as Hansard is
available.
207 CO 554/261, no 127 21 May 1953
[Political situation]: inward telegram no 741 from L H Goble to W L
Gorell Barnes on a motion in the Northern House of Assembly
demanding greater regional autonomy
[In the aftermath of the 31 March self-government debate in the House of Representatives
(see 184), separatist sentiment grew stronger among Northern political leaders. The day
after order had been restored following the Kano riots, the Northern Region House of
Assembly debated the motion (the so-called ‘Eight-points Motion’) outlined in this
document; the motion was carried without any dissenting vote and was passed by the
Northern Region House of Chiefs on the same day. In effect the motion called for regional
autonomy in all but the most limited spheres; there would in effect be no central
government for Nigeria and only a restricted central agency. In a earlier debate on the
same day rejecting self-government in 1956—also passed unanimously—Malam Yahaya
Gusau stated ‘the offices of the government in the North are filled by non-Northerners.
. . . Is it not madness for the North to ask for self-government at a time when the majority
of the junior service in the North are filled entirely by non-Northerners’ (CO 554/262, no
218, inward savingram no 1430 from Macpherson to Lyttelton). The House of Assembly
was still in session when news of Lyttelton’s statement to the House of Commons (see
206) reached it.]
Following for Gorell Barnes from Goble.
Begins.
It is understood motion in following terms will be introduced House of Assembly
tomorrow.
Begins.
Be it resolved that this House prays that a message be sent to the Government of
the United Kingdom requesting them to advise Her Majesty to amend the
Constitutional Instruments at present in force and to make provision for a new
constitutional arrangement for Nigeria on the following principles:—
First, Each region shall have complete legislative and executive autonomy with
respect to all matters except the following:—
1 Defence
2 External Affairs
3 Customs
4 West African Research Institutions.
Second, There shall be no central legislative body and no central executive or
policy making body for the whole of Nigeria.
Third, There shall be a central agency for all regions which will be responsible for
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the matters mentioned in paragraph first, 1 to 4 and any other matters delegated
to it by a region.
Fourth, The central agency shall be at a neutral place, preferably Lagos.
Fifth, The composition powers and responsibility of the central agency shall be
defined by the Order in Council establishing the new constitutional arrangements.
The agency shall be a non political body
Sixth, The services of the railway, air services, ports, electricity and coal mining
shall be organised on an inter-Regional basis and shall be administered by public
corporations. Such public corporations shall be independent bodies governed
solely by the statutes under which they are created. The boards of such
corporations shall be composed of experts with a minority representation of the
Regional Governments.
Seventh, All revenues shall be levied and collected by the Regional Governments
except customs revenue. Customs duties shall be collected at the port of discharge
by the central agency and paid to each Region. The administration of the customs
shall be so organised as to ensure that goods consigned to each Region are
separately cleared and charged to duty.
Eighth, Each Region shall have a separate public service.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that should general support be accorded to these proposals
they be forthwith communicated to the Government of the United Kingdom
requesting that Her Majesty be advised to amend the constitutional instruments
accordingly. Ends
208 CO 554/261, no 163c 22 May–3 June 1953
[Constitutional revision]: minutes by N B J Huijsman1 and I B Watt
outlining principles for a revised constitution
Mr. Williamson
Attached are two copies of my first thoughts on a Child’s Guide to the New
Constitution for your perusal and criticism.2 I am sorry that recent events have made
it impossible to submit it to you before, and that they have in the event also not left
me enough time to do some more thorough thinking on the financial suggestions.
You may wish to have a discussion with me, in which case you will know where I can
be reached before June the 3rd. In the meantime I am circulating copies of this
minute and its enclosure to Mr. Bourdillon, Mr. Peck and Mr. Watt for their
comments, as I have not had the opportunity of more than casual discussion of this
very intricate and difficult question with those others in the Office who will be
concerned with it.
2. I should explain that the note attached is in effect an attempted synthesis of
the views on a revised constitution which have flowed into W.A.D., plus some
additional thoughts of my own. Looking over it again I now feel:—
(a) that we must resist any attempt to create more Regions. I now feel that any
acceptance of the demand for a separate Cameroons Region might lead to violent
1 NBJ Huijsman, principal CO, 1949; ass sec, 1962. 2 Not printed.
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Southern agitation for a Middle Belt Region and possibly to a reopening of the
Western Region frontier dispute;
(b) that we must put an end to the present form of conciliar government and
instead leave the Governor free within limits to select a Council which will
cooperate. I am more than ever convinced that much of the failure of the Council
of Ministers is due to the fact that the individual Ministers are in effect the
creatures of the Regional Governments.2 The attempt to give the Central Ministers
an independent existence and source of authority is at the back of my suggestions
for the future form of political existence. Mr. Watt may wish to criticise my
suggestions.
(c) that the creation of a statutory Revenue Fund is a possible way out of the
political difficulties created by Nigeria’s peculiar financial set-up, and that we
should seek to preserve flexibility in the allocation of revenue by using C.D. & W.
funds as our instrument rather than by complicating the revenue allocation
machine in Nigeria. The net result may well be greater financial rigidity, plus
slower development in the East and the North. I see no easy way round this
difficulty but no doubt Finance Department will have better sight than I!
(d) the problem of the judiciary requires more consideration. Mr. Awolowo wants
to control Native Authority Courts; I think the reasons are obvious, but I don’t
know if he wants to extend his ‘regionalisation of the judiciary’ to the Supreme
Court. We should ask for Legal Department advice.
I hope that the obvious weakness of my note will not make it completely useless as a
start for our thinking on the subject. More work went into it than appears on the
surface!
N.B.J.H.
22.5.53
Mr. Williamson
May I offer a very limited number of comments on Mr. Huijsman’s paper.
2. If we divide Nigeria into four, i.e. a Centre and three Regions, with each of the
latter allowed to develop at its own pace, we are producing a system rather like those
in the Central African and West Indies Federations.
3. However in Central Africa and the West Indies it is agreed that only as an
entity will or can the component territories get Dominion status. To that extent the
leading politicians will take an active part in the Central Governments in each
Federation.3 The emphasis in each of these Federations will be for a gradual increase
in the authority and legislative scope of these Central Governments. There is not
likely to be pressure for advance of the component territories, individually, to
Dominion status.
4. In Nigeria pressure for Dominion status for the Regions individually appears a
distinct possibility, especially if the leading politicians, (confronted as they would be
with the choice between office either in the Centre or in the Regions, if Mr.
Huijsman’s proposal were adopted) decided to concentrate on holding office in the
Regional Ministries.
2 Huijsman added in the margin at this point ‘This applies with particular force to the West’.
3 This did not prove to be the case in the West Indies where the leading politicians concentrated their
efforts on their own local governments.
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5. We contemplate I take it that no Regional Government in Nigeria, however
complete a control of internal affairs it may achieve, shall, if at all feasible, be allowed
to obtain a degree of control of external affairs and defence which would enable it as a
Regional Government to claim Dominion status. Therefore should we not try, in the
forthcoming negotiations with Nigeria, to get agreement all round that control of
external affairs and defence by Nigerian Ministers, responsible to an all-elective
Nigerian Legislature, will not be conceded except to a Central Government in which
all Regions will agree, at the time when such control is conceded, to participate?
6. I agree with Mr. Huijsman that a good deal of the present frustration is
probably due to the fact that Central Ministers have been the creatures of Regional
Governments, but I am not sure that his proposal to make activity in Central and
Regional politics mutually exclusive is well adopted to political conditions in the
country. For one thing are there enough capable bodies to serve four political
organisations, leaving enough educated and responsible Africans over to take some
part in filling more high posts in the Public Services? In any case surely we must
recognise that any influential Nigerian politician will for the time being retain his
regional prejudices and draw his political strength from his regional backing. I
therefore suggest for consideration that for, say the first five years of a revised
constitution we adopt the West Indies Federation model and allow people to be
members of Regional and of Central legislatures and executives. We should however
make the choice of Central Ministers depend only upon the approval of the Central
Assembly. In the political circumstances of Nigeria, we should have to give the
Governor some discretionary power over the choice of Ministers, in order to ensure
that some members of the executive would represent regional rather than purely
party opinion. Therefore we could not approve a method of choice of a Ministry as
advanced as that now working in Jamaica where, once a Chief Minister is approved by
the House of Representatives the other Ministers are appointed on his nomination. I
suggest that something like the present arrangement in the Gold Coast would be
more suitable for Nigeria, with a slight but I think significant modification. Thus the
Governor, in his discretion should submit to the House of Representatives, for
approval, the name of the person whom he proposes for appointment to his Chief
Minister; then after consultation with that Chief Minister, but still acting in his
discretion, the Governor shall appoint the other members of the Executive Council.
7. I don’t like Mr. Huijsman’s proposal that a two-thirds majority vote should be
required to revoke the appointment of an individual Minister, Such a system has
been one of the main curses of the old Jamaica constitution as it did allow certain
individual Ministers who were in complete disagreement with their colleagues to be
retained. Unless and until a two-thirds majority could be secured it meant that the
Opposition could, if it wished, keep a Minister in Office even if he had forfeited the
confidence of his fellow Ministers. It would be better in Nigeria to provide simply, as
in the Gold Coast, that when the Chief Minister goes out all the elected members of
Executive Council do the same.
8. These are tentative and provisional thoughts which I put forward very much
for discussion only. I am sending copies to Mr. Huijsman, Mr. Peck and Mr.
Bourdillon, and keeping spares for others who will be coming to Mr. Gorell-Barnes’
meeting on Thursday.
I.W.
3.6.53
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209 CO 554/261, no 144 25 May 1953
[Political situation]: letter from L H Goble to E O Mercer on the
potential for disturbance in Nigeria [Extract]
. . . There is, indeed, never a dull moment in Nigeria these days. In the words of the
Prime Minister in another connection, there are ‘complex, changing uncertain and
unpredictable situations’ with which the Governor is ceaselessly confronted. Not
only is there never a dull moment, but there are insufficient moments.
Today it looks as if we might get by without serious inter-tribal disturbances in
the immediate future, though tension is very high, especially in places in the
North where there are large Southern elements. Nigeria at the moment seems to
be a very unstable compound and a detonation wave of very little force could
touch off a most calamitous explosion. The trouble is that there is scarcely a sin-
gle political party which has not an adequate supply of detonators, and whose irre-
sponsible leaders would be astounded at the violence of the explosion that they
touch off . . . .
210 CO 554/261, no 139 29 May 1953
[Constitutional revision]: inward telegram no 776 (reply) from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on Nigerian reaction to the
announcement of talks in London
Your telegram No. 608.1
Nigeria Constitution.
Local press comments generally favour the idea of London talks but there is clear
misunderstanding of the purpose of this preliminary meeting, which will discuss the
machinery for consultation only.2
So far no cumulative policy has emerged in N.C.N.C. and Action Group papers,
although there have been joint meetings of leaders of both parties. N.C.N.C. papers
purport to read into your statement victory over present constitution. Action
Group/N.C.N.C. axis has been strengthened in this way. It holds together because of
the desire to gang against the North and for anti-Imperialist motives.
1 See 206.
2 The original intention of the CO was that the London talks would discuss the mechanics of how to set
about amending the constitution (see 208). This had been explicitly set out by Gorell Barnes in a letter to
Macpherson dated 27 May 1953 (CO 554/261, no 135); the CO hope was that the constitution itself would
be drawn up by a panel of three or four British experts and then put to a conference in Nigeria for
discussion. Macpherson had endorsed this approach on 29 May (CO 554/261, no 141). Nigerian political
leaders however, were determined that any talks in London should be substantive and should discuss the
actual changes to be made in the constitution. As a consequence on 1 June both Awolowo and Azikiwe
refused their invitations to London; a further contributing factor, particularly for Azikwe, was the
invitation to the NIP to attend. This threat to boycott the talks was followed by a meeting in Lagos between
Macpherson, Awolowo, Azikiwe and the Sardauna of Sokoto on 19 June and led to a reconsideration by the
CO of its plans for the London conference (see 212).
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Nothing yet said publicly to prevent acceptance of the invitation by principal
leaders, but there is tendency to suggest conditions for acceptance. Great danger is
that axis will commit itself to conditions from which impossible to retract.
Apart from the press, reliable but most secret information is that meeting of
N.C.N.C. leaders on 22nd May agreed that party would oppose any form of
government with ‘a loose federation’. Before the London meeting, party would
summon ‘Constituent Assembly’ to draw up mandate and draft constitution for
presentation in London as the only form of government acceptable. Any other
proposals would be opposed by N.C.N.C. representative.
Similar report on Action Group meeting of 22nd May is that party leaders
considered looser federation would be advantageous to the West and in accord with
their proposals to the Minister of State. Party favour fuller Regional autonomy.
Danger of clash with N.C.N.C. on this issue discussed.
Most secret and reliable source states that at joint meeting of the two parties on
23rd May agreement reached as follows:—
(a) N.P.C. programme unacceptable except as regards establishment of
corporations.
(b) They will oppose the present 50% representation of the North at the centre.
(c) Constitution should be federal and bilateral [sic? bicameral] at the centre.
(d) Break away by any territorial region from the centre should be opposed.
(e) Central legislature (sic) should not be ‘a loose one’. Power of intervention
should be retained in matters of common interest.
(f ) Proposed London talks welcome and invitation will be accepted provided (1)
Azikiwe included; (2) North not given 50% representation but all regions have
equal representation, and (3) ‘no stooge invited’.
(g) Present constitution should be amended as opposed to new one being
redrafted.
(h) Representatives should remain in London until amendments drawn up and
signed by all concerned, and published.
In my view, major misconception about scope of talks (see paragraph 6(h)
above) must be corrected quickly. I realize that removing this misconception
might stop the axis accepting invitation on the grounds that no need to consider
mechanics: obviously redraft must be done by Nigerians (presumably in ‘con-
stituent assembly’). On the other hand, North, N.I.P., and Cameroons will be
encouraged to accept by appreciation of joint scope of talks. On balance, rejection
of invitation by the axis, in my view, much less damaging than discovery of mis-
conception only in London, with consequent walk-out and accusation of
Imperialist trick. This conception about function and composition of constituent
assembly is also dangerous. I propose, therefore, to have broadcast made analysing
and explaining your statement with contents of first two sentences of paragraph 2
of my immediately following telegram. I will bear your supplementary answers
carefully in mind. Lt. Governors similarly being asked to explain to political lead-
ers. My immediately following telegram suggests form in which invitation should
be couched.
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211 CO 554/430, no 3 3 June 1953
[Coronation day riots]: inward telegram no 802 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton reporting the Coronation day
disturbances in Lagos
My immediately preceding telegram.
2. About 30 supporters followed persons named1 to prison, were then reinforced
to about 150 by band of hooligans and together proceeded to the race course where
they doubled up and down behind crowd singing freedom song. Crowd took no notice
and mob dispersed while ceremony of Trooping the Colour was starting. There were
no incidents during ceremony. Mob re-formed in three or four groups after leaving
race course, stoned buildings in commercial area of Marina and near Carter Bridge
and Government and commercial buildings in Broad Street, breaking windows. No
cases of entry have been reported. Coronation decorations were torn down or broken
in certain areas. Victoria Street and War Memorial receiving particular attention.
3. Care returning to homes after Cathedral state service were stoned and about
10 cases of minor injuries, including both Europeans and Africans, and one Army
driver were treated in hospital.
4. In afternoon band of youths dressed as cowboys2 visited prison and were
dispersed peacefully, but a mob of hooligans who followed them had to be dispersed
forcibly by police.
5. On same afternoon a public meeting of Convention Peoples Party was convened
without permit and was dispersed by police who arrested five leaders of the party,
including Adewole Thompson and Dele Bakare.
6. Total number of arrests made by police to date eleven, although police were
handicapped by tip and run methods of hooligan gangs which, in no case, numbered
more than 60 to 70. They successfully prevented them from interfering with the
Coronation celebrations which were attended by happy crowds of thousands of
Africans (attendance at afternoon ceremony over twenty thousand) many of whom
have expressed disgust at the activities of the hooligans. See my immediately
following telegram for paragraph 7.
1 2 June 1953, Coronation day, was chosen by the youth movements of the AG and NCNC and the Lagos
branch of NEPU as a day of mourning for those killed in the Kano riots. Permits for a meeting however,
were refused by the authorities and, following a refusal by the leaders of the three organisations to alter
their plans, seven were arrested and brought before magistrates to be bound over to keep the peace.
Awolowo and Azikiwe attended court in their support. Following their refusal to enter into recognisance
to keep the peace, the seven were committed to prison for three days.
2 The curious trend for NCNC supporters to appear in cowboy dress in this period is remarked on by B E
Sharwood-Smith, Recollections of British administration . . . but always as friends (London, 1969) p 272.
212 CO 554/261, no 164 3 June 1953
[Constitutional revision]: outward telegram no 65 from W L Gorell
Barnes to Sir J Macpherson agreeing to substantive talks in London
Following for Macpherson from Gorell Barnes. Begins. London conference on
constitution.
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To-day’s London ‘Times’ reports that Azikiwe and Awolowo have rejected
invitation on the grounds that (1) they object to the manner in which the selection of
representatives has been made and suggest that this was ‘deliberately and arbitrarily
done to include friends of His Excellency the Governor, who by their recent acts have
forfeited such little following as they ever had in the country’; and (2) they consider
that it would be a ‘sheer waste of our time to go to London on such a futile mission as
a mere exchange of views on the method by which the work of revision of the
constitution should be undertaken’.
2. If this report is substantially correct, you will no doubt soon be telegraphing
your recommendations on action we should now take. Meanwhile it may be helpful
to know Secretary of State’s immediate reactions.
3. He is not (repeat not) prepared to consider withdrawing the invitation to
N.I.P. Indeed, he considers that, in the present political situation in the East, their
exclusion would be wholly wrong. He will, however, be ready and willing to have a
full exchange of views with the Nigerian representatives on the issues of substance
which will arise in a revision of the constitution; and, if it were the general desire of
the Nigerian representatives, he would, subject to your views, see no objection to the
conference attempting to reach some broad conclusions on at any rate some of the
principal points of substance as well as on the method by which the actual revision
should be carried out. He does not, however, think that it would be possible for the
complete work of revising the constitution to be carried out within the time which a
conference such as it is proposed to hold in London would be able to devote to it.
4. The Secretary of State considers, subject to your views, that in the last resort
conference must be held even if Azikiwe and Awolowo still stand out. Ends.
213 CO 554/261, no 184 4 June 1953
[Constitutional revision]: CO note of a meeting of officials held to
discuss changes to be made in the present Nigerian constitution
It was agreed that in discussion the meeting should discuss the Note on Constitutional
Changes compiled by Mr. Huijsman, an amended version of which could serve as the
first draft of a memorandum setting out the changes which Her Majesty’s Government
would be prepared to see made in the present Nigerian Constitution.1 After submis-
sion to the Secretary of State, this memorandum would have to be referred to Sir J.
Macpherson for his comments, it being made clear that the Secretary of State was not
at that stage committed in any way. After further consideration in the light of any
views expressed by the Governor, it could then serve as the brief for the Colonial Office
representatives at the forthcoming London discussions.
Paragraph numbers in the succeeding minutes refer to those of Mr. Huijsman’s Note.
Paragraph 5. Composition of a Federal Nigeria.
It was agreed to accept the conclusions of this paragraph.
Paragraph 6. Position of Lagos.
Mr. Gorell Barnes said that if there was no history to this we would probably
favour a solution similar to that of Washington, D.C. The question was not, however,
1 Not printed but see 208.
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a ‘sticking point’ from our point of view, and we should preserve an open mind at this
stage, remembering that we might, at some future time, be called upon to arbitrate.
What our decision would then be would depend upon the circumstances arising.
Both the ‘Washington’ and the ‘Ottawa’ solutions were technically feasible. It was
agreed that paragraph 6 of the Note should be redrafted along these lines.
Paragraph 7. The Centre.
Mr. Gorell Barnes pointed out that if we accepted the recommendations in this
paragraph, as we had to if the Centre is to retain its powers in respect of defence,
external affairs, etc., we would be rejecting one of the major points of the North. This
was recognised by the meeting. It was felt that the only way in which acceptance of
both the North and the South to a central legislature could be secured would be by
retaining the present North/South parity of membership in the House; equal
membership of each Region would be unacceptable to the North, while if members
were drawn from the Regions proportionately to their population the North would
obtain a clear majority over the combined South which would be totally
unacceptable to the South. We should retain the right of the Governor to address the
House when he wished, so that he might continue to act as President if no Speaker
could be found. Mr. Gorell Barnes felt it was right to remove the Lieutenant-
Governors from the Central Legislative House, but that we should take the line that
the Special Members should probably remain. Mr. Huijsman said that, judging by
Awolowo’s demands, we might have to give consideration to the establishment of a
Second Chamber at the Centre; it was agreed that we should, on the whole, be
against this, but that if the point became important we would be prepared to consider
a Second Chamber on the lines of the House of Lords, with limited delaying and
initiating powers of legislation. Mr. Watt suggested, and Mr. Gorell Barnes agreed,
that the Second Chamber might be a suitable place for the Special Members to sit.
Paragraph 8. Council of Ministers.
Mr. Williamson said that it might be necessary to avoid evil connotations and to
adopt a new title for the Council, e.g. the Council of State. With the increase of
matters to be a Regional responsibility, however, the number of Ministers required at
the Centre would be less. On the question whether the Order-in-Council should lay
down the number of Ministers representing each Region (including the Cameroons),
or whether in the interests of flexibility the Governor should act in his discretion but
be called upon in his Instructions to take account of equal representation of Regional
interests, Mr. Peck felt that higher authority would probably require such details to
be written into the Constitutional Instruments, preferably the Royal Instructions, if
we wished them to have legal force. If it were not intended to give such directions
legal force they should not be in legal form; and it would seem to be more
appropriate to incorporate them in an exchange of despatches. Mr. Gorell Barnes
agreed with this view.
Mr. Peck then asked whether it was intended to retain the present provision that
the Governor should consult the Lieutenant-Governors over the choice of Central
Ministers. Mr. Gorell Barnes felt that this provision should be omitted in order to
give the Governor a real initiative. Ministers should, however, be acceptable to the
Central House. By the provision that an affirmative vote of two-thirds of all members
of the Central House, taken in secret ballot, would be required to revoke the
appointment of a Minister, Ministers would not be placed at the sole mercy of either
the North or the South. Mr. Watt pointed out that in Jamaica the two-thirds vote
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provision had allowed a Minister who had lost the confidence of his colleagues to be
kept in office by the Opposition in order to handicap the Government. It was agreed
that to avoid this we should follow the Gold Coast and British Guiana precedents
which provide in addition, that the Governor can take the initiative in dismissing a
Minister. It was also agreed that the memorandum should stipulate that the
Governor’s existing powers to act in his discretion should remain intact, except with
regard to ‘existing legislation’.
Paragraph 9. It was agreed that the form of individual ministerial departmental
responsibility recently introduced in Nigeria should continue. In respect of statutory
corporations, only those operating throughout Nigeria should be a special
responsibility. The wording of the penultimate sentence of this paragraph should be
changed to provide that the Governor should have general reserve powers and that
the portfolios of Defence, External Relations, the Federal Police and the Federal
Public Service would be the responsibility of the ex-officio members of the Council.
Mr. Gorell Barnes said that we should keep those provisions whereby the Governor
alone would have adequate powers of government if the need ever arose.
Paragraph 10.
Mr. Peck confirmed that it would be possible to permit Regional advance at
varying speeds by amendment of the Constitution when each occasion arose. It
would suffice to provide for a general power of amendment in the new constitution,
and to make it clear in covering despatches that this power would be exercisable in
the Regions as well as at the Centre. With regard to the electoral provisions, it was
discussed how the present regulations should be amended; it was agreed that, in the
cause of Regional autonomy, we should allow the Lieutenant Governor of each
Region to make the regulations the Region desired. Mr. Gorell Barnes said that we
should have to make it clear whether the Lieutenant Governor should act in or out of
Council; he believed that the former should be the case and that we should not try at
the Conference to impose uniformity of electoral regulations between the Regions.
While in principle we were in favour of moving away from the Northern (and
Western) methods of a series of Electoral Colleges and injection of Native Authority
representatives, we should not ourselves raise this at the Conference, as it would be
fatal to give the North the impression that we were using the occasion to bring
pressure upon them. If the N.I.P. or others made a demand, it might be necessary to
negotiate an agreement on the question, but otherwise we should leave the matter
and should exercise our influence with the Lieutenant-Governors afterwards.
Mr. Gorell Barnes said that Sections (c) and (d) of paragraph 10 were very
important. It was agreed that, particularly in view of developments in the Gold Coast,
we could not refuse the Regions all-African Cabinets if they wanted them. Mr.
Williamson raised the question of a similar concession to the Cameroons if they
achieved Regional status. In Mr. Huijsman’s view, once we had started along the road
with other Regions we could not afford to exclude the Cameroons, however
nonsensical this might in practice be. It was agreed that on this point the
memorandum should content itself with saying that if a separate Region were
established for the Cameroons, the question of an all-African Cabinet there would
need separate consideration. On the question of African Cabinets in the existing
Regions, the memorandum should set out our arguments for supporting the
proposal, namely, that in view of developments in the Gold Coast a concession on
this point would be the only way to gain support for the general constitutional
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revision. Mr. Gorell Barnes said, however, that we should keep an open mind on
when we would show our hand.
Mr. Watt pointed out that an upgrading of the Lieutenant Governors’ title might be
necessary in the Regions, with the consequential problem of what to call the present
office of Governor. After some discussion of the relative merits of the terms ‘Governor-
General’ and ‘High Commissioner’, the former was adjudged more suitable.
Paragraph 11
Mr. Watt asked whether this proposal would not attract all the best and most
influential men to the Regions, making eventual unification of the territory more
difficult. Mr. Williamson pointed out that the Centre would attract the Zikists, who
supported a unitary Nigeria, and this in turn might force other Regions to send
better men to the Centre. Further, some able men (e.g. Nwapa) might prefer to go to
the Centre to avoid the worst of the hurly burly of politics in the Regions. It was
agreed that the terms of paragraph 11 were right and inevitable.
Paragraph 12. Division of Jurisdiction.
Mr. Huijsman explained that by ‘the usual provisions’ regarding the re-allocation of
subjects from the Centre to the Regions and vice-versa he meant that the Governor-
in-Council should be able to move a subject from one list to another and that the
Regions should be able to transfer subjects from regional to federal jurisdiction. It was
agreed that while there was no harm in transferring a subject from the Regions to the
Centre in this manner, any devolution from the Centre should be first approved by the
Secretary of State. The memorandum should make this clear.
List of Subjects. Mr. Williamson said that as much as possible should be given to
the Regions without antagonising the East. It was agreed that the memorandum
should state that the lists therein were illustrative and for consideration only. On the
question of the final approval of legislation, it was considered that Regional
legislation should come direct to the Secretary of State for signification.
Paragraph 13 The Public Service.
Mr. Gorell Barnes said that the North would insist upon a separate Regional service.
Officers from Nigeria to whom he had spoken had been of the opinion that there would
have to be central terms of service, but he himself was not so sure that competition
between the Regions would not be a good thing. Mr. Williamson said that the latter
would mean that the poorest Region would be penalised by having to compete with
the others; there would also be a danger of a march to the North where the expatriate
officer felt himself more secure. Further, the Centre would have to pay the highest
Regional rate in respect of the federal service. Mr. Tegetmeier said that in East Africa
competition was avoided if possible; agreement was reached by conference, which,
however, could not be relied upon in present Nigerian conditions. Mr. Bourdillon2 felt
that we were perhaps subscribing to administrative convenience by leaning towards
uniform terms: he himself would like to see competition. It was agreed, however, that
the balance of advantage lay with uniform conditions, with control of each service in
the hands of the respective Lieutenant-Governor, and that it would be to our own
credit politically to advocate this. We should therefore start with this idea in view and
put the pros and the cons in the memorandum, but it should not be a sticking point.
Mr. Williamson said that we could expect pressure from the Western Region at
least for political control of its public service; this would in turn raise the whole
2 H T Bourdillon, assistant secretary, CO, 1947; assistant-under-secretary, 1954.
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question of compensation for officers who wished to leave. It was agreed that our aim
should be to secure agreement that appointment to a Regional service should be by
the Lieutenant-Governor acting in his discretion, but assisted by a Public Service
Commission (of which there will be one in each Region). If there should be a decision
to have an all-African Cabinet in a Region then this would open the question of who
would deal with public service questions in the Legislature and if there were pressure
to make this the responsibility of a Nigerian Minister we should make it quite clear
from the outset that this would immediately involve consideration of compensation.
Paragraphs 14–16. The Judiciary.
Mr. Peck said that he could not commit his superiors, but as the powers proposed
for the Supreme Court were those of the Central African Scheme they should be
acceptable. However, the provision that an appeal would lie direct to the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council, rather than through the West African Court of
Appeal, might be criticised on the grounds that it would expose the Judicial
Committee to too much extra work. Mr. Gorell Barnes and Mr. Williamson thought
that, as only purely Nigerian constitutional matters would be involved, this would be
unlikely; it was agreed, however, that the point should be discussed with Sir Sidney
Abrahams before the memorandum was re-drafted.
Mr. Huijsman referred to the position of the native authority courts, which
Awolowo wished to turn into magistrates’ courts. It was agreed that the question
whether the lower courts should be a Regional responsibility should be discussed
with Sir Sidney Abrahams and that the re-drafted memorandum should pass through
Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray.
Paragraph 17. Financial Implications.
Mr. Gorell Barnes said that he thought that the use of C.D. & W. funds to make
good the East’s shortfall would be objectionable as the East would suffer when C.D. &
W. ceased. He would have seen no need to alter the present system; the trouble was,
as Mr. Huijsman pointed out, the West’s complaint that it was being mulcted. Mr.
Bourdillon said that the system proposed did not get away from the present objection
that the Regions were dependent on the Centre; if the principle of derivation were
applied and the East fall short, then the East would be dependent on the Centre and
would have grounds for objection. He felt that the ideal would be to adopt the
principles which had been propounded elsewhere by Sir Jeremy Raisman, namely, to
work out the financial needs of the Regions and then to fix the distribution of
revenue for a period of, say, five years. Mr. Gorell Barnes agreed that this might be
politically acceptable and would give more autonomy to the Regions, therefore being
superior to present arrangements. If, however, Sir J. Raisman were to be asked to go
to Nigeria in the expert touring team we should give only a general indication of our
views in the memorandum. We should, if possible, not take up too firm a position,
but if pressed at the Conference we should suggest, after listening to views, that
something along the Raisman lines might be a possible solution. It was agreed that
Mr. Huijsman should discuss this further with Mr. Bourdillon.
It was agreed that Mr. Huijsman should draft a Memorandum3 based on his Note,
incorporating the points made during this meeting, and setting out the reasons for
the various recommendations made at some length, for concurrence and submission
to Ministers.
3 See 214.
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214 CO 554/262, no 200 15 June 1953
‘Summary outline of proposals for a revised Nigerian federal
constitution’: CO memorandum by N B J Huijsman. Minute by W L
Gorell Barnes
(Paragraph references are to attached Notes)1
I. Territorial divisions
(a) Regions The balance of advantage lies with discouraging the creation of more
Regions, but if there should be a real and powerful demand for a separate Cameroons
Region we should be prepared to discuss the proposal. (See paragraphs 4 to 7).
(b) The federal capital. The obvious choice for federal capital is Lagos, and it is
probable that this will also be the view of the main Nigerian parties. We should keep
an open mind on the question of the status of Lagos which is largely a question for
Nigerians to settle but we should be prepared to arbitrate in order to prevent it
endangering agreement on the new constitution. From the technical point of view
both a solution which gave Lagos the position of a federal enclave inside Nigeria
(following the example of Washington D.C.) or left it a Western Region municipality
with certain special arrangements to meet its requirements as federal capital
(following the example of Ottawa) would be feasible. (See para. 8).
II. Political organisation of the centre and the regions
(a) Centre. The new Constitution should provide for a Federal Legislature and a
Federal Cabinet (See paragraph 9).
(i) The Legislature. The Federal Legislature should be unicameral with a directly-
elected membership. The present proportion in which the Regions are represented
in the Nigerian House of Representatives should be retained for the new Federal
Legislature. If it should prove essential the establishment of a second chamber
with limited powers of delaying and initiating legislation might be considered.
The Lieutenant Governors (or Governors) of the Regions should cease to be ex
officio members of the Federal Legislature, but the other ex officio members, and
probably the special members specified in the 1951 Order-in Council should remain
members. (If it were agreed to establish a second chamber the special members
might more appropriately sit in it). Section 68 of the 1951 Order-in Council (dealing
with the presidency of the House and the Governor’s right to address it) should be
incorporated in the new Constitution. (See paragraphs 10 and 11.)
(ii) The Cabinet. There should be a Federal Cabinet with the Governor (or
Governor-General) as President, three ex-officio members (Chief Secretary,
Financial Secretary, and Attorney-General) and not more than [nine] Nigerian
Ministers. The Governor should be left free to appoint the Nigerian members of
the Federal Cabinet from the members of the Federal Legislature, subject to an
affirmative vote of say two-thirds of the Legislature. He should however ensure
appropriate representation of regional interests in the Federal Cabinet. The votes
of not less than two-thirds of the strength of the Federal Legislature, cast in a
secret ballot, should be required to revoke the appointment of an individual
1 Not printed.
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Minister or for a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet. In addition, the Governor
should have the right in his discretion to propose to the Cabinet that the
appointment of a Minister should be revoked and, if the Cabinet so resolve, should
be required to revoke the appointment. Ministers should be given Departmental
responsibility, this responsibility extending also to ‘existing legislation’ falling
within the scope of their portfolios. The Governor should retain general reserve
powers and the following portfolios should be held by the ex officio members of
the Cabinet:—
External Affairs and Defence—Chief Secretary
Finance—Financial Secretary 
Justice—Attorney-General
The Cabinet should have full executive responsibility for all subjects exclusive to
the Centre and for subjects on the concurrent list on which executive power rests
with the Centre and would have to exercise a coordinating responsibility in regard
to all other subjects on the concurrent list, while the Federal Legislature would
have the right to legislate on subjects exclusive to the Centre, or on the
concurrent list. The Cabinet should operate on the principle of collective
responsibility and its deliberations should be secret. (Paragraphs 12–14)
(b) The Regions. The existing provisions regarding the legislative and executive
organisations in the Regions should be carried over into the new Constitution. Some
changes may be required to be made at once in the new constitution and others, will
probably be made later and at different stages in regard to the different Regions. It
would probably be desirable to make it clear in published despatches that Lieutenant-
Governors in Council would be free to propose amendments to the Secretary of State
for submission to H.M. in Council for the purpose of introducing greater autonomy
in the conduct of Regional affairs, and, so far as possible, it might be desirable to
indicate in the despatches what further changes would be likely to be acceptable to
the Secretary of State. To make it clear that this power of amendment would not be
confined to the Centre, there should be an appropriate gloss on this provision in
published despatches, making it clear that in principle Lieutenant-Governors-in-
Council would be left free to propose appropriate amendments to the Secretary of
State for the purpose of introducing a greater measure of self-government in the
conduct of Regional affairs. (See paragraph 15).
(i) Legislatures. There should be bicameral Legislatures in the Northern and
Western Regions and a unicameral legislature in the Eastern Region. If a
Cameroons Region were established it is more than doubtful whether it would
require or could afford more than a unicameral legislature. (See paragraph 16).
(ii) Elections. Our aim should be to leave the existing electoral provisions as they
are until the new Constitution is in force and, if necessary in a particular Region in
the interests of wider agreement, to secure earlier changes by negotiation or
pressure through the Lieutenant-Governor of the Region concerned. (See
paragraph 17.) It would be desirable for the Constitution to provide for separate
elections to the Regional and Federal legislatures, and exclusive membership of
the Federal and Regional Legislatures, i.e. no member of a Regional Legislature
being permitted to be a member of the Federal Legislature. (See paragraph 18.) We
should be prepared to accept changes in the Regional electoral regulations to allow
for direct elections and single-member constituencies. The Constitution should
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also provide that the electoral regulations in force in a particular Region should
apply to elections to the Federal as well as to the Regional Legislature. In other
words we should be prepared to accept elections to both the Regional and Federal
Legislatures under widely differing Regional electoral regulations. (See paragraph
19.)
(iii) Regional Executives, Ministerial Departmental responsibility should also be
conceded to the Regions, and there would be no objection if the Lieutenant-
Governors adopted the Gold Coast practice of drawing their Ministers from the
majority party or coalition. We should be prepared to accept all-Nigerian
Ministries in the Regions, subject to the Lieutenant-Governor retaining general
reserve powers, control of the police, and control of the Public Service in
association with a Public Service Commission. (See paragraphs 20 and 21.)
III. Division of jurisdiction between the Federal and Regional governments
The new constitution should divide legislation into three categories:—
(a) within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre;
(b) within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Region; and
(c) within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Centre and the Regions, with Central
legislation prevailing in the event of inconsistency.
A subject exclusive to the Region should be transferable to the concurrent list or to
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government by an affirmative vote of the
three Regional Legislatures, if confirmed by the Federal Legislature. No subject
exclusively within Federal jurisdiction should be transferred to concurrent or
exclusive Regional jurisdiction without the approval of the Secretary of State on the
recommendation of the Governor-in-Council. The Governor and Lieutenant-
Governor should continue to reserve for Her Majesty’s pleasure Bills on the subjects
listed in Clause 10 of the Royal Instructions. (See paragraph 22 and Annex I.)
IV. The Public Service
We should, if pressed, be prepared to accept a splitting of the Nigerian public service
into a federal and regional service. Control of the federal and regional public services
should be exercised by the Governor and Lieutenant-Governors in association with a
federal and regional public service commissions. The balance of advantage would lie
with uniform conditions of service and we should take the initiative in proposing
them, but should not regard acceptance as an essential requirement on our part.
(See paragraphs 23 to 25.)
V. The judiciary and interpretation of the constitution
(a) Judiciary. We should not raise the question of revising the present
organisation of the Nigerian judiciary, but if this becomes a live issue, we should be
prepared to accept the introduction of legislation transferring responsibility for the
lower courts to the Regions, and, if necessary, creating regional and appellate
divisions within the Supreme Court of Nigeria. (See paragraph 26.)
(b) Interpretation of the constitution. We should propose that the Supreme Court
of Nigeria should be vested with additional powers similar to those contained in
paragraphs 124 and 125 of the Central African Federal Scheme (Cmd. 8754). (See
paragraphs 27 and 28 and Annex II.)
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VI. Financial relations between the Centre and the Regions
While not actually stipulating any financial changes, we should take such
opportunities as may occur to advise an alteration along the lines of the
recommendations put forward by the Fiscal Commission under the chairmanship of
Sir Jeremy Raisman which recommended the percentage division of the Central
revenue of the Central African federation, representing a compromise between the
principle of derivation and the principle of need, to include the Central Government
as well as the Regions. It also seems important that the Centre should retain the
power under any future arrangement to make ad hoc grants-in-aid to individual
Regions. (See paragraphs 30 to 34.)
Minute on 214
Sir T. Lloyd
I have had second thoughts about one feature of the proposals for a revised Nigerian
Constitution which should be reaching you via Sir K. Roberts-Wray this morning.
The feature about which I now feel doubtful is the suggestion that confirmation of
the Central Ministers chosen by the Governor should be by simple majority of the
Central Legislature. This would, on paper, make it possible for the Northern and
Official Members together to force through Ministers who were acceptable neither to
the East nor to the West. I doubt very much whether the West and East can be
expected to accept this; and I think, therefore, that we should either propose or be
willing to accept an arrangement whereby confirmation of Central Ministers had to
be by a larger proportion of the Members of the Central Legislature—say two-thirds.
Under such an arrangement the North would still be able to veto Ministers they do
not like but would not be able, even if supported by officials, to force through the
appointment of Ministers objectionable to both the other Regions. An alternative
would be to provide that officials should not vote on this matter; but that would leave
the possibility of a deadlock.
If you agree with this view, which Mr. Huijsman on reflection shares, perhaps you
would very kindly make a suitable amendment either in the proposals themselves or
in my covering letter to Sir J. Macpherson.
W.L.G.B.
18.6.53
215 CO 554/261, no 196 17 June 1953
[Constitutional review]: CO note on recent constitutional
developments in Nigeria
On the 21st May, the Secretary of State announced in the House of Commons that
Her Majesty’s Government had decided that the Nigerian Constitution would have to
be redrawn, and that as a first step representatives of all three Regions would be
invited to London to discuss with him the best way in which this work could be
carried out.
2. This raised the question of what principles should guide the selection of
Nigerian representatives. It was felt to be important for instance, that the Northern
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Elements’ Progressive Union, the only Northern opposition organisation worth
noting, and which may become a force to be reckoned with in the North in future,
should be represented even though the party has no members in the present
Northern House of Assembly. It was also felt that the National Independence Party,
formed in opposition to the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons in the
East, and at present conducting the Government of the Region, though with a
minority in the Legislature, should attend. The U.K.’s obligations under the
Cameroons Trusteeship Agreement also required separate Cameroons
representation. After consultation with the Governor, the following guiding
principles, later published in Nigeria, were put forward by the Secretary of State:—
(i) there should not be more than 15 representatives at the Conference;
(ii) while as far as possible representations should be on a Regional basis the
major political parties, together with the Cameroons under U.K. Trusteeship,
should be represented;
(iii) The persons selected should, as far as possible but not necessarily exclusively,
be popularly elected representatives of the people, i.e. they should have had
experience of the operation of the present Constitution in a Legislature and, if
possible, in Ministerial Office.
3. Invitations were extended on this basis on the Secretary of State’s behalf to the
three leaders of the Action Group, the N.C.N.C. and the Northern People’s Congress
to nominate three representatives each, to the N.I.P. to nominate two
representatives, and to one representative each of the Cameroons and the N.E.P.U.
This choice can be described as of ‘parties or groups which have shown command of
a substantial number of votes in the legislatures or which contested the 1951
elections in their own name’. They were asked to a Conference at which there would
be a full exchange of views with the object of reaching agreement on the method by
which the work of re-drawing the Constitution should be undertaken, and on the
interests which should be consulted in the process.
4. The invitation has so far been accepted outright by the N.I.P. and the
N.P.C., and the Cameroons are expected to follow suit. There is also an uncon-
firmed Press report that N.E.P.U. have accepted it. It was, however, initially
refused by Mr. Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe, leaders of the Action Group and the
N.C.N.C. respectively, who objected to the inclusion of N.I.P. representatives and
felt that a visit to London to discuss only the method by which the Constitution
should be revised would be a waste of their time. Acting on a mandate from the
Secretary of State, and with the approval of the Council of Ministers, the
Governor then asked Mr. Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe to reconsider their decision,
assuring them that the full exchange of views referred to in the invitation would
not be confined to method but that each representative would be able to indicate
to the Secretary of State both in what respects, in his opinion, the present
Constitution was unsatisfactory and in what particulars it should be redrawn. The
Governor added that if there was a sufficient consensus of opinion there would be
nothing to prevent conclusions being recorded as a basis for a settlement of the
present constitutional difficulties. He also rebutted the objections to the inclusion
of the N.I.P. in the invitations.
5. To this, Mr. Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe have replied expressing their
willingness to attend the Conference provided:—
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(i) that 15 (instead of 13) representatives are invited, composed as follows:—
From the North: 3 N.P.C., 1 N.E.P.U. opposition, and 1 Chief;
From the West: 3 Action Group, 1 N.C.N.C. opposition, and 1 Chief;
From the East: 3 N.C.N.C., 1 N.I.P., and 1 Cameroons.
(ii) that the main purpose of the Conference is to consider those defects in the
Constitution which have made it unworkable, and to amend or revise it in the light
of such consideration. This would exclude amendments on such a scale that the
revised version could be called a new Constitution—as in effect it would be if the
Northern demands for no further political organisation at the Centre were to be
accepted—thereby enabling H.M.G. to argue in 1956 that longer experience of the
working of the constitution was needed before self-government could be granted.
6. The effect of the proposal in paragraph 5 (1) above would be to give the
Nigerian political parties the following representation at the London talks:—
N.P.C. – 4 (3 nominees plus 1 chief)
Action Group – 4 (3 nominees plus 1 chief)
N.C.N.C. – 4 (3 Eastern, 1 Western nominee)
N.I.P.
N.E.P.U. 1 nominee each
Cameroons  
The object behind paragraph 5 (ii) is of course to preserve the present constitution,
which is due for review in 1956, the date by which the Action Group and N.C.N.C.
claim full self-government for Nigeria.
7. These proposals involve a sacrifice on the part of the N.I.P., which it is believed
the party would accept. The Governor believes that the North would agree to the
revised representation but that they would not agree to commit their people to any
constitutional amendments until these have been approved at least by the Regional
Legislature. This is directly opposed to the Action Group/N.C.N.C. attitude which
insists on final decisions of substance in London. At the time of writing (the 17th
June), the Governor hopes to bring about a meeting in Lagos between Awolowo,
Azikiwe, the Sardauna of Sokoto (leader of the N.P.C.) and himself to try and
reconcile this difference. This meeting, if it takes place, will be preparatory to the
London meeting and without prejudice to the decisions which the latter may reach.
8. The constitutional talks are complicated by a further issue. The remaining
Central Ministers from the East have told the Governor that they will resign from the
Council of Ministers if the Western Ministers, who resigned at the end of March, are
not replaced by the 30th June. The Northern Ministers have stated that if the Eastern
Ministers resign, they too will do so. They have added that they will also resign if
Chief Bode Thomas and Akintola, previously Minister of Transport and Minister of
Labour respectively, are included among any new Ministers. The Action Group have,
however, committed themselves publicly by resolutions of both Regional Houses to
submitting for re-appointment only the names of the resigned Ministers.
Nevertheless, the Governor feels that an attempt must be made to avert mass
resignation on the 10th June by asking the Joint Council of the Western Regional
Legislature—the body responsible for approving the names of Western Central
Ministers proposed by the Governor—to consider other names. If the Council
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persists in nominating Chief Bode Thomas and Akintola, the ensuing deadlock may
affect arrivals at the London Conference, even if prior agreement on its constitution
and terms of reference had been reached.
216 CO 554/261, no 197a 17 June 1953
[Constitutional review]: minute by N B J Huijsman on an inward
telegram no 878 from Sir J Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton on the
revision of the constitution
Mr Watt
We spoke. The background to the Gov’s tel. is that there is at present a good deal of
loose talk in Nigeria about what happens in 1956, the date when the present
constitution comes up for review. The general line which appears to be adopted by
the local Southern politicians is somewhat as follows: ‘we are prepared to consider
changes in the present constitution which will make it more workable; on the other
hand, this is the last time we will accept a constitution from British hands. The next
constitution (ie 1956) will not be a British grant, but will be one which we shall have
worked out ourselves in a constituent assembly representative of all shades of
Nigerian opinion.’ The Northerners hold somewhat similar views in that they
maintain that any constitutional changes which may be required must be worked out
by agreement and must then be submitted to popular consultation.
As pointed out by you, the question of a constituent assembly is irrelevant to the
issue of full self-government, as this can only be granted by HMG under the
provisions of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act. That is the formal posn; but to go further,
it does raise the question of the way in which HMG can confer full self-government.
You pointed out that there are two main ways of so doing in these days:—
(a) By HMG withdrawing the Governor’s reserve powers and formally vesting
foreign affairs and defence responsibilities in the local government (Ceylon, India,
Pakistan, New Zealand); or
(b) By HMG incorporating the constitutional recommendations of a local
‘national convention’ or parliament in a new Act of the Imperial Parliament
(Australia, South Africa)
In neither case is a constituent assembly involved, in the sense that it is a sovereign
constitution-making body.
Our discussion also brought out that, judging by recent history, constituent
assemblies are generally established after a country has gained its independence.
This probably holds good for remoter periods of history as well, I think. We thought,
however, that it would be sufficient to quote the recent examples of India, Pakistan,
France and Italy, which in themselves also illustrate the essential function of a
constituent assembly, ie that it is a sovereign body charged with drawing up 
a constitution, either for immediate promulgation (e.g. India) or for confirmation by a
referendum (France, Italy). The later, from my recollection, tends to be Latin
practice. The three all-German constitutions which have been drawn up in the past
century were promulgated after adoption by the constituent assembly concerned.
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The foregoing discussions may serve as a guide towards a definition of the term
‘constituent assembly’.
With regard to (b) of the Governor’s telegram I think that we both felt that
circumstances determined the method of representation. In France (and Italy, I
believe) the assembly was elected by a system of proportional representation. In India
and Pakistan it endeavoured to be representative, in the absence of an established
electoral procedure.
It seems to me that the above points may serve as a basis for a reply to the
Governor. You kindly undertook to look at these points in greater detail. Although
the Gov’s query does not specify any fixed date for a reply, we did, I think, aim at
getting at least a telegraphic reply to him by Friday as I have just received a cable
from Nigeria indicating that the three major leaders may see him by then. It wld
therefore be most desirable to have him briefed on these points. I have therefore
given these pp priority.
N.B.J.H.
17.6.53
217 CO 554/262, no 207 20 June 1953
[Constitutional review]: inward telegram no 905 from Sir J
Macpherson to Mr Lyttelton reporting his discussion with Nigerian
political leaders on arrangements for the London conference
My telegram No. 881.
London Talks.
On my invitation the Sardauna, Awolowo and Azikiwe met me last night for frank
discussion of the position reached. As regards subjects to be discussed in London,
Sardauna said he had read the joint letter sent to me by Awolowo and Azikiwi [sic]
and had no comment to make. In the favourable atmosphere so induced, it soon
became clear that no point of major difference either as regards the object of London
talks or composition of the delegation was likely to form obstacle to agreement
between the leaders of majority parties. They agreed that the object of the talks in
London should be to consider:—
(a) defects in present constitution;
(b) what changes are necessary;
(c) what steps are necessary to put those changes into effect.
Elaborating, Azikiwe stressed the need for ensuring that even with changes made, no
further breakdown would occur and therefore political objective must be definitely
ascertained. This was self government in 1956. Sardauna stated no objection to
discussion of this point. Awolowo enquired whether you would agree that the subject
should be discussed and I promised to put the suggestion to you for your favourable
consideration in view of the fact that present political difficulties in Nigeria have
arisen over this very question.
2. As regards composition, Sardauna stated that he had no objection to proposals
in the joint letter. I explained the special consideration as regards representation of
the Cameroons which Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom must take
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into account, as also the fact that the greater part of the Cameroons, both area and
population, was in the North. All agreed that the Cameroons representation must be
separate from regional representation. Awolowo and Azikiwe found themselves
unable to agree that five places for the East should be divided as to three for N.C.N.C.
and two for N.I.P. Moreover, they could not agree that these two should be divided
one for N.I.P. and one for U.N.P. They considered such allocation quite
disproportionate. They suggested that as in the North and West, one place should be
allocated to a public figure without political affiliation, possibly a Chief, to be
nominated by the majority party, i.e. N.C.N.C.
3. Discussion then turned to the question of advisers to accompany the
delegates. It was suggested that difficulty over N.I.P. representation might be
overcome by permitting sole N.I.P. delegate to have N.I.P. adviser with him. Azikiwe
and Awolowo stated acceptable provided the following were agreed: there should be
one adviser from each region and from the Cameroons paid for by the Centre and
nominated by the majority party. Sardauna stated ‘and this was accepted as a
generous gesture’ that, as regards the North, adviser to be paid for from central funds
would be Northern Cameroonian. In addition, other advisers could accompany to be
paid for by the regions. N.E.P.U. must be allowed adviser. In the East both N.C.N.C.
and N.I.P. would have one adviser each paid for from regional funds. Sardauna had
no personal objection to the proposals but had to reserve the question of N.E.P.U.
agreement by Northern Executive Council. Azikiwe similarly had to reserve the
question whether N.C.N.C. would guarantee not to query the Eastern Regional
expenditure on the advisers’ expenses for reference to N.C.N.C. Party Executive.
4. Three political leaders, subject to the above reservations, agreed that
composition of the delegation should be as follows:—
West: Three Action Group,
One N.C.N.C.
One Oba (to be nominated by the majority party).
North: Three N.P.C.
One N.E.P.U.
One Emir (to be nominated by the majority party).
East: One N.C.N.C.
One N.I.P.
One public figure, possibly a chief (to be nominated by the 
majority party).
Cameroons: One, representing both North and South.
In addition, each Region and the Cameroons to take one adviser whose expenses
would be met from the centre. Other advisers could be taken to be paid for from
Regional funds. These should include one adviser N.I.P., one adviser N.C.N.C., one
adviser N.E.P.U.
5. I undertook to report immediately to you the views so expressed, and to
request you to let me have your comments upon them for communication to persons
named as early as possible. I estimated that reply might possibly be received within
four days.
6. All three political leaders agreed that the London meeting should begin the
earliest date you can manage, but not before 15th July.
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218 CO 554/262, no 216 26 June 1953
[Western ministers]: outward telegram no 75 from W L Gorell Barnes
to Sir J Macpherson on the deadlock over the appointment of Western
members to the Council of Ministers
[The resignation of the four Western members from the Council of Ministers at the time
of the self-government debate on 31 March raised important constitutional issues (see
187). Under the 1951 constitution the Council of Ministers had to have four ministers
from the Western Region. When in June the lieutenant-governor attempted to nominate
four new appointees to fill the vacancies, Awolowo argued that he could only nominate on
the advice of the regional government, in short the AG, and insisted that the original four
ministers—Akintola, Prest, Thomas and the Ooni of Ife—be re-appointed. Deadlock
ensued for several months. In the event the four were re-appointed in Sept 1953 (see CO
554/338, no 17, acting governor to Lyttelton, 10 Sept 1953).]
Following strictly personal for Governor from Gorell Barnes.
Begins. I am glad that, except for the carelessnesses for which I apologise, you
liked our telegram Personal No. 73. We in turn like the way in which you propose to
handle it.
2. At the same time I think I ought to let you know that the more I think about
it, the more concerned I am about the threatening crisis about the Western Members
of the Central Council of Ministers. If I were quite certain that we were on the right
lines, I should not worry about effect on London Conference; for I am sure we should
not buy that conference at the expense of lending ourselves to anything that is wrong
in the West any more than in the East. But I must confess to some rather gnawing
doubts about the Western affair.
3. My doubts arise from the following considerations:—
(a) If we are to get Nigerian politics back on to the rails, I feel we have got to have
with us one of the leading Southern Nationalist figures.
(b) There is no hope of having Azikiwe genuinely with us. If therefore (a) is
correct, we must win over Awolowo, and this means that we must rescue him from
the arms of Azikiwe into which his own political impetuosity has driven him.
(c) Awolwo has committed himself in public so deeply to the return to the Centre
of the former Western Ministers that, if we make no concession at all, it seems that
we are bound to drive him further into Azikiwe’s web.
(d) We know that the other Central Ministers will resign if the deadlock is not
resolved very soon (paragraph 9 of your telegram No. 822). Then Awolowo will no
doubt seek to place the whole blame on you and to make out that, whatever you
may say, they would not have resigned if the former Western Ministers had been
re-appointed. Nor, I imagine, can we be quite certain, in spite of paragraph 9 of
your telegram No. 877, that he will not be able to find some way of supporting this
statement (see in this connection paragraph 12 of the Minister of State’s secret
and personal savingram No. 950 of 24th April1 about early attitude of N.I.P.
Ministers), or that one or more of existing Central Ministers will not let you down
on this point sooner or later. This would all be fine material for Azikiwe.
4. As I understand it the reasons for which you and at any rate Northern Central
Ministers have hitherto felt—and we have agreed—that Bode Thomas and Akintola
1 See 193.
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cannot be taken back are firstly that they revealed proceedings of Council of
Ministers without your permission, and secondly that, after their resignation, they
used irresponsible language which amounted almost, if not quite, to encouragement
to violence and showed them to be unsuitable to be Ministers.
5. Whilst I naturally have not a complete picture of what happened, I have a
feeling that on the latter count a distinction can be made between Bode Thomas on
the one hand and, on the other, Akintola who, so far as I am aware, is the only one
who made references to the possibility of a Nigerian Mau Mau. If this is so, would it
be possible to make a distinction between Bode Thomas and Akintola on the ground
that unpermitted revelation of proceedings of Council of Ministers, though a very
grave thing for a Minister, is not perhaps unforgivable when committed in a state of
excitement by a man new to Ministerial life; but that Nigeria cannot have in a
Ministerial capacity a man who is prepared even to contemplate without horror the
kind of primitive savagery which is Mau Mau?
6. You may feel that this, even if it could be negotiated, would not be fair or
desirable as it would bring back Bode Thomas, who was the worst nuisance in the old
team, and sacrifice Akintola, who was capable of doing a good job. But I wonder
whether Bode Thomas, the consistent growler, may not be preferable to the smooth
and competent, but treacherous, Akintola.
7. If you decided to try this, you might think it advisable to ask me first to make
sure that it would be acceptable to higher authority here. But you are more likely to
feel that I am right off the beam, in which case be assured that this telegram is the
product of my own cogitations alone, and carried no other authority. Ends.
219 CO 554/338, no 9 29 June 1953
[Western ministers]: letter (reply) from Sir J Macpherson to W L
Gorell Barnes on his reluctance to re-appoint the Western ministers
I am most grateful to you for your personal telegram No. 75 of the 26th of June,1 in
which you put to me your personal anxiety about the crisis over the Western
Ministers. I have been more worried about this than anything else. I explained briefly
in my telegram No. 970 the main reasons which have led me to the conclusion that
your proposition about Bode Thomas is not possible. I will now set these out in
rather more detail.
2. While it is not possible to say now what the final result will be, the principal
points which I have had to bear in mind are as follows:—
(a) It was not only during and after the March crisis that Bode Thomas and Akintola
divulged Cabinet secrets. This had been going on for months, as had anti-Government
articles in ‘Service’,2 and the Council was extremely disturbed. The other Ministers
knew, and we knew, that Bode and Akintola were responsible but we could not pro-
duce evidence without compromising the source of our information.
(b) The result was that other Ministers did not dare to express their real views in
Council and Cabinet responsibility became meaningless.
(c) Whenever the Central Ministers drew closer together at informal meetings
outside Council, harmony was disrupted by those two, particularly Bode Thomas.
1 See 218. 2 ie the Daily Service, the AG newspaper.
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(d) If they return, and even if Ministers from the North and East could be
prevailed upon to continue in office, there could be no mutual confidence.
(e) As regards the method of appointing Central Ministers and the qualities
required of them, see despatches published with the Constitution Order in
Council—especially paragraph 8 of C.O. Despatch 464A and paragraphs 3–7 of
C.O. Despatch 147A.3
3. On the face of it, there is force in Awolowo’s argument that the final decision
should rest with the Joint Council4 and party in power. And constitutionally he is no
doubt correct. But I cannot include either Bode Thomas or Akintola in the four
names proposed to the Joint Council. Apart from losing four Northern and two
Eastern Ministers (they have repeatedly affirmed this), the effect on responsible
opinion would be very bad indeed. Even inside the Action Group there has been a
sharp difference of opinion about insisting on having the same four Ministers back,
and alternative names were proposed and agreed by Parliamentary Executive as
recently as the 21st of June. Within the past 48 hours the faction headed by Bode
Thomas and Akintola, which favours extreme action against Central Government
(civil disobedience, strikes and possibly even assassination) has won for the time
being.
4. As you know, I hoped to let things ride at least until after the London talks.
And I think the remaining Central Ministers would have agreed to this. But leaving
aside their threat of resignation, and despite the danger to the London talks,
Marshall and I agreed that the exercise must go on, however sterile or even
dangerous. The reason is that recently Awolowo himself has been pressing Marshall
on this question and the Action Group Press in the past few weeks has been attacking
me and the Council of Ministers for not having any Western Ministers, the allegation
being that decisions are being taken adverse to Western Region. Marshall accordingly
saw Awolowo on the 21st of June and told him of his intention to summon the Joint
Council for the 2nd of July and to seek my authority to nominate the Oni, Awokoya,
Ighodaro and Enahoro, unless Awolowo had alternative suggestions, excluding Bode
and Akintola. Awolowo erupted, but suggested further deferment of action. When,
however, Marshall asked if he would give a categorical assurance that the campaign
for filling the vacancies would be suspended, Awolowo bluntly refused. There was
then no option but to go ahead.
5. The Joint Council meets on the 2nd of July. Marshall is broadcasting today to
explain the purpose of meeting and the considerations involved, but without
mentioning personalities or disclosing the proposed names. In the unlikely event of
other names being suggested in the course of proceedings, Marshall would suspend
the sitting briefly and consult me by telephone.
6. On this picture I am sure you will agree that at this stage I could not possibly
suggest the insertion of Bode Thomas’s name. It is possible that attempts will be
made to create bad trouble (we are trying very hard to get firm information) but this
must be faced. If nothing positive emerges from this exercise we can then consider
the next steps. It may be best to do nothing more until after the London talks (if they
3 See 116 and 137.
4 The Western Region Joint Council was set up under the 1951 constitution and consisted of forty
members elected from each of the Western House of Assembly and Western House of Chiefs.
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take place) but at least we shall have shown that we want the Western Ministers and
are not reluctant to take strong Nationalists. Failure to secure Western Ministers
acceptable to other Central colleagues may involve the threat either to dissolve the
Western House or even the House of Representatives, probably the latter.
220 CO 554/312, no 25 30 June 1953
[Ministerial powers]: despatch no 1502 from Sir J Macpherson to Mr
Lyttelton on a request from the Council of Ministers for greater
responsibilities over departments
[Under the 1951 constitution, the Council of Ministers was to operate under a conciliar
system, with the Council acting as a policy making rather than policy executing body.
Although Heads of Department were bound by the decisions of the Council, they were not
subject to direction by ministers. From the start of the operation of the system, ministers
pushed to be given responsibilities for departments such as were being conceded in the
Gold Coast (see 177). From 1953 this was conceded stage by stage in Nigeria.]
I have the honour to inform you that on the 30th of March the House of
Representatives, upon a Motion by the Minister of Mines and Power, seconded by the
Chief Secretary to the Government, resolved:—
‘That in the opinion of this House the time has come for Ministers to have gen-
eral direction and control of, and individual responsibility for, the Departments
within their portfolios, and this House prays Her Most Gracious Majesty to
amend the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1951, accordingly.’
2. I made reference to the Government’s intention in this matter in my speech at
the opening of the new Session of the House of Representatives on the 3rd of March,
and I quote the relevant part of my speech:—
‘It will be noted that a change has been made in the form in which the
Estimates are set out, in that departmental expenditure has been grouped in a
way which reflects Ministerial responsibilities. My Ministers are in process of
establishing separate Ministries, and this process would have been completed
earlier but for difficulties, which are being surmounted, in matters of
accommodation and staff.
‘It is well known that policy is determined by the Council of Ministers at the
Centre and by the Executive Councils in the Regions, but that in respect of
the implementation of policy, the Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council
places certain limitations on the responsibility of Ministers. These limitations
were in accordance with the recommendations of the Constitutional
Conferences, notably the General Conference which was held at Ibadan in
1950. The delegates to the Conference were influenced, I am sure, not by lack
of confidence in the calibre of the Ministerial material that would be available,
but by their recognition of the special circumstances of this large and diverse
country. The Council of Ministers has had the question of the functions and
powers of Ministers under review for some time, in the light of practical
experience of working the Constitution. Proposals for far-reaching changes
are being considered and the results will be presented to you.’
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3. The decision of the Council of Ministers to introduce this Motion was taken
only a day or two before the opening of the Session and the Council of Ministers was
anxious that you should be aware of this development. In an exchange of informal
telegrams I ascertained that you would be prepared in principle to support a request
for changes in the functions and powers of Ministers if in due course a
recommendation to this effect were made following the consideration of the Motion
by the House of Representatives.
4. I do not consider that it is necessary to describe at any great length the cir-
cumstances which led to this decision by the Council of Ministers. From the very start
of the present Constitution there was a strong feeling, amongst some at least of the
Central Ministers, that modifications were desirable to the limitations set upon the
individual responsibility of Ministers by Section 162 of the Nigeria (Constitution)
Order in Council, 1951. You will recall that the subject was raised in the discussion
you had with the Council of Ministers during your visit to Nigeria at the end of May
last year. In the latter part of 1952 it was decided that the Nigerian Secretariat should
be replaced by separate offices of the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary and
by nine separate Ministries; this decision was reported to you in a telegram from the
Governor’s Deputy, No. 260 of the 28th of January. The Law Officers advised that this
arrangement did not conflict with the provisions of the Constitution Order in Council.
Four Ministries have already been established and plans were made for the setting up
of the other Ministries as quickly as staff and accommodation became available.
5. The Ministers appreciated that in making these arrangements, and in modify-
ing the Notes on Administrative Procedure under the new Constitution to give
Ministers the right to give instructions to Heads of Departments in order to ensure
the implementation of decisions of the Council of Ministers, I had stretched to the
utmost the interpretation of section 162 of the Order in Council; and they were grate-
ful. After further experience and reflection, however, they came to the conclusion that
the changes that they wanted could not be effected without an amendment to the
Order in Council, and, in a memorandum, dated 24th February, signed by all nine
Ministers with Portfolio, they asked that the Constitution be amended to secure:—
‘(i) that Ministers should have full executive authority over their
Departments, short of control of the Civil Service which had already been
provided for under the Constitution; and
(ii) that all executive authority in Legislation and Regulations be given to
Ministers and the Council of Ministers, and not officials and the Governor-in-
Council, providing, of course, that this does not prevent powers being given
to the Governor acting in his discretion.’
6. In the discussions which took place in Council on this subject, on various
dates, the principal arguments adduced in support of the case for a change were as
follows:—
(a) Experience had shown that the wording of the Order in Council, with its
limitations on individual responsibility, gave to the Ministers powers substantially
less than those which the Nigerian public thought they possessed.
(b) The fact that the Constitution provides for Ministerial responsibility for
‘matters’ and not for ‘Departments’ tended to encourage the staff of the various
Departments to continue to look only to the Head of the Department, not to the
Minister, as being in charge of the Department.
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(c) Experience had shown that the expression ‘in association with the appropriate
public officer’ in Section 162(b) of the Order in Council did not easily lend itself to
precise interpretation, and was likely to lead to difficulties between a Minister and
the Departments concerned with matters for which he had constitutional
responsibility. The Ministers also felt that the imprecision of the expression made
it difficult for them to answer with confidence when matters within their
portfolios were raised in the House of Representatives.
(d) Powers which in other countries are conferred upon Ministries were, in
Nigeria, conferred upon the Governor, the Governor-in-Council or officials; as a
result, the public did not sufficiently appreciate the extent of the work carried out
by Ministers.
7. Before reaching a conclusion on this subject the Council had the advantage of
having before it a Memorandum by the Attorney-General. It had earlier been
suggested that the changes to be made should bring Nigeria into line with the Gold
Coast in the matter of Ministerial responsibilities. The Attorney-General therefore
analysed the differences between the constitutional instruments of the Gold Coast
and of Nigeria, and drew attention to the fact that the federal, or Regional, structure
of Government in Nigeria introduced complications which were not present in the
Gold Coast. He pointed out, for example, that any changes made in Nigeria would
have to take into account, in the case of Central Ministers, the differing
responsibilities of those Ministers who are responsible for ‘Central’ matters, to which
the legislative and executive powers of the Regions do not extend, and of those
Ministers who are responsible for ‘Regional’ matters, as set out in the Third Schedule
to the Constitution Order-in-Council. After very full discussion, the Council of
Ministers agreed in principle that a request should be made for the amendment of
the Constitution so that Ministers in Nigeria might be given fuller powers on the
lines of those held by Ministers in the Gold Coast. It was also decided that a
Government Motion be moved, at the then impending meeting of the House of
Representatives, in the terms which I have quoted in the first paragraph of this
despatch. 
8. It is proper that I should emphasise the fact that Ministers were at pains to
make it clear that they had no wish for control over the Civil Service. This point was
made specifically on several occasions during the discussions in Council; the
Memorandum of the Attorney-General drew attention to the fact that the
Constitution of the Gold Coast, as well as that of Nigeria, provided that appointment,
promotion, dismissal and disciplinary control of public officers is vested in the
Governor, acting in his discretion, and that there shall be a Public Service
Commission to advise the Governor on such matters; and the memorandum
presented by the nine Central Ministers stated (as the extract quoted in paragraph 5
above shows) that their desire was for executive authority over Departments ‘short of
control of the Civil Service which has already been provided for under the
Constitution’.
9. The Ministers recognise, of course, that, because of the complication of our
Regional structure, effect could not be given to the prayer of the House of
Representatives merely by incorporating in the Nigeria (Constitution) Order-in-
Council the relevant provisions of the corresponding Gold Coas instrument. The
Attorney-General has prepared a draft amending Order-in-Council which will be
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considered by the Council of Ministers and will be referred to the Regions. In the
meantime, and without prejudice to developments which may take place as a result
of the proposal that the Constitution should be re-drawn, I seek formal confirmation
of your agreement in principle to support a request for changes to be made on the
lines proposed.
221 CO 554/600, no 1 30 June 1953
[Political situation]: inward telegram from Sir J Macpherson to Mr
Lyttelton on AG threats of a campaign of civil disobedience
During the past weeks there have been dark hints given by Action Group leaders that
they have plans for campaign of civil disobedience if they do not get their way. These
hints are confirmed by Special Branch reports which indicate that plans are still very
general and have not yet been worked out in effective detail.
2. Civil disobedience campaign first threatened by Action Group in the event of
Her Majesty’s Government refusing grant of self government in 1956. Awolowo
himself stated at Campos Square meeting on Youth Day, 28th April, that in the event
of self government not being granted ‘we would not consider ourselves bound by any
law, regulation or decree. We would deliberately disobey and break such laws and
bear the consequences’. Since then, threat of civil disobedience at earlier date has
frequently been hinted. 30th June, then 31st July have been mentioned and now it is
suggested that campaign may start on or after 2nd July when members of Western
Joint Council meet to consider appointment of Western Ministers to the Centre.
Latest information is that Action Group intend to insist on return of four resigned
Ministers with no compromise.
3. It is not considered that Action Group has sufficient general support or
support in labour field to organise effective campaign of civil disobedience at this
stage, but we are (omission? concerned at) possibility of hooliganism, illegal
processions, and possibly demonstrations by women at Lagos and Ibadan following
on stalemate over question of Western Ministers,
4. There is no cause for alarm, but these people are unpredictable and you will
not wish to be unprepared for news of incidents.
222 CO 554/262, no 232A 2–11 July 1953
[Self-government]: minutes by T B Williamson, W L Gorell Barnes
and Sir T Lloyd on Williamson’s visit to Nigeria
Mr. Gorell Barnes
I am dictating the following minute on my return from a fifteen day visit to Nigeria.
2. I spent a few days in Lagos both at the beginning and at the end of my trip, and
in between I visited Enugu, Kano, Katsina, Zaria, Kaduna and Ibadan. In addition to
long talks with the Governor, Chief Secretary and other senior officials in Lagos, I
had discussions with all three Lieutenant Governors, with several of their senior
(European) advisers, with a fair selection of Nigerian Ministers, including the
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Sardauna of Sokoto, Mr. Awolowo and Professor Eyo Ita (but not with Zik), with
N.P.C. representatives in Kano and Zaria, and with the Emirs (and their leading
councillors) in Kano, Katsina and Zaria. I was also able to visit two of the three pits at
the Enugu colliery, and Dr. and Mrs. Mellanby kindly took me over the new buildings
at the University College at Ibadan. The trip was a strenuous one, but no effort was
spared to make it worth while, and I was received with the greatest kindness and
warmest welcome wherever I went. I left with the feeling that Nigeria had been
absolutely right in pressing that I should make the visit when I did, and that it was
indeed high time that a member of the West African Department should acquaint
himself at first hand with developments in the territory.
3. There are a number of important matters arising from my visit which I should
like to discuss with you, and others with which I intend to deal on paper, in separate
notes. This note is concerned with the principal problem which I set myself to
attempt to solve during the fortnight I was away; namely how the Secretary of State
should be advised to deal with the demand now categorically set forth by the Action
Group and N.C.N.C. that H.M.G. should concede self-government to Nigeria by 1956.
4. The first point which I wish to make in this connection, and it is an absolutely
fundamental one, relates to the (expatriate) Public Service, particularly (though not
exclusively) the Administrative Grade. There is no doubt at all that the European
officials, not only in the East and West but also in the North, are deeply disturbed
about what the future holds for them, and their sense of insecurity is increasing. I
cannot emphasize too strongly my view (which I am sure is shared by the Governor
and his principal official advisers) that unless, within the next few months, H.M.G.
enunciates clearly the policy which it intends to follow as regards the future
government of Nigeria, a situation is almost certain to arise in which there will no
longer be a Public Service of sufficient quality and strength left in Nigeria to
implement any policy that may later be devised. In fine, H.M.G. have got to ‘come
clean’—and clear—now.
5. The second preliminary point which I want to make is that, if I may say so
with respect, I am sure that the Secretary of State was absolutely right when he
informed his Cabinet colleagues that the pattern of constitutional advance in the
Gold Coast was not necessarily applicable in Nigeria. Compared with the tribal
diversities in Nigeria, not only as between the Regions but within the Regions (for
example the substantially non-Ibo minorities in the East), the Gold Coast is a
relatively homogeneous unit. Moreover, I think there is no doubt—though Nigerian
political leaders would never admit this—that broadly speaking the Gold Coast is a
much more sophisticated and ‘advanced’ territory than the conglomeration of ethnic
groups which are comprised within Nigeria. All this is, of course, very obvious; but it
is sometimes overlooked.
6. Coming now to the crux of the problem, namely what the Secretary of State
should say to Awolowo and Zik when they ask whether H.M.G. is, or is not, prepared
to grant Nigeria self-government by 1956, I suggest that the Secretary of State’s first
answer should be: ‘What do you mean by Nigeria in this context? Do you mean the
whole of Nigeria, or only the West and East?’. Awolowo may attempt to hedge on this,
because personally (I am sure) he would be content for the West alone to be given
self-government by 1956 (or indeed even a little later), but he may not wish to
commit himself openly so long as he is working in alliance with Zik. Zik, on the
other hand, if ever he comes to London, will be speaking in terms of a united Nigeria
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and will demand self-government for the whole territory by 1956. In other words he
will be out to insist that the North should be ‘liberated’ by that date.
7. The Secretary of State will then presumably ask the Sardauna for his views;
and we know perfectly well what his answer will be.
8. At this point I would urge that the Secretary of State should make it clear
beyond all doubt—and should go on the record to that effect—that H.M.G. have no
intention whatever of bringing pressure to bear on the North to take self-government
before they consider themselves ready to assume the burden. It was emphasized to me
several times in Nigeria that the North (who, we should do well to remind ourselves,
comprise roughly a quarter of the total population of the Colonial Empire) are rapidly
losing faith in H.M.G’s integrity and determination to defend them from pressure from
without. They feel that, because they are ‘gentlemen’, H.M.G. feel they have an easier
problem in the North than in the South and that consequently there is a marked ten-
dency for H.M.G. to seek agreement on important matters of policy with the Southern
politicians first and then to bring unfair pressure on the North to come into line even
against the North’s better judgment and firmly held convictions as to what is in the
best interests of their people. In fact one of the Northern Ministers (Mr. Peter
Achimugu) put it to me perfectly bluntly in the words: ‘Is H.M.G. going to let us
down?.’ The next few weeks present us, in my view, with our last chance of demon-
strating to the North that we are not going to let them down: and if we miss that
chance I do not think it will ever recur. We had better, while we still have the oppor-
tunity, go all out to secure the loyalty and faith in us of the North, rather than to lose
the North, probably for ever, in an effort to placate an unreliable South, at the behest
of their anyway to some extent unrepresentative spokesmen.
9. This point is fundamental, and I believe will be readily accepted. I will not
attempt, in this note, to discuss the large question whether the Sardauna and his
colleagues from the North are truly representative of the North. By and large, I
believe they are; and in any event the Sardauna will make it perfectly clear that he is
not prepared to commit himself to anything in London but will insist on referring
everything back to the Northern people through the most representative organs of
Northern opinion which exist at this time. I only wish to add in this context that I
think it is important that the Secretary of State should emphasize to the Sardauna
(in a private session with him) that the quite remarkable progress which has been
made in the last eighteen months in democratising organs of local government in
the North must be continued and carried upwards at the fastest pace which is
compatible with the movement of public opinion in the North. And I believe that the
best judge of how fast, or how slow, that pace should be is the Lieutenant-Governor
of the North himself. He will not wish to go faster with this process than the North
can ‘take’ (without endangering stability or the advances already achieved), but he
will certainly wish to go faster tha some of his principal European advisers think
necessary. I hope to dictate a separate note on this question, and would merely
emphasize here that unless progress continues the North may run the risk of playing
into the hands of ill-disposed and misinformed people not only in Southern Nigeria
but also possibly in London.
10. The Secretary of State will then be left with the question whether H.M.G. is
prepared to give the Southern Regions (I exclude the Cameroons, which is a separate
problem) self-government in 1956, as distinct from the North. Here there seem to
me to be three alternative courses, viz:—
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(a) One answer could be a plain ‘No’, on the ground (which I believe to be well-
founded) that neither the East nor the West will be ready for self-government in
three years’ time; and that to concede it could only result in something not far
short of chaos in administration. If this answer were given, we should certainly
have to face the strong probability of civil disobedience and violence in both
Regions. I have every reason to believe that the authorities in Nigeria could cope
with this situation effectively, and without calling for assistance from outside
Nigeria. The police and military (including reinforcements from the North) would
have to be used on a considerable scale, but if vigorous and prompt action were
taken the situation could no doubt be fairly quickly contained. I discussed this
matter with both the Chief Secretary, the Lieutenant-Governors in the East and
West, and with the Civil Secretary and Commissioner of Police in the East. The
specific question which I put in the East was whether, for example, if Zik himself
had to be arrested and detained, there would be a danger of a general and
prolonged state of dissatisfaction and indeed violence in that Region; and whether
the police could be relied upon. Sir C. Pleass seemed fully confident that the
situation could be handled, and the consensus of opinion was that (as mentioned
above) Nigeria would not have to ask for outside assistance. Senior officials in
Lagos take the view that the number of really dangerous potential trouble makers
in Nigeria are ‘not more than would fill one Hermes’, and that if the worst came to
the worst the arrest and detention of some fifty such people, together with Press
censorship for not much more than a week, would see them over any threat of a
real rising. The vast masses of the population, in spite of Zik’s ‘mystique’ would
soon settle back, with a sense of happy relief, to the important business of making
a living under conditions of good government and stability. They agreed however
that it might be necessary after any initial swoop, to arrest and detain up to
perhaps an additional 2,000 or 3,000 persons for varying periods.
From one point of view this course has attractions, but I am sure that it is out of
the question and I do not think any responsible official in Nigeria would wish to
press it for a moment. It would be purely negative, and H.M.G. could never get
away with it either in the U.K. or before world opinion.
(b) The second alternative would be a policy of ‘gradualism’, or step by step,
which is the line being followed in the Gold Coast. The Secretary of State could
say that he could give no undertaking about self-government in 1956, but that it
would be necessary to proceed stage by stage. I believe, and I hold the view very
strongly, that this course too must be ruled out, as an opening gambit with
Awolowo and Zik. So long as it was being followed it would lead to increased
friction and bitterness, with inevitably a further deleterious effect on the Public
Service, and in the end (which could not be more than a few years off) H.M.G.
would still be forced to concede self-government before the South was ready for
it.
(c) The third alternative, and the one which I suggest the Secretary of State
should be advised to adopt, is the following. He should ask the Action Group and
the N.C.N.C. why they claim self-government in 1956 instead of forthwith. He
should emphasize that there is no reason whatever to suppose that they will be
materially readier for self-government three years hence than now; but that if they
insist on pressing their demand for self-government in 1956 H.M.G. will be
prepared, subject to certain conditions, to concede full Regional self-government
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to them now (i.e. in 1954), to see what they can make of it. The conditions would
have to include:—
(i) satisfactory arrangements with the North as regards communications,
railway, ports etc., and for the establishment of a central organisation to deal
with these and such other matters, e.g. defence, external affairs, which would
remain outside the ambit of purely Regional government. Satisfactory
arrangements would also have to be made for suitably qualified people from all
Regions to have right of entry to institutions such as the University College at
Ibadan and the Technological College, which have been financed partly by C.D.
& W. funds and partly by Central Nigerian funds;
(ii) fair and adequate arrangements to enable expatriate pensionable members
of the Public Service to leave the service of the Eastern and Western Regional
Governments with compensation if they felt unable to tolerate the new condi-
tions and could not be found vacancies in the North or elsewhere in the
Colonial Empire. Those who wished to remain would of course be free to do
so.
The Lieutenant Governors would remain, as H.M.’s representatives, but they
would be ‘constitutional monarchs’, ready to advise if their advice was sought, but
carrying no responsibility at all for good government. The exercise of their
reserved powers would be suspended, and it would have to be made abundantly
clear that the responsibility for success or failure of the experiment would rest
fairly and squarely with the leaders of the party elected to office.
I believe it should also be stated that if the East or West proved quite incapable
of running their own affairs, and chaos ensued, it would be necessary for the clock
to be put back and for Colonial government, possibly with a structure not
dissimilar from that prevailing at present, to be resumed.
As I see it there are many advantages in throwing out this challenge at the
London Conference. It would take the magic out of the date 1956, and would
restore the initiative to H.M.G. If, as is more likely than not, the Action Group and
N.C.N.C. refuse the offer, H.M.G. would be in the highly advantageous position of
being able publicly to state that the majority parties in the East and West had been
offered self-government now but had refused it; and H.M.G. would be in a much
stronger position to adopt a policy of gradualness and to implement it at a really
gradual pace with some hope of carrying it to a reasonably fruitful conclusion. It
would put an end to the uncertainty and unease in the Public Service, and would
provide a really clear cut issue on which General Elections in the East (and the
West) could be fought. If on the other hand the challenge were accepted, and the
electorate in the East and West showed that they supported the Action Group and
N.C.N.C., then of course H.M.G. would have to go through with it. And if chaos
ensued, as it probably would, I believe H.M.G. would be able, say eighteen months
hence, to resume responsibility for the government of the South, and to do so with
the goodwill of the vast majority of the people.
11. After I had reached, in my own mind, during the course of my travels, the
conclusions set out above, I discussed them first with the Chief Secretary on my
return to Lagos, and then with him and Sir J. Macpherson. Mr. Goble was also
present at this final discussion. I may say that both Mr. Benson and Sir J.
Macpherson agreed with me in all broad essentials, except that Sir J, Macpherson
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seemed doubtful whether it would in fact prove possible for H.M.G. to ‘come back’ if
the challenge were accepted and the experiment resulted in chaos. He did not,
however, completely rule out the possibility. Mr. Benson, on the other hand, seemed,
I think, to feel that a come back would be practicable. But they both thought it much
more probable that the challenge would be refused.
12. Sir J. Macpherson naturally said that he would wish to give further
consideration to the foregoing ideas, and to consult with his Lieutenant-Governors
on them as quickly as possible. He may in fact be having a meeting with two if not all
three of them tomorrow, the 3rd July; after which we may expect to receive his
considered views. I emphasized of course that while I might venture, if he saw no
objection, to put forward the results of my thinking in a preliminary way to higher
authority when I got back, what really mattered was that the Secretary of State
should have his (Sir J. Macpherson’s) own recommendations.
13. I should like at this point to emphasize that while I personally believe that
the course suggested in paragraph 10 (c) above presents us with the least undesirable
of the alternatives, I attach much more importance to paragraphs 4 and 8.
14. I will conclude by saying that if any offer of self-government in 1954 were
made and rejected, it would then no doubt be H.M.G’s aim to seek agreement to a
new constitution modelled on Mr. Huijsman’s draft, which was very well received in
Lagos and for which all concerned there were most grateful. We may expect to
receive the Governor’s detailed comments on that draft shortly.
T.B.W.
2.7.53
Sir T. Lloyd
You should see this stimulating minute which Mr. Williamson submitted on return
from his short visit to Nigeria.
I agree with everything that Mr. Williamson says in the first nine paragraphs of his
minute. The statements to be made to-day and to-morrow about the Public Service
in the Gold Coast are likely to have some reassuring effect in Nigeria, but not
enough; and the impressions which Mr. Williamson has recorded in paragraph 4 of
his minute provide yet further evidence of the need to do something on the lines of
the proposals which, at the recent meeting under your chairmanship, it was decided
to submit to the Secretary of State.
The reason for which I have delayed sending Mr. Williamson’s minute forward to
you is that I have found it necessary to think over very carefully the suggestion which
he has put forward in paragraphs 10–13 of his minute that we should, so to speak,
accept the challenge of the demand by Awolowo and Azikiwe for self-government by
1956 by saying that, if they persist in this demand, we shall hand them regional self-
government in 1954.
Mr. Williamson is of course right in saying that this demand for self-government
in 1956 will be the most difficult point with which we will have to deal at the
conference, if it takes place. As Mr. Williamson himself points out, we should clearly
not make up our minds on the line to be taken in response to this demand until we
have the views of the Governor. Subject to that, I have, after very careful thought,
come to the conclusion that I must advise caution. Mr. Williamson’s proposal is
daring and has its attractions. But I see various dangers and disadvantages. Thus:—
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(a) I do not myself believe that either Awolowo or Azikiwe would reject the
challenge. Awolowo might at any rate want to do so, but I am pretty confident that,
rightly or wrongly, he would not feel that it was politically possible for him to do
so.
(b) It seems to me most important that the Secretary of State should, during the
conference, do everything he can to bring it home to Awolowo firstly that the
philosophy which he appears to have swallowed, during his visit to India, that
chaos with self-government is better than order and progress with dependence is
dangerous nonsense; and secondly that self-government is not earned by abusive
attacks on the Queen’s representative and veiled threats of violence or passive
lawlessness, but rather by patient and careful work in building up a machine
which can sustain self-government. The Secretary of State is hardly likely to be
successful in doing this if, wholly irrespective of the readiness of the Eastern and
Western Regions in Nigeria for self-government, he is prepared to offer self-
government as, so to speak, a tactical move in negotiations. We must surely
maintain the position that, whilst doing all we can to bring Colonial territories
forward to self-government, we have some responsibility for satisfying ourselves
that self-government, when it comes, has some chance of being reasonably good
government.
(c) An offer of self-government now in response to irresponsible clamour for self-
government in 1956 by the leaders of the Western and Eastern Regions would, I
suggest, have a very bad effect in the Gold Coast where, in spite of the fact that he
came to power on a cry of ‘self-government now’, Nkrumah has been persuaded to
proceed in an orderly fashion stage by stage, and without demanding that dates be
fixed in advance for each stage.
(d) Mr. Williamson suggests that an offer of self-government in 1954 would
provide a clear-cut issue on which general elections could be fought in the East
and West. I doubt very much whether it would turn out this way; for I do not
believe that any party in either of the Regions of Southern Nigeria would have the
courage to fight an election on a programme of which the main feature was a
proposal to reject such an offer by H.M.G.
(e) I share Sir J. Macpherson’s doubts whether it would prove possible for H.M.G.
to ‘come back’ if the challenge were accepted and the experiment resulted in
chaos. This would of course be possible if in some way we reserved the power to do
so; but if we did that then we should not really be granting self-government but
retaining the Lieut.-Governor’s reserve powers, at any rate in a restricted way. If,
however, no reserve powers are retained, it would be only too easy for the galaxy of
talent which is only too ready to try to make trouble for us in Africa to brand us as
aggressors and to say that the excuse of rescuing the Region in question from
chaos was no more valid than the similar excuse used by Italy when she attacked
Abyssinia. What this really boils down to, I think, is that, if the offer were made at
all, it would have to be made subject to some reservation as regards internal
security.
Subject to further consideration when we have the Governor’s own views, my present
feeling is that the correct response for the Secretary of State to make to a demand for
regional self-government in 1956 in the East and West is to say that, whilst it remains
the policy of H.M.G. to bring Colonial territories forward towards self-government as
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rapidly as circumstances justify, and whilst he does not think that, in matters which
concern individual Regions only, the pace of advance towards self-government in each
Region in Nigeria need necessarily be the pace of the slowest, he is not prepared to
commit himself in advance to any particular date for full internal self-government in
any one Region. This does not mean that he utterly rules out 1956 or indeed any other
date, though he must say that a very considerable increase in the responsibility shown
by political leaders in their public utterances will be needed before he can be persuaded
that the time is ripe for full self-government in any one Region. He might then go on
to say what he is prepared to agree to now (on the lines of the proposals in our mem-
orandum, if they are agreed with Lagos), but make it quite clear that he is satisfied
that for the present the reserve powers and the Lieut.-Governor’s control of the Public
Service, etc. must remain.
If, in response to this line, Awolowo and/or Azikiwe start to organise campaigns of
lawlessness or passive resistance, I am sure we shall be able to deal with the situation
and shall have wide support in doing so. Actually I agree with Mr. Williamson in
thinking that this line is more likely to lead to a period of some strain and friction;
but I fear that that will have to be faced.
W.L.G.B.
9.7.53
Secretary of State
Mr. Williamson returned towards the end of last week from a visit of just over a
fortnight to Nigeria. In the attached minute he has recorded conclusions which he
then reached (and with which he believes the Governor and his principal Advisers to
agree in broad essentials) about the reply to be returned to the demand which Mr.
Awolowo and Dr. Azikiwe will make to you, if a conference with them is held here
next month, for the grant of self-government to Nigeria by 1956.
Mr. Williamson’s main conclusion (see paragraph 10 (c) of his minute) is that if
after questioning by you the two Nigerian political leaders persist in their demand for
self-government in 1956, you should offer on behalf of H.M.G. regional self-
government in the West and South in 1954 on conditions which Mr. Williamson has
set out in detail.
There is no need to attempt final judgment on this now. That can wait for the
Governor’s views on both general policy, and detailed tactics, at the conference.
My own first reaction is definitely against Mr. Williamson’s proposal. The two
Nigerian politicians would, I think, regard it as a psychic opening bid on a weak
hand—a piece of bluff to be fully exploited to their own advantage. They would be
bound as politicians to accept the challenge of such an offer and the very fact that
they had ‘extracted’ it from H.M.G. would be the greatest help to their political and
electioneering prospects in Nigeria. It would also, as Mr. Gorell Barnes has said, have
a bad effect on the Gold Coast and the better tactical line in handling Awolowo and
Azikiwe is, I feel, that suggested in Mr. Gorell Barnes’ last two paragraphs.
This, as I have said, needs no action now and I submit, for information only,
because of the complexity of the problem and the interest of the minutes.
T.K.L.
11.7.53
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223 CO 554/338, no 14 4 July 1953
[Western ministers]: letter from A E T Benson to T B Williamson on
AG attitudes to the reappointment of the Western ministers
Yesterday Gunning sent you copies of the Daily Times and Daily Service, as well as a
copy of Hugo Marshall’s broadcast (at 8 p.m. on Monday, 29th June) about the efforts
we are making to get back Western Ministers to the Centre. Today I send you copies
of yesterday’s Tribune and of today’s. You will remember that the Daily Service is
largely run by Akintola, whereas the Tribune is Awolowo’s own paper and takes its
orders direct from its master.
I think the highlight of all this is exemplified by the second headline of the Daily
Service of the 3rd July, which said: ‘I am to appoint Ministers—Awo’ and the passage
then quoted from Awolowo’s speech in the same paper as follows:—
‘Speaking, therefore, in respect of the three Ministers from among the
commoners in this Region, the responsibility for appointment is not, as he
very wrongly held, that of the Lieutenant-Governor, but mine and mine
alone, after due consultations with our noble and respected Obas.’
This, read in conjunction with the following:—
‘Before I take up the next point, it is, I think, appropriate that some reference
should be made to the Constitutional position as it obtains in analogous case
in the United Kingdom. By the law of Constitution, it is the British Monarch
that appoints all his Ministers.
But by the convention of the Constitution it is the Party in power that in
actual fact makes all the appointments. Even the Prime Minister who is
ostensibly appointed by the Monarch, is in reality an appointee of the majority
party. For, the Monarch cannot, without serious consequences, supersede the
person chosen by the Party in power as its Leader.
I have, in passing, drawn this distinction between the law and the convention
of the Constitution in the United Kingdom, because the Lt. Governor in his
broadcast on this subject glossed over this point, and to that extent misled his
hearers. The point I would like to emphasize is that in his own homeland it is
the spirit or the convention of the Constitution that prevails rather than the
letters thereof.’ 
really gives in a nutshell the whole history of what has happened since the Constitution
was brought into force. The Action Group, notably Awolowo, Bode-Thomas and
Akintola, have consistently arrogated to themselves the right to stick most closely to
the actual letter of the Constitution when it suits them (compare their objections to
the Secretary of State’s action over the Western Regional Local Government Bill), and
to say that what the Constitution actually lays down is of no importance whatsoever
whenever it best suits their book to say that. In other words, the sole interpreter of the
Constitution is Awolowo, and when the Nigerian Constitution doesn’t suit him he fer-
rets round until he finds something either in British usage or in Indian usage or in
French usage, and I have no doubt that if he failed there he would go to Mexican usage,
to justify his interpretation of the Nigerian Constitution.
That and that alone in my view is the reason why we are now in our present
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position. It has been the Action Group, who have deliberately caused the breakdown
by adopting this attitude towards the Constitution, which is responsible: there is no
failure in the Constitution itself, which would have worked if there had been the will
to work it.
At the risk of making this letter too long, I would cite what the Northern Ministers
were saying in an informal meeting of the Council of Ministers yesterday: invariably,
since February, 1952, when the Council of Ministers took a decision which either
Bode-Thomas or Akintola didn’t like as regards the way the Council of Ministers
should vote in the House of Representatives, they either absented themselves on that
particular day from the House altogether, or failed to go with the rest of the
Government through the lobby. There have been three meetings of the House of
Representatives and there are three or four clear cases which can be quoted from
each meeting. The number of cases where they just did not happen to be in the
House at the particular time is, of course, very large. They never actually voted
against the Government. All this is in very sharp contrast to all the Northern and
Eastern Ministers who, on a number of occasions—in fact whenever the occasion
arose—have regularly obeyed their pledge to the Council’s corporate responsibility.
The Northern Ministers were saying this in connection with their repeated
categoric statement yesterday that if Bode-Thomas or Akintola returned to the
Council, they regretfully would immediately leave it. Endeley was there and
associated himself again (after the event in the Joint Council) with this, and said that
he was speaking for both Nwapa and Arikpo also. Nwapa had indeed confirmed the
thing to me the evening before, but left Lagos at crack of dawn yesterday on the news
that his wife had presented him with a daughter.
224 CO 554/236, no 69 10 July 1953
[Local government]: minute by T B Williamson on the reform of local
government in Northern Nigeria
I want to set down, very briefly, the results of various enquiries which I made and
discussions which I had during my recent visit to Nigeria about local government in
the Northern Region. (This is the note promised in paragraph 9 of my minute of 2nd
July on the subject of self-government by 1956.)1
2. Regional Government in the North has, for the last eighteen months, been
conducted under a (largely) ministerial system, Ministers being—broadly speaking—
the elected representatives of the people. This contrasts markedly with the position
of the Native Authorities in the ‘classical’ Emirates of the North, no members of
which are elected. Although, under pressure from the Lieutenant-Governor, some
Native Authorities have recently become more broad based, the position still is that
all members are nominated by the Emirs.
3. At lower levels, however, quite remarkable progress in the direction of more
representative forms of local government has been achieved in the last eighteen
months or so, following the report of the Joint Select Committee of the Northern
Regional Council of the summer of 1951. The present position is summarised in the
progress report produced by Mr. Pott, the present Acting Resident of Kano, which
1 See 222.
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has recently been published and of which African Studies Branch may have sent you
a copy. Much of this progress has, I believe, been due to the initiative of the
Lieutenant-Governor himself.
4. I asked Mr. Pott (and certain other senior officials in the North) when they
thought the time would come for the Emirs’ Councils to become elected bodies. Mr.
Pott’s view, which I think is shared generally by officials in the North, is that it would
be very dangerous for H.M.G. or British officials to state openly that the aim of local
government reform in the North is ultimately to convert the Emirs’ Councils from
nominated to elected bodies. He thinks this would violently upset the Emirs at this
stage, that it might well be misunderstood by the broad masses of the people, and
that it might result in putting the clock back, not forward. He thinks—and I have
little doubt that he is right—that in due time the Native Authorities will become
elected bodies, but that the pressure should come from Nigerians themselves in the
North, and not from the British—anyway openly.
5. Various Northern Nigerians themselves expressed views to me on this subject.
Mallam Abubakar Tafawa Balewa held forth to me at considerable length on the
subject, and urged progress. In the course of his remarks he said, with considerable
bitterness, that in his experience not a single first-class Chief in the North had ever
been brought before a court of law by a British officer for malpractice, although
many Chiefs had been guilty of punishable conduct. (I mentioned this to the
Lieutenant-Governor, who said that while he sympathised with Mallam Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa he thought that much of his bitterness arose from the fact that his
experience was in Bauchi Province where the position had not been improved by a
rather conservative Resident). Party members, including members of the Northern
Regional House of Assembly, & of the N.P.C. in both Kano and Zaria, also urged to
me that the Emirs’ Councils ought to become elective bodies. My general line with
them was to say that if they felt strongly on these matters they should raise them, on
an appropriate occasion, in their own legislature. In the case of the Kano N.P.C.
members I asked what timetable they had in mind for this reform; and was told in
reply that in Kano they would not wish to make any change during the lifetime of the
present Emir (an old man, as you know) who was much liked and respected.2
6. One danger which we face is that the North are, anyway to some extent,
vulnerable to criticism on this question from ill-informed people, both in Southern
Nigeria and even in this country. Progress must continue—and as I suggested in my
earlier note, I think this is a point which the Secretary of State might well put to the
Governor of Nigeria, or the Lieutenant-Governor, North, during the London
conference—but not at such a pace as to jeopardise the advances already made. Mr.
Hudson expressed the view a year or two ago that what the North really needed was a
senior officer, who knew the North and who would go round stimulating progress
wherever progress appeared possible. This suggestion was put to Nigeria but was not
adopted. The position has changed since then because of the appointment of the
Sardauna of Sokoto as Minister of Local Government in the North, and we do not
know what his own views are about the reform of the N.A. Councils themselves. An
opportunity for ascertaining his views, discreetly, may present itself when the
Sardauna comes for his discussion with members of the Local Government Advisory
Panel on the draft Northern Local Government Bill. The proposal is that one of the
2 Alhajji Abdullahi Bayero, Emir of Kano 1926–1953.
13-(Doc179-225)-cp  15/7/01  7:32 am  Page 622
[225] JULY 1953 623
members of the panel (not an official of the Colonial Office) should be requested to
ask the Sardauna one or two gentle questions on this matter so that his views may be
ascertained, but without his knowing that the questions have been prompted by
H.M.G. Mr. Hudson and Mr. Wallis are going to arrange this.
7. One further point. I believe we may be faced at any time, and possibly at very
short notice, with a question by somebody like Mr. Fenner Brockway3 or Mrs. Eirene
White4 on this subject. The former has made a number of references recently to ‘the
feudal, reactionary Emir-ridden North’; and I took the opportunity while I was in
Nigeria of sketching out a draft answer and getting it agreed with officials in the
North and in Lagos in case there were not time to seek telegraphic concurrence if
and when the question were raised here. The draft answer which I prepared, which
would be in reply to a question about, say, the progress of local government in the
North, is as follows:
‘Very rapid, if uneven, progress has been made in the last two years in the
development of representative and elected organs of local government in
Northern Nigeria, particularly at the District, Urban and Outer Council level.
I am placing in the Library of the House a recent Progress Report prepared
for the Northern Regional Government which shows the position in detail.’
This answer avoids explicit reference to the Emirs’ Councils, but supplementary
notes could point out that these Councils contain by nomination the leading repre-
sentatives of the traditional and of the educated elements in the community, and that
some have also recently introduced leading members of the trading community. If the
Secretary of State were pressed on the question of introducing the elective principle
into the N.A. Councils, he would have to say that the time was not yet ripe for this, and
that to attempt to force the pace beyond what the broad mass of the people and their
Chiefs are yet ready for would be to court disaster, and indeed might undo the remark-
able progress that has been achieved, at other levels in so short a time. He could add
that progress, if it is to be lasting, must continue to be evolutionary, not revolution-
ary; and he could point out that the N.A. Councils consider all subjects effecting pol-
icy submitted to them by the elected Outer or District Councils; and that a Minister of
Local Government had recently been appointed.
I am sending copies of this note to Mr. Hudson, Mr. Wallis and Mr. Huijsman.
3 Fenner Brockway, Labour MP for East Leyton, 1929–1931; Labour MP for Eton and Slough, 1950–1964;
chairman of Movement for Colonial Freedom, 1954; cr Baron Brockway, 1964.
4 Eirene White, Labour MP for East Flintshire, 1950–1970; parliamentary undersecretary CO, 1964–1966;
minister of state FO, 1966–1967; minister of state for Wales, 1967–1970.
225 CO 554/262, no 250 15 July 1953
[Constitutional revision]: letter from Sir J Macpherson to W L Gorell
Barnes on CO proposals for revision of the constitution. Enclosure:
Notes on a revised Nigerian constitution
I am most grateful for the memorandum which you sent us under cover of your
secret and personal letter of the 19th June. Your ideas about the main provisions of a
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new Constitution are very much in line with ours, and although there are, naturally,
a number of points in the memorandum on which I have comments to make, I think,
if I may say so, that in view of the complexity of the political situation here, your
people have produced a remarkably useful foundation of what ought to be
encouraged to emerge.
As Williamson will have told you, we have gone through it in detail with him here
and he knows our preliminary views on all the main points. I have, therefore,
thought it unnecessary to send my comments by telegraph. I have also been able to
discuss the paper in general terms with the Lieutenant-Governors of the Eastern and
Western Regions. I now enclose a brief statement of our views on your Notes,
paragraph by paragraph. I should add that not all our comments have been agreed
with the Lieutenant-Governors but I do not want to delay any further my reply to
your letter.
On the question of tactics, we are very much attracted by Williamson’s suggestion
that a strong attempt ought to be made during the London talks—and in fact quite
early in them—to take the wind out of the sails of the ‘Axis’ by taking the ‘magic’ out
of the words ‘self-government in 1956’. As we see it, the Secretary of State will have to
be prepared at the opening of the conference to sit back and listen. He will hear from
the political leaders in turn what defects they consider exist in the present
Constitution which have made it unworkable; and those political leaders will find it
difficult not to go on immediately to tell the Secretary of State what amendments
ought to be made in it in order that it shall work satisfactorily. It is quite inevitable,
we think, that at that stage Awolowo, anyway, will have to say: ‘to make it work until
1956’; and the question of self-government in 1956 will inevitably loom large in the
expositions made both by the Action Group and the N.C.N.C., and probably N.I.P. also
(the last not because they want it, but because there are elections pending in the East
and they must not show themselves to lag behind the N.C.N.C. or the Action Group).
If then the Northerners are called upon to speak, they are going to make it absolutely
clear that the first thing they want is as complete a division of the North from the rest
of Nigeria as is compatible with their economic requirements. In terms of ‘politics’
they want a complete break. They will say at the same time that they have no wish
whatsoever to retard the progress of the South, and that they are only too willing to
permit the South to go its own way towards self-government at any time, provided they
are not called upon to take any part in it. The Constitution must be redrawn, they will
say, in such a way that ‘1956’ has no meaning for the North whatsoever.
At this stage there is likely to be a certain deadlock, and it may be well to have a
slight adjournment. It is immediately after the adjournment, we think, or at any rate
when this stage has been reached, that the Secretary of State will have to make some
points crystal clear; first and foremost, that H.M.G. in the U.K. will not bring any
pressure whatsoever to bear on the North to accept any self-government in Nigeria
which would affect the Northern Region before the North wish it to do so. (This
would not, of course, have any bearing on the importance—regarded as such by the
Northern leaders themselves—of hastening the development of local democratic
government.) It is now, we think, that Williamson’s suggestion, or at any rate
something very near it, should be put into effect. The Secretary of State might say
that he also would not wish that the South should be held back—if it desires and is
ready for self-government—simply because the North does not want it. But if that is
the situation in the South, why not self-government now? What difference between
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self-government in 1956 and self-government now? In any event the handover will
take a certain amount of time and, if H.M.G. is going to agree to self-government in
1956, H.M.G. would have to take that decision now. For the South, therefore, either
as one unit or as two, and they must make up their minds on that question, there can
be no half measures other than those necessary to ensure a smooth handover in the
quickest possible time. In other words, as quickly as possible the organs of
government in the South would be completely Nigerian and, whether or not a
Lieutenant-Governor remained, he would have no reserve powers. The Secretary of
State would have to accompany this by a statement that he would require two
separate guarantees: firstly, that the North’s economic interests were entirely
safeguarded and secondly that the interests of the Public Service were entirely
safeguarded in precisely the same way as Mr. Nkrumah now proposes to safeguard
them in the Gold Coast. More: if the arrangements made in the South went further
than those now proposed for the Gold Coast—viz. the withdrawal of the Public
Service from the Lieutenant-Governor’s control (which the Secretary of State would
regard as essential)—even greater safeguards than those now proposed by Mr.
Nkrumah would be required.
This, we think, would lead on to a frank discussion of the pros and cons for
immediate self-government for the West and East; and the position of the Cameroons
also would certainly be made plain at this stage. Marshall and Pleass think that if
anything in the nature of a firm offer of self-government is so made, the political
leaders would have no alternative but to accept it. Their constant clamour over the
past few years would make it politically impossible for them to refuse. Some of us
here, however, don’t take that view. We believe that the implications of such
acceptance would be so devastating, both to Azikiwe and Awolowo, that they would
realise that the depth of feeling against self-government amongst the farmers and the
townsmen would recoil on their heads.
One thing we are all firmly agreed on: the offer must not be made as a bluff. If the
offer is accepted, H.M.G. must go through with it. But H.M.G. would be going
through with it in the full knowledge
(a) that anything short of this is only postponing the evil day for a few short and
bitter years, during which all the opprobium which can be hurled at H.M.G. and
overseas officers and which has been hurled in the past few years, will be repeated
ad nauseam;
(b) that the angle of descent will be much steeper even than it has been in the
Gold Coast;
(c) that, as Williamson put it, so great a degree of mal-administration, inefficiency
and ineptitude will show itself within eighteen months, that comparison with the
good order and progress over the Northern and Cameroons borders, as well as a
comparison with the good order imposed by us up to now, will provoke a revulsion
of feeling and a demand for the return of British influence.
My belief is that if this line is adopted in the conference room we shall have got rid of
the phrase ‘self-government in 1956’ for all time, and replaced it by the phrase ‘self-
government as soon as practicable.’ And in that atmosphere and as a result of defects
which have been pointed out previously, suggestions for amendments precisely on
the lines of the Colonial Office memorandum will appear to emerge from the
Nigerian representatives at the conference themselves. Whether the Secretary of
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State will be prepared to take the wind out of their sails in this way or not, we believe
that it would be fatal to produce anything like the Colonial Office memorandum
early in the conference or at any time, save as heads for discussion which have
themselves emerged as such in the course of the debate.
Just in the same way it would, we think, be fatal, without bringing the leaders
themselves to suggest it as the next step (and this we think could easily be done
towards the end of the conference) to make the suggestion in your secret and per-
sonal letter of the 27th May of a team of experts to come out to Nigeria. Once
agreement has been reached that all the questions discussed in the Colonial Office
memorandum must be settled (we think it unlikely that agreement on them can
be reached during this particular conference), it will be necessary to make it clear
to the Nigerian delegates that the Secretary of State will require at some stage an
expression of opinion on each point by the people of Nigeria: the North in any
event will insist on this. Whether this expression of opinion is to be given by
Regional Houses or by consultation at meetings on a lower level, there will
inevitably be the need for some such team as you suggest: but at what stage they
should come to Nigeria; or at what stage the conference should discuss the send-
ing of a team of British experts to Nigeria; must, I think, depend on how the con-
ference goes.
Enclosure to 225
(1) BASIC REQUIREMENTS (Para. 2)
We prefer the original wording of sub-paragraph (c)
Add: (d) an efficient Public Service.
(2) TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS (Paras. 4 and 7)
It is agreed that the creation of more Regions should be discouraged but unless (as is
hoped) the Southern Cameroons decide to throw in their lot with the Northern
Region, it will probably be impossible to avoid the creation of something in the
nature of a separate Cameroons Region. But very strong resistance to the idea of an
‘all-Cameroons’ Region is to be expected from the Northern Region and the Northern
Cameroons.
(3) THE FEDERAL CAPITAL (Para. 8)
This is a most contentious subject but it is so important to all three Regions that we
believe it will be impossible to skate over it or to have it discussed as an issue entirely
separate from the rest of the agenda. The solution most likely to be accepted is to
provide for a Federal enclave covering the port area and the principal Federal offices
and institutions. They might, however, agree to something more on the Ottawa
model provided the West agrees to certain guarantees being written into the
constitution.
(4) THE CENTRE (Para. 9)
It is agreed that there must be a Federal Legislature and a Federal Cabinet. (The
North is prepared to accept some form of political authority at the Centre; what it
wants is that any such authority should have an official—British official—majority).
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(5) THE LEGISLATURE (Para. 10)
It is agreed that there should not be a second chamber, and we agree in principle that
the Federal Legislature should be directly elected. There are, however, very great
practical difficulties in the way of such direct elections, and these are seen most
clearly by those with the greatest experience of Nigeria. The difficulties include the
following:—
(i) the great majority of the electorate, particularly in the less sophisticated areas,
would not understand the need for separate elections to the Federal and Regional
Legislatures. A system of election must be basically intelligible. To superimpose
yet another type of election in addition to elections to local government bodies and
to Regional Houses would, at the present stage of political development, lead to
confusion.
(ii) a Centre which got out of tune with the Regions would have a centrifugal
effect and not a unifying effect.
(iii) the number of Nigerians who can think objectively from the point of view of
Nigeria as a whole is at present negligible; direct election to the Centre would
not in itself produce a body of people with Nigerian as opposed to Regional loyal-
ties;
(iv) it would probably be impossible to find men who would be prepared to back
their own judgment without consultation with the Regional legislatures; the idea
that members of legislatures are essentially delegates whose duty it is to seek a
mandate from those whom they represent is very deep rooted.
(v) there are not enough good candidates of the right calibre and the best men
would be drawn to the Regional Legislatures.
(vi) there would be considerable practical difficulties in the formation of
constituencies if the size of the Federal Legislature is to be kept small (vide
paragraph (7) below).
(6) The present proportion in which Regions are represented in the House of
Representatives should, if possible, be retained; the North would agree to nothing
worse than this from their point of view unless there is an official majority. But
difficulties will arise if a separate Cameroons Region is formed.
(7) The Federal Legislature should be kept as small as possible. The total number of
members should not be more than 40, preferably less.
(8) The Lieutenant-Governors should cease to be members, but they ought to be
replaced by the Civil Secretaries. (This is on the assumption that Civil Secretaries
remain members of Regional Executives—see (19) below). The other ex-officio
members should remain, but special members should either vanish or be reduced in
numbers to two or three. (Paragraph 11).
(9) THE CABINET (Para. 12)
The greatest defect from which the present Council of Ministers suffers is that it
contains none of the chief political leaders. The best way of overcoming this
deficiency would be for the Parliamentary leaders of the majority parties in each
Region (or the leaders of Government business in each Region) to be ex officio
Ministers without portfolio in the Federal Cabinet. (They would not be required to
attend frequently). In view of the proposed devolution to the Regions, there will be
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no need for more than three or, at the most, four Nigerian Ministers with portfolio.
The Cabinet should therefore consist of three ex-officio members (Chief Secretary,
Financial Secretary and Attorney-General), three representative Ministers with
portfolio (or four if the Cameroons becomes a separate Region) and three (or four)
‘ex-officio’ Ministers without portfolio. (It may be necessary to have a Cameroons
Minister, without portfolio, even if the Cameroons does not become a separate
Region). The Governor should not, normally, preside though he should be the
nominal president; he would thus be in a much more satisfactory position to make
use of reserve powers. Note also that it might be preferable for the three officials to
be ‘members of the public service, nominated by the Governor, to exercise
responsibility in respect of external affairs and defence, financial matters, and legal
matters’. The title ‘Chief Secretary’ should disappear.
(10) It is agreed that the Governor should be free to appoint the Nigerian members
of the Cabinet from the members of the Federal Legislature, subject to an affirmative
vote of the Legislature; but it must be made crystal clear that this does not imply
nomination by the Legislature. We agree that it will probably be desirable to provide
for more than a single majority: 60 per cent or two-thirds.
(11) Agreed that the votes of not less than two-thirds of the strength of the Federal
Legislature, cast in secret ballot, should be required to revoke the appointment of an
individual Minister or for a motion of no confidence in the Cabinet. In addition to the
powers proposed in the last sentence of paragraph 12, the Governor should have the
right to dismiss any member of the Cabinet who had forfeited his confidence, and to
dismiss the Cabinet if it receives a vote of no confidence by simple majority by secret
ballot in the Federal Legislature. This is necessary to prevent a deadlock such as
arose in the Eastern House of Assembly in February, when the N.C.N.C. majority was
too small to secure the revocation of the appointments of the Ministers but was
enough to prevent the transaction of any Government business.
(12) As regards responsibilities of Ministers, the North may have changed its mind
about granting departmental responsibility to Central Ministers, and would be
certain to oppose it if the present constitution was to remain in force without
significant change. But as nearly all departments are likely to be either under
Regional control or converted into statutory corporations, the question of the grant
of departmental responsibility over the few departments which will still remain
within the jurisdiction of the Centre is unlikely to be a source of serious contention.
(13) Para. 14
Agreed: (but we think the Federal list is too large and that a great deal of what is in
the concurrent list ought to go to the Regional list).
(14) THE REGIONS (Para. 15)
No comments: save that, with respect, we do not think the phrase ‘Regional
autonomy’ is rightly used here. It seems to us that the paragraphs following would
not affect a region’s autonomy.
(15) REGIONAL LEGISLATURES (Para. 16)
Agreed. If a Cameroons Region were established, special provision should be made
for the inclusion of Chiefs in its Legislature. If the Cameroons join the Northern
Region, some of the Chiefs would be found places in the Northern House of Chiefs.
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(16) ELECTIONS (Para. 17)
It is agreed that the present electoral procedures should stand until amended by
Lieutenants-Governors in Council.
(17) The proposals in paragraph 18 regarding separate elections and exclusive
membership of Federal and Regional Legislatures are regarded as desirable, but
there are great practical difficulties, cf. para. 5 above.
(18) It is agreed that we should be prepared to accept elections to both Regional and
Federal Legislatures under widely differing Regional electoral regulations.
(19) REGIONAL EXECUTIVES (Para. 20)
It is agreed that ministerial Departmental responsibility should be conceded to the
Regions: but we feel that this must be accompanied by a clear indication that the
position of the individual departmental officer will not thereby be affected in any way.
As regards the acceptance of all-Nigerian Cabinets in the Regions, the principle
that should be insisted on is that either we retain all the present ex-officio members
or none. What we should steadfastly refuse is to have (as has been proposed by
Awolowo) only one ex-officio member (the Civil Secretary) who would inevitably
become a ‘whipping-boy’. The Lieutenant-Governor should retain his reserve powers
and, by delegation from the Governor, control of the police and control of the public
service.
(20) DIVISION OF JURISDICTION (Para. 22)
Agreed, but the concurrent list should be kept as small as possible. The control and
organisation of Federal and Regional police presents a difficult and complicated
problem, whose solution must not only depend on the arrangements worked out as
regards other subjects, but will, to some extent, condition them.
(21) THE PUBLIC SERVICE (Paras. 23–26)
Agreed. We should be prepared to accept a Regionalisation of the public service, but
as we have said in our covering letter, arrangements similar to those guaranteed in
the Gold Coast, must be made if this is to happen. There would be, in addition, a
Federal Service.
(22) THE JUDICIARY (Para. 26)
In view of the strength of Northern feeling on this matter, it will almost certainly be
necessary for the Judiciary to be Regionalised.
(23) INTERPRETATION (Paras. 27–28)
If possible we should avoid giving the Courts jurisdiction over the interpretation of
the Constitution and constitutional disputes. The considerations which led us to
avoid this when the present Constitution was formed still apply, namely, the
probability of prolonged litigation and endless delays. Interpretation should either
remain a matter for the Governor or should be for the Secretary of State.
(24) FINANCE (Paras. 29–33)
The financial relations between the Federal and Regional Governments is not a
subject suitable for discussion at the London conference. It is, of course, vital but the
answer must be that a special investigation will be necessary.
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